aviation Security 7

200-250 words

10 hours to finish.

Chapter 8

Commercial Aviation Aircraft Operator Security

This chapter explains the roles of aircraft operators and the federal government in aircraft operator security. We discuss the issues airlines must address in their security programs, including crewmember safety and security training. We introduce you to the requirements and approval processes of the full and partial aircraft operator security programs. Characteristics that differentiate special security programs such as the private charter and Twelve-Five Security programs are provided. We investigate the functions and responsibilities related to stakeholders, such as flight crewmembers, aircraft operator security coordinators, ground security coordinators, and in-flight security coordinators\. Salient to these discussions is an introduction to the psychology of confrontation that may be encountered in aviation. The chapter concludes with
generalized comparisons of security requirements for foreign air carriers to those of domestic air carriers.
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Introduction

Aircraft operations offer unique challenges to security. With airlines moving across national borders, carrying millions of passengers every year and billions of tons of cargo and baggage, creates the opportunity for significant security loopholes, making airline security operations different from airport security management in a number of ways.
 
When there is a problem at an airline station far away from the airline’s security manager’s office, the security manager must fly to the location involved.
 
Airline security managers at the corporate level are geographically farther away from the personnel actually implementing and carrying out day-to-day security measures.
 
With potentially dozens of security incidents occurring daily, flying to the location of each is impractical and, in most cases, impossible.
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Airline Security:
Historical Context

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Airline Security: Historical Context
Early 1970 – Voluntarily implemented passenger and carry-on baggage screening
1973 – Screening, mandatory and regulated
1988 – PPBM, international flights

Airlines first embraced a formalized role of security management in the early 1970s in response to numerous hijackings. During this time, airlines voluntarily implemented passenger and carry-on baggage screening. In 1973, screening became mandatory and regulated for all air carriers. In 1988, positive passenger bag matching became a regulatory responsibility of air carrier security on international flights.
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, those conducting screening were required to meet few federal standards and had minimum training requirements. Airlines, trying to minimize expenses, placed security near the bottom of funding priorities.
 
The lower performance of U.S. screeners was more a result of the low expectations from U.S. aviation security regulations rather than the performance of U.S. screening companies. Internationally, screening has traditionally been viewed a great deal more seriously than in the United States.
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Textbook Page No. 255
Airline Security: Historical Context
ATSA 2001 transferred responsibility for screening to federal government
In 1996, Gore Commission, aviation security was a federal responsibility
In 2001, Congress, screening and in-flight air marshal functions are federal responsibilities

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA 2001) transferred responsibility for screening to the federal government and reduced, but did not eliminate, the air carrier security role.
 
In 1996, the Gore Commission concluded that aviation security was a federal responsibility. The Air Transport Association (ATA), an organization representing the airline industry, quickly agreed. In 2001, Congress decided that screening and in-flight air marshal functions are federal responsibilities.
 
From the perspective of protecting corporate assets and personnel, airline security officers conduct their own inspections of airports that their aircraft use to verify that the airports serviced meet minimum security standards. No airline manager wants to lose an airplane because of a bombing or hijacking. Such events usually result in the loss of life, the loss of public confidence in the airline attacked, and the loss of corporate assets.
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Aircraft Operators Standard Security Program (AOSSP)

 Airlines use security standards set forth in a document titled the “Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program” (AOSSP).
 
The AOSSP describes how an aircraft operator must manage a security program to be approved for U.S. commercial aircraft operations. the AOSSP is a standard document applicable to all of the airlines.
 
Specific policies and procedures of the AOSSP are classified as security sensitive information (SSI).
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Title 49 CFR Part 1544 – Aircraft Operator Security: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators

Before the passage of ATSA 2001, aircraft operator security was described under Federal Aviation Regulation Part 108. ATSA 2001 transferred Part 108 to TSR Part 1544. Title 49 CFR Part 1544 generally addresses commercial flight operations. However, any aircraft operator may request to be regulated under Part 1544.
 
This section addresses the requirements of aircraft operators as related to the airline’s security program, screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo; the use of law enforcement personnel including the carriage of armed law enforcement officers on an aircraft; criminal history record checks; flight deck privileges; the known shipper cargo program; and threat and response contingencies.
 
Much of Part 1544 is similar in content and scope to Part 1542.
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Applicability of the Regulations
Title 49 CFR Part 1544 applies to aircraft operator with a certificate issued by FAA under CFR Part 119

Title 49 CFR Part 1544 applies to any aircraft operator with a certificate issued by the FAA under CFR Part 119 Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators.
 
Part 119 specifies the requirements an aircraft operator must adhere to in order to conduct commercial operations in the United States.
 
Part 1544 applies to scheduled passenger operations, public charter passenger operations, private charter passenger operations, and the operations of aircraft operators holding operating certificates under 14 CFR Part 119 and operating aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more.
 
Subpart A also provides the TSA with the inspection authority and the rights to conduct tests and copy records of the aircraft operator in order to establish compliance with Part 1544.

