Reading note and answer questions
hello there,
I want some to read these files, and take a note note by word, and answer the questions in the sheet.
skip task 2
Hobbes Leviathan, Chapter 13 (XIII):
https://www-cambridge-org.uow.idm.oclc.org/core/books/hobbes-leviathan/of-the-naturall-condition-of-mankind-as-concerning-their-felicity-and-misery/2E51E1D6C1F8F3854F8F3C47CD98671D/online-view
audio: https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/13-natural-condition-mankind-as-concerning-their-felicity/id903860116?i=1000316942095&mt=2
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PIA EXERCISE SHEET
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Due before 12 noon on Monday, 12 October (Week 4) and for use in your seminar that day.
Ongoing module info you are expected to already know:
• Read this ENTIRE Exercise Sheet and open all of the materials before asking questions.
• As with Exercise Sheets 1-3, you will need to type up your notes and answers for this Exercise Sheet as
these are the only files that can be uploaded to Turnitin and checked for Originality (we will be using the
Reports for a later Skills Task).
• Be aware you are expected to spend around four hours per week (per module) on independent study –
in addition to participating actively in seminars, watching and taking notes on recorded lectures, and
joining and paying close attention in any other live sessions for each module (in our case that means the
Skills Workshops on Mondays at 2pm).
• As per above, leave sufficient time to complete the Exercise Sheet tasks (reading, thinking, notetaking,
processing the material, reflecting on the material, and answering questions!). It will take longer than
you think and you will probably be more successful if you don’t try to do it all in one sitting. If you have
waited until the weekend, you are probably too late!
• Leave sufficient time to deal with the technology (finding, accessing and downloading resources, using
Turnitin etc). Please download everything you need including this Exercise Sheet as soon as you get
access to it. This gives you time to get help from the appropriate staff member. Do not expect answers
to questions on a weekend or even last thing on a Friday. Ask earlier in the week.
o Problems using Bb or other online systems within the university? Spend time learning to use
them by visiting the Bb help pages and the Bb Institution Page (see under Sources of
Support on the PIA Bb site)
o Problems accessing or downloading reading materials? see* below and also Ask a Librarian
– library help pages
o Problems understanding module instructions? Ask the Module Leader via the Discussion
Board.
o Problems with understanding your reading or lecture material? Do your best to complete
your exercise sheet anyway. Then, ask your seminar tutor in the seminar. Ask the Module
Leader on the PIA Discussion Board (you can start a new thread). If having trouble regularly,
see your seminar tutor or the Module Leader during their office hours AND consider getting
help from Learning Support or Disability Support if appropriate (see Sources of Support on
the PIA Bb site).
• If you haven’t done so already, please read the full Module Handbook on Bb NOW! Make sure you are
up to date with announcements and any additions to the PIA Bb site.
• If you haven’t completed Exercise Sheet 1 yet, you can still do this without penalty.
• If you completed Exercise Sheet 1 before knowing who your personal tutor was, please make sure to
send it to your personal tutor now (with the covering letter) and copy this to me.
• Watch the lectures on The Idea of the State in the Week 3 Folder and make structured notes for your
own use (not for this Exercise Sheet). (These will appear by Wednesday evening this week)
http://blog.westminster.ac.uk/blackboardhelp/faqs-for-students/
https://westminster-uk.libanswers.com/
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• Watch any of the three Lectures from Week 2 that you haven’t seen had a chance to watch yet. Make
structured notes for your own use.
Reading and Notetaking Task (3)
1) Read the following encyclopedia entry:
• Ellis, Elisabeth, 2014, “The Social Contract” in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought,
edited by Michael Gibbons, Wiley Blackwell. (This is available via the Module Reading List or you
can look it up using the University Library search: Make sure you are signed in to the university
system first and then look up “Encyclopedia of Political Thought”. Once you have entered the
Encyclopedia, enter “Social Contract” in the search box at the top of the page.
• Note: The Encyclopedia is useful general resource for this and other modules. You can look up
various concepts and theories here. Do make use of it beyond this assessment.
2) Take structured notes on the Ellis article (of at least half a page long), and
answer the following questions:
• For instructions on how to take structured notes, see Exercise Sheet 3.
When answering the questions in this sheet:
• Write in complete sentences and in your own words as much as possible.
