Write a few sentences (about 100 words) integrating a quote from any of the articles that you will be using in your paper. Be sure to connect your quote to the rest of your sentences.

Write a few sentences (about 100 words) integrating a quote from any of the articles that you will be using in your paper. Be sure to connect your quote to the rest of your sentences. You can do this via signal phrases (“Smith argues” OR “According to Smith,” etc) or by integrating your quote as it grammatically fits into your sentence. Document your quote by using the APA in-text citation guidelines you have studied in this lesson.

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When you are done posting your response, reply to at least one classmate in no fewer than 75 words. Comment on how effectively they have integrated a quote.

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Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2011) Vol2, No 2, 149-161

149

China’s Response to Climate Change: A Policy Analysis
*

Hung Ming-Te (National Chung Hsing University)
Tony Tai-Ting Liu (National Chung Hsing University)

Abstract: China is greatly influenced by climate change and sensitive to
problems arising from climate due to high population, increased economic
development, wide climate range and vulnerable environment. In response
to the adverse effects of climate, China has introduced new policies based
on sustainable development, which seeks to find balance between
economic development and environment protection towards the ultimate
goal of national security. This analysis addresses China’s guiding
principle and policy response against climate change.

Key words: China, Climate Change, National Security, Environment
Policy
1. Introduction

In recent years, China has been under frequent attacks by
nature. Due to high population, low economic development,
wide climate range and vulnerable environment, China is
easily influenced by climate change and deeply sensible to
problems arising from climate. China has become a key
player in international climate institutions because (1) China
has surpassed the US as the leading producer of CO2 and
the amount of production is growing steadily; (2) China’s
status and influence in the G77 endow it with an
advantageous position in climate change negotiations. As the
world’s largest developing country with significant influence
in the United Nations, China is expected to have a greater
leadership role among developing countries (Heggelund,
2007: 156).

According to a report by the International Energy Agency
(IEA), if effective measures are not taken, China’s production

* This manuscript is revised from an earlier draft accepted for presentation at the 2011
International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada, March
16-19.

China’s Response to Climate Change

150

from 2004 to 2030 would be twice the sum of OECD states
(Bustelo, 2007). Despite China’s reluctance to compromise,
criticisms demand the country to undertake more actions.
China’s elites have promised that climate change would not
hinder state development and higher level promises such as
stable increase in the use of renewable energy and continued
control over population, have been made to deal with the
problem. China’s white paper entitled “China’s policies and
actions on climate change” published in 2007, proclaims to
reduce the use of energy and increase the use of renewable
energy (Bustelo, 2007).

China’s elites take notice of climate change because the
phenomenon would affect state capability for development
(Marks, 2010: 972). Scientists have made predictions that
China will face major impacts brought on by climate change
(Zeng et. al., 2008: 730-731), including: the melting of
glaciers, particularly in Tibet; estimated decline in
agricultural production, as much as 10% of production by
2030 (Bustelo, 2007); natural disasters caused by more
famine, storm, flood and severe weather; rising sea level,
influencing as many as 67 million people (Heggelund, 2007:
167); exposure of an additional 40% of the population under
natural threats.1

The main goals of China are economic development, poverty
reduction and social stability (Hallding et. al., 2009: 120).
Climate change is an area of conflict that lies between
poverty and sustainable development, an issue closely
related to economic development, resource management and
energy use. With a population of nearly 1.3 billion people,
diminishing natural resources resource, serious
environmental pollution and rapid economic growth, China
exhibits all the components of a typical development
dilemma (Heggelund, 2007: 158). China’s economic growth
depends on fossil fuels; expanding energy use has become
an important part of development and a priority in the
process (Heggelund, 2007: 160). China’s dilemma is that the
country needs energy to improve its economic development
and living standard.

1 “Melting Asia,” The Economist, 5 June, 2008.

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu

151

China is particularly vulnerable to climate change, a decisive
factor for the formation of policy on climate change. Climate
change will have a heavy impact on all aspects of China; the
cost of damage is high and threatens China’s national
interest (Bjorkum, 2005). China needs to take related
measures in order to maintain economic growth and reduce
the production of greenhouse gases. This paper discusses
China’s policy response to climate change. The discussion
begins with the influences of climate change on China’s
environment and then moves on to discuss China’s guiding
principle and policy action in reaction to the issue.

2. The Influence of Climate Change on China’s
National Security

The issue of climate change has elevated from a non-stream
issue to perhaps the biggest and most important threat to
national security. Richard Ullman is one of the pioneering
scholars calling for the redefinition of national security. In
the article “Redefining National Security,” Ullman criticizes
US definition of national security during the Cold War as
“greatly narrowed” and “extremely militarized,” which caused
US foreign policy to be over militarized and to neglect other
damaging threats to national security. Ullman (1983) thinks
that serious conflict may be provoked by the population
growth in developing countries and the ensuing conflicts of
resources and transnational migration.

“The Age of Consequences” report (2007) analyzes the effects
of climate on China’s national security. The report points out
that China’s rapid increase in greenhouse gases is caused by
its energy structure based mainly on coal, which forms a
long term threat to the global environment (Zhang, 2008;
Lewis, 2007-08; Campbell et. al., 2007: 61). Production of
greenhouse gases would exacerbate existing environmental
problems such as desertification, water scarcity and
atmosphere pollution. The phenomenon would in turn lead
to internal instability and conflict, with migration caused by
environmental problems being a source of conflict. This
migration is mainly expressed as urban flow from the
country, which puts pressure on cities already overloaded in
carrying capacity.

China’s Response to Climate Change

152

On the other hand, regions of China that benefit from some
additional rainfall will also need to cope with an influx of
migrants from water scarce areas. Han migrants from
China’s interior have travelled to Xinjiang in search of work
and resources, generating competition with local Uyghurs
and exacerbated ethnic tensions. Climate change has
increased the international pressure on China to become a
“responsible member.” (Campbell et. al., 2007: 62-63) In
sum, climate change may have serious implications for
China’s environment, coastal region, agricultural industry
and water resource, which may lead to an escalation in the
level of global conflict (Campbell et. al., 2007: 62-63).

In terms of national security, climate change may bring
about three basic challenges: (1) food shortage caused by the
decline in agricultural production; (2) decrease in water
supply and water quality caused by flood and drought; (3)
termination in the supply of strategic mineral resources
caused by ice and storm. In sudden events of climate
change, restrictions on food, water and energy supply may
be first expressed through economic, political and diplomatic
means such as treaty and trade embargo. Conflicts over the
use of land and water may become more severe and extreme
in the process. As states under such influence may become
increasingly depressed, the threat of conflict would be
further increased (Schwartz and Randall 2003, 14-15). From
the perspective of national security, climate change has the
following implications for China (Lewis, 2009: 1196-1213):

(1) territory and land quality

Climate change leads to sea level rise and retreat of coastal
line, which causes part of the continent to be flooded and
greater landmass in the coastal region to be under the
potential threat of inundation. In addition, climate change
increases the speed of soil degradation. Desertification has
minimized the living space of the Chinese people, which
implies the threat on continued economic development,
ecological security and survival and development of the
Chinese ethnicity (Zhang 2009, 21-27; 2010, 61-96).

(2) livelihood

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu

153

First, climate change affects water resource (Moore 2009, 25-
39). China has long suffered from water shortage and
unequal distribution; rapid economic development simply
exposes the issue of water security. Temperature rise or
decrease in rain cause changes to river passage and the
amount of flow. At the same time, climate change causes
glacier retreat and with great scale retreat, glacial runoff
would be reduced, causing the decrease in river runoff as
well. This phenomenon not only reduces the supply of water
resource, it also causes glacier to lose its adjustment
function on water runoff, which generates the negative chain
reaction between water resource, bio-system and
environment. Climate change further exacerbates China’s
vulnerability in water resource and the condition of scarcity.

Second, climate change also affects food production. The
influences of climate change on China’s agriculture are
mainly expressed in: (1) increase in production instability; (2)
major adjustments to production structure and planning;
and (3) great increase in cost and investment. Furthermore,
incidents of regional drought caused by high heat and
agricultural loss would increase as well.

Third, climate change increases the frequency and strength
of extreme weather events, which seriously threaten life,
property and living standard of the Chinese people. Climate
change increases the speed of the water vapour cycle and
transforms the time range and strength of precipitation. As a
result, extreme weather events such as increase in the
frequency and strength of drought and flood may occur.1
Flood, drought, snow storm and typhoon cause major losses
to life.

(3) autonomy and governing ability

Climate change causes China to confront ever increasing
international and domestic pressures. The government’s
space for autonomous choice is compressed and its

1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: The
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (New York: Cambridge
University Press).

China’s Response to Climate Change

154

governing ability further challenged. With climate change
becoming a focus of world attention, China faces increasing
international pressure. Several reasons contribute to the
limitation on China’s future development space and
potential:

i. Although China has adopted a series of measures
energy conservation and pollution reduction, rapid
economic growth and a coal based energy
consumption structure have caused China to have a
high level of CO2 production. Great potential for
increase has attracted growing international pressure
for reduced production.

ii. With its comprehensive capabilities greatly increased,
international recognition of China as a developing
state has become more difficult. General agreement by
the international community regarding China’s self
identity as a developing state is hard to come by.
Expectations and demands on China are fast
increasing.

iii. Internal separation and division among developing
states is increasing. Some island states and non-
developed states have commonly demanded global
reduction in CO2 production. This has caused
pressures on China. Solidarity among developing
states has become harder to maintain.

China has recognized that the modernization path of
developed states supported by high energy and resource
consumption is no longer applicable. New approaches for
modernization that emphasize low carbon development must
be adopted.

Aside from policy space, frequent incidence of extreme
weather events is also challenging the China’s governing
ability and political stability. Hit by great snow storm to the
south in 2008, China’s governing ability and authority was
in doubt due to the lack of emergency response in certain
regions. Failure to predict the scale of snow caused relief

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu

155

measures such as early protection, preparation,
reinforcement, storage and dispersal to be delayed.

(4) major national defense and strategic projects and military
constructions

Climate change causes negative impacts on China’s major
national defense projects, the Qingzang railway is a typical
example. Climate change has had different impacts on
strategic projects such as the Three Gorges Dam (san xia
gong cheng), South-North Water Transfer, West-East Gas
Pipeline, Sino-Russian Oil Pipeline and Green Wall of China
(san bei hu fang lin gong cheng). The increase in extreme
weather events produces negative influences on China’s
national defense infrastructure and limits the establishment
and advancement of its military capability.

Concrete impacts on China’s national defense include: (1)
threat on the security of personnel, equipment and facility;
(2) hindrance on regular military training; (3) heavier burden
on disaster relief by the army; the 2008 national defense
whitepaper lists natural disaster as a threat to China’s
national security for the first time and states that the army
should have the ability to carry out diversified missions;1 (4)
impact on weapon efficiency; some ballistic missile bases in
China’s northwest are located on tundra region; freezing and
thawing of tundra affects stable shooting ground; (5) sea-
level rise; some islands of strategic value are threatened,
which affects planning and infrastructure; (6) increased
tensions with neighbouring states; increasing local conflicts
and the possibility of military clashes.