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Reinforcement
Aircraft operations offer unique challenges to security
Early 1970’s, airlines voluntarily implemented passenger and carry-on baggage screening. 1973, screening became mandatory. 1988, PPBM on international flights
ATSA 2001 transferred responsibility for screening to federal government
AOSSP describes how an aircraft operator must manage a security program
Title 49 CFR Part 1544 generally addresses commercial flight operations
 Part 119 specifies requirements an aircraft operator must adhere to in order to conduct commercial operations in US

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Subpart B: Security Program
Subpart B: Security Program
Security program format, amendment and approval process
Addresses six aircraft operator security programs:
Full
Partial
Twelve-Five (12-5)
Private charter
Full cargo

This section covers the security program format, amendment, and approval process and addresses the six aircraft operator security programs: full, partial, Twelve-Five (12-5), private charter, and full cargo.
 
Each security program necessitates a set of requirements based on the threat presented by the aircraft type in terms of passenger capacity and weight.
 
This section also addresses the format of an aircraft operator security program and the amendment process.
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Type of aircraft operator will generally determine type of aircraft operator security program required

Scheduled passenger or public charter operators operating aircraft with a passenger seating configuration that allows 61 or more seats and scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations with an aircraft with 60 or fewer seats when passengers are enplaned from or deplaned into a sterile area are required to have a full security program.
 
Aircraft operators using aircraft with a passenger seating configuration of 31 to 60 seats not enplaning or deplaning from a sterile area or aircraft operators with passenger seating configurations of fewer than 60 seats but operating internationally adhere to partial security program requirements.
 
Aircraft with a maximum gross takeoff weight that exceeds 12,500 pounds used in scheduled or charter service, carrying passengers or cargo or both, and not already under a full or partial program must adhere to the Twelve-Five Program (12-5).
 
Aircraft with a takeoff weight in excess of 45,500 kilograms (100,309.3 pounds) with a passenger seating configuration exceeding 61 seats or any aircraft enplaning from or deplaning into a sterile area while
 
The Private Charter Standard Security Program (PCSSP) is primarily for commercial airline operators that offer their aircraft for private charter.
 
It is best to remember that the TSA may add requirements if the TSA administrator feels that additional requirements are necessary to address heightened security concerns.
 
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Subpart B: Security Program

Each aircraft operator must have an approved security program describing the facilities and equipment under its control and the specific security responsibilities. This includes geographic boundaries of exclusive areas, equipment used to screen passengers, carry-on baggage, checked baggage and cargo, and other factors. Security programs are approved and amended in the same manner as those for airport operators.
 
An initial security program for a new aircraft operator must be submitted for approval at least 90 days before start of passenger operations.
The TSA then has 30 days to approve or give the aircraft operator written notice to modify the program.
The aircraft operator can then either comply with the request to modify the program or appeal to the TSA administrator within 30 days of receiving the request.
Amendments to existing security programs requested by the aircraft operator must be filed with the TSA at least 45 days before the effective date of the change.
If the TSA denies a proposed amendment, the aircraft operator has 30 days to appeal the decision to the TSA administrator.
Amendments to a security program requested by the TSA provide for 30 days advance notice to an aircraft operator.
 
The TSA may issue an emergency amendment with which an aircraft operator must immediately comply. The aircraft operator may appeal the conditions of the emergency amendment but must comply with the conditions during the appeal.
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Aircraft Operator Security Operations and Screening Responsibilities
Subpart C of Title 49 CFR Part 1544

Subpart C of Title 49 CFR Part 1544 “Operations” details the day-to-day requirements for aircraft operators. It includes sections on:
Personnel identification systems,
Personal and property screening,
Law enforcement personnel,
Exclusive areas,
Flight deck privileges,
Known shipper program (air cargo)
Many of the requirements reviewed in this section can be met by other entities, such as the TSA (screening) and airport management (law enforcement support).
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Subpart B: Security Program
All-Cargo Aircraft Operators
Only authorized passengers and carry-on baggage allowed to board
Aircraft Operators
Ensure cargo properly screened and inspected

All-cargo aircraft operators who carry passengers must ensure that only authorized passengers and their carry-on baggage are allowed to board and that they do not bring any weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive devices, items, or substances onboard.
 
Aircraft operators under a full security program, a full all-cargo program, or a 12-5 program must ensure that cargo placed within the holds of their aircraft are properly screened and inspected to prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized persons, unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive substances or items in cargo onboard an aircraft.
 
Aircraft operators are obliged to maintain the integrity of any cargo from the time it is accepted until it is delivered to a proper entity.
Operators must refuse to transport any cargo that is not been subjected to the proper screening protocols.
 
Cargo may only be accepted from a shipper with a security program (such as an Indirect Air Carrier) similar to the aircraft operators’ security program.
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Subpart B: Security Program
Screened – some form of vetting that is not necessarily a physical inspection
Inspected – physical inspection of a parcel by explosive trace detection (ETD), K-9, or other approved means

Screened – some form of vetting that is not necessarily a physical inspection (i.e., the known shipper program)
Inspected – means a physical inspection of a parcel by explosive trace detection (ETD), K-9, or other approved means.
 
Subpart E of Title 49 CFR Part 1544 addresses screener qualifications when the aircraft operator performs the screening.
 