• Aim to write between one to five full sentences on each question.
• Insert inline references – including a page number – to show where you got particular answers. Like
this: (Hobbes 2019: 87). Make sure to include the year so we know exactly which edition of the
book you are using.
• Use the set text to answer the questions, but if you have to use another, make sure to reference
that, too.
• Be prepared to discuss your answers in a small group during the seminar.
• Be prepared to share at least one of these answers in front of the whole class during the seminar.
• Referencing FAQ: How to do I reference page numbers from a source on line? Download the pdf and
then use the page numbers in the pdf! Most academic articles can be downloaded as a pdf. If it has
no page numbers, it might not be a reliable (peer-reviewed) source.
Questions on Ellis (2014):
1) What do you think Ellis means by the “contractarian case”?
2) What is meant by “social contract” and what is it supposed to be for?
3) What do you think is meant by “natural right” in the context of social contract theory?
4) Why do social contract theorists believe it is worth agreeing to a social contract even though it
is a curtailment on freedom?
5) What is the link between the idea of a social contract and sovereignty?
6) What is the link between the idea of a social contract and social legitimacy?
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7) Do you think there is such a thing as a social contract today? (Explain why or why not.) How do
we consent to it if there is one?
3) Read the extract of Hobbes Leviathan, Chapter 13 (XIII), and follow the
instructions below:
Write a brief summary of each paragraph and answer the questions in italics.
Before you begin: The reading is an extract from Chapter 13 (of 47 chapters) of Thomas Hobbes’s 1651
book, Leviathan. This is a very important and well-known work of political philosophy and social contract
theory. The book is written in 17th Century English with old spellings, and can be difficult to read, so make
sure you give yourself time to interpret it. Start early and try your best to understand the message in spite
of the unfamiliar language and spelling. Treat the language like poetry which requires spending some time
with the text and its language in order to de-code it. Think of it like a particularly tricky puzzle! Taking time
to read and interpret difficult texts is part of becoming a graduate, so work at it!
Bear in mind that Hobbes is talking here about what life would be like for humans if there were no
government – this is often referred to as a “state of nature”, but it is not the same as a political state.
Think of it as the condition of nature – or a pre-state situation or even a “failed state”.
You can read the whole chapter (4 pages) available via the Reading list – OR you can use the annotated
extract below which may be a little easier for you. You can also find audio versions of this chapter on the
Reading List which you are welcome to use if that helps you.
Tips: Hobbes’s sentences are very long. Try interpreting them one individual clause at a time. (A clause is a
part of a sentence divided up by commas). Take the text one paragraph at a time. Write your
interpretation of each paragraph (or partial paragraph) below. Just do one piece at a time and then read it
again. Go slowly.
The Module Leader’s annotations are in italics. Hobbes’s text is in normal type. Words in bold and
underlined are given a definition in the annotations. The paragraphs are broken up into parts to help you
work your way through them piece by piece.
(Don’t know all the words here? Don’t just skip them! Look them up in a dictionary. What, for example, is “felicity”?
What are “faculties”?)
Paragraph 1: NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found
one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned
together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to
himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest
has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in
the same danger with himself.
Paragraph 2a: And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially
that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science, which very few have and but in few
things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else,
I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength.
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Hobbes refers here to the “faculties of the mind”? He means the intellectual abilities of most people.
Arts = disciplines or areas of study. What do you think are the “arts grounded on words”?
Hobbes is saying here that we all have the same intellectual abilities to some extent. “Prudence” is one of those
intellectual abilities (or “faculties of the mind”). What do you think he means by “prudence”? (Look it up!) And in
the next part of the same paragraph he is saying something more about where prudence comes from. Explain
this.
Paragraph 2b: For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things
they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit
of one’s own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all
men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve.
Paragraph 2c: For such is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more
witty, or more eloquent or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for
they see their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point
equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that
every man is contented with his share.
What is Hobbes’s main point in Paragraph 2?
Paragraph 3: From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if
any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in
the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only)
endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no
more to fear than another man’s single power, if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others
may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the
fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another….
The “attaining of our ends”. Ends = aims. Attaining of our ends refers to our ability to achieve our aims.
Why are other men such a threat, according to Hobbes?
