P2 Unit VII Scholarly Activity

P2 Unit VII Scholarly Activity

Instructions

Address both of the following writing prompts. Your responses to both of your chosen prompts should be at least 500 words each. No title page is needed, but be sure to indicate which writing prompts you are addressing at the top of each response. Each response needs its own reference page.

Writing Prompts (respond to both):

1. Review the Reading Assignment titled as “Designing a Low-Cost Pollution Prevention Plan to Pay Off at the University of Houston” by Bialowas, Sullivan, and Schneller. In your review, describe:

a. why the university developed a P2 plan,

b. the process of bulking hazardous wastes, fume hood modifications, and cost savings,

c. silver recovery and cost savings,

d. oil reclamation plan and cost savings, and

e. your overall thoughts about the university’s P2 program.

Answer must be 500 words

2. Review the Reading Assignment titled as “Effectiveness of State Pollution Prevention Programs and Policies” by Donna Harrington. In your review, describe:

a. the three objectives of the study,

b. the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI) and its impact on P2,

c. the empirical model (framework) used in the study,

d. costs of P2 programs, and

e. the article’s conclusions and your thoughts about the conclusions.

Answer must be 500 words

You are required to use at least your textbook as source material for both of your responses. All sources used, including the textbook, must be referenced; paraphrased and quoted material must have accompanying citations.

EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE POLLUTION PREVENTION PROGRAMS
AND POLICIES

DONNA RAMIREZ HARRINGTON∗

States are using regulatory-, information-, and management-based policies to
encourage the adoption of pollution prevention (P2) and reduce pollution. Using a
sample of facilities of S&P 500 firms which report to the Toxic Releases Inventory
from 1991 to 2001, this study employs dynamic panel data models to examine the
effectiveness of state legislations and policies in increasing P2 and reducing toxic
releases. I find that toxic waste legislations are effective in reducing toxic releases
and in promoting P2, but the effect of policy instruments differ. Facilities in states
with reporting requirement and mandatory planning adopt more P2 even in states
that do not emphasize toxic waste reduction. The effectiveness of reporting is stronger
among facilities with good environmental performance, while the potency of mandatory
planning is greater among facilities with past P2 experience. In contrast, numerical
goals reduce toxic pollution levels only among those which have been subjected to high
levels of enforcement action. These suggest that reporting requirement and mandatory
planning may be promoting the P2 practices which can improve public image and
which benefit from enhanced technical know-how, but they are not causing meaningful
pollution reductions, implying that the existing policies must be complemented by other
approaches to achieve higher reductions in toxic pollution levels. (JEL Q55, O38, H23)

I. INTRODUCTION

Environmental policies in the United States
have evolved from command and control to
market-based incentives, and more recently to
voluntary programs and information disclosure
mechanisms. The evolution largely stems from
the growing recognition that firms respond to
environmental policies not only to improve com-
pliance, but also to lower production costs,
improve product quality, and enhance mar-
ket competitiveness. Thus, prescriptive technol-
ogy and emission standards are being replaced
with a mix of policies that promote techniques
such as pollution prevention (P2) technologies

∗The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions
on an earlier draft of the paper provided by Keith Brouhle,
Tom Lyon, participants of the 2009 AEA-ASSA Meetings,
Robert Mohr and participants at the University of New
Hampshire Department of Economics seminar series, Marc
Law, and participants at the University of Vermont Depart-
ment of Economics seminar series. All remaining errors are
my own.
Ramirez Harrington: Assistant Professor, Department of

Economics, University of Vermont, 233 Old Mill Build-
ing, 94 University Place, Burlington, VT 05405. Phone
+1 (802) 656-0964, Fax +1 (802) 656-8405, E-mail
djramire@uvm.edu

which allow firms to go beyond compliance and
address strategic objectives.

In the United States, the National Pollu-
tion Prevention Act of 1990 mandates that
“pollution be prevented or reduced at source
whenever feasible.” Beginning in 1991, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
began collecting annual data on 43 types of
P2 activities undertaken by facilities and in
doing so, it expanded the purpose of the Toxic

ABBREVIATIONS

CAA: Clean Air Act
CWA: Clean Water Act
EPCRA: Emergency Planning and Community Right-

to-Know Act
IDEA: Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis
NPRI: National Pollutant Releases Inventory
P2: Pollution Prevention
PBT: Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
TLV: Threshold Limit Values
TQEM: Total Quality Environmental Management
TRI: Toxic Releases Inventory
TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act
USEPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

255
Contemporary Economic Policy (ISSN 1465-7287)
Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2013, 255 – 278
Online Early publication February 27, 201

2

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7287.2011.00312.x
© 2012 Western Economic Association International

256 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

Releases Inventory (TRI) under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA) by providing the public detailed infor-
mation about toxic chemical releases as well
as waste management activities to promote
informed decision-making by industries, gov-
ernment, and the public. In 1992, the National
Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and
Technology recommended to the U.S. EPA that
P2 programs should emphasize diffusion of P2
technologies through preferential increase in the
use of nonregulatory drivers, creation of incen-
tives, and provision of rewards, training, and
information (U.S. EPA 1992). In addition, 36
states have also legislated P2 programs, each
mandating a mix of regulatory-, information-,
and management-based policies. How effective
these policy instruments are in promoting P2
and reducing toxic releases is the central issue
addressed in this study.

The need for multiple policy instruments
to address environmental goals arises because
profit-maximizing firms tend to adopt fewer than
optimal levels of environmental technologies
and emit more than optimal pollution levels. In
this study, I focus on three of the reasons for
the suboptimal choices, which are the targets of
the policy instruments I examine. First is exter-
nalities: firms do not internalize the damages of
their pollution to the rest of society (Jaffe and
Stavins 2005). Second is incomplete informa-
tion: the reputational benefits from environmen-
tal technology adoption and pollution reduction
cannot be fully realized because stakeholders
that could influence firms’ choices are not fully
aware of the environmental performance and
activities of firms (Tietenberg 1998). Lastly, the
costs of environmental technology adoption and
abatement may be too high (King and Lennox
2002; Lennox and King 2004). Thus, a mix of
policy instruments that compel firms to reduce
their pollution levels and externalities, provide
environmental-related information to the pub-
lic, and lower costs of technology adoption
and abatement are necessary to promote envi-
ronmental technology adoption and encourage
lower pollution.

Empirical comparison of the relative effec-
tiveness of various policy instruments is limited.
Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante (2002) compare
the impact of regulation and public disclosure of
information on abatement activity while Fron-
del, Horbach, and Rennings (2007) compare
how standards, taxes, accounting, audits, and
reports promote adoption of end-of-pipe versus

cleaner production technologies. Arimura, Hibiki,
and Johnstone (2007) compare how environ-
mental taxes, accounting, and standards pro-
mote environmental R&D. In another study,
Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama (2008) compare
the effectiveness of management-oriented ISO
14001 and publication of environmental reports
on reducing natural resource use, solid waste,
and wastewater effluent levels. None of these
studies have analyzed the adoption of P2 activi-
ties or level of toxic emissions by U.S. facilities
nor have any of them analyzed how facility
characteristics influence how they respond to
different types of policy instruments. None of
these previous studies have employed a dynamic
framework that takes into account the history of
innovation or history of pollution.

The objectives of this study are (1) to investi-
gate whether state-level P2 legislations increase
the adoption of P2 activities and reduce toxic
emissions; (2) to examine the extent to which
three policy instruments namely, numerical goal,
reporting requirement, and mandatory P2 plan-
ning, contribute to the achievement of these
goals; and (3) to determine whether the potency
of these policies is influenced by facility char-
acteristics. To address the above objectives, I
employ dynamic estimation strategies that rec-
ognize the history of P2 adoption and history of
pollution, while controlling for facility-specific
unobservables. I use U.S. EPA TRI data on toxic
releases and P2 activities of a sample of manu-
facturing facilities belonging to S&P 500 parent
companies from 1991 to 2001.

The results show that adoption of P2 activ-
ities is higher among facilities that are located
in states that have P2 legislations that empha-
size toxic waste reduction. When such states
additionally mandate P2 planning or require
reporting of achievements and progress, facil-
ities adopt more P2 activities. Furthermore, the
potency of planning is greater among facilities
that have adopted P2 activities in the past, while
the effectiveness of reporting is greater among
facilities that have demonstrated good environ-
mental performance in the past, but potentially
counterproductive for the extremely dirty ones.
However, adoption of P2 activities is not signif-
icantly influenced by the existence of numerical
targets for pollution reduction. The findings
also show that the toxic waste discharges are
significantly lower among facilities in states
where the P2 programs emphasize toxic wastes.
When states prescribe pollution reduction tar-
gets, toxic releases are not necessarily lower for

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 257

all facilities, except among highly noncompli-
ant ones in those states. These results imply that
while traditional regulatory instruments such as
emission reduction targets can contribute to the
ultimate policy goal of toxic release reduction,
at least among the extremely noncompliant ones,
contemporary approaches such as mandatory
planning and information disclosure do not.

Section II provides policy background and
generates the hypotheses. Section III discusses
the empirical issues and the estimation pro-
cedures used. Section IV describes the sam-
ple, data, and variable construction. Section V
presents and discusses the results, and Section
VI summarizes and concludes the paper.

II. BACKGROUND, FRAMEWORK,
AND HYPOTHESES

A. State P2 Legislation and Policies

Since 1988, there are 36 states that have leg-
islated P2 programs and common among them
is their emphasis on source reduction activities
over other means of pollution reduction such
as waste disposal and treatment. Further, all of
them, except for four, provide technical assis-
tance by establishing an information clearing-
house, on-site consultation, education, training,
outreach, research assistance, guidance manu-
als, waste audits, or referral services to experts
through the state’s environmental agency, a pro-
gram within the state department, or through the
state university. However, they vary in terms of
the nature of waste that they seek to reduce.
Fourteen of these legislated programs empha-
size the reduction of toxic and hazardous wastes,
consistent with the U.S. EPA TRI, while others
are subsumed under general waste minimization
programs or solid waste reduction programs.

Twelve of the 36 states that currently have
P2 legislation also have regulatory policies in
the form of numerical goals for pollution lev-
els. The targets are expressed in percentage
reduction terms, relative to emission levels on
a baseline year, which is usually 1987, the first
year of TRI reporting. The numerical target is
usually a single pollution reduction goal that
needs to be achieved by a given year except for
four states where it consists of multiple targets
that increase in stringency through time. Despite
these pollution reduction mandates, none of the
legislations have indicated the specific penal-
ties for noncompliance with the targets. Eigh-
teen states have an information-based policy

that mandates reporting of action plans, targets,
progress reports, pollution levels, or any combi-
nation of these. Of the 18 states with a reporting
requirement, 8 clearly require reporting of envi-
ronmental performance measures. While these
reports are to be submitted to the state environ-
mental agency, it is not clear to what extent, if at
all, the information is made publicly available.
Further, while some states collect toxic informa-
tion and maintain their own toxic releases inven-
tory databases under the TRI Exchange Network
Program, the state P2 programs do not clearly
indicate whether or how the reports will fit in
with the existing state-level toxic release inven-
tory. Finally, 14 of the 36 states have adopted
management-based regulations which require
each facility to devise a P2 plan that will help it
identify problems, set targets, and develop solu-
tions to its pollution problems through source
reduction methods. The development of facility-
level plans is accompanied by reporting of
progress and achievements. In the 14 states that
mandate planning, the management policy is
stated clearly as a feature of the state legis-
lation. The policy instruments and the year of
implementation are summarized in Table 1.

B. Framework and

Hypotheses

In this study, my interest is to analyze
how polluting entities or facilities respond to
legislation and policy instruments aimed at
promoting the adoption of environmental tech-
nologies and/or abating pollution. Profit maxi-
mizing facilities choose the level of technology
adoption and the level of pollution depend-
ing on the private benefits and private costs
of these decisions. A facility will choose to
adopt environmental technologies up to a point
where its private marginal costs of environmen-
tal technology adoption are equal to the pri-
vate marginal benefits from technology adop-
tion. In choosing the level of pollution, which
is a by-product of production activities, a facil-
ity will choose to release pollution up to a
point where its private marginal benefits, in
the form of higher output and revenues, are
equal to the private marginal costs of pollu-
tion. The technology adoption decision and the
choice of pollution level are related to each
other since the benefits from technology adop-
tion are the costs from pollution that are avoided
if one chooses to undertake pollution-abatement
activities. These include lower compliance costs
associated with violations of environmental reg-
ulations, enhanced market recognition among

258 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

TABLE 1
State P2 Program Legislation Dates and Policy Instruments

State

Number of
Facilities in the

Sample
Year of P2
Legislation

Regulatory Policy:
Numerical Goal

Information-Based
Policy: Reporting

Requirement

Management-Based
Regulation: Mandatory

Planning

AK 0 1990
AL 22
AR 28 1993
AZ 12 1991 � (1993) �

�

CA 57 1989 � (1993) � � (2007)
CO 7 1992
CT 19 1991
DE 6 1990 � (1992)
FL 23 1991
GA 45 1990 � � (1993)
HI 1
IA 23 1989 � (1994)
ID 2
IL 70 1989 � (1992)
IN 61 1990
KS 20
KY 37 1988 � (1997)
LA 23 1992 �
MA 20 1989 � (1997) � (1991) � (1994)
MD 16
ME 11 1990 � (1994) � (2000) � (2000)
MI 69 1994
MN 19 1990 � (1992) � (1991)
MO 27 1990 � (1998)
MS 21 1990 � � �
MT 2 1995
NC 49
ND 2
NE 14 1992
NH 6 1996
NJ 28 1991 � (1996) � �
NM 3
NV 0
NY 44 1990 � (2000) � �
OH 129 1992 �
OK 15 1994
OR 18 1989 � �
PA 63
RI 1
SC 25
SD 2 1992 �
TN 41 1991 � �
TX 85 1991 � �
UT 2
VA 27 1994
VT 4 1990 � (1992) � (192)
WA 20 1988 � (1995) � �
WI 30 1989
WV 12 1998
WY 0

Source: National Pollution Prevention Roundtable, July 15, 2008.