Aircraft operator/screeners must meet similar qualifications as TSA screening personnel, which includes completing at least 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training, as well as passing a readiness test.
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Airline Security Coordinators

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Subpart B: Security Program
Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator (AOSC)
Primary POC
Manage security programs
Ensure compliance

Each aircraft operator must appoint an aircraft operator security coordinator (AOSC) who is the primary point of contact to the TSA.
 
The AOSC’s responsibilities are similar to the airport security coordinator, but with a much larger span of control. AOSCs must manage security programs for operations with dozens of remote locations across the United States and, for larger airlines, the world.
 
The AOSC:
Receives and disseminates security directives and information circulars and works with the ASCs at each airport to ensure compliance with security regulations and procedures.
Audits the hub and station security programs to ensure uniformity with the airline program for passenger, baggage, and cargo operations.
Oversees the airline’s security program and works with the TSA to ensure compliance with the program and the regulations may work with the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of State for the transport of dignitaries
 
At large airlines, the primary AOSC is often assisted by other security managers at the airlines’ major hubs. Airline station managers are responsible for the operation of an airline at each hub or station and assume certain security responsibilities, which vary from airline to airline.
 
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Subpart B: Security Program
The Ground Security Coordinator
Responsibilities Before & After 9/11
GSC’s:
designated for every passenger & cargo flight
respond to passenger incidents/conflicts
aware of SDs and ICs

Each flight has a ground security coordinator (GSC) responsible for the security of that flight.
 
The GSC:
Must review all security-related functions for which the aircraft operator is responsible, including the Aircraft Operator’s Security Program and applicable security directives.
Correct each instance of noncompliance as determined by the TSA.
At foreign airports where the government or a contractor provides security, they must notify the TSA for assistance in resolving noncompliance problems.
Trained in bomb threat and hijack management procedures.
Primary responsibilities are to:
Resolve security-related conflicts between gate agents and passengers,
Provide liaison with the airport operator during security incidents,
Intervene in disruptive passenger situations,
Oversee baggage and cargo-handling acceptance procedures, and
Act as the primary contact for the airline in a security incident until relieved by higher authority.
Required to make a pilot in command (PIC) aware of any security issues related to a flight
Ground security coordinators and crewmembers must complete annual security training as outlined in the airline’s security program. The content of such training is considered SSI. In-flight security coordinators and crewmembers must complete an advanced qualifications program approved under SFAR 58 in 14 CFR Part 121, which includes security training required by 14 CFR 121.417(b)(3)(v) or 135.331(b)(3)(v)—covering hijackings or other unusual situations.
 
GSCs watch to ensure that passenger-boarding doors are secured when not in use and that positive passenger bag match (PPBM) procedures are being followed.
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Subpart B: Security Program
Pilot in Command (PIC)
Responsible for safety and security
In flight security coordinator (ISC)
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO)

The pilot in command has final responsibility for the safety and security of a flight and its passengers. The PIC acts in the capacity of the in-flight security coordinator (ISC) on each flight. The ISC receives a security briefing before each flight, both from the GSC and through preflight briefings. For practical purposes and to the extent possible, the PIC is “in charge” of security-related incidents onboard the aircraft during flight, including hijackings.
 
In some cases, a member of the flight crew may be trained as a federal flight deck officer (FFDO). However, FFDOs are not allowed to exit the cockpit to deal with a situation in the cabin. The FFDO jurisdiction ends at the cockpit door.
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Reinforcement
Subpart B covers security program format, amendment, and approval process and addresses six aircraft operator security programs
Type of aircraft operator will generally determine type of aircraft operator security program required
Each aircraft operator must have an approved security program
Subpart C of Title 49 CFR Part 1544 “Operations” details day-to-day requirements for aircraft operators
Each aircraft operator must appoint an aircraft operator security coordinator (AOSC) who is the primary POC to TSA
 Each flight has a ground security coordinator (GSC) responsible for the security of that flight

Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security

Law Enforcement Personnel

Law enforcement requirements prescribed in Part 1542.215 and 1542.217 must still be met where an aircraft operator conducts passenger operations at domestic airports not required to have a security program under Part 1542. These requirements address the availability and training for law enforcement officers.
 
Specific response times and numbers of available law enforcement officers (LEOs) are addressed in the aircraft operator security program and are considered SSI.
The aircraft operator must ensure its employees, including crewmembers, have the training and resources to contact LEO support when needed.
 
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Carriage of Firearms in Checked Baggage

Federal regulations require that firearms must be unloaded and carried in a hard-sided locked container. Only the person checking in the firearm can have the combination or key. Furthermore, the firearm must be declared at the ticket counter and stored on the aircraft such that it is not accessible to passengers. Aircraft operators may require additional policies regarding the transport of firearms in checked baggage.
 
The transport of ammunition is covered in Title 49 CFR Part 175, which addresses the carriage of hazardous materials onboard aircraft. Ammunition must be kept separate from any flammable liquids or solids.
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Carriage of Accessible Weapons
Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs)

Generally, the only individuals authorized to carry a loaded firearm onboard are law enforcement officers (LEOs).
 
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
LEO
Federal LEO
Full-time municipal, county, state LEO – direct employee of federal agency
Need to access weapon
Unique Federal Agency
Number (UFAN)

For flights requiring screening, a LEO must be a federal law enforcement officer or a full-time municipal, county, or state law enforcement officer who is a direct employee of a government agency. This individual must be sworn and commissioned to enforce criminal statutes or immigration statutes. The individual must be authorized by the employing agency to have the weapon in connection with assigned duties and must have completed the training program, Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed.
 
