Unit 3
you will focus on Hurricane Katrina. Review the “Executive Summary and Investigation Overview” (pp. 1–26) in the Katrina report, A Failure of Imitative
Based on your review of the “Executive Summary and Investigation Overview,” write a 3- to 5-page paper that describes how you would have applied the 4 incident management principles of: 1) mitigation, 2) preparedness, 3) response, and 4) recovery, to make effective decisions during the Katrina emergency.
Explain why you would have taken the approach. What would the results have been had your approach been implemented during Katrina?
Turn it in will be used. Please follow assignment guidelines
HM500: Crisis and Emergency Management Fundamentals
Unit 3 Assignment 2
For this Assignment, you will focus on Hurricane Katrina. Review the Executive Summary and Investigation Overview (pp. 1–26) in the Katrina report.
A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response of Hurricane Katrina: GPO U.S. Government Publishing Office. Retrieved from
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?browsePath=109/HRPT/%5B300%3B399%5D&granuleId=CRPT-109hrpt377&packageId=CRPT-109hrpt377
Based on your review of the Executive Summary and Investigation Overview, write a 3–5 page paper that describes how you would have applied the four incident management principles of: 1) Mitigation, 2) Preparedness, 3) Response, and 4) Recovery, to make effective decisions during the Katrina emergency.
Explain why you would have taken the approach. What would the results might have been had your approach been implemented during Katrina?
Note: This Assignment will require outside research. Use at least two credible sources beyond the text material and discuss how you evaluated the credibility of the resources used.
You may consult the Library, the internet, the textbook, other course material, and any other outside resources in supporting your task, using proper citations in APA style.
Directions for Submitting Your Assignment
Compose your paper in a Microsoft Word document and save it with a name you will remember. Be sure to include your name, class, and section number. Submit your Assignment by selecting the
Unit 3: Assignment 2 Dropbox by the end of Unit 3
.
Checklist for Unit 3 Assignment
|
Criteria: Ask yourself the following questions. |
Not Yet |
Yes |
|
Content |
||
|
Did you review the Executive Summary and Investigation Overview (pp. 1–26) in the Katrina report? |
||
|
Did you identify the four phases of Emergency Management Principles? |
||
|
Did you describe how you would have applied the four incident management principles to the Katrina emergency? |
||
|
Did you explain why you would have taken the approach you described? |
||
|
Did you explain the results that might have been had your approach been implemented during Katrina? |
||
|
Research |
||
|
Did you use at least |
||
|
Is your research |
||
|
Did you use appropriate |
||
|
Did you discuss how you evaluated the credibility of the resources used? |
||
|
Quality |
||
|
Is your content |
||
|
Is there a |
||
|
Did you present the material in a |
||
|
Format |
||
|
Did you prepare your paper in Word®? |
||
|
Did you |
||
|
Did you use |
||
|
Did you check your document for |
||
|
Did your presentation meet the 3–5 page length requirements? |
A FAILURE
O
F I
N
ITIATIVE 1
The Select Committee identifi ed failures at all levels of
government that signifi cantly undermined and detracted
from the heroic efforts of fi rst responders, private
individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and
others.
The institutional and individual failures we have
identifi ed became all the more clear when compared to
the heroic efforts of those who acted decisively. Those
who didn’t fl inch, who took matters into their own
hands when bureaucratic inertia was causing death,
injury, and suffering. Those whose exceptional initiative
saved time and money and lives.
We salute the exceptions to the rule, or, more
accurately, the exceptions that proved the rule. People
like Mike Ford, the owner of three nursing homes who
wisely chose to evacuate his patients in Plaquemines
Parish before Katrina hit, due in large part to his close
and long-standing working relationship with Jesse St.
Amant, Director of the Plaquemines Offi ce of Emergency
Preparedness.
People like Dr. Gregory
H
enderson, a pathologist
who showed that not all looting represented lawlessness
when, with the aid of New Orleans police offi cers, he
raided pharmacies for needed medication and supplies
and set up ad hoc clinics in downtown hotels before
moving on to the Convention Center.
But these acts of leadership were too few and far
between. And no one heard about or learned from them
until it was too late.
The preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina show we are still an analog government in a
digital age. We must recognize that we are woefully
incapable of storing, moving, and accessing information
– especially in times of crisis.
Many of the problems we have identifi ed can be
categorized as “information gaps” – or at least problems
with information-related implications, or failures to act
decisively because information was sketchy at best. Better
information would have been an optimal weapon against
Katrina. Information sent to the right people at the
right place at the right time. Information moved within
agencies, across departments, and between jurisdictions of
EXECUTIVE SUMMAR
Y
OF FINDINGS
government as well. Seamlessly. Securely. Effi ciently.
Unfortunately, no government does these things well,
especially big governments.
The federal government is the largest purchaser of
information technology in the world, by far. One would
think we could share information by now. But Katrina
again proved we cannot.
We refl ect on the 9/11 Commission’s fi nding that
“the most important failure was one of imagination.”
The Select Committee believes Katrina was primarily
a failure of initiative. But there is, of course, a nexus
between the two. Both imagination and initiative – in
other words, leadership – require good information. And
a coordinated process for sharing it. And a willingness to
use information – however imperfect or incomplete – to
fuel action.
With Katrina, the reasons reliable information did
not reach more people more quickly are many, and these
reasons provide the foundation for our fi ndings.
In essence, we found that while a national emergency
management system that relies on state and local
governments to identify needs and request resources
is adequate for most disasters, a catastrophic disaster
like Katrina can and did overwhelm most aspects of the
system for an initial period of time. No one anticipated
the degree and scope of the destruction the storm would
cause, even though many could and should have.
The failure of local, state, and federal governments
to respond more effectively to Katrina — which had
been predicted in theory for many years, and forecast
with startling accuracy for fi ve days — demonstrates that
whatever improvements have been made to our capacity
to respond to natural or man-made disasters, four and
half years after 9/11, we are still not fully prepared. Local
fi rst responders were largely overwhelmed and unable
to perform their duties, and the National Response
Plan did not adequately provide a way for federal assets
to quickly supplement or, if necessary, supplant fi rst
responders.
The failure of initiative was also a failure of agility.
Response plans at all levels of government lacked
fl exibility and adaptability. Infl exible procedures often
2 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
delayed the response. Offi cials at all levels seemed to
be waiting for the disaster that fi t their plans, rather
than planning and building scalable capacities to
meet whatever Mother Nature threw at them. We
again encountered the risk-averse culture that pervades
big government, and again recognized the need for
organizations as agile and responsive as the 21st century
world in which we live.
One-size-fi ts-all plans proved impervious to clear
warnings of extraordinary peril. Category 5 needs
elicited a Category 1 response. Ours was a response that
could not adequately accept civilian and international
generosity, and one for which the Congress, through
inadequate oversight and accounting of state and local
use of federal funds, must accept some blame.
In crafting our fi ndings, we did not guide
the facts. We let the facts guide us. The Select
Committee’s report elaborates on the following
fi ndings, which are summarized in part here, in the
order in which they appear:
The accuracy and timeliness of
National Weather Service and
National Hurricane Center forecasts
prevented further loss of life
The Hurricane Pam exercise
refl ected recognition by all levels
of government of the dangers of a
catastrophic hurricane striking
New Orleans
■ Implementation of lessons learned from
Hurricane Pam was incomplete.
Levees protecting New Orleans
were not built for the most severe
hurricanes
■ Responsibilities for levee operations and maintenance
were diffuse.
■ The lack of a warning system for breaches and other
factors delayed repairs to the levees.
■ The ultimate cause of the levee failures is under
investigation, and results to be determined.
The failure of complete evacuations
led to preventable deaths, great
suffering, and further delays in relief
■ Evacuations of general populations went relatively
well in all three states.
■ Despite adequate warning 56 hours before landfall,
Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a
mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours
before
landfall.
■ The failure to order timely mandatory evacuations,
Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the
remaining population, and decisions of individuals
led to an incomplete evacuation.
■ The incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to
deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and horrible
conditions for those who remained.
■ Federal, state, and local offi cials’ failure to anticipate
the post-landfall conditions delayed post-landfall
evacuation and support.
Critical elements of the National
Response Plan were executed late,
ineffectively, or not at all
■ It does not appear the President received adequate
advice and counsel from a senior disaster
professional.
■ Given the well-known consequences of a major
hurricane striking New Orleans, the Secretary should
have designated an Incident of National Signifi cance
no later than Saturday, two days prior to landfall,
when the National Weather Service predicted
New Orleans would be struck by a Category 4 or
5 hurricane and President Bush declared a federal
emergency.
■ The Secretary should have convened the Interagency
Incident Management Group on Saturday, two
days prior to landfall, or earlier to analyze Katrina’s
potential consequences and anticipate what the
federal response would need to accomplish.
■ The Secretary should have designated the Principal
Federal Offi cial on Saturday, two days prior to
landfall, from the roster of PFOs who had successfully
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 3
completed the required training, unlike then-
FEMA
Director Michael Brown. Considerable confusion was
caused by the Secretary’s PFO decisions.
■ A proactive federal response, or push system, is not a
new concept, but it is rarely utilized.
■ The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic
Incident Annex to direct the federal response posture
to fully switch from a reactive to proactive mode of
operations.
■ Absent the Secretary’s invocation of the Catastrophic
Incident Annex, the federal response evolved into a
push system over several days.
