Reading Analysis

1. The second option is to use the Correll reading to explain the Zenger and Folkman found that when women assess their own leadership abilities, they rate themselves harshly.

Final Paper

You have two options for your final paper:

1. The first option is an analysis of the HRB case, Seaside Organics, in which you would respond to the following prompt:

Compare and contrast the leadership of Sara Norton and Ernest Shackleton.

If you choose this option, you would need to purchase the case online from Harvard Business Review ($8.95). The link is

here

. You can also google the title of the case: Seaside Organics. But make sure you are purchasing the case and not something else, i.e. make sure it’s from HBR and that it’s $8.95.

2. The second option is to use the Correll reading to explain the Zenger and Folkman finding that when women assess their own leadership abilities, they rate themselves harshly.

If you choose this option, the two readings you will need are:

Zenger, Jack and Joseph Folkman. 2019. “Research: Women Score Higher Than Men in Most Leadership Skills.” Harvard Business Review, June 25, 2019.

Correll, Shelley J. 2004. “Constraints into Preferences: Gender, Status, and Emerging Career Aspirations.” American Sociological Review 69 (1): 93-113.

Whichever option you choose, your response should be in essay format. Your essay should have an introduction, body, and conclusion. Your paper should be 3 pages, double-spaced, 12-point font, 1 in. margins.

You should proof read your writing and, if possible, ask someone else to read your essay. Writing with errors and typos will lose points. You should cite sources. Please submit your responses on Quercus by midnight EST Tuesday April 6th.

GENDER

Research: Women Score Higher
Than Men in Most Leadership
Skills
by Jack Zenger and Joseph Folkman

JUNE 25, 2019

ALEX AND LAILA/GETTY IMAGES

For the first time in history, a major political party in the United States has several women who have

declared their candidacy to be their party’s presidential nominee. But TV pundits have been

questioning whether, despite the progress indicated by the huge influx of women elected into

https://hbr.org/topic/gender

https://hbr.org/search?term=jack%20zenger

https://hbr.org/search?term=joseph%20folkman

Congress last fall, the U.S. is ever going to elect a woman to the country’s highest leadership

position.

This is baffling to us, especially in light of what we see in our corporate research. In two articles from

2012 (here and here) we discussed findings from our analysis of 360-degree reviews that women in

leadership positions were perceived as being every bit as effective as men. In fact, while the

differences were not huge, women scored at a statistically significantly higher level than men on the

vast majority of leadership competencies we measured.

We recently updated that research, again looking at our database of 360-degree reviews in which we

ask individuals to rate each leaders’ effectiveness overall and to judge how strong they are on

specific competencies, and had similar findings: that women in leadership positions are perceived

just as — if not more — competent as their male counterparts.

Still, the disturbing fact is that the percentage of women in senior leadership roles in businesses has

remained relatively steady since we conducted our original research. Only 4.9% of Fortune 500

CEOs and 2% of S&P 500 CEOs are women. And those numbers are declining globally.

There are of course many factors that contribute to this dearth of women at senior levels. For

centuries, there have been broad, cultural biases against women and stereotypes die slowly. People

have long believed that many women elect not to aspire to the highest ranks of the organization and

take themselves out of the running (though recent research disputes that). Lots of research has

shown that unconscious bias places a significant role in hiring and promotion decisions, which also

contributes to the lower number of women in key positions.

Our current data presents even more compelling evidence that this bias is incorrect and

unwarranted. Women are perceived by their managers — particularly their male managers — to be

slightly more effective than men at every hierarchical level and in virtually every functional area of

the organization. That includes the traditional male bastions of IT, operations, and legal.

As you can see in the chart below, women were rated as excelling in taking initiative, acting with

resilience, practicing self-development, driving for results, and displaying high integrity and

honesty. In fact, they were thought to be more effective in 84% of the competencies that we most

https://hbr.org/2012/03/a-study-in-leadership-women-do

https://hbr.org/2012/04/gender-shouldnt-matter-but-app

http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies

https://hbr.org/2018/05/what-most-people-get-wrong-about-men-and-women

https://hbr.org/2014/12/rethink-what-you-know-about-high-achieving-women

https://hbr.org/2016/04/if-theres-only-one-woman-in-your-candidate-pool-theres-statistically-no-chance-shell-be-hired

frequently measure.

According to our updated data, men were rated as being better on two capabilities —”develops

strategic perspective” and “technical or professional expertise,” which were the same capabilities

where they earned higher ratings in our original research as well.

Women Are Rated Better Than Men on Key Leadership Capabilities
According to an analysis of thousands of 360-degree reviews, women outscored men on 17 of the 19

capabilities that differentiate excellent leaders from average or poor ones.

Capability Women’s percentile Men’s percentile

Takes initiative 55.6 48.2

Resilience 54.7 49.3

Practices self-development 54.8 49.6

Drives for results 53.9 48.8

Displays high integrity and honesty 54.0 49.1

Develops others 54.1 49.8

Inspires and motivates others 53.9 49.7

Bold leadership 53.2 49.8

Builds relationships 53.2 49.9

Champions change 53.1 49.8

Establishes stretch goals 52.6 49.7

Collaboration and teamwork 52.6 50.2

Connects to the outside world 51.6 50.3

Communicates powerfully and prolically 51.8 50.7

Solves problems and analyzes issues 51.5 50.4

Leadership speed 51.5 50.5

Innovates 51.4 51

Technical or professional expertise 50.1 51.1

© HBR

Develops strategic perspective 50.1 51.4

NOTE: THE T-VALUES OF ALL DATA ARE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
SOURCE: ZENGER FOLKMAN 2019

Interestingly, our data shows that when women are asked to assess themselves, they are not as

generous in their ratings. In the last few years we created a self-assessment that measures, among

other things, confidence. We’ve been collecting data since 2016 (from 3,876 men and 4,779 women

so far) on levels of confidence leaders have in themselves over their careers and we saw some

interesting trends.

When we compare confidence ratings for men and women, we see a large difference in those under

25. It’s highly probable that those women are far more competent than they think they are, while

the male leaders are overconfident and assuming they are more competent than they are. At age 40,

the confidence ratings merge. As people age their confidence generally increases; surprisingly, over

the age of 60 we see male confidence decline, while female confidence increases. According to our

data, men gain just 8.5 percentile points in confidence from age 25 to their 60+ years. Women, on

the other hand, gain 29 percentile points. One note: This is what we see in our data though we

recognize that there are studies that come to different conclusions on whether women truly lack

confidence at early stages in their career.

These findings dovetail with other research that shows women are less likely to apply for jobs unless

they are confident they meet most of the listed qualifications. A man and woman with identical

credentials, who both lack experience for a higher level position, come to different conclusions

about being prepared for the promotion. The man is more inclined to assume that he can learn what

he’s missing, while in the new job. He says to himself, “I am close enough.”  The woman is inclined

to be more wary, and less willing to step up in that circumstance.

https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men

https://hbr.org/2018/05/what-most-people-get-wrong-about-men-and-women

https://hbr.org/2014/08/why-women-dont-apply-for-jobs-unless-theyre-100-qualified

 

It’s possible that these lower levels of confidence at younger ages could motivate women to take

more initiative, be more resilient, and to be more receptive to feedback from others, which in turn

makes them more effective leaders in the long run.

We see a similar trend in women’s perceptions of their overall leadership effectiveness, with their

rating rising as they get older. This data is from a study that includes 40,184 men and 22,600 women

and measures the overall effectiveness rating of males and females on 49 unique behaviors that

predict a leaders effectiveness. Again, women at younger ages rate themselves significantly lower

than men but their ratings climb — and eventually supersede those of men — as they get older.

 

This data continues to reinforce our observations from our previous research — women make highly

competent leaders, according to those who work most closely with them — and what’s holding them

back is not lack of capability but a dearth of opportunity. When given those opportunities, women

are just as likely to succeed in higher level positions as men.

Keep in mind that our data is mostly perceptions of current and past behavior and performance.

That’s different than a promotional decision that involves movement to a higher position and

involves taking a bigger risk. If 96 out of 100 people currently serving in comparable positions are

male, and you are making the decision about who to promote, and you have a highly qualified

female and a highly qualified male, what are you inclined to do? It may seem safer to choose the

man.

Leaders need to take a hard look at what gets in the way of promoting women in their organizations.

Clearly, the unconscious bias that women don’t belong in senior level positions plays a big role. It’s

imperative that organizations change the way they make hiring and promotion decisions and ensure

that eligible women are given serious consideration. Those making those decisions need to pause

and ask, “Are we succumbing to unconscious bias? Are we automatically giving the nod to a man

when there’s an equally competent woman?” And, as our data on confidence shows, there’s a need

for organizations to give more encouragement to women. Leaders can assure them of their

competence and encourage them to seek promotions earlier in their careers.

Jack Zenger is the CEO of Zenger/Folkman, a leadership development consultancy. He is a
coauthor of the October 2011 HBR article “Making Yourself Indispensable” and the book Speed: How

Leaders Accelerate Successful Execution (McGraw Hill, 2016). Connect with Jack at

twitter.com/jhzenger.

Joseph Folkman is the president of Zenger/Folkman, a leadership development consultancy.
He is a coauthor of the October 2011 HBR article “Making Yourself Indispensable” and the book Speed:

How Leaders Accelerate Successful Execution (McGraw Hill, 2016). Connect with Joe at

twitter.com/joefolkman.