A federal agent (whether or not on official travel) carrying the proper credentials is not required to show any other reason for carrying a weapon onboard, provided he or she is armed in accordance with an agency-wide policy governing that type of travel established by the employing agency by directive or policy statement.
 
Armed law enforcement officers must notify aircraft operators of the flights on which an accessible weapon is needed at least one hour, or in an emergency as soon as practicable, before departure.
For flights where screening is not conducted, LEOs may carry weapons onboard provided they are federal law enforcement officers or full-time municipal, county, or state law enforcement officers who are direct employees of a government agency. They must also provide the proper notification to the aircraft operator and present proper credentials.
 
LEOs traveling armed must not consume any alcohol while on the flight or board the flight armed having consumed alcohol within the eight hours before the flight. When traveling armed, LEOs not in uniform must keep the firearm concealed on their person or within reach; if in uniform, they must keep the firearm on their person at all times.
The TSA will issue a specific alpha-numeric Unique Federal Agency Number (UFAN) for each Federal law enforcement agency or entity or other organization, including those performing personnel security detail (PSD) missions, as approved by the TSA
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Prisoner Transport

High Risk Prisoners
Low Risk Prisoners

Prisoners are classified as:
“high risk” – any prisoner who presents an exceptional escape risk, as determined by the law enforcement agency, and has been charged with, or convicted of, a violent crime
Only one high-risk prisoner may be carried on any particular flight and must be escorted by two armed LEOs.
The LEOs must have no other prisoners under their charge during this time. The TSA can approve more than one high-risk prisoner on a specific flight provided that there is a minimum of one armed LEO for each prisoner and one additional armed LEO.
 
“low risk.” – any prisoner who is not classified as high risk
at least one armed LEO must accompany the prisoner for flights that are shorter than four hours
One armed LEO can escort no more than two low-risk prisoners.
A minimum of two armed LEOs is required for flights longer than four hours for one or two low-risk prisoners.
 
Law enforcement officers escorting a prisoner must notify the aircraft operator at least 24 hours before departure, or as far in advance as practicable, and advise the airline of the identity of the prisoner and whether he or she is high or low risk.
 
The LEO must arrive at least one hour before the departure time of the flight and ensure that the prisoner has been thoroughly searched. The LEO must be seated between the prisoner and the aisle and must accompany the prisoner at all times during the flight. Ideally, prisoners should be boarded first and deplane last, and they should be seated in the farthest rear section of the plane possible, but not near any exits.
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Transportation of Federal Air Marshals

Aircraft operators are required to carry federal air marshals, on any scheduled passenger or public charter flight, on a first-priority basis and without charge while on duty, including the repositioning of flights and in the seat requested by the air marshal. The TSA determines the number of air marshals required on a flight.
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Security of the Aircraft on the Ground and in Flight

Aircraft operators must ensure that unauthorized personnel are unable to access the air carrier’s aircraft, associated facilities (hangars, administrative areas that may have access to aircraft, etc.), and exclusive areas. Air carriers must conduct a security inspection of each aircraft if the aircraft has not been previously protected in accord with the aircraft operator security program. Air carriers conduct a daily inspection of each aircraft that has been out of service before returning it to passenger operations.
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Reinforcement
Law enforcement requirements must still be met where an aircraft operator conducts passenger operations at domestic airports not required to have a security program
Federal regulations require that firearms must be unloaded and carried in a hard-sided locked container
Generally, the only individuals authorized to carry a loaded firearm onboard are law enforcement officers (LEOs)
Prisoners are classified as “high risk” and “low risk”
Aircraft operators are required to carry federal air marshals
Aircraft operators must ensure that unauthorized personnel are unable to access the air carrier’s aircraft, associated facilities and exclusive areas

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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Other Aircraft Operator Security Requirements
CHRC
Personnel Identification
system

Aircraft operators must conduct fingerprint-based criminal history records checks (CHRCs) for any employee who conducts a “covered function,” which includes unescorted access authority, the authority to perform screening, or the authority to check baggage or cargo.
 
These requirements are essentially the same as Part 1542.209 of the Airport Security regulations requiring those operating within the security identification display area (SIDA) to complete a fingerprint-based CHRC to ensure he or she has not been found guilty (or not guilty by reason of insanity) of 28 listed disqualifying offenses.
 
Aircraft operators must also designate an individual to be responsible for conducting the CHRC, including receiving results on investigations from the FBI and conducting internal audits of CHRC records.
Within an aircraft operator exclusive area, aircraft operators must establish and carry out a personnel identification system that is approved for use in the exclusive area. The personnel identification requirements are the same as in the Airport Security regulations under Title 49 CFR Part 1542.211. Aircraft operators must conduct yearly audits and include measures to retrieve expired ID, report lost or stolen ID, and secure unissued identification media stock. Temporary IDs may also be issued.
 
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Training
Contingency & Incident Management Planning
Receipt of Air Cargo

Training: Aircraft operators must provide SIDA training for their personnel and any additional security training that may be required under the Aircraft Operator Security Program.
  
