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Required to write an essay of 1,500 words (excluding references) in response to the following essay topic:

Consider the merits of the claim that, in light of the literature on employee voice and the case study materials provided in this module, Google management failed spectacularly in managing employee voice.

– One paragraph on introduction

– 500 words on theoretical perspective (Literature review) using the journal I provide and other journal you can find online.

– Analyse & Argument with Citations

– Concluding para – What has been said? Summary of key points discussed

Must be harvard referencing

Google Case- prepared by Dr. Loredana Dreptate and Professor John Geary
©

Google is a much admired company. It is financially successful. It is also claimed to be one of the best
places to work because of its culture of openness, ethics and creativity. It is a non-unionized
company. Management claim they treat employees well and, as a consequence, there is no need for
union representation for its staff. Instead, employees are provided with internal voice mechanisms.
One such mechanism is the active internal boards where employees’ concerns can be aired. These
boards are broadly of two forms. One is operated by management and is provided as a means for
hearing employees’ views and concerns. The other is a grass-roots board which is operated and
overseen by employees, albeit management provide the technological means for its operation.
Another voice mechanism is the grievance filling system through which employees can report issues
to their manager, the HR department or an anonymous helpline in an attempt to resolve their
concerns.

In the last two years, Google’s employees have become increasingly concerned with aspects of the
management of the company and have expressed their desire for having more voice over their
company’s business model.

There have been a series of public campaigns pursued by them in an effort to shape the company’s
strategies and policies. Their objections include a request of the company to withdraw from
engaging in military contracts with the U.S. Pentagon which involved the development of new
technologies that could identify and kill human targets; to discontinue work on a censored search
engine for the Chinese government; to demand that the company avoids working for the US Border
agencies which were accused of abusing human rights; and finally, to end contracts with the oil
industry. Staff had other concerns, too, and we will address these in class discussion
In November 2018, around 20,000 employees of its 94,000 workforce protested by engaging in a
walk-out of their offices across the world. The walk-out was precipitated by the company’s shielding
and rewarding of men who were accused of sexually harassing their female co-workers. The story
made international headline news following an article published by the New York Times. The protest
included both full-time and contract employees, which make up more than 50 per cent of the
company’s workforce. This level of coordination across countries designed to oppose management
by some of the arguably best paid and highly skilled people in the economy was unprecedented.

Study the materials provided and answer the following questions:

1. Why did Google’s employees protest?

2. What form did their protest take?

3. What were employees’ demands?

4. How did the employees in Dublin respond? Discuss the developments that took place in the Irish
context and their significance.

5. How did Google management respond to employees’ demands and actions?

6. Was employees’ action successful? Why?

7. What lessons can be drawn from this case?

8. What does the case tell us about the merits of direct versus indirect (representative) forms of
voice?

9. Do you think management have responded to employees’ concerns in the correct manner? How
might you advise them?

10. In summary, what do you think is the significance of the Google case for our understanding
employee voice?

Resources:

1. We’re the Organizers of the Google Walkout. Here Are Our Demands

https://www.thecut.com/2018/11/google-walkout-organizers-explain-demands.html

2. Google Is Ending Forced Arbitration. Don’t Expect Your Own Employer To Follow Suit
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/google-is-ending-forced-arbitration-dont-expect-your-own-

employer-to-follow-suit_n_5c702129e4b03cfdaa54a390

3. Google announces changes to sexual harassment policies after global employee walkout

https://www.vox.com/2018/11/8/18075840/google-ceo-announces-sexual-harassment-policy

4. Google CEO Sundar Pichai discusses the walk-out planned by Google employees to protest

company’s handling of sexual misconduct. VIDEO

https://www.thecut.com/2018/11/google-walkout-organizers-explain-demands.html

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/google-is-ending-forced-arbitration-dont-expect-your-own-employer-to-follow-suit_n_5c702129e4b03cfdaa54a390

https://www.vox.com/2018/11/8/18075840/google-ceo-announces-sexual-harassment-policy

5. Two organizers on the walkout and its consequences –VIDEO
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/amanpour-and-company/video/claire-stapleton-and-meredith-whittaker-

google-walkouts-htzi/

6. Google sit-in: Workers protest alleged company retaliation after walkout and engage in a sit-in
https://www.cnet.com/news/google-sit-in-workers-protest-alleged-company-retaliation-after-

walkout/

7. Most of the Google Walkout Organizers Have Left the Company
https://www.wired.com/story/most-google-walkout-organizers-left-company/

8. Dozens of Google employees say they were retaliated against for reporting harassment
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/9/9/20853647/google-employee-retaliation-harassment-me-

too-exclusive

9. Google staff condemn treatment of temp workers in ‘historic’ show of solidarity

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/02/google-workers-sign-letter-temp-
contractors-protest

10. Google contract workers vote to form a union amid employee discord over treatment
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/30/google-contract-workers-vote-
form-union-amid-employee-discord-over-treatment/

Claire Stapleton & Meredith Whittaker on the Google Walkout

https://www.cnet.com/news/google-sit-in-workers-protest-alleged-company-retaliation-after-walkout/

https://www.wired.com/story/most-google-walkout-organizers-left-company/

https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/9/9/20853647/google-employee-retaliation-harassment-me-too-exclusive

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/02/google-workers-sign-letter-temp-contractors-protest

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/30/google-contract-workers-vote-form-union-amid-employee-discord-over-treatment/

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? A
Critique of the Conception of Employee
Voice as a Pro-Social Behaviour within
Organizational Behaviour
Michael Barry and Adrian Wilkinson

Abstract

For many years, the employment relations (ER) literature took the perspective

that employee voice via trade unions could channel discontent and reduce exit,

thereby improving productivity. In organizational behaviour (OB) research

voice has also emerged as an important concept, and a focus of this research has

been to understand the antecedents of the decision of employees to engage or not

engage in voice. In OB research, however, voice is not viewed as it is in ER as

a mechanism to provide collective representation of employee interests. Rather,

it is seen as an expression of the desire and choice of individual workers to

communicate information and ideas to management for the benefit of the orga-

nization. This article offers a critique of the OB conception of voice, and in

particular highlights the limitations of its view of voice as a pro-social

behaviour. We argue that the OB conception of voice is at best partial because

its definition of voice as an activity that benefits the organization leaves no room

for considering voice as a means of challenging management, or indeed simply

as being a vehicle for employee self-determination.

1. Introduction

Employee voice has been a major topic in the field of employment relations
(ER) for many years. In the 1980s, the ideas of Hirschman (1970) inspired
interest in voice as an alternative to employee exit, and the early work on
voice focused on unions as the main instrument of voice (Freeman and
Medoff1984).Thecontinuingdifficulties facingorganized labourhave,more
recently, given voice broader significance within the field, and there has been

Both authors are at Griffith University.

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

British Journal of Industrial Relations
54:2 June 2016 0007–1080 pp. 261–284

doi: 10.1111/bjir.12114

interest in voice in non-union as well as union contexts (Benson 2000; Boxall
et al. 2007; Gollan et al. 2014; Gomez et al. 2010). In contemporary ER
studies, voice mechanisms are seen as viable substitutes for flagging union-
ism, or alternatively as possible ways of substituting other mechanisms for
unions in instances when employee voice schemes are initiated by manage-
ment (Charlwood and Pollert 2014; Marchington 2007; Wilkinson et al.
2013).
For many years, the ER literature adopted Freeman and Medoff’s (1984)

view that collective voice could channel discontent and reduce exit, thereby
improving productivity. Freeman and Medoff (1984) saw trade unions as the
best agents to provide such voice, as they were generally independent of the
employer and thus added legitimacy. However, it is important to note that
voice structures can be contested. There can be tension between the aspira-
tions of employees for voice, including an independent form of voice, and a
desire by management to institute voice as part of its human resource man-
agement (HRM) agenda.
Employee voice has also emerged as an important concept for organiza-

tional behaviour (OB) scholars who are interested in understanding the ante-
cedents of the decision of employees to engage or not engage in voice
(Greenberg and Edwards 2009; Morrison 2011, 2014). In OB research,
however, voice is not viewed as it is in ER as a mechanism to provide
collective representationofemployee interests.Rather, it is seenasanexpres-
sion of the desire and choice of individual workers to communicate informa-
tion and ideas to management for the benefit of the organization. The OB
literature follows the highly cited definition of voice that is offered by Van
Dyne and LePine (1998), which is that it is discretionary, pro-social, largely
informal, individual behaviour. For OB, ‘pro-social’ is a behaviour that is
defined as being other-regarding (rather than self-regarding), and of benefit
to the organization or the work unit. Interestingly, OB research on voice has
extended intomainstreammanagement journals, giving this interpretationof
voice greater reach, and also potentially challenging other conceptions of
voice. In this article, we have been stimulated by two recent review papers
that were written with the intention of being broad integrative reviews of the
entire voice field (Klaas et al. 2012; Morrison 2011). Of concern to us is that
although thesepapersarepublished inmanagement rather thanOBjournals,
they do not engage with conceptions of voice outside of OB, such as those
coming from ER. Consequently, they are not integrative reviews because
they do not consider other conceptualizations, but instead ignore them or
shunt them down another conceptual and theoretical path, leaving them
sealed off as irrelevant to the view of voice that they seek to present.
This article offers a critique of the OB conception of voice, and in particu-

lar highlights the limitations of its view of voice as a pro-social behaviour. At
theoutset, thisarticleacknowledgesandwill argue that theOBconceptionof
voice is important in highlighting the value of constructive, individual
employeevoicebehaviour,and in thiswayhasmuchtoofferanERaudience.
Indeed, in focusing on the formal and collective mechanisms of voice, we

