Philosophy
See attached.
Assignment 1
Papers must: • Defend a thesis and should proceed according to the following format: Thesis, Argument, Objection(s), Response(s), and Conclusion. • Include citations to the primary required class readings. These and any additional sources must be properly cited using MLA format. • Fall within the following length requirements: 1200-1500 words. Use a standard 10-12 pt. font and be double-spaced.
The Critical Writing Assignment 1
Due at the end of Module Three.
For this assignment, please make sure to analyze and discuss one (and only one!) of
the following two classical arguments for the existence of God:
1. St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument
2. Clarke’s Cosmological Argument
You may argue either for or against the soundness of the argument, but you must take
up and defend a specific position.
Make sure to submit the Critical Writing Assignment 1 no later than Sunday 11:59 PM
EST/EDT. (This Dropbox basket is linked to Turnitin.)
PHI 110RS
Critical Writing Assignment Guidelines & Rubric
There will be two (2) critical writing assignments. Topics for each writing assignment are in Module 3
(Assignment 1) and Module 6 (Assignment 2).
Some generic requirements to be observed for all Writing Assignments include that all papers must:
Defend a thesis and should proceed according to the following format: Thesis, Argument,
Objection(s), Response(s), Conclusion
Include citations to the primary required class readings. These and any additional sources must
be properly cited using MLA format.
Fall within the following length requirements: 1200-1500 words.
Use a standard 10-12 pt. font and be double spaced.
Critical Writing Assignments 1 and 2 are due no later than Sunday 11:59 PM EST/EDT of Modules 3
and 6 respectively. (These Dropbox baskets are linked to Turnitin.)
Information on MLA Citation style can be found here: https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/747/01/
SEE RUBRIC ON NEXT PAGE
https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/747/01/
TOTAL: ___ / 120
Elements
Criteria
Score
Not Attempted
(Criterion is
missing or not in
evidence)
0-11.99%
Novice
(does not meet
expectations;
performance is
substandard)
12-13.99%
Basic
(works towards
meeting expectations;
performance needs
improvement)
14-15.99%
Proficient
(meets expectations;
performance is
satisfactory)
16-17.99%
Exemplary
(exceeds expectations;
performance is
outstanding)
18-20%
Paper Topic
16.66%
Paper contains
no thesis and/or
does not
address the
essay prompt.
Thesis is difficult
to discern and/or
fails to address
multiple parts of
the essay prompt.
Thesis is discernible,
but not explicitly
stated in introductory
paragraph and/or
addresses most, but
not all, of parts of the
essay prompt.
Thesis statement is
present in introductory
paragraph, but it is wordy,
generic or unclear and/or
paper addresses all parts
of the essay prompt, but
not adequately.
Thesis statement is
present in introductory
paragraph. It is concise,
articulate, and narrowly
focused. Paper
adequately addresses all
parts of the essay prompt.
__/20
Length
Requirements
16.66%
There was little
or no evidence
of a complete
assignment.
Paper is entirely
too short.
Paper contains a
great deal of “fluff”
and still doesn’t meet
the length
requirements
Paper is on the short side
or meets requirements
only because it contains
“fluff.”
Paper falls within the
required length
requirements without
going off topic.
__/20
Mechanics of
Writing
16.66%
Little to no
evidence of
proper writing
mechanics.
The grammar of
the paper greatly
impedes
understanding of
content.
Organizational
structure is
unclear.
Paper needs a good
deal of improvement
with respect to
grammar, spelling,
and/or style.
Organization and/or
flow of ideas need
improvement.
Paper is mostly free of
errors with respect to
grammar, spelling, and/or
style, but needs some
improvement.
Organizational structure
is adequate.
Paper is nearly perfect
with respect to grammar,
spelling, and style.
Organizational structure
is clear and the paper
flows nicely.
__/20
Conceptual
Analysis &
Thoughtful
Engagement
16.66%
Paper exhibits a
complete lack of
thoughtful
engagement with
the text.
Concepts are
identified, but not
clearly defined.
No attempt to
elaborate/
exemplify.
Paper exhibits
very little
thoughtful
engagement with
the text. Few
concepts are
clearly defined
using
elaboration/
exemplification.
Paper exhibits basic
engagement with text,
but needs
improvement. Some
concepts are clearly
defined using
elaboration/
exemplification,
Paper exhibits thoughtful
understanding of the text,
but some improvement
needed. Most concepts
are clearly defined using
elaboration/
exemplification.
Paper does an excellent
job demonstrating an
accurate understanding of
the text and goes beyond
mere summary.
All relevant concepts are
clearly defined using
elaboration/
exemplification.
__/20
Points of View/
Consideration
of Objections
16.66%
Paper does not
acknowledge the
existence of
alternative points
of view. Does
not state
objections to
thesis.
Acknowledges
existence of more
than point of view,
but does not clear
articulate a
specific objection
and respond.
Acknowledges
existence of more
than point of view, but
considers only one.
States a specific
objection to thesis,
but makes no clear
attempt to respond.
Acknowledges existence
of more than point of
view. States at least one
objection to thesis and
responds, but needs
some improvement.
Acknowledges existence
of more than point of
view. Clearly and
articulately states at least
one objection to thesis
and then adequately
responds to the objection.
__/20
MLA
Style/Citations
16.66%
Paper lacks both
in-text citations
and a proper
works cited list.
Paper lacks either
in-text citations or
a proper works
cited list, but not
both.
Paper contains in-text
citations and a works
cited list, but does not
follow MLA style.
Paper contains in-text
citations and a works
cited list, but several
stylistic errors are
present.
Paper contains proper in-
text citations and a works
cited list. Few stylistic
errors are present.
__/20
r
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,..
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Unit 0: An Introduction to Thinking Critically
Module 1 – Logic and Critical Thinking
Readings: Solomon and Higgins, “A Little Logic”; Solomon and Higgins, “Deductive Logic Valid
Argument Forms”; Solomon and Higgins, “Common Informal Fallacies”
Unit 1: The Real and the Rational
Module 2 – Evidentialism
Reading: Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief’
Module 3- Classical Theistic Arguments
Readings: Anselm, “The Ontological Argument”; Thomas Aquinas, “The Five Ways”; Rowe, “An
Examination of the Cosmological Argument”; Paley, “The Watch and the Watchmaker”; Collins,
“A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God”
Module 4 – Problem of Evil
Readings: Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence”; Plantinga, “The Free Will Defense”; Hick, “Evil and
Soul-Making”; Rowe, “The Inductive Argument from Evil Against the Existence of God”
Unit 2 – Experience and the Real
Module 5 – Pragmatism and Reformed Epistemology
Readings: Pascal, “The Wager”; James, “Will to Believe”; Bergmann, “Rational Religious Belie
f
without Arguments”
Module 6- Existentialism and Mysticism
Readings: Kierkegaard, “Truth is Subjectivity”; Selections of Mystical Experiences, James,
“Mysticism”; Alston, “Perceiving God”
Unit 3 – Paths to the Real
Module 7 – Problem of Religious Diversity
I
Readings: Dalai Lama, “Buddhism, Christianity, and the Prospects for World Religion”; Hick,
“Religious Pluralism and Ultimate Reality”
Module 8 – Problem of Religious Diversity II
Readings: Plantinga, “A Defense of Religious Exclusivism”; Basinger, “Hick’s Religious Pluralism
and ‘Reformed Epistemology’-A Middle Ground”
h,
I
‘
R Dean Davenport
Highlight
U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 107
Fair Use, Educational Purpose
138 PART II• TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
II.A.1
The Ontological Argument
ST. ANSELM
St. Anselm (1 033-11 09), Abbot cif Bee and later Archbishop cif Canterbury, is the originator cif one
of the most intriguing arguments ever devised by the human mind, the ontological argument for the
existence of a supremely peifect being. After the short selection from Anselm’s Proslogion, there
From Motw/ogiou and Proslogion, with the replies ~{ C.1ut1i/o ami Anselm, trans. with introduction and notes by Thomas Williams.
(Indianapolis. IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.) © 1996 by Thon’las Williams. Used with penuission.
\
~··.
eST, ANSELM,•:TH·E QNJQLOGICAV.ARGUM.ENT 139
follows a briif selection from Gaunito ‘s reply,. In Behalfof the Fool; and a cQUnterrespoi:lse
by Anselm: . .
[ST, ANSEL.M’S
PRESENTATION]
Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to
faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful for
me, I may understand tharyou eX:istas we believe you
exist, and that you are what we believe you to he.
Now we believe that you are something than which
nothing greater can he thought. So can it be that no
such nature exists, since ”The fool has saidinhisheart
‘There isho God”‘ (P5alm 14;1; 53:1)? But when thi~
same fool hears me say “something than whfchcnoth-
ing greater can be thought,” he surely understands
what he hears; and what he understands exiSts in his
understanding, 1 even ifhti·does not understand that it
exists [in tealityl For it is one thing for ari object to
exist in the understanding and quite another to under-
stand that the object exists [in reality]. When a painter;
for example\ thinks out in advance what he is going to
paint, he has it in his understandihg, but he does not
yet understand·that it exists;· since· he has not ·yet
painted it. But once he has painted·it, he both·has it
in his understanding and understands that it ex:ists
because he has now painted it. So even the fool
inust admit that something than which nothing
greater can be thought exists at least in his ull.derstand..:
ing~ since he’ understands this when he hears it, and
whatever is understood exists in the ·understanding.
And surely that thari which a greater cannot be
thought c1nhot exist only in the understanding. For
ifitexists ·only in the understanding; ‘it can be thought
to exist .in realitY as well, which is grdter. So if that
than which a greatercannotbe thought exists only iri
the understanding; then thatthan which a greater can”
not be thought is that than which a greater can be
thought. But that is dearly impossible. Therefore;
there is no doubtthatsomethirig th1mwhi€h a greater
cannot be • thought exists both· in the understanding
and in reality ….
This· [being] • exists so truly· that it cannot be thought
not to exist. For it is possible to think: that something
exists that cannot be :thought not to exist, and such a
being is greater than one thatcan be thought not to
exist: Therefore; ifthat than which a greater cannot
be thobght.can bethought not to: exist; then .that
than which a greater·cam1ot. be .thought is not that
than which a greater cannot he thought; and· this ·is a
contradiction. So that than which a. greater cannot
be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought
not to exist.