3. China’s Guiding Principle in Reaction to Climate
Change

In terms of climate change strategy, China abides by the
following principles: (1) respond against climate change under

1 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “2008 PRC National Defense,”
http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-01/20/content_1210075.htm

China’s Response to Climate Change

156

the framework of sustainable development: China will
continue to engage climate change issues according to its
national strategy on sustainable development; (2) abide by
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle as
stated in the Climate Change Convention: developed states
should take lead in reducing the production of greenhouse
gases and provide financial and technological support for
developing states; economic development and poverty
reduction are priorities for developing states, and whether
developing states meet the goals of the convention depends
the realization of basic compromises by developed states; (3)
equal importance placed on reduction and adaptation: China
will continue to strengthen policies in energy conservation
and structural improvement, combining the key project of
environmental protection and basic infrastructure
construction such as disaster prevention and reduction
while raising the adaptability to climate change.

(4) Combine policies in response to climate change and other
related policies: reduction in greenhouse gas production
relates to many different fields; climate change policies can
be more effective through connections with other related
policies; (5) rely on technological advancement and
innovation: China will effectively exploit technological
advances in reducing and adapting to the effects of climate
change and provide strong technological support for
sustainable development; (6) active participation and general
cooperation: China will actively participate in discussions
under the Climate Change Convention and related activities
held by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC); China will further strengthen international
cooperation in climate change and push forward cooperation
in cleaning institution and technology transfer, in joint
response with the international community to the challenges
of climate change.

4. China’s Policy Response to Climate Change

The Chinese government set up special institutions to deal
with climate change in 1990 and established the National
Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) in

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu

157

1998. In 1994, NCCCC established and passed “China’s
Agenda 21 – White Paper on China’s Population,
Environment, and Development in the 21st Century,” which
sets China’s overall strategic framework for sustainable
development in the twenty-first century and main targets in
related fields, making an active contribution to the issue of
global climate change. The Beijing Outline of the Eleventh
Five-Year Program for National Economy and Social
Development (2006) confirms the goal and mission of energy
conservation and the national plan in response to climate
change.

In 2007, China established the National Leading Group to
Address Climate Change (Zhu 2010, i). China has adopted
substantial measures towards climate change and
environmental improvement according to the national
strategy for sustainable development. The National Climate
Change Programme (ying dui qi hou bian qian guo jia fang an)
(2007) is China’s first policy document in response to climate
change. The paper states in detail China’s response policies
towards climate change before 2010, including the mid-term
reduction target of one billion tons of greenhouse production
(Song 2009).

Also in the same year, China introduced the report on
“Scientific and Technological Actions on Climate Change”
(2007), corresponding to the National Programme’s emphasis
on technological advancement and innovation as important
measures to be taken in response to climate change. In order
to realize the Guidelines on National Medium- and Long-
term Program for Science and Technology Development
(2006-2020), China has coordinated scientific research and
technological innovation in climate change. The state has
raised the overall technological capability in response to
climate change and provides technological support for other
states.

Regarding the UN climate change conference held in
Copenhagen in 2009, China’s position is to realize the Bali
Action Plan and introduce clear and concrete arrangements
for reduction, adaptation, technology transfer and financial
support: (1) confirm that developed states should accept

China’s Response to Climate Change

158

great emission cut target in the second phase of the Kyoto
Protocol and developed states that have yet to ratify the
Protocol can accept comparable promises; (2) make effective
institutional arrangements that see developed states realize
promises to provide financial aid, technological transfer and
capability establishment support for developing states; (3) in
the condition that developing states receive support, China
would adopt appropriate adaptive and reduction actions
according to the basic situation of the country and under the
framework of sustainable development. China’s is
determined to conform to the basic framework of the Climate
Change Accord and Kyoto Protocol; abide strictly to the Bali
Action Plan; abide by the “common but differentiated
responsibilities” principle; hold the opinion that equal weight
should be put on the principle of sustainable development
and reduction, adaptation, technology transfer and financial
support.1

September 2009, PRC leader Hu Jintao presented a speech
titled “Join Hands to Address Climate Change” at the UN
climate change conference.2 Hu points out that states should
join hands in facing the common threat of climate change
and China has set national plans in response. China will
further integrate actions on climate change into its economic
and social development plan and take strong measures to
reduce carbon emission. Hu also notes that “it is imperative
to give full consideration to the development stage and basic
needs of developing countries in addressing climate change”
and “China still lags behind more than 100 countries in
terms of per capita GDP.”3 China will adopt a balanced
measure between low carbon economy and economic
development in the future. It is clear that China expects to
seek a balance between controlling greenhouse emission and
sustainable development.

1 National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China,
“Realize the Bali Road Map: China’s Position regarding the Copenhagen Climate Change
Conference” (luo shi ba li lu xian tu – zhong guo zheng fu guan yu ge ben ha gen qi hou
bian hua hui yi de li chang),
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbqt/2009qt/t20090521_280387.htm
2 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Hu Jintao’s Speech at
the Opening Plenary Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change ‘Join
Hands to Address Climate Change’,” http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t606111.htm
3 Ibid.

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu

159

5. Conclusion

An examination of China’s policies regarding climate change
reveals several points. First, climate change is affected by
greenhouse emission, which would inevitably limit China’s
increase in emission and influence its economic development
and national interest (Wiener 2008, 1805-1826). Moreover,
climate change would influence agricultural, food, water
resource, energy and environmental security. As global
temperature rises, increased frequency of extreme natural
events such as sea level rise, typhoon, flood and drought
would severely damage China’s conditions for social
economic development and threaten the life and asset
security of its people and social stability. China must
maintain its national interest and attempt to find a point of
balance between economic development and emission
reduction. In other words, China seeks to reduce the effects
of global warming without paying the cost of economic
development.
Second, China has concerns for playing the role of a
responsible state with vested interest in the international
community. In order to become a responsible power, China
must accept international responsibilities, make efforts in
reducing carbon emission and greenhouse effect and
contribute to the resolution of global climate change. Third,
China has concerns for initiating international cooperation
and maintaining global interest. Climate change affects the
national interest of all states and international cooperation
remains the only possible solution. China wants to initiate
effective cooperation and create new governance framework
and model in response to climate change. In addition, China
attempts to make an effort in reconstructing climate change
related international organizations and conventions in order
to resolve related problems (Tao 2009, 279). Finally, China
seeks to improve the effectiveness of climate change
institutions through related measures such as improving the
quality of law, setting stricter regulations and reinforcing
existing norms.

China’s Response to Climate Change

160

It is clear that a very long road remains ahead for China, as
the state has yet to achieve the policy targets set for climate
change and related measures remain loose and ineffective.
China needs to adopt the following measures in order to
achieve better results (Marks 2010, 983-985):
(1) strengthen the ability of law to supervise environmental
law
(2) increase investment in education for environmental
protection
(3) work with regional officials to encourage clean energy
investment
(4) develop wider covering energy law and stricter penalties
and demands
(5) further strengthen the regulating ability of related
departments in charge of environmental protection
(6) provide regional officials with motivation and inducement
for setting climate change policies

References

Bjorkum, Ida. 2005. China in the International Politics of Climate

Change: A Foreign Policy Analysis. Norway: The Fridtjof Nansen
Institute.

Bustelo, Pablo. 2007. China and Climate Change: Responsible Action?”
ARI 68/2007, Real Instituto Elcano.

Campbell, Kurt, Jay Gulledge, J.R. McNeill, John Podesta, Peter Ogden,
Leon Fuerth, James Woolsey, Alexander Lennon, Julianne Smith,
Richard Weitz and Derek Mix. 2007. The Age of Consequences: The
Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate
Change. Washington D.C.: CSIS.

Hallding, Karl, Guoyi Han and Marie Olsson. 2009. China’s Climate- and
Energy-Security Dilemma: Shaping a New Path of Economic

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu

161

Growth. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38(3):119-134.
Heggelund, Gorild. 2007. China’s Climate Change Policy: Domestic and

International Developments. Asian Survey 31(2): 155-191.
Lewis, Joanna. 2007-08. China’s Strategic Priorities in International

Climate Change Negotiations. The Washington Quarterly 31(1): 155-
174.

Lewis, Joanna. 2009. Climate Change and Security: Examining China’s
Challenge in a Warming World. International Affairs 85(6): 1196-
1213.

Marks, Danny. 2010. China’s Climate Change Policy Process: Improved
but Still Weak and Fragmented. Journal of Contemporary China
19(67): 971-986.

Moore, Scott. 2009. Climate Change, Water and China’s National Interest.
China Security 5(3): 25-39.

Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall. 2003. An Abrupt Climate Change
Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security.
Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense.

Song, Guo Cheng. 2009. Mainland China’s Participation in Global
Climate Change and Carbon Reduction Cooperation and Impact on
China’s Economic Development (zhong guo da lu can yu quan qiu qi
hou bian qian yu jian tan he zuo dui qi jing ji fa zhan zhi yin xiang).
Unpublished paper presented at “Twenty Years of Taiwan Business
Investment in China: Experience, Development and Prospect”
Academic Conference, Taipei.

Tao, Zhengfu. 2009. China’s Policy Choice in Response to Climate
Diplomacy (zhong guo ying dui qi hou wai jiao de zheng ce xuan ze).
Economic Research Guide 14: 277-279.

Ullman, Richard. 1983. Redefining National Security. International
Security 8(1): 129-153.

Wiener, Jonathan. 2008. Climate Change Policy and Policy in China.
UCLA Law Review 55(6):1805-1826.

Xufeng, Zhu. 2010. China’s National Leading Group to Address Climate
Change: Mechanism and Structure. EAI Background Brief 572.

Zeng, Ning, Yihui Ding, Jiahua Pan, Huijun Wang and Jay Gregg. 2008.
Climate Change – the Chinese Challenge. Science (319): 730-731.

Zhang, Haibin. 2009. Climate Change and Chinese National Security (qi
hou bian hua yu zhong guo guo jia an quan). International Politics 4:
12-39.

Zhang, Haibin. 2010. Climate Change and Chinese National Security.
Beijing: Shishi Publishing.

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1

1

9

 

THOUGHTS ON THE U.N. 201

7

POPULATION
PROSPECTS: PROCREATION-RELATED

INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, AND
OVERPOPULATION AS GLOBAL RISK

Ciprian N. Radavoi*

ABSTRACT

Two relatively recent factual elements are the basis of this Article:
the 20

17

revision of the United Nations’ Population Prospects,
showing a world population increase of around

5

0% by

21

00, and
Turkey’s President Erdogan’s call for the Turks living in Western
Europe to “have five children” in order to become the future of the
continent. The statement substantiates one of the negative impacts
of overpopulation—that on international relations and regional
balances of power. This Article argues that (1) Erdogan’s
incitement to increased procreation abroad qualifies as an
internationally wrongful act of Turkey; (2) excessive procreation
within national boundaries could qualify as an internationally
wrongful act; and (

3

) although without legal consequences on the
perpetrating countries, such a qualification has at least the potential
of igniting a renewed debate on the issue of overpopulation. In this
context, one way forward as a matter of global policy on the now-
stalled debate on population is suggested.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 121
I.Part I – Excessive Fertility Rates as Internationally Wrongful

Acts …………………………………………………………………. 124

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Ciprian N. Radavoi: Lecturer in Law, University of New England, Australia,
cradavoi@une.edu.au.