262 British Journal of Industrial Relations

would concede that ER has tended to discount the contribution of commu-
nicative and relational aspects of individual voice behaviour. However, we
argue that the OB conception of voice is at best partial because its definition
of voice as an activity that benefits the organization leaves no room for
consideringvoiceasameansofchallengingmanagement,or indeedsimplyas
being a vehicle for employee self-determination.
We argue that the OB conception of voice is narrow because OB research-

ers view employee behaviour from a unitarist lens in which ‘what is good for
the firm must be good for the worker’. This view does not properly consider
how the unequal employment relationship creates in one way a divergence of
interests between workers and management that gives workers cause to have
a voice on their own terms, and in another way creates a power imbalance
that can limit the capacity of workers to engage in voice. Given its frame of
reference, the OB conception of voice is divorced from the historical devel-
opment of mechanisms of employee representation as vehicles for creating
voice opportunity. Operating within this unitarist lens, OB voice does not
properly consider why there is a need for a full range of voice mechanisms,
including formal and informal, as well as pro-social and critical/pluralist.
Indeed, thedominantviewofbehaviour thatdoesnotmeet thenarrowtestof
being pro-social is that it is complaining, and therefore is not considered
voice.
Our critique of OB voice goes beyond what we see as its narrow concep-

tion, to question what we see as a more fundamental limitation. OB regards
employee voice as a discretionary, individual behaviour, and seeks to under-
stand the antecedents of the choice to either raise or withhold voice.
However, we would contend, as we argue throughout the article, that to
ignore the ER conception of voice leaves OB open to failing its own research
agenda. Our argument, fleshed out in detail throughout the article, is sum-
marized as follows. First, in focusing on voice as a discretionary behaviour,
OB does not properly consider the ways in which organizations create cul-
tures of voice or silence that act as supply-side opportunities or constraints.
In thisway,discretionary, individualbehaviour,as theERperspective sees it,
is institutionally embedded in ways that structure and limit the ‘choice’ to
voice. Coupled with this is an inadequate consideration in the OB literature
of how the broader regulatory context, which is crucial to ER, shapes and
constrains opportunities for employees to engage in voice behaviours.
Second, in examining individual voice (and isolating collective voice
behaviour such as that which ER focuses on), it can be very difficult to
distinguish between the motives of different employees to voice in ways that
might be either self-regarding or other-regarding. We would see self-
regarding voice behaviour, or what is often referred to as employee impres-
sion management behaviour, as not meeting the OB test of pro-social
behaviour because it is a behaviour that is intended to benefit the individual
rather thantheworkunitororganization.Third,andrelated to thispoint,we
willdemonstrate that theOBdefinitionofpro-socialbehaviour isdeficientby
showing that the range of voice behaviour that employees engage can meet

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 263

some aspects of this test but not others. For example, we will cite sociology
of work literature on ‘soldiering’ to highlight that individual voice can be
seen as other-regarding behaviour, and also further the aims of the work unit
itself, but nevertheless be consciously intended to frustrate or impede orga-
nizational goals. This behaviour, which we would argue is clearly ‘social’,
would both meet and fail the test of pro-social behaviour according to OB.
We see the key features of ER voice as follows: voice is viewed as how

employees are able to have a say in work activities and organizational
decision-making issues (Freeman et al. 2007). A recent definition states that
employee voice is ‘the ways and means through which employees attempt to
have a say and potentially influence organisational affairs about issues that
affect their work and the interests of managers and owners’ (Wilkinson et al.
2014: 5). This is a broad definition that encompasses a variety of voice
mechanisms, regardless of the institutional channel through which voice
operates (which includes speak-up programmes, quality circles, teamwork,
collective negotiation or informal means). Voice encompasses the myriad of
individual discretionary employee behaviours as set out in the OB literature,
but also includes the various ways in which employees challenge managerial
behaviour, either individually or through collective behaviours and mecha-
nisms, and also includes self-determining efforts by employees to identify
themselves in ways that are set aside from the interests of the firm. Although
ER has a preoccupation with institutions that are vehicles for voice, Budd
(2014) reminds us that voice is not just a constructive process, rather voice in
its own right is a means of employee self-determination.
In the next section, we briefly review the concept of voice within the ER

and HRM literature. We will then examine how voice is conceptualized
within the OB field. From there, we examine how the conception of voice as
a pro-social behaviour is problematic from an ER perspective, and we
explain the value of retaining an ER approach to understanding employee
voice. We then extend our discussion to look at the related notion of silence,
and again suggest limitations in the OB approach. In offering this critique of
the OB conception of voice and silence, we seek to revive the term ‘employee
voice’ fromwhathasbecome the impoverishednotion that currently exists in
the OB voice literature. We argue that employee voice is too important to be
left to a single discipline that so narrowly defines its reach, and therefore
limits its broader practical and policy implications.

2. Voice in ER and HRM

Inthissection,weexaminetheconceptualdevelopmentofvoicewithintheER
field, showhowtheERandHRMviewsofvoicehavedivergedover time,and
highlight the relative strengths and weaknesses of the ER and HRM concep-
tionsofvoice.MostERresearchersgobacktotheclassic studyofHirschman
(1970) for conceptual grounding on voice. Hirschman (1970) developed a
model of exit/voice/loyalty (EVL), which was subsequently interpreted and

264 British Journal of Industrial Relations

refined for an ER audience by Freeman and Medoff (1984), who used the
exit/voice framework as an analytical tool to distinguish between non-union
and union contexts. The definition that Hirschman (1970: 30) used for voice
was ‘any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from an objectionable state
of affairs’, which is widely cited in ER research on voice.
While these are the two studies most often cited in ER research, Kaufman

(2014a)pointsout there isamuch longer,neglectedhistoryofERresearchon
voice, with the term employed for around 100 years. As Kaufman (2014a)
notes, both Karl Marx and Adam Smith expressed interest in the ways and
means inwhich labourexpressed its voice.Kaufman(2014a)alsoargued that
for much of the twentieth century, personnel management sat within the
broad field of labour and employment relations. It was only in the 1980s that
HRM displaced personnel administration and emerged as a distinct disci-
plinary field. HRM sought to provide a more strategic view of employment
by showing how management efforts to garner employee commitment could
advance the bottom line, and a key assumption that underlined this was that
voice should be linked to firm performance. From an HRM perspective,
setting up employee voice mechanisms potentially allows staff to influence
eventsatwork,buthavingavoicedoesnotmean it is listenedto.SowhileER
and HRM are often lumped together, especially in the United Kingdom
where the scholars share a common intellectual tradition, there are clear
differences of emphasis. ER scholars have tended to be more interested in
indirect voice such as collective employee representation through trade
unions, or more recently non-union structures such as consultative commit-
tees or councils. HRM scholars have been more interested in direct voice
schemes that allow for individual employee involvement, such as task-based
participation and upward problem solving (Marchington 2007; Mowbray
et al. 2014). In the HRM strand, it is the management who decides whether
or not workers have a voice, and it is managers rather than employees who
decide which mechanisms to utilize so it can be voice without muscle
(Kaufman and Taras 2010). This approach is quite different from the theo-
retical underpinnings of voice in ER where voice has been closely associated
with employee representation, and therefore tied to an important debate
about the current and future prospects of trade unions. ER and HRM
literatures attach different meaning and values to the term voice (Wilkinson
and Fay 2011), with the HRM literature more closely aligned with the OB
conceptionofvoice, in that itsutility isprimarilydefined in termsof thevalue
ofemployeevoice to thefirm.Wealsonoterecentpapers that suggest that the
trajectory of HRM research is towards OB (Godard 2014; Harley 2014). For
these reasons, for the remainder of this article, we will limit our discussion to
ER voice and OB voice, and our argument will emphasize key differences in
these two disciplinary perspectives and how their respective conceptions of
voice diverge.
From an ER perspective, voice is an expression of the desire of workers to

have their own say over matters that affect their working lives (Dundon and
Rollinson 2011). This broad approach to employee voice brings the concept

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 265

closer to that of a political process in which voice is seen as an expression of
industrial democracy. This argument is exemplified by Budd (2004: 23–8),
who asserts that voice does not need to fulfil a constructive purpose; it is
sufficient in itself for voice to be a means of employee self-determination.
Budd’s (2004) approach shows us that the mainstream ER view has, in its
own way, pushed employee voice down a narrow path that seeks to identify
voice with particular mechanisms or structures that operate as vehicles to air
and redress employee grievances. Indeed, the ‘Hirschmanian’ framework
takes a grievance as a starting point to voice, for in that case it was the
dissatisfaction of a trading partner with a repeated transaction that might
lower loyalty and lead to possible exit.
Thus, while we are criticizing OB research for neglecting the important

aspects of voice that they see as ‘complaining’, we also acknowledge that ER
research, stemming from Hirschman, can also be criticized for focusing too
heavily on the component of voice that is related to dissatisfaction. In apply-
ing the exit/voice framework to unions, Freeman and Medoff (1984) can be
argued to have embedded this limitation of the ER conception within a
predominantly collective framework. In other words, ER research has
remained preoccupied with the collective mechanisms of voice that provide
opportunity to air and redress grievances, just as OB research is preoccupied
with the individual, communicative aspects of voice that they claim reveal
employee pro-social behaviour.
In a recent study comparing employee voice in the United Kingdom and

France, Marsden (2013: 251) highlighted this very limitation, claiming that
hisfindings showed that individualvoice ismuchmoreextensive than theER
field supposes, and that ‘thedichotomybetweennovoiceandcollectivevoice
needs to be reviewed’. Similarly, Budd (2014: 478) says that:

the traditional industrial relations emphasis on collective voice through collective
bargaining is excessively narrow. Richer understandings have and continue to
come from including non-union collective voice as well as various dimensions of
individual voice within our conceptualization of employee voice. Similarly, the
frequent approach of starting with Hirschman’s (1970) definition of voice is exces-
sively narrow because employee voice is then linked so strongly with complaining
rather than broader conceptualizations of input, expression, autonomy, and
self-determination.