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Lynne Copp 12 hours ago

Very good article, thank you. For the past five years I have been conducting a study based on my hypothesis “There is

no such thing as a glass ceiling, but there are toxins in the walls!” and the data is compelling. Your study adds to this

and confirms some of our specific findings. Unlike some of the other comments below, leaders are not born and

leaders are not all warriors. Leaders are custodians of leadership and that is a very different focus. Good leadership is

certainly needed in many aspects of our world today and followership is not a decision made by leaders, but by

followers. Winston Churchill once said “Leadership without followership is like the sound of one hand clapping”… Our

study maps the leadership environment in which women can succeed as great leaders, and defines the toxins that

prevent growth for both men and women. Alongside studies like your own, I am sure that we will soon map the

terrain in which women and men will succeed and I suspect that will be a different way of leading organisations too

…and a different yardstick to measure success other than the traditional…

Thanks again, insightful.

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How do gender differences in career choic-es emerge? Understanding the gendered
nature of the career choice process is important
since, to the extent that men and women make
different career-relevant choices throughout
their lives, the labor force will continue to be
segregated by gender. Gender segregation in
paid work is stubbornly resilient, persisting
despite other structural changes in society,

changes such as the vast movement of women
into paid work in recent decades (Jacobs 1989,
1995a; Jacobsen 1994; Reskin 1993) and the
transformation of work content due to techno-
logical changes and the increase in service sec-
tor jobs (England 1981; Game and Pringle 1983;
Reskin and Roos 1990; Tienda and Ortiz 1987).
The distribution of men and women into dif-
ferent kinds of occupations, firms, and estab-
lishments is consequential, explaining the
majority of the gender gap in wages (Peterson
and Morgan 1995).

Many explanations of this continued segre-
gation have examined the impact of “demand-
side” processes, a phrase referring to processes
that lead to a greater demand for men when
f illing more desirable jobs (Anker 1997;
England 1992; Nelson and Bridges 1999;
Reskin and Roos 1990). This paper focuses

Constraints iinto PPreferences:
Gender, SStatus, aand EEmerging CCareer AAspirations

Shelley J. Correll
Cornell University

This study presents an experimental evaluation of a model that describes the

constraining effect of cultural beliefs about gender on the emerging career-relevant

aspirations of men and women. The model specifies the conditions under which gender

status beliefs evoke a gender-differentiated double standard for attributing performance

to ability, which differentially biases the way men and women assess their own

competence at tasks that are career relevant, controlling for actual ability. The model

implies that, if men and women make different assessments of their own competence at

career-relevant tasks, they will also form different aspirations for career paths and

activities believed to require competence at these tasks. Data from the experiment

support this model. In one condition, male and female undergraduate participants

completed an experimental task after being exposed to a belief that men are better at this

task. In this condition, male participants assessed their task ability higher than female

participants did even though all were given the same scores. Males in this condition also

had higher aspirations for career-relevant activities described as requiring competence

at the task. No gender differences were found in either assessments or aspirations in a

second condition where participants were instead exposed to a belief that men and

women have equal task ability. To illustrate the utility of the model in a “real world”

(i.e., nonlaboratory) setting, results are compared to a previous survey study that showed

men make higher assessments of their own mathematical ability than women, which

contributes to their higher rates of persistence on paths to careers in science, math, and

engineering.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 22004, VVOL. 669 ((February:93–113)

#1331-ASR 69:1 f lename:69106-correll

Direct all correspondence to Shelley J. Correll,
Department of Sociology, Cornell University, 323
Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, sjc62@cornell.edu.
This project was made possible with support from the
National Science Foundation (award no. SES-
0000201) and the Institute for Research on Women
and Gender, Stanford University. I wish to thank
Cecilia Ridgeway and Myra Marx Ferree for their
helpful suggestions and guidance.

instead on the “supply side” of the issue by
addressing how men and women develop pref-
erences or aspirations for different kinds of
work.1 Most scholars of gender inequality have
been reluctant to develop supply-side explana-
tions because these explanations often “blame
the victim” (Browne and England 1997).
However, by developing models that are truly
sociological (i.e., that explicate how macro-
level variables constrain individual action) it
should be possible to understand how gender
differences in career choices emerge without
simultaneously suggesting that women volun-
tarily choose less advantageous positions in the
labor market.

This paper, which is part of a larger project
to develop a theory about gender and the career
choice process, presents an experimental eval-
uation of one model that describes the con-
straining effects of cultural beliefs about gender
on the emerging career-relevant preferences or
aspirations of men and women. The main
hypothesis is that cultural beliefs about gender
that accord men higher status in society than
women (i.e., status beliefs) can evoke gender-
differentiated standards for attributing per-
formance to ability, which differentially biases
the assessments men and women make of their
own competence at career-relevant tasks. This
paper uses status characteristics theory and the
empirical literature on stereotype threat to
explain how and when this biasing effect is like-
ly to occur. The implication is that, if individu-
als act on gender-differentiated evaluations of
their own competence when forming aspira-
tions for activities that lead to different careers,
then status beliefs about gender will also dif-
ferentially impact the career-relevant choices
that men and women make. In the aggregate, if
men and women systematically make different
career-relevant choices, the gender-segregated
labor force is necessarily reproduced. Before
developing the model further, I briefly review
supply-side explanations of gender segregation
in paid work.

SUPPLY-SIDE EEXPLANATIONS OOF
GENDER SSEGREGATION

Early on the path to many careers, men and
women—indeed, even boys and girls—begin
to differentially commit themselves to activities
that are career relevant. As early as high school,
and even more strikingly by college, young men
and women elect to take different kinds of cours-
es and choose different college majors, which
produces gender differences in the kinds jobs
that are later seen as plausible options for stu-
dents (AAUW 1992; Jacobs 1995b; National
Science Board 1993; National Science
Foundation 1994). Given this early gender diver-
gence, it is probably not surprising that those
who study labor market matching processes
(i.e., the processes by which prospective
employees become matched with employers)
f ind that the supply networks from which
employers recruit are highly segregated by gen-
der (Granovetter and Tilly 1988). The gender
segregation of job supply networks means that,
even if all gender discrimination at the point of
hire and subsequent promotion were removed,
considerable gender segregation would still
remain in paid work due to the different and
seemingly voluntary career choices men and
women make.

HUMAN CAPITAL EXPLANATIONS

Scholars studying labor market matching
processes tend to downplay the issue of gender
differences in job supply networks. They assume
that men and women have different tastes, pref-
erences, or ways of maximizing utility, which
leads to differences in men’s and women’s choic-
es in careers and/or jobs. For example, human
capital theorists have argued that women choose
jobs with flatter rates of wage growth, because
these jobs, which are primarily in female-dom-
inated occupations, have smaller wage penalties
for sustained periods of absence from the paid
labor force and have higher starting wages
(Polachek 1976, 1981; Zellner 1975). According
to these theories, women know they will likely
need to take an extended absence for child birth
and/or care, so they choose jobs with the above
characteristics to maximize their lifetime earn-
ings. However, England and colleagues (1984;
1988) demonstrate that, contrary to the predic-
tions of human capital theory, women employed

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1 In taking a supply-side approach, I am not sug-
gesting that demand-side approaches are not impor-
tant. To the contrary, this has been and continues to
be a very important line of work. My argument is that
demand-side process cannot fully account for gender
segregation in paid labor (see England 1992 and
Reskin and Roos 1990 for a review).

in male-dominated occupations actually have
higher lifetime earnings.

When human capital theorists are confront-
ed with evidence that men and women with
equivalent human capital are found in jobs with
different wages or different lifetime earning
potential, they often expand their model of indi-
vidual choice (Glass 1990). The most common
expansion of this model is that women choose
jobs that maximize their ability to coordinate
family and paid work responsibilities (Marini
and Brinton 1984; Polachek 1976). However,
Glass (1990) shows that male-dominated jobs—
compared with female-dominated jobs—are
actually associated with more flexibility and
autonomy, thus allowing a person, for example,
to more easily leave work to tend to a sick child.
In sum, women maximize neither earnings nor
their ability to coordinate family and paid work
duties by working in female-dominated occu-
pations, leaving the question of why women
and men choose different kinds of careers unan-
swered by the human capital perspective.

CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHOICE

What is needed is a supply-side approach that
recognizes that the culture in which individuals
are embedded constrains or limits what these
individuals deem possible or appropriate, there-
by shaping the preferences and aspirations that
individuals develop for activities leading to var-
ious careers, often starting early in the life
course. Pierre Bourdieu (1984 [1979:175]) artic-
ulated a most compelling explanation of this
type of approach when he described how social
class frames or constrains preferences and
choices. Bourdieu noted that the “habitus,”
which includes an internalization of the power
and status relationships between groups of peo-
ple in a society, “continuously transforms neces-
sities into strategies, constraints into preferences
and, without any mechanical determination, it
generates a set of ‘choices’|.|.|.|It is a virtue
made of necessity which continuously trans-
forms necessity into virtue by inducing ‘choic-
es’ which correspond to the condition of which
it is the product.”

This description is engaging, but it fails to
specify how choices are induced. One goal of
the current project is to develop a model that can
account for this type of constraint on choice and
that can be evaluated empirically. While there
are undoubtedly many reasons why individuals

develop preferences for one career or another,
my model assumes that, as a minimum, indi-
viduals must believe they have the skills nec-
essary for a given career in order to develop
preferences for that career. I refer to a person’s
understanding of his or her own competence as
a “self-assessment.” The model explains how
cultural beliefs about gender bias the formation
of self-assessments of their competence at
career-relevant tasks. I use “career-relevant” to
refer to tasks, activities, decisions, and aspira-
tions that, when performed, enacted, or held,
impact the trajectory or path of an individual’s
job or career history. For example, going to
graduate school is a career-relevant activity.
Before developing the model further, I first
describe a companion study in the larger proj-
ect that shows the benefit of focusing on self-
assessments of task competence when trying to
understand how gender differences in career
preferences or aspirations emerge.