1

120 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

(a) Incitement to Overbreeding Abroad as Breach of
International Norms ……………………………………… 124

(b) Overpopulation at National Level as Breach of
International Norms ……………………………………… 126

II.Part II – A Window of Opportunity for Global Policy on
Overpopulation? …………………………………………………

13

0
(a) Main Nodes of the Debate on Overpopulation …. 130
(b) Cracks in the Spiral of Silence on

Overpopulation? ………………………………………….. 135
(c) From Global Problem to Global Risk? ……………. 141

Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 144

2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/3

2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 121

INTRODUCTION

The 2017 revision of the United Nations’ (“U.N.”) ‘World
Population Prospects’1 insists on the dramatic differences in fertility
among countries and regions of the world, thus inviting further
consideration of those gaps’ global impact. Built around the
medium growth scenario, the study makes it clear that:

To achieve the substantial reductions
in fertility projected in the medium
variant, it will be essential to support
continued improvements in access to
reproductive health care services,
including family planning, especially
in the least developed countries, with
a focus on enabling women and
couples to achieve their desired
family size.2

With the U.N.’s study as background, this Article takes as a

departure point one particular aspect of the fertility gap between
nations and cultures: purposeful multiplication of an ethnic group in
order to alter the demographic balance in a region at the instigation
of state leaders. More specifically, the starting point of this Article
is the call made in March of 2017 by the President of Turkey to the
Turkish families living in Europe: “Have not just three but five
children. . . . The place in which you are living and working is now
your homeland and new motherland. Stake a claim to it.”3
At first sight, the right theoretical framework for analysing
the presidential statement is the stakeholder theory, which, in one of

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

1 U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World
Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, U.N.
Doc. ESA/P/WP/248 (2017) [hereinafter World Population Prospects].

2 Id. at 6.
3 Raf Sanchez, Erdogan Calls on Turkish Families in Europe to Have

Five Children to Protect Against ‘Injustices’, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2017,
6:34 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/17/erdogan-calls-turkish-
families-have-five-children-bulwark-against/.

3

122 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

its most widely employed versions,4 posits that stakeholders5
influence an organization to varying degrees, depending on their
power, legitimacy, and urgency. The organization in this case is the
U.N., given their Population Division role in the governmental
dialogue on population and development, and more generally given
their role in preserving world peace. As stakeholders, there are the
states that rely on large populations to give them leverage in the
international relations, transnational corporations (“TNCs”) who
need constantly-growing markets, and major religions where priests
need large congregations. On the other side of the balance are
stakeholders like the individuals, women especially, who naturally
aim for reduced family sizes, as suggested by the U.N. in the above
block quote. On the same side are also the future generations, who
may ‘claim’ the right to live on a non-crowded planet, and even the
natural world, increasingly aggressed by the spread of the human
race. Synthesizing the irreconcilable and often short-sighted
positions of the numerous stakeholders, one author purports:

Poor nations with exploding
populations charge racism,
colonialism, imperialism, and
demand aid, but do not deal with their
overpopulation, deteriorating
environment, and corruption.
Feminists might ascribe blame to
patriarchy, racism, and lack of rights
for women. Human rights advocates
might uphold the principle that each
woman should have the right to
determine how many children she
bears. Most religions prefer to see
human population increase, basing

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle & Donna J. Wood, Toward a

Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who
and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853 (

19

97).

5 In the foundational work of the stakeholder theory, a stakeholder is
defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization’s objectives.” EDWARD R. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (Pitman Pub.) (1984).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 1

23

this view on ancient teachings created
for another time and very different
circumstances. Each one of these
groups tries to define the world
through their own specific special
interest, losing the overall
perspective.6

In this view, the stakeholder theory would lead nowhere,
because all of the above-mentioned stakeholders claim legitimacy
and urgency. As for power, it is rather on the side of the
stakeholders who favor the status quo: major churches and the
transnational corporations. This Article proposes instead a
discussion confined to international law, that is, to norms on
sovereignty, non-interference, cooperation and peace, and human
rights.

T he remainder of the Article is built on two pillars. The first
one is a doctrinal discussion based on rules of public international
law, aiming to show that state actions (like in the case of the above
statement of Turkey) or omissions to act (the case of states that do
not tackle excessive population growth) are internationally wrongful
acts in the actual circumstances of globalization and border
permeability. The second pillar moves toward global public policy,
showing that the findings in the first section, while not triggering
legal consequences, can at least contribute to a revival of the
population debate. In this context, this Article points to the nodes
in the population debate, indicates the recent developments that may
shake the actual spiral of silence on population, and suggests one
way forward.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Anthony J. Cassils, Overpopulation, Sustainable Development, and

Security: Developing an Integrated Strategy,

25

POPULATION & ENV’T 171, 172
(2004).

5

124 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

I.   PART I – EXCESSIVE FERTILITY RATES AS
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS

(a)   Incitement to Overbreeding Abroad as Breach of International
Norms

Erdogan’s call to increased procreation by Turkish families
residing in Europe, with the specific purpose to become “the future
of Europe,”7 has all of the elements for being seen as an
internationally wrongful act of Turkey (in addition to a breach of
women’s right to dignity, since in the presidential vision, they seem
to appear as mere children-producing tools). In the well-known
formulation of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, “[t]here is an internationally wrongful act
of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes
a breach of an international obligation of the State.”8 Since the
statement was made by the President, attribution is not a contentious
matter here; the troika head of state – head of government – minister
of foreign affairs is seen as representing the State of Turkey without
further demonstration. As for the obligations that are breached, they
are sourced in the U.N. Charter and customary law, as detailed
below.

Turkey’s incitement is anything but friendly, and as such, is
against the principle of good neighbourliness stipulated in the U.N.
Charter’s preamble and its Article 1(2).9 Moreover, Article 2(4)
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the . . . political
independence of any state.”10 It is now agreed that prohibited
intervention in another state’s affairs does not refer exclusively to
military intervention, as such a limited interpretation “ignores the
modern techniques ranging from subversion to hostile propaganda

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Russell Goldman, ‘You are the Future of Europe,’ Erdogan Tells Turks,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2017, at A5.
8 Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.

Doc. A/56/10, art. 2 (2001).
9 U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1(2).
10 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶5.

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 125

that are used to undermine the internal autonomy of another State.”

11

In Nicaragua v. United States of America (“Nicaragua”), the Court
stated that intervention is prohibited either “directly or indirectly,
with or without armed force.” 12

If not as an ‘intervention,’ Turkey’s action qualifies at least
as an ‘interference,’ and the Security Council made it clear that all
states should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of
others.13 The broader view on what qualifies as a prohibited
intervention or interference is confirmed in the Friendly Relations
Declaration, and recognized as an expression of customary law in
Nicaragua, which held that armed intervention and “any other form
of interference” with a state’s political, economic and cultural
elements are condemned.14 The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-
Determination specifically includes alteration of the democratic
political process in another country in the list of prohibited
intrusions.

15

In light of all these aspects, purposefully increasing an
ethnic group’s proportion abroad is subversive, interferes with host
states’ political and cultural affairs, and is thus prohibited by binding
international norms. With the subversive intention being clearly
incorporated in President Erdogan’s political statement, a
hypothetical tribunal, even applying the strictest standard of proof
(i.e., beyond reasonable doubt), would probably agree that Turkey’s
purpose was to establish in time a democratic domination of the
Turkish (now) minorities in their host countries by the power of
numbers and votes, or at least to alter the cultural fabric in those
countries. In the second scenario, tension and conflict would come
as a natural consequence, undermining political stability.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Richard A. Falk, The United States and the Doctrine of

Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States, 5 HOW. L.J. 163,
166 (1959).
 

12 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 206 (June

27

).

13 S.C. Res. 1234, ¶ 1 (Apr. 9, 1999).
14 See G.A. Res. 25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶

55 (emphasis added).
15 Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-intervention in domestic

affairs), THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 (last visited Sep. 13, 2017).

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126 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

(b)  Overpopulation at National Level as Breach of International
Norms

The above discussion on outright interference by altering the
ethnic balance in a foreign country prompts an analysis of the more
general case of a country flooding another one with people. This
analysis was made, with no conclusive result, for the particular case
of countries that provoke the flow of a large number of refugees.16
The argument for holding the home country responsible was that, by
pushing its citizens out of its territory, the government is aware that
the victims, qualifying as refugees, have to be accepted, kept, and
looked after by states party to the 1951 Geneva Convention on
Refugees, given its non-refoulment principle.17 As such, the home
country affects the sovereign rights of its neighbours to decide
whom they admit to their territories.18 When refugees flee in large
numbers, problems beyond this breach of sovereignty arise: pressure
on the economy of the host country, potentially affecting the locals’
own well-being, and tensions due to regional cultural imbalances in
areas hosting most refugees.19

However, these are mostly theoretical considerations; they
have not yet taken the shape of global public policy, as the
perpetrating state is usually in no condition to make good for its
wrongs at the moment of the crimes, being, for example, thorn by
civil war like Syria currently. As for demanding compensation at a
later moment in time, such a demand would create the awkward

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 See, e.g., Nafees Ahmad, Refugees: State Responsibility, the Country

of Origin and Human Rights, 10 ASIA PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 1 (2009).
17 Id. at 15.
18 See Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries

of Asylum, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 532 (1986); see also Luke T. Lee, The Cairo
Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees,
April 1992, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 157 (1993) (showing that turning a person into a
refugee is an internationally wrongful act and the United Nations High
Commissariat for Refugees (“UNHCR”) can claim compensation from the home
country).

19 See Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme,
Standing Committee, Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations
on Host Developing Countries, ¶¶ 2-14, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.7 (Jan. 6,
1997).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 127

situation that the refugees, now back in their homeland, are debtors
and creditors simultaneously.20 That is, they would be owed money
from the public budget, as compensation for their suffering, but they
would be also contributors to that payment, as tax payers.21
Accordingly, cases are rare when the state-sources of massive
refugee flows are accepted, or were forced to accept, responsibility
toward the states hosting its people. Examples of these cases would
include Germany after World War II and Iraq, as the result of the
United Nation Security Council (“UNSC”) Resolution after the
invasion of Kuwait.22

The situation discussed in this paper is similar with regard to
the effects on receiving countries. Dramatic differences in fertility
among countries make huge migration flows inevitable, by a
mechanism that may be seen to metaphorically mirror the principle
of communicating vessels from the physics of fluids.23 The
economic, social, and security impacts referred to above are the
same. In this case, however, it is not the action of the migrant
sending countries that causes migration, but rather, their inaction:
failure to tackle overpopulation. People flee from poverty, not from
discrimination and abuse. A discussion on a home state’s
responsibility for failing to achieve a population density optimal for
life, and consequently flooding other countries with mass
emigration, has not yet taken place. However, the most recent U.N.
revision of the population prospects, emphasizing dramatic
differences in fertility between regions of the world,24 suggests that
such a discussion is timely.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 See Ahmad, supra note 16, at 13.
21 Id.
22 Christian Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Country of Origin,

in THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 59, 66 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996); see U.N.
Comp. Comm’n, Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1992/INF.1. (Jun. 26, 1992).

23 Ferdinand J. C. M. Rath, Population Problems: A Constituent of
General Culture in the 21st Century, 39 INT’L REV. EDUC. 5, 9 (1992).

24 World Population Prospects, supra note 1, at 6.

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128 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

The discussion should begin with the concept of
overpopulation (“OP”), which, according to the Merriam-Webster
dictionary, is “the condition of having a population so dense as to
cause environmental deterioration, an impaired quality of life, or a
population crash.”25 There seems to be agreement among scholars
that OP is undesirable: it brings poverty26 and democratic deficits,27
lays at the origin of environmental destruction,28 and leads to
conflicts over resources.29 More relevantly for this Article’s focus,
OP exports tension and conflict via mass migration and the
subsequent impossibility or unwillingness of integration of

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 Overpopulation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/overpopulation (last visited Nov.
19, 2017).