And this is you, 0 Lord our God. You exist so
truly, 0 Lord my God, that you cannot be thought
not to e~d~t .. :And r~ghtly so,· (or •if ~ome @nd could
think something better than you, a creatur~ would
rise; above the c;reator and sit injudgmen,t upon
him; which is completely absurd. Jndeed, ev<;ry-
thing that exists; ex:cept for you alone, .c:an be
thought not. to exist. So yc)u alone among aU things
have existence mos.t truly, ;and therefore most
greatly. Whatever else. exists has existence less
truly, and therefore l~ss greatly. So .then why did
"the foolsay in his heart, 'There is. no God,'nwhen
it is so e;yident to tqe ratiqnal mind th;ttyouamong
all, beings exist most ,greatly? Whyjnde,ed, except
because he is stupid and a fool? ...
But how, has he said in his heart.what he could•not
think? Or. how, could he not· think what he said in
his heart; since to.say inone’s heart is the same as to
think? But if he really-:-or rather;csince.he ·really.,.-‘-
thought this, be€ause he said it in his heart,. and did
not say it in his heart, because .he could not think it,
there must be more than one way in which. some-
thing is “said in one’~ heart” or ”thought,~’ In one
sense of the word, to think a thing is to think the
word that signifies that thing, But in •another sense,
it is to understand what exactly the thing is. God
can be thought,notto exist.in thefitstsense;butnot
at all in the second sense. No one who understands
what God is can think thatGod .does not ·exist,
although he may say these•wotds in his heart with
no signification at all, or with some peculiar signifi-
cation. For God is that than which a greater cannot
140 PART II • TRADITIONAl \ARG l.JMENTS FOR’THB EXISTENCE OF GOD
be thought. Whoever understands this ;properly,
understands that this being exists in such a way
, that he cannot, even in thought, tail to exist. So
whoever· understands~. that God; exists.in this way
cannot think·that he does not exist.
. Thanks be to you, my good Lord, thanks be
to you .. For what I once believed through:,your
grace; I now understand through your’·illumina-‘
tion, so’ that even if I .did·not wanLJo believe tha:t
you exist, I could not fail to understand’tliat· you
exist. …
[GAUNILO”S CRITICISM]
“For example, there are those’ who say thafsome-
where in the ocean iS an. island, whii:::h,’bebuse of
the difficulty-“‘-otrather, impossibility..:…..:of finding
what dOes ‘not exist, some call ‘the’ Lost . ISland’!
This: isliuid”(so the ‘story goes) is more plentifully
endowed than even the IsleS:· ofthe Blessed with
an indescribable abundance of ‘a}} sorts ·Of riches
and delights: And beduse”it has neither dwil.er
nor inhabitant, it is everywhere sl1pehor iri its abun~
dant riches to’ all the otlier lands that htimari ‘bein:gs
inhabit.
“Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is
easily told and• involves no difficulty,”and so··I
understand it. But ··if’ this person went on to draw
a conclusion, and say,. ‘You cannot any’longer
doubt that this iSland; more excellent than all others
on earth, truly exists somewhere in reality: For yot1
do not doubt that this· island exists in your under-
standing; and since it is.more excellent to exist not
merely in the understanding, but also in realitY,
this island must also exist· in reality, For ifit did
not, any land that exists in’ reality would be greater
than it. ‘And so this more excelk~nt thin,g that
you have understood would not in f~ct be more
excellent.’..,.If, I say, he should tty to convince me
by, this argument that I should no longer doubt
whether the island truly exists, either F•would
think he wasj6king, or I would not kilow whom
I· ought to think more foolish: myself,. if I grant
him his conclusion, or him, if he thinks he has
established the existence of that island with any
degree of certainty, without first. showmg that its
excellence exists in my understanding as a thing
that truly and un:dotihtedly~>exiSci and not in any
way like someth~g (alse or uncertain.” …
(S;J . .: ANSELM’S;REJ.QI NOER]
But, you ·say, this; is just the samG· as·if. someone
were .. to claim .. that it cannot· be doubted that.a
certain island in the ocean,. surpassing, all o.ther
lands in its fertility (whicildrom the difUqdty ~
onather, impossibUity-:-:af finding what •does not
exist, is ;called “the Lost .Island”), .tr.uly .exists in
rGality, because .someone, can easily understand it
when itis described to him in words.) say quite
qonfidently that if anyone can find .for me· some-,
tl}ing existing. either in reality or only in. thought
to which he can apply this. inferente in myargu.,
ment, besides that than which a.greater cannot bG
thought, I will find and give tQ ·him that Lost
ISland, never to be lost again. In fact, l}oweyer, it
has a4eady become , quite clear ·that that than
which;a greater. cannot bG thought cannot be
thought not to exist, since its existence is a matter
ofsuch certain truth. For otherwise it would not
exist at. all.
Finally, i£ someone says that he .thinks it does
not ·exiSt; I say that when. he thinks this, either he
is thinking something than which a greater. cannot
be thought,; or heis I1ot, If he is not, then he is not
thinking that it dqesnot.exi:;~; since.heis·notthinb
ing it at all. £utjfhe is, he is surely thinking some-
thing that cann()t. be thought not to e:l{ist. ·For if i~
could. be thought not to. exist, it .could be thought
t(.) have a begirming and art end; which is impossi,..
blec. Therefore;. SOI11eone. who is thinking. it, is
thinlqng something ~hat.cannot be thought .not to
exist,, i\nd of course someone who is thinking this
does not think that that very thing doe$ not. exist,
Otherwise he would be thinking something that
cannot be thought. Therefore, that than: which a
greater cannot be· thought’ cannot be· thought not to
exist ….
‘
‘
(
IMMANUEL KANT • A CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 141
NOTE
1. The word here translated “understanding” is
“intellectus.” The text would perhaps read better if!
translated it as “intellect,” but this would obscure
the fact that it is from the same root as the verb
“intelligere,” “to understand.” Some of what
Anselm says makes a bit more sense if this fact is
constantly borne in mind.
From Kant’s Critique~( Pure Reason, translated by J. M. 0. Meiklejohn (New York: Colonial Press, 1900). Translation revised by
Louis Pojman.
‘ ‘
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f
11.8.’1
T.he Five: Ways
THOMAS AQUINAS .
T11e Dominican .friar. T11omas’ Aquinas . ( r 22 5-127 4) is considered by ·many to. be th~ greatest theo-
logian in W~tern reli.iion. The five ways tifshowing.’the existence o/ God given ‘In ‘this. selection are .. ·
versions Of the cosmological a;_gument. The first way concerns the fact that there is change(?’ motion) and.
argues that there must be an Unmov:d Mover that originates all change ?ut itself is. not m~ed. T11e
second way is from the idea of causation dna argues that there tnust’ lieafirst, unca~sed cause to ex,plai~
the exist~nce oj’all othercauses. T11ethird way is .from the ideaq[conting~ncy: It argues thaf. 6eca~se
there aredependeYJt beings (e.g., humans), there must be an indep~nilent or necessary being qtiwhoin the
dependent beings rely jodheir subsistence: The fourth way is frmii e;;cellence, and itargties ·that because
there are degrees o/ excellehce,there must be a peifect bei.iigftom whence all excellences come ;The final
··way is ftom the h-armony o/ things;· T1ure is a harmony o/ nature, which’ calls for qn explanation. The
only ‘suffidehi explamition is that. there is a divine de~gner’ who planned’ this ham;ony.
147
ARTICLE 3:’D’OES G’Ob EXIST? B~t l.t seems that e~erythirig that happen~ in the
, ~ :’ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ – ‘ – – ” . , — — – –‘ — – – _. 1 – -‘ ‘ t – , •
If seems that God does not exist:
Objectiont:Ifone ofa pair of contraries
were infinite, it .would ‘totally destroy the other
contrary. But by the name ‘God’ one means a cer:-
tain infinite good. Therefore, if God existed,. there
would be nothing eviL But there is evil in the
world. Therefore, God does not exist.
Objection 2: What ~an be accoQlplished with
fewer principles isnot done thro~gh more principles:
world could’ have been accomplished .. through
other principles~ ~venif Godclidnot exist; for things
that are . natural are traced back to hature ·.as a princi-
ple, whereas thing.; that are purposeful are. traced
back to human reas~n· mwil! i1S a principle. There-
fore, there.is no. need.to .ciaiii:i.that God.·exists.
But contrary to .thls::Exodusl:14 says.urider
the perso~age of God, “I im Who ain.”
I respond: There are five ways to ‘proVe that
God exists. · ·
Printed with the pen11ission of the thnslator, Alfred). Freddoso: This translation is being published by Saint Augustine’s Preis’.
148 PARTII•TRADITIONALARGLIMENTSFOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
The first and clearest way is that taken from
motion:
It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in
this world some things are moved.
But everything that is moved is moved by
another. For nothing is moved except insofar as it
is in potentiality with respect to that actuality toward
which it is moved, whereas something effects
motion insofar as it is in actuality in a relevant
respect. After all, to effect motion is just to le~d
something from potentiality into actuality. But a
thing cannot be led from potentiality into actuality
except through some being that is in actuality in a
relevant respect; for example, something that is hot
in actuality—-say, a fire-makes a piece \ofwood, ·
which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality,
and it thereby moves and alters the piece of :wood,
But it is impossible for something to be simulta-
neously in potentiality and in actuality with respect
to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and
in actuality only :with I:espec~ to differ;ent things: For
what is hot in actualityc:umot simultai}e(msly be hot
in potentiality; rather, ,it is dold i11 potentiality.
Therefore, .it is in1possible. ‘that. soiil.ething should
be both moverand ~oved i11 th.e sam~ way’imd
with respect.to the sam~ thillg, or; in ~ther words,
that somet~ing, ~hould. n1ov~ itSeff; Til~!~fore, every-
thing that is moved nn1st pe moved by~another.