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 259

consumers and the supply chain, and improved
reputation with local communities (Arora and
Cason 1996, 1999; Brunnermeier and Cohen
2003; Gray and Shadbegian 1998; Hall 2001;
Khanna, Harrington, and Deltas 2009). It is
through all these benefits and costs that the pol-
icy instruments influence the rate of adoption
of environmental technologies and the level of
pollution chosen by facilities. I explore below
the impact of legislated programs and policies
on the adoption of environmental technologies,
specifically P2 practices, and on toxic emission
levels by explaining how each program or policy
potentially affects the benefits and costs of P2
adoption and the benefits and costs of pollution.
I then generate the hypotheses.

Legislated programs may promote environ-
mental technology adoption and reduce pollution
levels in two ways. First, information-sharing
and technical assistance provided through the
legislated programs enhance technical know-
how which can lower the costs of searching,
discovering, learning, acquiring, and adapting
existing knowledge, enabling a facility to adopt
environmental technologies and lower pollu-
tion levels (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). In the
absence of technical assistance, facilities may
find such costs to be too high, causing abate-
ment technologies to be underexploited (King
and Lennox 2002; Lennox and King 2004). Sec-
ond, the legislation may provide a perception
of increased visibility of the state regulatory
agency which monitors and enforces regula-
tions. To enjoy reduced regulatory scrutiny and
avoid future regulatory actions, facilities adopt
environmental technologies and reduce their
pollution levels to signal environmental stew-
ardship (Brouhle, Griffiths, and Wolverton 2009;
Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Gray and
Shadbegian 1998; Khanna and Damon 1999;
Khanna, Harrington, and Deltas 2009; Vidovic
and Khanna 2007). Thus,

Hypothesis 1a: Legislated P2 programs for toxic
waste reduction will lead to more P2 activities.

Hypothesis 1b: Legislated P2 programs for toxic
waste reduction will lead to lower toxic releases.

The degree to which legislated programs can
achieve their policy goals depends on the mix
of policy instruments that are putting them into
practice (Freeman et al. 1992). I analyze the
impacts of three specific policies: a regulatory
policy in the form of a numerical goal for
pollution reduction, a mandatory information

disclosure policy in the form of a reporting
requirement, and a management-based regula-
tion in the form of mandatory P2 planning.
Regulatory policies such as mandated maximum
allowable pollution standards are direct controls
to limit pollution and compliance with such a
policy is promoted by imposing a penalty for
exceeding the standard. The lower the allow-
able level of pollution, ceteris paribus, the
more motivated a facility will be to under-
take abatement activities to reduce violations
and liabilities associated with noncompliance.
Additionally, the higher the expected penalty
for exceeding the standard, ceteris paribus, the
greater will be the incentive to abate pollution in
order to meet the target. Thus, emission reduc-
tion targets have the ability to enhance the bene-
fits from environmental technology adoption and
increase the costs of pollution that are associated
with the anticipated penalties and lawsuits due
to violations of environmental regulations (Hart
and Ahuja 1996).

Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
a mandatory target is mixed. While Lanoie,
Thomas, and Fearnley (1998) find that more
stringent facility-specific emission limits lead
to lower emissions, neither Jaffe and Stavins
(1995) or Stafford (2003) find state-level manda-
tory building codes to improve energy effi-
ciency or mandatory state programs to improve
compliance status of polluting entities, respec-
tively. In contrast, the existing literature has
consistently found penalties and enforcement
actions on noncompliant facilities to be effec-
tive not only in reducing violations but also
in lowering emissions (see survey by Gray
and Shimshack 2011). Further, state enforce-
ment action has been shown to have significant
and distinct effects on environmental compli-
ance from federal enforcement actions (Earnhart
2004a, 2004b). Thus, state-level numerical goals
may pose a state-level regulatory threat that will
lead to better environmental outcomes:

Hypothesis 2a: Emission reduction targets will lead
to more P2 activities.

Hypothesis 2b: Emission reduction targets will lead
to lower toxic releases.

Information-based policies that provide reg-
ulated entities a means to publicly disclose
environmental-related information aimed at
improving their reputation with consumers,
investors, regulators, and the general public
can increase benefits from pollution abatement

260 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

activities and lower costs associated with high
pollution levels. Disclosing information about
pollution abatement activities and pollution lev-
els allows a facility to respond to the demands
of these stakeholders by providing them various
signals: a signal of product quality improvement
to its consumers, a signal of lower liabilities,
fewer lawsuits, and better overall financial per-
formance to its stockholders, a signal of com-
pliance to enforcement agencies, and a signal of
environmental stewardship to communities (see
survey by Tietenberg 1998).

The empirical evidence on the efficacy of
information disclosure programs in promoting
better environmental performance and behavior
depends on the nature of information disclosure
system, the stakeholder channel through which
behavior is affected, and the nature of environ-
mental issue addressed. The information that is
required to be reported to the U.S. TRI has been
effective not only in reducing emissions directly
(Khanna and Damon 1999) but also in shap-
ing future regulatory action (inspection activity)
and influencing subsequent stock market returns
which then affect pollution levels (Decker 2005;
Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova 1998; Hamilton
1995). The U.S. EPA (2003) also documents
how the TRI has been used by local communi-
ties to lobby for more stringent regulations and
by enforcement agencies for prioritizing facili-
ties for enforcement and monitoring and for cre-
ating inspection targeting lists. Bae, Wilcoxen,
and Popp (2009) further show that the TRI
is more useful in reducing releases and health
risks when states undertake further data pro-
cessing efforts to refine and analyze the data
before disseminating it to the public. In Canada,
mandatory reporting to the National Pollutant
Releases Inventory (NPRI) has been shown to
reduce chemical pollution levels among those
who perceive a stronger threat of regulation and
to a much less extent among those who perceive
significant consumer pressure (Antweiler and
Harrison 2003; Harrison and Antweiler 2003).
A stronger role of information via the con-
sumer channel is observed when there is a
direct consumer information provision program
as shown by Bennear and Olmstead (2008) who
find that water utilities reduce their violations of
Safe Drinking Water Act standards if they are
mandated to report water contaminant levels to
consumers. In the climate change arena where
the specific form of regulation is forthcoming
but still uncertain, voluntary information disclo-
sure programs are growing but existing studies

demonstrate evidence of greenwashing behav-
ior among participants in a number of voluntary
programs such as the U.S. DOE 1605, U.S.
DOE/EPA Climate Challenge, and the Cana-
dian Voluntary Climate and Challenge Registry
(Brouhle and Harrington 2010; Kim and Lyon
2011; Welch, Mazur, and Bretschneider 2000).
These are in contrast to the electricity indus-
try’s mandatory disclosure of fuel mix infor-
mation which as Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and
Shimshack (2009) find, lead to lower usage of
fossil fuels and higher usage of clean fuels. As
the reporting requirement in state P2 programs
are mandated mostly for pollutants that are reg-
ulated under an existing environmental statute,
one could expect the following:

Hypothesis 3a: Reporting requirements will increase
adoption of P2 activities.

Hypothesis 3b: Reporting requirements will reduce
toxic releases.

Management-based regulations require the
adoption of environmental management prac-
tices for the fulfillment of environmental goals.
It may lower the costs of environmental tech-
nology adoption and pollution abatement for
facilities because environmental management
practices enable them to systematically review
and identify pollution-reducing opportunities,
undertake audits and benchmarking, and mon-
itor environmental performance on very spe-
cific segments of their operations (Coglianese
and Nash 2006). Further, a management sys-
tem can facilitate communication among differ-
ent units and can promote better information
flow (DeCanio, Dibble, and Amir-Atefi 2000).
Such a “management innovation” has the poten-
tial to enhance technological opportunities for
facilities and promote adoption of environmental
product and process innovations that can reduce
pollution (Frondel, Horbach, and Rennings
2007).

A few studies show that voluntary adop-
tion of environmental management systems
promotes better environmental behavior and
performance. Khanna, Harrington, and Deltas
(2009) show that Total Quality Environmen-
tal Management (TQEM) promotes P2 adop-
tion, while Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004)
demonstrate that a more comprehensive environ-
mental management system reduces onsite and
offsite releases. Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama
(2008) further find that adoption of management
systems that comply with ISO 14001 standards

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 261

can improve environmental performance even
after controlling for the influence of environ-
mental regulations. With regard to mandated
management systems, Bennear (2007) finds that
mandatory planning can promote P2 adoption
and lower toxic releases, but she did not account
for the presence of other policy instruments (as
in Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama 2008) which
may complement or substitute for planning.
Thus,

Hypothesis 4a: Mandatory P2 planning will increase
adoption of P2 practices.

Hypothesis 4b: Mandatory P2 planning will lower
toxic emissions.

In analyzing how a facility responds to
each policy instrument, I recognize that the
response may depend on facility characteristics
such as facility-specific knowledge, past envi-
ronmental performance, and exposure to past
enforcement actions. Facility-specific knowl-
edge acquired through learning is important
because past experience promotes acquisition
and exploration of new knowledge, enables
a facility to exploit other external sources
of information, and hastens the build-up of
knowledge stock that enhances a facility’s abil-
ity to assimilate new information (Cohen and
Levinthal 1989; Lennox and King 2004; Mans-
field 1968). Thus, highly technical facilities may
be more capable of improving their environ-
mental performance and modifying their behav-
ior in response to state policies that require a
significant amount of facility-specific technical
information. Past environmental performance is
important because responsive regulators use past
performance and behavior of the facility as a
sign of latent noncompliance that would war-
rant future enforcement action (Decker 2005;
Maxwell and Decker 2006; Innes and Sam
2008). Facilities that face greater prospect of
regulatory scrutiny may therefore respond more
aggressively to state policies to avoid future
regulations. Finally, because past enforcement
actions have been shown to be credible signals
of threat (Innes and Sam 2008; Sam, Khanna,
and Innes 2009; Shimshack and Ward 2005),
exposure to past enforcement activity such as
inspections and penalties may make facilities
more vigilant in their response to state poli-
cies as well. To deflect further monitoring and
enforcement, a facility that has been subjected to
more regulatory action may be more motivated

to adopt P2 technologies and lower pollution.
Thus,

Hypothesis 5a: The extent of adoption of P2 in
response to state policies is expected to be signifi-
cantly influenced by different facility characteristics.

Hypothesis 5b: The extent of toxic pollution reduction
in response to state policies also depends on various
facility characteristics.

III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

The main objective of this study is to estab-
lish the link between the legislation of P2
program and policy instruments and two mea-
sures of environmental performance of a facil-
ity: adoption of environmental technologies and
pollution levels using panel data models in a
framework with lagged dependent variable. As
measure of technology adoption, I use the count
of P2 activities adopted by a facility i at time t ,
and denote it as P2it . As measure of pollution,
I use the level of toxic releases of facility i at
time t , and denote it as Rit . The main explana-
tory variables of interest for both are Leg it , the
P2 legislation dummy variable, and Policyit , a
vector of three policy dummy variables: numeri-
cal goal, reporting requirement, and P2 planning.
In each model, I include lagged dependent vari-
ables, P2it−1 and Rit−1, respectively, to account
for the history of P2 and history of pollution.
I also control for various time-varying facil-
ity characteristics, including regulatory pres-
sures specific to the facility, (zit ), time- or
period-specific dummies (Yt ), and time-invariant
characteristics (ci ).

I specify the toxic emissions equation with a
lagged dependent variable as follows:

Rit = α0Rit−1 + Legit β0,R + Policyit β1,R(1)
+ zit γ1,R + Yt γ2,R + ci,R + εit,R

where ci includes a full set of facility dummies,
industry dummies, and state dummies, and εit
denotes idiosyncratic errors. If there are time-
invariant facility-specific unobservables, pooled
estimation of Equation (1) that contains a lagged
dependent variable will yield inconsistent esti-
mates (Anderson and Hsiao 1982). To derive
consistent estimates, I employ the Anderson
and Hsiao two-stage approach as implemented
by Jaffe and Stavins (1995). The first stage
involves estimating the first differenced ver-
sion of Equation (1). Because the differenced
lagged dependent variable is correlated with

262 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

the first differenced error terms, I instrumented
for the differenced lagged dependent variable
using its twice lagged level (Rit−2) in the dif-
ferenced equation. The second stage derives the
coefficients of the time-invariant regressors by
deriving a “residual” from the differenced first
stage regression and regressing (using OLS) the
residuals against the time-invariant factors. The
“residual” is computed for each facility by mul-
tiplying each coefficient estimate from the first
step by the facility mean for each variable and
subtracting their sum from the facility mean of
the dependent variable.