Budd (2004: 24–8) offers a possible bridge between the ER and OB con-
ceptions of voice by highlighting voice as a means of self-determination, and
thus being present without being attached to a specific dissatisfaction. By
adding self-determination to industrial democracy, he argues that voice can
be both individual and collective: ‘The industrial democracy dimension of
voice suggests that a collective voice component is necessary while the self-
determination dimension implies that individual voice mechanisms are also
important’ (Budd 2004: 28).
We would argue that ER needs a conception of voice that encompasses

both individual and collective, as well as the relational and communicative,

266 British Journal of Industrial Relations

aspectsofvoiceontheonehand,andthe formalandstructuralaspectsonthe
other. However, we maintain that an important point of distinction remains
between the ER and OB voice research; that is, the basis of the ER perspec-
tive is that it sees voice as being grounded in the asymmetrical employment
relationship that provides a structure of management authority with some
limits (Marsden 1999). Because employees seek voice to, in some ways,
redress an inherent power imbalance, there is a clear sense that workers use
voice to express interests that are separate from, and sometimes in conflict
with, those of management. While voice is seen as a legitimate expression of
workers’ interests, it is also understood that management may have its own
agenda, and may seek to suppress voice where it is being raised to challenge
managerial authority. While OB does talk about power in relation to ante-
cedents related to voice (in particular studies on leadership), this is at the
more individual level and relates to position power rather than reflecting
more fundamental imbalances in the employment relationship. Equally, OB
does not tend to take note of different interests between workers and man-
agers. For example, Detert and Burris (2007: 870) note that ‘to speak up, by
definition, involves sharing one’s ideas with someone with the perceived
power to devote organizational attention or resources to the issue raised’.
Therefore, we contend that the OB view is faulty because it fails to acknowl-
edge that there can be genuine differences of interest between workers and
owners/managers, and that the actors have different levels of power when
asserting their interests.

3. Voice in OB: Its conception and limitations

The concept of employee voice has become widely used outside of ER in
management and OB studies. Not surprisingly, in these studies, voice is
viewed in terms of its potential to add value to the organization. In OB
research, voice is examined as a discretionary, individual employee
behaviour. For instance, Morrison’s (2011) overarching review of voice lit-
erature notes that while the specific wording may differ, the OB definitions
share three key features. First, voice is an act of verbal expression, where a
message is conveyed from a sender to a recipient. Second, voice is defined as
discretionary behaviour — individuals choose whether or not to engage in
this behaviour at any particular moment in time, a choice that is affected by
a variety of factors. Third, voice should be constructive in its intent. The
objective is to bring about improvement and positive change, not simply to
complain (Morrison 2011: 375).
To understand how the OB field has become focused on a narrow inter-

pretation of voice, it is instructive to look at how the OB voice literature has
evolved. Until the early 1990s, the OB discipline had conceptualized and
studied a range of constructs that were related to or could be construed as
voice, suchaswhistle-blowingandprincipledorganizationaldissent,butVan
Dyne et al.’s (1995) article on extra-role behaviours in the organizational

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 267

citizenship behaviour literature began to narrow the construct of voice. They
identified voice as an extra-role challenging/promotive behaviour, where the
employee ‘proactively challenge(s) the status quo and make(s) constructive
recommendations for change’ (1995: 266). Later work by Van Dyne and
LePine (1998) produced a new measure of voice behaviour. They recognized
that theirdefinitiondiffered frompreviousdefinitionsofvoicewhichcovered
grievanceprocedures, participation indecisionmakinganddueprocess.This
created twoseparate streamsofvoice literaturewithin theOBdiscipline, that
is pro-social voice and justice-oriented voice (Mowbray et al. 2014).
We see some flirting with wider concepts of voice within OB, such as that

proposedbyLiang et al. (2012),whomakethedistinctionbetweenpromotive
and prohibitive voice, and Morrison herself (2011, 2014) labelling voice
as suggestion-focused and problem-focused, and including remedial
voice alongside prohibitive and problem-focused voice, to explain how the
voice content can refer to information about serious problems. But even in
her more recent review, Morrison (2014: 179–80) contends that the ‘under-
lying motivation for voice is prosocial in nature’ (citing Grant and Ashford
2008; Van Dyne et al. 2003); ‘that is, voice is motivated by the desire to bring
about a constructive change for the organisation or for one or more stake-
holders’. Indeed, Morrison (2014: 180) lists the following studies as support
for the idea that voice is pro-socially motivated: Fuller et al. (2006), Liang
et al. (2012), Liu et al. (2010), Tangirala and Ramanujam (2008a,b),
Nikolaou et al. (2008), Lam and Mayer (2014), Tangirala et al. (2013), and
Wang and Hsieh (2013).
Thus, while it is accurate to say that OB voice is not only pro-social, the

study of pro-social voice is clearly the mainstream in the OB literature, and
OB studies that examine aspects of voice, such as complaining or whistle-
blowing, have been streamed down another path and labelled ‘justice-
oriented’ voice. Klaas et al. (2012) provide a broader review than Morrison
(2011) in the sense that it incorporates the smaller stream of justice-oriented
voice and seeks to illustrate in what way the two types of voice can be seen to
impact the antecedents of voice. For example, Klaas et al. (2012: 327–8) note
the ‘pure form’pro-socialvoice showsan identityof interestsbetweenworker
and management that lessens the risks of raising voice, whereas justice-
oriented voice is more about wrongdoing and restitution. In this regard,
Klaas et al. (2012: 336) also acknowledge other literature like that on unions
but only to say that unions reduce the perception of risk to employees of
raising voice in a formal context. In general, the Klaas et al. (2012) review is
less concerned with the role of institutional structures, such as unions or
works councils, and more concerned with the distinction between formal
versus informal voice, focusing mainly on whistle-blowing (principled orga-
nizationaldissent)andgrievanceproceduresas formsof formalvoice. Impor-
tantly, however, while Klaas et al. (2012) specifically discuss the importance
of justice-oriented voice, they see this as a form of dealing with disputes or
correcting wrongdoing, or of voice as being a way employees can exact
revenge. This view of voice does not accord with the ER notion that voice

268 British Journal of Industrial Relations

reflects the differences of interest between workers and owners/managers, or
that voice can simply be a means of employee self-determination.
Accordingly, thenotionofvoice identifiedbyVanDyneandLePine (1998)

has driven much of the empirical research on discretionary voice behaviour
(as is noted by Morrison 2014: 176). In short, the OB conception of voice has
consolidated around the pro-social definition so that the recently integrated
OB definition of employee voice provided by Morrison (2011: 375) is ‘discre-
tionary communication of ideas, suggestions, concerns, or opinions about
work-related issues with the intent to improve organizational or unit func-
tioning’. Thus, the current OB-centric, one might call it managerial perspec-
tive, sees voice as being about verbal communication, chosen by an
individual, which is constructive to management. Management encourages
voice to emerge on their terms, setting the parameters of what is and is not
permissiblevoicebehaviouraccording toemployer interests (Donaghey et al.
2011). Morrison (2011: 375) explicitly rules out voice as a mechanism ‘simply
to vent or complain’, and therefore excludes any conceptualization of
employee voice based on interests other than those of the employer. By
excluding complaints, the OB perspective tends to leave out what the ER
perspective views as an essential component of voice.
The OB literature attaches specific requirements to voice behaviour under

its narrow conceptualization. It must benefit more than just the person who
raises his/her voice (Van Dyne et al. 2003), and it is offered to bring positive
change rather than for the airing of grievances (Morrison 2011), although
little consideration is given to the idea thatdealingwithgrievances (or indeed
deviant behaviour) might produce positive change. Voice then is only useful
if it benefits the work unit or the organization as a whole, particularly in
terms of improved productivity. A strong emphasis in the OB literature is
that studies of voice should explain the preconditions for this benefit and
measure its impact. In other words, the research agenda is aimed squarely at
explaining what features of the workplace lead individual employees to
decide to raise their voice, rather than choosing to remain silent, and what
impact this behaviour has on the organization.
If management research operates from a view that voice is a useful activity

if it can provide benefit to the organization, it also conceptually narrows
voice into such terms and excludes other perspectives. In her wide-ranging
review of the various literatures on voice, Morrison (2011: 381) acknowl-
edged ‘a rich literature’ within ER (she refers to it as industrial labour
relations) and HRM, but went on to dismiss this from her review because:

[t]hey have not considered discretionary voice behaviour, or the causes or conse-
quences of this behaviour. In sum, as these various literature streams define voice
in a way that does not closely match current conceptualizations, I exclude them
from this review.

Here, paradoxically, ER studies are referred to as voice studies in a litera-
ture review of voice which is meant to be encompassing, but are then deemed
not to be studies of voice because they do not examine discretionary,

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 269

individual voice behaviour which is the current conceptualization, according
to Morrison (2011). So what she means by the current conceptualizations of
voice is current conceptualization within OB. However, excluding ER in this
way seems to be unproductive and at odds with Morrison’s (2011) stated
intention to identify gaps and unresolved issues in the voice literature, and to
‘integrate’ research and provide directions for future studies. It is also in
danger of being charged with a conventionalist twist.
Our claim here is that voice has been reframed in OB to suit a narrow

managerial bias that requires that the articulation of voice should meet
certain prerequisites and be of benefit to management. Donaghey et al.
(2011) have criticized the way that OB researchers use the voice construct to
claim that by allowing employees to raise different and even possibly com-
peting viewpoints, management is creating a climate of organizational plu-
ralism. As these authors point out, the ability to offer views that are different
from management, so long as those views assist in improving the quality of
decision making and organizational performance, falls well short of the
mark, for a ‘genuine pluralism rests upon social values which recognise the
right of employees to an effective voice in their own destiny, regardless of
the consequences for management’ (Donaghey et al. 2011: 55).
In defining voice as a pro-social behaviour, voice becomes framed as an

activity that is linkedtoorganizationalcitizenship.AsKlaas et al. (2012:327)
notes, ‘in its pure form, pro-social voice is framed as benefiting the organi-
zation by improving processes and performance (Van Dyne et al. 2003). As
such the literature has given little attention to the potential for conflict of
interestbetween theemployeeandthe recipientof themessage’.Accordingly,
voice is considered something employees do to help the organization rather
than build an identity for themselves, which is separate to and distinct from
management. Not only does this contradict the prevailing view of ER that
voice is an expression of employees’ desire to co-determine work rather than
just raise interesting suggestions for improved processes, it also ascribes a
very simplistic set of motives to acts of organizational citizenship. Indeed,
Grant and Mayer (2009) caution against drawing a direct link between
pro-social motives and organizational citizenship, arguing that employees
who have both pro-social and strong impression management motives will
exhibithigher levelsof ‘affiliative’ citizenshipand lower levelsof ‘challenging’
citizenship. This would tend to indicate that it is difficult to disentangle
instrumental voice behaviour (employee impression management motives)
fromexpressionsofpro-socialbehaviour thatare trulyother-oriented. It also
has an important implication for voice, as workers who have pro-social
motives may be guided by stronger impression management motives, and
suppress feelings of empathy and concern for others, if raising voice means
challenging supervisors and the status quo (Grant and Mayer 2009). What
this suggests is that to look at voice as only pro-social misses the point that
individual employees may have a mix of motives in raising voice, or indeed
choosing silence. Those who raise voice may do so in a positive manner, but
this may have more to do with seeking to create a positive impression of