Using a national probability sample of high
school and college students, I measured the
extent to which cultural beliefs about gender and
mathematics contribute to the gender gap in
careers in science, math, and engineering
(Correll 2001). Research has shown that stu-
dents, parents, and teachers perceive mathe-
matic skills to be associated with masculinity
and verbal skills are not (c.f., Hyde et al. 1990).
Assuming that students in my sample were
aware of these beliefs, I hypothesized that cul-
tural beliefs about gender and mathematics lead
men to make higher assessments of their own
mathematical competence than women do.
Controlling for grades and test scores in math-
ematics, I found that male high school students
indeed rated their own mathematical ability (but
not verbal ability) higher than female students
did. Also, self-assessments of task competence
impacted early career-relevant decisions: con-
trolling for actual ability, the higher students
assessed their own mathematical ability, the
greater their odds of enrolling in a high school
calculus course and choosing a college major in
science, math, or engineering. Most impor-
tantly, when mathematical self-assessment lev-
els were controlled, the previous higher
enrollment of male students in a calculus course
disappeared and the gender gap in college major
choice was reduced.

Similarly, the psychologist Eccles and her
colleagues (Eccles 1994; Eccles, Barber and
Jozefowicz 1999) analyzed longitudinal survey

CONSTRAINTS IINTO PPREFERENCES—–95

#1331-ASR 69:1 f lename:69106-correll

data from a sample of students in Michigan to
evaluate part of their model of achievement-
related choices. Their analyses show that the
“cultural milieu” (which includes gender role
stereotypes) influences parents’ expectations of
their children’s abilities, which ultimately influ-
ences children’s self-perceptions and their deci-
sions regarding school course selection.

The results of the companion study (Correll
2001), and less directly the results of Eccles
(1994; Eccles et al. 1999), provide evidence
that is consistent with the main causal hypoth-
esis that cultural beliefs about gender differen-
tially bias men and women’s self-assessments of
task competence.2 The companion study also
uses “real world” data to show the utility of the
model: self-assessments of task competence
impact career-relevant decisions. However, these
results can only provide limited support for the
more general theoretical model for several rea-
sons.

First, although the results of the companion
study were obtained using a probability sample,
they are still specific to a very limited set of
tasks and professions, thereby limiting the gen-
erality of the model. Second, while the results
illustrate the impact of self-assessments, they do
not definitively support the hypothesis that cul-
tural beliefs about gender bias their formation.
This is because we must assume that the students
in the sample were aware of the cultural beliefs
about gender, mathematical abilities, and ver-
bal abilities, and this awareness caused the
observed gender differences in self-assessments
of competence. Since we could not isolate and
manipulate students’ exposure to gender beliefs
associated with these abilities, we could not
rule out competing explanations for the findings.
For example, the companion study could not
address the possibility that mathematical self-
assessments tap an additional component of

“real” mathematical ability not captured by
math grades and test scores that served as con-
trols of mathematical ability. If this is correct,
the higher self-assessments male students make
of their mathematical ability might not be the
result of cultural beliefs about gender and math-
ematics that exist in society, but might instead
emerge because men “really are better” at math-
ematics. To the extent that measures of ability
are imperfect, statistical controls of ability can-
not rule out explanations of unmeasured actu-
al ability.

The following social psychological experi-
ment was designed to overcome these limita-
tions and provide evidence that allows for a
more definitive evaluation of how gender sta-
tus beliefs bias self-assessments of task com-
petence, as described below. However, each
type of data (i.e., the data from the experiment
and data from the probability sample) has its
own strengths. Therefore, the theoretical argu-
ment is best evaluated by simultaneously con-
sidering the results of these two companion
studies. Before describing the experiment, I
first develop the theoretical model.

STATUS BBELIEFS, SSELF-ASSESSMENTS,
AND EEMERGING AASPIRATIONS

I rely on status characteristics theory and the
empirical literature on “stereotype threat” to
develop a model that describes the constraining
effect of cultural beliefs about gender on self-
assessments of task competence and emerging
career-relevant aspirations. Status characteris-
tics theory has developed empirically support-
ed propositions linking cultural beliefs about
social categories (such as gender and race) with
inequalities in participation and evaluations in
collectively oriented task groups (i.e., groups
who work together to complete a joint task,
such as work groups or athletic teams) (Berger
et al. 1977). The literature on stereotype threat
suggests that the impact of these beliefs on the
reproduction of categorical inequality might
occur in a wider range of settings than collec-
tively oriented task groups, including situations
where individuals evaluate or assess their own
task competence in non-group settings.

STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY

An attribute that differentiates people is a sta-
tus characteristic if there are widely held beliefs

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#1331-ASR 69:1 f lename:69106-correll

2 Both Eccles (1994) and Correll (2001) suggest
that cultural beliefs about gender impact individuals’
self-perceptions and career or educational decisions,
though their causal mechanisms differ. For a more
detailed comparison, see Correll (2001). For a more
general description of how psychological sex role
socialization explanations differ from situational
approaches, see Wagner and Berger (1997). The
model and method presented in the current study
have advantages over both Eccles (1994) and Correll
(2001).

in the culture attaching greater social value and
competence with one category of the attribute
(men, computer expert) than another (women,
computer novice) (Berger et al. 1977). Although
status characteristics, as defined by the theory,
have beliefs about the relative competence of
social categories attached to them, whether or
not these beliefs generalize from the category
to a member of the category in any particular
instance depends on features of the setting. The
theory is composed of propositions about when
this generalization will occur and how it leads
to inequalities in participation and evaluations
(Berger et al. 1977; Lovaglia et al. 1998; Troyer
and Younts 1997; Webster and Foschi 1988).

Status characteristics theory has primarily
restricted its scope to collectively oriented task
groups because in these groups, the shared pres-
sure to successfully complete the group’s task
causes group members to unconsciously antic-
ipate the relative quality of each member’s future
task performances. When a status characteris-
tic is salient for individuals in a setting, as
def ined below, its cultural association with
greater or lesser worthiness and competence
shapes the implicit and relative performance
expectations members form for one another.
Those possessing the more valued state of a
salient characteristic are expected to offer more
valuable task contributions in the group than
those with the less valued state. Therefore, in a
self-fulfilling manner, higher status individuals
are given more opportunities to participate and,
when they do participate in the group, their
contributions are evaluated more positively.
Experiments confirm that a wide variety of sta-
tus characteristics systematically organize influ-
ence, participation, and the appearance of
competence in this manner (see Webster and
Foschi 1988).

The strength of status characteristics theory
is that in addition to demonstrating that status
characteristics influence behaviors and evalua-
tions, it also specifies the circumstances under
which status characteristics have their effect
and the relative strength of their impact under
differing conditions. For example, a status char-
acteristic is only predicted to impact behavior
or evaluation when it is salient in the setting. A
status characteristic is salient when it differen-
tiates those in a group (e.g., gender is salient in
a mixed-sex group) or when it is believed to be
relevant to the group’s focal task (e.g., com-
puter expert/novice might be relevant to a group

whose goal is to design a web page) (Wagner
and Berger 1993). The theory further argues
that any salient status characteristic will shape
expectations of those in the setting unless it is
specifically dissociated from the task at hand.
That is, the burden of proof lies with establish-
ing that the characteristic is not relevant.
However, the more directly relevant to the task
the characteristic is perceived to be, the greater
the strength of the impact of the status charac-
teristic on behaviors and evaluations. For exam-
ple, given the content of the beliefs about gender
in our society, we might expect gender to seem
more relevant and therefore have a larger impact
on behavior and evaluations in a group repair-
ing a car than in a group planning a fund-rais-
ing event. I will return to this point about the
relevance of the characteristic to the focal task
since it will be important for establishing how
and when cultural beliefs about gender influence
the formation of self-assessments of task com-
petence when individuals are not in group set-
tings.

GENDER AS A STATUS CHARACTERISTIC

Gender is commonly described as a diffuse sta-
tus characteristic, meaning that widely shared
cultural beliefs about gender include expecta-
tions that men are diffusely more competent or
capable at most things, as well as specif ic
assumptions that men are better at some par-
ticular tasks (e.g., mechanical tasks) while
women are better at others (e.g., nurturing tasks)
(Conway, Pizzamiglio, and Mount, 1996; Fiske
et al. 2002; Wagner and Berger 1997; Williams
and Best 1990). Beliefs about gender and com-
petence have changed over time; however,
empirical studies continue to find that men are
thought to be generally more capable (Williams
and Best 1990:334) and competent (Fiske et al.
2002:892) than women. For example, Fiske et
al. (2002:892) surveyed nine diverse samples,
from different regions of the United States, and
found that members of these samples, regard-
less of age, consistently rated the category
“men” higher than the category “women” on a
multidimensional scale of competence.

Since my argument draws on the psycholog-
ical literature on stereotypes, it is worth com-
paring gender stereotypes to gender status
beliefs. Gender stereotypes are often concep-
tualized as a broad set of beliefs about the kinds
of traits, attributes, or behaviors that can be (or

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should be) expected of a person of a given sex
category (Deaux and Kite 1987). By contrast,
gender status beliefs are a specific component
of gender stereotypes: they are beliefs that men
are more socially valued and diffusely more
competent than women at things that “count”
(Wagner and Berger 1997; Ridgeway and
Correll 2000). Gender stereotypes include sta-
tus beliefs, but also include other types of
beliefs, such as beliefs about appropriate role
behaviors, sexuality, and violence.