■ The Homeland Security Operations Center failed
to provide valuable situational information to the
White House and key operational offi cials during the
disaster.
■ The White House failed to de-confl ict varying
damage assessments and discounted information that
ultimately proved accurate.
■ Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees
of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities
under the National Response Plan and National
Incident Management System.
■ Once activated, the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact enabled an unprecedented level
of mutual aid assistance to reach the disaster area in a
timely and effective manner.
■ Earlier presidential involvement might have resulted
in a more effective
response.
DHS and the states were not prepared
for this catastrophic event
■ While a majority of state and local preparedness
grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this
does not preclude a dual use application.
■ Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was
not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of
Hurricane Katrina.
■ DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and
experienced staff for the Katrina
response.
■ The readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response
teams was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of
the federal response.
Massive communications damage
and a failure to adequately plan
for alternatives impaired response
efforts, command and control, and
situational awareness
■ Massive inoperability had the biggest effect on
communications, limiting command and control,
situational awareness, and federal, state, and local
offi cials’ ability to address unsubstantiated media
reports.
■ Some local and state responders prepared for
communications losses but still experienced
problems, while others were caught unprepared.
■ The National Communication System met many of
the challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina, enabling
critical communication during the response, but
gaps in the system did result in delayed response and
inadequate delivery of relief supplies.
Command and control was impaired
at all levels, delaying relief
■ Lack of communications and situational awareness
paralyzed command and control.
■ A lack of personnel, training, and funding also
weakened command and control.
■ Ineffective command and control delayed many relief
efforts.
The military played an invaluable role,
but coordination was lacking
■ The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident
Annex as written would have delayed the active duty
military response, even if it had been implemented.
■ DOD/DHS coordination was not effective during
Hurricane Katrina.
■ DOD, FEMA, and the state of Louisiana had diffi culty
coordinating with each other, which slowed the
response.
■ National Guard and DOD response operations were
comprehensive, but perceived as slow.
4 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
■ The Coast Guard’s response saved many lives, but
coordination with other responders could improve.
■ The Army Corps of Engineers provided critical
resources to Katrina victims, but pre-landfall contracts
were not adequate.
■ DOD has not yet incorporated or implemented
lessons learned from joint exercises in military
assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed
for a more effective response to Katrina.
■ The lack of integration of National Guard and active
duty forces hampered the military response.
■ Northern Command does not have adequate insight
into state response capabilities or adequate interface
with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual
understanding and trust during the Katrina response.
■ Even DOD lacked situational awareness of post-
landfall conditions, which contributed to a slower
response.
■ DOD lacked an information sharing protocol that
would have enhanced joint situational awareness and
communications between all military components.
■ Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked
joint training, which contributed to the lack of
coordination between active duty components.
■ Joint Task Force Katrina, the National Guard,
Louisiana, and Mississippi lacked needed
communications equipment and the interoperability
required for seamless on-the-ground coordination.
■ EMAC processing, pre-arranged state compacts, and
Guard equipment packages need improvement.
■ Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected
the National Guard response.
■ Search and rescue operations were a tremendous
success, but coordination and integration between
the military services, the National Guard, the Coast
Guard, and other rescue organizations was lacking.
The collapse of local law enforcement
and lack of effective public
communications led to civil unrest
and further delayed relief
■ A variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence
in hurricane stricken areas.
■ The New Orleans Police Department was ill-prepared
for continuity of operations and lost almost all
effectiveness.
■ The lack of a government public communications
strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated
public concerns and further delayed relief.
■ EMAC and military assistance were critical for
restoring law and order.
■ Federal law enforcement agencies were also critical to
restoring law and order and coordinating activities.
Medical care and evacuations suffered
from a lack of advance preparations,
inadequate communications, and
diffi culties coordinating efforts
■ Deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not
proactive.
■ Poor planning and pre-positioning of medical
supplies and equipment led to delays and shortages.
■ New Orleans was unprepared to provide evacuations
and medical care for its special needs population
and dialysis patients, and Louisiana offi cials lacked a
common defi nition of “special needs.”
■ Most hospital and Veterans Affairs Medical Center
emergency plans did not offer concrete guidance
about if or when evacuations should take place.
■ New Orleans hospitals, Veterans Affairs Medical
Center, and medical fi rst responders were not
adequately prepared for a full evacuation of medical
facilities.
■ The government did not effectively coordinate private
air transport capabilities for the evacuation of medical
patients.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 5
■ Hospital and Veterans Affairs Medical Center
emergency plans did not adequately prepare for
communication needs.
■ Following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans Veterans
Affairs Medical Center and hospitals’ inability to
communicate impeded their ability to ask for help.
■ Medical responders did not have adequate
communications equipment or operability.
■ Evacuation decisions for New Orleans nursing homes
were subjective and, in one case, led to preventable
deaths.
■ Lack of electronic patient medical records contributed
to diffi culties and delays in medical treatment of
evacuees.
■ Top offi cials at the Department at Health and Human
Services and the National Disaster Medical System
do not share a common understanding of who
controls the National Disaster Medical System under
Emergency Support Function-8.
■ Lack of coordination led to delays in recovering dead
bodies.
■ Deployment confusion, uncertainty about mission
assignments, and government red tape delayed
medical care.
Long-standing weaknesses and
the magnitude of the disaster
overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to
provide emergency shelter and
temporary housing
■ Relocation plans did not adequately provide
for shelter. Housing plans were haphazard and
inadequate.
■ State and local governments made inappropriate
selections of shelters of last resort. The lack of a
regional database of shelters contributed to an
ineffi cient and ineffective evacuation and sheltering
process.
■ There was inappropriate delay in getting people out
of shelters and into temporary housing – delays that
offi cials should have foreseen due to manufacturing
limitations.
■ FEMA failed to take advantage of
the Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s expertise in large-
scale housing challenges.
FEMA logistics and contracting
systems did not support a targeted,
massive, and sustained provision of
commodities
■ FEMA management lacked situational awareness of
existing requirements and of resources in the supply
chain. An overwhelmed logistics system made it
challenging to get supplies, equipment, and personnel
where and when needed.
■ Procedures for requesting federal assistance raised
numerous concerns.
■ The failure at all levels to enter into advance contracts
led to chaos and the potential for waste and fraud as
acquisitions were made in haste.
■ Before Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of
suffi ciently trained procurement professionals. DHS
procurement continues to be decentralized and
lacking a uniform approach, and its procurement
offi ce was understaffed given the volume and dollar
value of work.
■ Ambiguous statutory guidance regarding local
contractor participation led to ongoing disputes over
procuring debris removal and other services.
■ Attracting emergency contractors and corporate
support could prove challenging given the scrutiny
that companies have endured.
Contributions by charitable
organizations assisted many in need,
but the American Red Cross and
others faced challenges due to the size
of the mission, inadequate logistics
capacity, and a disorganized shelter
process
6 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“We were abandoned. City offi cials did nothing to protect us. We were
told to go to the Superdome, the Convention Center, the interstate bridge
for safety. We did this more than once. In fact, we tried them all for
every day over a week. We saw buses, helicopters and FEMA trucks, but
no one stopped to help us. We never felt so cut off in all our lives. When
you feel like this you do one of two things, you either give up or go into
survival mode. We chose the latter. This is how we made it. We slept
next to dead bodies, we slept on streets at least four times next to human
feces and urine. There was garbage everywhere in the city. Panic and
fear had taken over.”
Patricia Thompson
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 20051
A
P
P
H
O
T
O
/E
R
IC
G
A
Y
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall near the Louisiana-
Mississippi border on the morning of August 29, 2005, it
set in motion a series of events that exposed vast numbers
of Americans to extraordinary suffering. Not only would
Katrina become the most expensive natural disaster in U.S.
history, it would also prove to be one of the deadliest.
From the marshes of Louisiana’s Plaquemines Parish
to the urban center of New Orleans to the coastal
communities of Mississippi and Alabama, Katrina cut an
enormous swath of physical destruction, environmental
devastation, and human suffering.
With the overtopping and breaching of the New
Orleans levees, the vast majority of the city became
submerged, requiring the emergency evacuation of tens
of thousands of residents who had not left prior to the
storm. Lifted off roofs by helicopters or carried to safety in
boats, they were taken to the Superdome, the Convention
Center, a piece of high ground known as the Cloverleaf, or
any other dry spot in the city.
At these locations, they were subjected to unbearable
conditions: limited light, air, and sewage facilities in the
Superdome, the blistering heat of the sun, and in many
cases limited food and water. They feared for their safety
and survival — and the survival of their city.
“You had people living where people aren’t supposed
to live,” said Dr. Juliette Saussy, Director of New Orleans
Emergency Medical Services, referring to the dire
situations in the Superdome and Convention Center. “In
general, people were just trying to survive. Some people
acted badly. But most just wanted something to eat and
drink, and wanted to feel safe.”2
At least 1,100 Louisianans died as a result of Katrina.
Mississippians have understandably felt slighted that the
devastation to their state has received less national public
attention than New Orleans. Mississippi experienced a
different storm than Louisiana — in essence, a massive,
blender-like storm surge versus the New Orleans fl ooding
caused by breached and overtopped levees.
By the end of the day on August 29, due largely to
a storm surge that reached 34 feet in the western parts
of the state — and extended inland as far as 10 miles
— more than half of Mississippi was without power and
had suffered serious wind and water damage. In addition
to the surge, high winds and tornadoes left thousands of
homes damaged and destroyed, and as many as 66,000
Mississippians were displaced from their homes.