Paragraph 4: Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where
there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the
same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as
he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them
destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his condemners, by damage; and from others, by the
example.
“no power able to overawe them all” = no government that everyone obeys and respects.
What is Hobbes saying here about the relationships between “men” in a world without government?
Paragraph 5: So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition;
secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
Paragraph 6: The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The
first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second,
to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue,
either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or
their name.
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What is “Diffidence”? (Look it up!!)
Explain these three “causes of quarrel”.
Paragraph 7: Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For
war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by
battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in
the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an
inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the
known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Why does Hobbes see the lack of a government as “war”? What does he mean by “war” (or “Warre”)?
What does Hobbes mean by “every man against every man”?
Paragraph 8: Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man,
the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and
their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that
may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society;
and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.
What do you think Hobbes mean by each of the following: “industry”, “culture of the earth”, “navigation”,
“commodities… imported by sea”, “commodious building” (Look up: commodious!), “instruments of moving and
removing”, “knowledge of the face of the earth”, “account of time”, “arts”, letters, “society”.
Why does he believe none of these activities or goods are possible without government?
Paragraph 9: It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus
dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another… Let him therefore consider with himself:
when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his
doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and public officers,
armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides
armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his
chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse
man’s nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions
that proceed from those passions till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot
know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it….
What is Hobbes saying in Paragraph 9 about man. Does he think man is naturally evil or bad? If not, how does
he characterize man?
Paragraph 10a: To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust.
The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power,
there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and
injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were
alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in
solitude.
What do you think Hobbes means by this last sentence?
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Paragraph 10b: It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine
and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus
much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out
of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.
What does Hobbes mean by “propriety” here?
Paragraph 11: The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary
to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles
of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the
laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters.
What do you think Hobbes means by “reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be
drawn to agreement”?
The complete Chapter 13 of Hobbes’s Leviathan can be found at on the PIA Reading List and also free online at
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3207
You may also find it useful to Listen to: this radio discussion (especially the first half) on the Social Contract
(BBC Radio 4, In Our Time, hosted by Melvin Bragg) https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b008w3xm (you
may click through from the module Reading List as well) and the radio discussion on Hobbes (In Our Time):
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003k9l1 (These are optional.)
4) Make some brief notes of your thoughts on at least four of these questions in
preparation for the seminar discussion:
1) Why do people obey the state?
2) How might the ‘state of nature’ concept help us understand why people obey the state?
3) Why does Hobbes identify natural equality as a problem?
4) What is Hobbes’ solution to natural equality?
5) Do you think Hobbes is at all concerned about individual freedom?
6) What do you think should happen to a government that betrays the social contract (and what
would this betrayal look like?
7) Do you think Hobbes’s idea of the state of nature is accurate? Why or why not?
8) How might we prevent a political authority or sovereign from slipping into authoritarianism?
Skills Task (4): Interpreting Essay Questions and Starting an Essay Introduction
1) Interpreting essay questions (the meaning of the “how to” or “process”
words and phrases in the question)
• Define the following terms as found in typical essay questions in politics and IR. In each case, write
a line explaining what these terms are asking you to do in your essay.
a. Discuss ….
b. Give evidence for/of x….
c. Illustrate….
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b008w3xm
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003k9l1
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d. Use examples (include an explanation of the type of examples you think this refers to in a
politics essay)
e. To what extent is x
f. Evaluate x
g. Justify x
h. Give an account of x
i. Compare and Contrast x and y
j. Why is it that x is?
k. Should there be an x?
l. Is x a sign of y?
2) Writing a thesis statement or an opening sentence for an essay:
Instructions: Using two of the module’s essay questions (copied below), try to formulate the first one or
two sentences for an essay on each of your chosen questions. You can either formulate a thesis
statement (which answers the question by putting forward an argument), OR you can formulate a
statement about what the essay is about (which also restates the essay question). For an idea of how to
do both of these, refer back to the Skills Workshop that took place on Monday, October 5th.
Module Essay questions – choose two (for this exercise only)
1) “Politics is about who gets what, when and how.” (Lasswell 1936). Discuss.
2) Why does Lukes argue that power affect us in insidious ways? Use examples to illustrate how this
works.
3) What is the purpose of the state and why do we accept its authority?
4) Should the state curtail civil liberties in the name of protecting citizens? Discuss with reference to
contemporary political events.