270 British Journal of Industrial Relations

oneself, rather than to improve conditions for others. As Klaas et al. (2012:
329) put it, ‘[e]fforts to offer constructive suggestions may thus be driven by
a desire to be recognised for having competencies and skills that are impor-
tant to the organisation’. Such behaviour would seem to satisfy one require-
ment of the OB conception of pro-social voice as not being about airing
grievances, but fails another requirement of pro-social behaviour, in that
impressionistic motives that underlie voice do not indicate other-oriented
behaviour. This type of contradiction is not problematized in the OB litera-
ture on voice.
As we have noted, the focus of the majority of OB research on voice looks

at the antecedents of individual voice decisions and outcomes. OB studies
ask what prompts an employee to raise voice in a pro-social manner, and
what factors within organizations are likely to promote or impede voice
outcomes. In one such study, McClean et al. (2013) surveyed a large number
of employees in over 100 stores within a single US restaurant chain. Seeking
to examine only pro-social voice — which they defined as ‘suggestions
hav(ing) broad benefit rather than just improvement in the speaker’s well
being’ (McClean et al. 2013: 531) — they carefully coded responses to open-
ended questions to screen out selfish, individual responses that did not meet
this test. The following are provided by these authors as examples of their
categorizations:

Pro-social — Not paying your workers that have been here for 3+ years $7–8. Yet
new hires sometimes walk through the door making $8.50 and $9 and up — so this
isn’t right. We as a company need to work on paying our old hires more money for
their jobs. Let’s make a change.

Not pro-social — I have worked for the company for 3 years. I make $7.25 an
hour and I do the EOD, inventory, and deposits. Why is this? I feel I am not
important to this company and what I do here means squat (McClean et al. 2013:
532).

These categorizations seem curious as both statements represent concern
that experienced employees receive inadequate and unfair payment. It is
possible that these statements could be rewritten as follows: the pay for
experienced employees should be better (pro-social); my pay as an experi-
enced employee should be better (not pro-social). We highlight this example
of OB research because it points to a fundamental problem in seeking to
define voice as an individual, pro-social behaviour, which is that drawing
boundaries between individual and collective workplace behaviour as self- or
other-oriented is inherently fraught. In the ER field, voice is often seen as an
expression of real or perceived concerns about matters that relate to equity
and fairness. What is fair and equitable are normative judgements that are
fundamentally collective in nature. In other words, individuals (employees)
make judgements about themselves, but they often do so in relative rather
than absolute terms (Baldamus 1957). In this sense, even if voice is self-
directed (about an individual’s experience of work and employment), it is
also other-oriented (felt in relation to other workers’ experience).

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 271

4. The value of ER voice

Aswenotedearlier,accordingtoMorrison(2011),ERstudiesofvoicedonot
fit the conception of voice because they do not consider discretionary
employee voice behaviour. Morrison (2011) acknowledges ER studies but
dismisses them because they are limited to explaining the nature and type of
institutional mechanisms that provide workers with voice. Therefore, under-
lying the exclusion of ER studies in the OB conception of voice is an assump-
tion that institutional mechanisms do not shape employee behaviour. The
contention we offer here is that ER voice literature highlights the important
influence of institutional context on individual voice behaviour (Dundon
et al. 2004; Wilkinson et al. 2004). In OB studies of voice, however, the
context for individual behaviour does not extend far beyond the relationship
betweenthe individualworkerandmanagement (bothsupervisorsandhigher
leaders). An awareness of this limitation can be seen in the work of McClean
et al. (2013), who make the valuable point that, by definition, pro-social
behaviour is collective in that it extends beyond the individual actor to the
influence of that behaviour on the work-group or the firm. Despite this,
however, theseauthors concede that therehasbeen little effort tounderstand
work-group behaviour in the OB voice literature, nor the complex relation-
ship between the effort by employees to raise voice and the way that voice is
actedonbymanagers. Inanearlier study,DetertandBurris (2007:881)more
broadly acknowledged that a limitation of their work was that it was set in
one specific context and that a similar study of leader reactions to voice in a
different context might yield very different patterns of voice. These authors
were usefully highlighting that in a low-skill, service sector workplace, the
consequencesof raisingvoicemightbeconsiderably lower foremployeeswho
could transfer employment to other firms without much cost than for
employees inothersettingswheresubstantial investment infirm-specificskills
tied themtotheir employer. Insuchsettings, logicwould followthat forvoice
to have a chance to flourish, management would need to demonstrate much
more openness.
Of course, one could say that ER studies of voice are predominantly

interested in analysing the institutional structures of voice without regard to
their impactonemployeebehaviouroronorganizationaloutcomes,andthus
are a mirror image of OB studies that do the reverse (Marsden 2013). We
acknowledge thatERresearchhas tendedtofocuson institutional structures,
but we would dispute the view that the interest has stopped there. Empirical
research on the role of works councils in Germany found that this structure
of employee voice can be considered ‘organisationally efficient’ because
works councils played a largely supportive role in the provision of training
and also had a measurably positive effect in reducing layoff and quit rates
(Backes-Gellner et al. 1997; Sadowski et al. 1995). These same studies found
thatahighdegreeofmutualityexistedbetweenthe interestsofemployersand
works councils in the provision of voice, which stemmed from the institu-
tional separation of this structure of voice from the role that unions play in

272 British Journal of Industrial Relations

pay bargaining and industrial action. The legal restriction on work councils
from engaging in pay bargaining and industrial action, and indeed the legal
obligation of works councils to work in the interests of the firm as well as its
employees,providesan institutional structure thatallowsvoice toberaised in
a way that is less adversarial and potentially more ‘pro-social’ than where it
is absent (Marsden1999:226–7; seealsoFreemanandLazear1995).Accord-
ing to Backes-Gellner et al. (1997: 329), these features of the German system
make works councils an ‘institutionally efficient’ arrangement.
In making these remarks, we are aware that there is a danger of idealizing

European works councils and other union collective bodies as they represent
an almost prima facie case for a more extensive and deeper voice channel
than other voice processes. In their classic study, Popitz et al. (1969) revealed
the concerns of German workers that works councillors formed too close a
relationship with management. The views of councillors, once elected, were
not ‘thoseofus’but reflectedvaluesof ‘thoseup there’.Equally, it is tooeasy
to dismiss other management-led structures as a bleak house without fully
unpicking and examining employer motives for such voice, the type of
mechanisms used and the needs of employees. In other words, there is a
danger of categorizing all non-union representation or voice as ineffectual
and union representation as very effective without investigating the detail of
non-union voice empirically (Dundon and Rollinson 2011).
Evidence of the impact of ER structures on individual voice preferences is

provided by Freeman and Lazear (1995) in relation to work councils, and
Marsden (2013) in a study comparing voice structures and voice outcomes in
France and the United Kingdom. Freeman and Lazear (1995) hypothesize
that works councils can enhance the prospect of employee voice for the
benefit of workers and management, under certain circumstances. These
authors found that councils can improve the prospect of information sharing
on the part of workers where councils have consultation rights because
workers perceive that these rights will raise the likelihood that workers will
also benefit from information sharing. Crucially, benefits to both parties
accrue from information sharing where workers have information that man-
agement does not possess, and where the benefits of gaining that information
exceed the cost of the additional time incurred in the consultation process.
Here, itwas specificallynoted that consultationbecomescostly the longer the
process goes on, and also, in slowing decision making, formal consultation
can potentially narrow the range of decision options for management. The
benefits of this particular structure must then be weighed against potential
costs.
Marsden(2013)addsacomparativeelement to this researchbycontrasting

the UK ‘negotiated’ model in which individual and collective voice are sub-
stitutes for each other, with the French ‘rights-based’ model where employ-
ment law guarantees a role for works council representation, and where
individual and collective voice are compatible. Marsden (2013) finds that in
the UK context, shop stewards tend to collectivize individual voice because
of their links to unions and the need to mobilize voice into collective issues/