If, then, that by whishs~m~tliing is ITiove(is
itself lllO'[ed, then jt, too, must be moved by
another, and that oth~t:. by still another.l;>ut this ·
does not go on to infinity. For if it ·. d1d, then
there. would not be any first mover and, ;}S a result,
none of the others wduld effect IIl.otiop, eithe~. For
secondary movers effect modo~ only because they
being moved by a first mover,justas astick do~s
not effect. motion except because it is being moved
by a h,and. Therefore, ()ne has to arrive at some first
mover that is rw( being moved byanyfhing. And
this is what everyone t;tkes to be God. ‘
The’ second way is based on the notion of an
efficient cause: ·· . .
· · · We find that among sensible· things there is .an
ordering of efficient causes, and yet we do ·not
find-nor is it possible to find-‘-anything that is
an efficient cause of its ownsel£ .for if.something
were an efficient cause of itself, then it would be
prior to itself-which is impossible.
But it is impossible to go on to infinity among
efficient causes. For in every case of ordered effi-
cient causes, the first is a cause of the intermediate
and the intermediate is a cause of the last-and this
regardless of whether the intermediate is constituted
by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is
removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there
· w,ere no first among the efficient causes, then nei-
ther would there be a last or an intermediate. But if
the efficient causes went on to infinity, there would
not be a first efficient cause, and so there would not
be a last effect or any intermediate efficient causes,
either~W.hich is obviously false. Therefore, one
must posit some first efficient cause–which every-
, one calls God.
The third way is taken from the possible and
the necessary, and it goes like this:
Certain of the things we find in the world are
able t!) exist and able not to exist; for some things
are found to be generated and co~pted .and, as a
result, they areable tO (!XiSt .and able nOt tO exist.
. ‘ But it is impossible that everYthingshquld be like
this;fo~ that whichisable not tp exist is. such that at
some tiro~ It does~otexist. Therefore, if everything
is such that it is.;tb}e n()tto exist, then at some time
~othing .e~isted ih the world. But ifthi~ \Vere true,
then nothingwould.exi~t.even t!Ow … Fo~what does
not e~iSt:heg41sto exist only thrqugn soll].e~ing that
does exist; therefore! ifthere we.re no beiilgs, then it
was impossible that anything should have begun to
exist, an!f. so rr()thiJ:lg would .exist no\V~\Vhich is
obviously £alse. therefore, not all beings are. able to
exist [and able not to exist]; rather, it mt~st l;>e that
there is.s()mething necessaryinthe worla: ….•..
· ..
. Now every nece.ss:try.b~ing eitl~er has’a·cause of
its necessity from Ot}tslde ~ts.elfor it does.not: But it is
impossible to go on tt?, infinity among Ilecessary
b(!mgs that havea cau.se of their .. necessicy;in . the
same way, as was p~ovelrabo~e, that itis illlpossible
tp go on to infihity among efficient .causes. The~e
fqre, one m~st posit something that. is nece~;try per se,
which does not have acause ofi~ necessity from out.:.
side itself but is instead a cause of necessity for the
o~her.[necessary] things. But tb.is everyone.callsGod.o
SAM t;J,EL CLARKE:• THE ARGUMENT FRQM,(ON·TINGEN.CY 149
The fourth way is taken from the gradations that
are found in the world:
In the world some things are found to be more
and less good, more and less true, more and less noble,
etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse things
insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is
maximal in a given respect. For instance, the hotter
something is, the closer it approaches that which is
maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is
maximally true, maximally good, and maximally
noble, and, as a result, is a maximal being; for accord-
ing to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are
maximally true are maximally beings.
But, as is claimed in the same book, that which
is maximal in a given genus is a cause of all the
things that belong to that genus; for instance, fire,
which is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things.
Therefore, there is something that is a cause for all
beings of their esse, their goodness, and each of their
perfections-and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of
things:
We see that some things lacking cognition,
viz., natural bodies, act for the sake of an end.
This is apparent from the fact that they always or
very frequently act in the same way in order to
Reprinted from A Discourse Conceming NatuMI Religion (1705).
bring about that which is best, and from this it is
dear that it is not by chance, but by design, that
they attain the end.
But things lacking cognition tend toward an
end only if they are directed by something that
has cognition ~nd intelligence, in the way that an
arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, there is
something intelligent by which all natural things are
ordered to an end-and this we call God.
Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in
the Enchiridion, “Since God is maximally good,
He would not allow any evil to exist in His
works if He were not powerful enough and good
enough to draw good even from evil.”
Therefore,
it is part of God’s infinite goodness that He should
permit evils and elicit goods from them.
Reply to objection 2: Since it is by the direc-
tion of a higher agent that nature acts for the sake of a
determinate end, those things that are done by nature
must also be traced back to God as a first cause. Simi-
larly, even things that are done by design must be
traced back to a higher cause and not to human reason
and will. For human reason and will are changeable
and subject to failure, but, as was shown above, all
things that can change and fail must be traced back
to a first principle that is unmoved and necessary per se.
150 PART II “TRADITIONA(ARGUMENTS FOR ‘THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
11.8.3
An Examination of the Cosmological Argument
WILLIAM ROWE
Briif biographical remarks about William Rowe appear bifore selection I. B. 9. In the present selection,
taken from the second edition tif his Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (1993), Rowe
begins by distinguishing between apriori and a posteriori arguments and setting the cosmological argument
From Rowe, l’hilosoplly of Religion, 2nd edition.© 1993 Wadsworth, a part ofCengage Learning, Inc.
Reproduced by pennission. www.cengage.com/pennissions
‘·
-!’·
WILLIAM ROWE • A.N EXAMINATION OF THE COSMOL0(31CAL ARGUMENT 151
in historical perspective. Next, he divides the argument into two parts: that which seeks. to prove the. •
existence of a self-existent being and thatwltich seeks to, prove that this.self-e;xiStent being is the· God;of. .
theism. He introduces the principle of sufficient reason..,.,-“There•mustbe an explanation (a)ojthe ·.·· ··
existence of any being and (b) of any positivejact whatever”,..-,andshows.itsrole in the cosmological·.;
argument. In the light ofthis principle, he .examines the argument itseifand four objections to it.
STATING THE:AR;GUMENT
Argt!mel’lts for the existence of God are tonihionly
divided into a posteriori arguments and a prjori argu-
ments. An a posteriori argument depends on a prin-
ciple or premise that can be kn:own’C>nly by means
of our experience of the world. An a priori argu-
ment, on th~ other hand, purpo~s to rest on prin-
ciples all of “‘hich can· be’ knowit. independently of
our experience of the world, by just reflecting on
and understandirig them. Of the three· major argu-
ments for the eXistence ofGod-the Cosmological,
the Teleological, and the Ontological..:.._orily the
last 6fthese is entirely a priori. Intlie Cosn1ological
Al:gul:nent one startS from some simple fact about
the world, such as that it contains thirigs which
are caused to exist by other things. In the Teleolog-
ical Argument a somewhat more complicated. fuct
about the world :serves as a starting poirit, the
fad thanhe world exhibits order and •design. In
the Ontological’:Argumerit, however, one· begiris
siinply with a concept of’God ….
··Before we state ·the Cosmological Argument existence is itselfuncaused. And in-. the thir,4 argu”” We noted above that a; second major develop- ~-· I . 152 PART II•’T:RADITIONAL A·RGUMENTS n:>R THE EX’ISTENCE· OF~”GOD
Leibniz (1646″-1716), and especiaUy in the whtings The first part qf the eighteenth-“d:ntury form of In stating the first part of the Cosmological these two• concepts; thee> concept of a dependent T Every beirig (tliat’ exists or ever dl:d’exist) is 2. Nqt every being can be a depenqe,nt being.
Therefore, 3. . Ih~re exists ,a self-exis~ent. being.
I)EDU(:TtV.E VAL.IDlTY
Before we loo~ critically at each of the premises of 1. Babe Ruth is the Presidentof’the Onited · States.
The Presidentbf th;’Uriited States is from Therefore, 3. Babe Ruth.is from Indi:ma. · The argument is deductively valid because ‘ ‘ f WI LLIAM,ROWE • AN cEXAM I N’ATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAlARG U MENT ~53
the President be from Indiana, and yet Babe Ruth ,The Cosmological Argument (that is; its first PSR AND THE fiRSfPREMISE
At first glance the first premise might appear to be a. explained by another
b. explained by nothing
c. explainedpyitself
What otir first prernise asserts is that each being that Ea,rlier we saw that Anselm accep~ed. as a •basic The Principle ofSufficient Reason, as it was Since the proponent of the Cosmological 154 PART II•’TRAPITIONAI!.’ARGUMENTS FOR THE” EXISTENCE OF GOD’
into ;the deepyr question -of whether the proponent . PSR.itself. But: we shall p’ut.this question aside•for THE S’E.COND PREMISE .
According to· the· second- premise; not every· being every being that exists or did exist is· an A and A.popular butmistaken idea1of how the pro- 1. ·There must be afl;stbeingio start any cau~al 2. If eyery ,l?eing were dependent there would,be Therefore, 3. Not every being can be a dependent being.
Although this argument is. deductively valid,. and its in . the. series there . wollld be’ a .• piece ding. A reason for’ making tlut assumptiop ….•.. ··. •·••· · .. · … ·•·.·.· .. · .· Cosmological Argument recognizedthatthe cahsal ‘ I I WILLIAM’ROWE •’ AN EXAMINATION: OFTH E’CiOSMOLOGICALcARGUMENT 155
a .time, each,one:perishing as it produces the next in QUESTIONING THE
JUSTIFICA’TlON OF THE
SECOND PREMI.SE
Critics of the Cosmological Argument ha:ve raised The first criticism is that the proponent ofthe therefory, requires ari explanation .of•its. existence: A second ‘criticism i~ that the ·p~8ponent makes A third criticism is that the proponent•pf the Finally, even if the proponent of the. Cosmo., r-., 156 PART II• TRADITIONAt ARGUMENTS F~R THE· EX”ISTE:NCE OFcGOD’.