5) Why hasn’t liberal democracy delivered political and legal equality for all citizens within the state?
6) To what extent are free-market liberals right to argue that the state should not get involved in
making citizens socially or economically equal?
7) Should there be a strict firewall between religion and politics?
8) Is the recent rise of populism a sign of a democratic revival?
How to Submit your Work
This week’s submission method is a little different. You will still submit to Turnitin, but we are asking you to
submit to one of three portals. You must submit your work to the portal with your seminar leader’s name.
Please ensure you are attending the correct seminar and are aware of your seminar tutor’s name os you do
not submit your work to the wrong person.
Submit your work by 12:00 noon on Monday, October 5th through the Turnitin submission portal in the
Week 2 Folder on Bb. You will need to type up your notes, even if they are initially handwritten. Write your
answers into a word document and Save As: “Your Full Name, Exercise Sheet 3”. Inside the document,
include your name, student number and the section headings in this sheet so we can easily see which parts
you are answering.
If you need information about how to submit: follow the Online Submission Guidance, and these
instructions. More information about what Turnitin is and how it works is at the bottom of this FAQs page.
http://blog.westminster.ac.uk/blackboardhelp/online-course-submission/
http://blog.westminster.ac.uk/blackboardhelp/wp-content/uploads/sites/73/2019/11/Submitting-assignments-via-Turnitin-assignment-Ultra
http://blog.westminster.ac.uk/blackboardhelp/faqs-for-students/
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If you have problems with Turnitin see the FAQs. Then, if still having issues, you can Log a Call to IT. It is
important to leave plenty of time to complete and submit your work in case you have technical issues.
*You will find the essential readings on the Module Reading List under Learning Resources. When accessing
the books, you may be taken to a page giving you a range of access points. Choose “Shibboleth”, then enter
our university name. You should then be able to sign in with your usual Westminster login details. If you
encounter further problems finding or accessing a source at any point, remember to Ask a Librarian!
https://servicedesk.westminster.ac.uk/MSMSelfService/
https://westminster-uk.libanswers.com/
- Chapter XIII ‘Of The Natural Condition Of Mankind As Concerning Their Felicity And Misery’
The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0949
Social Contract
Elisabeth Ellis
“Social contract” means different things in dif-
ferent contexts; there is no single authoritative
social contract theory. In present-day popular
discourse, the phrase is often used to denote
a more or less tacit agreement in which the
people remain obedient in exchange for a
minimum package of social conditions. For
example, Richard Eskow recently blogged that
a number of government programs embody
our social contract [in the United States].
Medicare, Medicaid, welfare, food assistance –
each reflects the vision of a society which rec-
ognizes that its shared interests are reflected
in the safety and well-being of each of its
members. But perhaps no program in this
country reflects the social contract more
clearly than Social Security. (Eskow 2013 )
In the history of political thought, “social
contract” has most often referred, similarly, to
the idea that legitimate public order has its
basis in the people (in their consent, their will,
their interests, the possibility of their rational
agreement, or some other representation). The
threat of anarchy is a common thread among
social contract theorists: from John Locke’s
refrain that the “People shall be judge” to the
common protest chant of “No justice, no
peace,” the social contract is said to guarantee
public order, while its breach would bring
violent disorder. This entry will discuss the
general contractarian case for how a state can
legitimately coerce subjects conceived of as
naturally free. We shall refer to some prominent
modern contract theorists such as Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, as well as to argu-
ments made in the present day. Rather than
give a chronological account of the development
over time of arguments in the social contract
tradition, we shall follow the logic of social
contract from its basis in natural right to its
conclusions about popular sovereignty.
There have of course been many other, non-
contractarian strategies for legitimating the
state. For example, James I and others argue
that God’s order prescribes ruling to kings and
obedience to people. In contrast to this theory
of the divine right of kings, social contract
theory begins with people’s natural rights
(these can be justified with or without refer-
ence to divinity). Each author constructs a
unique version of contract theory, but the main
lines of the social contractarian argument pro-
ceed as follows. We imagine a “state of nature” in
which there is no political (and sometimes also
no social) order; no one exercises legitimate
authority and everyone operates independently,
as a free agent. Everyone naturally pursues his
or her own interests under conditions of rad-
ical uncertainty (no one knows what course of
action will in fact lead to maximum security).