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 273

grievances, whereas in the rights-based model delegates are much more able
to support individual voice because of their guaranteed status under the law,
and as a result individual and collective voice can more easily coexist.
Marsden (2013) also found that workers have more capacity to engage in
voicewhere theyhavemarketable skills, andthismay indeedpromptemploy-
ers to engage in management-led voice because management may fear that
without voice, disagreements can lead to higher levels of costly exit and that
collective voice could potentially give unions greater bargaining power. Here
again, however, works councils may be supported (rather than unions in
other countries) because they are legally restricted from engaging in pay
bargaining.
In a work on the Australian experience of voice, Benson (2000: 457)

reports that union presence did not inhibit other HRM forms of voice, and
indeed employees in unionized workplaces had significantly more voice
mechanisms than those innon-unionworkplaces. In theUnitedStates,Black
and Lynch (2004: F113) noted that workplace innovation, especially when it
hasoccurred inunionizedestablishments, ispositivelyassociatedwith labour
productivity. These authors inferred that this strong effect in unionized
workplaces couldbe the resultofworkersbeingmorewilling toparticipate in
employee involvement programmes and voice (in a pro-social way) if they
feel the union will protect their employment security.
Given these various findings, we would argue that ER studies have much

to offer in explaining employee (as well as employer) voice preferences and
behaviours.ERstudieshave sought toexplainwhat featuresof thepatternof
employee relations in different settings give rise to extensive or limited forms
of voice. What they show in general is that voice is likely to be more expan-
sive or have more depth where it is employee-initiated and where it is backed
by statutory protections that mandate a role for employee voice in organi-
zational decision making. Management-initiated voice schemes, on the other
hand,are likely toprovidevoiceontermsdictatedbymanagement,whichare
often limited to opening up lines of communication, and potentially extend-
ing voice into the provision of consultation in matters of (employer) decision
making.However,managementvoice schemesdonotgenerallyofferworkers
forms of voice that enable them to contest decisions. The reason for this is
quite obvious, as Freeman and Lazear (1995: 48) remind us that ‘[c]o-
determinationcangreatly increaseworkerpower’.However, as theseauthors
and others who have studied works councils note, where councils are for-
mally removed from pay bargaining, the prospect of employees using voice
mechanisms to extract economic rent is greatly reduced. In summarizing the
contribution of these ER studies, we would assert that they do deserve
consideration, evenwithin thenarrowconfinesofOBvoice research,because
they provide an essential backdrop to ‘the predominant focus of much of the
empirical research on voice (which) has been on identifying factors that
increaseordecrease theamountofvoicebehaviour thatanemployeeengages
in’ (Morrison 2011: 385). In short, there are some possible comple-
mentaritiesbetweenERandOBvoice research.Thus,while theOBliterature

274 British Journal of Industrial Relations

focuses on specific employee behaviours at an individual level whereas the
ER literature does not tend to analyse, measure or observe individual
behaviours or actions, what ER does explain is the context in which those
behaviours and actions take place and what makes them more likely to take
place.
The OB literature is also interested in how effective voice can be and what

role managers, as voice targets, play in this process. Therefore, management
style, and in particular whether managers are receptive to suggestions and
feedback, is an important determinant of voice. The ER lens would again
seem to help provide answers, such as showing that in unionized contexts, or
where formal voice mechanisms are mandated by law, workers have greater
opportunity to voice and contest management decisions. This is a limitation
of the OB research that does not explain how context shapes and constrains
managers’ choices in dealing with voice, and how management style is influ-
enced by context. Institutional factors that provide voice also make voice
more likely, in that they offer protection against repercussions for employees
who might otherwise, individually, choose silence. A related point is that the
presence of formal voice mechanisms may also lead to increased informal
voice, because formal mechanisms create a climate in which voice overall can
flourish (Marchington 2007; Marchington and Suter 2013). Yet, in excluding
ER voice because it is focused on mechanisms rather than individual
behaviour, the OB research cannot gauge the importance of a ‘spillover’
effect between formal and informal voice.

5. Silence is also golden: Voice, silence and pro-social behaviour

Aninterestingdevelopment in theOBliteraturehasbeen the extensionof the
voice construct to incorporate employee silence. ER researchers have also
begun to examine silence as part of their analysis of voice (Donaghey et al.
2011). Both literatures argue that silence is not just the antithesis of voice in
the sense that it denotes a lack of voice, but that silence can also be the
conscious decision to withhold voice. Efforts by OB scholars to better under-
stand silence are encouraging because much less is known of silence than
voice, and in exploring silence these studies have also added to our under-
standing of the dynamic between exit and voice. Indeed, it could be argued
that the original EVL and exit/voice frameworks were simplistic in that they
did not consider that workers might choose both voice and exit (McClean
et al. 2013: 525), and that it is also possible that workers might choose to be
silent and stay, rather than exit. Yet, as alternative potential behaviours to
voice, silence and exit are both underlined by feelings of frustration and
futility. In that sense, the exit/voice framework continues to have salience for
contemporary voice studies.
In an effort to develop the nascent work on silence, Van Dyne et al. (2003)

extended the existing OB conceptualization of silence by incorporating pro-
social behaviour. Previous OB research on silence included two types of

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 275

behaviour — one being defensive silence, aimed at protecting the individual;
and the other being acquiescent silence, which denoted a lack of voice stem-
mingfromfutility.Tothesewasaddedpro-social silence,whichtheseauthors
defineasactions (innotvoicing informationandopinions) thatareproactive,
positive and other-oriented (Van Dyne et al. 2003: 1368).
Like the OB conceptualization of voice, this OB view of silence also has

apparent limitations. In distinguishing between these types, the conceptual-
ization limits the possibility that silence might result from a combination of
all three factors. Thus, employees might be fearful of the repercussions of
speaking up, but at the same time they might be de-motivated, and they
might also believe that speaking up is futile because in past instances they
perceived that voicing ideas and opinions led to victimization and/or no
change. In such instances, silence would be defensive in terms of a perceived
fear of personal repercussions, pro-social in as much as there is a fear of
repercussions for others, and acquiescent in that there is also a perception
that voice is futile.
The problem with the OB conceptualization of silence is that it draws a

hard line between defensive behaviour, which is framed as protecting the
individual, and pro-social behaviour, which is framed as helping others.
However, it seems logically possible for defensive silence to be an act to
protectothers in instanceswhere speakingupmight cause collectiveharm. In
this way, defensive silence would meet the definition of pro-social behaviour,
which is that it is proactive, positive and other-oriented. While Van Dyne
et al. (2003: 1362) acknowledge that the relationship between silence and
voice ‘often represents a complex amalgam of motives’ and that ‘they do not
intend for (their) framework to be comprehensive’, these qualifying state-
mentsarenot framedas specific limitationsof theirmodel,whichposits three
mutually exclusive silence behaviours. Interestingly, the notion of ‘mixed
motives’waspickedup in the reviewofvoice literaturebyKlaas et al. (2012),
who provide a scenario in which an employee suggestion to formalize a
process of assigning work is pro-social, in that it leads to a more efficient
process, but at the same time reveals another motive, in that the effect of the
change is to limit management discretion in the allocation of work.
OB research on silence, just like OB voice research, is also limited because

it explicitly framesvoiceasdiscretionary, individualbehaviour.Thereare few
OB studies, one being Morrison and Milliken (2000), that underscore the
collective aspects of voice by showing how employees remain fearful of
exercising their voice in organizational cultures of silence. Even when OB
does look at collective behaviour, it is looked at through the lens of group
voice climate, that is the relationship between the group and the supervisor
but disconnected from the organization and regulatory structures (see, e.g.,
Detert and Treviño 2010; Frazier and Bowler 2012; Frazier and Fainshmidt
2012;Morrison2011).BothPinderandHarlos (2001)andHarlos (2001)also
allude to a culture of silence when they talk about voice falling on ‘deaf ears’.
Taking this point further, Donaghey et al. (2011) argue that OB literature on
employee silence is deficient because it seeks to ask why employees choose

276 British Journal of Industrial Relations

silence when, in many instances, employee silence stems from a fundamental
inability to exercise voice. These ER authors question whether workers
choose silence or whether in fact that choice is made for them. Again, this
highlights the value of ER research that situates voice, and silence, within its
ER context, and in doing so highlights the importance of power structures
and draws links between voice ‘climate’ and voice outcome (Pyman et al.
2006).

6. Where to from here?

This review has argued that the OB approach to both employee voice and
silence proceeds from a narrow conception of these phenomena that limits
the capacityofOBstudies to fulfil their researchagenda, tobeable topredict
the determinants of voice and silence, and measure their impact on employee
and organizational performance. OB research sees voice as operating in a
world where organizational actors are divorced from an institutional context
composed of such things as labour law regulation, unionization, and
company policies or statutory regulations that mandate certain forms of
employee involvement (Godard 2014). OB voice studies are also preoccupied
with explaining individual traits that would lead some employees to ‘choose’
voice, while others ‘choose’ to remain silent. Equally important in this
research are the traits of individual managers, including their openness to
voice, in terms of determining what reception voice will get. Within this
framework, there is blindness to systemic issues of power.
The OB literature on voice also contains value-laden assumptions, based

on a presumed identity of interests, such as what is good for the firm is good
for the employee and that employees naturally want to speak up in ways that
benefit management. These assumptions are not properly tested in the litera-
ture,whichmeans that their conceptionofvoiceasapro-social activity isnot
contested.Weneed lookno further than theclassicworkofRoy (1952, 1954)
for a useful corrective to these assumptions. In his famous participant obser-
vation study, Roy (1952: 430; 1954: 265) challenged the view that employee
soldiering resulted from a lack of understanding on the part of work-groups
of the ‘economic logics of management’. The workers in the machine shop
were in facthighlyalert to their economic interests,whichdiffered fromthose
of management, in restricting output. The author, as an employee, was
actually scolded by workmates on many occasions for working too hard
because the work-group reasoned that the inevitable result of turning in
excess earnings would be a retiming of the work and a consequent cut in the
piece rate. Although this soldiering behaviour advanced the interests of the
work-group, itwouldbehard to imagine thatOBwould see this aspro-social
behaviour because it clearly was intended to frustrate the interests of man-
agement. In Roy’s (1952, 1954) study, individual employee behaviour was
forged through a highly social process, but one where employees came to
view their identity and interests as distinct from, and in opposition to, that of
management.

