Article Analysis #3- The Constitution
First, read a news story from the newspaper or the Internet. Answer the following questions regarding your news story: 1) What is the main issue, who are the main actors being discussed;
Second, choose one of the assigned articles you read for this week. Answer the following questions regarding the assigned article: 1) What are the basics of this article (who, what, when, how, why, etc.); 2) What is the overall main point the author is trying to convince you of? 3) Do you agree with the author’s argument? Why? Why not?
Finally, tie together your news story with what you learned from the assigned article, textbook readings, podcasts, videos, etc. for this week. Type your answers using your own words, no outline or bullets, complete sentences and paragraphs, single-spaced, full-page.
Monday September 17, 1787
In Convention of the Whole
James Madison’s Notes
The engrossed Constitution being read,
Docr. Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, which he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency, and
which Mr. Wilson read in the words following. 1
Mr. President
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I
shall never approve them: For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better
information or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but
found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to
pay more respect to the judgment of others. Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion, think themselves
in possession of all truth, and that whereever others differ from them it is so far error. Steele, a Protestant in a
Dedication tells the Pope, that the only difference between our Churches in their opinions of the certainty of their
doctrines is, the Church of Rome is infallible and the Church of England is never in the wrong. But though many
private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as
a certain french lady, who in a dispute with her sister, said “I don’t know how it happens, Sister but I meet with no
body but myself, that’s always in the right” — Il n’y a que moi qui a toujours raison “.
In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general
Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if
well administered, and believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only
end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need
despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain may
be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their
joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion,
their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It
therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will
astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the
Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of
cutting one another’s throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I
am not sure, that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the public good — I have
never whispered a syllable of them abroad — Within these walls they were born, and here they shall die — If every
one of us in returning to our Constituents were to report the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain
partizans in support of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary
effects & great advantages resulting naturally in our favor among foreign Nations as well as among ourselves,
from our real or apparent unanimity. Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and
securing happiness to the people, depends. on opinion, on the general opinion of the goodness of the
Government, as well as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own
sakes as a part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act heartily and unanimously in
recommending this Constitution (if approved by Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever our
influence may extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors to the means of having it well administered.
On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still have
objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility– and to make manifest our
unanimity, put his name to this instrument.” — He then moved that the Constitution be signed by the members and
offered the following as a convenient form viz. “Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States
present the 17th. of Sepr. &c — In Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names.”
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This ambiguous form had been drawn up by Mr. G. M. in order to gain the dissenting members, and put into the
hands of Docr. Franklin that it might have the better chance of success.
Mr. Gorham said if it was not too late he could wish, for the purpose of lessening objections to the Constitution,
that the clause declaring “the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every forty thousand–” which
had produced so much discussion, might be yet reconsidered, in order to strike out 40,000 & insert “thirty
thousand” This would not he remarked establish that as an absolute rule, but only give Congress a greater
latitude which could not be thought unreasonable.
Mr. King & Mr Carrol seconded & supported the ideas of Mr Gorham.
When the President rose, for the purpose of putting the question, 2 he said that although his situation had hitherto
restrained him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it might be thought, ought
now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear expressing his wish that the alteration proposed might
take place. It was much to be desired that the objections to the plan recommended might be made as few as
possible– The smallness of the proportion of Representatives had been considered by many members of the
Convention, an insufficient security for the rights & interests of the people. He acknowledged that it had always
appeared to himself among the exceptionable parts of the plan; 3 and late as the present moment was for
admitting amendments, he thought this of so much consequence that it would give much satisfaction to see it
adopted. 4
No opposition was made to the proposition of Mr. Gorham and it was agreed to unanimously
On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled in order to be signed. It was agreed to all the States
answering ay.
Mr Randolph then rose and with an allusion to the observations of Docr Franklin, apologized for 5 his refusing to
sign the Constitution, notwithstanding the vast majority & venerable able names that would give sanction to its
wisdom and its worth. 6 He said however that he did not mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose the
Constitution without doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his duty as it should be
prescribed by his future judgment–He refused to sign, because he thought the object of the convention would be
frustrated by the alternative which it. presented to the people. Nine States will fail to ratify the plan and confusion
must ensue. With such a view of the subject he ought not, he could not, by pledging himself to support the plan,
restrain himself from taking such steps as might appear to him most consistent with the public good.