A human being’s very survival depends on
cooperation with others, however, and the
more cooperation is possible in a society, the
more human flourishing is possible. It is hard
to imagine how people in the state of nature
can safely cooperate with each other when they
have no external source of assurance that
promises will be kept. The basic logic of social
contract is as simple as the logic one might
employ when conducting an economic trans-
action with a stranger: using a credit card
rather than cash involves a third party who can
guarantee some of the commitments made on
each side. Cash transactions take place in a
relative state of nature compared to credit card
transactions, offering both risks and freedoms
compared to the relative security and submis-
sion to third-party surveillance of the credit
card-based alternative.
Political theorists often illustrate this
collective action problem with the famous
“prisoner’s dilemma.” Imagine that a pair of
confederate criminals have been caught by the
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authorities and the two of them are locked up
in separate prison cells, unable to communi-
cate with one another. The authorities do not
have enough information to convict the two on
the most serious charge, though they could
convict both of them on lesser charges on the
basis of the evidence they have at the outset. If
at least one of the criminals would betray the
other by giving the authorities the information
they need, then the authorities would be able to
make the most serious charges stick. Therefore
the authorities offer each prisoner a deal: to
give evidence against his/her confederate in
exchange for a reduced sentence. If both
prisoners take the deal, then each serves a
medium-length sentence – which is based on
joint responsibility for the more serious crime
(say, two years each). Should only one prisoner
take the deal and provide information to the
state, then that prisoner would be set free,
while his/her confederate would pay a high
price for remaining loyal to the other prisoner:
the maximum sentence (of, say, three years). If
the prisoners could trust each other, they could
both stay mum and serve short sentences, on
the basis of the lesser charge only (say, a one-
year term). In the absence of such trust, how-
ever, each has an incentive to rat the other one
out, since staying mum and being ratted out
yields a longer term (three years) than the
reduced sentence a rat would receive in either
case (two or zero years). The best collective
outcome of one year of incarceration each
cannot be reached by noncommunicating,
individually rational actors. We can easily see
how, in the absence of trust and communica-
tion, each player follows his/her individual
rational interest and defects from the collective
interest, which results in the worst possible
collective outcome from the prisoners’ point
of view. This risky environment, in which
players are autonomous and unable to make
commitments to each other, represents a game-
theoretic version of the classic state of nature.
Social contract theorists diverge in their
assessments of just how terrible the state of
nature would be, but none of them suggests
remaining in it. Even Rousseau, who famously
contrasts the corrupt inauthenticity of modern
life with the rustic simplicity of an earlier
time, insists on individual submission to sover-
eign rule. The state of nature is a thought
experiment, not a historical account; it is meant
to explain why naturally free individuals ought
to submit to political authority. There do
exist more or less complete states of nature –
circumstances in which no legitimate source of
authority adjudicates interactions – in the
world, most prominently in international rela-
tions. Immanuel Kant, for example, argues that
the idea of the social contract should determine
sovereign states to leave the international state
of nature and move toward what he calls a “civil
condition” among states. But though we might
reasonably characterize international relations
as a state of nature, there are no historical states
of nature consisting of autarkic individuals: real
people (and also some nonhuman animals) are
born into social circumstances complete with
norms that promote cooperation more or less
imperfectly, and nearly everyone is subject to
some kind of political authority. Locke refers to
this sociable reality when he says that liberty is
not a state of license; but even people inhabiting
the relatively peaceable Lockean version of the
state of nature would want to exchange it for
the civil condition. Collective submission to
an authoritative sovereign would solve the
problem that people are not very reliable judges
of natural right in cases that involve their own
interests, and it would provide a regular way to
control free riders, bandits, and other offenders
against the collective interest. Lockean sover-
eignty can be revoked in cases where the ruler
has stopped protecting the people against rule-
breakers (or has become one him- or herself ).