In explaining the count of P2 using its lagged
count and other factors, I assume that the count
of P2 has a Poisson distribution with the mean
specified as

E(P2it |Xit , ci )
= ci ,P 2 exp[P2i,t−1ρ + Legit β0,P 2

+ Policyit , β1,P 2 + zit γ1,P 2 + Yt γ2,P 2].
However, the presence of a lagged dependent
variable makes within-estimation yield inconsis-
tent coefficient estimates due to the correlation
between the differenced lagged regressor and the
error term (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Thus,
rather than employing a fixed effects model, I
adopt Wooldridge’s (2005) model that assumes
a specific distribution for the facility-specific
effect but which allows the use of a random
effects Poisson model with gamma distribution.
I follow Wooldridge’s (2005) recommendation
for ci to have a specific conditional distribution
as follows:

ci = ai exp[α0 + f (P2i0)α01 + zi α2],
where f (P2i0) is a function of the initial value
of P2 on the first year of reporting, P2i,0, the
vector, z i consists of time-invariant facility-
specific characteristics, and ai is assumed to
be independent of (P2i0, z i ), and follows a
gamma distribution. Wooldridge (2005) shows
that after conditioning the ai out of the density
(Wooldridge 2005, 50 – 51, equations 32 – 34), if
only one lag is included and if the explanatory
variables are exogenous, one can estimate the
following model using a random effects Poisson
model with gamma heterogeneity:

E(P2it |P2it−1, P2i0, Legit , zit , ci )(2)
= ai exp

[
g(P2i,t−1)ρ + f (P2i0)α01

+ Legit β0,P 2 +
3∑

k=1
Politkβ1,P 2

+ zit γ1,P 2 + Yt γ2,P 2 + α0 + zi α2
]

where the full set of regressors consists of all
time- and facility-specific variables and those
that determine the facility-specific effects, ci ,
shown above. To satisfy these assumptions, I
assume gamma heterogeneity in my random
effects model,1 I use one lag of the depen-
dent variable, and I include the initial P2 count,
industry dummies, state dummies, and other
time-invariant characteristics to define ci .

2

Regarding the exogeneity assumption, par-
ticularly of the legislation and policy vari-
ables, which can be of concern for estimating
both Equations (1) and (2) using the approaches
described above, there is reason to suspect
that the nature of facilities which determines
the count of their P2 activities and their level
of emissions could also influence whether the
state they are located in legislates a P2 pro-
gram and implements a particular policy. To
check for this possibility, I employ a probit
model to explain the legislation of the P2 pro-
gram and the adoption of each of the policies
using various state-level measures of environ-
mental performance as well as political pres-
sure and community pressure variables. These
state-level explanatory variables are correlated
with facility-specific measures of environmen-
tal behavior and performance which I use as
dependent variables in Equations (1) and (2). If
the state-level explanatory variables are signif-
icant in the probit models, there is reason to
suspect that state legislation/policies are deter-
mined simultaneously with the decision to adopt
P2 and the level of toxic releases. The results

1. I compared the log likelihood and BIC of the Poisson
models with normal versus gamma heterogeneity and find
that the gamma heterogeneity models have higher log-
likelihoods and lower BIC than the model that assumes
normally distributed heterogeneity.

2. Further, as this is basically now a random effects
model, I also checked if the other regressors that include
measures of actual past regulatory action or proxy for forth-
coming regulations are correlated with the initial count of
P2. I find that the correlation between initial count and
various measures of regulatory pressures (lagged releases,
lagged inspections, and lagged penalties) range only from
0.10 to 0.29. Further, while these measures may be asso-
ciated with total level of pollution, pollution can be abated
using either P2 techniques or end-of-pipe abatement meth-
ods, or both. Hence, these variables which are all measured
at time t − 1 can be considered uncorrelated with initial P2
count in 1991.

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 263

(not shown) indicate that there is no evidence
that state P2 legislation and policies are adopted
in response to factors that may also affect P2
adoption and toxic releases.3

As a second check, I use prelegislation or
prepolicy variables in place of the actual legis-
lation/policy variables in Equations (1) and (2)
as in Bennear (2007). These prelegislation/pre-
policy variables take on a value of 1 for states
which eventually pass the legislation/adopt the
policy on the year immediately preceding the
year of legislation or policy implementation, and
0 otherwise. Statistical significance of these vari-
ables would indicate that there are differences
in the P2 counts and toxic releases of facili-
ties between states which eventually adopt the
legislation/policies on the year before the leg-
islation/policies were adopted and those facil-
ities in states which never did. This implies
that there may be other time-varying factors
that can explain differences in P2 counts and
emission levels and that I may be wrongfully
attributing the response to the legislation/policy.
In Table A1, Models 1-A and 1-B are random
effects P2 models, while Models 2-A and 2-B
are Anderson-Hsiao models, all of which use the
prelegislation/prepolicy variables. All models
show that none of the prelegislation/prepolicy
variables are significant, implying that the leg-
islation and policy can be treated as exogenous
in Equations (1) and (2). Thus the toxic emis-
sions equations are estimated using Anderson-
Hsiao models, while count of P2 practices are
explained using random effects Poisson mod-
els with initial P2 as one of the time-invariant
variables that define facility-specific effects.

IV. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION, VARIABLE
CONSTRUCTION, AND DATA SOURCES

A. Sample Description

The sample consists of facilities whose parent
companies are among the S&P 500 firms report-
ing to the TRI every year from 1991 to 2001.4

The TRI mandates the reporting of toxic releases
and P2 activities by facilities which belong to

3. The full description and results of the probit model
and the variables used are not included in the paper for the
interest of brevity. They are available in the online version
of the article.

4. 1991 is the first year of P2 reporting, and many states
passed their P2 legislations between 1992 and 1998. Further,
even though a number of states passed their P2 legislations
in 1991 or earlier, many of the actual policies did not take
into effect until the 1992 to 2001 time frame.

specific industries, have at least ten full-time
employees, and which manufacture, process, or
use any EPCRA Section 313 chemical in quan-
tities greater than the established threshold.5 The
original 11-year sample is an unbalanced panel
with 34,121 observations, consisting of 5,094
unique facilities. I effectively start my analysis
in 1992 and use 1991 P2 data as a facility-
specific effect, a key explanatory variable in my
dynamic random effects Poisson model. This
drops the 1991 reporters, or 5,101 observations.
Because many facilities do not report every year
and reporting years are not always adjacent, an
additional 3,146 observations do not have 1-year
lagged data. For those which have lagged data
but which do not report every year, their attrition
in any year cannot be clearly attributed to hav-
ing zero or below threshold toxic releases, nor
can below-threshold levels be attributed to the
use of P2. Thus, I only include the 1,261 S&P
facilities who report every year from 1991 to
2001, for a total of 12,610 observations.6 Rela-
tive to the complete unbalanced set, the facilities
in this smaller balanced panel adopt approxi-
mately 39% more P2 activities and emit 70%
more toxic releases. They also have been sub-
jected to 19% more penalties and 39% more
inspections. Thus, I emphasize that the conclu-
sions derived from this analysis apply only to
the facilities with similar characteristics: belong-
ing to large parent companies (S&P 500 firms)
which report every year from 1991 to 2001 and
whose toxic emissions are always at or above
the threshold.

B. Dependent Variables

I use two variables to measure the response
to the state legislation and policies. The first
is the count of all new P2 activities or prac-
tices adopted by a facility each year for all the

5. The USEPA mandates reporting to the TRI for
facilities that have at least 25,000 pounds of chemicals that
are manufactured or processed or 10,000 pounds otherwise
used, except for certain persistent bioaccumulative toxic
(PBT) chemicals. The threshold for the PBT chemicals is
100 pounds or less depending on the chemical beginning
with the 2000 reporting year.

6. Even if we can attribute the reduction in releases
to the adoption of P2 activities, the data on P2 adoption
and releases that result from previous adoption will not be
observed for the year that a facility has below threshold
releases because the facility will not be required to report to
the TRI. But it is very likely that facilities that have below
threshold (but still positive) releases may still be adopting P2
activities. Thus, any TRI-related data will not be available
for these facilities in those years.

264 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

chemicals it uses, processes, and manufactures.7

The U.S. EPA classifies 43 different types of
practices a facility may adopt into eight cate-
gories: good operating practices, inventory con-
trol, process and equipment modifications, spill
and leak prevention, cleaning and decreasing,
surface preparation and finishing, raw material
modifications, and product modifications (U.S.
EPA 2007). The first three consist of activi-
ties that involve adjustments in operating and
production systems that are part of day-to-day
activities which are highly customized to a
facility’s operations and include maintenance
scheduling, recordkeeping, changes in produc-
tion schedule, adoption of recirculation within
a process, modification of equipment, layout or
piping, and use of a different product catalyst.
The next three deal with preventing visible air
and water residues in work areas that result from
production or cleaning activities which can be
accomplished through installation of alarms and
automatic shut-off valves, installation of vapor
recovery systems, implementation of inspection
or monitoring program for potential spill or leak
sources. Such activities impact day-to-day expo-
sure to water and air residues that may cre-
ate hazards for employees. The last two prac-
tices include the more technologically sophisti-
cated P2 practices: substitution of raw materials
and changes in product specification which are
becoming the basis for product differentiation
through product labeling and marketing cam-
paigns. Each facility is allowed to report up
to four practices that it adopts for each of its
chemical. The dependent variable Total P 2 is
therefore the sum of all the practices from all
these categories adopted for all chemicals every
year by each facility from 1992 to 2001. To
ensure that the change in P2 adoption over time
is not due to differences in the chemicals that
were required to be reported, chemicals which
have been added or deleted (due to changes in
the reporting requirements by the EPA) over the
sample period were dropped. The average Total
P 2 count is 1.64 practices, with a minimum of

7. I verified if facilities do indeed report new P2
activities by examining the annually reported P2 counts for
each chemical by each facility belonging to S&P 500 firms
which report to TRI and compared it with their reports for
the preceding year. I calculated the number of facilities for
which the reported P2 counts were nondecreasing for all
chemicals. This was the case for only 5.68% of all facilities
and represents only 0.67% of the chemical-facility pairs
(these facilities have a lower than average chemical count).
Therefore, even if there was any misinterpretation of the
survey question, it impacted a tiny fraction of the data.

zero and a maximum of 84. The distribution is
also highly skewed, with 68% of observations
having adopted zero P2 count, and 19% having
between 1 and 10 counts of P2. The states with
the highest mean adoption of Total P 2 among its
facilities are MT (7.2) and MN (6.2), while the
lowest mean adoption is observed in UT (0.05)
and ND (0.45).

The other dependent variable is a measure of
toxic pollution level. The TRI requires facilities
to report the quantities of onsite toxic releases
to air, water, land, and underground injection,
as well as offsite disposals, transfers, and treat-
ment, on a chemical-specific basis. The level
of a facility’s toxic releases, denoted as Toxic
Releases, is an aggregation of the emissions
across all media and all chemicals in each time
period, released onsite and offsite. To ensure
that the change in toxic releases over time is
not due to differences in the chemicals that
were required to be reported, I dropped from
the aggregation the releases for those chemicals
which have been added or deleted over the sam-
ple period. The level of toxic releases ranges
from 0 to 3,402 million pounds, with a median
of 141,245 pounds. As the Toxic Releases vari-
able is highly skewed, I use the natural log of
this variable (plus one).

C. Explanatory Variables

The main explanatory variables of interest are
the P2 legislation decisions and adoption of pol-
icy instruments at the state level. The dates of
legislation and the specific details on the fea-
tures regarding policy instruments are obtained
and manually coded from the NPPR.8 The P2
Legislation dummy variable takes a value of 1
if the facility is located in a state with a P2 leg-
islation beginning at time t , and 0 before that
year. A facility located in a state that has never
passed a P2 legislation or has adopted it after
2001 will have a value of 0 for this variable
for the entire sample time frame, while a facil-
ity located in a state that has passed it before
1991 will have a value of 1 for this variable for
the sample time frame. A state is considered to
have a P2 program if it legislated an act that is
named as such or as long as the state legislation
clearly gives highest priority of waste reduc-
tion to P2. Because Total P2 and Toxic Releases
are collected only for specific toxic substances

8. National Pollution Prevention Roundtable, http://
www.p2.org/inforesources/nppr_leg.html, downloaded on
July 15, 2008.

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 265

identified under EPCRA Section 313, I further
differentiate states by including a Toxic dummy
variable, to indicate whether the state P2 pro-
gram is focused on toxic wastes.