INVESTIGATION OVERVIEW
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 7
F
E
M
A
8 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Katrina completely fl attened entire neighborhoods in
communities such as Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Pass
Christian, but its damage was not limited to those who
lived closest to the Gulf of Mexico. Even well inland, there
is no debate over whether homes may be habitable or
not. They just aren’t there anymore. In these towns, brick
walkways and front porches lead up to . . . nothing. Just a
concrete slab where a house used to stand.
The storm careened upwards through the entire state
with hurricane force winds and tornados, reaching
Jackson, the state capital, and its northern most counties,
and transforming 28,000 square miles — or 60 percent of
the state — into a catastrophic disaster area. By the time
the storm had passed, at least 230 people were dead and
nearly 200,000 people were displaced from their homes.
Agricultural, forestry, gaming, and poultry industries were
severely damaged. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) reports estimate Veterinary Medical Assistant
Teams disposed of over three million chickens that were
destroyed by the storm.
While winds upon landfall
were not as powerful as those
of Hurricane Camille in
1969, Katrina was in many
ways the “perfect storm”
for coastal Mississippi.
The combination of high
winds, extraordinarily low
barometric pressure, and
arrival during a high tide resulted in a storm surge nearly
twice that of Camille’s. Wind-whipped water fl ooded
towns not only from the south, but from the north — not
just from the Gulf, but from the bayous.
This was not a tsunami-like, single wave of destruction.
This was a sustained, ever-growing high tide, one that
kept coming for hours. And when the water did roar back
toward the Gulf, it took everything with it — furniture,
pool tables, refrigerators, 30-foot boats, countless
household items. Everything that was once inside was
suddenly outside.
“Even the very accurate forecasts didn’t capture the
magnitude and devastation,” said Eddie Favre, Mayor of
Bay St. Louis. “It was the in and out of the surge that killed
us. The out, in particular. It carried everything away.”3
“Our infrastructure was devastated,” Gulfport Mayor
Brent Warr said. “The water came in, blew off manhole
covers, then receded and caused a vacuum, sucking gators
and DVD players and lots and lots of sand into water and
sewer pipes. You couldn’t have backed a truck up to a
manhole cover and dumped it in more effectively.”4
Out on his converted shrimp boat on the evening
following Katrina’s landfall, Rep. Gene Taylor, whose
home was destroyed, recalls seeing complete and utter
devastation on the ground and a telling sight in the air.
“Birds were so tired all they could do was hold their wings
out and soar on the wind,” he said. “Our seagulls, if I had
to guess, ended up in Arkansas.”5
Very little wildlife remains evident in the storm-ravaged
areas. National Guardsman stationed in Louisiana said
they rarely see any pelicans or alligators any more. There
are few shrimp boats working the Gulf, and elected
offi cials in Mississippi guess it will take two years for the
state’s oyster industry to begin to recover.
Areas presumed to be fl ood-proof, like the
Diamondhead community — built after Hurricane Camille,
miles north Bay of St. Louis — suffered fl ood damage.
Wind shifts “caused a lot of areas considered safe to
be fl ooded, like the town of DeLisle, where my district
director’s brother lives,” Taylor said on a tour bus with
Select Committee Members in January. “His house was
pancaked. When he came home and tried to crawl in to
see what he could salvage, he ended up face to face with
an alligator. He ended up shooting the thing. People got
mad because they were hungry and he let the alligator rot
in his front yard.”6
“It was the in and out of the surge that
killed us. The out, in particular.
It carried everything away.”
STAFF PHOTO
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 9
While only two hurricane-related deaths were reported
in Alabama, Katrina caused signifi cant damage along its
coast with a wave surge of 13.5 feet, exceeding the 100-
year fl ood level of 12 feet, despite the fact that the state
did not suffer a direct hit from the hurricane. Bayou La
Batre and Dauphin Island received the brunt of the storm
in Alabama, losing 800 and 200 homes, respectively. The
storm caused wind damage as far north as Tuscaloosa
County. Mobile Bay spilled into downtown and fl ooded
large sections of the city, destroying hundreds of homes.
The sheer power of the storm dislodged a nearby oil
drilling platform, which became caught under the U.S.
Highway 98 bridge.
The overall toll from the devastation is still being
tallied. At the time this report was issued, more than
3,000 people from storm-affected states remained
unaccounted for.
During the most recent fact-fi nding trip to the Gulf
coast in late January 2006, Members and staff of the Select
Committee were shocked by the level of devastation and
slow pace of cleanup. So many towns, cities, and parishes
remain almost entirely empty.
A throbbing metropolis of 470,000 before the storm,
New Orleans had become at the time of our writing a
struggling city that is home to barely 100,000 people—
although offi cials say that fi gure almost doubles for now
during the daytime, when contractors and employees
come into the city to work.
Signifi cant portions of the city and region
remain uninhabitable. In St. Bernard Parish,
a few miles east of downtown New Orleans,
only four houses did not suffer catastrophic
damage from wind, rain, or the sudden fl ood
that resulted from the breaking of the levees
of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal
(MR-GO). The parish, once home to nearly
70,000 people, has seen its population dip to
about 7,000, with nearly all of those people
living in temporary housing.
In all of the affected communities, the
local economies remain on the brink of
disaster, fearful of another punch that
would surely be the knockout blow. In
Mississippi, Hancock County lost 64 percent
of its real property value. In Bay St. Louis
and Waveland, the fi gure is estimated to be
closer to 90 percent.
Investigative context: an overview
It’s been said that experience is the best teacher. The
unfortunate thing is that the learning process is sometimes
such a painful one.
This report is the result of a fi ve-month journey by the
Select Committee to gather information from all those
who learned painful lessons during Katrina. It examines
how well local, state, and federal offi cials worked with
each other and with private entities to alleviate the
suffering of so many of our fellow citizens.
In crafting an investigative plan, the
Select Committee
faced and overcame several challenges. We had to
appoint Members quickly and rely on other committees
to detail staff to the Select Committee. We had to move
quickly, while memories and evidence were fresh. We had
to gather as much information as we could while leaving
time to write and design a consensus report before our
February 15, 2006 deadline. We had to remain focused
on our prescribed “right-before-and-right-after-the-
storm” timeframe, despite signifi cant interest in longer-
term issues and challenges. Like juggling with knives,
we had to keep multiple investigative elements in play
simultaneously — preparing for and holding high-profi le
public hearings; requesting, receiving, and reviewing
documents; and conducting interviews and briefi ngs.
And all this had to be done in a less-than-ideal
political atmosphere.
F
E
M
A
10 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The Select Committee remains grateful to those
Democrats who chose to participate in our investigation
in defi ance of their leadership’s decision not to appoint
Members offi cially to the panel. The refusal by the
Minority Leader was self-defeating, given that the Select
Committee’s composition and minority subpoena
authority would have given the Democrats more clout
than they enjoy on any standing committee of the House.
Despite this strategy, the Select Committee’s review and
the creation of this report have been bipartisan endeavors
in spirit and in fact.
On September 15, before the Select Committee was
established by a bipartisan House vote, the Government
Reform Committee held a hearing on the early lessons
learned from Katrina. At that hearing, the Committee’s
Ranking Member, Rep. Henry Waxman, said there were
“two steps we should take right away.”7
First, he said, we should request basic documents from
the agencies. And second, he said, “We need to hear from
Michael Brown and Michael Chertoff. These are the two
government offi cials most responsible for the inadequate
response, and the Committee should call them to testify
without delay.”8
The Select Committee did not delay. We met and
exceeded those goals. While many who so urgently called
on Congress to swiftly investigate refused to participate
and instead prejudged our efforts, we investigated
aggressively what went wrong and what went right.
The Select Committee continuously invited any and
all interested Democrats to join our hearings, giving
them full and equal opportunity to make statements and
question witnesses and help guide the direction of our
inquiry, including identifying and inviting witnesses. Five
Democratic members did just that: Representative Charlie
Melancon, Representative Gene Taylor, Representative
Bill Jefferson, Representative Cynthia McKinney, and
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee. Document requests
submitted to federal, state, and local agencies were signed
by both Chairman Davis and Rep. Melancon.
In addition to direct
member participation,
Democratic Members
and staff were
assigned to travel
with Republican
Members and staff to
the affected locales,
and Rep. Waxman’s
top Government
Reform Committee
investigative staff
assisted Democratic
participants. Finally,
Democratic members were repeatedly invited to offer
narrative text and fi ndings for inclusion in this report.
The Select Committee, beyond extending these
courtesies, remained focused on the job of Congress.
In our system of checks and balances, the Congress has
both the duty and the obligation to ask tough questions.
We did not believe it was appropriate to outsource our
congressional oversight responsibility. The American
people did not want us to punt. They wanted answers,
and they wanted them quickly. If there is a consensus
down the road to establish an outside commission, which
some purportedly wanted, so be it. The two were not and
are not mutually exclusive. However, a commission will
take months to set up, and an eternity to fi nish its work.
We needed to begin immediately, while evidence and
memories were fresh.
News reports and other statements suggested many
Democrats felt the same. For example, Bloomberg News
reported in November that “Some House Democrats Want
[a] Larger Role in Katrina Investigation.”9 In that report,
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
A
P
P
H
O
T
O
/D
E
N
N
IS
C
O
O
K
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 11
Rep. Gene Taylor said, “It’s really important that we’re
there. I certainly wish more of my colleagues who are
interested in this would participate . . . . Mr. Davis, to his
credit, has been extremely fair.”