Contingency & Incident Management Planning: Aircraft operators must have contingency plans in the event of increased security levels required by a higher level of the color-coded Department of Homeland Security alert system.
 
Receipt of Air Cargo: Aircraft operators are prohibited from carrying cargo unless that cargo is received from a known shipper meeting the requirements of the Aircraft Operator Security Program.
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Airline Security Issues
Airport VS Airline security
Personnel
Financial
Customer base

General differences between airport and airline security department include:
Personnel – airlines generally employ more people than an individual airport,
Financial – airports are generally nonprofit and airlines are usually for-profit,
Customer base – airports serve a variety of stakeholders including the airlines, vendors, passengers, contractors, and others and airlines generally serve just passengers and cargo customers
With thousands of passengers every day, airlines must be prepared to handle issues such as air rage and on-board medical emergencies.
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Positive Passenger Bag Match
ATSA 2001
No longer required
EDS, ETD, physical or canine inspection

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 mandated that positive passenger bag matching (PPBM) be used for all domestic and international flights. PPBM process is no longer required in the United States as all checked baggage is screened either through EDS, ETD, physical inspection or canine inspection.
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Catering and Vendor Services
Opportunity to conceal an IED within catering stock
Security begins with employment of personnel and management

Catering provides an opportunity for an individual to conceal an improvised-explosive device within the catering stock for loading onto an aircraft.
Extensive background checks are needed to ensure individuals have no criminal history, are legal residents, and do not have past affiliations with terrorist or organized crime groups. For catering personnel with access to the security identification display area or the aircraft, a CHRC must be completed before the person is allowed unescorted access to either.
 
Catering and vendor facility security is also important. Visitors to flight kitchens and catering facilities should be verified and authorized, and then issued visitor’s identification and be accompanied by a staff member throughout the time they are in the facility.
 
Once packaged at the flight kitchen, security personnel should monitor the loading of the catered goods onto trucks. Trucks and personnel responsible for moving catered goods should be inspected and searched before accepting the goods each time they enter SIDAs. Random inspections should also be conducted using explosive trace detection (ETD), EDS, or physical inspections.
 
Catering personnel, such as loaders and drivers, often carry items such as box cutters that are normally prohibited in SIDAs and other sterile areas. Catering personnel should be required to register prohibited items that are essential for the job and be responsible for keeping track of those items.
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Airline Security Staff Operations and Issues
The corporate security responsibilities of an airline include:
Dealing with disgruntled employees
Protection of airline facilities
Employees with addictions
Employees with mental illness challenges
Baggage and cargo theft
Pilfering of airline assets
Abuse of flying privileges
Assault
Intimidation
Cyber security
General loss prevention

The corporate security responsibilities of an airline include:
Dealing with disgruntled employees
Protection of airline facilities
Employees with addictions
Employees with mental illness challenges
Baggage and cargo theft
Pilfering of airline assets
Abuse of flying privileges
Assault
Intimidation
Cyber security
General loss prevention
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Law Enforcement Operations Related to Airline Security
Bag Theft
Airline employees and TSA screeners
Baggage claim areas
Drug smuggling

Millions of dollars of personal belongings are entrusted to airlines every day, and unfortunately the reputation airlines have of losing bags works in the favor of those attempting to steal from a bag.
The advent of the Internet and online sales websites have provided another means to anonymously offload stolen goods, Unfortunately, bag theft involves airline and airport employees and TSA personnel, who then attempt to sell stolen property on eBay or other websites.
 
Baggage theft of this nature is particularly difficult to investigate as several individuals including airline employees and TSA screeners handle a passenger’s baggage after it is checked as luggage.
 
Another form of baggage theft occurs at the baggage claim areas where bags are returned to their owners, as passengers are not required to prove that the bag(s) they are taking belong to them.
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Reinforcement
Aircraft operators must conduct fingerprint-based criminal history records checks (CHRCs) for any employee who conducts a “covered function”
Other aircraft operator security requirements: training, contingency and incident management planning, and receipt of air cargo
General differences between airport and airline security department: personnel, financial, and customer base

Catering provides an opportunity for an individual to conceal an improvised-explosive device within the catering stock for loading onto an aircraft
The corporate security responsibilities of an airline include dealing with disgruntled employees, protection of airline facilities, employees with addictions, employees with mental illness challenges, baggage and cargo theft, pilfering of airline assets, abuse of flying privileges, assault, intimidation, cyber security, and general loss prevention

Aircraft Security Requirements
Cockpit doors
Secondary Flight Deck Barriers

The ATSA of 2001 mandated that cockpit doors be strengthened and that access to the cockpit be strictly controlled. By “strengthening,” the government means making it harder to physically knock in the door or to punch or kick through it.
Secondary Flight Deck Barriers: At the request of some airlines, some aircraft manufacturers have installed reinforced curtains, which are pulled across the forward section of the cabin seating area and locked.
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Methods of accessing the cockpit
Coercion
Jumpseating

Methods of accessing the cockpit:
 