Each of the policy instruments is constructed
as a dummy variable, where 1 indicates presence
of a policy beginning at time t , and 0 before that
year. The specific years of implementation are
obtained from the NPPR and state environmen-
tal bureaus. If the legislations do not specify a
year of implementation for a particular policy,
it is assumed to be in effect on the same year
as the legislation. The Numerical Goal variable
pertains to whether target(s) exist for emission
reductions. The year of adoption of a numerical
goal is the year that the first target is expected
to be met. I alternatively investigate models that
use the actual percentage reduction in pollu-
tion levels, which I denote as Target. Reporting
Requirement refers to the mandatory submission
of details on the action plans, targets, progress
reports, or pollution levels. In this study, a state
with any type of reporting, regardless of the
required content, is considered to have a Report-
ing Requirement. Finally, Mandatory Planning
variable refers to the presence of mandatory P2
planning policy. States are considered to have
a management policy if it is clearly stated as a
mandatory feature of the state legislation in the
NPPR. The number of facilities in the sample
that are subjected to each policy in each state is
indicated in Table 1.

The role of history in technology adoption
and history of pollution are captured by the
inclusion of the lagged dependent variables as
explanatory variables. Lagged P 2 is constructed
as the count of new practices adopted in the
previous year and is included to account for
past experience in technology adoption. Lagged
Toxic Releases is the volume of all toxic releases
of a facility in the previous year and is included
to account for time-persistent facility character-
istics such as nature of operations and technical
constraints that influence pollution levels. I use
the natural logs of these variables (plus one).

Facility-specific regulatory pressures and
market pressure variables are also included to
control for influences of regulatory action (some
at the federal level) and other external stake-
holders. The first set includes measures of regu-
latory threat. Because past enforcement actions
are found to be credible sources of threat (Innes
and Sam 2008; Sam, Khanna, and Innes 2009;
Shimshack and Ward 2005), polluters who face a
prospect of greater regulatory scrutiny because

they have been subjected to high enforcement
activity in the past may adopt more P2 and
reduce toxic releases more to signal environ-
mental stewardship. I use the number of Lagged
Inspections and the number of Lagged Penalties.
The Lagged Inspections variable is the number
of times a facility was inspected by state and
federal environmental agencies to monitor com-
pliance with mandatory regulations in the past
year. Lagged Penalties refer to the number of
times a facility has been cited for and has been
penalized for noncompliance with federal envi-
ronmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act
(CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA), and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in the
past year. Both are from the EPA Integrated Data
for Enforcement Analysis (IDEA). I use both to
explain Total P 2 and Toxic Releases. Both are
highly skewed so I use the natural log of these
variables (plus one).

To further explain Total P 2, I include Lagged
Toxic Releases as a proxy for the threat of
anticipated compliance costs with existing or
forthcoming regulations. The reporting of P2
practices under the TRI is mandated specifically
for toxic chemicals and many of these chemi-
cals are regulated under different environmental
statutes.9 Further, the total volume of releases
captures the extent of pollution of the facility,
making it more visible to the regulator (Arora
and Cason 1996; Innes and Sam 2008; Khanna
and Damon 1999). Thus, the lagged level of
releases may proxy for the degree of poten-
tial liability associated with violations of these
regulations, which can increase P2 adoption.

I use two additional measure of regula-
tory threat to explain Toxic Releases : Lagged
Toxicity-Weighted Releases and Nonattainment.
Because the risk impacts of the chemicals
reported to the TRI vary, Lagged Toxicity
Weighted Releases may be able to capture extent
of liabilities related to health risks as in Bae,
Wilcoxen, and Popp (2009). This variable is
a weighted sum of toxic releases which is
obtained by multiplying the volume of releases
for each chemical with its corresponding toxicity
weight from the Threshold Limit Values (TLV)
Index and summing up over all chemicals for
each facility in each year. TLV is determined
by the American Conference of Governmental

9. A matrix that relates the TRI chemicals to different
environmental statutes is available from the USEPA web-
site: http://www.epa.gov/tri/trichemicals/reg_requirements/
94regmat .

266 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

Industrial Hygienists and is obtained from the
World Bank.10 The nonattainment status of all
counties in the United States according to the
1977 CAA Amendments is a designation on
every county as being in attainment or nonat-
tainment with national air quality standards for
each of six criteria air pollutants: CO, SO2, TSP,
O3, NO, and PM. Facilities in areas which are in
nonattainment may face a more stringent regu-
latory environment (List, Mchone, and Millimet
2004). For each county, I derived the sum of the
number of pollutants for which it is in nonat-
tainment of environmental standards to create
the Nonattainment variable. The data is obtained
from the U.S. EPA Greenbook.11 I use the nat-
ural log of these variables (plus one).

The second set of explanatory variables
include measures of influences from the mar-
ket and local citizens because polluting entities
may also be subjected to pressures from its con-
sumers, supply chain, and its local community
to improve environmental behavior and perfor-
mance. On one hand, polluting entities can bene-
fit from higher consumer sales if they can project
a signal that the production process reflects
environmentally responsible manufacturing, say
through adoption of environmental technologies
or lower emission levels. Several studies have
shown that those that are in closer contact with
consumers are more likely to participate in vol-
untary environmental programs and adopt more
comprehensive environmental management sys-
tems (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004; Arora
and Cason 1996; Khanna and Damon 1999;
Vidovic and Khanna 2007). On the other hand,
intermediate good producers are exposed to both
suppliers and clients in their supply chain and
may be required by their suppliers and clients
to comply with certain environmental standards
(Hall 2001). They may even be expected by their
clients to adopt specific environmental manage-
ment systems to conform to ISO 14001 stan-
dards (Arimura, Darnall, and Katayama 2010).
Thus, there is no a priori expectation on whether
Final Good dummy will have a positive or a
negative effect on Total P2 or Toxic Releases.
The Final Good dummy variable is based from

10. The TLV is expressed in milligrams per cubic meter
and is based on “time-weighted average concentrations in air
that cannot be exceeded without adverse effects for workers
in a normal 8-hr work day and a 40-hr work week”. The
index is available from http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/data/
toxint/.

11. Can be found at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/
greenbk/anay.html.

the facility’s four-digit SIC code as constructed
in Harrington, Khanna, and Deltas (2008). It is
equal to 1 if the facility produces a final good,
0 otherwise.

Because local communities can exert pres-
sures on polluting entities directly through cit-
izen suits or indirectly by lobbying for more
stringent regulations (Earnhart 2004b; USEPA
2003) it is important to control for local pres-
sures that capture willingness to pay for environ-
mental quality. I use median household income,
denoted as Income obtained from the Bureau
of Census. Many studies have shown that sev-
eral measures for economic attributes are corre-
lated with various environmental outcomes such
as pollution, exposure to risk, plant location
decisions, and participation in voluntary envi-
ronmental programs (Arora and Cason 1999;
Becker 2004; Brooks and Sethi 1997; Earnhart
2004b; Hamilton 1995; Wolverton 2009). Thus,
facilities in areas with higher willingness to pay
for environmental quality, measured by Income,
are expected to have higher Total P 2 and have
lower Toxic Releases.

In addition to the regulatory and market
variables, several experience-related variables
are included to help explain Total P 2. Lagged
Cumulative P2 is defined as the count of all new
P2 activities adopted since 1991 up to the imme-
diately preceding year and captures the stock of
knowledge from past P2 adoption. Initial P2 is
the count of P2 adopted in 1991, the first year
that P2 reporting is mandated in the TRI, and it
captures both the adoption on the first year of
reporting and the facility-specific effect. Both
variables are obtained from the TRI. The adop-
tion of P2 may also be influenced by activities
of other facilities in the same corporate fam-
ily because experience of these related facilities
may generate positive spillovers that can also
enhance a facility’s capacity to develop tech-
nologies that are in line with the parent company
culture, needs, and priorities (Jaffe 1986). Thus,
I include the average adoption of P2 by facil-
ities belonging to the same parent company,
which I denote as Spillover P2. It is obtained
from the TRI. I use the natural log of the two
experience variables and the spillover variable
(plus one).

To control for the scope over which Total
P 2 and Toxic Releases are reported while
avoiding the potential problem of endogeneity
of contemporaneous or 1-year lagged number
of chemicals, the Number of Chemicals of a
facility, averaged over all years is included as

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 267

an explanatory variable.12 This data is obtained
from the TRI. The value of this variable ranges
from 0.67 to 79.5, with a median of 3.47.
Finally, because environmental quality improve-
ments may be costly and technically challeng-
ing for facilities, I use R&D Intensity, the
ratio of R&D expenditures to net sales as
measure of parent company technical capac-
ity as in Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004)
and Khanna, Harrington, and Deltas (2009),
because facilities that belong to more innova-
tive companies are better able to use, assimi-
late, and exploit existing information to develop
new technologies (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
This data is from Research Insight. Due to
the skewness of the distribution of the data
for both variables, I use the natural logs (plus
one) of Number of Chemicals and RD Inten-
sity. State, year, and industry dummies are also
constructed. The descriptive statistics are in
Table 2.

V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The discussion of results is organized as fol-
lows. I first summarize the robust results with
regard to the other factors that influence Total
P2 and Toxic Releases. I then proceed with the
summary of results with respect to the hypothe-
ses regarding the legislation and policy vari-
ables. The detailed discussion of the findings on
how Total P2 (Models I to V in Table 4) and
Toxic Releases (Models VI to IX in Table 5)
respond to each policy variable follows in sep-
arate subsections.

Overall, the empirical results show very
robust results with regard to the effect of differ-
ent regulatory, market and community pressure
variables on Total P2 and Toxic Releases. For
the case of Total P2, Models I to V show that
Total P2 is higher among facilities that have
higher Lagged Inspections, higher Lagged Toxic
Releases, those which are intermediate good

12. The number of chemicals reported consists of chem-
icals used, manufactured, processed, and disposed of, thus,
the opportunities for reporting P2 activities is greater for
facilities which emit more chemicals. This indicates that
contemporaneous number of chemicals may be endogenous
with the P2 practices adopted. Lagged chemicals may also
pose some endogeneity issue because having fewer chem-
icals in the previous year implies fewer opportunities to
report P2 in the following year. The number of chemicals in
1991 could be used, but it is highly correlated (0.56) with
1991 P2 count, which is a key explanatory variable in this
dynamic Poisson model. Hence, I use average number of
chemicals between 1991 and 2001.

producers, those located in areas with higher
Income, those which release a higher Number of
Chemicals, and those which have greater expe-
rience in P2 activities in the past. I also find
the experience-related variables to have different
impacts. One year Lagged P2 and Initial P2 are
always positive and significant, indicating that
past experience provides facilities the know-how
in identifying and implementing new source
reduction practices, possibly because of cost-
reducing effects or momentum effects (Lagged
P2 ). However, Lagged Cumulative P2 is neg-
ative and significant which suggests diminish-
ing opportunities for further adoption of new
P2 activities. Thus, despite short-term learning
effects (captured by Lagged P2 ), there may be
some degree of exhaustion of new opportunities
to further reduce releases of chemicals at source.
Nonetheless, the combined impact of both vari-
ables is positive and statistically significant (at
5% level), lending support to the inclusion of
past experience as key explanatory variables. In
the Toxic Releases models, Models VI to IX
show Toxic Releases to be lower among facil-
ities that have higher Lagged Penalties, have
higher Lagged Toxicity-Weighted Releases, have
lower Number of Chemicals, and which are
Final good producers. I also find strong path
dependence in Toxic Releases suggesting the
importance of persistent facility characteristics
that may constrain large reductions in pollution
levels every year. One interesting result to con-
trast between Total P2 and Toxic Releases is
the negative and significant sign of the coeffi-
cient of the Final good dummy in both the Total
P2 and Toxic Releases equations, which sug-
gests that it is the pressure from the supply chain
that is motivating technology adoption, but it is
the pressure from consumers that is motivating
pollution reduction. These results can be inter-
preted as a support for the view that consumers
are more concerned with observable measures
such as pollution levels but not necessarily with
the nature of technologies adopted to achieve
these ends.

I now summarize the findings with regard
to the hypotheses. I find some evidence to
support Hypothesis 1a and 1b. While Total
P 2 is only slightly higher in states with P2
legislation that emphasize toxic waste reduction,
Toxic Releases are significantly lower in states
with a state P2 legislation that are geared toward
reducing toxic wastes. I do not find evidence
to support Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Total P2
is not significantly higher and Toxic Releases

268 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

TABLE 2
Summary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics: Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses).