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 277

Asstatedat theoutsetof thisarticle, there is someacknowledgement in the
OB literature that voice is more than just a pro-social activity, and this is
highlighted in the smaller, justice-oriented stream. Interestingly, the meta-
review of voice by Klaas et al. (2012) calls for a greater understanding of this
type of voice so as to identify the ‘critical determinants’ that would lead
employees to engage in justice-oriented voice or pro-social voice. However
useful thismightbe inraising theneedto lookbeyondpro-socialvoice,where
studiessuchasthisresearcharestill limited is intheuseofaframeofreference
thatsees justice-orientedvoiceasbeingfundamentallyaboutthecorrectionof
mistreatmentorinjustice,ratherthanabouttheassertionofemployeeinterests
that are different from those of management. Implicit in this framing is the
negative connotation of formal voice being about identifying wrongdoing.
Thus, Klaas et al. (2012: 337–9) have a section of their review devoted to
‘consideringthedarksideofvoice’. In this section, theydiscuss formsofvoice
that are counterproductive to the organization which include attempts to
restore justicebycausingharmtotheorganization, includingengaging inacts
of revenge. An ER perspective on this would see employee efforts to cause
harm to the organization as appearing at the far end of the behaviour
spectrum, and usually engaged in only after more constructive avenues of
voice have been explored or exhausted. Consistent with the exit/voice frame-
work, ER would also say that the assertion of employee interests may well be
interpreted as criticism of management, but may nevertheless lead to
productivity-enhancing outcomes if for no other reason than an inability to
voice may lead to productivity-lowering outcomes such as higher levels of
de-motivation, absenteeism and turnover, as highlighted above in the case of
workscouncils.Here,ERmightalsodrawontheclassicworkofWrightMills
(1948),who invokedthenotionofunionsasmanagersofdiscontent,harness-
ing conflict but also moderating its disruptive effect.
Very slowly it seems there may be developments that suggest that the OB

field sees the need to engage with other literatures to get a fuller picture of
voice.Klaas et al. (2012:322)acknowledgethat ‘thedifferentvoice literatures
have developed, for the most part, in isolation from one another’. According
toBrinsfield (2014), theOBliterature lacksan integrative frameworktomake
sense of the extensive body of related literatures on voice. Therefore, ‘OB
scholars need to stay abreast of relevant new research from a wide variety of
sources. We also need to thoughtfully question our paradigmatic assump-
tions surrounding voice and silence which may unwittingly constrain our
thinking’ (Brinsfield 2014: 128). This view is echoed by Kaufman (2014b),
who argues that ‘no field is free of excessive specialisation and narrowness of
approach; however, the OB-related segment of the voice literature seems
particularly isolated from the historical roots of the subject and theories and
findings in other research traditions’. Given that OB voice studies increas-
ingly appear to claim to represent management, rather than just OB, it is
important toensure that thenarrowOBconceptionofvoicedoesnotbecome
an accepted unifying framework for voice research — not at least without
some debate!

278 British Journal of Industrial Relations

7. Conclusion

This review has highlighted a number of deficiencies in the OB conception of
voice as predominantly pro-social, individual behaviour. According to OB
research, individuals choose to exercise pro-social voice (and voice is only
considered that which is pro-social), but that choice is made in the context of
formal and informal voice alternatives, with only the informal channel con-
sidered pro-social.
Overall, our article sets out our concern at the impoverished definition of

voice currently being used. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that OB is in
danger of making illegitimate that which most scholars outside the OB field
— not just ER ones — would regard as voice. Is there a hint of doublethink
in the contention that thenotionofvoice,which isonlydefinedaspro-social,
can lead to better lives and conditions only as agreed to by management?
What would happen if this term was redefined by politicians such that voice
is only voice if it benefits the party in power?
While we agree that there is considerable scope for gaining the

co-operation of employees in voicing, as the employment relationship is not
‘zero-sum’, thisdoesnotnegate theargument that thereare inherent conflicts
over the costs and benefits of the employment relationship (Wilkinson and
Willmott 1995). Paradoxically, OB disenfranchises workers as active agents
with a legitimate claim to have their voices heard. Rather, they are to merely
be the functionaries of a pre-established scheme in a hegemonic climate that
emphasizes management’s right to manage (Nichols 1986).
We also observe that the mainstream ER view has, in its own way, nar-

rowed employee voice by seeking to identify voice as being only about airing
and redressing employee grievances (see Budd 2014). Thus, just as OB
research has ignored aspects of voice that they see as ‘complaining’, ER
research has been too focused on dissatisfaction. As we have noted, if voice
is seen as a means of self-determination, it can be present without being
attached to a specific dissatisfaction, and we believe that ER needs a concep-
tion of voice that includes self-determination, as well as encompassing both
individual and collective, informal and formal, and communicative and
structural components of voice. However, if the ER and OB fields are able to
be better integrated, we also maintain that a crucial distinction remains, for
the basis of the ER perspective is that it sees voice as being grounded in the
asymmetrical employment relationship.
Furthermore, Budd and Zagelmeyer (2010) remind us that employee voice

is not simply a private affair, a case of those employers who believe it is in
their own interest to provide vehicles for employee voice doing so, while
others decide against it. Rather, they argue that employee voice can reach far
beyond competitiveness and profitability, and can also shape the psychologi-
calandeconomicwell-beingof individuals, thephysicalandemotionalhealth
of a community’s families, and the quality of a country’s democracy. As a
consequence, employee voice has important implications for public policy
through governmental regulation of the employment relationship. In

Pro-Social or Pro-Management? 279

addition, voice in the workplace allows for workers to develop skills
and values, which then have a role in broader society (Foley and Polanyi
2006).
Ourcontention is that employeevoice is too important tobesimply seenas

a vehicle to assist management on management terms. The danger of not
challenging the OB conception of voice is that the voice term might be
degraded in Orwellian, newspeak fashion.

Final version accepted on 1 December 2014.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the two anonymous referees, the editor, Paula
Mowbray and Werner Nienhueser for their helpful comments on our article.

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GUEST EDITORS’ NOTE:

NEW TIMES FOR EMPLOYEE

VOICE?

A D R I A N W I L K I N S O N A N D C H A R L E S F A Y

In this review, which also serves as an introduction to this special section,
we briefl y discuss the growing interest in employee voice and how and why
interest in this topic has emerged over the last few years. “Employee voice”
has been used to summarize several different approaches to employee re-
lations, and numerous other terms have been used interchangeably with
“employee voice.” In this introduction, we discuss the different approaches
to voice, and, relying on the literature of HRM, political science, industrial
relations, and organizational behavior, we develop a specifi c conceptuali-
zation of voice useful to scholars and HRM professionals. We discuss the
direction of research in this area and summarize the papers in this issue.

Keywords: employee voice, involvement, participation, employee engagement,
empowerment, decision making, unions, diversity, turnover intentions, high-
performance work systems, organizational commitment, job design

T
he term “employee voice” is one
that has become used increasingly in
the field of human resource manage-
ment (HRM) in recent years. Even
smaller organizations, such as the

East Boston Savings Bank (in Peabody, Mas-
sachusetts), have developed formal and infor-
mal programs to ensure that managers under-
stand employee concerns and employees
know that managers will hear their voiced
concerns. Larger organizations, such as DHL,
have developed multiple programs to provide
employees with opportunities to express their
concerns and have trained managers to re-
spond to those concerns (Hirschman, 2008).
Providing voice mechanisms to employees
may provide concrete advantages to employers.
Employees with voice opportunities may be

less motivated to support union organizing
drives (Lewin & Mitchell, 1992) and may be
less likely to quit (Spencer, 1986).

In general, the term “voice” refers to
how employees are able to have a say re-
garding work activities and decision mak-
ing issues within the organization in which
they work. We find that practitioners and
academics, however, use other terms for
employee voice (participation, engage-
ment, involvement, or empowerment) in
different ways. Some authors refer to in-
volvement, others use participation, while
still others use empowerment or engage-
ment as if they were interchangeable, often
without extracting the conceptual mean-
ings or differences used in practice (Parks,
1995).

Correspondence to: Adrian Wilkinson, Business School, Griffith University, Queensland 4111, Australia,
Phone: 0061 7 37356792 37356792, E-mail: adrian.wilkinson@griffith.edu.au.

Human Resource Management,Human Resource Management, January–February 2011, Vol. 50, No. 1, Pp. 65 – 74

Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com).

DOI: 10.1002/hrm.20411

66 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

A central issue, therefore, is that employee
voice is a broad term with considerable width
in the range of definitions authors assign (see,

for example, Budd, Gollan, &
Wilkinson, 2010; Dietz, Wilkin-
son, & Redman, 2009; Poole, 1986;
Sashkin, 1976; Strauss, 2006). This
width is particularly evident across
different disciplinary traditions
from human resource manage-
ment—political science, psychol-
ogy, law, and industrial relations—
that have distinct perspectives on
voice as well as the other overlap-
ping and related terms (Wilkinson,
Gollan, Marchington, & Lewin,
2010). So, it seems scholars from
diverse traditions often know rela-
tively little of the research that has
been done in other areas. Perhaps
the best exposition of the term
voice goes back to Hirschman’s
(1970) classic work, although the
notion of employee voice could be
dated to the ideas of the human
relations school. Hirschman, how-

ever, conceptualized “voice” in a very specific
way and in the context of how organizations
respond to decline, though the term has been
used in rather different contexts and applica-
tions since. His own definition was “any at-
tempt at all to change rather than to escape
from an objectionable state of affairs” (p. 30).
The point about voice is that its provision
may secure general improvements. If exit is
reduced, however, this may force the discon-
tented to take action within the organization,
hence making voice more

powerful.

Conceptualizing Employee Voice

We can try to make sense of the elasticity of
the terms by seeing employee voice as an op-
portunity to have “a say” and, indeed, this is
central to most definitions (Freeman, Boxall,
& Haynes, 2007; Marchington, 2008). But as
Strauss (2006) points out, voice is a weaker
term than some of the others, such as par-
ticipation, as it does not denote influence
and may be no more than spitting-in-the-wind.
Voice is a necessary precursor for participa-

tion but does not in itself lead to participation.
So voice has multiple “meanings” and can be
interpreted in different ways such as being
seen as a countervailing source of power on
management action or perhaps part of a mu-
tual gains process (Dundon, Wilkinson,
Marchington, & Ackers, 2004).

But much more important than the no-
menclature is what specific practices actually
mean to the actors, whether such schemes
can improve organizational effectiveness and
employee well-being, and the extent to which
various practices allow workers to have a say
in organizational decisions. Much will de-
pend on whether voice initiatives are per-
ceived as faddish or are embedded within an
organization (Cox, Zagelmeyer, & Marching-
ton, 2006). Clearly, forms of employee voice
through participation can differ in the scope
of decisions, the amount of influence work-
ers can exercise over management, and the
organizational level at which the decisions
are made. Some forms are purposely designed
to give workers a voice, but not more than a
very modest role in decision making, while
others give the workforce a more significant
say in organizational governance.