26 See, e.g., Robert Eastwood, The Impact of Changes in Human Fertility
on Poverty, 36 J. DEV. STUD. 1 (1999) (finding a positive correlation between
population growth and absolute poverty); see also Martha Campbell, Return of
the Population Factor: Its Impact upon the Millennium
 Development Goals, 315
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. 1501, 1501 (2007) (report of hearings
by the group showing that the rapid
 pace of population growth in Africa and some
other areas makes eradication of poverty impossible.).
 

27 See, e.g., Albert A. Bartlett, Democracy Cannot Survive
Overpopulation, 22 POPULATION & ENV’T 63 (2000) (describing democracy loss
as the dilution of voice due to addition of people in the same administrative unit);
see also Carol J. Greenhouse, Democracy and Demography, 2 IND. J GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 21 (1994) (describes yet a different type of democracy loss, i.e.,
rendering voiceless local populations overwhelmed by mass immigration in the
U.S. and the E.U.).

28 Lester Brown, creator of World Watch Institute, said: “We can see the
loss of tree cover, the devastation of grasslands, the soil erosion, the crowding and
poverty, the land hunger, and the air and water pollution associated with [the]
addition of people.” TYLER G. MILLER JR., LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT:
PRINCIPLES, CONNECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 47 (10th ed. 1996); see also Union
of Concerned Scientists, World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity, 18 POPULATION
& DEV. REV. 782, 782-83 (1992).

29 See, e.g., RICHARD P. CINCOTTA et al., THE SECURITY DEMOGRAPHIC:
POPULATION AND CIVIL CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR (2003) (showing that
the chance of civil conflict is positively correlated with the proportion of young
adults, fighting for jobs and leadership, in the adult population); see also James
A. Brander, Sustainability: Malthus Revisited?, 40 CAN. J. ECON. 1 (2007)
(indicating overpopulation as the main cause in recent conflicts in Central Asian
or African countries).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 129

ethnically or religiously diverse migrant populations,30 or simply as
a result of terrorism being nurtured in overpopulated poor
countries.31

It would appear that similar to the case of refugees, the issue

of state responsibility for highly exaggerated fertility rates could be
raised. A counter-argument is that, unlike in the case of refugees,
overpopulated states do not have their hands tied by the non-
refoulment principle and thus can simply keep their borders closed.
Such reasoning, however, does not stand in actual circumstances, as
can be seen by the tens of thousands arriving yearly in Italy and
Greece after crossing the Mediterranean Sea on boats, and the
millions more to come.32 The problem with the causality link
between the potentially wrongful act of the home country
(overpopulation) and the damage to the host country (economic,
social, security, etc.) does not lay in the willing acceptance of
immigrants by the host, but in conceptual and factual uncertainties
related to the idea of overpopulation.

As mentioned above, there is wide agreement that OP is bad,

but beyond this, there is a field of total contradiction as to when in
fact a country experiences OP, and as to whether any action against
OP is legally and morally permissible. If a country can do nothing
to tackle OP within its borders, then, taking into account that it is
also barred from forcibly keeping its people inside, its responsibility
toward other countries or toward the international society as a whole
cannot be established. These matters are the object of the next
section, conceived as a brief literature review underlying areas of

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

30 See, e.g., Rath, supra note 23 (showing that international overflows of
population can lead to fear of losing identity among host populations, and from
here, to xenophobia); see also Jack A. Goldstone, Population and Security: How
Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict, 56 J INT’L AFF. 4, 13-14
(2002) (explaining clashes between locals and immigrants on economic
resources and cultural identity).

31 Cassils, supra note 6, at 187.
32 Justin Huggler, Up to 6.6m Migrants Waiting to Cross to Europe from

Africa: Report, THE TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2017, 5:53),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/23/66m-migrants-waiting-cross-
europe-africa-report/; see also Mediterranean Situation, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.

11

130 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

disagreement and pointing to some recent evolutions in the for-now-
stalled debate on overpopulation.

II.   PART II – A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR GLOBAL
POLICY ON OVERPOPULATION?

(a)  Main Nodes of the Debate on Overpopulation

The first area of academic disagreement regards the present
and concerns the threshold over which we should speak about OP.
It has been shown that humans have always had a somewhat
irrational fear of not becoming too many.33 Accordingly, numerous
authors ridicule those who today raise the spectre of OP in a
panicked manner.34 These authors argue that there is no such thing
as OP, it is just the land not being judiciously used, with huge areas
left uninhabited while people rush to the big cities.35 Other authors
point to overconsumption (“OC”), and not overpopulation, as the
problem, if sustainability is seen in a global perspective. It was
argued, for example, that with one child in the United Kingdom
using as many resources as twenty-two in Malawi,36 scholars and
academics in the Global North have no moral right to raise the issue

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

33 See Bart K. Holland, A View of Population Growth Circa AD 200, 19
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 328 (1993) (see Tertullian warning some eighteen
centuries ago that populations had grown to the extent that they are becoming
burdensome to Earth).

34 See Michael Balter, The Baby Deficit, 312 SCIENCE 1894 (2006)
(stating that the population bomb “wasn’t” and the real issue is, on the contrary,
the danger of under-population); Kai Nielsen, Global Justice, Capitalism and the
Third World, 1 J. APPLIED PHIL. 175 (1984) (arguing that “[t]he principle problem
is not overpopulation . . . but man-made problems”); Amartya Sen, Fertility and
Coercion, 63 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1035, 1044 (1996) (showing among other
arguments that we should leave the population matter to “the responsible
reflection of people themselves”). But see Brander, supra note 29, at 6 (noting
that most academics writing about population live in areas with low fertility,
which bars them from seeing the issue in a global perspective).

35 This argument is centuries old: Engels believed that “it is absurd to
talk of over-population so long as there is enough waste land of Mississippi for
the whole population to be transplanted there.” See Friedrich Engels, Outline of a
Critique of Political Economy, in 3 MARX AND ENGELS: COLLECTED WORKS 418,
440 (Lawrence & Wishart, 2010).

36 Blake Alcott, Population Matters in Ecological Economics, 80
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 109, 114 (2012).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 131

of OP in developing countries: not while their own countries
continue to put pressure on global ecosystems.37

From the other side of the population debate, it is argued that
OP does not mean a condition so bad as to lead to physical
extinction, but just so bad as to affect the general quality of life.38
In the word of one author:

[T]here are relevant costs [of OP]
short of human starvation: poverty,
crime, lack of health care, hunger,
global warming, overfishing, sprawl,
ground-level ozone pollution, traffic
jams, endangered species, the spread
of infectious disease, overcrowding in
schools, the unavailability of clean
drinking water, destruction of
wetlands, holes in the ozone layer,
and shortages of oil.39

Moreover, the argument of geographical redistribution does not
stand today, because all areas with carrying capacity are already
inhabited.40 As for the ‘OC versus OP’ discussion, it should rather
be treated as the ‘OC and OP’ problem: overconsumption in the
Global North and overpopulation in some areas of the Global South

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 See, e.g., George Monbiot, Stop Blaming the Poor: It’s the Wally-

yachters Who Are Burning the Planet, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/sep/28/population-
growth-super-rich.

38 See, e.g., Martin P. Golding MP & Naomi H. Golding, Ethical and
Value Issues in Population Limitation and Distribution in the United States, 24
VAND. L. REV. 495, 498 (1970) (“What is at stake is not the survival of the species,
but rather the survival, or realization, of a way of life.”); see generally Jesper
Ryberg, The Argument from Overpopulation: Logical and Ethical
Considerations, 19 POPULATION & ENV’T 411 (1998) (discussing optimal
populations).

39 Sarah Conly, The Right to Procreation: Merits and Limits, 42 AM.
PHIL. Q. 105, 111 (2005).

40 Population-Environment Balance, Inc., Why Excess Immigration
Damages the Environment, 13 POPULATION & ENV’T 303, 304 (1992).

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132 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

equally affect sustainability. Reducing consumption is only
possible to some extent, and it is also likely that hundreds of millions
in the developing world, when reaching the middle-class level, will
naturally aim for consumption levels now common by the Western
world’s middle class.41 In the end, therefore, numbers do matter,
and tackling OC alone cannot resolve the problems. As a famous
agronomist warned upon receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize half a
century ago: “If fully implemented, the [green] revolution can
provide sufficient food for sustenance during the next three decades.
But the frightening power of human reproduction must also be
curbed; otherwise the success of the green revolution will be
ephemeral only.”42

The second area of disagreement pertains to the future and
concerns the uncertainty as to whether OP is even likely. Those
betting on a lower growth scenario rely on the well-known
‘demographic transition theory’ (“DTT”), which posits that with
economic development come lower fertility rates due to the action
of various mechanisms, such as lower economic incentives for
procreation, higher ages at which the first child is conceived, better
education, and gender equality.43 But, on the other hand, the DTT
has been challenged in recent decades with various arguments.44
Moreover, the DTT-skeptics believe that “[t]o hold out hope in the
theory of ‘demographic transition,’ where population growth stops
only when per capita income and consumption reaches a respectable
level, is to court disaster (imagine China [1.3 billion] or India [1.25

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Id. at 303 (noting that “every person, however conservative, adds to

the environmental burden”).
42 Norman Borlaug, Nobel Lecture—The Green Revolution, Peace, and

Humanity, THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE (Dec. 11, 1970) (transcript on file with Nobel
Media).

43 See generally ROBERT WOODS, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF VICTORIAN
ENGLAND AND WALES 18-19 (2000).

44 See, e.g., Cassils, supra note 6 (showing that in Europe, demographic
decline was achieved not in times of prosperity, but in the harsh economic years
in the 1920s and 1930s); Andrey Korotayev & Julia Zinkina, East Africa in the
Malthusian Trap?, 31 J. DEVELOPING SOC’YS. 385 (2015) (showing that in order
for the DTT to work, countries need first to lower their fertility rates under a
certain level).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 133

billion] where nearly every family owns a car, a refrigerator, an air
conditioner).”45

Some of the optimists also believe that with population

increasing, so does the necessity to innovate.46 Also on the side of
the optimists is the common sense argument that higher population
increases the pool of potential geniuses of tomorrow, who in turn
will find the technological solutions for accommodating more
people on Earth (e.g., better agricultural efficiency or improved
urbanism). The pessimists, however, counter-argue that high
population growth rates dissipate the surplus that might otherwise
support investment in research and development, bringing as
argument the evidence that in recent decades, the most technological
progress has originated in regions with the slowest growing
populations.47

Finally, a third issue that has stirred fevered debates is

whether states are legally allowed to do anything about OP, even if
we agree that OP is present or highly likely. The discussion here
concerns the balance of rights. Is there an overriding public interest
justifying limitations of reproductive rights?48 Are reproductive
rights susceptible to limitations in the first place?49 Those who
answer “no” sometimes rely on the sanctity of these rights—as

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Robert Chapman, No Room at the Inn, or Why Population Problems

Are Not All Economic, 21 POPULATION & ENVT’L L.J. 81, 86 (1999).
46 See generally ESTER BOSERUP, POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE: A STUDY OF LONG-TERM TRENDS (1981) (claiming a positive
correlation between population growth and technological creativity, explained by,
inter alia, the fact that the former leads to scarcity, which in turn induces
communities to find new solutions to deal with diminishing natural resources).