Variables
Without State
P2 Program

With State
P2 Program All Observations

Total P2
Equation

Toxic Releases
Equation

Dependent Variables
Total P2 1.705 1.621 1.637 X

(5.446) (4.425) (4.638)
Toxic Releases 1,700,153 2,572,414 2,405,571 X

(6,957,141) (36,200,000) (32,700,000)
Explanatory Variables

P2 Legislation 0.000 1.000 0.809 X X
(0.000) 0.000 (0.393)

Numerical Goal 0.000 0.191 0.155 X X
(0.000) (0.393) (0.362)

Reporting Requirement 0.000 0.572 0.462 X X
(0.000) (0.495) (0.499)

Mandatory Planning 0.000 0.344 0.278 X X
(0.000) (0.475) (0.448)

Toxic dummy 0.000 0.37164 0.3005 X X
(0.000) (0.4832) (0.4585)

Target 0.5182 0.9359 0.8560 X X
(5.0650) (6.2803) (6.0687)

Initial (1991) P2 2.347 2.637 2.581 X
(5.783) (5.999) (5.959)

Lagged P2 1.863 1.766 1.785 X
(5.786) (4.665) (4.899)

Cumulative P2 10.276 11.504 11.269 X
(29.636) (27.603) (28.006)

Spillover P2 0.882 0.929 0.920 X
(1.037) (1.127) (1.111)

Lagged Inspections 5.004 2.980 3.367 X X
(11.017) (8.449) (9.031)

Lagged Penalties 0.070 0.087 0.083 X X
(0.359) (0.507) (0.482)

Lagged Toxic Releases 1.673044 2.616549 2.436078 X X
(6.717) (36.300) (32.800)

Toxicity-Weighted Releases 5,750,387 5,069,449 5,199,697 X
(64,700,000) (51,300,000) (54,100,000)

Nonattainment 0.4556 0.6797 0.6368 X
(0.7666) (0.9934) (0.9582)

Final Good dummy 0.274 0.358 0.342 X X
(0.446) (0.479) (0.474)

Income 34134.62 37475.91 36836.80 X X
(8408.175) (9177.562) (9130.221)

R&D Intensity 0.026 0.030 0.030 X X
(0.020) (0.028) (0.027)

Number of Chemicals 4.970 5.541 5.432 X X
(4.981) (6.477) (6.222)

Number of observations 2,412 10,198 12,610

are not significantly lower among all facilities
in states which have Numerical Goals. I find
evidence to support 3a and 4a but not 3b and
4b: Total P2 is higher among facilities in states
with Reporting Requirement and Mandatory
Planning, even among those in states that do
not emphasize toxic waste reduction, but Toxic

Releases are not significantly affected by either
policy. Finally, I find evidence for Hypothesis 5a
and 5b: some facility characteristics do influence
the adoption of Total P2 and reduction of
Total Releases in response to policy instruments.
The hypotheses and findings are summarized in
Table 3.

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 269

TABLE 3
Summary of Hypotheses and Evidence

Hypotheses
Evidence to Support

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1a: Legislated P2 programs for toxic waste reduction will lead to more P2 activities. �
Hypothesis 1b: Legislated P2 programs for toxic waste reduction will lead to lower toxic releases. �
Hypothesis 2a: Emission reduction targets will lead to more P2 activities. ×
Hypothesis 2b: Emission reduction targets will lead to lower toxic releases. ×
Hypothesis 3a: Reporting requirements will increase adoption of P2 activities. �
Hypothesis 3b: Reporting requirements will reduce toxic releases. ×
Hypothesis 4a: Mandatory P2 planning will increase adoption of P2 practices. �
Hypothesis 4b: Mandatory P2 planning will lower toxic emissions. ×
Hypothesis 5a: The extent of adoption of P2 in response to state policies is expected to be

significantly influenced by different facility characteristics
�

Hypothesis 5b: The extent of toxic pollution reduction in response to state policies also depends
on various facility characteristics.

�

A. Effect of P2 Policies on the Adoption of P2
Practices

The results of the models that explain how
policy instruments affect Total P2 are in Table 4.
All models (except for Model V) are estimated
using random effects Poisson and include the
lagged dependent variable, state dummies, year
dummies, initial (1991) P2 counts, industry
dummies, and time-varying covariates to con-
trol for past experience in P2, fixed differences
between states, national trends that affect all
facilities, facility-specific characteristics, fixed
differences between industries, and time-varying
characteristics affecting P2 at each time period,
respectively. In Table 4, Model I is the base
model and includes the P2 Legislation dummy
and Toxic dummy. Model II is Model I with
all policy dummy variables included. Model III
uses Target instead of Numerical Goal dummy.
Model IV-A and IV-B include interaction terms.
Model V has the same specification as Model II
but is estimated using Poisson with all facility
dummies in place of the Initial P2 and is pre-
sented for comparison purposes. It yields similar
coefficients.

All models in Table 4 show some limited evi-
dence for Hypothesis 1a, no support for 2a, but
broad support for Hypothesis 3a and 4a. The
nonsignificant coefficient of P2 Legislation in
all models indicates that any P2 Legislation is
not sufficient to yield higher adoption rates for
Total P2. However, the Toxic dummy variable is
significant at 10% which suggests that when the
effect of P2 Legislation is assessed for facilities
in states that emphasize toxic pollution reduc-
tion, the effect on Total P2 variable is positive
and significant indicating that P2 Legislation is

effective in promoting P2 activities only in these
states. This is not surprising because the data
on P2 activities used in this study are obtained
from the TRI and are the ones adopted specif-
ically for toxic chemicals. Hence, P2 activities
adopted by facilities in states whose legislation
and technical assistance emphasize reduction of
other types of wastes would not be reflected in
this dataset, which may explain the lack of sig-
nificance of the P2 Legislation variable by itself,
but a significant effect when the focus of the
legislation is accounted for.

The coefficients of Reporting Requirement
and Mandatory Planning are positive and sig-
nificant, consistent with Bennear (2007) and
Khanna, Harrington, and Deltas (2009), while
that of Numerical Goal is not significant. These
findings suggest that the P2 adoption deci-
sion of facilities positively responds to policies
which may improve their reputation with exter-
nal stakeholders (Reporting Requirement ) and
which allow them to reduce their costs of tech-
nology adoption (through Mandatory Planning )
but not to those that can pose threat of regula-
tory action. The signs of the policy coefficients
are similar whether included singly or jointly,
though the magnitudes and levels of significance
are higher if the policy instrument variables are
included in the model one at a time (results
not shown). This is especially true for Report-
ing Requirement which has a coefficient of 0.62
and significant at 1% when included as the only
policy instrument in the model. Nonetheless,
Reporting Requirement and Mandatory Plan-
ning are individually significant even when
other policy variables are included in Model II,
indicating that they have distinct effects and

270 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

TABLE 4
Determinants of Total P2, Poisson Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE)

Poisson RE Poisson FEa

Variables I II III IV-Ab IV-Bb V

P2 Legislation 0.03249 0.03715 0.03933 0.03708 0.07579 0.0347∗

(0.0515) (0.0518) (0.0516) (0.0518) (0.0523) (0.0521)
Toxic dummy 0.23036∗ 0.23023∗ 0.22833∗ 0.19268 0.23158∗ 0.2055

(0.1351) (0.1351) (0.1351) (0.1361) (0.1350) (0.1353)
Numerical Goal −0.02541 −0.02731 −0.04252 −0.0169

(0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0398)
Reporting Requirement 0.40922∗ 0.4010∗ 0.4599∗∗ 0.4325∗∗ 0.5127∗∗

(0.2192) (0.2194) (0.2204) (0.2183) (0.2186)
Mandatory Planning 0.2122** 0.2113** 0.2111** −0.0625 0.1921∗∗

(0.0937) (0.0935) (0.0937) (0.1065) (0.0938)
Target −0.00161

(0.0015)
Reporting Requirement ×

Lagged Toxic Releases
−0.1110∗∗
(0.0450)

Mandatory Planning ×
Cumulative P2

0.0972∗∗∗

(0.0182)
Lagged P2 0.8410∗∗∗ 0.8408∗∗∗ 0.8411∗∗∗ 0.8400∗∗∗ 0.8427∗∗∗ 0.9079∗∗∗

(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0176)
Cumulative P2 −0.5203∗∗∗ −0.5219∗∗∗ −0.5227∗∗∗ −0.5227∗∗∗ −0.5567∗∗∗ −0.731∗∗∗

(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0266) (0.0257)
1991 P2 0.7083∗∗∗ 0.7101∗∗∗ 0.7106∗∗∗ 0.7097∗∗∗ 0.7171∗∗∗

(0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0533)
Spillover P2 0.2772∗∗∗ 0.2794∗∗∗ 0.2812∗∗∗ 0.2823∗∗∗ 0.2824∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗

(0.0338) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0349)
Lagged Inspections 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗

(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111)
Lagged Penalties 0.0160 0.0180 0.0170 0.0208 0.0166 0.0167

(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0298)
Lagged Toxic Releases 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0918∗∗∗ 0.1657∗∗∗ 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.0887∗∗∗

(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0371) (0.0220) (0.0229)
Final Good dummy −0.2941∗∗∗ −0.2946∗∗∗ −0.2946∗∗∗ −0.2976∗∗∗ −0.2949∗∗∗ −2.1567

(0.1049) (0.1050) (0.1050) (0.1051) (0.1054) (2.0794)
Income 0.000014∗∗∗ 0.000015∗∗∗ 0.000015∗∗∗ 0.000015∗∗∗ 0.000013∗∗∗ 0.000018∗∗∗

(0.0000047) (0.0000047) (0.0000047) (0.0000047) (0.0000047) (0.00000637)
RD Intensity 0.5469 0.3778 0.4376 0.4293 0.5270 0.6041

(0.8093) (0.8133) (0.8150) (0.8137) (0.8136) (0.8943)
Number of Chemicals 0.5997∗∗∗ 0.6013∗∗∗ 0.6013∗∗∗ 0.5943∗∗∗ 0.5953∗∗∗ 3.9990∗∗∗

(0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0824) (0.0829) (1.2629)
Constant −2.9408∗∗∗ −2.9434∗∗∗ −2.9448∗∗∗ −2.9523∗∗∗ −2.8627∗∗∗ −6.375∗∗∗

(0.6503) (0.6507) (0.6509) (0.6512) (0.6531) (1.8794)
Facility dummies — — — — — 5351.45∗∗∗

SIC dummies 43.80∗∗∗ 43.89∗∗∗ 43.84∗∗∗ 43.73∗∗∗ 43.06∗∗∗ 143.98∗∗∗

State dummies 68.64∗∗ 75.84∗∗∗ 75.54∗∗∗ 75.66∗∗∗ 76.25∗∗∗ 770.70∗∗∗

Year dummies 68.88∗∗∗ 65.81∗∗∗ 65.70∗∗∗ 66.01∗∗∗ 69.66∗∗∗ 163.39∗∗∗

LR (a) 3913.46∗∗∗ 3915.72∗∗∗ 3919.11∗∗∗ 3915.11∗∗∗ 3944.32∗∗∗ —
No. of observations 12,610 12,610 12,610 12,610 12,610 8,810
No. of groups 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 881

aThere are 8810 for Models III because those facilities which have zero P2 counts in all the years get dropped from a
Poisson model with facility dummies.

bModels with other interaction terms between Reporting Requirement and Final Good dummy, Numerical Goal and Lagged
Inspections or Lagged Penalties and Reporting Requirement and Lagged Inspections or Lagged Penalties are not shown for
the interest of brevity but in all these models, the interaction terms are not statistically significant while the rest of the
coefficients variables are similar to those in Model II. A complete set of these results are available upon request.

Standard errors in parentheses: ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 271

reinforce each other’s influence on P2 adop-
tion, similar to findings by Arimura, Hibiki, and
Katayama (2008). Additionally, these policies
increase Total P2 adoption even in states that
do not emphasize toxic waste reduction (and
they remain significant even if Toxic dummy
is dropped from all models in Table 4), imply-
ing that the effectiveness of such policies is not
constrained by the emphasis of the state’s P2
legislation.

To demonstrate the magnitude of the effect
of Reporting Requirement, Mandatory Planning,
or both, I compute for the ratio of the condi-
tional mean of P2 counts between states with
and without each policy, which is a function
of the relevant coefficients.13 The magnitude of
the coefficients of Reporting Requirement and
Mandatory Planning are very consistent across
the models and are approximately 0.41 and
0.21, respectively. Thus, facilities in states with
reporting requirement have 1.5 times as much
P2 counts as those in states which do not require
reporting, while facilities in states with manda-
tory planning have 1.2 times as much P2 counts
as those in states without mandatory planning.
For those facilities in states with both Report-
ing Requirement and Mandatory Planning, their
count of P2 practices is 1.86 times that of facil-
ities in states with neither. (These three ratios
are statistically different from one at the 1%,
5%, and 5% levels, respectively). If one takes
into account that being in states whose P2 pro-
grams emphasize toxic waste reduction leads to
even higher Total P2, the coefficients from the
models suggest that facilities in states with a
toxic waste reduction focus and which impose a
Reporting Requirement, Mandatory Planning, or
both will respectively have 1.97, 1.61, and 2.43
times as much P2 counts as those in states with-
out them. (These ratios are statistically different
from one at 1%.)

I further investigated the role of Numerical
Goal in Model III where I alternatively use
the level of pollution reduction, Target, in place
of the Numerical Goal dummy and I obtain
results similar to those in Models I and II,
indicating that even differences in stringencies
of targets do not affect adoption of Total P2. In
fact, Numerical Goal also remains insignificant
when its interactions with Lagged Inspections
and Lagged Penalties are included, and the

13. The ratio is computed as
E(P 2it |P 2it −1,P 2i 0,2it ,ci ,Legit =1,Policyit =1)
E(P 2it |P 2it −1,P 2i 0,2it ,ci ,Legit =1,Policyit =0)

= exp[βPolicy].

interactions are also insignificant (results not
shown). The results suggest that regardless of
how much regulatory action or enforcement
activity that a facility has been subjected to in
the past, Numerical Goal is an ineffective policy
tool in promoting P2. These results hold if the
Toxic dummy is dropped from all models in
Table 4.