Rep. Maxine Waters, who had told Chairman Davis she
wanted to participate but later said she could not, told
Bloomberg, “I feel a certain void and a great absence from
these discussions. I was hoping that our leaders could a
fi nd a way . . . so we could participate.”10
Rep. Neil Abercrombie said he unsuccessfully expressed
interest in serving on the committee. “The position of
Ms. Pelosi and the leadership is pretty clear,” he said.
“I have a different view.”11
Democrats who did
buck their leadership
have acknowledged
both the value of their
participation and the
eagerness of the Select
Committee to have
them participate. Rep.
Cynthia McKinney
expressed her regret
about the Democrats’
failure to offi cially
appoint Members to
the Committee while
thanking Chairman Davis
for convening a hearing
on December 6th featuring testimony from African-
American residents and evacuees:
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
allowing us to have this day. Because were it left up
to — I will get in trouble now. But were it left up
to the Democratic leadership, we would not have
had this day, because we wouldn’t be here. The
Democratic leadership has instructed us to boycott
this panel…. So I would like to thank my Chairman
for giving us the opportunity to invite people who
don’t have the opportunity to come and testify
before Congress…. We are here to serve all of the
people of this country, and too rarely do we hear
from all of the people.12
Regardless of who did or did not participate in our
investigation, the Select Committee had a job to do, and
we were determined to do it right.
Hearing chronology: an overview
The Select Committee held nine hearings over the course
of approximately three months. Select Committee
Members and staff simultaneously conducted scores
of interviews and received dozens of briefi ngs from
local, state, and federal offi cials; non-governmental
organizations; private companies and individuals who
provided or offered external support after Katrina; and
hurricane victims. Select Committee Members and staff
traveled numerous times to the Gulf Coast. The Select
Committee also requested and received more than
500,000 pages of documents from a wide array of sources.
The information gleaned from our investigation
is provided in detailed, narrative form in subsequent
chapters. What follows here is a brief synopsis of the topics,
questions, and themes raised at each of our hearings:
“Predicting Hurricanes:
What We Knew About Katrina and When”
September 22, 2005 Select Committee hearing
The Select Committee began at a logical place: a hearing
to establish a record of who was told what, and when,
about the nature of the hurricane in the days immediately
before the storm. We explored the timeline of Katrina
progressing from a tropical depression to a major
hurricane, and asked when warnings were issued to
the public and to federal, state, and local offi cials. We
reaffi rmed what we already suspected — at least two
federal agencies passed Katrina’s test with fl ying colors:
the National Weather Service (NWS) and the National
Hurricane Center.
Many who escaped the storm’s wrath owe their lives to
these agencies’ accuracy. This hearing provided a backdrop
for the remainder of our inquiry. We repeatedly tried to
determine how government could respond so ineffectively
to a disaster that was so accurately forecast.
How accurately?
■ Storm-track projections released to the public 56
hours before Katrina came ashore were off by only 15
miles. The average 48-hour error is 160 miles, and the
average 24-hour error is 85 miles.
■ The Hurricane Center’s predicted strength for Katrina
at landfall, two days before the storm hit, was off the
mark by only 10 miles per hour.
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
12 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
■ NWS Director Max Mayfi eld personally spoke by
telephone with the governors of Mississippi and
Louisiana and the mayor of New Orleans two days
prior to landfall to warn them of what was coming.
He also gave daily pre-storm video briefi ngs to
federal offi cials in Washington, including top Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DHS
brass.
■ The day before Katrina hit, the NWS offi ce in
Slidell, Louisiana issued a warning saying, “MOST
OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR
WEEKS…PERHAPS LONGER…HUMAN SUFFERING
INCREDIBLE BY MODERN STANDARDS.”
The Select Committee determined — despite more
recently revised reports that Katrina was actually a strong
Category 3 storm at landfall, not a Category 4 — that
Katrina’s strength and the potential disaster it could bring
were made clear well in advance through briefi ngs and
formal advisories. Inadequate response could not be
blamed on lack of advance warning.
“Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency”
September 27, 2005 Select Committee hearing
This hearing featuring former FEMA
Director Michael
Brown attempted to construct a timeline of what FEMA
did and did not do before, during, and after Katrina made
landfall.
Fair or not, by the time of this hearing, FEMA in general
and Brown in particular had become the symbol of all that
went wrong with the government’s response to Katrina.
By the September 27 hearing date, with the emergence
of Hurricane Rita, the Select Committee had the ability to
compare and contrast disaster response actions after the
two storms. While Rita was predicted to be a very different
storm from Katrina — a mere size Large compared to a size
XXXL, and a storm that struck a far less densely populated
area — it was immediately clear that governments at all
levels did things differently this time around.
More supplies were stockpiled on the ground prior to
Rita’s arrival. The federal government declared Rita an
“incident of national signifi cance” two days before landfall,
triggering our most thorough response, and named a
federal offi cer in charge. These steps occurred two days after
Katrina. Ten thousand National Guardsmen were called
to Texas in advance of Rita; Louisiana summoned 1,500
We repeatedly tried to determine how government could respond
so ineffectively to a disaster that was so accurately forecast.
A
P
P
H
O
T
O
/D
E
N
N
IS
C
O
O
K
A
P
P
H
O
T
O
/A
N
D
Y
N
E
W
M
A
N
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 13
before Katrina.
Search and Rescue
operations were far
better coordinated.
Even if a little
rough around
the edges, the
massive pre-
storm evacuation
of Houston and
surrounding locales
showed improved
foresight from state and local offi cials — and how lives
can be saved when people pay attention to a coordinated
message from their government.
We also attempted to clarify FEMA’s role in disaster
response. We were faced with the problematic reality
that many Americans — and perhaps even some state
and local offi cials — falsely viewed FEMA as some sort
of national fi re and rescue team. An important task for
the Select Committee moving forward was defi ning what
FEMA is — what it can and cannot do based on what it is
actually charged with doing by statute.
We noted that FEMA is not a fi rst responder agency
with the resources to assume principal responsibility
for overwhelmed state and local governments during a
disaster. This is the real world, not the reel world. There
is no Tommy Lee Jones character that comes in and takes
charge of…well…everything.
But we also attempted to contextualize that discussion.
In other words, before getting to what FEMA cannot do,
we wanted to understand what they simply did not do.
Just because they are not “fi rst responders” does not mean
they should be a second thought.
We explored the possible causes of FEMA’s inadequate
response, which are covered exhaustively in subsequent
chapters. Among those discussed at the hearing:
Inadequacies in the Stafford Act. Organizational or
budgetary or grant-making shortcomings. State and
local governments that didn’t know how to ask for
help, or simply didn’t. A bureaucratic mindset that now
emphasizes terrorism to the exclusion of natural disaster
planning. We looked at these possibilities, and more.
We also examined why FEMA seemed unable to
implement lessons that should have been learned well
in advance of Katrina. There were the lessons of previous
hurricanes. Further, FEMA offi cials participated in the
now-widely-known exercise called Hurricane Pam in
July 2004, an exercise that predicted with eerie similarity
Katrina’s impact on New Orleans, including an evacuation
of a million people, overfl owing levees, and the
destruction of hundreds of thousands of buildings.
“Hurricane Katrina:
The Role of the Department of Homeland Security”
October 19, 2005 Select Committee hearing
Although by this date
FEMA and Michael
Brown had received the
most attention from
Members of Congress,
state and local offi cials,
and the news media
in Katrina’s wake, the
Select Committee
sought to recognize
that DHS and Secretary
Michael Chertoff have
primary responsibility
for managing the
national response to a catastrophic disaster, according to
the National Response Plan (NRP).
Therefore, three weeks after hearing from Michael
Brown, we turned to his boss, the man who ultimately
fi red him.
We needed to fi nd out if Michael Brown had it right
when he testifi ed that FEMA had been under-funded and
under-staffed, that it had become “emaciated,” and that
Congress had undermined FEMA’s effectiveness when the
agency was folded into DHS.
Michael Brown testifi ed that he asked the Department
for funding to implement the lessons learned from the
Hurricane Pam exercise and that those funds were denied.
He also testifi ed about brain drain, diminished fi nancial
resources, and “assessments” of $70 to $80 million by
DHS for department-wide programs. He said he had
written memos to Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff
regarding the inadequacy of FEMA’s resources. We asked
Secretary Chertoff about those assertions.
We also sought to establish the Department’s role
and responsibilities in a disaster. What resources can the
Secretary bring to bear? What triggers the decision to
F
E
M
A
A
P
P
H
O
T
O
/L
A
W
R
E
N
C
E
J
A
C
K
S
O
N
14 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
deploy those resources? During Katrina, how personally
involved was Secretary Chertoff in seeking, authorizing, or
deploying specifi c resources?
Under the National Response Plan, the DHS Secretary
is the federal offi cial charged with declaring an Incident
of National Signifi cance. Part of that declaration entails
naming a Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), to manage the
response.
The government’s pre-landfall decision to declare an
Incident of National Signifi cance with Rita suggested
awareness that the call came too late with Katrina. And,
based on some of Brown’s emails, we knew that he resented
being named the PFO by the Secretary. We needed to ask
Secretary Chertoff what he thought about that, and what
those comments said about the underlying NRP.
Finally, we asked Secretary Chertoff what we asked
all offi cials during our investigation: Where were you
in the days and hours right before, during, and after the
hurricane? What were you doing? Who were you talking to?