Mr. Govr. Morris said that he too had objections, but considering the present plan 7 as the best that was to be
attained, he should take it with all its faults. The majority had determined in its favor and by that determination he
should abide. The moment this plan goes forth all other considerations will be laid aside– and the great question
will be, shall there be a national Government or not? and this must take place or a general anarchy will be the
alternative– He remarked that the signing in the form proposed related only to the fact that the States present
were unanimous.
Mr. Williamson suggested that the signing should be confined to the letter accompanying the Constitution to
Congress. which might perhaps do nearly as well, and would be found be satisfactory to some members 8 who
disliked the Constitution. For himself he did not think a better plan was to be expected and had no scruples
against putting his name to it.
Mr Hamilton expressed his anxiety that every member should sign. A few characters of consequence, by
opposing or even refusing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the latent sparks which
lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may soon subside. No man’s ideas were more remote
from the plan than his own were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and Convulsion on
one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other.
Mr Blount said he had declared that he would not sign, so as to pledge himself in support of the plan, but he was
relieved by the form proposed and would without committing himself attest the fact that the plan was the
unanimous act of the States in Convention.
Docr. Franklin expressed his fears from what Mr Randolph had said, that he thought himself alluded to in the
remarks offered this morning to the House. He declared that when drawing up that paper he did not know that any
particular member would refuse to sign his name to the instrument, and hoped to be so understood. He professed
a high sense of obligation to Mr. Randolph for having brought forward the plan in the first instance, and for the
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assistance he had given in its progress, and hoped that he would yet lay aside his objections, and, by concurring
with his brethren, prevent the great mischief which the refusal of his name might produce
Mr. Randolph could not but regard the signing in the proposed form, as the same with signing the Constitution.
The change of form therefore could make no difference with him. He repeated that in refusing to sign the
Constitution, he took a step which might be the most awful of his life, but it was dictated by his conscience, and it
was not possible for him to hesitate, much less, to change. He repeated also his persuasion, that the holding out
this plan with a final alternative to the people, of accepting or rejecting it in toto, would really produce the anarchy
& civil convulsions which were apprehended from the refusal of individuals to sign it.
Mr Gerry described the painful feelings of his situation, and the embarrassment under which he rose to offer any
further observations on the subject wch. had been finally decided. Whilst the plan was depending, he had treated
it with all the freedom he thought it deserved– He now felt himself bound as he was disposed to treat it with the
respect due to the Act of the Convention– He hoped he should not violate that respect in declaring on this
occasion his fears that a Civil war may result from the present crisis of the U. S– In Massachusetts, particularly
he saw the danger of this calamitous event– In that State there are two parties, one devoted to Democracy, the
worst he thought of all political evils, the other as violent in the opposite extreme. From the collision of these in
opposing and resisting the Constitution, confusion was greatly to be feared. He had thought it necessary for this &
other reasons that the plan should have been proposed in a more mediating shape, in order to abate the heat and
opposition of parties– As it had been passed by the Convention, he was persuaded it would have a contrary
effect– He could not therefore by signing the Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all events. The proposed
form made no difference with him. But if it were not otherwise apparent, the refusals to sign should never be
known from him. Alluding to the remarks of Docr. Franklin, he could not he said but view them as levelled at
himself and the other gentlemen who meant not to sign;
Genl Pinkney– We are not likely to gain many converts by the ambiguity of the proposed form of signing. He
thought it best to be candid and let the form speak the substance– If the meaning of the signers be left in doubt,
his purpose would not be answered– He should sign the Constitution with a view to support it with all his
influence, and wished to pledge himself accordingly–
Docr. Franklin. It is too soon to pledge ourselves before Congress and our Constituents shall have approved the
plan.
Mr Ingersol did not consider the signing, either as a mere attestation of the fact, or as pledging the signers to
support the Constitution at all events; but as a recommendation, of what, all things considered, was the most
eligible.
On the motion of Docr. Franklin
N. H. ay. Mas. ay– Ct. ay– N. J. ay– Pa. ay– De–lay. Md. ay. Va. ay– N. C. ay 9 S. C. divd. 10 Geo. ay. [Ayes —
10; noes — 0; divided — 1.]