I further investigate whether the response to
Reporting Requirement and Mandatory Planning
depend on facility characteristics in Models
IV-A and IV-B by including interaction terms.
In Model IV-A, the interaction between Report-
ing Requirement and Lagged Toxic Releases
is significant, while none of the other pol-
icy variables or any other explanatory vari-
ables experience a change in sign, magnitude
and significance. Specifically, the sign of the
interaction term is negative, which implies that
facilities that respond more positively to Report-
ing Requirement by adopting more P2 are those
which have been able to demonstrate good envi-
ronmental performance in the past (those with
low Lagged Toxic Releases ). This suggests that
the mandatory information disclosure program
promotes better environmental behavior among
those which have good news to report, but not
for those whose toxic releases are too high.
Using the coefficients in Model IV-A, the level
of toxic releases needs to be extremely high,
3,402 million pounds, (99th percentile) before
reporting will have a negative impact on the
P2 count.14 Hence, for most of the facilities in
the study, P2 counts are higher when report-
ing is mandated in the state P2 program, but
extremely dirty ones are “penalized” by the pol-
icy. Note further that the sample used in this
analysis has relatively higher toxic releases than
those in the original unbalanced sample of all
TRI reporters. Thus, even among these relatively
high emitters, the results show that a policy
that mandates reporting will still promote P2
adoption among most facilities. These results
suggest that the response to a reporting require-
ment may be driven by the desire to reduce
potential enforcement action in the future, which
is consistent with the findings of Maxwell and

14. In models with an interaction, the ratio can
be computed for facilities in states with and without
reporting requirement for various values of the Lagged
Releases, that is, exp[βReport + γReport−Lagged Releases(Lagged
Releases ∗ Report)it ]. The ratio is significantly lower than
unity (at the 11%) when the natural log of lagged releases
is at least 8.13 (lagged releases is at least 3,402 million
pounds).

272 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

Decker (2006) and Decker (2005) who show
that disclosure of information can be used to
lower the probability of being inspected and that
those which have reported lower toxic releases
per unit of output receive fewer inspections. In
an alternative model where Reporting Require-
ment is interacted with Final good dummy, the
interaction term is not significant but the rest
of the coefficients are unchanged (results not
shown).

Model IV-B further investigates how a facil-
ity responds to Mandatory Planning given
its characteristics. It includes an interaction
term between Mandatory Planning and Lagged
Cumulative P2. In this model, Mandatory Plan-
ning becomes negative but insignificant (it used
to be positive and significant in the model with-
out the interaction term), but the interaction term
is positive and significant. This implies that for
facilities that have not adopted any P2 in the
past (36% of the sample), mandatory planning
will not result in significantly higher (or lower)
count of P2 activities. But for those facilities
which have adopted at least one P2 practice in
the past and are in states with Mandatory Plan-
ning, they adopt significantly more P2 practices
than those in states without such a policy. How
much mandatory planning can promote P2 is
shown by the ratio of the conditional mean of P2
counts of facilities in states with planning to the
conditional mean of those in states without plan-
ning for various values of Lagged Cumulative
P2. The ratio is significantly greater than one at
the 5% level of significance for facilities with at
least 30 counts of Lagged Cumulative P2 prac-
tices in the past (within the 90th percentile).15

These findings lend support to Bennear (2006)
who asserts that the management-based regula-
tions will be successful when the regulated facil-
ity enjoys low costs to pollution reduction. Since
the literature shows how past experience lowers
cost of adoption, the findings in this study imply
that a high enough accumulation of P2-specific
experience lowers a facility’s costs of exploit-
ing other sources of knowledge and integrating
new knowledge generated through P2 planning,
which in turn lowers the costs of finding new
P2 opportunities.

15. If an interaction with Lagged Cumulative P2 is
included, the ratio can be computed for facilities in states
with and without mandatory planning for various values
of the Lagged Cumulative P2, that is, exp[βPlanning +
γPlanning−Lagged Cumulative P2(Lagged Cumulative P2∗Plann-
ing)it ]. The ratio is significantly higher than unity when the
natural log of cumulative P2 is 3.43 or when count is at
least 30 practices.

B. Effect of P2 Policies on Toxic Releases

The results of the models explaining Toxic
Releases are in Table 5. All models are esti-
mated using the Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
two-step approach and include the lagged depen-
dent variable, state dummies, year dummies,
industry dummies, and time-varying covari-
ates to control for the past history of pollu-
tion, fixed differences between states, national
trends that affect all facilities, fixed differences
between industries, and the time-varying char-
acteristics affecting toxic releases at each time
period, respectively. Model VI is the base model
that includes P2 Legislation and Toxic dummy.
Model VII includes all the policy instruments,
while Model VIII uses Target in place of Numer-
ical Goal. Model IX-A and IX-B include inter-
action terms. All models in Table 5 show that
P2 legislations are effective in reducing Toxic
Releases in states whose legislated programs
emphasize toxic waste reduction, consistent with
Hypothesis 1b. Similar to Earnhart (2009), the
findings here suggest that state agencies are able
to provide an additional threat to facilities that
are distinct from the threat associated with fed-
eral legislations.

However, I do not find evidence to support
Hypotheses 2b, 3b, and 4b: none of the policy
instruments I investigate are able to encourage
further toxic pollution reduction. In conjunc-
tion with the significant effect of the legisla-
tion, these results are consistent with findings
by Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan (2005)
who find that promulgation of laws and uncer-
tainty surrounding their enforcement may be
more salient than actual sanctions. Except for
Numerical Goal, the coefficients of the policy
variables are slightly larger when the policy
variables are included one at a time but their
coefficients remain insignificant in those mod-
els (results now shown). In Model VI, I use
the actual level pollution reduction Target in
place of the Numerical Goal dummy, and I find
that states with more stringent targets do not
have lower toxic pollution either. Despite the
unexpected findings, the results regarding the
insignificant effect of Numerical Goal or Target
is consistent with findings of Jaffe and Stavins
(1995) and Stafford (2003) who find mandated
state-level codes to be ineffective in induc-
ing energy efficiency and compliance, respec-
tively. The nonsignificant effect of Mandatory
Planning however, is in contrast with the find-
ings of Bennear (2006) and Arimura, Hibiki,
and Katayama (2008). Reporting Requirement

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 273

TABLE 5
Determinants of Toxic Releases, Anderson – Hsiao Estimators

Variables VI VII VIII IX-Aa IX-Ba

P2 Legislation 0.02712 0.02744 0.02757 0.02734 0.02829
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265)

Toxic dummy −0.31253∗∗∗ −0.31258∗∗∗ −0.31241∗∗∗ −0.31268∗∗∗ −0.31384∗∗∗
(0.0903) (0.0903) (0.0902) (0.0903) (0.0902)

Numerical Goal −0.00266 −0.00731 0.00457
(0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0190)

Reporting Requirement 0.05883 0.05881 0.05776 0.06935
(0.1011) (0.1011) (0.1012) (0.1011)

Mandatory Planning 0.02036 0.0205 0.02061 0.02068
(0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0389)

Target 0.00019
(0.0003)

Numerical Goal × Lagged Inspections 0.00607
(0.0094)

Numerical Goal × Lagged Penalties −0.08169∗∗∗
(0.0298)

Lagged Inspections −0.00207 −0.00215 −0.00211 −0.00294 −0.00214
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0034)

Lagged Penalties −0.02332∗ −0.02351∗ −0.02363∗ −0.02364∗ −0.00632
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0141)

Lagged Toxic Releases 1.01843∗∗∗ 1.01841∗∗∗ 1.01793∗∗∗ 1.01910∗∗∗ 1.01629∗∗∗

(0.1285) (0.1286) (0.1285) (0.1287) (0.1283)
Lagged Toxicity-Weighted Releases −0.40768∗∗∗ −0.40777∗∗∗ −0.40760∗∗∗ −0.40810∗∗∗ −0.40690∗∗∗

(0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0463)
Nonattainment 0.02741∗ 0.02783∗ 0.02774∗ 0.02787∗ 0.02810∗

(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161)
Final Good dummyb −0.17499∗∗∗ −0.17517∗∗∗ −0.17512∗∗∗ −0.17530∗∗∗ −0.17320∗∗∗

(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0164)
Income 0.00000193 0.00000211 0.00000207 0.00000214 0.00000214

(0.00000830) (0.00000830) (0.00000830) (0.00000830) (0.00000829)
RD Intensity 0.2425 0.24278 0.23518 0.2445 0.22624

(0.3908) (0.3909) (0.3908) (0.3910) (0.3903)
Number of Chemicalsb 0.83050∗∗∗ 0.83063∗∗∗ 0.83066∗∗∗ 0.83095∗∗∗ 0.82113∗∗∗

(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0111)
Constant −0.0027 −0.00306 −0.0031 −0.00309 −0.00317

(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110)
SIC dummiesb 88.35∗∗∗ 88.42∗∗∗ 88.40∗∗∗ 88.44∗∗∗ 88.30∗∗∗

State dummiesb 21.62∗∗∗ 21.51∗∗∗ 21.49∗∗∗ 21.52∗∗∗ 21.76∗∗∗

Year dummies 22.51∗∗∗ 22.30∗∗∗ 22.20∗∗∗ 22.30∗∗∗ 21.93∗∗∗

No. of observationsc 11,349 11,349 11,349 11,349 11,349
No. of groups 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261

aModels with other interaction terms between Reporting requirement or P 2 Legislation and Lagged Inspections or Lagged
Penalties are not shown for the interest of brevity but in all these models, the interaction terms are not statistically significant
while the rest of the coefficients variables are similar to those in Model VII. A complete set of these results are available
upon request.

bThese are the variables that are estimated in the second stage of the Anderson – Hsiao two-step framework.
cThere are 10,088 observations in Models VI – IX because the Anderson – Hsiao models require 2-year lagged levels as

instrument for the first differenced 1-year lagged dependent variable.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.

is not significant either, which is contrary to
findings of many studies that show mandatory
information disclosure mechanisms yield signifi-
cant pollution reductions. However, if viewed in
conjunction with the findings of Bae, Wilcoxen,

and Popp (2009), my results may suggest that
state agencies need to further process and
disseminate the reported information better to
make them more relevant to the public and local
communities before these external stakeholders

274 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

can effectively use the information to influence
the environmental performance of facilities.

I investigate the lack of significance of the
policy instruments to determine whether there
are specific types of facilities that would reduce
their toxic emissions in response to the poli-
cies by constructing several interaction terms
between Lagged Inspections or Lagged Penal-
ties and Numerical Goal, Reporting Require-
ment, Mandatory Planning, or P2 Legislation
dummies and included each interaction term
one by one in the model. I show in Models
IX-A and IX-B two of these models which
include interaction terms between Numerical
Goal and Lagged Inspections (Models IX-A)
and Lagged Penalties (IX-B). I find that among
all interaction terms investigated, only the inter-
action between Numerical Goal variable with
Lagged Penalties is negative and significant (in
Model IX-B) while the rest of the coefficients
remain unchanged, providing some evidence for
Hypothesis 5b. While the coefficient of Lagged
Penalties is slightly lower and loses significance
in Model IX-B, the elasticity of Toxic Releases
with respect to Lagged Penalties is now stronger
(but still very modest), at −0.09, compared to
elasticity in Models VI-VIII, at only −0.02. The
findings also show that state pollution reduc-
tion targets are effective in reducing emissions
only among highly noncompliant facilities, that
is, those which have already been subjected to
more enforcement action in the past. Specif-
ically, toxic emissions are significantly lower
among those facilities located in states with a
Numerical Goal if they have been subjected to
at least eight penalties (75th percentile) in the
previous year.16 This is consistent with Earnhart
(2009) who find that the potency of deterrence
instruments is greater among polluting entities
that are facing more regulatory scrutiny.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Regulations for pollution reduction have
increasingly emphasized P2 over end-of-pipe
abatement through legislation of P2 programs
offering a combination of numerical goals,
reporting requirements, and management poli-
cies. The findings of this study show a significant
effect of the toxic waste reduction legislation in
reducing toxic emissions, and to a less extent in

16. This is the number of penalties that would make
the marginal effect of Numerical Goal dummy statistically
negative in Model IX-B.

promoting P2 adoption, which indicates that the
potential for enforcement action and provision
of technical assistance through the state legis-
lation may be providing additional regulatory
threat while also reducing the costs of under-
taking pollution abatement. However, the policy
instruments play very different roles in further
influencing P2 adoption and the level of toxic
releases. Specifically, the results show that facil-
ities in states with reporting requirement and
mandatory planning adopt significantly more P2
practices, even in states that do not emphasize
toxic waste reduction, while numerical goals
prescribed under the state P2 programs do not
yield significantly higher P2 counts. On the
other hand, numerical goals yield significantly
lower toxic pollution levels but only among
those which have been subjected to greater
enforcement action in the past. Thus, while
policy instruments enhance the effect of toxic
waste legislation in increasing P2 adoption, they
are largely ineffectual in further reducing pol-
lution levels. Overall, these results are consis-
tent with the survey findings of Koehler (2007)
who finds significant demonstration of efforts
(through participation in voluntary environmen-
tal programs) in response to various measures
of regulatory threat and other external pressures,
but no meaningful or long-term environmental
performance improvements.