We identify four strands of literature that
are useful for our understanding of employee
voice. The first relates to HRM literature fo-
cused on performance. Here the argument is
that informing and allowing employees an
input into work and business decisions can
help create better decisions and more under-
standing and hence commitment (Boxall &
Purcell, 2003). This is linked to the substan-
tial high performance literature in which
voice is seen as a key ingredient in creating
organizational commitment (Lewin & Mitch-
ell, 1992; Pfeffer, 1998). It also links with re-
cent discussions concerning the idea of en-
gagement (Emmott, 2005; Welbourne, 2007).
These various arguments and prescriptions
appear to have clear implications for manag-
ing employee participation in organizations.
Among these implications are that hierarchy
and compliant rule-following are inappropri-
ate for employees who are expected to ex-
pend discretionary effort. Wilkinson, Dun-
don, Marchington, and Ackers’s (2004)
research on employee voice suggested there

The point about

voice is that its

provision may

secure general

improvements. If exit

is reduced, however,

this may force the

discontented to take

action within the

organization, hence

making voice more

powerful.

NEW TIMES FOR EMPLOYEE VOICE? 67

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

are three ways in which it can have a positive
impact. First, valuing employee contributions
might lead to improved employee attitudes
and behaviors, loyalty, commitment, and
more cooperative relations. Second, it could
lead to improved performance, including in-
creases in general productivity and individual
performance due to lower absenteeism and
greater teamwork. Third, it could improve
managerial systems by tapping into employ-
ees’ ideas, knowledge, and experience and
promoting greater diffusion of information.

Royer, Waterhouse, Brown, and Festing
(2008) argued that treating employees as
stakeholders in the organization bears similar
outcomes. Employees who have developed
significant firm-specific human capital have
invested in the organization and have earned
voice just as have shareholders. Providing
voice to these employees provides a rationale
for further emotional and human capital in-
vestment, with the same sorts of outcomes
noted by Wilkinson et al. (2004).

The current business narrative is that or-
ganizations need to take the high road with
high-value-added operations or be dragged
down into competing for low-value-added
jobs that are in danger of moving abroad
(Handel & Levine, 2004). As Strauss (2006)
observed, getting workers voice “provides a
win-win solution to a central organizational
problem—how to satisfy workers’ needs while
simultaneously achieving organizational ob-
jectives” (p. 778). Theory and practice, how-
ever, can diverge (Harley, Hyman, & Thomp-
son, 2005). Moreover, the main aim of this
approach to voice reflects a management
agenda concerned with increasing under-
standing and commitment from employees
and enhancing contributions to the organi-
zation. Thus, while some forms may provide
employees with new channels through which
their influence is enhanced, facilitating em-
ployee voice does not involve any de jure
sharing of authority or power; therefore,
there is not always a link between voice and
decision making. Indeed, it can be voice
without muscle (Kaufman & Taras, 2010).

A second strand of literature from politi-
cal science sees voice in terms of rights,
linking this to notions of industrial citizen-

ship or democratic humanism. First, the con-
cept of industrial democracy (which draws
from notions of industrial citizenship) sees
participation as a fundamental democratic
right for workers to extend a degree of con-
trol over managerial decision making. More
recently, organizational democracy is a term
that is beginning to be used (see Harrison &
Freeman, 2004). This also brings in notions
of free speech and human dignity (Budd,
2004). Indeed, the argument is that work-
place democracy allows skills and values to
develop, which then have a role in broader
society (Foley & Polyani, 2006).

A third strand, drawing from the indus-
trial relations (IR) literature and not unrelated
to the above, sees voice as representative (and
largely union voice). The academic concept
of voice used in this strand was popularized
by Freeman and Medoff (1984), who argued
that it made good sense for both company
and workforce to have a voice mechanism.
This had both a consensual and a conflictual
image: On the one hand, employee voice
could lead to a beneficial impact on quality
and productivity, while on the other, it could
identify and deal with problems (Gollan &
Wilkinson, 2007). Trade unions were seen as
the best or only agents to provide voice be-
cause they were independent. A variation of
this strand has looked at representative voice
but takes into account non-union forms.
Thus, there has been considerable literature
on non-union employee representation and
the efficacy of such structures (Kaufman &
Taras, 2010). The debate on workers’ losing
their voice was originally premised on union
decline, but unions’ losing their place does
not mean employees have a reduced appetite
for voice. In many European countries, the
state plays a much more active role on top of
voluntary collective bargaining. France, for
example, has statutory elected workers’ coun-
cils, while West Germany has an elaborate
system of works councils and workers’ direc-
tors known as co-determination. Our focus in
this issue is not on this wide aspect of public
policies, although it is important to note that
voice does extend beyond competitiveness to
shaping employees’ psychological and
economic well-being. Further, it extends to

68 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

the health of families and the quality of a
country’s democratic process (Budd & Zagel-
meyer, 2010).

A fourth strand is rooted in the organiza-
tional behavior (OB) literature and relates to
task autonomy in the context of work groups’
acquiring a greater degree of control. Creat-
ing semi-autonomous work groups, now
commonly referred to as teamworking or self-
managing teams, gives workers a say in allo-
cating tasks, scheduling, monitoring atten-
dance, health and safety issues, the flow and
pace of production, and even setting of im-
provement targets (Wall & Martin, 1987).
Teams can also be responsible for recruiting
and training, as well as controlling overtime
levels. Such groups can have both skill discre-
tion (solving problems with the knowledge
of the group) and means discretion (choice in
organizing the means and tools of work)
(Cooper, 1973). These practices have a long
pedigree seeking to counter the degradation
of work and employee alienation (Proctor &
Mueller, 2000); many of these schemes
formed part of a series of work psychology
experiments in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., the
Tavistock Institute, quality of work life pro-
grams in the United States and Sweden; Berg-
gren, 1993).

We represent the above categorization in
Table I. We acknowledge that these are sim-
plistic and there are overlaps, but it is a useful
heuristic device. Basically, we represent how
each of the strands of literature covers the
dimensions of voice. These are the type of

schemes typically discussed, the focus and
forms of these vehicles, and the underlying
philosophy.

Much of the research relates to how these
structures are established, the motivation for
them, and how they operate in practice.
Other research takes a largely institutional
view: that is, that failure is the decline or col-
lapse of the structure. The assumption is that
setting up a structure itself sorts the problem
(Dietz et al., 2009). But many voice systems
have “deaf ears” and frustration can be evi-
dent (Harlos, 2001). A recent area of research
has looked at the antithesis of voice: em-
ployee silence, defining silence as an employ-
ee’s “motivation to withhold or express ideas,
information and opinions about work-related
improvements” (Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero,
2003, p. 1361). This literature investigates
when and how employees in organizational
settings exercise voice and when and how
they opt for silence (Milliken, Morrison, &
Hewlin, 2003). This approach tends to focus
explicitly on the intentional withholding of
ideas, information, and opinions with rele-
vance to improvements in work and work
organization (Van Dyne et al., 2003). But
equally, management might, via agenda set-
ting, seek to perpetuate voice on a range of
issues (Donaghey, Cullinane, Dundon, &
Wilkinson, in press). While it is possible that
regulatory rules and laws force management
to do things that they would otherwise ne-
glect (Marchington, Wilkinson, Ackers, &
Dundon, 2001), management is likely to re-

T A B L E I Summary of Theoretical Paradigms

Literature Strand Schemes Focus Form of Vehicle Philosophy

HRM Briefi ng, open door
policy; suggestion
schemes

Performance Individual Effi ciency

Industrial
relations

Collective bargaining;
works council; social
partnership; non-
union employee
representation

Power, Control Representative Countervailing
power

Industrial
democracy

Workers on boards Decision making Representative Rights

Organizational
behavior

Teams; groups Job redesign Individuals and
groups

Autonomy and
human needs

NEW TIMES FOR EMPLOYEE VOICE? 69

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

tain some choice, at least in determining the
robustness of voice at the workplace level
(Willman, Bryson, & Gomez, 2006). Manage-
ment behavior then lies at the heart of the
debate on managing voice structures.

Blended Voice and New Channels

While the literature may well come from dis-
crete camps, there are overlaps of the schemes
in practice. Some forms of direct voice coexist
and overlap with other techniques, such as
suggestion schemes, quality circles, or con-
sultative forums. In a European context, col-
lective participation remains significant in
certain countries, notably Germany and Swe-
den. A key issue is how direct and indirect
voices coexist and the extent to which they
complement or conflict with each other (Pur-
cell & Georgiadis, 2006). Further, the context
for voice has changed with union decline. As
Freeman et al. (2007) noted:

Quality circles and other forms of
small group problem solving have
become commonplace in the Anglo-
American world. These management
driven forms of involvement are
designed to serve employer goals of
improved productivity and fl exibil-
ity. However, our data suggests they
increasingly meet the desire of work-
ers to be involved in the things that
relate most directly to them. (p. 215)

Increasingly research suggests that em-
ployers have a range of voice structures
(Bryson, Gomez, & Willman, 2010), and evi-
dence suggests that employees want a range
of channels. Equally, while there is talk of
voice systems, much of the data suggest em-
ployers have ad hoc practices reflecting his-
tory rather than a fine-tuned employee voice
strategy. So, employee voice is not always
embedded in the workplace and can be frag-
ile in terms of both the structure and the ef-
ficacy. Pyman, Cooper, Teicher, and Holland
(2006) argued that a critical issue is the con-
figuration of multiple channels of voice
rather than a single channel. Furthermore,
they questioned how and why different voice

channels complement one another and under
what conditions multiple arrangements are
sustainable. They concluded that the interac-
tion and coexistence of multiple channels of
voice and plurality of arrangements are most
effective and legitimate from an employee’s
perspective in achieving organiza-
tional outcomes. Similarly, Han-
del and Levine (2004) pointed out
that bundles should be more ef-
fective than the simple sum of ef-
fects for the

individual practices;

hence, the existence of voice
schemes may tell us little about
the quality of

the process.