New York University Professor Paul Light wrote shortly
after Katrina that, “Mr. Chertoff is just about the only
offi cial in Washington who can say ‘I told you so’ about
FEMA,” based on some of the reforms he outlined in
July 2005 in his Second Stage Review. We asked Secretary
Chertoff if he believed FEMA’s response to Katrina would
have been better if the reforms had been in place on
August 29.
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response
by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard,
and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama”
October 27, 2005 Select Committee hearing
At this hearing we
examined Department of
Defense responsibilities,
procedures, and
coordination with
the Department of
Homeland Security in the
event of a catastrophic
disaster.
We looked at the roles of the National Guard and U.S.
Northern Command in disaster response as the operational
arms of DOD and the states, and we reviewed the role of
the Coast Guard, a unique national asset with both military
capabilities and domestic law enforcement authorities.
We sought to establish a timeline of the military’s
actions — what they were asked to do, when they were
asked, and whether the jobs actually got done.
We acknowledged the heroic efforts that DOD, National
Guard, and Coast Guard personnel made, efforts that saved
many, many lives. The mobilization was massive and, at
least once the call went out, swift and effective.
But we also discussed problems with the military
response. The Select Committee believed even some
of the successes occurred despite less-than-optimal
planning, and too often offi cers were planning in a crisis
environment.
There were problems: With situational awareness and
damage assessments. With coordinating search and rescue
operations. With the effective use of Defense Coordinating
Offi cers by FEMA. With an early and persistent disconnect
between DOD and state and local authorities. With
inadequate telecommunications that prevented effective
coordination. And, once again, with failing to learn as
much as possible from previous disasters.
While we continued to emphasize that local fi rst
responders are best suited for handling local emergencies,
the recurring question was: What happens when fi rst
responders are overwhelmed, as they clearly were in
Katrina?
As a result, we asked whether DOD anticipated these
circumstances, what preparations were made, and what
actions were taken with regard to the National Response
Plan’s “Catastrophic Incident Annex” — the annex that
authorizes federal agencies to act when state and local
capacity even to know what they need is compromised by
the sheer size of the calamity.
Our hearing came amid growing debate over an
expanded military role in future disasters. President Bush
prompted the discussion in a nationally televised address
from New Orleans on September 15, saying, “It is now
clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal
authority and a broader role for the armed forces — the
institution of our government most capable of massive
logistical operations on a moment’s notice.”
Two witnesses — Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, and Admiral Timothy
J. Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command — had
indicated prior to the hearing that DOD was considering
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 15
training and equipping an active duty force specifi cally for
disaster response.
Those remarks led to some confusion over specifi cs,
and even to some outright opposition.
On October 13, the National Governors Association
issued a statement reasserting their authority. “Governors
are responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens
and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters,” the
association wrote.
An October 21 statement by Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, who
is leading President Bush’s examination of the federal
response to Katrina, also spawned negative reactions
from state offi cials. Townsend reportedly said she was
considering whether there is “a narrow band of cases” in
which the President should seize control when a disaster
strikes.13 A spokesperson for Louisiana Gov. Kathleen
Babineaux Blanco responded by saying she could not
think of an instance in which the President should be able
to unilaterally take control. “We don’t believe Katrina was
the time, and I don’t know what another time would be,”
Denise Bottcher told the Times-Picayune.14
The Select Committee, therefore, began addressing this
basic tension. On the one hand, we heard understandable
caution from our Members and witnesses against over-
reacting to Katrina with sweeping changes to laws or
processes, caution against deviating too wildly from the
locals-as-fi rst-responders paradigm. None of us believed
the best lesson to be learned from Katrina was that all
answers can be found in Washington.
On the other hand, the call for increasing the military’s
role in domestic affairs is easy to grasp. Who else can
respond the way the military can? Who else can stand up
when others have fallen?
This tension was refl ected in the National Response
Plan before Katrina. The Catastrophic Incident Annex
assumes that local response capabilities may be
“insuffi cient,” as they will be “quickly overwhelmed.”
But the NRP plan states federal resources will only be
integrated into the response effort upon a request by state
and local authorities and assumes state and local offi cials
will be able to do the integrating themselves.
The Select Committee was left wondering if the plan
as written tried to have its cake and eat it too. How can
we rely on the overwhelmed to acknowledge they are
overwhelmed, and then expect them to direct and manage
the process of coming to their rescue?
We agreed we needed a closer evaluation of existing
procedures for DOD under the National Response Plan,
paying particular attention to DOD’s role when fi rst
responders are wiped out or otherwise incapable of
providing the initial response.
We agreed that Incidents of National Signifi cance
require a response on a national scale. But we also agreed
the devil is in the details. We cannot expect the Marines
to swoop in with MREs every time a storm hits. We train
soldiers to fi ght wars. You can’t kill a storm.
So what is the threshold? When can or should the
Stafford Act’s assumption that states will be able to “pull”
needed federal resources to meet their needs give way to
the operational imperative that federal agencies “push”
assets to those who need them? What would spur the kind
of enhanced or heightened military role that some have
been promoting in the aftermath of Katrina? When would
we pull that trigger? And fi nally, would it have made a
difference in the response to Katrina?
The fact is, military resources are not infi nite. It seems
the kind of standing humanitarian force that would be
needed to provide this sort of immediate assistance at
a moment’s notice would either threaten readiness or
require an expansion of the active force and a signifi cant
boost in how well they are equipped.
Legal questions also arose. Were we talking about
statutory changes? Should we revisit Posse Comitatus,
the 127-year-old law that bars federal troops from
M
S
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
G
U
A
R
D
16 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
assuming domestic law enforcement duties? Did Katrina
demonstrate a need for a new exception to Posse
Comitatus, one to be utilized after major disasters?
The Select Committee ultimately refocused the
discussion by simplifying the question: Do we need a
larger DOD role — or just a smarter one?
The Select Committee tried hard to acknowledge at
this hearing what an incredible job the Coast Guard did,
and recognize the National Guard’s clear sense of urgency.
We noted for the record that Northern Command had
prepared for this storm, deploying Defense Coordinating
Offi cers to the three states before landfall and placing
units on alert.
But we also had to recognize that it was unclear how
much “real” support was in place before the storm arrived,
and that Secretary McHale himself had acknowledged
prior to our hearing the DOD response was too slow.15
“Hurricane Katrina: The Federal Government’s
Use of Contractors to Prepare and Respond”
November 2, 2005 Select Committee hearing
Local, state, and federal governments
rely heavily on contractor support to
prepare for and response to disasters.
This hearing examined the contracts
in place prior to Katrina’s landfall,
and procurement planning efforts
that took place in anticipation of
a large-scale catastrophic event.
We also reviewed the rationale
and process for awarding disaster
relief and recovery contracts in the
immediate aftermath of Katrina.
The Select Committee asked
about the internal controls in place
to ensure that federal acquisition
laws were followed; the terms
and performance of Katrina relief
contracts; and the ways in which
the management and oversight of
disaster-related contracting can be
strengthened.
A great deal of taxpayer money went out the door to
private fi rms to help prepare for and respond to Katrina.
Part of our job was to ask whether it’s been money well
spent. And part of that inquiry was asking what contracts
should have been in place before the storm arrived,
based on what everyone knew — or should have known
— would be needed.
Was the contracting
system up to the task?
Were we able to get what
we needed, when and
where we needed it? By
any measure, this was
an enormous storm,
described as one of
“Biblical” proportions.
In the face of the
massive destruction
caused by Katrina,
acquisition personnel
acted to meet pressing
humanitarian needs,
contacting fi rms in an effort to provide immediate relief to
survivors and to protect life and property. And thankfully,
many fi rms responded.
Do we need a larger DOD role
— or just a smarter one?
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
FEMA
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 17
It is true that several companies were called into action
on a sole-source basis under acquisition provisions that
allow the government to acquire urgently needed goods
and services in emergency situations. It’s also true that,
contrary to many media reports, some of the immediate
response efforts were provided through existing contracts
that had been previously awarded through full and open
competition.
Nevertheless, concerns were raised with respect to how
FEMA awarded contracts in Katrina’s immediate aftermath
and regarding what contract vehicles were in place before
landfall. These were legitimate concerns that affect not
only our fi ndings relative to the preparation for and
response to Katrina, but also how well prepared we’ll be
the next time — and how willing contractors will be to
step up to the plate the next time they’re called.
The indirect result of ineffi cient contracting and
misdirected, even baseless charges against contractors
could be a government left with more than it can manage
in-house.
In the weeks following Katrina, more than 80 percent
of the $1.5 billion in initial contracts awarded by FEMA
were awarded on a sole-source basis or pursuant to
limited competition. Many of the contracts awarded were
incomplete and included open-ended or vague terms. In
addition, numerous news reports questioned the terms of
disaster relief agreements made in haste.
Under the Stafford Act, prime contractors are to give
preference to local subcontractors, but reports indicated
that not enough local businesses were being hired.
Questions were also raised about the Corps of Engineers’
use of a limited competition to award contracts for debris
removal and clean up.
Undoubtedly, FEMA before Katrina suffered from
something Congress has grappled with government-wide
for many years: a lack of suffi ciently trained procurement
professionals.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the DHS Offi ce of Inspector
General (IG) had repeatedly cited the lack of consistent
contract management for large, complex, high-cost
procurement programs. DHS procurement continues to
be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach. DHS
has seven legacy procurement offi ces that continue to serve
DHS components, including FEMA. Notably, FEMA was not
reporting or tracking procurements undertaken by disaster
fi eld offi ces, and the procurement offi ce remains to this day
understaffed given the volume and dollar value of its work.