Mr. King suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be either destroyed, or deposited in the custody of
the President. He thought if suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by those who would
wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution–
Mr Wilson prefered the second expedient. he had at one time liked the first best; but as false suggestions may be
propagated it should not be made impossible to contradict them–
A question was then put on depositing the Journals and other papers of the Convention in the hands of the
President, On which,
N– H– ay. Mtts ay. Ct. ay– N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Md. 11 no. Va. ay. N. C. ay– S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes 10;
noes — 1.]
The President having asked what the Convention meant should be done with the Journals &c, whether copies
were to be allowed to the members if applied for. It was Resolved nem: con: “that he retain the Journal and other
papers, subject to the order of Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution. 12
The members then proceeded to sign the instrument.
Whilst the last members were signing it Doctr. Franklin looking towards the Presidents Chair, at the back of which
a rising sun happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him, that Painters had found it difficult to
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distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. I have, said he, often and often in the course of the Session, and
the vicissitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that behind the President without being able to tell
whether it was rising or setting: But now at length I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting
Sun.
The Constitution being signed by all the Members except Mr Randolph, Mr Mason, and Mr. Gerry who declined
giving it the sanction of their names, 13 the Convention dissolved itself by an Adjournment sine die–
• The few alterations and corrections made in these debates which are not in my hand writing, were dictated
by me and made in my presence by John C. Payne.
James Madison
1: Franklin seems to have sent copies of this speech in his own handwriting to several of his friends, and one of
these soon found its way into print (see Carey’s American Museum, II, pp. 558–559). After examining several of
these copies, it seems probable that Madison’s copy represents the speech as it was read. The others all embody
subsequent modifications.
2: Crossed out “he made a few observations”.
3: Crossed out “of such peculiar importance was its amendments, he could not therefore suppress his
approbation of the mo”.
4: This was the only occasion on which the President entered at all into the discussions of the Convention.
5: Crossed out: “yielding to his own judgment against so”.
6: Upon Randolph’s refusal to sign, see September 15.
7: Crossed out “results of all deliberations”.
8: He alluded. (Crossed out “probably”.) to Mr. Blount for one.
9: Taken from Journal.
10: Genl Pinkhey & Mr. Butler disliked the equivocal form of the signing, and on that account voted in the
negative.
11: This negative of Maryland was occasioned by the language of the instructions to the Deputies of that State,
which required them to report to the State, the proceedings of the Convention.
12: For the subsequent history of these papers, see Introduction.
13: See above note 6.
THIS WORK IS LICENSED UNDER A CREATIVE COMMONS ATTRIBUTION-NONCOMMERCIAL-SHAREALIKE 3.0 UNPORTED
LICENSE.
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Article Analysis Assignment
First, read a news story from the newspaper or the Internet. Answer the following
questions regarding your news story: 1) What is the main issue, who are the main actors
being discussed; Then, choose one of the assigned articles you read for this week. Answer
the following questions regarding the assigned article: 1) What are the basics of this article
(who, what, when, how, why, etc.); 2) What is the overall main point the author is trying to
convince you of? 3) Do you agree with the author’s argument? Why? Why not? Finally,
tie together your news story with what you learned from the assigned article, textbook
readings, podcasts, videos, etc. for this week. Type your answers in the box below using
your own words, no outline or bullets, complete sentences and paragraphs, single-spaced,
full-page.
This week’s article that I chose to read from the New York Times was titled “Study
ties lax state gun laws to crimes in other states.” My article was about the mayor of New
York, Michael Bloomberg and “Mayors Against Illegal Guns” (a coalition) and their push to
single out states with lax gun laws to prevent the trafficking of guns used in crimes. This new
campaign was brought on by a recent study of the flow of guns used in crimes across state
lines. In the study, the three worst offenders were Mississippi, West Virginia, and Kentucky
who supplied nearly half of the 43,000 guns traced to crime scenes in other states. Along with
tightening the lax states’ gun laws, the coalition wants to close the so-called “gun show
loophole.” The loophole allows people to buy firearms without going through as rigorous of a
background search as opposed to going through a shop or dealer.