As we look across different
countries, providing for voice var-
ies considerably (Lansbury &
Wailes, 2008). Thus, in European
countries government policy and
legislation provide for a statutory
right to voice in certain areas and
among both union and non-union
establishments. This is by no
means typical. Other countries,
including America and Australia,
place much less emphasis on stat-
utory provisions for employee
voice and more emphasis on the
preferences of managers and
unions to establish their own arrangements.
In many organizations, the result is a mixed
cocktail of direct and indirect voice. It is also
worth noting that depending on the societal
regime within which employee voice is situ-
ated, the benefits tend to be seen from rather
different perspectives. Thus, in liberal market
economies, voice is seen in terms of contribu-
tion to profit and shareholder value at the
organizational level and in customer service
and in product quality and staff retention at
the workplace level. Issues related to worker
commitment, job satisfaction, and alignment
with organizational goals are often the prox-
ies used to measure the success of employee
voice schemes, but in themselves these may
tell us little about the impact of particular
schemes on the bottom line or the consolida-
tion of management prerogative. In coordi-
nated market economies, the focus is longer-
term and more widely defined in terms of a

Similarly, Handel

and Levine (2004)

pointed out that

bundles should be

more effective than

the simple sum

of effects for the

individual practices;

hence, the existence

of voice schemes

may tell us little

about the quality of

the process.

70 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

range of stakeholder interests including that
of the government, employers, trade unions,
and workers. The focus is on peak level insti-
tution representation. In other words, in these

situations the expectation is more
likely to be of mutual gains, either
at the level of the individual em-
ploying organization or more
broadly in terms of citizenship
and long-term social cohesion
(Wilkinson et al., 2010). As Budd
and Zagelmeyer (2010) remind us,
voice is not necessarily a private
affair, and it is not simply about
improving economic perfor-
mance.

The Special Issue

In this issue, we present a range of
papers to shed light on the topic
of voice. Goldberg, Clark, and
Henley (this issue) bring together

voice, procedural justice, and social
identification literature. Their model
incorporates observers’ voice responses to
injustices perpetrated on co workers. Based on
social identity theory, they argue that the tar-
get of injustice influences observer identifica-
tion with the target, as moderated by the ob-
server’s scope of

justice.

This, in turn,
influences the observer’s perceptions of
injustice and decision to express voice. They
also suggest that the link between observers’
perceptions of injustice and expressed voice is
moderated by the observers’ perceived
opportunity to express voice. They argue the
decision to express voice individually or
collectively depends on the justice climate
along with the costs and benefits associated
with each option. The new model helps us
understand that if a co-worker is treated
unfairly, when individuals are likely to engage
in expressed voice and whether they are likely
to do so on an individual basis or as a group.

Holland, Pyman, Cooper, and Teicher (this
issue) examine the relationship between em-
ployee voice and job satisfaction. They test
hypotheses concerning the relationship be-

tween direct and union voice arrangements
and job satisfaction. This relationship repre-
sents a gap in the literature and is important
from both theoretical and practical perspec-
tives. Controlling for a range of personal, job,
and workplace characteristics, regression anal-
yses suggest that although there was evidence
of voice complementarity, direct voice appears
to be the central voice arrangement underpin-
ning job satisfaction. The paper examines the
implications of the study for management
practice. It was unclear in previous research
whether the benefits of complementary voice
arrangements are due to union presence or
progressive HRM practices that encourage di-
rect voice. Their findings show that although
the presence of both union and direct voice
arrangements in the workplace may be posi-
tively associated with job satisfaction, direct
voice appears to be the central mechanism
underpinning job satisfaction. The role union
voice arrangements played in this relationship
remains unclear. HR managers, therefore, must
be mindful of the relationship between em-
ployee voice arrangements and job satisfac-
tion, not only in seeking to build organizations
that comprise committed, loyal, and high-per-
forming employees, but in developing and
implementing arrangements that allow em-
ployees to have influence over a range of task-
related and organizational issues.

Farndale, van Ruiten, Kelliher, and
Hope-Hailey (this issue) examine employee
voice using the lens of exchange theory:
how perceptions of employee voice, the
employee–line manager relationship, and
trust in senior management are related to
organizational commitment. It is
hypothesized that the direct relationship
between perceptions of the opportunity for
employee voice and organizational
commitment is mediated by the longer-
term effects of the perceived employee–line
manager relationship and trust in senior
management. They note the importance of
trust in senior management as a partial
mediator of the relationship between
employee voice and organizational
commitment. This study supports the
idea that employees perceive the opportunity
for voice as an exchange commodity

Based on social

identity theory,

they argue that the

target of injustice

influences observer

identification with

the target, as

moderated by the

observer’s scope of

justice.

NEW TIMES FOR EMPLOYEE VOICE? 71

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

that they reciprocate with organizational
commitment. In particular, Farndale et al.
have also highlighted that it is important to
consider two types of relationship between
an employee and the organization: the
employee–line manager relationship and
trust in senior management. From a practical
perspective, this study has highlighted the
value of placing a greater focus on employee
voice to enhance employee attitudes toward
the organization. Line managers also have
an important role in ensuring this required
belief and trust in the organization and its
leaders exists.

Bell, Özbilgin, Beauregard, and Sürgevil
(this issue) note that as invisible minorities,
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
employees offer a perspective from which to
examine the relationship between the
increasing diversity of the workforce and
employee voice mechanisms. Because sexual
minorities are often silenced by what is
perceived as “normal” in work organizations,
they examine some of the negative
consequences of this silencing and propose
ways in which the voices of sexual and other
invisible minorities may be heard. Clearly,
this is relevant to policies and practices in
other organizations, given the “don’t ask;
don’t tell” policy of the U.S. military to cite
just one example. The authors suggest how
HR managers can facilitate the expression of
voice for sexual minority employees in
today’s increasingly diverse organizations.

Avery, McKay, Wilson, Volpone, and
Killham (this issue) examine how tenure
diminishes the affect of voice. They point
out that while research has shown that the
opportunity to provide voice leads to posi-
tive employee reactions, there is little on
the boundary conditions for its effects on
worker outcomes. Taking Greenberger and
Strasser’s (1986) model of personal control
in organizations, they hypothesized that
the positive effect of voice on intent to re-
main would be less pronounced for employ-
ees with longer organizational tenures. Re-
sults of national surveys from the United
Kingdom and United States supported the
anticipated relationships. Thus it appears
that the beneficial effects of voice on

employee attitudes may lessen as employees
accrue tenure with their employer.

Conclusion

The articles in this issue suggest that voice
is an important issue for human resource
professionals. If an organization has a good
justice climate, employees are less likely to
seek collective action in the face of unfair
treatment of a coworker (Goldberg, this
issue). Similarly, the work of Holland et al.
suggests that direct voice is more impor-
tant to job satisfaction than the presence
of a union (collective voice). The work of
Farndale et al. suggests that the opportu-
nity for voice is closely linked to organiza-
tional commitment, especially when em-
ployee–line manager relationships are good
and the employee trusts senior manage-
ment. The work of Bell et al. highlights the
importance of voice in promoting organi-
zational diversity. Finally, the work of
Avery et al. suggests that employee voice is
particularly important for employees with
less tenure. Taken jointly, these papers ex-
pand the rationale for HR professionals to
support employee voice policies and proj-
ects: The organizational outcomes make
such support well worthwhile.

It is clear from this short review and
the contents of this issue that there are
competing visions and expectations of em-
ployee voice, and quite different motives
can underpin a desire for collective voice
rather than for individual voice. While
voice has important democratic
implications, given a choice, managers
tend only to be interested if there is a
perceived payoff. That might be avoiding
issues because of early warning systems, or
it could represent a more positive role. For
voice to have legitimacy, however, it needs
to be about more than the managerial
concept of efficiency and adding value to
business.

Yet voice does not exist in a vacuum
and choice is likely to be affected by other
HR structures and management style. Wood
and de Menezes (2008) concluded that
management’s overall orientation to the

72 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2011

Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm

ADRIAN WILKINSON is a professor and director of the Centre for Work, Organisation,
and Wellbeing at Griffi th University, Australia. Recent research has encompassed em-
ployee participation and voice, high performance work systems, and comparative and
international employment relations. He has published nine books and more than 100
articles in refereed journals. His recent books include Human Resource Management at
Work (4th edition, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2008), Contempo-
rary Human Resource Management (3rd edition, Pearson, 2009), The Sage Handbook
of Human Resource Management (Sage, 2009), and The Oxford Handbook of Organisa-
tional Participation (Oxford University Press, 2010).

CHARLES FAY is a professor of human resource management at Rutgers University,
New Jersey. His research focuses on compensation and performance management,
particularly on the intersection of the two areas—performance-based pay. His published
books include Managing for Better Performance: Enhancing Federal Performance Man-
agement Practices (IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2007), Strategic Rewards:
An Executive’s Handbook on Compensation (Free Press, 2001), and New Strategies for
Public Pay: Rethinking Government Compensation Programs (Jossey-Bass, 1997). He has
also contributed numerous chapters to edited books.

involvement and development of employees
can be more significant than any specific
practice. Equally, Bryson, Charlwood, and
Forth (2006) concluded that managerial
responsiveness to the process of participa-
tion is as important for superior labor pro-
ductivity as the existence of a formal voice
regime. Just as HRM may need bundling to
produce a payoff, so voice may need to be
bundled and then embedded. Once
implemented, voice can shrivel. There
seems to be a life cycle in relation to
specific schemes such that employee voice

is a fragile plant that needs care and
attention to allow it to flourish.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to all of the authors who responded
to the call for papers for this special issue, and we
are particularly indebted to all of the referees for
the constructive reports that made this special
issue possible. Our sincere thanks also go to
Theresa Welbourne, editor-in-chief of Human
Resource Management, and Leslie Wilhelm Hatch,
managing editor, for her support and guidance.

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