47 Brander, supra note 29, at 20.
48 See, e.g., Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE

HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (asking whether procreation is “in all
circumstances just . . . without being subject to law and regard for others”).

49 See Alcott, supra note, at 36, for a discussion on derogability (or lack
thereof) from the reproductive rights. See JA Robinson, Provisional Thoughts on
Limitations to the Right to Procreate, 18 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L. J. (2015), for
a legal analysis of the issue in the South African context.

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134 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

freedoms touching upon the most intimate aspects of our lives.50
Cultural rights are at stake, as well, since some cultures traditionally
value large families.51

On the contrary, those who believe that reproductive rights

can be limited find ammunition in the very definition of the
reproductive rights, constantly referred to, in all of the international
instruments of the last half a century, as the right of couples to
decide ‘freely and responsibly’ the number of their children.52
‘Responsibly’ means considering the others’ right to not live in an
overcrowded world, and to this end, a cap of two or three children
per family is acceptable, since the right to parenthood was already
fulfilled with the first child.53 Those who claim the couple’s
inalienable right to choose how much to procreate54 are also pointed
at as hypocritical since the term ‘couple’ in most of the areas where
overpopulation is a problem means, in fact, ‘the male,’ as husband,

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 Alcott, supra note 36, at 115 (“[D]irectly limiting the number of people

born at all, touching as it does on human intimacy and evolution, is a stark
limitation of freedom.”).

51 See generally E. A. Hammel, A Theory of Culture for Demography,
16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 455 (1990); see also Rath, supra note 23 (showing
how cultural underpinnings of high fertility rates can be countervailed by
education).

52 See Stan Bernstein, The Changing Discourse on Population and
Development: Toward a New Political Demography, 36 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 127
(2005) (provides an overview of the major conferences on population, the
concept’s evolution, and the various policies undertaken at different stages of
global understanding of the ‘overpopulation versus reproductive rights’ balance).

53 See, e.g., Conly, supra note 39; Chapman, supra note 45; see also
CHRISTINE OVERALL, WHY HAVE CHILDREN: THE ETHICAL DEBATE 180-84 (MIT
PRESS 2012) (arguing to uphold a basic right of two children per couple); see also
Carol S. Robb, Liberties, Claims, Entitlements, and Trumps: Reproductive Rights
and Ecological Responsibilities, 26 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 283, 294 (1998)
(speaking of “moral disapproval of fertility above replacement rate”); see
generally Elisabeth Cripps, Climate Change, Population, and Justice: Hard
Choices to Avoid Tragic Choices, 8 GLOBAL JUST. 1 (2015).
 

54 See SONIA CORREA & REBECCA REICHMANN, POPULATION AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOUTH 66 (1994)
(showing that “[r]eproductive rights are human rights which are inalienable and
inseparable from basic rights such as food, shelter, health, security, livelihood,
education, and political empowerment”).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 135

father, or priest.55 As for a claim to the cultural right of having a
large family, it was shown that high fertility in certain areas is most
often neither an exercise of rights nor a reaction to economic needs,
but simply an inertial perpetuation of socially transmitted, learned
traits, which can and should be unlearned.56

With so many sensitive variables and irreconcilable views,

it is no wonder that the debate was put on hold at the U.N., as
detailed in the following subsection. Recent events, however, in
addition to the aforementioned statement of Turkey, suggest that
some stakeholders may have sensibly altered their views, thus
providing a window of opportunity for reopening the discussion on
OP.

(b)   Cracks in the Spiral of Silence on Overpopulation?

The aversion of politicians and policy makers at the U.N. to
approaching the population growth issue in the last two decades was
noted by many scholars. It was shown, for example, that the United
Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”) deals with everything
but population,57 and that “neglect of human population size is
indeed widespread.”58 One author bluntly stated that “the United
Nations . . . does not want debate.”59 Symptomatically, the
Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000 completely

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 See Lynn P. Freedman & Stephen L. Isaacs, Human Rights and

Reproductive Choice, 24 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 18, 19 (1993) (advocating a
woman-centered approach to reproductive rights, and speaking in this context
about “the specific situations of dependency, discrimination, and fear that women
face” in some developing countries); see also Tomris Türmen, Reproductive
Rights: How to Move Forward?, 4 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 31, 33 (2000).

56 Bobbi S. Low, Alice L. Clarke & Kenneth A. Lockridge, Toward an
Ecological Demography, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1 (1992).

57 Paul Erlich, Demography and Policy: A View from Outside the
Discipline, 34 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 103, 107 (2008).

58 Alcott, supra note 36, at 116.
59 Stan Bernstein, The Changing Discourse on Population and

Development: Toward a New Political Demography, 36 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 127,
129 (2005).

17

136 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

ignored the issue.60 Asking in her article titled “Why the Silence on
Overpopulation?,” one author answers:

The 1994 United Nations
International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD,
or “Cairo”) was the turning point in
removing the population subject from
policy discourse. The important
difference between ICPD and the
previous decadal UN population
conferences was its emphasis on
drawing attention to the needs of
women around the world. In the run-
up to ICPD and following the two-
week conference in Cairo, talking
about population became politically
incorrect in many circles. Drawing
attention to any connection between
population and the environment
became taboo — again, because it was
viewed, or promoted, as
disadvantageous to women.61

This author’s response is but one explanation. Others may
have to do with troubling memories from the disastrous population

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept.

18, 2000).
61 Martha Campbell, Why the Silence on Population? 28 POPULATION &

ENV. 237, 241 (2007); see also Robert Engelman, Population, Climate Change
and Women’s Lives, 183 WORLDWATCH REP. 1, 5 (2010) (showing that
“[a]lthough many policymakers would welcome slower population growth, there
is a concern that policies to slow growth will violate the right of couples to
determine their own family size”).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 137

policies put in place in countries like India62 or Peru63 in the second
half of the last century, or with the developing countries’
accusations of Western cultural and demographic imperialism.64
Also, the conservative (Christian and Islamic) religious lobby is
indicated by some authors as a main inhibitor of debate at the UN.65

But regardless of its causes, the spiral of silence built around
OP is a fact, and it is this Article’s claim that recent developments
should shake it. To look first at the pretext of this paper—Erdogan’s
statement—how should an aggressive, unacceptable statement by a
head of state, inciting its supposed followers to multiply excessively
in another country, contribute to breaking this spiral of silence? The
answer is embodied in the question: by being aggressive and
unacceptable in light of norms of civility in international relations.

In a non-academic expression: the ostrich policy may work

when all is silent above the ground, but should come to an end if the
ostrich is kicked in the rear. Erdogan’s statement touches upon one
of the most sensitive issues associated with overpopulation: regional
security threats, following internal conflict or mass migration.66

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 See generally Davidson R. Gwatkin, Political Will and Family

Planning: The Implications of India’s Emergency Experience, 5 POPULATION
DEV. REV. 29 (1979).

63 See generally Anna-Britt Coe, From Anti-Natalist to Ultra-
Conservative: Restricting Reproductive Choice in Peru, 12 REPROD. HEALTH
MATTERS 56 (2004).

64 See, e.g., Bahati Kuumba, Population Policy in the Era of
Globalisation: A Case of Reproductive Imperialism, 16 AGENDA: EMPOWERING
WOMEN FOR GENDER EQUITY 22 (2001) (critiquing Western policies).

65 See generally Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, From Population Control
to Reproductive Rights: Feminist Fault Lines, 3 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 152,
159 (1995) (pointing to the “unusual alliance among, the Vatican, its client states,
and some Middle Eastern governments”); see also Brander, supra note 29, at 6
(listing religious sensitivities as hurdles that population debates need to side-step,
in recent times of religious radicalization).

66 The positive correlation between population growth and the propensity
of civil conflict was demonstrated in numerous studies. See, e.g., Markus
Brückner, Population Size and Civil Conflict Risk: Is There a Causal Link? 120
ECON. J. 535 (2010); Henrik Urdal, Population, Resources, and Political
Violence, A Subnational Study of India, 1956–2002, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 590
(2008).

19

138 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

While it is morally improper to hold a failed state responsible for
being a source of mass emigration, and it is practically difficult with
a state that quietly promotes policies of cultural invasion, none of
these scenarios are the case here. A positive measure aimed at
altering the ethnic and cultural balance in another country, publicly
announced by the head of a state with aspirations to join the
European Union, amounts to an internationally wrongful act as
shown above, and thus should at least prompt a serious international
debate on the issue of overpopulation.

Other recent developments also indicate that the time may

be ripe for an honest debate on overpopulation. A recent position
issued by the Vatican calls for couples to refrain from procreation
unless they can bring up their children properly,67 which comes in
stark contrast with centuries old teachings on the blessings of having
large families. Pope Francis’s ‘unorthodox’ position is not
accidental, but in line with previous views indicating more
flexibility on reproductive matters in the broader framework of
fighting poverty in the developing world.68

A look at the views expressed by the other major global

religion in terms of number of adherents—Islam—also shows
encouraging signs. A quick online search produced several policies
in countries of Islamic faith, such as Pakistan, Niger, Iran, and
Uganda, recommending a maximum of four children per family.69
Admittedly, an average of four children per family is still almost

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Jan Bentz, Pope Has Urged Having Fewer Children if ‘You Cannot

Bring Them Up Properly’, LIFESITE NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:30 AM),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/francis-praised-by-population-controller-at-
vatican-workshop-for-urging-us.

68 Claire E. Brolan & Peter S. Hill, Sexual and Reproductive Health and
Rights in the Evolving Post-2015 Agenda: Perspectives from Key Players from
Multilateral and Related Agencies in 2013, 22 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 66, 67
(2014) (citing an interviewee from the U.N.).

69 Law Pertaining to Population and Family Planning of 23 May 1993
(Iran); Pakistan Population Policy (2010), MINISTRY OF POPULATION AND
WELFARE; Déclaration de Gouvernement en Matière de Politique de Population
(2007), Gov’t of Niger; National Population Policy for Social Transformation and
Sustainable Development (2008), MINISTRY OF FIN., PLANNING & ECON. DEV.
(Uganda).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 139

double the replacement fertility rate,70 but the fact that Islamic
leaders are at least willing to mention a cap is more than the new
U.S. administration would do—see the recent cancellation of funds
for the United Nations Population Fund (“UNFPA”) motivated by
unsubstantiated claims that UNFPA supports forced abortions in
China.71 In fact, even Turkey’s President exhibits acceptance of the
idea that excessive population growth is bad as he makes a clear
distinction between what he sees desirable at home and abroad in
terms of family size. While for Turks abroad he encourages a
minimum of five children, as seen above, for home he only suggests
three,72 which seems like an acceptable limit if we consider the
larger context of family sizes and population planning in countries
of the Muslim religion.

We should not conclude the brief overview of recent

developments on the religions’ views without putting them in their
historical context. The wider leeway for reinterpretation and change
in Islam, compared to the Christian Church, permitted leaders like
Iran’s Khomeini, Egypt’s Mubarak, or Tunisia’s Bourguiba to
promote in the recent past successful population policies.73 These
policies reduced the fertility rate under three children per woman,
without the abuse that accompanied similar efforts in countries like
Peru or India.74 It is perhaps exactly this lack of a monolithic

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 The U.N. indicates 2.1 children per woman as the replacement rate.

See World Population Prospects, supra note 1, para. 16.
71 Nurith Aizenman, Citing Abortions In China, Trump Cuts Funds For

U.N. Family Planning Agency, NPR (Apr. 4, 2017, 4:16 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/04/04/522040557/citing-
abortions-in-china-trump-cuts-funds-for-u-n-family-planning-agency.