We must now see what £an be said•ip. response to ·Responses to’ Cfiticism
It is certainly ·a mistake. to think that a collection of The.csecond criticism attributes to the propo- {. Every wember of the coll~~~on’qfdependent Therefore, ‘
2. The collection of depend~nt b~ings has a cause As we noted in setting forth this :criticism, argu~ the proponent of the Cosmological:Argumentneed The third objection contends that to explain the In order for there to be an;explanation of the / WILLIAM ROWE •AN ;EXAMINATION, OF THE.CcOS.MOLOGICAL .ARGUM.ENT 1.57
require that the following two conditions be C1. ‘fhere is an explanation of the ~xistence of~ach · beings. · ·.· . · ·
C2 . .There is ~n explanati9n of why .there.are any According to the propon~nts of the Cosmological ”Although the issue is a complicated one, I think G, we shall. say,;·has always·existed and always wilL On thi~ diagra~thereis riofirstfu~mber ofth~ col, Someone might object that we hav~n’t really ~-‘ : – die onei (eX:plaining’ why each dependent being In the examples we’ve considered, we have gone 1 some other dependent \:Jeing, . ad infinitull1·. This THE TRUTH OFPSR
we .c9ine now to the final criticism ofthe reasoning. fact that~ dependent beings • exist and have always The proponent reasons that if every being were , – – – – – — ~ – – – – – -·
quently, ife\!ery being were dependent, the fact \
( WILLIAM ROWE • AN EXAMINATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 159
important questions, and any fmal judgment of the Most of the theologians and philosophers who The second way philosophers and theologians explanation. Nature is not bound to satisfY our pre- Our study of the first part of the Cosmological NOTES
1. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Surnnza Theologica, Ila. 2. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, r WltUAM,~AL’EY • THE,,WATCH ‘AN,D.T.HEWATCHMAK£R
, U.C.1
WILLIAM PALEY
William Paley (1.7 43~ 1805), Archdeacon
From William Paley, Natural 711eology, or Evitletu:es of tlie Exiswnce and Atrtibutes 4 the Deity Collecte,Jjrom tlteAppe~rances oF ~’ 181 I 182 PART’II • TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FORTH E: EXISTENCE OF GOD
a subtle and complex artifact like a watch, so too we must infer the existence c.if an intelligent Grand STATEMENT OF THE
ARGUMENT
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against so regulating that motion as to temlinate in causing I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the con- . such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of under- ·~ :i.. WIL.tiAM f’AL’EY’fTHE.WATCH AND:THE WATCHMAI<::ER 183
II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate :0ur III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncer- IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses configuration ihight be the structufe.riow exhib- y.Nor, fifthly, wouldit yield his inquiry IlJ,Or,e, VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that vn. And not less surprised to be informed, that VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be 184 PART “11 • TRADITIONAl ARGOMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE Of GOD
,APPLICATION OF THE
‘ARGUMENT,
~very ,i,ndication ~f contrivance, . ~very manifesta- 1of n~ture S!,Upass the
contrivanceS’.>of ait,. in the complexity,· subtilty, From David Hume, Dialogue Concemit~g Natiot1a/ Religiofl (1779) London: Longman ·c.;ieen, 1878.
\ \. 202 PART II•TRAOITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
11.(.4
A Scientific Argument for the
Existence of God Robin Collins (1961- ) is professor of philosophy at Messiah College, and he has written several I. INTRODUCTION
The Evidence of Fine-Tuning
Suppose we went on a mission to Mars, and found explanation we can think of-that the structure The universe is analogous to such a “biosphere,” From Reasot1 for rile Hope Within, Michael J. Murray, ed., © 1999, Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI. Used with pennission.
\ I ROBIN COLLINS <• A SCJENTIFIC ARGUMENTFO,RTH.E:·EXISTENCE,OF GOD 203
hydrogen atoms could not’ forr:h breakable bridges ·Scientists; <:all this· .. extraordinary . balancing' :of
the·paranieters .of physics and. the initial conditions
of the universe the "fme-tuning of the cosmos." It
has been extensively discussed by philosophers,
theologians> and scientists; especially: since .. the r a6 ‘not believe that any . scientists \Vho A few examples. ofthis fine-tuning •are listed· beloWJ
1. Ifthe’initial explosiori of the big ban,g hafdif: 2. Calculations. indicate. that: i[th~ strong n~clear · · weaker by as little as five percent,; :life would :be 3. Calculatihns By ‘Brandon Cartt+ show’ that’ if · part in “10~0, then ‘life-“sU:stamirig staidike the 4. Ifthe·fi~U:tro~ wefe not’aboutr:oofHmesth~ 5. If the elect~()magnetic force were slighfly Imaginatively, one could think of each instance of Although indiVidual·calculations of fine::.tu:nirig What is’ controversial/ liowever, is the degtee to 204 PART II•TRADITIONAlARGUMENH’ FOR THETXISHNCE OF GOD
alsd ,many theists .. I have known~ for. instance,’,both a ‘ ” ” ,. ‘ ‘ ‘. . ‘ f . . ~ ‘ ‘ ‘ • ‘ • ·’ ‘ . • .
unconvinced because of certain. atheist objections to A Preliminary Distinction
To develop the fine-tuning argument rig()rot;tsly, it Plim of the Chapter
:ijelow, we w,ill use. this distinctip:Q between the reaSons to).prefet theism. oveFthe atheistic II. CORE ARGUMENT
RlGOR.OUSLV FORMULATED
Gen~ral Principle of Reasoning_ ‘used .
The Principle Explained We will fornmlate the \ / ROBIN COHINS •-A SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT: FOR-THE EXISiH NCE OrGOD 205
present a -more fonnaLand ··elaborated rendition of Additi.onal Illustrations .of the Principle For our Or consider· another case’, thaf of’ finding· the Support for ,the Principle Several t~ings can be principle. appears to have .a·wide range .ofrapplita’– Further DeveiQpmellt of Argument
Tb fi.ttthet develop core Veri>ibrl :of’the firte- • Premise 1 .. The existence of the fine..,tuning is • Premise 2. The existence· of the fine..: tuning is • Conclusion: ‘Fr6m. pien{ises (l). and. (2) anH th~. At this point, we should paQse to note t:wo featt._u::es In this . way; the ·•· evidence of the’ fine-:-ttming ~- I ~ defendant at a party at the • time ofthe shooting.· In The ~econd feature of the argument we should Support ·for. the. Premises Support for Premise (2) Upon looking at the data, galaxy, and the conditions necessary for life to exist Typically; advocates of. the fine~tiihing ·argu”‘ Ill. SOME OBJECTIONS TO CORE VERS.ION
As powerful as the c~~e versi;n ~fthe fue,-tuhing Objection 1: Mote ‘Fundamental
law Objection
One criticism of the· fine..::tuning argument· is that;· as Besides being• entirely speculative, the problem \ ROBIN COLLINS •:A SCIE·NTIFIC ARGUMENJ.FORTH.E.EXlSJE.NCE•OF GOD 207
be, the universe .just happens to have the. one. that A similar sort of response can be given to the Objection 2: Other Forms of
Lif~ Olljettion
Another objection people commonly raise to the is simply.cl’wt enough’ stable complexjty, So,dn’gen~ ‘ -_’ ,_; _,-_;;_, ‘,
•Objection. 3: Anthropic PrinCiple ·
‘ obj~ctiori
Acco.rding to. the we;aLversion of the so-called To further illustrate this response, consid~r the ·objection 4: The HWho Designed
God?” ObjectiC)ri.
Perhaps the inost common objection that atheists 208 PARJU.•JRADITIONAI!.ARGUM·EN’TS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
fine,..tuning argument .is on’e instance, is thafpostu…: . lem ·of design, but ‘merely;ttansfet’S it up one level; If the universe is wo’Ad.~rl”~lly designed: . there is no reason why such a: relatively leSs Or, as philosopher J.. J. C. Smart state~ the If we postUlate God in addition t · coniplexiry of outhypothesis; We have all ‘the atheist should be a theist:14 ·
.. • The first resp9nse. ~o .the ~l?o;e, atheist objection The second, and better, response is topointout But this requirement is still met .even ifGod:exhil To illustrate, considerthe example ofthe ”bio’- The final response theists can •giVe to this objec:… lv. rtiEArijEisrrc MANY- The Ath~isti!=. Many~Universes
Hypothesis Explained
I11 response to the theistic explanation. of fine” . fr . . . 15 Of · · . varymg ()Ill, umverse: to umveJ:Se• r+. course:. ·111 · .. ; ROBIN COLLIN.S • ASCI ENTI f’IC ARG U MENTF(DRoTH:E.•EXJS’fE N:C E :OF GOD 209
Nonetheless, in a small proportion of universes they Advocates of this hypothesis offer various types .. The other model, the oscillating big bang In the neA.’i: section, we will list several reasons Reasons for Rejecting the Atheistic
M~ny”Universes Hypothesis First Reason · The·· first· reason for rejecting the extrapolations from what we already know. Let’s first ··Most of us take the existence ofdiriosaur· bones In the case ofthe fine.,;tuning,·we already know Second Reason
A second reason for rejecting the atheistic· many- 210 PAR-rll• TRADITIONA’f:ARGUMENTS FOR TH:E EXISHNCE :oF GOD
For mstance, in all current :worked…::out,proposals Tliird Reason A third reason for rejecting the The reason the ··~many-‘universes generator” without this principle all eleCtrons would collapse Fourth Reasori ‘Fhe feurth reason for ,rejecting Now such beauty, elegance; and· ingenuity FinalReason This brings us· to the· final reason for \ / ROBIN COLLIN.S~• A SC.IE•NTIFIC ARGUMENT;FO;R’.HIE EXISTENCE.QF G0D 211
universe is·constantly increasing. The standar&.way No:w,. for purposes of illustratioh, we could . Now our. question is, Could the atheistic Conclusion
Even ‘th6ugh the aboye critifiStl1sdo not#efini- V. OVERALL CONCLUSION
In the above sections I showed there are, good, Typically, the atheist”argurhent against iGod ·What makes this argumentweak in comparison 212
seems largely to rest on a’triistake in reasoning. To The first problem with this atheist argument is As·withthe garden example, we have no idea could·have, Hence”we,do notknowiwhat:propor.,- from the. above .discussion;’ therefore, it>is ·clear fi . APPENDIX
In this appendix, I offer a rigorous .:support· for \ / ROBIN COLLINS’• A SC.IEN.JIFIC ARGUMENTF.OR’THE .EXISUNCE•OFGOD 213
fine.,.tuning is improbable· given that the. universe cis i. The Example of’Gravity
The force ofgravity is deteri:nined by Newton’s law In the previous section, we reported.that some ii. The Principle of lnditferen(e a;. The::•Principle Stated. Applied•.to .cases in , The above expli~ation of the. principle. applies 214 PART’U.•TRADIHONAtARGUMENTS FOR THrEXISTENCE OF GOD’
the board, what is tlie probability it ~will hit within b~; Application to Fine-Turri.itg In the •case ·Of Now physicists ;can make rough estimates .of times stronger than its “current value: a.s far as we know,· there/could be; other life,..permitting ranges Fortunately, however, this limitation does. not c. The ·Principle Qualified Those who ·are ·~····
\ I ROBIN COLLIN.S • A SC.I E·NTU’IC ARG UMENJ FOR. THE\ EXISTENCE O•F GOD 215
the “illuminated~’ range of possible values 2 U0, like:G0, represents·the actualvalue.ofUin::our ;The answer to.i this:questionis ·to.require that which;•: hecatise of the, scale,used, the .. :east coast d. Support: for Principle Finally;;f!lthougp the Finally, in certain .everyday cases the principle of 216
directly from experience with fifty-sided ‘dice;’ silice iiCThe Me~ning ofProbabilitY ,•,’ > • ,- ‘ Classical: Probability ·The’ classical conception of thafthe principle, of indifference holds for ,classical Epistemic Probability · Epistemic probability is a Besides epistemic probability ‘Sumpliciter, phi:.. ‘ ‘ /
ROBIN COLLINS • A SCIENTIFIC ARGI.:J MENT FORTHLEXISJENCE o.F GOD 217
hypothesis. that the weatherman has predicted a . . . · … · . ·~ ·Conclusion
Th~. ~bove’ discussiOJ1, slH:~vy-s ·.that .;;e· h~y~ ·~~Jeast NOTES 1. Freeman Dyson, Di~turbing th~ Univer~e (New York: 2. Paul Davies, T1Je Cosmic Blrleprint: New Discoveries in · York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 203.:
3. Fred Hoyle, in Religion and the Scientists (1959); Jphn Barrow and Frank Tipler {Oxford: Oxford 4. See Paul Davies, Tiw Accidental Universe 5. John Leslie, Universes (New York: Routledge, 6. Paul Davies,· Supeiforce: T1Je Seard1 for a Grand 7. Leslie, Universes, 39-40:
8. John Leslie, “How to Draw Conclusion from a 9. Leslie, “How”toDraw Conelusions,”300.
10. ‘For d10se fan:Uliar with the; p~obability calculus, (H2)] X [P(E/Ht)/(E/H2)]. The ge’!eral version of ‘ — —,
11. Thpse with sorne trainip.g in probapility theory will , here is what ph\losophers•call epistemi( probability, . speak ‘of ,an l!npr9veri mathematical hyp,~thesis 12. Leslie; ”How to Draw Con~ll1siofi,” 3o4. An Anthology qf A ‘theism and Ratidtialism, ed .. Gordon 14. ]. J. C. ~n~art, ”Laws of t-J’i~:ture and Cosmic 15. I define a “universe” as.ahy ·region pf spacbtime 16. Quentin Smith, “World .Ensemble. Explanations,” 218 PART II• TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR TH;E EXISTENCE OF GOD
17. Moreover, the advocate. of the atheistic many- 18. Leslie, Universes, 59:
19. Dyson, Disturbing the Universe, 251.
20. Chapter 6, “Beautiful Theories.”
21. Paul Dirac, “The Evolution of the Physicist’s 22. Davies, Supeiforce, 235-36.
23. This connection between order and probability, 24. See Lawrence Sklar, Physics and Chance: Philoso- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ‘explanations for’ the ordered arrangement· tif the 25. A more thoro~gl{ disc,ussio~,of ~he atheist argu- 26. This work was made possible in part by a Discovery 27. In the language of probability theory, rhis sort of 28. I say ”approximately right” because in this case the , land that are the same distance from the equator: equidistant from the equator are truly symmetri<;al
with regard to the motion oLthe earth. Sin<;e. the·
northern, contiguous United .States ;1re all about
.. the sam~ distance. from. the equator, equal land . .. probabilities. ‘ ‘ . ·
29. Thls solution will not always ~ork sin~e, as the 30. Weatherford, Probability Theory, 35.
31. SHu, Physics and Chance, 191; Bas van Fraassen, 32. Of course, one could daim that•oi.u experience 33. See Weatherford,Pmbability Theory, <;h. 2.
34. For an il);-depth discussion of epistemic probability, ROBIN COLLINS • A SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 219
35. It should be noted here that this rational degree of have, such as that we are alive. In the case at hand,
itself, we shall consider some rather general points
ahouttheargument. I-Ii~torically, it can, betrac~d to
the writings of the Greek philosophers, Plato and
Aristotle, but the major developments in the argu-
merit took place i~ the thirteenth and in the ~igh
teenth centuries. In the thirteenth century Aquinas
put forth five distinct arguments for the existence
of God, and of these, the first three are versions of
the Cosmological Argument.1 in the first of” these
he started from the. fu~:;t that there are things in the
world undergoing change and reasoned to the con-
clusion that there must be some. ultiniate cause of
change that .is itself unchanging. In the second he
started from the fact that there are things in the
world that clearly are caused to exist by oilier things
and reasoned to the conclusion .. that there must
he some ultimate cause of existence whose
men the started from the fact that there are things in
the world which need not have: existed at all, thipgs
which do exist but which we can easily in1agine
might not; and reasoned to; the· conclqsion that
there must he some heirig that ·had to be ;”that exiSts
and could not have failed to exist. Now it might be
objected. that even .if Aquirias’ arguments do:prove
beyond doubt the existence of an unchanging
changer, an uncaused ’cause, and a.: being: that
could .not have failed to• exist, the arguments fail
to prove the existence· of the· theistic·. God; For the
theistic -God, as we .saw, is supremely good,oomnip~
otent, omniscient, arid creator ofbut separate from
and independent of the world. How do we know,
for example, that the· unchanging changer isn’t evil
or slightly ignorant? The answer to this
ment in the Cosmological Argument took .place in
the eighteenth .century;• a· development reflected ill
the writirig5 of the Gem1an’ philosopher, Gottfried
of the English’ theologian ·and;philosopher,·Samuel
Clarke (1675-1729). In 1704 Oarke gave a series of
lectures, later published imderthe title A Demonstra~ · •
tion cif the Being and Attributes ~fcGod. These lectures
constitute, perhaps, the most complete, forceful,
and
the Cosmological Argument seeks to .establish· the
existence • of a self:.-existent’ being/ The. second part
of the argument attempts to ·pfove that the’ self-
existent being is the .theistic God, ·that is; has •the
features which we have noted to ·be basic elements
in the. theistic idea of God. •.W e shall consider
mainly the first part of the argilment, fodt is against
the first part that. philosophers .froni Hume to
Russell have• advanced very important objections.
Argumentwe shall make use oftwoimportant con-‘
cepts, the concept of a dependent being and ,the· con-
cept ofa self-existent being. By a dependentbeingwe
meal’l a being whose existence. is accountedfor by the
causal activity cif other things:’ Recalling Anselm:s clivi::
sion into the three cases: “explained by another,”
”explained by nothing,” and ”explained by itself,:’
ies dear that ‘a dependent being .is a being whose
existenc’e •is explained ‘by another. By a self-existent
being wdmean a being whose,existence is accounted for
by its own nature. This idea … is an essential element
in the theistic concept of God. Again, in terms .of
Anselm1s three cas,es, a self-existent being is a being
whose cexistence is~explained by itself· Armed. with
being.•and the yoncept of a self”‘existent being, we
can now state· the fitst part of the Cosmological
Argument.
either. a depend~nt, b~ing or. a ~elf -existent
being. · · · ·
this. argument, we sho.uld note .. that this argument
is, to. use an expt:ession frqm the logician;s yocabu-
lary, detiuctively vqlid. To find out V\)’hether i!l1 argu”‘
rnent is deductiyely .yalid, we 11eed only as~ the
question: If its premises were true, w,ould)ts co.n~
elusion: have to be true? If the answer is yes, the
argument .. i~ deductively valid., If.the;.answer. is nq,
the argument is deductively ipvalid:Notiq:itha,tthe
question ;of the va.lidity of an. a~:gument is. entirely
different fi:om. th.e. ql1estion ofw,hether: ,its premises
are in fact true. The follo’Yi.ng
‘ .
Indiana,
;. ,_ – – -,
even though its premises ar:e f;~:lse, if they were
trUe’its.conclusion would have to be true. Even
God, +Aquinas would say; cannot bring it ·about
that the .premises of this argument are true and
yet its conclusion is false ,for God’s power extends
only to what is ·possible, and it is·. an absolute
impossibility ·.that Babe Ruth be. the~ President;
not be from Indiana.
part) is a deductively valiq argument. [fits prernises
arec or were true~ its conclusion would. have. to be
true. It’s dear from our example about Babe Ruth,
however, that the fact that an argumentc.is deduc-
tively valid is insufficient to establish cthe truth of its
conclusion .. What else is required? Clearly that we
know or have rational grounds’ for believing that
the premises are true. If we know that the Cpsmo-
logical .i’\rgument is deductively valid, and can
establish that its premises are true, we shall thereby
have proved that its conclusion: is true. Are, theti,
the premises of the Cosmological Argument true?