However, even the state’s temporary protection
is still preferable to the state of nature. Here is
Hobbes’s description of it:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time
of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every
man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than
what their own strength, and their own
invention shall furnish them withall. In such
condition, there is no place for Industry;
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because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently no Culture of the Earth; no
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that
may be imported by Sea; no commodious
Building; no Instruments of moving, and
removing such things as require much force;
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no
account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall
feare, and danger of violent death; And the
life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short. (Hobbes 2010 : ch. 13)
Hobbes provides the most vivid description
of the price of anarchy, and his theory gives
us the most absolute version of sovereignty
among contractarians. But, even though Hobbes
disagrees with his successors about the revoca-
bility of sovereign authority, all contractarians
agree that social cooperation among limited
rational human beings requires some external
guarantor (while the sovereign performs this
function for Hobbes, the rule of law does so for
Kant, for example). Critics of contractarianism
such as Elinor Ostrom disagree, arguing that
under the right circumstances human beings
are able to cooperate without any external guar-
antor (Ostrom cites empirical examples, from
rural meadow management to fishing coopera-
tives, but she also employs the same game-
theoretical reasoning prized by present-day
contractarians). Other critics of social contract
theory have pointed out that contractarians tell
a voluntarist story in support of violent regimes
that are anything but voluntary (Nietzsche,
Foucault); that real people, when given the
choice to join the contractarian state, have fled
and resisted for good reasons (Scott); that
contract theory’s emphasis on agreement among
equal agents leaves us blind to essential elements
of justice toward others – like animals and the
disabled (Nussbaum); and that social contract
rhetoric has masked the subordination of
women (Pateman) and of people of color
(Mills). Only an unempirical commitment to
ideological contractarianism could lead one to
dismiss these criticisms out of hand.
However, there is an important difference
between dogmatic commitment to supposedly
contractarian principles and the many-faceted
basic insights of social contract theory. It is a
mistake to reify the institutions that seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century contractarians
employed in their day to vindicate their
commitments to equality and freedom, as
present-day contractarians often do with the
institution of property rights, for example (see
Ellis 2006 ). Though there are as many social
contract theories as there are contractarian
authors, contract theories share a recognition of
people’s equal rights to freedom. According to
social contract theorists, the state will always be
necessary for limited rational beings like our-
selves. We ought to submit to a common
authority capable of overcoming the barriers to
collective action that anarchy entails. However,
social contract theorists agree, legitimate
coercive power can only be exercised in the
name of the people.
SEE ALSO: Collective Action ; Divine Right of
Kings ; Freedom ; Game Theory ; Hobbes, Thomas
(1588–1679) ; Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) ; Locke,
John (1632–1704) ; Natural Law ; Natural Rights ;
Political Obligation ; Popular Sovereignty ; Rawls,
John (1921–2002) ; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
(1712–78)
References
Ellis , E. ( 2006 ) “ Citizenship and Property Rights:
A New Look at Social Contract Theory ,” Journal
of Politics , 68 ( 3 ), 544 – 55 .
Eskow , R. ( 2013 ) “Was This the Social
Contract’s Comeback Year?” http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/was-this-the-
social-contr_b_4516859.html (accessed
January 3, 2013).
Hobbes , T. ( 2010 ) Leviathan , ed. I. Shapiro .
New Haven , CT: Yale University Press .
Further Reading
Hopfl , H. and Thompson , M. P. ( 1979 ) “ The
History of Contract as a Motif in Political
Thought ,” American Historical Review , 84 ( 4 ),
919 – 44 .
Kant , I. ( 1996 ) Practical Philosophy , ed.
M. J. Gregor . Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press .
4
Locke , J. ( 2003 ) Two Treatises of Government and a
Letter concerning Toleration , ed. I. Shapiro .
New Haven, CT : Yale University Press .
Mills , C. W. ( 1997 ) The Racial Contract . Ithaca,
NY : Cornell University Press .
Nussbaum , M. ( 2006 ) Frontiers of Justice: Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership . Cambridge,
MA : Harvard University Press .
Ostrom , E. ( 1990 ) Governing the Commons: The
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action .
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
Pateman , C. ( 1988 ) The Sexual Contract . Stanford,
CA ; Stanford University Press .
Rawls , J. ( 1971 ) A Theory of Justice . Cambridge,
MA : Harvard University Press .
Rousseau , J.-J . ( 2002 ) The Social Contract and
the First and Second Discourses , ed. S. Dunn .
New Haven, CT : Yale University Press .
Scott , J. C. ( 2009 ) The Art of Not Being
Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland
Southeast Asia . New Haven, CT : Yale
University Press .