Both sociologists and psychologists often
note that gender beliefs reflect a cultural system,
representing what we think “most people”
believe or accept as true about the categories of
“men” and “women” (Ridgeway 1997; Deaux
and Kite 1987). As such, status beliefs, and
stereotypes more generally, operate as schemas
for interpreting and making sense of the social
world (Fiske 1998; Ridgeway 1997). Viewing
status beliefs as cultural schemas implies that
their effect is potentially far reaching: even indi-
viduals who do not personally endorse beliefs
that men are generally more competent than
women are likely to be aware that these beliefs
exist in the culture and expect that others will
treat them according to these beliefs. This expec-
tation, or what we think “most (other) people”
believe, has been shown to modify behavior
and bias judgments (Foschi 1996; Lovaglia et
al. 1998; Steele 1997).

DOUBLE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING
COMPETENCE

In an extension of status characteristics theory
that is highly relevant for understanding how
gender differences in self-assessments emerge,
Foschi (1989) incorporates insights from the
psychological literature on attribution to devel-
op a theory about how individuals attribute per-
formance to ability (or lack of ability). The
main claim is that the standards individuals use
to determine if a given performance is indica-
tive of ability are a function of the diffuse sta-
tus characteristics that are salient in a setting.
When people who possess the lower state of a
salient diffuse status characteristic (symbolized
as D–) perform well at the group’s task, their
performances are critically scrutinized, because
a good performance is inconsistent with sta-
tus-based expectations for them. When people
with the more valued state (D+) perform equal-
ly as well, their performances are consistent

with expectations and are, therefore, less scru-
tinized. Since their performances are less scru-
tinized, higher status group members are judged
by a more lenient standard than lower status
group members. As a result, higher status group
members are more likely to be judged as hav-
ing task ability even when no “objective” per-
formance differences exist. This result is
predicted unless the task is one for which lower
status individuals are believed to be “naturally”
better, such as a task requiring nurturing abili-
ty in the case of gender. Empirical evidence
supports these predictions for both gender
(Foschi 1996) and race (Bier nat and
Kobrynowicz 1997).

When individuals assess their own compe-
tence at a task, they undoubtedly rely on per-
formance information provided by legitimate
evaluators (e.g., teachers, testing agencies, and
employers). More positive evaluations of per-
formance should lead to higher self-assessments
of task competence. However, if we apply the
double standard argument presented above in
settings where individuals make assessments
of their own competence, we would expect that,
if gender is salient in the setting, gender will
impact the performance expectations men and
women hold for themselves. As long as the task
is not one for which beliefs specifically advan-
tage women, men will have higher perform-
ance expectations for themselves than otherwise
similar women will. Men will, therefore, use a
more lenient standard when assessing their own
task competence. If individuals are provided
with equal performance evaluations of their
competence (e.g., have equal scores on a test),
but men use a more lenient standard, then men
will overestimate and women will underesti-
mate their actual task ability. In this way, cul-
tural beliefs about gender can lead to biased
self-assessments of task competence. However,
this prediction assumes that the status process
just described occurs in the kind of setting where
individuals assess their own competence.

STATUS PROCESSES IN INDIVIDUAL SETTINGS

Applying status characteristics theory to devel-
op this argument requires explaining why the
theory should hold in settings where individu-
als commonly assess their own task compe-
tence. For instance, individuals likely assess
their competence in settings where they take
socially important mental ability tests, such as

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intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, scholastic apti-
tude tests (SATs), and graduate record exami-
nations (GREs). In these situations, which
Erickson (1998) refers to as “individual evalu-
ative settings,” individuals are highly task ori-
ented (i.e., they are focused on performing well
on the task), but since they are not participat-
ing in a group, they are not collectively orient-
ed. I first provide theoretical justification for
why status generalization might occur in indi-
vidual evaluative settings and then I review
empirical evidence from the stereotype threat lit-
erature that is consistent with the theoretical
argument.

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION. As previously
mentioned, status characteristics theory has lim-
ited its scope to collectively oriented task
groups, because in these groups the shared pres-
sure to complete the group’s task forces group
members to anticipate the relative contribution
of each member of the group. In other words,
collective orientation produces the situational
pressure to make relative comparisons about
the future task performances of those in the set-
ting. However, the logic of the theory does not
specif ically require collective orientation:
instead it requires that some feature of the set-
ting generate pressure for actors to consider
their anticipated performance ability relative to
others. Therefore, the theory should apply in
other settings that generate this pressure, assum-
ing that a status characteristic is salient, as
described below.

Individual evaluative tasks represent anoth-
er setting where individuals are potentially pres-
sured to consider their performances relative to
others. As Erickson (1998) describes, they will
do so if they anticipate that they will receive a
socially important and socially valid perform-
ance evaluation. This is because evaluative tasks,
even if performed individually, often have the
explicit purpose of ranking performances of
actors. The use of evaluative tasks to rank indi-
viduals’ performances is socially valid in the
Weberian sense: individuals expect others to
accept the ranking as legitimate and, conse-
quently, orient their behavior towards this expec-
tation (see Weber 1968:31–33). When
individuals anticipate this ranking, they likely
feel pressure to assess their task competence rel-
ative to others who, they imagine, are being or
have been evaluated. This requires evaluating

oneself in relation to the social environment.
However, the standards for what constitutes a
competent performance are not usually clearly
defined beforehand, and others’ precise scores
are rarely known. In this uncertain environ-
ment, status characteristics, if salient, are avail-
able to influence performance expectations, as
they do in collective task situations. Those with
the more valued state (e.g., males, in the case
of gender) should hold higher performance
expectations and, therefore, see their perform-
ances as more competent than those occupying
the less valued state (e.g., females), even if
there are no differences in “objective” per-
formances.

A status characteristic must be salient in the
setting for this process to occur. Although indi-
vidual settings, by definition, do not contain
others to provide differentiation on a status
characteristic, salience can be achieved if the
characteristic is believed to be relevant to task
performance (Wagner and Berger 1993). For
example, if men (or women) are believed to be
better at some task, gender will be a salient sta-
tus characteristic. In addition to making gender
salient, a belief about male superiority (or
female superiority) at a particular task makes
gender highly relevant to the goals of the setting,
assuming individuals want to perform well on
the task. Therefore, we would expect gender to
impact individuals’ behavior and assessments of
their own competence in this setting. We would
also expect the effect to be greater than if gen-
der were perceived to be less relevant to the
task at hand.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. A growing body of
empirical evidence is consistent with the idea
that status generalization occurs in individual
evaluative settings, such as those where indi-
viduals take socially important mentally abili-
ty tests. Lovaglia et al. (1998) demonstrate that
individuals randomly assigned to low status
conditions in experiments scored lower on a
test of mental ability than those assigned to
high status conditions. They contend that any
attempt to measure mental ability needs to
account for the way that salient status process-
es interfere with test-taking performance.

Similarly, the psychologist Claude Steele
(1997) theorizes that individuals experience a
self-evaluative threat in the presence of salient
negative stereotypes about their group’s intel-

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lectual ability. This threat of social devaluation
generates anxiety, arousal, and/or task-irrelevant
processing that interferes with intellectual func-
tioning and leads to decreased test perform-
ance (Steele and Aronson 1995). Although those
who study “stereotype threat” use the more gen-
eral term, “stereotype,” these studies actually
focus on the status element of stereotypes. They
claim the belief that one category of the char-
acteristic (African Americans, women) is less
competent or capable than another (whites,
men) causes the threat.3

Steele and Aronson (1995) show, for exam-
ple, that when a difficult, standardized verbal
exam is described as diagnostic of ability,
African American students perform more poor-
ly than white students. However, when the same
test is not characterized as diagnostic of abili-
ty, African American and white students perform
at the same level. Defining a test as ability-
diagnostic primes a stereotype about race and
verbal ability and makes race salient in the set-
ting. Likewise, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady
(1999) show that Asian women experience a
stereotype threat, which reduces their mathe-
matical performance when the stereotype that
women have lower mathematical ability is
primed, but they experience what might be
called a stereotype “bonus,” raising their math-
ematical performance, when the stereotype that
Asians have superior mathematical ability is
primed instead. As this study shows, the very
same group of people, Asian women, can be
advantaged or disadvantaged when performing
the same task (a mathematics test) by varying
what belief is described as relevant in the set-
ting. Although beliefs about women and Asians
are widely available in the culture, the impact
of these beliefs in a given setting varies with the

relevance of the belief in that setting, as status
characteristics theory would predict.

Collectively, these studies indicate that status
beliefs impact task performance in settings
where individuals are task oriented, but are not
members of a group. Based on these empirical
results and the theoretical justification given, I
make predictions about the effects of status
beliefs on self-assessments of task competence
in individual evaluative settings, identifying the
conditions under which we would expect to see
these effects.

EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS

Based on the argument developed above, if sta-
tus generalization occurs in individual evalua-
tive settings, status beliefs will impact the
self-assessments of individuals in these set-
tings. This will occur when individuals are task
oriented and anticipate that they will receive a
socially important and socially valid perform-
ance evaluation. Under these conditions and if
a diffuse status characteristic (D) is defined as
relevant to the task at hand, performance expec-
tations will vary positively with the state of D.
Those with + states of D will have higher per-
formance expectations than those with – states
of D, assuming the task is not one for which cul-
tural beliefs specifically advantage those with
– states of D. In turn, higher performance expec-
tations will lead to lower (more lenient) per-
formance standards for inferring task ability
(Foschi 1989). Therefore, I present the follow-
ing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: In the presence of a belief mak-
ing D task relevant and given an equal task
outcome and differing states of D, those
with a + state of D will assess their com-
petence at the task higher than those with
a – state of D.