Several insights can be gleaned from these
findings. First, the significance of reporting
requirement and mandatory planning for P2
adoption suggest some consistency with the
growing emphasis on management- and
information-based instruments to promote P2
activities. It also lends some support to the find-
ings of Lent and Wells (1994) who find that the
trend and pattern of firm investment in environ-
mental management shows a shift in investment
priorities from remediation and regulatory com-
pliance toward investments that will reduce pol-
lution and increase competitive advantage. As
management- and information-based policies are
more flexible and allow firms to respond to mar-
ket factors, it is not very surprising that they are
the types of approaches that may promote strate-
gic and beyond-compliance types of activities
such as P2.

Second, that reporting increases P2 adoption
but does not reduce toxic releases shows a very
limited role for information disclosure as a pol-
icy tool, at least at the state level, contrary
to numerous positive findings about the TRI.
The disclosure of environmental-related plans

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 275

and actions to the state regulatory agency seem
to create incentives to adopt P2 practices that
would enable facilities to sufficiently signal envi-
ronmental stewardship through their technology
adoption behavior possibly to deflect regulatory
action and other pressures, but without making
any meaningful pollution reduction. By improv-
ing the quality of information that is made pub-
licly available, say through better data processing
and dissemination as Bae, Wilcoxen, and Popp
(2009) find is necessary for TRI data, the state
agencies may be able to create incentives for
facilities to undertake P2 activities that do not
only improve reputation through their demonstra-
tion of efforts but also activities that can actually
reduce toxic releases. Nonetheless, the findings
emphasize the power of good news: how infor-
mation disclosure promotes P2 among those who
have demonstrated good behavior in the past and
that information disclosure may be potentially
detrimental to extremely dirty facilities.

Third, the significant impact of a manage-
ment policy in promoting P2 adoption con-
tributes to both economic literature and policy
regarding the role that environmental manage-
ment systems play in promoting adoption of
environmentally responsible practices especially
in the context of the EPA’s specific emphasis on
management based tools to promote P2. A key
contribution of this study is the observed com-
plementarity between planning and past expe-
rience, implying that P2 planning as a policy
tool cannot entirely operate in a vacuum; it is
a more potent instrument among facilities that
have accumulated enough P2-specific expertise
in the past. Thus, despite the recent popularity
of employing management-based regulations, it
would be foolish to abandon other policy tools
that can promote even modest adoption of P2
practices to allow facilities to build experience
and know-how that will allow them take advan-
tage of the benefits of P2 planning. The find-
ings also reveal that not only are management
based regulations effective in promoting P2, the
impact of management systems is distinct from

and reinforces the effect of other policies such as
reporting requirement, which is consistent with
findings of Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante (2002)
and Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama (2008).
However, while the findings suggest that P2
planning is able to lower the cost of P2 adop-
tion, they also imply that P2 planning is not
able to facilitate adoption of other abatement
techniques that lead to significant reduction in
toxic releases. Reduction of toxic releases may
be more responsive to other abatement activi-
ties (say, end-of-pipe techniques) that are not
promoted by P2 planning. Because P2 planning
may be effective in promoting specific means
of pollution reduction, but not in achieving the
ultimate goal of lowering pollution levels, it
may need to be complemented by other policy
instruments.

Finally, any discussion of the role of pol-
icy instruments in inducing environmentally
responsible behavior is incomplete without pro-
viding the dynamic context to the analysis.
Thus, despite the finding that they only pro-
mote investment in environmental technologies
without bringing about consequential environ-
mental improvements and that the coefficients
of the policy instruments are small compared
to the very large and statistically strong coef-
ficients of history of P2 adoption and history
toxic releases, the impact of the policy instru-
ments would be larger if we consider how the
effect of past behavior perpetuates further out
into the future. Thus, even with modest short-
term impacts on P2 and toxic releases, this study
shows that reporting requirement and manda-
tory planning can promote P2 in the long term
because the effect of accumulated knowledge
and expertise is strong. For the case of toxic
releases, strong path dependence in the level of
releases suggests it may still be worthwhile to
pursue numerical targets, even though it is only
effective among highly noncompliant facilities
because this policy significantly reduces levels
of releases, which can then reduce future growth
rate of pollution among violators.

276 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
Robustness Check Using Prelegislation and Prepolicy Variables

Dependent Variable: Total P2
Poisson Random Effects

Dependent Variable: Toxic Releases a
Anderson – Hsiao Two-Step Model

Variables 1-A 1-B 2-A 2-B

Pre-P2 Legislation −0.00167 −0.00365 0.0272 0.02716
(0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0187) (0.0188)

Pre-Numerical Goal 0.04835 −0.0253
(0.0467) (0.0337)

Pre-Reporting Requirement 0.07751 0.01006
(0.3053) (0.0141)

Pre-Mandatory Planning −0.16798 0.00606
(0.1038) (0.0742)

Lagged P2 0.84059∗∗∗ 0.83996∗∗∗

(0.0170) (0.0170)
Cumulative P2 −0.52117∗∗∗ −0.51990∗∗∗

(0.0259) (0.0259)
1991 P2 0.70909∗∗∗ 0.70843∗∗∗

(0.0532) (0.0532)
Spillover P2 0.28803∗∗∗ 0.29033∗∗∗

(0.0332) (0.0333)
Lagged Inspections 0.04097∗∗∗ 0.04016∗∗∗ −0.00214 −0.0022

(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Lagged Penalties 0.01604 0.01753 −0.02433∗ −0.02434∗

(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Lagged Toxic Releases 0.09665∗∗∗ 0.09748∗∗∗ 1.01852∗∗∗ 1.02020∗∗∗

(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.1286) (0.1288)
Lagged Toxicity-Weighted Releases −0.40747∗∗∗ −0.40812∗∗∗

(0.0464) (0.0465)
Nonattainment 0.02472 0.02521

(0.0161) (0.0161)
Final Good dummyb −0.29342∗∗∗ −0.29331∗∗∗ −0.17511∗∗∗ −0.17531∗∗∗

(0.1049) (0.1049) (0.0165) (0.0165)
Income 0.000014∗∗∗ 0.000014∗∗∗ 0.00000216 0.00000224

(0.00000467) (0.00000467) (0.00000820) (0.00000831)
RD Intensity 0.59635 0.52452 0.24588 0.24503

(0.8092) (0.8100) (0.3910) (0.3913)
Number of Chemicalsb 0.59583∗∗∗ 0.59531∗∗∗ 0.83104∗∗∗ 0.83130∗∗∗

(0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Constant −2.94637∗∗∗ −2.94605∗∗∗ −0.00301 −0.00314

(0.6505) (0.6502) (0.0110) (0.0110)
SIC dummiesb 43.62∗∗∗ 43.64∗∗∗ 88.42∗∗∗ 88.43∗∗∗

State dummiesb 66.68∗∗∗ 66.72∗∗∗ 18.65∗∗∗ 18.69∗∗∗

Year dummies 74.79∗∗∗ 73.16∗∗∗ 23.61∗∗∗ 23.46∗∗∗

LR (a) 3915.45∗∗∗ 3910.73∗∗∗ — —
No. of observations 12,610 12,610 11,349 11,349
No. of groups 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261

aThere are 10,088 observations in Models 2-A and 2-B because the Anderson – Hsiao models require 2-year lagged levels
as instrument for the 1-year lagged differenced dependent variable.

bThese are the variables that are estimated in the second stage of the Anderson – Hsiao two-step framework.
Standard errors in parentheses.
+Significant at 15%, ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.

RAMIREZ HARRINGTON: STATE P2 POLICIES 277

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the
online version of this article:

Appendix S1. Probit Models for State P2 Legislation/
Policy Adoption.
Table S1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Probit
Models
Table S2. Probit Model Results: P2 Legislation and Policy
Adoption

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Designing a Low-Cost Pollution Prevention Plan to
Pay Off at the University of Houston

Yurika Diaz. Bialowas , Emmett C. Sullivan & Robert D. Schneller

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(2006) Designing a Low-Cost Pollution Prevention Plan to Pay Off at the University of
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Designing a Low-Cost Pollution Prevention Plan to Pay Off at
the University of Houston

Yurika Diaz Bialowas, Emmett C. Sullivan, and Robert D. Schneller
Environmental Health and Risk Management Department, University of Houston, Houston, TX

ABSTRACT
The University of Houston is located just south of down-
town Houston, TX. Many different chemical substances
are used in scientific research and teaching activities
throughout the campus. These activities generate a signif-
icant amount of waste materials that must be discarded as
regulated hazardous waste per U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) rules. The Texas Commission on Envi-
ronmental Quality (TCEQ) is the state regulatory agency
that has enforcement authority for EPA hazardous waste
rules in Texas. Currently, the University is classified as a
large quantity generator and generates �1000 kg per
month of hazardous waste. In addition, the University
has experienced a major surge in research activities during
the past several years, and overall the quantity of the
hazardous waste generated has increased. The TCEQ re-
quires large quantity generators to prepare a 5-yr Pollu-
tion Prevention (P2) Plan, which describes efforts to elim-
inate or minimize the amount of hazardous waste
generated. This paper addresses the design and develop-
ment of a low-cost P2 plan with minimal implementation
obstacles and strong payoff potentials for the University.
The projects identified can be implemented with existing
University staff resources. This benefits the University by
enhancing its environmental compliance efforts, and the
disposal cost savings can be used for other purposes.
Other educational institutions may benefit by undertak-
ing a similar process.

INTRODUCTION
The University of Houston campus covers �550 acres and
includes �100 buildings. Current enrollment is �35,000
students with �5000 faculty and staff.1 There are �400

laboratories on campus presently with more planned in
2006.

Colleges and universities typically generate a wide
range of chemical waste and, because of their decentral-
ized organizational structure face, challenges in comply-
ing with applicable waste regulations.2,3 One of the criti-
cal functions of the University’s Environmental Health
and Risk Management Department (EHRM) is to manage
chemical waste in accordance with the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) and Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) rules.4,5 This is a sizable
undertaking for the EHRM staff and ties up many re-
sources. There is no formal long-term investment in waste
disposal costs for the University other than a demonstra-
tion of regulatory compliance.6 Therefore, it is in the best
interest of the University to minimize the quantity of
chemical waste generated whenever possible so that funds
could be spent on projects other than waste disposal.

In addition, the TCEQ has promulgated rules that
require large-quantity hazardous waste generators, such
as the University, to develop a written 5-yr Pollution
Prevention (P2) Plan.7,8 In these plans, generators describe
the actions planned to minimize or eliminate the gener-
ation of hazardous waste at their facilities.7 Previous P2
plans submitted by the University, as required by the
regulations, had limited success in reducing wastes. The
implementation of a more effective plan maximizing the
available staff resources was needed.

Previous P2 Plan
The previous P2 Plan at the University of Houston was
designed for the period of 2001–2005. This plan proposed
goals to reduce or minimize hazardous waste by taking
several steps.9 These steps included the following: (1)
chemical substitution: replacing a nonhazardous or less-
hazardous substance for a hazardous or regulated chemi-
cal; (2) small-scale experimentation: scaling down the
experimental techniques used in research or instructional
laboratories; (3) chemical exchange program: instituting a
CHEM-SWAP program for laboratories to trade their un-
used or reusable chemicals with other laboratories on
campus; and (4) procurement initiatives: the EHRM peti-
tioned the Purchasing Department to adopt a no-pur-
chase policy for mercury-containing equipment and lead-
based paint; historically mercury waste has been
generated at the campus along with lead-based paint
waste.

The University had some modest success with the
previous P2 Plan. However, as the level of research has

IMPLICATIONS
There is regulatory and economic pressure on educational
institutions to reduce the amount of EPA-defined hazard-
ous waste generated at their campuses. Although reducing
and/or eliminating hazardous waste generation is a good
management practice, institutions may face challenges in
implementing this practice. These could arise from an in-
crease in educational activities on campus or limited inter-
nal resources to implement new waste management initia-
tives. Regardless, a review of the current waste generation
and disposal practices of the institution should be a priority.
It is likely that waste reduction projects with attractive pay-
offs, which can be implemented with existing resources,
will be identified.

TECHNICAL PAPER ISSN 1047-3289 J. Air & Waste Manage. Assoc. 56:1320 –1324
Copyright 2006 Air & Waste Management Association

1320 Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association Volume 56 September 2006

grown 400% during the years 2000 –2005, the overall total
quantity of waste generated continued to grow.10 In the
year 2001, the University generated 30 t of waste, and by
2004 the total was 38 t. The EHRM expects that by im-
plementing a more systematic review of the generating
patterns of the University, a more effective P2 plan can be
developed with minimal costs and without increasing
staff.

DESIGNING A LOW-COST YET EFFECTIVE
P2 PLAN
The first stage of the plan development was to form a
waste minimization team. The team was selected from the
EHRM and then asked to follow a three-step process to
identify potential projects. These steps included a review
of the current waste generation profile, peer institution
contacts, and identification of likely successful projects.
Likely successful projects were defined as those that could
be implemented with a fast payoff, such as �12 months,
and with the existing manpower of the EHRM.