The main opposition, Chris W. Cox, with the National Rifle Association (NRA),
called the upcoming report, “a cute little PR stunt.” He was also quoted saying, “the report
appeared to have relied on flawed assumptions.” “It is completely bogus for a group with a
clear political agenda to release some study based on selective statistics,” he said. “This is not
a serious discussion, but this is what we’ve come to expect from Mayor Bloomberg and his
gun control agenda.”
The assigned article this week was titled “Federalism’s Ups and Downs,” by Carl
Tubbesing. It is basically about comparing the philosophies of Alexander Hamilton, Franklin
Roosevelt, and Benjamin Franklin, and relating it to modern day issues with state and federal
government powers. The article questions, “Which of our historical talking heads is right? . . .
Is it Alexander Hamilton, our founding fathers’ staunchest advocate for a strong, national
government? What about Franklin Roosevelt, who by most accounts, had to overcome his
own caution about centralizing power. . . or is it Benjamin Franklin, renowned early
American curmudgeon and contratarian?” It was written, about a year after the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center, in 2002. Another main point is the balance of power
between the federal and state bodies. Although the article was written in 2002, it seems to be
somewhat of an unpredictable foreshadow to today’s economic standing in the United States.
The article from the New York Times loosely relates to the assigned article,
“Federalism’s Ups and Downs,” by balancing the power of the federal government and state
laws. In the case of the article, it was how much control the federal government has over state
gun laws. The federal government is, basically, pressuring states to tighten up their gun laws.
The pros of the federal government being able to tighten the gun laws would hopefully reduce
the number of murders caused by illegally trafficked guns. On the opposite end, the tighter
Source citation: Lichtblau, Eric. “Study ties lax state gun laws to crimes in other states.” The
New York Times. 26 September, 2010. NYTimes.com. 26 September, 2010.
The Federalist No. 46
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
New York Packet
Tuesday, January 29, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents.
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.
Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.
The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.
It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the preorgatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.
Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter.
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.
PUBLIUS
The Antifederalist Papers
No. 9
A Consolidated Government is a Tyranny
Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787.
We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many inconveniences to which the late confederation subjected the well-born, the better kind of people, bringing them down to the level of the rabble-and holding in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill of rights, “that all men are born equal”-beg leave (for the purpose of drawing a line between such as we think were ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any share in its administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class for their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, aristocratical democracy.
lst. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally incapable of thinking or acting in governmental matters) are more readily led than driven, we have thought meet to indulge them in something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to guard against every possible danger from this lower house, we have subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too much under the influence and control of their constituents, and thereby prove the “weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show the shiftings of every fashionable gale,”-for we have not yet to learn that little else is wanting to aristocratize the most democratical representative than to make him somewhat independent of his political creators. We have taken away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed us-that grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our government from time to time for life. This will have a two-fold good effect. First, it prevents the representatives from mixing with the lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they would have come charged on re-election.
2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a short time will think and act like us, independently of popular whims and prejudices. For the assertion “that evil communications corrupt good manners,” is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this house the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try. We hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what matters it who accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends. In fine, this plebian house will have little power, and that little be rightly shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have a very extensive influence-from their being chosen out of the genteeler class … It is true, every third senatorial seat is to be vacated duennually, but two-thirds of this influential body will remain in office, and be ready to direct or (if necessary) bring over to the good old way, the young members, if the old ones should not be returned. And whereas many of our brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their persons to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have framed a privilege clause, by which they may laugh at the fools who trusted them. But we have given out, that this clause was provided, only that the members might be able without interruption, to deliberate on the important business of their country.
We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the happy discrimination which pervades this system; but finding we could not bring the states into it individually, we have determined … and have taken pains to leave the legislature of each free and independent state, as they now call themselves, in such a situation that they will eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or dwindle into petty corporations, and have power over little else than yoaking hogs or determining the width of cart wheels. But (aware that an intention to annihilate state legislatures, would be objected to our favorite scheme) we have made their existence (as a board of electors) necessary to ours. This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to any clamors that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven continental and state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we in truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of external and internal commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices and roads; when we and we alone, have the power to wage war, make peace, coin money (if we can get bullion) if not, borrow money, organize the militia and call them forth to execute our decrees, and crush insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod, which we have the power of raising and keeping even in the time of peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states, when we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A name we thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican government, that we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to them, in order more effectually to secure the substance of our proposed plan; but we all know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector). I repeat it, what have we to fear armed with such powers, with a president at our head who is captain- -general of the army, navy and militia of the United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse reprieves or pardons, who can make judges of the supreme and other continental courts-in short, who will be the source, the fountain of honor, profit and power, whose influence like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself far and wide, will exhale all democratical vapors and break the clouds of popular insurrection? But again gentlemen, our judicial power is a strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we can and will ere long play off from it. For the judicial power embraces every question which can arise in law or equity, under this constitution and under the laws of “the United States” (which laws will be, you know, the supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all cases, affecting ambassadors or other public ministers, “and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.”
Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one or other of the above cases? Certainly not. Then our court will have original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, how fallen are state judicatures-and must not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat? Our constitution answers yes. . . . And finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals of the commonalty. A few regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad that they are absolutely necessary to defend the frontiers. Now a regiment and then a legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built, still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of our revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a bill of rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon our designs, as a lock chain to the wheels of government-though, by the way, as we have not insisted on rotation in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill. We have for some time considered the freedom of the press as a great evil-it spreads information, and begets a licentiousness in the people which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a daring printer may expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of our president and senate-for these and many other reasons we have said nothing with respect to the “right of the people to speak and publish their sentiments” or about their “palladiums of liberty” and such stuff. We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-the right to demand the writ of habeas corpus. We have therefore reserved the power of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are the judges of what is rebellion…. Our friends we find have been assiduous in representing our federal calamities, until at length the people at large-frightened by the gloomy picture on one side, and allured by the prophecies of some of our fanciful and visionary adherents on the other-are ready to accept and confirm our proposed government without the delay or forms of examination–which was the more to be wished, as they are wholly unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on the merit of so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that this constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and power of the LOWER CLASS-to draw that discrimination we have so long sought after; to secure to our friends privileges and offices, which were not to be … [obtained] under the former government, because they were in common; to take the burden of legislation and attendance on public business off the commonalty, who will be much better able thereby to prosecute with effect their private business; to destroy that political thirteen headed monster, the state sovereignties; to check the licentiousness of the people by making it dangerous to speak or publish daring or tumultuary sentiments; to enforce obedience to laws by a strong executive, aided by military pensioners; and finally to promote the public and private interests of the better kind of people-we submit it to your judgment to take such measures for its adoption as you in your wisdom may think fit.
Signed by unanimous order of the lords spiritual and temporal.
MONTEZUMA
THE
CONSTITUTION
oftheUnitedStates
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
Article.I.
SECTION.
1
.
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Sen-
ate and House of Representatives.
SECTION.
2
.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem-
bers chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifi –
cations requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty fi ve Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.
[Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term
of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fi fths of
all other Persons.]* The actual Enumeration shall be made
within three Years after the fi rst Meeting of the Congress
of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The
Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one
Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made,
the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse
three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence
Plantations one, Connecticut fi ve, New-York six, New
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland
six, Virginia ten, North Carolina fi ve, South Carolina fi ve,
and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of
Election to fi ll such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Offi cers; and shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.
SECTION.
3
.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, [chosen by the Legislature there-
of,]* for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence
of the fi rst Election, they shall be divided as equally as may
be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the fi rst
Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year,
of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and
of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that
one third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacan-
cies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess
of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may
make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of
the Legislature, which shall then fi ll such Vacancies.]*
1
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless
they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Offi cers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice
President, or when he shall exercise the Offi ce of
President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on
Oath or Affi rmation. When the President of the United
States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Offi ce, and disqualifi cation to
hold and enjoy any Offi ce of honor, Trust or Profi t under
the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.
SECTION.
4
.
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and
such Meeting shall be [on the fi rst Monday in December,]*
unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
SECTION.
5
.
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifi cations of its own Members, and a Majority
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members,
in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House
may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts
as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
shall, at the Desire of one fi fth of those Present, be entered
on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, with-
out the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
SECTION.
6
.
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compen-
sation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid
out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Ses-
sion of their respective Houses, and in going to and return-
ing from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Offi ce
under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased during such time; and no Person holding any
Offi ce under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Offi ce.
2
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
SECTION.
7
.