72 Sara Malm, President Erdogan Urges Turkish Women to Have at Least
Three Children, THE DAILY MAIL (June 6, 2016, 4:59 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3627087/President-Erdogan-urges-
Turkish-women-three-children-tells-lives-incomplete-without-babies.html.
 

73 Gioetta Kuo, MegaCrisis? Overpopulation Is the Problem, 4 WORLD
FUTURE REV. 23, 26 (2012); Population Council, President Hosni Mubarak on
Egypt’s Population, 34 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 583 (2008); Freedman &
Isaacs, supra note 55, at 27-28 (“[U]nder the strong personal guidance of
President Bourguiba, Tunisia was able to . . . abolish polygyny, and to permit
abortion during the first trimester.”).

74 Gwatkin, supra note 62; Coe, supra note 63.

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140 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

understanding of the Islamic rules that allowed these leaders to
navigate smoothly in the waters of tempering population growth.
Similarly, the rigidity of the Christian rules led to more radical, sort
of ‘all or nothing’ approaches by policy makers in countries where
the Christian religion intermingles with state business (to be noted,
again, that the United States seems to have recently joined this club,
since one of the first priorities of President Donald Trump’s
Administration was toughening the abortion rules75).

The above changes in some stakeholders’ positions are
indicated by their statements or actions but more changes can be
detected in the international community’s silent acceptance of a
major recent demographic event, such as China’s two-children
policy announced in 2015.76 The previous one-child policy,
launched in 1978, was met with ferocious criticism in the Western
human rights discourse and led to radical measures like the U.S.
repeatedly cancelling its contributions to United Nations Fund for
Population Activities (“UNFPA”), based on allegations that it
supported China’s policy.77 Now, the two-children policy is
accepted without reaction, which is strange. After all, a cap is
abusive, regardless of the number. The lack of Western reaction to
the two-children policy must have a reason. Either times have
changed since 1978 and the world has come to realize that
something must be done to curb OP, or a cap is acceptable in

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 In January of 2017, in his first week in the Office, the President signed

an order banning funds for groups that support or even provide information about
abortion. See Trump’s Order on Abortion Policy: What Does It Mean?, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38729364, for
measures impacting on international policy. See Jill Filipovic, Trump’s New Birth
Control Rule Is a Deliberate Move to Hold Back Women, COSMOPOLITAN (Jun.
2, 2017), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/a9961534/birth-control-
mandate-women-contraception-trump/, for measures impacting women’s
freedom of choice at home.

76 Chris Buckley, China Ends One-Child Policy, Allowing Families Two
Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2015, at A1.

77 See China’s One-child Controversy Reignites, THE WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/18/family-
planning-funding-spotlights-china/ (Presidents Reagan and Bush (and now
Trump) have cut the funds to UNFPA–while presidents Clinton and Obama
restored the funding.).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 141

principle, but the cap of one child was too restrictive. Notably, the
cap of two is also suggested by a recent change in the United
Kingdom’s child tax credit policy. From April of 2017, a family can
claim child tax credit, which is worth up to £2,780 per child each
year, only for the first two children.78

(c)  From Global Problem to Global Risk?

The events noted above are obviously not of a magnitude to
prompt a radical change in the discourse on OP, but could become
‘pull’ (the openness of some stakeholders) and ‘push’ (the
aggressiveness of Turkey) factors for academics and policy makers
to re-assess the population problem. In order to avoid the debate
going to the same dead end as before, like the one of unclear OP
threshold and uncertain future demographic evolutions, this Article
proposes reconceptualising OP as global risk. Global policy is
generally understood to be motivated by a distinct ‘policy problem,’
namely “a set of circumstances that can be potentially improved
upon with purposeful action.”79 Global policy problems:

[C]an be distinguished from those
that are merely national . . . on the
basis of two criteria which normally
go hand in hand. First, the problem
has aroused concern throughout much
of the world. Second, it has been, or
can be expected to be, taken up by one
or more international institutions,
such as the United Nations.80

Concern with OP has indeed been aroused throughout much
of the world. Even in Europe, where the intuition tells us that people

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

78 Patrick Knox, Making Ends Meet: What are the child tax credit
changes 2017, what benefits can I claim and who is eligible?, THE SUN (April 6,
2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/money/3268826/child-tax-credit-
changes-april-2017-cuts/.

79 Marvin S. Soroos, A Theoretical Framework for Global Policy
Studies, 11 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 309, 311 (1990).

80 Id.

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142 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

should be rather concerned with under-population given the low
fertility rates,81 a quarter of the citizens indicate population growth
as a major global risk; significantly, the proportion is higher among
educated interviewees.82 However, for the reasons shown above,
the U.N. cannot be expected to take up OP as a global policy
problem. In fact, in recent policies, instead of striving for solutions
to tackle the global problem of population growth, the U.N. calmly
recommends migration as a solution for decongesting crowded
areas, thus in fact encouraging further increase in procreation
rates.83

Could this change if we conceptualize OP as a global risk?
The theory of the world risk society maintains that modern societies
are shaped by new kinds of self-generated (as opposed to the older)
risks,84 such as high-risk modern technologies (nuclear energy and
genetic engineering), new types of environmental and health
problems (global warming, worldwide pandemics), new forms of
transnational terrorism, and systemic risks of the global economy
and finances.85 The new global risks are characterized by three
features: delocalization, incalculableness (hypothetical risks, based

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 From nearly 8 million births in 1964, the number declined

continuously until 1995, when it stabilized somewhere around 5 million births per
year. See Number of Live Births, EU-28, 1961–2015 (million) YB17, EUROSTAT
STATISTICS EXPLAINED (Mar. 7, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Number_of_live_births,_EU-
28,_1961%E2%80%932015_(million)_YB17 .

82 Report of the Directorate-General for Communication on Europeans’
Attitudes Towards Climate Change, at 33 (2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_313_en.
Pdf.

83 See Rep. on Integrating Population Issues into Sustainable
Development, Including the Post-2015 Development Agenda, U.N. Dept. Of.
Econ. & Soc. Affairs, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/364 (2015). But see Cassils,
supra note 6, at 175 (noting that countries that are leading in reducing their
populations should not give in to the advocates of growth by allowing massive
immigration; this notion rewards those who multiply irresponsibly).

84 See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY (Sage Publ’n trans., 1992).
85 EDGAR GRANDE, Global Risks and Preventive Governance, in

HUMANITY AT RISK: THE NEED FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 19 (Daniel Innerarity
& Javier Solana eds., 2013).

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 143

on science-induced not-knowing and normative dissent), and non-
compensability.86

It has been shown above that the first two features apply to
OP. As for non-compensability, in the context of the already-
recognized new risks, it means, for example, that if the climate has
changed irreversibly, if progress in human genetics makes
irreversible interventions in human existence possible, if terrorist
groups already have weapons of mass destruction, then it is too late.
The compensation logic, that is, post-factum reaction and
adaptation, does not apply. But this seems to be the case with OP,
as well. How will humanity adapt to not having enough resources
to feed, for example, 20 billion people, other than by violently and
suddenly reducing numbers, or breaking borders into other states?
What was already accepted in the field of climate change, i.e., we
are past mitigation and we should gradually move to adaptation, will
not apply then, at least not in a peaceful manner, but in a ‘survival
of the fittest’ scenario.

Once OP is included on the list of new global risks, an
agreement on a maximum world population should be discussed,
similarly to what happened in the field of carbon emissions. This
global total87 can be translated into a population cap per couple,
which in the beginning could be high enough to not encounter
significant resistance from the stakeholders traditionally favouring
high populations (churches, corporations, and the like). Even
though without real demographic impact, it would gradually craft
acceptance for the idea that there is a limit to population growth.
From here, already-proposed technical solutions could be applied—
the tradable procreation rights scheme suggested first by the British

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 ULRICH BECK, Living in and Coping with a World Risk Society, in

HUMANITY AT RISK: THE NEED FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 12, 13 (Daniel
Innerarity & Javier Solana eds., 2013).

87 Interestingly, this global maximum was found, not long ago, to be 2
billion. See David Pimentel et al., Natural Resources and an Optimal Human
Population, 15 POPULATION & ENV. 347 (1994).

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144 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N

economist Kenneth Boulding,88 and refined in recent years.89 A
global convention on overpopulation, modelled after the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCC”),90
could detail the technicalities of a global version of this scheme, so
that the rights left unused in the developed world can be transferred
to other countries.

CONCLUSION

This Article had as departure point relatively recent events
relevant to the debate on the limits to population growth. Focusing
on statements made earlier this year by the President of Turkey, it
discussed the impact of exaggerated fertility rates of one immigrant
group, when they are incited by the leadership of their country of
origin, with declared political purposes, to multiply excessively.
Zooming out, this Article embraced more generally the situations in
which high fertility rates lead to mass emigration. In both cases,
albeit more clearly in the first, the country of origin can be the
subject of a claim of interference and breach of neighbors’
sovereignty. For the second, more general case, the discussion
remains speculative, mainly because the idea of limiting the
population growth is a taboo matter in international policy circles,
for subjective and objective reasons. As a result, there is no legal
obligation for a country to stabilize its population. Therefore, even
if in a particular case mass immigration in one country can be
attributed to overpopulation in another country, a claim against the
latter would be unsuccessful.

This Article, however, spotted recent evolutions that suggest
a more flexible attitude of stakeholders in the population debate:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE MEANING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

135-36 (1964).
89 See David de la Croix & Axel Gosseries, Population Policy Through

Tradable Procreation Entitlements, 50 INT’L ECON. REV. 507 (2009) (addressing
the issue in an international perspective dealing with both over and under
population).

90 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.

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2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 145

representatives of major religions and the Western human rights
lobby. Taken together with the bellicose position of Turkey’s
president, these suggest a window of opportunity for global policy
makers who are preoccupied by overpopulation. Turkey’s
aggressive stance could be a ‘push’ factor for a renewed debate,
while the other elements could be ‘pull’ factors, in the sense that
they are somehow inviting discussion and analysis, perhaps with
new arguments.

With respect to these new arguments, this paper suggested
that to avoid the dead end in which the overpopulation debate was
abandoned some two decades ago, global policy makers could re-
conceptualize OP as global risk, which would justify a preventative
approach. If OP is found to present the traits of a global risk, then
countries with excessive fertility rates could be persuaded to assume
population stabilization, in its non-coercive variant and perhaps in
cooperation with the international community, as an internationally-
binding obligation.

27

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MegaCrisis? Overpopulation Is the Problem
By Gioietta Kuo

A succinct and all-embracing article on the
state of the world by Wuliam Halal and Michael
Marien, titled “Global MegaCrisis: Four Scenar-
ios, Two Perspectives,” appeared in The Futurist
magazine for May-June 2011.’ It contains the pre-
diction of an impending global crisis, a perfect
storm resulting from a congruence of the ills af-
flicting the world today, including climate change,
environmental destruction, water and food scar-
city, and poverty, along with such cultural and
economic effects as financial meltdown and global
recession. The authors explore these phenomena
from different angles: Halal takes a more positive
view based on the technology that our society has
achieved, while Marien adopts a more pessimis-
tic outlook, foreseeing at best a “muddle through”
attitude on the part of the majority of the world’s
less-informed people.

Reasons for the MegaCrisis
As much as I admire the erudition of both

authors, I would like to point out that they have
not put their fingers sufficiently on the one evil
that is the mother of all others: world overpopu-
lation. Imagine if the world miraculously lost 20%
of its population. Many of the problems described
by Halal and Marien would simply disappear.