Hypothesis 2: If competence at the task is per-
ceived to be necessary for persisting on a
particular career path, then higher self-
assessments of competence lead to higher
aspirations for activities that are associat-
ed with that career path.

When we apply hypothesis 1 to gender as a
diffuse status characteristic, the hypothesis spec-
if ies the relationship between status beliefs
about gender and the self-assessments men and
women make of their task competence. When
a status belief about a task advantages men (i.e.,

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3 One common criticism of the stereotype threat
literature and the larger literature on stereotype acti-
vation is that there are inconsistencies in the mech-
anisms proposed to explain how stereotypes produce
their effects depending on whether the stereotypes are
negative or positive and whether the stereotypes are
about one’s own group or about other groups (see
Wheeler and Petty 2001 for a review). Status char-
acteristics theory, by contrast proposes one mecha-
nism for the effects of status beliefs (regardless of
whether the beliefs are advantaging or disadvantag-
ing) on the behaviors and evaluations of both self and
others.

if men are believed to be “naturally” better at a
given task) and individuals are engaged in that
task, gender is made salient and relevant to the
goal of good performance. This primes a status
generalization process where men make high-
er self-assessments of task competence com-
pared to women who perform at the same level.
Hypothesis 2 states the relationship between
self-assessments and emerging aspirations for
career-relevant activities. Although many factors
influence individuals’ preferences for various
careers, I argue that cultural beliefs about gen-
der differentially impact the emerging career-rel-
evant aspirations of men and women.

THE EEXPERIMENT

OVERVIEW

The experiment was designed primarily to eval-
uate hypothesis 1, regarding the bias that status
beliefs impose on self-assessments of task com-
petence. It will also provide some limited evi-
dence about the effect of self-assessments on
emerging aspirations. A test of the hypotheses
calls for an experimental setting in which task
performance can be controlled and the rele-
vance of cultural beliefs about gender can be
manipulated by associating or dissociating gen-
der with task performance. The gender belief
associated with the task and the gender of the
subject are independent variables; self-assess-
ment of task competence and the standard used
to infer ability are the primary dependent vari-
ables. Task performance was experimentally
held constant.

In one condition of the experiment, I manip-
ulate gender belief associated with the task to
advantage males (the “male advantaged” or
“MA” condition). I provide subjects in this con-
dition with evidence that males, on average,
have more ability at the experimental task. This
association between gender and task perform-
ance is intended to make gender salient and
task relevant, leading to the prediction that men
will use a more lenient standard than women
when assessing their own task competence,
resulting in higher male self-assessment lev-
els. In the contrasting condition, I specifically
dissociate gender beliefs from the task (the
“gender dissociated” or “GD” condition) by
providing subjects with evidence that there are
no gender differences in task ability. The explic-
it dissociation of gender from the task should

eliminate the task relevance of gender in the set-
ting and, consequently, the effect of gender on
self-assessments.

A more complete test of the bias imposed by
gender status beliefs would also have included
a condition where I present subjects with evi-
dence that females have more task ability (i.e.,
a female advantaged condition). In this condi-
tion, I would predict women use a more lenient
standard than men when assessing their own task
ability, resulting in higher female self-assess-
ments of task competence. Unfortunately, due
to limited resources, only one experimental con-
dition (the MA condition) and one contrasting
condition (the GD condition) were r un.
However, the companion study described ear-
lier provides some limited support for the female
advantaged prediction. In that study, male stu-
dents made significantly higher assessments of
their mathematical ability than their equal-abil-
ity female counterparts. However, the effect
was actually reversed when the students assessed
their verbal ability: female students made sig-
nif icantly higher self-assessments of verbal
ability, controlling for actual verbal performance
(Correll 2001). To the extent that verbal tasks
are culturally associated with women and stu-
dents in the sample were aware of this cultural
belief, the verbal result is consistent with the
female advantaged prediction. Nonetheless,
experimentally manipulating the gender asso-
ciation of the task to advantage women would
have provided stronger evidence for evaluating
the causal argument. A female advantaged con-
dition would also have allowed us to test whether
men and women respond differently to negative
feedback about their own gender group. Also,
it would have been useful in illuminating the
source of the biasing effects that are found, as
will be discussed in the results section below. In
spite of these limitations, the two conditions
presented here do provide the variation in the
relevance of cultural beliefs about gender that
is minimally necessary for evaluating the main
hypothesis.

The final design, based on procedures drawn
from Foschi (1996) and Erickson (1998), cross-
es the gender of subject with the “male advan-
taged” or “gender dissociated” presentation of
the task, yielding four conditions. The subjects
were male and female first-year undergraduates,
who were paid for their time and randomly
assigned to either the MA or GD condition.
Analysis is based on a sample of 80 subjects (20

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subjects per condition). A total of 94 subjects
participated in the study, but I excluded the data
from 14 of the subjects because they did not
meet one of the scope conditions (n = 6)4 or they
were suspicious about some part of the study (n
= 8).5 Rejection rules were conservative and
established beforehand. All analyses were also
conducted with all available data and no sub-
stantive differences were found.

PROCEDURES

Subjects came to the lab individually and were
told that they were participating in the pretest-
ing of a new set of graduate admissions exam-
inations for a national testing ser vice,
purportedly measuring their “contrast sensitiv-
ity” ability. To establish that the task is social-
ly important and would be used to legitimately
rank “test-takers,” as is required by the theory,
subjects were informed verbally by an under-
graduate experimenter and by reading a passage
on their computer screen, that a national testing
organization developed the contrast sensitivity
exam and that both graduate schools and
Fortune 500 companies have expressed interest
in using this exam as a screening device. To fur-
ther emphasize that individuals would be ranked
based on their scores, subjects were also told that
participants who scored in the top 25 percent of

the scoring distribution would be entered into
a drawing for a 50-dollar cash prize.

Next, the gender task belief manipulation
was introduced. As a part of the initial verbal
script delivered by the experimenter, partici-
pants were told either that males, on average,
perform better on tests of contrast sensitivity
(the MA condition) or that there is no gender dif-
ference in scores on tests of contrast sensitivi-
ty (the GD condition). To further emphasize
the association or dissociation of gender with the
task, subjects read more about gender and con-
trast sensitivity on their computer screen. In
particular, the cover story described the inter-
est of social science researchers in understand-
ing either the gender difference or the lack of
gender difference in performance on this task.
This manipulation was intended to either make
gender relevant to the goals of the situation
(i.e., scoring high on the test) or to explicitly
break the bond of relevance between gender
and task performance.

Participants then completed two, 20-item
rounds of the computer-administered contrast
sensitivity test, in which subjects have five sec-
onds to judge which color (black or white) pre-
dominates in each of a series of rectangles
(Troyer 2001). The contrast sensitivity task is a
reliable instrument commonly used in experi-
mental social psychology. The task has no dis-
cernable right or wrong answers, yet subject
suspicion in regard to the task is low (although
see note 5). Since the amounts of white and
black area are either exactly equal or very close
to equal in each rectangle, it is impossible for
subjects to actually derive correct solutions to
the problems. All subjects were told that they
correctly answered 13 of the 20 items during
round one and 12 of 20 in round two. The scores
were similar between rounds to convey that the
test reliably measures contrast sensitivity abil-
ity. Mid-range scores, such as these, should
allow for a wider range of self-assessment val-
ues than more extreme scores would (Foschi
1996). Giving all subjects identical test “scores”
ensures that they assess their ability from objec-
tively identical performance information.

After receiving their scores at the end of each
round, participants answered a series of ques-
tions designed to first provide ability standard
and then self-assessment measures. After the
second round, they also answered a set of ques-
tions about how likely they would be to engage
in activities that required high levels of task

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4 Six subjects answered “no” when asked if they
wanted to do well on the task, thereby violating the
scope condition that they be task-oriented. Of these
six, 1 was a female from the GD condition, 1 was a
female from the MA condition, 2 were males from
the GD condition and 2 were males from the MA con-
dition.

5 The 8 cases excluded due to suspicion were 2
males and 2 females from the MA condition and 1
male and 3 females from the GD condition. The sus-
picion rate in this study is slightly higher than in
comparable studies. This may be because the uni-
versity where this study was conducted has students
with some of the highest average SAT scores in the
United States. As will be discussed in a subsequent
section, all subjects were given the same, average
score after they completed the experimental task.
Students who were coded as being suspicious said that
they did not think the task was “real” (i.e., they did
not think the task had right and wrong answers)
because they personally did not receive a high score
on it. However, in analysis not shown, including their
data in the analysis produced no substantive differ-
ences in the results.

ability. They then answered questions to assess
the extent to which the experimental manipu-
lations were successful. Before leaving, they
were debriefed and paid.

MANIPULATION CHECKS

As is necessary for the experiment to provide an
adequate test of the theory, items on the post-
experiment computerized questionnaire evalu-
ated whether the scope conditions of the theory
were met and whether the manipulations of the
gender belief associated with the task were suc-
cessful. I phrased these questions in one of two
ways. Some questions asked subjects how they
thought “most people familiar with contrast
sensitivity, including social science researchers,
members of testing agencies and employers”
view contrast sensitivity (“most people rat-
ings”). Although the test was described as new,
subjects learned that some groups of people
were familiar with it and there was increasing
interest in using the test or understanding this
newly discovered ability. Other questions asked
how subjects personally would describe contrast
sensitivity (“personal ratings”) after having been
exposed to it. Subjects also completed a free
response written questionnaire and were inter-
viewed prior to debriefing as further checks on
the experimental manipulations.