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
prove he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall
be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in
all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined
by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
House respectively, If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
their Adjournament prevent its Return, in which Case it
shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur-
rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or be-
ing disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
SECTION.
8
.
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
Coin, and fi x the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securi-
ties and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offi ces and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To defi ne and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to
the States respectively, the Appointment of the Offi cers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress;
3
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance
of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Maga-
zines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;
-And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Offi cer thereof.
SECTION.
9
.
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand
eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed
on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
[No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken.]*
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Con-
sequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of
all public Money shall be published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Offi ce of Profi t or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept
of any present, Emolument, Offi ce, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
SECTION.
10
.
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money;
emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of At-
tainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid
by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of
Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay.
4
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.II.
SECTION. 1.
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. He shall hold his Offi ce during
the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice Presi-
dent, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Offi ce of Trust or Prof-
it under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not
be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And
they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of
the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign
and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certifi cates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The
Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole
Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than
one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of
Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person
have a Majority, then from the fi ve highest on the List
the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President.
But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote;
A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or
Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of
all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case,
after the Choice of the President, the Person having the
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice
President. But if there should remain two or more who
have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Bal-
lot the Vice President.]*
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Offi ce of President;
neither shall any person be eligible to that Offi ce who shall
not have attained to the Age of thirty fi ve Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
[In Case of the Removal of the President from Offi ce, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Offi ce, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
of the President and Vice President, declaring what Offi cer
shall then act as President, and such Offi cer shall act ac-
cordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.]*
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Offi ce, he shall
take the following Oath or Affi rmation:- “I do solemnly
swear (or affi rm) that I will faithfully execute the Offi ce of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States.”
5
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
SECTION. 2.
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Offi cer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offi ces, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Offi cers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-
ferior Offi cers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fi ll up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of
their next Session.
SECTION. 3.
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Informa-
tion of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge neces-
sary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he
shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed, and shall Commission all the Offi cers of the
United States.
SECTION. 4.
The President, Vice President and all civil Offi cers of the
United States, shall be removed from Offi ce on Impeach-
ment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
6
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.III.
SECTION. 1.
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offi ces during good Behaviour, and shall at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Offi ce.
SECTION. 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; – to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls; – to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; – to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; – to Controversies
between two or more States; – [between a State and Citizens
of another State;-]* between Citizens of different States,
– between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, [and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof;- and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.]*
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment;
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
SECTION. 3.
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levy-
ing War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giv-
ing them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corrup-
tion of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted.
7
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.IV.
SECTION. 1.
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every oth-
er State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
SECTION. 2.
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall fl ee from Justice, and be found in
another State, shall on Demand of the executive Author-
ity of the State from which he fl ed, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
[No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Conse-
quence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.]*
SECTION. 3.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States con-
cerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
SECTION. 4.
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
Article.V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Con-
stitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which in either Case, shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratifi ed by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratifi cation may be proposed by
the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and
eight shall in any Manner affect the fi rst and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth Section of the fi rst Article; and that no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate.
8
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against
the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all execu-
tive and judicial Offi cers, both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affi rmation,
to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualifi cation to any Offi ce or public Trust
under the United States.
Article.VII.
The Ratifi cation of the Conventions of nine States, shall
be suffi cient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying the Same.
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty
seven and of the Independence of the United States of
America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto
subscribed our Names,
Go. Washington–Presidt:
and deputy from Virginia
NEW HAMPSHIRE
John Langdon
Nicholas Gilman
MASSACHUSETTS
Nathaniel Gorham
Rufus King
CONNECTICUT
Wm. Saml. Johnson
Roger Sherman
NEW YORK
Alexander Hamilton
NEW JERSEY
Wil: Livingston
David Brearley
Wm. Paterson
Jona: Dayton
PENNSYLVANIA
B Franklin
Thomas Miffl in
Robt Morris
Geo. Clymer
Thos. FitzSimons
Jared Ingersoll
James Wilson
Gouv Morris
9
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
DELAWARE
Geo: Read
Gunning Bedford jun
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jaco: Broom
MARYLAND
James McHenry
Dan of St. Thos. Jenifer
Danl Carroll
VIRGINIA
John Blair-
James Madison Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA
Wm. Blount
Richd. Dobbs Spaight
Hu Williamson
SOUTH CAROLINA
J. Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
Charles Pinckney
Pierce Butler
GEORGIA
William Few
Abr Baldwin
Attest William Jackson Secretary
In Convention Monday
September 17th, 1787.