For example, unemployment is already un-
acceptably high globally, afflicting both industri-
alized and developing nations. Most important is
unemployment among youth in the 15 to 24 age

group. Youth unemployment is a problem not
only in the likes of France (23%), Spain (37%),
and Italy (25%), but also in developing countries
like Saudi Arabia (28%) and Egypt (24%).̂ What
is most horrifying in the developing nations is not
that the unemployment figures are high, but that
the number of young people continues to in-
crease, even in places where more than 30% of the
national population is in the 0-14 age group.
Where are these young going? To swell even fur-
ther the ranks of the 15-24 group of unemployed,
creating still more social ills!

On October 31, 2011, the UN celebrated a
day on which the latest baby born in the Philip-
pines added the last person needed to raise the
total world population to seven billion. Celebrate?
This is no cause for celebration, as the world is al-
ready overpopulated. I was aghast. Coming from
such an influential body as UN, this announce-
ment seems to me the last nail in the coffin. Is it
possible that there is no hope for humanity?

In this article, we shall examine the pros and
cons of the overpopulation issue. As a scientist, I
accept the fact that all known systems have
boundaries (with the possible exception of our
universe itself). That means we are bounded. We
cannot possibly put nine billion people on the
planet, as the UN so calmly predicts, because our
agriculture and water resources are already insuf-
ficient to meet the needs of the present global pop-
ulation of seven billion.’ More than one billion

Gioietta Kuo, senior fellow, .American Center for International Policy Studies, is a research physicist specializing

in energy problems. She has published more than 70 articles in American and European professional journals,

and many more in The People’s Daily and other widely read publications in China. She can be reached at

kuopet@comcast.net.

World Future Review Fatl2012 2 3

people are already on starvation level.” Even more
have no access to clean water, and some 2.6 bil-
lion lack basic sanitation leading to disease, e t c ‘

Malthus and the Principle of
Population

The idea that there are limits to what we can
do, such as providing food, water, energy, and
other resources to each individual on earth is not
new. The great nineteenth-century British econ-
omist Thomas Malthus, in his work “An Essay on
the Principle of Population,”* predicted that in-
creasing population would eventually diminish
the world’s ability to feed itself. He based this con-
clusion on the thesis that population expands in
such a way as to overtake thé development of suf-
ficient land for crops, and will continue to expand
until it is checked by lack of water, food, and other
resources essential for survival, and/or until its
growth is reduced by disease, predators, and war-
fare.

Buoyed by optimism in the early days of the
industrial revolution, many philosophers, influ-
enced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx,
believed that society would expand naturally to-
wards Utopian perfection, and Malthus was much
maligned. But toward the end of the twentieth
century, with billions of Third World citizens—
constituting about 80% of the world’s popula-
tion—malnourished and many near starvation,’
more objective observers came to admit that, in
many ways, Malthus was right. And yet, even to-
day unfortunately, many still do not appreciate
the gravity of the overpopulation problem and
consider “Malthusian” a dirty word.

Let us put Malthus’s thesis into simple math-
ematical terms that all can understand. While
population growth over a series of 25-year inter-
vals can occur in a geometric progression—1, 2,
4,8,16,32,64, etc.—food production at best can
increase only linearly. It seems that even the much
touted GMO (genetically modified organisms),
do not produce yields much above that of tradi-

tional methods.*

World Population Reduction: Is It
Possible?

So, for our planet to survive, humanity has
no choice but to reduce population. A study by a
team of scientists led by Mathis Wackernagel ag-
gregated the use of all the Earth’s natural assets—
our “ecological footprint.” They concluded that
humanity’s collective demands first surpassed the
Earth’s regenerative capacity around 1980. By
2007, global demands on the Earth’s natural sys-
tems exceeded sustainable yields by 50%. Stated
another way, it would take 1.5 Earths to sustain
our current consumption. If we use environmen-
tal indicators to evaluate our situation, then the
global decline of the economy’s natural support
systems—the environmental decline that wül lead
to economic decline and social collapse—is al-
ready well under way’

It is obvious that more people require more
food, more water, more housing, more employ-
ment, more education, more medicine, and even
more fresh air. Delegates to the 1994 Conference
on Population and Development'” held in Cairo
recognized reproductive health and family plan-
ning as fundamental human rights and pledged
to invest between $17 billion/year and $22 bil-
lion/year to reach the goal of universal family
planning by 2015. Yet we are now approaching
2015 and much ofthat investment has not been
forthcoming. As a consequence, many in the de-
veloping nations still do not have access to fam-
ily planning, and poverty remains the major
cause.

To illustrate how thorny the problem of lim-
iting population is, we need go no further than
China. Thanks to its unique government struc-
ture, this is the only country in the world where
it has proved possible to mandate a draconian
one-child-per-family policy. Yet even here, while
this policy works in large cities where the govern-
ment has more or less strict control, it has proven

2 4 World Future Review Fall 2012

difficult to regulate the birthrate in rural areas
where 70% of China’s population lives. As a con-
sequence, China’s population is still rising: 81 mü-
lion people will be added between 2010 and
2015.” In countries that lack a comprehensive
pension system, people tend to want more chil-
dren as insurance for their old age.

World History and Our Future
Many look back on the world’s history and

conclude that, since we have survived disasters of
all kinds—wars, disease, famine, etc.—we will
overcome whatever evils the impending Mega-
Crisis will bring us. But this argument contains a
fallacy. Today’s malaise is of a different kind be-
cause we have changed our environment in an ir-
reversible way.

We have let the genie out of the bottle; how
do we put it back? How does one reduce the
earth’s temperature, extract CO^ and methane
from the atmosphere, prevent sea level rise, re-
freeze tundra, reduce world desertification, stop
the melting of glaciers, restore tropical forests, and
reduce world population all at the same time?’^

In our hearts, we know that we are on an un-
sustainable path. We are taking resources out of
the Earth so fast that we can no longer hope to
maintain existing supplies. Sooner or later, we will
encounter the limits to what our planet can pro-
vide us.

What is different from previous history is
that the world has never had to cope with seven
billion people before. Overpopulation has brought
with it the many specific stresses listed below. Of
these, the chief concern is undoubtedly climate
change. Following this are some other semi-irre-
versible phenomena that appear to be here to stay
and to be progressing at an ever faster rate.

Yet even admitting that we can see no way
out at the moment, there is nothing to be gained
by despair. Facing hard facts and still remaining
optimistic offers the best chance we have left to
overcome the hurdles confronting our future. Let

us now examine what the history of past civiliza-
tions has taught us.

• Climate change is the most serious phenom-
enon confronting us. As the world population has
increased, ever-greater fossil fuel use has demon-
strably resulted in global warming. Today the
global average temperature has risen 0.7°C since
1900, and is forecast by the IPCC to rise a total of
1.5°C by 2030″ The number-one effect of global
warming is the melting of glaciers and icecaps,
and this is leading to widespread water scarcity
worldwide.'”* Following this comes, naturally, food
scarcity. Thus, even now, we are beginning to ex-
perience global scarcity ofthe two most essential
elements of human existence: food and water.

According to the UN, more then 11 million
people have died from drought since 1900.” Al-
ready 1.1 billion people lack access to safe drink-
ing water, and 2.6 billion lack adequate sanita-
tion.” Almost one billion people are already going
hungry world wide today.’^ Hunger is most per-
vasive in less-developed countries where popula-
tion is dense. Work by the UN and various foun-
dations is providing some relief But endemic
poverty is the main cause, and remains largely un-
checked.’*

• Warming in the equatorial regions has al-
ready intensified drought conditions to some 30
degrees latitude north and south, helping expand
desert regions in Australia, the American South-
west, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Med-
iterranean region.” Already we are seeing the
scorching effect of the drought in the American
corn belt and the agriculture lands of Croatia. The
result has been to force agriculture to higher lat-
itudes and to decrease yields in arid areas.̂ °

To support an additional two billion people
by 2050, the world would need access to a new
growing area the size of Brazil. By 2050, 80% of
world’s population will live in urban areas.^’ Lim-
ited water and growing space will increasingly
turn agriculture indoors—toward greenhouses
and vertical farming. There also will be new meth-

World Future Review Fall 2012 2 5

ods of irrigation—aerophonics, hydroponics, and
drip irrigation. Unfortunately much energy in the
form of lighting and water will still be necessary.
There will likely be huge demographic changes,
too, with people and agriculture moving toward
the higher latitudes in Canada, the Arctic, Alaska,
Siberia, and even Greenland.

It is very interesting that Greenland was pop-
ulated and cultivated for nearly 500 years—from
AD 984 to the 1400s—by Viking settlers who wiO-
ingly left a rich European civilization behind to
create and maintain their new homeland, Norse
Greenland.^^ They depended on domestic live-
stock and hunting for living. The most likely rea-
son for the eventual failure of these Viking settle-
ments is that the climate grew steadily colder over
time. However, the Inuit peoples managed to sur-
vive there simultaneously and continue to do so
to this day.

There may be a lesson here for humanity’s
future. The low-tech, low-population Inuit com-
munity was able to adapt to changing climate con-
ditions because of its simple lifestyle of fishing
and hunting. But the European-derived Viking
culture proved unable, or unwilling, to give up its
reliance on imported materials (such as lumber
and iron), clung to the European concept of
“growth” as its measure of success, and continued
to see greater nobility in trying to defy and tri-
umph over nature than in closely observing na-
ture and altering its lifestyle to remain in harmony
with the changing environment.

• Family planning is the only way to control
global overpopulation. Even to mention this re-
ality tends to make some people throw up their
arms in despair that this could ever be accom-
plished. Yet such a reaction is actually unjustified,
for much has been achieved in the past few dec-
ades. Here are some shining examples to follow.
Japan managed to cut its birthrate by one-fourth
in just seven years between 1951 and 1958.” And
countries like Taiwan and South Korea, while
struggling to achieve First World living standards.

actually managed to lift themselves out of pov-
erty by following Japan’s example.̂ ” It is the un-
derdeveloped failed states with relatively unedu-
cated populations that have maintained high
birthrates.

The recent history of Iran shows what can be
done even in a Muslim country if the government
is motivated to reduce population.” When Aya-
tollah Khomeini first came to power in 1979, he
dismantled the Shah’s familyTplanning clinics in
the belief that more people brought strength in
numbers especially when it came to the Iraq-Iran
war. However, the added stresses that population
growth brought about unemployment, over-
crowding, and environmental degradation, and
made him realize that much can be gained by
achieving a stable sustainable population.

So in 1989, the country turned an about-face
and implemented an aggressive family planning
program, combining clinics with universal pri-
mary schools and public sex education. Through
government propaganda and incentives, Kho-
meini was able to reduce the rate of population
growth from an explosion to a very low level in a
space of 10 years.̂ * This is by no means an en-
dorsement of Iran’s treatment of women in its
society. It is simply an instance of how population
control can be achieved even in cultures where,
traditionally, unlimited reproduction has been ac-
cepted as inevitable and even desirable.

Furthermore, the cost of pursuing a zero
growth population is not prohibitive. As men-
tioned earlier, delegates to the International Con-
ference on Population and Development in Cairo
in 1994 pledged to fully stabilize world popula-
tion by 2015.” So far the First World countries
have fallen short of the goal by half. But their fail-
ure has been due to a lack of will, not a lack of
possibility. And so, NGOs like the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation have taken up thê task.