SCOPE CONDITIONS. To evaluate the extent to
which subjects believed that contrast sensitivi-
ty is a socially valued ability or that it is instru-
mental to other socially valued abilities (as the
theory requires), I asked the subjects how “most
people” would rate contrast sensitivity in terms
of being important and predictive of success. For
these and other questions, subjects used the
mouse of their computer to drag a pointer
between the two bipolar endpoints on a scale
(e.g., “unnecessary” to “necessary”). The com-
puter recorded a value between 0 and 100 to
indicate how far to the right side of the scale the
pointer was moved. Subjects indicated that most
people would view the task as moderately
important (mean 62.0, standard deviation [SD]
22.4) and predictive of success (mean 64.8, SD
of 21.3).6 Subjects also personally found the task

to be moderately hard (mean 65.1, SD 12.4) and
complex (mean 62.2, SD 17.7). Finally, subjects
described the test as unfamiliar (mean 73.0, SD
18.5) and found the test instructions to be clear
(mean 91.1, SD 10.8).

GENDER TASK BELIEFS. To evaluate the manip-
ulation of the relevance of gender in the setting,
subjects rated how “most people” view con-
trast sensitivity on a 100-point scale ranging
from “not at all masculine” to “highly mascu-
line.” Asking subjects about how they perceive
that “most people” view the task, rather than
how they personally understand it, is appropri-
ate since status beliefs about gender are argued
to impact behaviors and evaluations, even when
individuals do not personally endorse the con-
tent of the belief (Ridgeway et al. 1998).
However, for comparison, I asked subjects to
provide their personal impressions of how mas-
culine the task is.

Confirming the success of the manipulation,
subjects in the MA condition indicated that
“most people” view the task as significantly
more masculine compared with their same gen-
der counterparts in the GD condition.7 As can
be seen in Table 1, the mean “most people rat-
ing” for women in the MA condition was 62.1,
compared with a rating of 24.4 for women in the
GD condition (t = 6.68, p < .001). Likewise, the mean for males in the MA condition was 52.5, compared with a rating of 30.0 for their same gender counterparts in the GD condition (t = 3.05, p < .01). The differences between the means for males and females within condition are not significant. As with the “most people” ratings, both males and females in the MA con-

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ly important, meaning that they believed that the
experimental “test,” like other standardized tests,
would have important consequences. Subjects often
expressed this opinion with anger or frustration at
what they described as the undue importance of stan-
dardized tests, in general, on individuals’ life chances,
but importantly they did see the experimental “test”
in the category of those tests that “matter.”

7 In interviews before debriefing, subjects were
asked questions designed to further assess whether
the manipulation of the gender belief associated with
the task was successful. Depending on condition,
they were asked if they were surprised either that
males had higher averages on the test (the MA con-
dition) or that no gender difference exists for this test
(the GD condition). Subjects in the MA condition vol-

6 In interviews conducted prior to debriefing, most
subjects indicated that they viewed the task as social-

dition found the task to be significantly more
masculine personally compared with their same
gender counterparts in the GD condition.8

Because researchers have sometimes used a
single continuum ranging from “masculine” to
“feminine” to measure gender beliefs (c.f.,
Foschi 1996), I also asked subjects to rate how
“most people” and they personally viewed the
task on a scale ranging from not at all feminine
to highly feminine.9 I then performed a paired
t-test within condition to compare the means of
subjects’ “most people ratings” on the mascu-
line and feminine scales. Females and males in
the MA condition had significantly higher “most
people” masculine ratings than “most people”

feminine ratings (females: t = 7.62, p <. 001; males: t = 2.80, p < .05). In other words, they acknowledged that others were more likely to associate the task with masculinity than femi- ninity. Females and males in the GD condition, by contrast, indicated that “most people” would associate the task more with femininity than masculinity (females: t = -2.18, p = . 024; males: t = 2.0, p = . 058). Together, these results offer considerable evidence that relevance of gender to task performance differed across conditions in the direction intended.

MEASUREMENT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

SELF-ASSESSMENT. The main dependent vari-
able is self-assessment of task ability, in this case
contrast sensitivity ability. This variable is meas-
ured in three different ways. The primary self-
assessment dependent variable is a composite
variable constructed from subjects’ responses to
ten items on the computerized questionnaires in
which they were asked to evaluate their per-
formance on the contrast sensitivity test. Five
contrasting adjective semantic differential items
were included in the questionnaire following the
first round and five identical items were includ-
ed after the second round. The anchors for these
items were: skilled/unskilled, incompetent/com-
petent, incapable/capable, knowledgeable/
unknowledgeable, adequate/inadequate.
Subjects moved their computer mouse towards
one of the two anchors to record values ranging
from 0 to 100, a value of 100 indicating the
extreme right anchor. The items were then
recoded, if necessary, so that higher values rep-
resent higher assessments of ability.

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unteered diverse hypotheses for the supposed gender
difference, ranging from socialization to brain later-
ality explanations. In no instance, did a subject state
that she or he did not believe that a gender difference
exists. Before debriefing, subjects also filled out a
free response questionnaire that asked them similar
questions, which gave them an opportunity to express
any suspicion privately. Although all subjects in the
GD condition accepted the “finding” of no gender dif-
ference, some were surprised personally.

8 The personal ratings are significantly lower than
the “most people” masculine ratings for subjects in
the MA condition (females: t = 5.50, p < .001; males: t = 2.43, p < .05); i.e., subjects view the task as less masculine “personally” compared to how they per- ceive “most (other) people” view it.

9 Subjects had less differentiated ratings of how
feminine they thought most people would view the
task (Table 1). The differences between conditions are
not significant. Not surprisingly, since the task beliefs
were not manipulated to advantage females, all sub-
jects found the task to be not very feminine.

Table 1. Means of Gender Task Association Manipulation Variables By Condition

MAa GDa

Females Males Females Males

Most people ratingsb

—Masculine 62.1 (16.8) 52.5 (24.9) 24.4 (18.8) 30.0 (21.6)
—Feminine 39.4 (10.4) 36.0 (19.1) 31.4 (26.5) 40.0 (27.5)
Personal ratingsb

—Masculine 51.4 (16.0) 45.7 (25.9) 21.4 (20.4) 26.4 (25.3)
—Feminine 43.5 (12.1) 35.3 (20.9) 29.4 (26.7) 32.5 (28.2)

Note: Data shown as mean with standard deviation in parentheses; N = 80.
a Task beliefs: MA = male advantaged condition; GD = gender dissociated condition.
b Subjects were either asked how they perceived that “most people” would rate the task or how they “personally”
would rate the task on a scale from “not at all masculine” (or feminine) to “highly masculine” (or feminine).

The composite self-assessment variable is a
factor score computed as a weighted -average
generated by a confirmatory factor analysis in
which all 10 items predict the latent variable
“self-assessment.” The f it statistics for this
model indicate that the model is consistent with
the data (GFI = . 914, CFI = . 980, RMSEA =
. 084). The standardized factor loadings rang-
ing from .60 to .96 suggest that the ten items
measure the same underlying concept, in this
case self-assessment of contrast sensitivity abil-
ity. The self-assessment composite has a mean
of 47.7 and a SD of 13.0.

The second measure of self-assessment, the
self-assessment “rating” variable, was con-
structed from an ordinal level question where
participants were asked to describe their contrast
sensitivity ability on a 7-point scale ranging
from “considerably below average” to “consid-
erably above average.” This question was asked
after both rounds of the study and responses
were averaged. The mean of this item is 3.89 and
its SD is 1.00.

The final self-assessment measure is taken
from a single item in which participants were
asked to assess how well they did on the con-
trast sensitivity test. This variable takes on a
value between zero and 100 as participants
moved their computer mouse between anchors
of “not very well” to “very well.” The mean of
this item is 35.5 and the SD is 17.0. Not sur-
prisingly, the three self-assessment variables
(composite, rating, and single-item) are posi-
tively correlated with one another (Pearson cor-
relations range from .52 to .67).

ABILITY STANDARD. After each round, partic-
ipants indicated the score they would need to
have achieved on the test to be convinced that
they definitely possessed high levels of con-
trast sensitivity ability. Reponses from the two
rounds were averaged.10 The mean of the abil-
ity standard variable is 83.4 percent and the SD
is 6.62 percent.

EMERGING ASPIRATIONS. To measure their
emerging aspirations for activities described as
career-relevant and requiring high task ability,
I asked the subjects to rate (on a six-point scale
ranging from “highly unlikely” to “highly like-
ly”) how likely they would be to: 1) apply to
graduate programs requiring high levels of con-
trast sensitivity ability, 2) apply for a high-pay-
ing job requiring high levels of contrast
sensitivity ability, 3) take a one-quarter course
designed for those who possess high levels of
contrast sensitivity ability in order learn more
about this ability, and 4) enroll in a 3-hour sem-
inar on contrast sensitivity for those with high
contrast sensitivity ability.

Two composite variables were then created:
one that is the sum of the course and seminar
items and the other, the sum of the job and
graduate school items, thereby allowing the
composite variables to take on values from two
to twelve. Confirmatory factor analysis pro-
vides support for this two-factor model of aspi-
rations, with separate domains representing
aspirations either within the university (cours-
es and seminars) or beyond the university (grad-
uate school and jobs). The mean of the “within
university” aspiration variable is 7.49, with a
SD of 2.57. The mean of the “beyond univer-
sity” aspiration variable is 7.70, with a SD of
2.06.