Coercion – Intruders will take a flight attendant or passenger hostage and then demand access to the cockpit, often beating the hostage until access is granted.
Flight crewmembers are aware that they may have to make a decision whether to allow the hostage to be beaten and possibly killed, along with other hostages, vs allowing access to the cockpit.
Jumpseating – Airline and FAA employees typically share in the benefit of free or nearly free air travel within the cabin, but on occasion when the cabin is full, an employee may be placed in the cockpit’s third or jump seat.
Flight crewmembers not comfortable with a particular individual in their cockpit have the right to not permit that individual to occupy a jump seat.
General employees (not pilots or mechanics or dispatchers) of a particular airline can only occupy flight deck jumpseat on case-by case-basis, with the approval of airline, pilot-in-command and the FAA through the use of an FAA form 8430 (Title 14 CFR Part 121.547). Pilots of that airline can occupy flight deck jumpseat with PIC approval. Off-line airline employees may not ride flight deck jumpseat, except for off-line pilots, who must first be approved through the Cockpit Access Security System (CASS), and also have PIC approval.
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Airline
Employee
Security

An aircraft in flight is in a very remote location; often 35,000 feet or more above the surface, traveling more than 400 miles per hour, and usually without law enforcement personnel onboard. This environment has a high risk potential. Drugs, alcohol, and mentally disturbed individuals traveling alone exacerbate the potential.
 
Airline security personnel concerned with the safety of passengers during flight, but also the safety of their flight crews both onboard and while staying in cities around the globe.
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Airline Employee Safety
Air Rage
Factors contributing to air rage:
Alcohol and drugs (both legal and illegal)
Being “stuck” on an aircraft
Poor service and limited food and drink options
Cramped quarters and an invasion of personal space
Gender and sexual preferences
Weight and size
The feeling of losing control over your life
Being forced to check carry-on baggage and a lack of space in the overhead bins

Factors contributing to air rage include the following:
Alcohol and drugs (both legal and illegal)
Being “stuck” on an aircraft
Poor service and limited food and drink options
Cramped quarters and an invasion of personal space
Gender and sexual preferences
Weight and size
The feeling of losing control over your life
Being forced to check carry-on baggage and a lack of space in the overhead bins
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Airline Employee Safety
Air Rage

Air rage incidents are a:
Threat to the lives of those onboard
Threat to the safety of the flight
Cost to the airline in time and delay

Before 9-11, the FAA did not take air rage very seriously, nor did the agency learn about other vulnerabilities in the aviation system resulting from air rage.
 
Air rage incidents are a threat to the lives of those onboard, a threat to the safety of the flight, and a cost to the airline in time and delay.
 
Protecting crewmembers against air rage is often a combination of several elements including training in verbal de-escalation of an incident, training in physical self-defense, enlisting the help of other passengers, communication with the flight deck, and techniques to safely restrain a hostile individual. Many airlines have contracted with private industry to provide verbal and physical self-defense instruction. Hands-on self-defense training for flight crews also serves a protective purpose for terrorist incidents
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Airline Employee Safety
Flight Crew Protection

A passenger who is upset and argumentative:
Verbal response
Protection
Resources and knowledge

In-flight security and response by crewmembers must be addressed by considering the perceived threat and applying the appropriate response strategy.
 
A passenger who is upset and argumentative should receive a verbal response in an attempt to de-escalate the situation.
If the passenger becomes physically violent, then crewmembers need to be able to respond to protect themselves and the safety of the other passengers.
If the passenger is threatening the lives of the crewmembers or passengers or the passenger is a terrorist threatening the safety of the flight, crewmembers must have the resources and knowledge to defend the aircraft and themselves.
 
In all cases, from verbal response to deadly force to protect the aircraft, crewmembers should be trained in each area and know when to escalate from one stage to the next.
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Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 8
Textbook Page No. 280
Airline Employee Safety
Protecting Airline Personnel While Traveling

Traveler needs high level of awareness of location and nature of his or her surroundings
Tourists are targets
Encouraged to stay on “Bourbon Street”

It is in the interest of both employees and employers to be aware of traveler safety practices. General travel security requires the traveler to have a high level of awareness of location and the nature of his or her surroundings. Airline personnel should be acutely aware of their responsibility to protect their travel documents, uniforms, and equipment. The theft of these items could facilitate criminal or terrorist activity.
Hotel room and street theft constitute nearly 70% of all travel theft.
Theft from vehicles and at airports account for almost 30% of the total thefts.
 
Tourists in particular are targets. Travelers should minimize these indicators, such as reading a map in public, openly carrying travel guides, dressing differently from local styles, opening a hotel room door to strangers, and not taking extra cautions when using the fitness or pool facilities.
 
Once at a hotel, flight crews should change from airline attire and dress to blend
in to the local culture.
 