To this more difficult question we must now tt~m.
an obvious or even trivial truth: But it is neither
obviousnor;triviaL And if it appears to he obvi()US
or trivial, we must be confusing the igea of a
self~existent being with the idea of a being that is
not ~ dependent ·.being. Clearly,.· it is tr)Je. that
~ny • being. is either a dependent b~i'[lg (explain~d
bY other things) or it is UO! a dep(![ldent being
(not ~xplained by other things). But .. What our
premise says is that any being is either a depen’dent
being (explained by other things) or it is, a self-
existent ~eing. ·.(explained by itself). Consider
again Amehn’s. tlifee cases.
exists (of ever did exist) is either ofsbrt a or of sort e;
It denies that any being is of sort b, And it is this
denial that makes the first premise both significant
and controversiaL.The obVious truth we must not
confuse it with is the truth. that;any being is either
of sort a or not of s9rt a. While this is true it is
neither very significant nor controversial.
principle that whatever exists has an. explanation of
its existence. Since this basic. principle denies that
anytliing of sort b exists or everdid·exist,;ifs clear
thatAnselrri would,,believe the first premise .of our
Cosmological.Argument. •The eighteenth-century
proponents of the argument also ;were. convinced
of the truth of the. basic .principle ;we attributed to
Anselm … And because they,,were convinced •of its
truth; they readily ·accepted. the first premise of
the· Cosmological Argument:· But :by the eighteenth
century, Anselm’s basic principle had .been more
fully elaborated and had received a name, the Prin-
ciple if Sufficient Reason. Since this principle (PSR, as
we shall call it) plays such an important role in jus-
tifying the .premises· ()f the \CosmologiCal Argument,
it will help us to consider it for a moment before
we continue our enquiry into the truth or talsity of
the premises of the Cosmological Argument.
expressed byboth Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, is a
very general principle and is·bes.t .understood as hav~
ing two parts. In its first part it.is simply a· restate~
ment of Anselm’s principle.that there must be an
explanation of the existence· of any· being whatever.
Thus• if we come. upon a man· in a room;. PSR
implies that there must be an;•explanation iof.the
fuct that that particular man exists .. A moment’s
reflection,. however; reveals.• that: there are· ;many
facts about the man other than the mere .fuct that
he exists. There is the fact thatthe .man in question
is· in the room he’s in, rather than somewhere else,
the fuct. that he is in good. health, and the fact that
he is at .the moment thinking of Paris, .rather. than;
say, London. Now, the purpose·. of the second· part
ofPSR is to require:an·explanation ofthese fucts, as
well. We may state·PSR, therefore, as the pririciple
that there must be:atl explanation (a) of the existence of
a11y being, and (b) of any. positive fact whatever. We are
now in a position •to study the role this veryimpor”-
tant principle plays in the Cosmological Argument.
Argument accepts• PSR in both its·. parts, it· is clear
that he will appealto its first part; .PSRa; as justifi::.
cation for the fitst premise of the Cosmological
Argument. Of course;. we can and. should·enquire
of the’ argull1ent is rationally> justified.· in· accepting
the moment. What we need to see. first is whether
he is correct in thinking •that if l?SR is true then
both·· of the premises of the Cosmological•Argu”
ment are true. And what we have· just seen ‘is ,that
if only. the first part of PSR, that is, PSRa; is•.ttue,
the first premise of the Cosmological·Argument
will be true. But. what of .the second premise .,of
the argument? Forwhatn~asons does the proponent
think that it must be true?
that exists can be a dependent being, that is, can
have the explanation of its existence’ in some
other being or beings. ·Presumably, the proponent
of the. argument thinks there is something funda-
mentally wrong with the idea that every being that
existsf is dependent, that each existing; being was
caused by some other beingo·whfch in tum was
caused by, some other being, and SO• on.’ But just
what does he; think is wrong with ·it? To help us
in understanding his thinking, let~s:simplifY things
by supposing that there· exists only one. thing now,
At; a living•thing perhaps, •that was;brought into
existence by something else, A 2 , whiCh perished
shortly after it brought A 1 into existence. Suppose
further that A 2 wasbrm:ight into existence in similar
fashion some time agobyA3·, and A3 byA4, and so
forth back. into the past .. Each of these beings is a
dependent being, it owes’ its existence to· the preced~
ing. thing in the series. Now jf nothing else ever
existed.ibut these beiligs, then what the second
premise says would not be true. ·for if every being
that exists or ever did exist is an A and was pro”‘
duced by a; preceding A, then every.· being· that
exists or ever did exist would be dependent and,
accordingly; . premise> two of the Cosmological
Argument would be false. If the proponent of the
Cosmological Argument • is correct there must;
then., ·be ; something •wrong with t.he idea tha:t
that they form a causal series:.A1 caused by A 2;
A 2 caused by A3\ A3 caused by A 4, , .. A,; caused
by An~t~ How .does the proponent ofthe Cosmo..:.
logical· Argument propose to. show us that thew is
somethirig’\vrong with• this view?
ponent tries to show·that•somethingis”wrong with
the view, that every being might’ be dependent, is
that he uses the following argument to reject it.
series.
no first being t() start; the causal series ..
second premise is ‘true, its first preniise overlooks
the distinct possibility that a causal series might be
infinite; with no first member at all .. Thusifwe go
back to our series o( A bein~, where . ~ach A is
depend~nt, having been produced by· the’ preceding
A in the! ca~sal senes, it’s dear that ‘if the -series
existed. it wohld have·. ho first ~elliber, for ev’ery
Which produced it:· ad infinitum. Thefirst premise
of the arg~ment just ~ven. assumer that a . causal
series. must stop with a first member somewhere
in th~. distant past. But there seems to be no good
The eighteenth-century proponents of the
series of dependent beings could be infinite, with-
out a first member to start the series. J’h,ey rejected
the idea that every being thatisor ever was is
dependent not because there. would. then ·.be no
first member to thee series of· dependent beings,
but because there would then be no· explanation
fot the, fact that there are and have . always, been
dependent beings. To, see their reasoning Jet’s
return to our simplification of the supposition tha.t
the only ·things that exist .or ever did exist· care
dependent beings: hi our simplification· of that sup-
position onlyrone of-the dependent beings exists at
~
the series, Perhaps .the first thing to ‘note ahoul: this
supposition is that there .is no individual A in the
causal series of dependent beings whose existencejs
unexplained’-,-A 1 is,explained by A 2, by A3, and
A, by An+ 1• So the first part o(PSR, PSRa, appears
to be satisfied. There is no particular ,being whose
existence lacks an explanation, What, then, ‘is it
that lacks an explanation, if every particular A in
the causal series of dependent beings has an. expla,..
nation? It is the series>itself that lacks an explana.,.,
tion, or,·.as Tve chosen to express it, thCjact that
there are and have always been dependent beings.’ For
suppose we ask why itjs that there are and have
always been As in existence. kwon’t do to say that
As. bave· always been producing other As…,.,we
can’t! explain why there have always been As by
saying there always have been As. Nor, on the
supposition that only As have ever existed, can
we explain the fact that there have always been
As by appealing to something other than an A-
for ·no such thing would have existed. Thus the
supposition that the only things that exist :or ever
existed are dependent things leaves us with a fact
for ,which there can be .no explariation;•namely,
the fact that there are and have, always been
dependent beings,
severalimportant objections against the claim that if
every being is dependent the series er collection of
those • beings would have no explanation. Our
understanding of the Cosmological Argument, as
well as of its strengths and weaknesses, ,\\’ill be deep.~
ened.:by a careful consideration ofthese criticisms.
Cosmological Argument makes the mistake of
treating the collection or series of dependent beings
as though it were jtself a dependent being, and,
But, so the objection goes, the collection, ofdepen”‘
dent beings is not itself a dependent being any more
than a collection ?fstafl1ps is itself a stamp.
the mistake of inferring .that·because eaGh member
of the· collection bf dependent beings has a cause,
the .collection itself must have. a cause,.
Bertrand Russell. noted; such. reasoning• is, as falla~
cious as to infer. that ·the human• race (that is, the
collection ofhuman·beings)·must.have a mother
bec~use each member . of.the c:ollection (eaCh
human being) has amother.
argument fails to realize that for there .to· be ,an
explanation of a. collection:. of things is• nothing
more.thahJor.there to be an explanation of each
of the things making up the colleCtion. Since in
the .infinite collection (or series). of depeJident
beings, each .• being in the: collection· does have an
explanation~by virtue of having been caused. by
some preceding member. ·.of .the•. collection”””7the
explanation of . the collec:tion; •so the criticism
goes, has already been given: As David .Hume
remarked, “Did I show you the particular. causes
of each ihdividual in. a collection of tw-enty particles
of matter, I should think it very unreasonable;
shouldyou aftenvards askme, what wasthecausy
of the whole t~enty. This; is: sufficiently. explained
in explaining the cause ofthe parts. “2 .•
logical Argument can .. satisfactorily answer ,these
objections, he. must fa~e one last objectioh to his
ingenious attempt to justify premise tWo of the
Cosmological. Argumenti• For .someone may agree
that if nothing exists. but an infinite .collection of
dependent beings,• the infinite collection will• have
no explanation’ of its existence; ·and· still·refuse to
conclude from this that: there. is .something wrong
with the idea that every being is a dependent being.
Why, he might ask, should•we think that every-:-
thing has to have an explanation?, What’s Wrong
with admitting that the fact that there are arid
have always been dependent beings is. a. brutejact, a
fact having no explanation whatever?. Why ;does
everything .have to have an explanatioir”anyway?
!
these se’veral objectionS:
stamps is itself a stamp; and very likely a mistake to
think • that the collection of dependent· beings is
itself a dependent being: But the; mere fact that
the proponent. of the· argument thinks that there
must ·be an explanation· not .only· for: each member
of the collection of dependent beings but for the
collection itself is not sufficient grounds for con-
cluding that he must view the colle<::tion as itself a
dependent being. The collection of hui:han beings,
for example, is certainly not itself a human being.
Admittin'g· this, however, we might still seek an
explanation· of why there is a: collection nf human
beings;' of why there are such things as human
beings(atall. So the mere·fact that an:explanation
is demanded for the collection of dependent beings
is no proof that the person who demands the expla-
nation mustbe supposing that the: collection itself is
just another dependent being.·
nent of the Cosmological Argumenfthe following
bit of reasoning.
. beings has a cause or. explanatio.n.
or explanation.
ments ofthis sort are often unreliable.’ It would be
a mistake to conclude that a collection of objects is
light in weight simply because each object in the
collection is light in weight,. for if there were many
objectS3·in•the:collection it might be quite heavy.