These measures are intended to evaluate
whether self-assessments impact emerging
aspirations for activities that are believed to
require task competence. Since participants
only learned about the experimental task and
ability upon arriving at the laboratory, we
should not automatically assume that the meas-
ures reflect a commitment to actual behavior.
It is also important to note that many factors
will impact the aspirations individuals report for
these or any activity. The argument is simply
that the assessment individuals make of their
own competence at a particular task will
increase or decrease their emerging aspirations
for paths requiring competence at that task. If
men and women, on average, make different
assessments of their own task competence, we
would expect systematic gender differences in
their aspirations for paths requiring some level
of task ability.

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10 After the first round, subjects were asked to
provide this score as a percentage of correct answers.
After the second round, they were asked to provide
the number correct out of twenty. Reponses from
the second round were converted to a percentage
scale and averaged with the first round value to cre-
ate the ability standard variable.

RESULTS AAND DDISCUSSION

STATUS BELIEFS AND BIASED SELF-
ASSESSMENTS HYPOTHESIS

The main hypothesis about the biasing effect of
gender status beliefs on self-assessments of task
competence leads to the empirical prediction
that men in the MA condition will assess their
contrast sensitivity ability higher than women
will. Recall that all subjects were given the
same “score,” thus ensuring that men and
women received equal performance feedback.
Men in the MA condition are also hypothesized
to use a more lenient standard in assessing their
task competence compared to women per-
forming at the same level. No gender differences
in self-assessments of task competence or in the
ability standard used to assess competence are
predicted in the GD condition, since the rele-
vance of gender in the setting has been explic-
itly disassociated.

The top half of Table 2 provides means and
SDs of the three self-assessment variables and
the ability standard variable for women and
men in the MA and GD conditions. In the MA
condition, men have a mean self-assessment
composite rating of 55.3 on a 100-point scale,
and women, a rating of 41.1 of 100. The other
two self-assessment variables show a similar
pattern with men in the MA condition making

higher self-assessments of their task compe-
tence than women in the MA condition. Men in
the MA condition indicated that they would
have to score at least 79.3 percent on a test of
contrast sensitivity to be convinced that they had
high task ability. Women reported that they
would need a higher score of at least 88.9 per-
cent correct to be certain they possessed high
task ability. The gender differences in the means
of these variables are smaller in the GD condi-
tion.

The results of a two-way (gender of subject
and task belief) analysis of variance are shown
in the lower half of Table 2. While no signifi-
cant main effect is predicted for either the sub-
ject gender or the task belief factor, a significant
interaction between the two factors is hypoth-
esized since the interaction tests whether the
effect of gender on self-assessments of task
competence varies with the gender belief asso-
ciated with the task. The interaction term, then,
provides for a test of the status belief and biased
self-assessment hypothesis. As can be seen in
Table 2, the two-way interaction is significant
for all four dependent variables, providing strong
support for the main causal hypothesis.

Note that the gender main effect is also sig-
nificant for three of the four dependent vari-
ables. This result is due to the magnitude of the
experimental effect as can be seen in Table 3,

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Table 2. Comparison of Means of Self-assessment and Ability Standard Variables by Subject Gender and Task
Belief

Self-assessment
Ability

Composite Rating Single item Standard

Meansa

—MA Task Belief
——Female subjects 41.1 (13.5) 6.90 (1.59) 29.3 (15.2) 88.9 (4.61)
——Male subjects 55.3 (14.8) 8.85 (2.43) 43.8 (20.0) 79.3 (7.70)
—GD Task Belief
——Female subjects 47.1 (11.6) 7.60 (1.31) 35.5 (13.1) 82.4 (3.93)
——Male subjects 47.2 (7.90) 7.75 (2.10) 33.4 (16.7) 83.1 (5.89)
F-Valuesb

—Factor
——Subject Gender 6.77* 6.05* 2.77 12.2**
——Task Belief 0.146 0.220 0.331 1.09
——2-way interaction 6.71* 4.45* 4.98* 16.6**

Note: N = 80.
a Data shown as mean with SD in parentheses; MA = male advantaged condition; GD = gender dissociated condi-
tion.
b F-values from the 2-way (gender � task belief) ANOVA.
* p < .05; ** p < .01

which contains the results of a series of planned
contrast t-tests for pairs of conditions for each
of the four dependent variables. Contrast 1 com-
pares the means of the dependent variables for
men and women in the MA condition and shows
that men make significantly higher self-assess-
ments of their task competence and use signif-
icantly lower ability standards than women when
a task belief advantages men. In the gender-
dissociated condition, however, the gender
differences in self-assessments and ability stan-
dards are insignificant (see contrast number 2).

Consistent with the first hypothesis, when
males are believed to be more competent at a
task, men using a more lenient standard than
women for assessing their own task compe-
tence, and consequently, men assess their own
task ability higher than women performing at the
same level. No significant gender difference
was found in the GD condition, which suggests
that men do not globally assess their task com-
petence higher regardless of the task’s gender
association. Instead, when gender is made rel-
evant in the setting, status beliefs about gender
differentially bias the assessments men and
women make.

SOURCE OF THE BIASING EFFECT. The results
presented thus far demonstrate: 1) when a task
belief advantages men a gender gap in self-
assessment of task competence emerges that
favors men, and 2) no gender gap appears when
gender is specifically dissociated from the task.
But, what is the source of the gender differ-
ence in the self-assessment in the male-advan-
taging condition? There are three logical ways
that a gender gap in self-assessments can
emerge. One is that men and women are both
influenced, albeit in different directions and
perhaps to differing degrees, by a male-advan-
taging task belief. In this scenario, confronted
with a male-advantaging task belief men inflate
their self-assessments and women deflate theirs,
compared to the assessments they would have
made if gender was explicitly defined as irrel-
evant to the task. The second possibility is that
men ignore the male-advantaging task belief, but
women attend to it. The final possibility is that
women ignore the task belief, but men attend to
it. To evaluate these possibilities, I compare
mean self-assessments and ability standards for
men and women in the MA condition with their
same gender counterparts in the GD condition.
These results are presented as the third and

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Table 3. Planned Contrast T-tests Comparing Means of Self-assessment and Ability Standard Variables Between
Conditions

Dependent Contrast
Variable Number Task Belief Contrasta .t

Self-assessment
—Composite 1 Female MA vs. Male MA –3.17*

2 Female GD vs. Male GD –0.10
3 Female MA vs. Female GD –1.52
4 Male MA vs. Male GD 2.17*

—Rating 1 Female MA vs. Male MA –2.73*
2 Female GD vs. Male GD –0.27
3 Female MA vs. Female GD –1.52
4 Male MA vs. Male GD 1.18

—Single item 1 Female MA vs. Male MA –2.55*
2 Female GD vs. Male GD 0.44
3 Female MA vs. Female GD –1.35
4 Male MA vs. Male GD 1.78*

Ability standard 1 Female MA vs. Male MA 4.82**
2 Female GD vs. Male GD –0.47
3 Female MA vs. Female GD 4.83**
4 Male MA vs. Male GD –1.78*

Note: N = 80.
a MA = male advantaged condition; GD = gender dissociated condition.
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (one-tailed, variances not assumed to be equal)

fourth set of contrasts for each dependent vari-
able in Table 3.

For both the main dependent variable—the
composite self-assessment variable—and the
single-item self-assessment variable, men in
the MA condition made significantly higher
assessments of their own task competence than
did men in the GD condition. Furthermore, men
in the MA condition were found to use a sig-
nificantly more lenient standard for assessing
their task ability than men in the GD condition
(79.3 percent versus 83.1 percent). Taken
together, these results suggest that men inflate
their self-assessments of task competence when
a task belief advantages them. This inflation of
self-assessments in the presence of an advan-
taging task belief is similar to the stereotype
bonus described earlier, where Asian women
experienced enhanced mathematical perform-
ance when a positive stereotype about Asians
and mathematical ability was primed (Shih et al.
1999).

The results for women were less consistent.
Compared with women in the GD condition,
women in the MA condition indicate that they
would need higher scores to be certain they
possessed high levels of task competence (i.e.,
their ability standard is higher). However, the
differences between the means of the three self-
assessment variables do not differ significant-
ly between conditions for women. Taken
together, the male and female results provide
some evidence that both men and women are
influenced by male-advantaging beliefs,
although the results are more reliable for men.
It is possible that men attend to male-advan-
taging beliefs more than women do. This result
would be consistent with research showing that
individuals are more prone to cognitive biases
that are self-serving (Markus and Wurf 1987).
If so, women should attend more than men to
beliefs that are female-advantaging, a prediction
that unfortunately could not be evaluated with
the data collected in this study.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS. The main hypothesis
was strongly supported. Men use a more lenient
standard to infer ability and assess their task
competence higher than women when exposed
to a belief about male superiority, but no gen-
der differences in self-assessments or ability
standards were found when gender was defined
as irrelevant to the task. Further, these differ-

ences were produced relatively easily. Although
subjects had not heard of the task before par-
ticipating in the study, after minimal exposure
to a belief about male superiority and two rounds
of testing, significant gender differences in self-
assessments of task competence emerged.
Finally, the results provide empirical support for
the theoretical claim that status generalization
occurs in individual evaluative settings under the
conditions previously described.