Lastly, whereas finding effectivé’vaccines is
an arduous task that involves years of research,
sometimes with no guarantee of ever developing

2 6 World Future Review Fall 2012

a viable final product, a program of family plan-
ning to reduce population growth is sure to suc-
ceed because there are precedents. Furthermore,
significant results can often be achieved in a short
space of time—as little as 5 to 10 years.

• World desertification now affects 74% ofthe
land in North America and Africa.̂ * The habitat
of around a bülion people has been affected. The
major cause is population pressure leading to
over-cultivation and over-grazing of land. Defor-
estation also allows erosion and the loss of top-
soil. According to the World Wide Fund for Na-
ture, the Earth lost 30% of its natural wealth
between 1970 and 1995. This is a fast and irre-
trievable process that is devouring our agricul-
tural land and our cities. The Gobi Desert is mov-
ing south at three kilometers a year, and sand
dunes are forming just 70 kilometers from Bei-
jing.” But China has initiated a vast reforestation
program to reverse the advance of desertification,
and it appears to be achieving great success.'”

• Due to population pressure, some two giga-
tons of carbon are released every year into the at-
mosphere. Much of this is caused by the defores-
tation of our tropical rainforests, the lungs of our
planet. The UN, together with countries that con-
tain tropical forests, like Brazü and Indonesia, are
very aware of these dangers and have initiated
large-scale reforestation programs to reverse for-
est loss.

But the ultimate success of such efforts will
require significant changes in global demand for
slow-growth forest products, as well as an end to
the financial incentives that now encourage large-
scale deforestation. Paying farmers not to clear
land for new plantings, taxing or even prohibit-
ing the trade in slow-growth forest products, and,
perhaps best of all, widespread promotion of more
sustainable lifestyles (e.g., making bamboo and
cork flooring more fashionable than hardwood)
may have still greater impact in the long run.

• Aquifers were created during the ice age. De-
pleting aquifers to meet water needs can cause

dangerous ground subsidence. For example, over
50 cities in the North China Plain are even now
experiencing destruction of the surface infra-
structure due to the subsidence of depleted un-
derground aquifers. ‘̂ Even though the total effect
is small, industrialized nations should neverthe-
less be wary of depleting aquifers for golf courses,
private swimming pools, and other nonessential
luxury uses—particularly in arid regions ofthe
United States. At present there is no way to re-
verse this depletion. The only way to avoid sub-
sidence is to stop pumping from aquifers.

• The burgeoning middle class in countries like
China and, India has recently installed many air
conditioners.’^ The chemical coolant CFC was
banned by the Montreal Protocol to protect the
ozone layer. But the new HFC coolant, caüed 410a
and labeled “environmentally friendly” because
it spares the ozone, has been found to have 2,100
times the warming effect of carbon dioxide. We
need urgently to find a different coolant chemi-
cal—as we earlier abandoned CFC—if we hope
to reduce the warming effect of the present sys-
tem.

• As mentioned earlier, sea level has been ris-
ing at an accelerating rate of three millimeters a
year since 1990.” Already countries like the
Netherlands, the Maldives, and Indonesia are ex-
periencing inundation. It is possible that some-
time in the future, major coastal cities like New
York, London, and Shanghai will all be sub-
merged. Massive efforts should be started now to
move people from these cities to higher ground.

At the same time, work is in progress in Lon-
don and East Anglia to build dams to protect his-
torical buOdings like Westminster Abbey from in-
undation by the Thames. To alleviate water
shortage, one can recycle waste water. Also, de-
salination of sea water is currently being used in
Australia and the Middle East. Already in Aus-
tralia desalination plants are producing 150 bü-
lion liters of fresh drinking water for Melbourne
and other cities.'”* Eventually cities on the coast of

World Future Review Fall 2012 2 7

China or India may use nuclear reactors with co-
generation to combine energy production with
desalination.

• There is no doubt that present-day lifestyles
will change, but not necessarily for the worse. For
example, food should be produced locally to re-
duce transport costs. Diet will become more veg-
etarian because it takes 2,000-16,000 liters of wa-
ter to produce one kilogram of beef, while one
kilogram of wheat needs only 800-4,000 liters.’^
Overpopulation is partly responsible for the waste
of water in polluted rivers. The lack of sewers in
underdeveloped countries is a major cause. An-
other is the careless or unnecessary use of pesti-
cides and petroleum-related products that lead to
uncontrolled wastewater runoff in developed
countries. Both of these might be eliminated by
improved infrastructure and more effective reg-
ulation and enforcement of environmental
controls.

It is important to realize that we are using up
our resources—metals, materials, etc.—in a
wasteful and unsustainable way. Yet there is much
we can do, such as recycling. As the cost of scarce
materials rises, efficiency and conservation will
be naturally phased in.-” These changes wül be re-
alized in areas such as passive house design, light-
ing, mass transport, and many other spheres. As
for how to cope with shortages of materials, a
good example is that China is now mining rare
earth metals not hitherto used for the essential
CPU (central processing unit) of electronic com-
ponents.” It now holds a near monopoly of these
metals and is able to dictate the market.

It is true that the world is not short of energy
per se, although more and more of it (currently
65% of the energy we use) comes from fossil fuels.
However, the use of these fossil fuels leads to fur-
ther greenhouse emission and global warming—
hence ever greater water and food scarcity. Thus
we are in a vicious circle. The more energy we use,
the more global warming occurs. If we are to have
any hope of dealing with this problem, we must

exploit all available alternative energy sources.
This means that, in addition to developing renew-
able wind, solar, biofuel, hydro, geothermal, and
newer and safer designs for nuclear reactors, we
must take advantage of technology advances in
new methods for extracting energy (e.g., obtain-
ing natural gas from shale—although this, too,
has environmental drawbacks).

Beyond the MegaCrisis
Halal and Marien do not really offer solu-

tions to the MegaCrisis, other than hoping that
humanity’s phenomenal technology progress, in
such areas as information technology, artificial
intelligence, and others may lead in time to bet-
ter governance and world culture. Sadly, “mud-
dling up or down” may buy us some time, but it
is no solution.

However, concomitant to the cultural/eco-
nomic problems posed by the MegaCrisis, there
is another problem that no one addresses: the
capitalist system itself. I am not speaking of
abolishing free markets. For all its obvious
flaws, capitalism as practiced today is still the
best economic system there is. But it is based
on the impossible goal of continuous economic
growth. For growth, we need to use more and.
more energy, more and more resources, and to
continually expand markets—not only by
breeding more and more potential customers,
but also persuading them that they need more
and more possessions and services. And yet we
are in a bounded system. At some stage that
growth has to level off. And it looks as though
right now we are very near the limit set by nat-
ural systems and resources.

The Lesson of Easter Island
In his book Collapse,^” the great anthropolo-

gist Jared Diamond pointed out two groups of civ-
ilizations: those like Easter Island and the Maya,
which eventually failed, and those like Japan and
Iceland, which managed to survive for thousands

2 8 World Future Review Fall 2012

of years. Where do the societies ofthe present day
belong?

For contemporary civilization to survive, we
must work on two fronts: We must maintain a
sustainable environment and keep population low
enough that Earth’s environment can support it.
At present, we are not achieving either.

Take the history of Easter Island as an ex-
ample of a failed civilization. Easter Island’s near-
est neighbors are a thousand miles away. When
any disaster strikes, they can look for no help from
outside. Theirs is a bounded system. Similarly,
our planet is a bounded system. When we have
ravaged our etivironment, we cannot expect the
Martians to come rescue us.

All societies consist of human beings who
possess the same familiar contradictory traits of
aggression, cruelty, and treachery together with
compassion, generosity, and love. It therefore
comes as no surprise that, in general, the collapse
of failed civilizations in the past—including that
of Easter Island—all seem to have followed the
same familiar pattern.

First comes an assault on the environment,
beginning with deforestation to provide for hu-
man habitation and create more arable land. As
the population continues to increase, still more
forest has to be cleared. This is inevitably followed
by soil erosion.” Then, within society there
emerges a governing elite, whose members con-
sume a disproportionately high amount of the
available resources while the rest of the popula-
tion remain essentially paupers. The clans of this
elite vie with each other for wealth and grandeur,
erecting bigger and bigger monuments—such as
those long-eared statues whose ruins make Eas-
ter Island famous to this day.

Human nature being what it is, most people
tend to focus mainly on short-term goals of en-
riching themselves and experiencing pleasure
rather than safeguarding the environment over
the long term. The societies that fail do so because
they are set on a non-sustainable course, and over-

exploit their available resources. Eventually, com-
petition for these diminishing resources leads to
warfare and civil strife, sometimes culminating
in a scarcity of food so great that it leads to can-
nibalism'”‘ and the destruction of everything that
civilization had hitherto achieved.

There is an eerie resemblance of the pre-
dicted MegaCrisls of our society to the history of
Easter Island. Are we on the same path to
self-destruction? Just look at the impact of pop-
ulation pressure on the Amazon basin—about
78 million acres of our tropical forests disappear
each year. Already more than 20% have gone.'”

At this point in our history, we stand at a
crossroads. We can ask ourselves, are we going to
be overwhelmed as a failed society like Easter
Island? Or are we going to flourish like Iceland
and Japan? The choice is ours. Already we are at
the danger point. And there is little time left. The
Earth is warming fast.

The world has experienced water and food
scarcity in its history before. The question facing
us today is just how much scarcity can we endure,
given the clamoring of 7 billion mouths? If we al-
low our present climate change and the resulting
deterioration in food, water, weather, and physi-
cal infrastructure to continue unchecked, then,
carried to its logical extreme, we must reckon with
the ultimate consequences.

Will we really become so short of food that
we have to face cannibalism one day? CNN
founder Ted Turner reached precisely this con-
clusion in his interview with Charlie Rose in
2008.”̂ Turner predicted “mass cannibalism” by
2040 when crops will have been destroyed by
global warming. So perhaps we shall all end up
eating each other? Only, being the richest coun-
try in the world, we Americans may be the last
cannibals on earth!

Epitaph
If our civilization does vanish—and I say if—

it will be because we have so overcrowded and

World Future Review Fall 2012 2 9

damaged our planet that it becomes uninhabit-
able. It is our responsibility not to let this happen.
As James Lovelock, the distinguished environ-
mentalist, put it:

We are the intelligent elite among
animal life on earth and whatever our
mistakes, [Earth] needs us. This may
seem an odd statement after all that I
have said about the way 20th century hu-
mans became almost a planetary disease
organism. But it has taken [Earth]
2.5 biUion years to evolve an animal that
can think and communicate its thoughts.
If we become extinct she has little chance
of evolving another.”

Suppose however, that the worst occurred,
and humans were wiped out. And suppose fur-
ther that, after perhaps a million years, our planet
did manage to recover sufficiently from the rav-
ages inflicted on it that another race—not neces-
sarily similar to our own—sprang up and devel-
oped their own science. Imagine how their
paleontologists and archaeologists might inter-
pret.whatever relics might survive from human
civilization, and how they might speculate on
what caused us to vanish, just as we speculate
about Easter Island today.

They might compose an epitaph for us along
the following lines: “Here there once existed a very
clever race. They developed incredible technol-
ogy—even went to the moon and changed the
planet’s climate. But they allowed their popula-
tion to grow unchecked and consequently as-
saulted their environment in an unsustainable
way, and in the process, brought about their own
destruction.”

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3 2 World Future Review Fall 2012

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