Present
The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Ham-
ilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion
of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted
to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the
People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-
ture, for their Assent and Ratifi cation; and that each Con-
vention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give
Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that
as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratifi ed
this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled
should fi x a Day on which Electors should be appointed by
the States which shall have ratifi ed the same, and a Day on
which the Electors should assemble to vote for the Presi-
dent, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings
under this Constitution.
That after such Publication the Electors should be ap-
pointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That
the Electors should meet on the Day fi xed for the Election
of the President, and should transmit their Votes certifi ed,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to
the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled,
that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the
Time and Place assigned; that the Senators should appoint
a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving,
opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that
after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the
President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the unanimous Order of the Convention
Go. Washington-Presidt:
W. JACKSON Secretary.
* Language in brackets has been changed by amendment.
10
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Preambletothe
BillofRights
Congress of the United States
begun and held at the City of New-York, on
Wednesday the fourth of March,
one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at
the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed
a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse
of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added: And as extending the ground
of public confi dence in the Government, will best
ensure the benefi cent ends of its institution.
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America,
in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses
concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to
the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, all, or any of
which Articles, when ratifi ed by three fourths of the said
Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of the said Constitution; viz.
ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America, proposed
by Congress, and ratifi ed by the Legislatures of the
several States, pursuant to the fi fth Article of the
original Constitution.
(Note: The fi rst 10 amendments to the Constitution were
ratifi ed December
15
, 1791, and form what is known as
the “Bill of Rights.”)
AmendmentI.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
AmendmentII.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.
AmendmentIII.
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
AmendmentIV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affi rma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
AmendmentV.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES AS RATIFIED BY THE STATES
11
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentVI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
AmendmentVII.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
AmendmentVIII.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fi nes
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments infl icted.
AmendmentIX.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.
AmendmentX.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENTS 11-27
AmendmentXI.
Passed by Congress March 4, 1794. Ratifi ed February 7, 1795.
(Note: A portion of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution was
modifi ed by the 11th Amendment.) th Amendment.) th
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or pros-
ecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AmendmentXII.
Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratifi ed June 15, 1804.
(Note: A portion of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution was
changed by the
12
th Amendment.)
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted
for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of
all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted
for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed
to the seat of the government of the United States, directed
to the President of the Senate;-the President of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives, open all the certifi cates and the votes shall then be
counted;-The person having the greatest number of votes
for President, shall be the President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if
no person have such majority, then from the persons having
the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choos-
ing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum
for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall
be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representa-
tives shall not choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of
March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as
President, as in case of the death or other constitutional
disability of the President.-]* The person having the greatest
number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number
of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority,
then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate
shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose
shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators,
and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to
a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the
offi ce of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President
of the United States.
*Superseded by Section 3 of the 20th Amendment.
12
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXIII.
Passed by Congress January 31, 1865. Ratifi ed December 6,
1865.
(Note: A portion of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
was changed by the
13
th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXIV.
Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratifi ed July 9, 1868.
(Note: Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
Section 2 of the
14
th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for
the choice of electors for President and Vice President of
the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Execu-
tive and Judicial offi cers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, [being twenty-one years of age,]* and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
SECTION 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any offi ce, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an offi cer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial offi cer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
SECTION 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, au-
thorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrec-
tion or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or eman-
cipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.
SECTION 5.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.
*Changed by Section 1 of the 26th Amendment.
13
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXV.
Passed by Congress February 26, 1869. Ratifi ed February 3, 1870.
SECTION 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXVI.
Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratifi ed February 3, 1913.
(Note: Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
the
16
ththe 16ththe 16 Amendment.) th Amendment.) th
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AmendmentXVII.
Passed by Congress May 13, 1912. Ratifi ed April 8, 1913.
(Note: Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
the 17th Amendment.)
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for
six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors
in each State shall have the qualifi cations requisite for elec-
tors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall
issue writs of election to fi ll such vacancies: Provided, That
the legislature of any State may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people
fi ll the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes
valid as part of the Constitution.