Onthe::otherhand;•ifwe know that each marble
weighs more than one ounce, we could infer val-
idly that the·collection of marbles weighs more than
an ounce. Fortunately, however, we don:t rteed to
decide whether the inference from 1 to 2 is valid or
invalid·:
not use this inference .to establish that there must be
an explanation· of the collection ·. of dependent
beings; He need not use this ·inference because he
has in PSR a prirlcipfe from which it followsimmec.
diately that the collection ofdependerit beings •has’ a
cause or explanation. For according to PSR, every
positive fact must have an ·explanation. If it is a fact
that there exists a collection of dependent beings
then, according to PSR, that fact too must have
an explanation. So it is PSR that the proponent
of the Cosmological Argument appeals to in con-
cluding that there .must be an explanation of the
collection of dependent beings; and not some dubi-‘
ous inference from•the premise that each•member
of the collection. has an explanation. It seems, then,
that neither of the first two criticisms ·is strong
enough to·do any serious damage to the reasoning
used to support the second premise of the Cosmo-
logical Argi.lment.
eXistence ofa collection.ofl:hings is the same thing as
to explain the existeqce of each of its members. If we
consider. a collection of dependent. beings where
each being in the collection is explained by the pre-
ceding member ·which caused it, it’s clear’ that no
member of the collection will lack ‘an explanation
of its existence. But, so the criticism goes, if we’ve
explained the existence of every member of a col-
lection, we’ve explained the existence of the collec-
tion-there’s nothing left over to be explained. This
forceful criti<;:ism, ori~ally advanfed py David
Hume, has gained considerable support in the mod-
ern period. But the:critkism rests on an assumption
that the proponent of the Cosmological Argument
would not accept. The assumption is that to explain
the existence of a collection ofthings itis sufficientto
explain the existence. of every member in the collec-
tion. To see' what is wrongwith this assumption is to
understand. the basic issue iri ·the· reasoning by which
the prop'onent of the'Cosmological Argument seeks
to establish that not every being,can be a dependent
being,
existence of the collection of dependent, beings; it’s
clear that the eighteenth-century proponents would
satisfied:.
of the. niemhers ·of the collection of depende11~
qependent bein,gs.
Argument, if every being that exists or ever·did
eXistis a: dt~pendent~ being’-that is/if the whole
ofreality consists of nothing more than a collectiOn
of dependent beings-“-Cl will he satisfied;’ but C2
will not be’ satiSfied. Aild since C2 Won’t be’ satis-
fied, there will •be rio explanation of the collection
of dependent beings. The third. criticism; therefore,
says in effect that if Cl is satisfied, C2 will be satis-‘
fied; and, since in a collection. ofdependent beings
each member will have an explanation in whatever
it was that produced it, Cl will be satisfied, So,
tliefefore, C2 will be satisfied and the collection
of dependent oeings will have an explanation.
it is possible t6 see that the third ‘criticism rests ori
a mistake: the 1nistake of thinking’ that ‘if Cl is
satisfiea C2 must also be satisfied, Tile niistake is
a natural· one to make ·for it·is easy to ‘ima’gine
Circumstances in which ‘if Cl is satisfied C2 also
will be satisfied> Suppose; for example that the
whole of reality includes· not just a collection of
dependent beings but alsb a self … existent being.
Supposefurther th~t instead” Of each dependent
being Having been produced By some other
dependenf be’ing, every dependent being was
produced by the self-existent being. Finally, let
us consider both the possibility that the :collection
ofdepeilderit beings is finite intime ~nd has a first
rnernber, and the possibility thatthe collection of
deperideht ;beings is infinite in past time, having
no first member. ·Using G for· the self.:existent
being, the first ,possibility may ;be diagramed as
follows:·
We can· think of. d1 as so1he •presently .ex;isting
dependent being, d2, d3, arid so forth as dependent
beings that existed at some tirne;in :the past, arid d.;
as .the ·first ·dependent being to exist .. 1’he’ second
possibility may be portrayed• as follows:’
l~ction .. of dep1~ndent beings. EaTh membei:’. of tht;
infinite collection, however, is exP-l;rined. })y refer::
ence. t~ • the self-existent being G . which’ J’r()duced
it. Now the inter~st~g pointabout bothth(!se
cases is that the explanation that has been provided
for themerrrbers ofthe <;ollection ofdependent
bein.gscarries 'With,it, at l~;,15t in p;trt, ,ari answer to
the ques6on of why th:reare any dependept beings
at all. In both cases we may explaiti why there are
depencleht. beings by po1ndng out th:~f there exisfs a
self-existent beillg that has been enga~ed in produc-
ingthem. So oncewe.have le'~ed."that theeJcistence
of each member of the collection ()fdependept
beings has. its existence explained by the fa\t that c
produced it, .;"'e have alreaqy feaw.~d· why there are
depepdentbeings. , .. · . , · . . . ·. · . · .....
learned,whythere a~ dependent beings until. w~
also learn why has been· .nroc:Iucingthern. But, ,of
coul’Se, “Ye could also saythatwe hayen’t really
explained FheFexistence of .. ~ partictjlar dep?ndent
being,say,d3, until we als9 leaw not just tha((; pro;-
duced it. but why ~ produced.ft:The pointwe need
to grasp, hq~e~er, is that onc(! weadmitJpiit ~very
dependent being’s existence is explained by G, we
must admit that the fact that there are dependent
beings has alsobt;en e~pJ~in.ed .. so it is not unnatural
that someone’ should think that to explain the exis-
tence of the collection ofdependentbeings is nothi!lg
more than to explain· the’existerice or’itsmembers.
For, as we’ve seen, to e’h.’plain the collection’s eXis,-
tence is to explain each ri1eii!ber’ s .existenc~ and tp
explain why therea~e any dependent being$ at ~
Ari:d, iri the exan1pks :we’ve, considered, in doing
158 PART II• TRADITIONAl ARGUMENTS’ FOR THE’ EXISTENCE OFGOD
exists) we\!e already done the Other (explained why
there are any dependent beings .at all). We must n9w
see; however,•that on the supposition that the Vllhole
of reality consists .only ofa collection•.Ofdependent
beings, to give an explanation of each membefs.exis’-7
tence is not to provide an explanation of why there
are dependent beings;
outside of the collection of dependent bemgs in order
toexplain the n1embers’ ~xiste~ce. B,utJf the only
beings thatexist o~ ever e~ted ~e depe!Jd~ntbeings
then each
d~pendent beillg · will b~ ·e:)Cplained by
does. not mean that there \\fill be ‘s6II1e particular
depend~nt. b~ing,whose .e~istence is yriac,coumed
for. E~i.ch dependent being hasan explanationofits
existence; nWtely, in t?e dependent obing “‘hi~li
pre~eded it andproduced it. So C1. is satisfied: there
is an explailation of the existence of eaci:J. member of
the. collection. of dependept. ~~iiigs. I~fning tp C2,
however, wefansee that ‘it will not\:Je.satisfied. We
cann()t explain’ why the.re are’ (or haveev~r be~n)
4ependent beings bx ~ppealing to. ali the m’embers
of the infinite.colle~tion,Q~dependent beir).gs. For if
the questi<}nto be :mswered is why there (()r have
ever been) any dependent beings' at all; we cannot
answer that questi<,m by H()ting diatthere aiways
have beendependept beings, each op.e' accoUnting
for the. existence of some otller i:i6peJ1dent being.
Thus on the ·stippos.itiqri th.ateverybeing is depen-
dent, itseerruthere Will be rio explana,~ion of why
there aredependent beings. C2 willnotbe satisfied.
Therefo~~. on the supposition. that ever¥ \:Jeing is
dependent there will be no expian.ation of the'ex1s ...
tence oftplcollection of dependent b~ings. . .
supporting die second premise of the Cosmological
Argument, 1~cording to the, ~rhicisril, it is admitted
iliat. th~ suppqsitiol1. that every beirig is Oepen~ent
ilnpljesthat the~ewill be a brntefaetin the unive~,
a: £let, that is, for wliich diere can be rio explanation
whatever. For there will be no explanation of the
been in existence. It is this brute fact that the pro-
ponents ofth(! argum~11t were describing wht;n.they
po~ted qut ‘that if every.· being is. dependent, the
series or collection of d~pendent beings would.lack
an explallatio~ of its. existence .. The final criticism
askS what is wrong with admitting that die universe
contains such a brute, unintelligible fact: In· isking
this quest1on the critic challenges th.e: fundamental
principle, PSR, on \Vhich the Cosmo~ogic;:al J\rgw-
I11~f1t re~ts·, For, as we?v:e seef1, the first premise ofthe
a,rgumen,t denies thi}tthere exists a being \Vhose exis-
tence. has no e,xplanation. In support o(diis premise
the. propqnent appeals .. t() die first part of PSR .. The
second prelllise of the argument. ,claims that n()t
evt?ry being can be dep~ndent. In support of this
premi~ the. proponent appeals to ~e second part
of PSR, the part which states that there .must be an
explan,ation of any. positive fact whatever,
a dependent being, then although the first part .of
PSR would. be satisfied~very ,being. woj.l}d have
an explar1ation~the second part W{)l,lld b.e yiolated;
there would be r10 explanation for.the pqsitiv:e fact
that there. are an,d. have. always . been d~pendent
beings .• For. Hrst, •· since . every being .. is supposed. to
be . dep.endent,. there would be. nothip.g. optside of
the collectiqn qf dependent .beings to explain the
collection’s. existence. SecoQd, the .fact. that· each
membeJ; .. ()( the cqllection has an,.explanation in
sorp.e , other dependeQt being .is ir1sufficient to
explain whythere,are ang hav,e alw,~ys been depen~
dent. beings, And, fin¥ly, ,there is J:l,Othing ~bout
the collection ofdependentbeings that V\l0419sug~
gest that it is a self-existent .collection. Conse-
that the.re are ar1d have always geen dependent
bein~;wol).ld. have .no explanation. But ~pis violates
the second part of PSR,, So the secpng premise of
the Cosmological Argument _must be . true: Not
every. being ca11 :be, a dependent being. This con-
clusion, however, is no better than the principle,
PSR, on which it rests. And it is the point of die
final criticism to question the truth of PSR. Why,
after all, shpuld we accept the idei} that every being
and every positive fact must have an explanation?