Review of Current Waste Generation Profile
The team then reviewed the annual waste summaries for
the years 2001–2004. These are required reports for regu-
lated waste per the TCEQ rules.5 Figure 1 is representative
of the waste generation of the University for the period of
2001–2004. The top six waste streams by quantity were
waste oil derivatives, used photographic fixer, spent ha-
logenated solvents, spent nonhalogenated solvents, and
both EPA-defined hazardous waste and nonhazardous lab-
oratory overpack drums.11 The associated disposal cost of
these six waste streams is given in Table 1.

Peer Institution Contacts
The team then contacted several other educational insti-
tutions and inquired about their waste handling practices
and facilities. The initial contacts were made via tele-
phone. The primary objective of these telephone conver-
sations was to review their successful waste minimization

practices and possibly identify those that could be imple-
mented at the University of Houston.

A site visit was made to the University of Texas Health
Science Center at Houston (UTHSC-H). This institution
consists of six health-related schools and has �800 labo-
ratories.12 The team was briefed on successful waste min-
imization projects undertaken by the UTHSC-H Environ-
mental Health and Safety Department and then was
escorted on a tour of their waste facilities.

Identification of Likely Successful Projects
The final step in the process was for the team to identify
likely successful projects based on the waste generating
profile of the University and the peer institution contacts.
Each potential project was analyzed for time require-
ments, equipment needed, safety precautions, cost and
savings expectations, potential waste stream reduction,
and regulatory compliance.13,14 Projects with the greatest
cost benefit and ease of implementation were given the
highest ranking. Likely successful projects were consid-
ered as having a projected payoff of �12 months based on
2001–2004 waste generation data or being readily doable
with existing EHRM staff.

Figure 1. University of Houston waste streams generation profile from 2001 to 2004.

Table 1. Top six waste streams generation and estimated disposal cost
for 2004.

Waste Stream

Quantity
Generated

(lb)

Waste
Disposal Cost

($)

Nonhalogenated solvents 4146 651
Halogenated solvents 5030 1580
Hazardous lab pack 1769 328
Nonhazardous lab pack 10,046 7890
Waste oil derivatives 18,343 3411
Photographic fixer 11,713 5018
Total 51,047 18,878

Notes: Source—University of Houston 2004 Annual Waste Summary.11

Diaz Bialowas, Sullivan, and Schneller

Volume 56 September 2006 Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association 1321

The team considered many different waste minimi-
zation options for the six largest quantity streams. These
included the following: (1) increase recycle of waste oil:
expand existing program to include all recyclable oils on
campus; (2) increase bulking of compatible liquid waste:
safely combine as much compatible liquid waste in a
single drum versus individual containers overpacked with
absorbent material; (3) increase bulking of compatible
solid wastes: safely combine as much compatible solid
waste in a single drum versus individual containers over-
packed with absorbent material; (4) install solvent recov-
ery system for chlorinated solvent wastes: secure the
equipment necessary to recover the hazardous constitu-
ents of the chlorinated solvent waste stream, making the
remaining material nonhazardous; and (5) installation of
a silver recovery system for photographic waste: a system
designed to capture the silver in the photographic fixer,
which makes the remaining liquid waste nonhazardous.

From this list of potential projects, three were chosen
by the team with the expectation that a significant reduc-
tion in waste generation could be made with the resources
available to the department. The selected projects were:
(1) increase bulking of compatible liquid waste; (2) instal-
lation of a silver recovery system for photographic waste;
and (3) increase recycle of waste oil.

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION

Increase Bulking of Compatible Liquid Waste
This project consists of safely bulking compatible liquid
chemical wastes by combining individual containers into
a single larger container, such as a 55-gal drum. Compat-
ible liquid waste would be considered as being in the same
classification according to the Department of Transporta-
tion Hazardous Materials table.15 Successful bulking of
more chemical waste would lead to a reduction in the
quantity of laboratory overpack (lab pack) waste. A lab
pack waste drum typically contains 14 –16 individual bot-
tles placed throughout the absorbent packing material.
The entire drum is considered hazardous waste, although
a significant percentage may be the packing material. By
bulking compatible wastes whenever possible a signifi-
cant reduction in the total quantity of lab pack waste
could be achieved. The team estimated that this project

could reduce the cost of lab pack waste from $8218 to
$569 per year. This would be a 93% cost savings.

The project would likely require an additional 8 hr
per week of EHRM staff time to segregate chemicals ac-
cording to their compatibility and bulk them into drums.
A reassignment of duties for existing personnel could be
made to accommodate the 8 hr. In addition, there is
always a possibility of an unforeseen chemical reaction
while bulking chemical waste. Historically, bulking was
conducted under a flexible exhaust line in the waste fa-
cility. The team identified a method to facilitate safer
bulking by moving the operation to a fume hood. This
could be accomplished by retrofitting the hood at a cost
of �$2307 dollars. Due to the savings potential of this
project, the alterations were made to the fume hood.
Figure 2 shows the modifications made to enhance the
bulking process in the university waste facility.

Installation of a Silver Recovery System for
Photographic Waste

The photographic laboratories at the University of Hous-
ton generated a total of 6 t of liquid silver-containing
waste in 2003 and 6.5 t in 2004. Silver is one of the
primary components of film and photographic paper that
make it possible to form an image. Although it is not an
ingredient of the original photographic solution, it is a
byproduct of the film and paper processing. Silver is a
heavy metal and is considered a hazardous waste by EPA.4

Discharge of silver to the City of Houston wastewater
treatment system is strictly regulated.16

Silver has an economic value, and recovering it from
the photographic waste saves the University money from
two sources. First, the University receives a monetary
value or credit for the silver recovered, and second, the
University reduces the amount of hazardous photo-
graphic waste generated and the associated disposal cost.

Silver in the form of thiosulfates anionic complex can
be removed from photographic processing solutions by a
number of techniques including electrolytic recovery, me-
tallic replacement, precipitation, and ion exchange.17,18 The
best alternative for the University is a combination of an
electrolytic recovery system followed by a chemical recovery
cartridge system. This combination will provide a higher

Figure 2. Original flexible exhaust line (left), original fume hood configuration (center), and retrofitted fume hood—note modification to easily
roll drum underneath for safe bulking (right).

Diaz Bialowas, Sullivan, and Schneller

1322 Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association Volume 56 September 2006

silver recovery, allowing the remaining solution to be dis-
posed into the city sewer system. The necessary equipment
can be leased, and a vendor can service and maintain the
silver recovery unit. The equipment lease, service, and main-
tenance cost is expected to be �$676/yr. There will be ad-
ditional costs for setup and installation. This project is ex-
pected to reduce the cost of photographic fixer waste
disposal from $5018 to $676/yr, an 87% savings.

The EHRM expects to eliminate �11,713 lb of pho-
tographic waste per year with the addition of the new
silver recovery unit. By using a lease service option, there
will be minimal impact on staff requirements to service
the unit.

Increase Recycle of Waste Oil
One of the benefits of developing a systematic P2 plan for
an institution is that it is possible to improve on existing
recycling efforts that are already in place.5,19,20 This was
the case for the University in terms of used oil recycling.
The University has a fleet of 139 assorted trucks and cars
and also has an auto shop that performs routine mainte-
nance on these vehicles. The auto shop has a used oil
collection system with a pump, associated piping, and a
1000-gallon storage tank. The auto shop had an arrange-
ment with a local used oil reclamation firm to have the
tank pumped out on a regular basis at no cost.

The waste minimization team quickly realized that used
oil from other parts of the University could be added with
this oil. EHRM waste personnel could easily bring used oil
collected on campus to the collection system and have it
pumped to the storage tank. The impact on the EHRM staff
would be minimal to implement this procedure. The team
conducted a compliance check of the current vendor with
the TCEQ and also visited the reclamation site. This project
is expected to eliminate used oil disposal costs from $3411
per year to $0, a 100% savings.

THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Table 2 displays the potential impact of the new P2 plan.
The table lists the total waste generated before the plan is
implemented and the projected implementation quanti-
ties of the proposed projects.

Comprehensively, all of the projects combined could
benefit the University in reducing the waste generated
from the six largest waste streams from 51,047 lb per year

to 20,991 lb/yr. This will lead to a reduction in overall
disposal costs.

The most significant remaining challenge is the re-
duction of unknown waste. Although the amount of un-
known waste is minimal, the analytical expense to iden-
tify the waste and assure proper disposal is significant,
greater than the collective disposal cost of the six largest
waste streams. This challenge can be addressed by educat-
ing the laboratory personnel of the importance of waste
identification and segregation.

Figure 3 demonstrates the University waste genera-
tion profile for the base years 2001–2005 and the pre-
dicted waste generation for the years of 2006 –2010. The
figure shows the projected waste reductions with the im-
plementation of the three selected projects described pre-
viously. The forecast shows the elimination of the photo-
graphic fixer and waste oil derivatives streams. Lab pack
waste also shows a very significant reduction. The halo-
genated and nonhalogenated solvents show an increase
due to the shift from lab pack waste to bulked solvents.
However, the increase in disposal costs for the bulked
halogenated and nonhalogenated waste solvents is offset
by the projected savings in lab pack waste disposal costs.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
The University of Houston is a large teaching and research
institution that generates a significant amount of chemi-
cal waste that will likely increase as the University con-
tinues to grow. Much of the waste generated is considered
hazardous per EPA regulations. The University faces in-
creasing regulatory and economic pressure to reduce the
amount of hazardous waste generated and the associated
disposal costs. The EHRM has had modest success in the past
in reducing hazardous waste generation; however, it faces
staff and budget limitations. A more effective P2 Plan was
necessary using the available departmental resources.

A waste minimization team was formed, and a three-
step process to identify likely successful projects was fol-
lowed. These steps consisted of profiling current waste
generation processes, contacting peer institutions, and
selection of projects. By following this process, the uni-
versity has identified several projects and is expecting to
reduce its six largest waste streams collectively by 50%. Fur-
thermore, the University expects to achieve these goals with
its existing staff and also expects to pay the cost of imple-
mentation within the first 12 months of each project.

Waste minimization is a long-established environ-
mental and economic best practice. The University has
faced challenges in trying to reduce waste generation with
the available resources while at the same time experienc-
ing growth. Other institutions and organizations may
face similar challenges. The University has found that
despite these challenges, an effective P2 Plan to minimize
waste generation can be developed with the resources
available to the organization. Such a P2 Plan can be sur-
prisingly effective in reducing waste quantities and can be
highly cost effective.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Alan Lucas, environmental protection
manager at the University of Texas Health Science Center
at Houston, for his ideas and suggestions on this project.

Table 2. Projected impact of the waste minimization program (6 largest
waste streams).

Major Waste Streams

Quantity
Generated
Before (lb)

Projected
Quantity

Generation (lb) Project

Nonhalogenated solvents 4146 5824 Bulking
Halogenated solvents 5030 14,558 Bulking
Hazardous lab pack 1769 518 Bulking
Nonhazardous lab pack 10,046 91 Bulking
Waste oil derivatives 18,343 0 Recycle
Photographic fixer 11,713 0 Silver recovery
Total 51,047 20,991

Notes: Source—Expected waste reduction by implementing waste reduction
projects: (1) bulking, (2) recycling, and (3) silver recovery.

Diaz Bialowas, Sullivan, and Schneller

Volume 56 September 2006 Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association 1323

They also wish to thank Mark O’Riley, hazardous waste
coordinator, and Rocio Harrelson, biological safety man-
ager, both members of the Environmental Health and
Risk Management Department, for their assistance in the
preparation of this paper.

REFERENCES
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uh.edu/uh_glance (accessed 2005).
2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Environmental Virtual Campus.

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(CSHEMA) List Server. Available at: listserv@lists.umn.edu (accessed 2005).
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6. Environmental Protection Agency Sector Program Colleges and Uni-
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cessed 2005).

7. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. Pollution Prevention:
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13. Schwartz, C.; Howard, W. Waste Minimization: Cornerstones for a Suc-
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15. Keegan, R.J. 2004/2005 Hazardous Materials Substances and Wastes
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16. City of Houston. Water and Sewer Code Ordinances; Article V; Dis-
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17. Silver Council. Code of Management Practices: Guide for Photo Processors.
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codes/Photo_Manual (accessed 2004).

18. Eastman Kodak Company. Sources of Silver in Photographic Processing
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0900688a800f80f9/J210ENG (accessed 2005).

19. The University of Houston Environmental Health and Risk Manage-
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Waste Minimization Procedures. Available at http://www.uh.edu/plantops/
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About the Authors
Yurika Diaz Bialowas is a chemical engineer intern and an
environmental compliance at the University of Houston En-
vironmental Health and Risk Management Department.
Emmett Sullivan is the University of Houston environmental
compliance manager and Robert D. Schneller is the direc-
tor of the Environmental Health and Risk Management
Department. Address correspondence to Yurika Diaz
Bialowas, 935 Rock Springs Dr., Richmond, TX 77469;
phone: �1-832-588-8385; fax: �1-281-344-0094; e-mail:
yurikadiazbialowas@houston.rr.com.

Figure 3. University of Houston major waste stream generation profile.

Diaz Bialowas, Sullivan, and Schneller

1324 Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association Volume 56 September 2006