The results from the experimental are con-
sistent with those found in the analysis of the
probability sample described earlier where male
students assessed their own mathematical, but
not verbal, competence higher than their equal
ability female counterparts did. Mathematics is
believed to be a masculine domain, while ver-
bal skills are not culturally associated with mas-
culinity (c.f., Hyde et al. 1990), thereby
providing natural variation in the gender belief
associated with these domains that is similar to
that manipulated in the laboratory. Therefore, the
survey results suggest that the causal mechanism
evaluated with experimental data operates in a
similar way in a “real world” (i.e., non-labora-
tory) setting.

The experimental data also rule out the alter-
native explanation described earlier for higher
male self-assessments. Recall that, according to
this alternative logic, self-assessments tap an
additional component of unmeasured “real”
ability, leading to the explanation that, in the
case of mathematics, men make higher assess-
ments of their mathematical ability, not because
of the biasing effect of cultural beliefs about
gender and mathematics, but because men “real-
ly are better” at mathematics. However, because
correct solutions to the experimental task are
impossible to derive, men cannot “really” be bet-
ter at the experimental task. Nevertheless, when
subjects, who were all given the same score on
the task, were told that, on average, men perform
better on the test, male subjects rated their task
ability higher than female subjects did, consis-
tent with the hypothesis advanced in this study.

In sum, both kinds of data support the hypoth-
esis that status beliefs about gender bias the
assessments men and women make of their own
task competence. But, do gender differences in
self-assessments influence emerging aspirations
for activities that require task ability? In the
next section, I evaluate the evidence designed
to answer this question.

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EMERGING ASPIRATIONS HYPOTHESIS

The second hypothesis is that higher self-assess-
ments of competence at a particular task lead to
higher aspirations for activities that require
some level of competence at that task. Therefore,
higher self-assessments of contrast sensitivity
ability should be associated with higher levels
of aspirations for future activities that are
thought to require this ability, regardless of
experimental condition. However, because men
in the MA condition were found to assess their
contrast sensitivity ability higher than women
in this condition, these men should also have
higher aspiration levels.

In Table 4, I provide a comparison of means
and SDs of the two future aspiration variables
by subject gender and task belief. The top por-
tion of the table contains the means and SDs,
and the lower portion provides results from two
different 2-factor analysis of variance models.
As expected, the means for the two future aspi-
rations variables are higher for men in the MA
condition than for women. However, women in

the GD condition have higher mean aspirations
than men. The two-way interaction between
gender and task belief is significant for both
aspiration variables in the 2-factor analysis of
variance presented in the middle portion of
Table 4. Consistent with theoretical predictions,
the significant interaction term indicates the
effect of gender on emerging aspirations does
differ with the gender belief associated with
the task. When a belief exists that men are bet-
ter at a task, men have higher aspirations than
women for paths requiring some level of task
ability.

But, is the interactive effect the result of the
gender difference in self-assessments found in
the MA condition? To answer this question, I
added the self-assessment composite variable as
a covariate to the baseline model above (see
bottom portion of Table 4). The self-assessment
composite variable has a significant positive
effect on both aspiration variables, and the
model fit improves significantly with the addi-
tion of this variable. Higher self-assessments of
task competence do increase individuals’ report-

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Table 4. Comparison of Means of Emerging Aspiration Variables by Subject Gender and Task Belief

Within University Beyond University
Aspirations Aspirations

Meansa

—MA Task Belief
——Female subjects 5.75 (1.89) 5.90 (1.62)
——Male subjects 7.55 (3.19) 6.75 (2.47)
—GD Task Belief
——Female subjects 6.75 (2.00) 7.65 (1.69)
——Male subjects 5.90 (2.73) 6.70 (1.66)
F-Valuesb

—Factor
——Subject Gender 0.717* 0.014*
——Task Belief 0.336* 4.03*0
——2-way interaction 5.58*0 4.52*0
—R-squared 0.080* 0.100*
F-Valuesc

—Factor
——Gender 0.040* 0.620*
——Task Belief 0.251* 4.69*0
——2-way interaction 2.830* 2.050*
——Self-assess (beta) 0.052* 0.040*
—R-squared 0.140* 0.162*

Note: N = 80.
a Data shown as mean with SD in parentheses; MA = male advantaged condition; GD = gender dissociated condi-
tion.
b F-values for baseline 2-factor ANOVA (gender � task belief), with no covariates.
c F-values for 2-factor ANCOVA (gender � task belief) with self-assessment covariate added.
* p < .05; ** p < .01

ed aspirations to continue on a path requiring
high levels of task competence.

Importantly, the two-way interaction is no
longer significant once the model is conditioned
on level of self-assessment. This result is con-
sistent with the mechanism advanced in this
study: gender differences in self-assessments of
task competence play a mediating role in pro-
ducing gender differences in emerging aspira-
tions. While many factors undoubtedly influence
the formation of aspirations for activities
thought to be career-relevant, the experimental
data suggest that status beliefs about gender
bias individual self-assessments and differen-
tially influence the emerging aspirations of men
and women.

Although the experimental data provide high-
quality evidence for evaluating the biasing effect
of gender status beliefs, the evidence in regard
to emerging aspirations is more limited because
the aspirations individuals express for activities
associated with an unfamiliar task or ability are
likely more tentative than they would be if the
task or ability were more familiar. However, if
the task or ability were more familiar, it would
be more difficult to vary the gender beliefs
associated with it, thereby making it harder to
evaluate the main hypothesis about how gender
beliefs bias self-assessments. (In fact, for some
tasks, such as those requiring nurturing or
mechanical ability, it would likely be impossi-
ble to convincingly vary the gender association
of the task). Fortunately, while the companion
study could only provide limited support for
the main hypothesis, it is better suited for illus-
trating the effect of self-assessments on early
career-relevant decisions.

Results from the companion study show
that self-assessments of task competence do
influence actual decisions that might be
described as career-relevant. The fact that
male students assessed their own mathemati-
cal competence higher than their equal abili-
ty female counterparts did explain part of the
gender gap in enrollment in high school cal-
culus courses and selection of a “quantita-
tive” major. In this way, gender differences in
self-assessment of mathematical competence,
which are biased by cultural beliefs about
gender and mathematics, influence actual
commitment to paths leading to careers in sci-
ence, math, and engineering, thereby con-
tributing to the continued dearth of women in
the quantitative professions. Taken together,

the experimental and survey results illustrate
that gender-differentiated self-assessments of
task competence impact emerging aspirations
and early career-relevant decisions.

SUMMARY

The main contribution of this study is to devel-
op and evaluate a theoretical model that describes
the constraining effect of cultural beliefs about
gender on the emerging career-relevant aspira-
tions of men and women. Using status charac-
teristics theory and the empirical literature on
stereotype threat, I argue that gender status
beliefs will lead men and women to use differ-
ent standards to judge their own task competence
in individual evaluative settings, such as testing
situations, when gender is salient and defined as
relevant to performance in the setting. In this sit-
uation, I hypothesize that gender differences in
self-assessments of task competence will emerge
and lead to gender differences in emerging aspi-
rations for career paths and activities that require
task competence. The theoretical model is eval-
uated with data from an experiment that was
designed to permit the manipulation of the rel-
evance of gender in the setting, thereby provid-
ing for a strong test of the causal argument.
Importantly, the experimental data support the
model. A comparison of the experimental results
with results from a probability sample illustrates
the utility of the model and suggests that the
causal process operates similarly in a “real word”
setting.

More generally, the experimental results,
along with the work on stereotype threat and the
recent study by Lovaglia et al. (1998), indicate
that the impact of status processes on the repro-
duction of inequality might be more far reach-
ing than status characteristics theory has
considered. Extending the scope of the theory
to include individual evaluative settings, such as
those described here, is an important advance-
ment, since this setting is both very common and
highly consequential in its impact on educa-
tional and occupational attainment. It includes
most standardized test settings, including those
that are used to determine college, graduate
school, and professional school admissions and
those used for certification in a wide range of
professional occupations.

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CONCLUSION AAND IIMPLICATIONS

The motivation for this study was to better under-
stand how gender segregation in paid labor per-
sists over other structural changes in society by
focusing on the supply-side of the issue, exam-
ining how cultural beliefs about gender differ-
entially constrain the emerging career-relevant
aspirations or preferences of men and women.
The implication of the theory is that if gender dif-
ferences in aspirations emerge, men and women
will likely make different career-relevant choic-
es, which will funnel them into supply networks
for different types of jobs. Rather than examin-
ing how men and women’s aspirations emerge,
many previous supply-side explanations simply
document or assume that men and women have
different aspirations or different career-relevant
preferences. Economic models, in particular,
tend to view aspirations or preferences as exoge-
nous to labor market matching processes
(England 1993). However, as I have shown, indi-
viduals form aspirations by drawing on percep-
tions of their own competence at career-relevant
tasks, and the perceptions men and women form
are differentially biased by cultural beliefs about
gender. In this way, macro belief structures con-
strain emerging preferences and aspirations and,
to the extent that individuals act on their aspi-
rations, individual choice. The failure to recog-
nize the constrained aspect of choice obscures
some of the processes by which gender inequal-
ity is perpetuated. It either defines the problem
away or locates its source in the individualistic
actions of those already disadvantaged by their
position in the labor market.

Shelley J. Correll is Assistant Professor of Sociology
and an affiliate with the Center for the Study of
Inequality at Cornell University. She received her
Ph.D. from Stanford University in 2001. Her research
interests are in gender and social psychology, with
the goal of explicating how various social psycho-
logical processes reproduce structures of gender
inequality, especially in schools and the labor mar-
ket. A current project explores how cultural under-
standings of the motherhood role create subtle
discriminatory barriers for employed women who
are mothers. Laboratory and field experiments are
being conducted to evaluate the theoretical argu-
ment.

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