The Chief Procurement Offi cer (CPO) had established
an eighth offi ce called the Offi ce of Procurement Operations
to meet the procurement needs of the rest of DHS. After
Katrina, however, the CPO reassigned its staff to assist
FEMA’s procurement offi ce.
At this hearing, we learned errors were made in the
contracting process before and after Katrina. The contract
oversight process is not always pretty, and decisions made
under life-and-death pressure are not always as lucid as
those made under less complicated conditions. But there are
lessons to be learned about effi cient and effective contracting,
even from this, hopefully, once in a lifetime event.
That there were and will be disagreements with
contractors over pricing and payment schedules
should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with
the administration of complex contracts in diffi cult
circumstances.
The good news is, DHS has begun establishing a
rigorous oversight process for each and every federal
contract related to Katrina. Now the process needs to be
fully implemented.
Shortly after the emergency needs arose, DHS’s Chief
Procurement Offi cer asked the DHS Inspector General’s
Offi ce to begin overseeing the acquisition process. The
DHS IG assigned 60 auditors, investigators, and inspectors
and planned to hire thirty additional oversight personnel.
The staff is reviewing the award and administration of all
major contracts, including those awarded in the initial
efforts, and will monitor all contracting activities as the
government develops its requirements and as the selection
and award process continues to unfold.
Undoubtedly, FEMA before Katrina suffered from something Congress
has grappled with government-wide for many years: a lack of suffi ciently
trained procurement professionals.
18 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
To further ensure that any payments made to
contractors are proper and reasonable, FEMA engaged
the Defense Contract Audit Agency to help monitor and
oversee any payments made — and pledged not to pay on
any vouchers until each one is audited and cleared.
The Select Committee has no patience with waste,
fraud, or abuse. We expect that any such instances that
are proven will result in harsh punishment for the
perpetrators. We also expect that, as the conditions on the
ground have improved, the next generation of contracts
have been and will be awarded and administered in
accordance with standard acquisition procedures.
Emergency procedures are for emergencies only.
FEMA said it continues to revisit non-competitive
arrangements made immediately after the storm.
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and
Response by the State of Alabama”
November 9, 2005 Select Committee hearing
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and
Response by the State of Mississippi”
December 7, 2005 Select Committee hearing
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparation and
Response by the State of Louisiana”
December 14, 2005 Select Committee hearing
The three state-focused hearings we held were arguably
the most important in terms of fact-gathering. After all, we
understood that in the event of an emergency, state and
local government offi cials bear primary responsibilities
under both the National Response Plan and their own laws
and directives. Throughout federal, state and local planning
documents the general principle is for all incidents to
be handled at the lowest possible organizational and
jurisdictional level. Police, fi re, public health and medical,
emergency management, and other personnel are
responsible for incident management at the local level.
For federally declared emergencies or major disasters, DHS
provides operational and/or resource coordination for
federal support to on-scene incident command structures.
Our goal was to better understand the responsibilities
and actions of state and local offi cials before, during, and
after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. We explored state
laws, policies, procedures, and how state and local offi cials
interfaced with DHS and FEMA when they confronted
Katrina — and how DHS interfaced with them.
The National Response Plan and the National
Incident Management System were crafted to provide
the framework and template, respectively, for the federal
government to work with state and local authorities to
prepare for and respond to crises. In turn, states, localities,
tribal governments, and nongovernmental organizations
are asked to align their plans and procedures with federal
guidelines and procedures.
Did this coordinated alignment occur? By the time of
these hearings, we knew in large part it had not. We sought
to understand, from a state and local perspective, why.
“Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm”
December 6, 2005 Select Committee hearing
In mid-November, Rep. Cynthia McKinney asked Select
Committee Chairman Tom Davis to focus a hearing on
the “African-American voice” related to Hurricane Katrina.
With that request in mind, and having already planned
a hearing featuring testimony from storm victims, the
Select Committee sought to better understand the
experiences of Gulf coast residents, including those forced
AP PHOTO/SUSAN WALSH AP PHOTO/HARAZ N. GHANBARI AP PHOTO/SUSAN WALSH
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 19
to evacuate, during the catastrophe. Only by hearing
from those most directly affected by Katrina could we
determine where, how, and why the government response
at all levels was so terribly inadequate.
There was little question that Katrina had sparked
renewed debate about race, class, and institutional
approaches toward vulnerable population groups in
the United States. In the aftermath of the storm, a wide
array of media reports, public statements, and polls
underscored this reality.
In his September 15 speech to the nation, President
Bush touched on the issue. “As all of us saw on television,
there is also some deep, persistent poverty in this region
as well. And that poverty has roots in a history of racial
discrimination, which cut off generations from the
opportunity of America,” the President said.
Since then the debate had become increasingly heated.
In media interviews, Jesse Jackson compared New Orleans’
shelters to the hold of a slave ship, and Louis Farrakhan
suggested New Orleans’ levees were intentionally blown
up to destroy primarily African-American neighborhoods.
While not all the commentary has necessarily been
constructive, substantiated, or fair, the Select Committee
believed the issue warranted further discussion, especially
within the context of understanding the experiences of
those caught inside the storm, and in hopes of making sure
the governmental response is more effective the next time.
We knew from government e-mails and other
documents that offi cials were almost immediately sensitive
to public perceptions of race as a factor in the inadequate
response. An aide to Louisiana Governor Blanco cautioned
colleagues about how to respond to a request from Rep.
Maxine Waters, an African-American, for security escorts
in New Orleans shortly after the storm. “Please handle
this very carefully,”
aide Johnny
Anderson wrote in
an e-mail. “We are
getting enough bad
national press on
race relations.”16
E-mails from aides
to former FEMA
Director Michael
Brown refl ected
similar concerns
about public relations
and racial politics. And Alabama offi cials discussed similar
sensitivities about a proposal to conduct background
checks on out-of-state evacuees being housed in state parks.
A CNN-Gallup poll from September 8 to 11 reported
60 percent of African-Americans, but only 12 percent of
whites, believed race was a factor in the slow response to
Katrina. Another poll by the Pew Research Center found
that 7 in 10 blacks believed the disaster showed that
racial inequality remains a major problem in America. A
majority of whites disagreed.
A November survey of 46 Katrina evacuees published
by the Natural Hazards Center at the University of
Colorado-Boulder concluded that “issues of race and
class were central to evacuation experiences.”17 For many,
the evacuation process was complicated by age, mental
or physical disability, the need to care for dependents, or
material possessions they were trying to take with them.
The Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and
Harvard University also conducted face-to-face interviews
with 680 randomly selected adult evacuees residing in
Houston.18 When asked, “Has your experience made you
feel like the government cares about people like you, or
has it made you feel like the government doesn’t care?”
61 percent reported they felt the government doesn’t
care. Additionally, the evacuees suggested an intersection
between race and class: 68 percent of respondents thought
the federal government would have responded more
quickly if more people trapped in the fl oodwaters were
“wealthier and white rather than poorer and black.”
At an early November forum at Emerson College,
Louis Elisa — a former regional director for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency under President Clinton
— reportedly suggested that race had to be a factor in the
A
P
P
H
O
T
O
/S
U
S
A
N
W
A
L
S
H
20 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
inadequate response. “I am telling you, as a professional,
that you could not have had a mistake of this nature…if
something else was not afoot,” the Boston Globe quoted
Elisa.19
Whether or not one believed racist charges were well-
founded (and clearly a majority of our members did not),
the Select Committee agreed it should recognize and
discuss the socioeconomic and racial backdrop against
which Katrina unfolded.
As the Brookings Institution reported in October,
New Orleans, which once had economically and
demographically diverse neighborhoods, had grown
extremely segregated by both race and income by the time
of the storm. “As a result,” Brookings concluded, “blacks
and whites were living in quite literally different worlds
before the storm hit.” 20
At the very least, the Select Committee determined it
should further explore at this hearing how socioeconomic
factors contributed to the experiences of those directly
affected by the storm. The UC-Boulder survey found
that “almost all interviewees described the evacuation
process as disorderly and disorganized, with minimal
communication about where evacuees were heading and
when the next transportation would arrive. This created
a state of uncertainty and insecurity…. [P]redominantly
working-class African-Americans did not evacuate because
they did not have the fi nancial resources to do so.”21
The Select Committee sought to learn more about
whether government messages to Gulf coast residents
regarding the dangers of the coming hurricane could have
been presented in a more effective manner, a question
which also carried racial and socioeconomic implications.
“If you don’t hear the message from someone you
trust, you tend to be skeptical,” Margaret Sims, vice
president of the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies, told Public Relations Strategist magazine. “If you
get confl icting information from people you’re not sure
of, then inaction may be, from your perspective, the most
prudent form of action.” 22
The same magazine article noted that disaster
response may have been hampered by not taking the
“circumstances” of area residents fully into account. “The
people creating the verbal or image measures don’t take
into account access or physical barriers to opportunities in
certain communities,” said Linda Aldoory, director of the
Center for Risk Communication Research at the University
of Maryland. “With Katrina, people knew the importance
of storm warnings and the need to evacuate, but didn’t
have the physical access to do so.”23
In other words, the Select Committee agreed it should
examine to what extent response inadequacies stemmed
from the messengers — and the message. We wanted to
further explore the possibility that different people may
hear different things when their elected offi cials are telling
them to evacuate.