Travelers should seek directions to restaurants and other sites from hotel staff and get clear directions written down to the destination or from police officers or business owners
 
Airline personnel should always carry a cell phone and ensure the battery is charged before going out. If venturing out from a hotel alone or with just one other person, advise the hotel staff of the destination and expected return time.
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Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 8
Textbook Page No. 282
Airline Employee Safety
Self-Defense for Crewmembers and Passengers
IATSA outlined elements included in flight crew security training:
Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence
Crew communication and coordination
Appropriate responses to defend oneself
Use of protective devices
Psychology of terrorists to cope with hijacker behavior and passenger response
Live situational exercises regarding various threat conditions
Flight deck procedures or aircraft maneuvers to defend aircraft
Any other subject matter deemed appropriate by administrator

The terrorist attacks on 9-11 brought to light a long ignored subject—aircrew self-defense training. IATSA outlined eight elements to be included in flight crew security training:
Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence
Crew communication and coordination
Appropriate responses to defend oneself
Use of protective devices
Psychology of terrorists to cope with hijacker behavior and passenger response
Live situational exercises regarding various threat conditions
Flight deck procedures or aircraft maneuvers to defend the aircraft
Any other subject matter deemed appropriate by the administrator
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Basic levels of response
Verbal
Physical
Extreme

Three basic levels of response that should be addressed in self-defense training are:
Verbal – a person is trained in methods and procedures of talking to upset individuals as a way to calm them and move toward a peaceful resolution
Physical – involves contact between a crewmember and a passenger, does not warrant deadly force
Extreme – when life or the safety of the aircraft is in jeopardy. This level should only be used when there are no other options
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Violent Passenger or Terrorist
Force Policy
Application of Force

Once a situation has escalated to a level requiring a violent response, then the reasonable use of force, lethal force, and passenger restraint must be considered. Passenger restraints present a serious issue considering the legalities involved in false imprisonment and the possibility of aircraft evacuation in an emergency.
 
A “hold” of any sort requires a level of consent on the part of the person being held or overwhelming force applied by the defenders.
 
An airline’s use of force policy should be clearly articulated and integrated into the aircrew security training program.
If a hijacking begins, passengers should wait to see if an air marshal or other law enforcement officer takes action. Passengers jumping up in the middle of an armed response may be misidentified as a hijacker and shot.
 
If it’s apparent that a law enforcement officer is either not onboard or not going to immediately respond, anyone taking action should understand that the most confusing part of a hijack is at the very beginning. This can be used to a defender’s advantage. Defenders should also yell when attacking hijackers as a way to posture themselves and instill fear into the hijackers.
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Federal Flight Deck Officer Program

It was in the spirit of defending the flight deck that the Air Line Pilot’s Association (ALPA) and other pilot groups lobbied for the right to carry a gun in the cockpit (Sloan, 2002). The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act was incorporated into the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and passed by the U.S. Congress, thus creating the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.
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Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 8
Textbook Page No. 286
Airline Employee Safety
FFDO’s – passenger and cargo airline pilot volunteers
Flying and using firearms different skills
Flight attendants expressed concern
Able to pull trigger

FFDOs are passenger and cargo airline pilot volunteers; they are provided a firearm and a weeklong training session taught by the TSA.
 
Some pilots have criticized the program for the TSA’s tight restrictions on who is selected to be an FFDO.
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Foreign Aircraft Operations

Foreign air carrier operations introduce unique challenges to the aviation security system.
Foreign operators must adhere to U.S. aviation security regulations.
 
For airport operators, the foreign air carrier arrival area represents the U.S. border, making customs, immigration, and agriculture protection agents a part of the airport security program. The airport operator must provide these agencies with the proper facilities to secure the U.S. border, including handling reverse screening.
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Reinforcement
ATSA of 2001 mandated that cockpit doors be strengthened and that access to cockpit be strictly controlled
Many factors contribute to air rage
In-flight security and response by crewmembers must be addressed by considering perceived threat and applying appropriate response strategy
It is in interest of both employees and employers to be aware of traveler safety practices
Terrorist attacks on 9-11 brought to light a long ignored subject—aircrew self-defense training
Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act was incorporated into Homeland Security Act of 2002 and passed by the U.S. Congress, creating Federal Flight Deck Officer Program

49 CFR Part 1546 –
Foreign Air Carrier Security

Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 8
Textbook Page No. 287
Title 49 CFR 1546 Foreign Air Carrier Security
Foreign air carriers may not access SSI materials
Model Security Program (MSP)
Exclusion of exclusive area agreements

One major difference in foreign air carrier security versus domestic is that foreign air carriers may not access SSI materials unless specifically authorized by the TSA. Foreign air carriers do not follow, nor are they allowed access to, the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP), which is only for domestic air carriers. Foreign air carriers must adhere to the Model Security Program (MSP), which outlines the relevant required security actions and programs.
 
Foreign air carriers are allowed to develop their own practices for the carriage of prisoners, requirements for carrying weapons in checked baggage, and protection of aircraft and facilities.
 
Noteworthy is the exclusion of exclusive area agreements for foreign air carriers. Foreign air carriers cannot take responsibility for security in certain areas of an airfield or sections of an Airport Security Program. Foreign air carriers operating within the U.S. must allow the TSA to enter secure areas to make inspections, conduct tests, and copy aircraft operator to establish compliance with Part 1546.
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Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 8
Textbook Page No. 288
Title 49 CFR 1546 Foreign Air Carrier Security
Title 49 Part 1546.203 -allows foreign air carriers to:
Requirements for transportation of weapons in checked baggage
Ensure checked baggage has been properly screened
Refuse to transport any item not subjected to screening

Part 1546.213 requires that those with access to cargo undergo a security threat assessment (STA)

Title 49 Part 1546.203 – allows foreign air carriers to:
Determine the requirements for the transportation of weapons in checked baggage,
Ensure that checked baggage has been properly screened
Refuse to transport any item not subjected to screening.
The regulations require passengers to notify the foreign air carrier that he or she is checking a firearm but allows the foreign air carrier to determine how to prepare the weapon for transport. Part 1546.203 only requires that the weapon be transported in an area of the plane that is inaccessible to passengers.
 