AmendmentXVIII.
Passed by Congress December 18, 1917. Ratifi ed January 16,
1919. Repealed by the 21st Amendment, December 5,
1933.
SECTION 1.
After one year from the ratifi cation of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
thereof from the United States and all territory subject to
the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited.
SECTION 2.
The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
SECTION 3.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by the legisla-
tures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution,
within seven years from the date of the submission hereof
to the States by the Congress.
AmendmentXIX.
Passed by Congress June 4, 1919. Ratifi ed August 18, 1920.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
14
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXX.
Passed by Congress March 2, 1932. Ratifi ed January 23, 1933.
(Note: Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution was modifi ed
by Section 2 of this Amendment. In addition, a portion of the
12th Amendment was superseded by Section 3.)
SECTION 1.
The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end
at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Sena-
tors and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January,
of the years in which such terms would have ended if this
article had not been ratifi ed; and the terms of their succes-
sors shall then begin.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and
such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January,
unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
SECTION 3.
If, at the time fi xed for the beginning of the term of the
President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice Presi-
dent elect shall become President. If a President shall not
have been chosen before the time fi xed for the beginning of
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify,
then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a
President shall have qualifi ed; and the Congress may by law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a
Vice President shall have qualifi ed, declaring who shall then
act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act
shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until
a President or Vice President shall have qualifi ed.
SECTION 4.
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death
of any of the persons from whom the House of Representa-
tives may choose a President whenever the right of choice
shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the
death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall
have devolved upon them.
SECTION 5.
Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of Octo-
ber following the ratifi cation of this article.
SECTION 6.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by the leg-
islatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission.
AmendmentXXI.
Passed by Congress February 20, 1933. Ratifi ed December 5,
1933.
SECTION 1.
The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.
SECTION 2.
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.
SECTION 3.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by conven-
tions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution,
within seven years from the date of the submission hereof
to the States by the Congress.
15
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXXII.
Passed by Congress March 21, 1947. Ratifi ed February 27,
1951.
SECTION 1.
No person shall be elected to the offi ce of the President
more than twice, and no person who has held the offi ce of
President, or acted as President, for more than two years of
a term to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the offi ce of President more than once.
But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the
offi ce of President when this Article was proposed by Con-
gress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding
the offi ce of President, or acting as President, during the
term within which this Article becomes operative from
holding the offi ce of President or acting as President during
the remainder of such term.
SECTION 2.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by the leg-
islatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission to the States by the
Congress.
AmendmentXXIII.
Passed by Congress June 16, 1960. Ratifi ed March 29, 1961.
SECTION 1.
The District constituting the seat of Government of the
United States shall appoint in such manner as Congress
may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal
to the whole number of Senators and Representatives
in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it
were a State, but in no event more than the least populous
State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the
States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of
the election of President and Vice President, to be electors
appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District
and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article
of amendment.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXXIV.
Passed by Congress August 27, 1962. Ratifi ed January 23, 1964.
SECTION 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any pri-
mary or other election for President or Vice President, for
electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay
poll tax or other tax.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
16
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXXV.
Passed by Congress July 6, 1965. Ratifi ed February 10, 1967.
(Note: Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
the 25th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
In case of the removal of the President from offi ce or of
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.
SECTION 2.
Whenever there is a vacancy in the offi ce of the Vice Presi-
dent, the President shall nominate a Vice President who
shall take offi ce upon confi rmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress.
SECTION 3.
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his offi ce, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
SECTION 4.
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal offi cers of the executive departments or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his offi ce, the Vice President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the offi ce as Acting President.
17
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability ex-
ists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his offi ce un-
less the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
offi cers of the executive department or of such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his offi ce. Thereupon Congress shall decide the
issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose
if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days
after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress
is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his offi ce, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the Presi-
dent shall resume the powers and duties of his offi ce.
AmendmentXXVI.
Passed by Congress March 23, 1971. Ratifi ed July 1, 1971.
(Note: Amendment 14, Section 2 of the Constitution was
modifi ed by Section 1 of the 26th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXXVII.
Originally proposed Sept. 25, 1789. Ratifi ed May 7, 1992.
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an elec-
tion of representatives shall have intervened.
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