Document request, production,
and review: an overview
Within a week of its September 15, 2005 creation, the
Select Committee held its fi rst hearing. By the end of the
month, Chairman Davis and Rep. Charlie Melancon,
on behalf of the Select Committee and in cooperation
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, had submitted 19 offi cial and
comprehensive requests for documents to relevant federal
agencies and state governments.
By the beginning of January 2006, 67 formal requests
for documents had been issued by the Select Committee
and the Senate Committee to 29 federal agencies as
well as the governments of Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana and their subdivisions.
“If you get confl icting information
from people you’re not sure of,
then inaction may be, from your
perspective, the most prudent form
of action.”
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 21
In response to those formal requests and numerous
other staff requests, the Select Committee received
hundreds of thousands of documents.
The responses by the federal agencies and state
governments inundated the Select Committee. A constant
stream of boxes containing responsive documents arrived
daily at the Select Committee’s door. Select Committee
staff worked around the clock to organize and review
this stream of documents. Aggressive follow-up by the
Select Committee, detailed below, ensured the document
production was responsive to the Select Committee’s
requests.
To fulfi ll its mission, the Select Committee needed to
do more than hold hearings. We requested and received
more than half a million pages of documents from
governmental organizations at all levels: federal, state,
and local. The information gleaned from these documents
played a critical role in helping the Select Committee
paint a picture of what happened and why.
Below is a brief overview of what was requested and
what was received. Most of the governmental organizations
complied with our requests in a timely and complete
fashion. Efforts by others to comply unfortunately were
neither timely nor complete. This is discussed below as well.
In September 2005, the Senate Committee, chaired by
Senator Susan Collins, began its Katrina investigation.
In many cases, the two committees desired the same or
similar information. To facilitate both investigations,
and to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication of
efforts, the Select Committee simply asked to receive all
documents requested by the Senate.
Federal
The Select Committee sent request letters to all 15
cabinet-level departments as well as many independent
federal deparments including: the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the United States Postal Service
(USPS), the Agency for International Development (AID),
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Small Business
Administration (SBA), the Social Security Administration
(SSA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Offi ce
of Personnel Management (OPM), and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We also
requested information from the White House and the
Offi ce of the Vice President.
In particular, the Select Committee requested extensive
information from the Department of Homeland Security,
particularly from two of its constituent agencies, FEMA
and the U.S. Coast Guard. We requested documents and
communications from before August 23 related to the
threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the
Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses. We also sought
documents and communications from between August
23 and August 29 related to the threat posed by Hurricane
Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses. And we requested
documents and communications from between August
29 and September 15 related to the impact of Hurricane
Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses.
In addition, we requested information about the
different elements of DHS and individuals holding
key positions. We wanted to know the different roles
and responsibilities of those components, as well as
the actions they took before, during, and after Katrina.
We asked for information regarding the activation of
the National Response Plan and National Incident
Management System, and any discussions about the
use of the armed forces. We also requested relevant
communications, specifi cally any requests for assistance,
communications with local and state authorities, and
communications that revealed any plans to prepare for
the hurricane, or communications that demonstrated
possible vulnerabilities to a hurricane. We also wanted any
documents containing authorities, regulations, plans, and
S
TA
F
F
P
H
O
T
O
22 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
procedures of the agency, weather reports, information
about medical response assets, and information about
DHS and FEMA funding and budgeting.
We requested an employee directory and organization
chart for FEMA, as well as the individuals in key position
during the hurricane in the affected regions. We asked
for documents referring to risks posed by hurricanes or
fl ooding of New Orleans, and documents indicating
whether offi cials knew of those risks. We also requested
documents and communications regarding the levee system
in New Orleans, including plans, risk assessments, and
knowledge of the levees’ failure, particularly documents
and communications with the Army Corps of Engineers.
We sought documents and names of key individuals
related to the Hurricane Pam exercise, and information
about FEMA’s chain of command during the storm
and FEMA’s authorities, plans, and policies relevant
to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, we requested after-
action reports for past hurricanes; information about the
activation of the National Response Plan; qualifi cations of
key FEMA personnel; and contributions of contractors and
subcontractors.
Finally, we requested a description of the Coast Guard’s
role with respect to the National Response Plan and other
domestic emergencies, specifi cally Hurricane Katrina. We
wanted to know what components will act, who they will
cooperate with, and in what capacity. We also requested
information about search and rescue, such as command
structures, regulations, and assets available. We also
requested details about when the Coast Guard learned of
certain key information before, during, and after Katrina.
DHS responded to most of these requests from the
Select Committee, including requests addressed to Secretary
Chertoff, Acting Undersecretary Paulison, and Assistant
Secretary Robert Stephan. The Department produced in
total well over 200,000 pages of documents including:
(1) Briefi ng books, reports and communication from the
Secretary’s offi ce; (2) Communications from the Deputy
Secretary’s offi ce; (3) E-mails from Undersecretary Brown’s
offi ce; (4) E-mails from FEMA personnel involved in
planning and response efforts; (5) the National Response
Plan, Hurricane plans, New Orleans and Mobile area plans,
Incident Action Plans, Operation Manuals and planning
worksheets, and Katrina specifi c plans; (6) Mission
assignments, task requests and logs, action requests,
tracking reports, and situation reports; (7) tasking logs and
requests; (8) briefi ngs; (9) grant program documents; (10)
planned shipments; resource tracking reports, commodity
maps, and staging areas; (11) audits; (12) Katrina maps and
graphics; and (13) organizational charts.
The Select Committee sent specifi c requests to the
Department of Defense as well. We sent request letters
to the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, the National
Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), and
Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
Specifi cally, we requested documents and
communications from before August 23 by offi cials of the
Department of Defense or any constituent agencies related
to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or
the Gulf coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses. We requested
documents and communications from between August 23
and August 29, by offi cials of the Department of Defense
or any constituent elements related to the threat posed
by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects,
emergency preparations, or emergency responses. And,
we requested documents and communications, including
internal communications from between August 29 and
September 15 by offi cials of the Department of Defense
or any DOD elements related to the impact of Hurricane
Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses.
We also requested information about DOD’s role and
legal authority with respect to domestic emergencies and
Hurricane Katrina. We wanted organizational charts,
after-action reports, and plans with respect to national
catastrophes. We requested information about DOD and
the events of Hurricane Katrina, such as any guidance
provided by the Secretary of Defense before landfall, the
preparations made, specifi c actions taken, and personnel
involved. We asked for information about Joint Task Force
Katrina and on actions taken during Hurricane Katrina,
specifi cally those of active duty troops and National
Guard units; requests for assistance; and information on
DOD’s chain of command during the incident.
The Select Committee initially received responses
from the Department of Defense on behalf of Secretary
Rumsfeld that only partially complied with the various
requests. On November 18, the Select Committee received
a production from the Department containing: execution
orders; requests for forces; correspondence regarding
National Guard authorization; daily update briefi ngs; and
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 23
daily executive summaries. On December 14, the Select
Committee received further production containing the
Joint Staff Director of Operations’ (J-3) Redacted Timeline,
outlining the Department’s response actions to Hurricane
Katrina and the Joint Task Force Katrina Commander’s
Assessment Briefi ngs.
In further response to the letter requests, on December
22 the Select Committee received: the Assistant Secretary
for Defense for Homeland Defense’s Smart Book;
responses to Senate interrogatories of September 28;
National Guard and Northcom timelines; Execute and
Deployment orders; NORTHCOM teleconference minutes;
Captain Rick Snyder’s, XO USS Bataan, Lessons Learned
Package; Vice Admiral Fitzgerald’s e-mails, timelines,
and notes; 2nd Fleet Lessons Learned; Records of Annual
Hurricane exercises; memo to Admiral Starling regarding
Naval assets in the region; information regarding
helicopter assets; Rear Admiral Kilkenny’s Lessons Learned
brief to the Chief of Naval Operations; Northcom requests
for forces; Northcom deployment orders; Northcom
timeline; and twice-daily Joint Operations Center emails.
In addition the Department produced: Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) timeline and logs of verbal
orders; JFCOM Standard Operating Procedures;
Unifi ed Command Plan; TOPOFF exercise paperwork;
Commander Fleet Forces command general requirement
for Humanitarian Response/Disaster Relief; National
Guard Bureau Readiness Documents; National Guard
Bureau Senior Leadership Questions; and Katrina effects
on National Guard Bureau readiness.
Despite these signifi cant productions, Chairman
Davis was concerned that the communications of senior
Defense Department offi cials — a priority in the fi rst
request to the Department — had not been produced.
Consequently, after discussions with Rep. Melancon,
he issued a subpoena to the Department of Defense on
December 14. The subpoena required the production of
the correspondence of senior DOD offi cials related to
Hurricane Katrina.
On December 22, the Select Committee received
documents responsive to the subpoena, including offi cial
correspondence from Assistant Secretary Paul McHale,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Verga, Admiral
Keating, Lieutenant General Honoré, Lieutenant General
Blum, and Colonel John Jordan. On December 30, the
Select Committee received more documents responsive
to the subpoena, including DOD offi cial correspondence
from Secretary Rumsfeld, Acting Deputy Secretary
England, Colonel Daskevich, Brigadier General Scherling,
Colonel Roberson, Colonel Chavez, Colonel Young,
F
E
M
A
24 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Admiral Keating, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Verga. On January 13, the Select Committee received
further submissions of correspondence from Department
offi cials including, Brigadier General Graham, Major
General Young. And on January 17, the Select Committee
received the emails of Major General Grass and Lieutenant
General Vaughn.