Part 1546.213 requires that those with access to cargo undergo a security threat assessment (STA). Foreign air carriers can decide who is a known shipper based on the requirements that each determine the shipper’s validity and integrity as provided in the foreign air carrier’s security program, separate known shipper cargo from unknown shipper cargo, and ensure that cargo is screened or inspected.
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Threat and Threat Response

Foreign air carrier regulations do not have a section related to contingency plans and are not required to increase their security posture when the department of Homeland Security color-coded alert system is raised. All foreign air carriers are required to have their security programs approved by the TSA.
 
Upon receipt of a threat, the foreign air carrier must notify the pilot in command and conduct a security inspection at the earliest opportunity.
Any foreign air carrier flight within the United States or heading to the United States that has received a bomb threat is not allowed to take off unless the aircraft has been searched.
Any foreign aircraft in flight that receives a threat must land as soon as possible, notify the appropriate authorities, and search the aircraft before continuing the flight.
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Additional Considerations of Foreign Air Carrier Operations
Master crew list (MCL) and crew manifest data to TSA on Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website

Foreign air carriers have additional requirements such as providing passenger manifests to the U.S. government.
 
Foreign air carriers or domestic air carriers flying into, out of, and overflying the U.S. must provide passenger manifest lists to the TSA within 15 minutes after the departure of the flight.
The TSA inputs the data into the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS).
Carriers must also provide a master crew list (MCL) and crew manifest data to the TSA on the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website.
The TSA reviews the data against the no-fly lists and known terrorists watch lists. In some cases, flights inbound to the United States have been diverted and a passenger taken off the plane by law enforcement.
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Border Protection

Airport operators must design and operate their federal inspection service (FIS) areas (customs, immigration, Department of Agriculture) to ensure that passengers entering the United States via air are separated from domestic flight operations until FIS officials can conduct the proper inspections of the passengers and their baggage.
 
At the G8 conference in 2005, the United States announced the creation of a Smart Border of the Future, which is based on the following rationale:
 
The border of the future must integrate actions abroad to screen goods and people prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory, and inspections at the border and measures within the United States to ensure compliance with entry and import permits. . . . Agreements with our neighbors, major trading partners, and private industry will allow extensive pre-screening of low-risk traffic, thereby allowing limited assets to focus attention on high-risk traffic. The use of advanced technology to track the movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals is essential to the task of managing the movement of hundreds of millions of individuals, conveyances, and vehicles. (White House, 2002)
 
Through Section 233(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the aircraft operator is responsible for the costs of the FIS facilities. This is usually through the collection of fees by the airport (as the owner/operator of the facility). The FIS facility represents the border of the United States.
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Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 8
Textbook Page No. 291
Additional Considerations of Foreign Air Carrier Operations

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Primary mission of CBP –
prevent terrorists and weapons from entering US

Design of the FIS facility is guided by the CBP Airport Technical Design Standards (also called the Air Technical Design Standards and available from the Customs and Border Protection division of Homeland Security).
The primary mission of the CBP is to prevent terrorists and weapons from entering the United States.
Customs agents watch for individuals attempting to bring contraband, which could include illegal weapons or drugs, into the United States. Agents decide who to check based on prior intelligence, profiling, and random checks.
Department of Agriculture agents are often on hand to ensure that certain foods and other items are not brought into the country.
On some occasions, agents of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Public Health Service, and other federal agencies may be present and conducting inspections for a variety of reasons, including the illegal trafficking of protected fish, wildlife, and plants and to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases.
At larger airports, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may be present and conducting ongoing investigations of criminal activity through the airport’s borders.
The size of an FIS facility is determined by the number of passengers processed at the peak hour of operation and the number of aircraft arriving during a set period.
In some instances, airport operators may have to incorporate additional TSA checkpoints into the overall design of the FIS facility to screen passengers and their carry-on baggage if they are arriving from an airport that does not meet the U.S. standard for screening.
The integrity of the FIS facility must be protected in a number of ways, including the use of CCTV and a computerized access control system. CBP will assist in access control by applying strict standards as to who (besides passengers) may be in the FIS facility, often requiring airport workers, such as airline personnel and airport operations, security, and law enforcement personnel, to wear additional identification.
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Conclusion

This chapter examined requirements and processes that aircraft operators must address when managing security related to aircraft operations. Aircraft operators work in conjunction with the federal government to implement many security programs, such as screening, transporting armed law enforcement officers, or conducting criminal history
background checks.
 
This chapter also introduced different types of approved security programs, such as a full security program, full all-cargo program, 12-5 program, or private charter program.
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TSA – 30 days to
approve or give written
notice to modify
Initial Security Program
– 90 days before start
of operations
Aircraft operator –
comply or appeal
within 30 days
Amendments to existing
security programs filed with
TSA at least 45 days before
the effective date of change