The Select Committee also requested information
from the White House. Specifi cally, the Select Committee
requested documents and communications from before
August 23 related to the threat posed by a hurricane
striking New Orleans or the Gulf coast, mitigation
measures or projects, emergency preparations, or
emergency responses. We requested documents and
communications from between August 23 and August
29 related to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina,
mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations,
or emergency responses. And we requested documents
and communications from between August 29 and
September 15 related to the impact of Hurricane Katrina,
mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations,
or emergency responses. Initially, the White House
produced more than 4,000 documents in response to
these requests; however, the Select Committee was not
satisfi ed with this initial production of documents.
In a December 6 letter, William Kelly, White House
Deputy Counsel, said the September 30 and December 1
requests were too broad and asked the Select Committee
to narrow the request. In response, the Select Committee
insisted on briefi ngs by senior administration offi cials and
the production of certain items, including e-mails and
documents from the White House Situation Room. As a
result of our demands, a briefi ng was provided and more
than 12,000 pages of documents from the Executive Offi ce
of the President on the response to Hurricane Katrina
were delivered on December 16. The Select Committee
made similar requests to the Vice President’s offi ce, which
responded with almost 6,000 pages of documents.
While the Select Committee was disappointed and
frustrated by the slow pace and general resistance to
producing the requested documents by the White
House and the Department of Defense, at the end of the
day, the Select Committee believes it received enough
information through documents, briefi ngs, and interviews
to understand the actions and decisions of those entities,
and reach sound fi ndings on them, without implicating
executive privilege.
That’s what this was about: obtaining suffi cient
information. Getting the documents and testimony
we needed to make sure Americans are better prepared
the next time. Ultimately, our public criticism of the
Administration’s slow pace did the job. At our insistence,
the White House provided Deputy Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security Ken Rapuano for a
briefi ng with staff and Members. With the President in
Texas, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend out
of the country, and Chief of Staff Andrew Card in Maine
at the time of the storm, Rapuano offered the best view
of White House knowledge and actions right before and
right after Katrina. In fact, his briefi ng included more
acknowledgements of institutional failure than any we
had received previously.
The agreement with the White House gave us an
opportunity to understand the White House role in
Katrina while keeping the Select Committee on a parallel
track with the Senate, which had not pursued White
House subpoenas, and had not even subpoenaed DOD. A
subpoena for White House documents would have simply
derailed and delayed our inquiry, with the likelihood of
a lengthy and unproductive court battle over executive
privilege to follow.
State
The Select Committee sent request letters to governmental
components in the three states hit hardest by Hurricane
Katrina: Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In each
state, we requested information from both the offi ce of
the governor and the state’s respective agency in charge of
homeland security or emergency management.
Specifi cally, the Select Committee asked each state’s
governor’s offi ce for documents or communications,
including internal communications, received, prepared,
or sent up to the date of September 15 by state offi cials
related to the threat posed by a hurricane, mitigation
measures or projects, emergency preparations, or
emergency responses. Also, for each state’s offi ce in charge
of homeland security or emergency management, the
Select Committee requested: information about that
organization, including organization charts; the agency’s
responsibilities with respect to emergencies; regulations
and procedures; after action reports for past hurricanes;
past requests for federal grants; budgets for the agencies;
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 25
contractors and subcontractors that assisted with Katrina;
a detailed chronology of events and actions taken during,
before, and after the hurricane; key state personnel
involved with Katrina; and all communications to and
from the agencies relevant to the disaster.
The Select Committee also requested any state, county,
and local emergency plans, and the identity of state and
local agencies involved in those plans. Finally, the Select
Committee asked for documents from the past fi ve years
that evaluate the threats posed by hurricanes and any
information about exercises to prepare for hurricanes.
The Select Committee sent request letters to the
Alabama Department of Homeland Security (ADHS),
as well as the offi ce of Governor Bob Riley. The State
of Alabama answered all questions and replied to all
requests. The state provided the Alabama Emergency
Management Plan, 26 different situation reports, the
Governor’s proclamations, a timeline, and four Incident
Action Plans. The state also provided communications
such as a MOU with Mississippi, Alabama county
emergency management standards, and state emergency
procedures. In answering the Select Committee’s
questions, the state provided organization charts, key
personnel, the roles and responsibilities of ADHS and
the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA),
state and county emergency plans and the state and local
agencies involved in the response to Katrina. The state
also provided risk assessments and after action reports
and information on exercises to prepare for disasters.
Alabama also provided information on budgets for the
past fi ve years. The state also provided timelines, a list of
actions taken by state agencies in response to Katrina and
a complete set of AEMA internal communications and
action tracking system (EM 2000) messages.
The Select Committee sent requests to both the
Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (LOHSEP) and to the offi ce of Governor
Kathleen Blanco. After asking for a 90 day extension
on October 26 due to the need to address immediate
hurricane relief, the Governor fully responded on
December 1 with tens of thousands of documents on their
response and preparation for Hurricane Katrina including:
an overview of the Governor’s actions, Executive Orders
and declarations, emergency preparedness plans, the LA
Citizen Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guide, offi cial
correspondence, organization charts, notes and internal
communications. Included was the response of the Acting
Deputy Director of LOHSEP based on “the best available
information” in that agency’s possession at that time,
including specifi c responses to the committee’s questions
in the original Senate Committee letter.
The Louisiana Attorney General’s Offi ce responded
with additional information on January 11 and also
informed us there would be a slight delay in sending two
CDs containing e-mails of the Louisiana National Guard
due to technical problems. Those CDs arrived February 2.
The Select Committee sent request letters to both the
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and
the Offi ce of Governor Haley Barber. MEMA provided
organization charts, and a listing of key personnel. MEMA
produced state plans including the MS Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan (CEMP Vol. II), Contra-
Flow Plan of August 2005, as well as many inter-agency
state plans such as plans from Louisiana, transportation
evacuation plans, and parish/city plans. MEMA provided
risk assessments for hurricanes, fl oods, surges, and
economic impacts. MEMA also included all Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) maps of the state and local
jurisdictions. MEMA provided information on plans and
training exercises such as Hurricane Pam and Lifesaver
2004. Other items provided: timeline of events and
communications such as director briefs, news releases,
media advisories, MEMA situation reports, Incident Action
Plans, EM 2000 messages, and mission assignments.
The documents produced by all three states and the
federal government allowed the Select Committee to
gain important insights into the workings of government
entities stressed to the breaking point by a terrible disaster.
They helped reveal the true nature of the relationship
of state emergency management operations to the
system of federal emergency management support.
These documents allowed the Select Committee to reach
conclusions about what worked well and what did not.
Those conclusions will help improve preparation and
response for the next disaster, protect the public, save
lives, and reduce suffering. We don’t pretend to have the
entire universe of information related to the preparation
for and response to Katrina. But we had more than
enough to do our job. ■
26 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from inside the Storm Before Select Comm., (Dec. 6, 2005) at 28 (statement of Patricia Thompson)
[hereinafter Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
2 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Juliette Saussy, Director, New Orleans Emergency Medical Services, in New Orleans, LA (Jan. 19, 2006).
3 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Eddie Favre, Mayor of Bay St. Louis, in Waveland, MS (Jan. 20, 2006).
4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Brent Warr, Mayor of Gulfport, in Waveland, MS (Jan. 20, 2006).
5 Rep. Gene Taylor, comments to Select Comm. Members and Staff during bus tour of coastal MS (Jan. 20, 2006).
6 Rep. Gene Taylor, comments to Select Comm. Members and Staff during bus tour of coastal MS (Jan. 20, 2006).
7 Hearing on Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at Lessons Learned from Katrina Before House Gov’t Reform Committee, 109th Cong. (Sept. 15,
2005) at 11 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) [hereinafter Sept. 15, 2005 Gov’t Reform Hearing].
8 Sept. 15, 2005 Gov’t Reform Hearing at 12 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
9 Nicholas Johnston, Some House Democrats Want Larger Role in Katrina Investigation, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2005.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voice from Inside the Storm Before the Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2005).
13 Bill Walsh, Plan would let president take control in disasters; Proposal may be seen as slap at Blanco, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 22, 2005
[hereinafter Plan Article].
14 Plan Article.
15 See, e.g., George C. Wilson, Suiting Up for the Next Katrina, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 17, 2005 at 5.
16 E-mail correspondence from Johnny Anderson, aide to Gov. of LA, to other aides (Sept. 2, 2005) (11:56 p.m.).
17 John Barnshaw, Continuing Signifi cance of Race and Class among Houston Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER (Natural
Hazards Center), Nov. 2005 at 2.
18 Wash. Post Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, Survey of Hurricane Katrina evacuees (2005).
19 Christine MacDonald, Months After Katrina, a Local Storm Surge on Race and Class, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2005 at 4.
20 Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, New Orleans after the Storm: Lessons Learned from the Past, a Plan for the Future, (Oct. 2005)
at 6.
21 John Barnshaw, Continuing Signifi cance of Race and Class among Houston Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER (Natural
Hazards Center), Nov. 2005 at 3.
22 Alison Stateman, Time for a Change? What Hurricane Katrina Revealed About Race and Class in America, PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGIST, Oct. 1,
2005 at 8 (hereinafter Strategist Article).
23 Strategist Article.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 27