Why, in short, should we believe PSR? These are
/
Cosmological Argument depends on how they are
answered.
accept PSR have tried to defend it in either of two
ways. Some have held that PSR is (or can be) known
intuitively to be true. By this they mean that if we fully
understand and reflect on what is said by PSR we can
see that it must be true. Now, undoubtedly, there are
statements which are known intuitively to be true.
“Every triangle has exactly three angles” or “No
physical object can be in two different places in
space at one and the same time” are examples of
statements whose truth we can apprehend just by
understanding and reflecting on them. The difficulty
with the claim that PSR is intuitively true, however,
is that a number of very able philosophers fail to
apprehend its truth, and some even claim that the
principle is false. It is doubtful, therefore, that many
of us, if any, know intuitively that PSR is true.
who accept PSR have sought to defend it is by claim-
ing that although it is not known to be true, it is,
nevertheless, a presupposition of reason, a basic
assumption that rational people make, whether or
not they reflect sufficiently to become aware of the
assumption. It’s probably true that there are some
assumptions we all make about our world, assump-
tions which are so basic that most of us are unaware
of them. And, I suppose, it might be true that PSR is
such an assumption. What bearing would this view of
PSR have on the Cosmological Argument? Perhaps
the main point to note is that even if PSR is a pre-
supposition we all share, the premises of the Cosmo-
logical Argument could still be false. For PSR itself
could still be false. The fact, if it is a fact, that all of
us presuppose that every existing being and every pos-
itive fact has an explanation does not imply that no
being exists, and no positive fact obtains, without an
suppositions. As the American philosopher William
James once remarked in another connection, “In the
great boarding house of nature, the cakes and the
butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and
leave the plates so clear.”
Argument has led us to the fundamental principle
on which its premises rest, the Principle of Suffi-
cient Reason. Since we do not seem to know that
PSR is true, we cannot reasonably claim to know
that the premises of the Cosmological Argument
are true. They might be true. But unless we do
know them to be true they cannot establish for us
the conclusion that there exists a being that has the
explanation of its existence within its own nature. If
it were shown, however, that even though we do
not know that PSR is true we all, nevertheless,
presuppose PSR to be true, then, whether PSR is
true or not, to be consistent we should accept the
Cosmological Argument. For, as we’ve seen, its
premises imply its conclusion and its premises do
seem to follow from PSR. But no one has suc-
ceeded in showing that PSR is an assumption that
most or all of us share. So our final conclusion must
be that although the Cosmological Argument
might be a sound argument (valid with true pre-
mises), it does not provide us with good rational
grounds for believing that among these beings
that exist there is one whose existence is accounted
for by its own nature. Having come to this conclu-
sion, we may safely put aside the second part of the
argument. For even if it succeeded in showing that
a self-existent being would have the other attributes
of the theistic God, the Cosmological Argument
would still not provide us v…ith good rational
grounds for belief in God, having failed in its first
part to provide us with good rational grounds for
believing that there is a self-existent being.
2, 3.
Part IX, ed. H. D. Aiken (New York: Hafner
Publishing Company, 1948), pp. 59-60.
(
Nature (1802).
I
-J
Designer to explain the existence c.if the works c.if nature, which are far more subtle, complex, and
cleverly contrived than any human artifact.
a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be
there, I might possibly answer, that, for anything I
knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor
would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity
of this answer. But suppose I found a watch upon
the ground, and it should be inquired how the
watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly
think of the answer which I had given-that, for
anything I knew, the watch might have always
been there. Yet why should not this answer serve
for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it
not as admissible in the second case as in the first?
For this reason, and for no other; viz., that, when we
come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we
could not discover in the stone) that its several parts
are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that
they are so formed and adjusted as to produce
motion, and that motion so regulated as to point
out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts
had been differently shaped from what they are, if a
different size from what they are, or placed after ariy ·
other manner, or in any other order than that in
which they are placed, either no motion at all
would have been carried on in the machine, or
none which would have answered the use that is
now served by it. To r~ck6Ji:Up a few ofthe plainest
of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one
result:-We see a cylindrical box containing a: coiled
elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself,
turns round the box. We next observe a flexible
chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure)
communicating the acti()n of the spring from the
box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels,
the teeth of which•catch in; and apply to, each other,
conducting the motion from· the fusee to the bal-
ance, and from the balance to the pointer, and, at
the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels,
an index, by an equable and measured progression,
to pass over a given space in a given time. We take
notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to
keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other
metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch
there is placed a glass, a material employed in no
other part of the work, but in the room of which,
if there had been any other than a transparent sub-
stance, the hour could not be seen without opening
the case. This mechanism being observed, (it requires
indeed an exanlination of the instrument, and per-
haps some previous knowledge of the subject, to
perceive and understand it; but being once, as we
have said, observed and understood,) the inference,
we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had
a maker; that there must have existed, at some time,
and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers
who formed it for the purpose which we find it
actually to answer; who comprehended its construc-
tion, and designed its use.
clusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that
we had never known an artist capable of making
orie; that we were altogether incapable of executing
standing in what manner it was performed; all this
being no more than what is true of some exquisite
remains of ancient art, of s~me lost and to the gen-
erality of m’aclcihd, ·of the’lno~e curious productions
of modem manufacture. Does one man in a million
know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this
kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown
artist’s skill, ifhe be unseen and unknown, but raises
no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency
of such an artist, at ‘some fom1er ‘time,· and in some
place or other. Nor: can I perceive that it varies at all
the inference, whether. the question arise concerning
a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different
species, or an agent possessing, in some respect, a
different nature.
i
conclusion, that the ·.Watch ‘sometimes went
wrong, or that it seldom: went exactly hghLThe
purpose of the machinery, the :design, and the
designer, mightcbe evident, and, in the ·case sup-
posed; . would be evident; in whatever· way we
accounted for the irregularity of·the movement,
or whether we could account for ‘it or not. It is
not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order
to show with what design it was made; still less
necessary, where the only question is, whether it
were made with any design at all.
tainty into the argument, if there were a few parts
of the watch, concerning which we could not dis-
cover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner
they conduced to the general effect; or even some
parts, concerning which we could not. ascertain
whether they conduced to that effect in any man-
ner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case,
if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in
question, the movement of the watch were found
in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no
doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility
or intention of these parts, although we should be
unable to investigate the manner according to
which, or the connection by which, the ultimate
.effect depended upon their action or assistance;
and the more complex is the machine, the more
likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the sec-
ond thing supposed, namely, that there were parts
which might be spared without prejudice to the
movement of the watch, and that he had proved
this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if
we were completely assured that they were such,
would not vacate the reasoningwhich we had insti-
tuted concerning other parts. The indication of
contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly
as it was before.
think the existence of the watch, with its various
machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was
one out of possible combinations of material forms;
that whatever he had found in the place where
he found the watch, must have contained some
internal configuration or other; and ,that this
ited, viz., of the works o(\1 watch, as well as a
different structure:
safisfactiol1,.to •. be’answerea, that,there.· eristed in
tnfngs a prin21pl7 of order,. whi~~ h~d:diip~~ed
the parts of the .·~atch into th~ir.prese’nt .. form ~nd
situati
the mechanism of the watch was no proof of
contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to
think so.
the watch in his hand was nothing more than the
result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion
of language to assign any law as the efficient, oper-
ative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent;
for it is only the mode according to which an agent
proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order
according to which that power acts. Without this
agent, without this power, which are both distinct
from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The
expression, “the law of metallic nature,” may sound
strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems
quite as justifiable as some others which are more
familiar to him such as “the law of vegetable
nature,” “the law of animal nature,” or, indeed, as
“the law of nature” in general, when assigned as the
cause of phenomena in exclusion of agency and
power, or when it is substituted into the place of
these.
driven out of his conclusion, or from his confi-
dence in its truth, by being told that he knew
nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough
for his argument: he knows the utility of the end:
he knows the subserviency and adaptation of
the means to the end. These points being
known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts
concerning other points, affect not the certainty of
his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little
need not beget a distrust of that which he does
know ….
tion of d~sign,’ which existed ‘in’tl1e’ watch exish
in’,the Zyor,ks of nattir~; ~ith the’differeh~e ~n
t}ie s~de of ~atu.re, ofbeing great~rand inore,! and
that i}1. a. ‘degree which exceeds. all tomputatio~. I
mean that’ the i::()titrivances
and curiosity ofthe mechanism; and still more, if
poSsible,. do they·go beyond them in number and
variety; yet in a’ multitude of cases, are not less evi~
dently ·mecHanical;: not less evidently ccontrivances,
not less evidently accommodated to .their end;’ or
suited to .their office, than,are the most perfect •pro”-
ductions•of human ingenuity>’
ROBIN COLLINS
articles on the argument from design. The article included here presents a simplified version (if an
argument that he has developed in much more technical detail elsewhere. He begins by noting that ltfo
would have been impossible had certain laws of nature an.d fundamental physical constants (such as the
gravitational constant) been even slightly d!fferent. He then argues that since this apparent ‘fine-
tuning” of the laws and constants is significantly more probable on the assumption that the universe
was designed to be hospitable for ltfo than on the assumption that it was not designed at all, such
apparent fine-tuning counts as evidence in favor if the existence if a designer.
a domed structure in which everything was set up
just right for life to exist. The temperature, for
example, was set around 70° F and the humidity
was at 50 percent; moreover, there was an oxygen
recycling system, an energy gathering system, and a
whole system for the production of food. Put sim-
ply, the domed structure appeared to be a fully
functioning biosphere. What cqnclusion would
we draw from finding this structure? Would we
draw the conclusion that it just happened to form
by chance? Certainly not. Instead, we would unan-
imously conclude that it was designed by some
intelligent being. Why would we draw this conclu-
sion? Because an intelligent designer appears to be
the only plausible explanation for the existence
of the structure. That is, the only alternative
was formed by some natural process~eems
extremely unlikely. Of course, it is possible that,
for example, through some volcanic eruption vari-
ous metals and other compounds could have
formed, and then separated out in just the right
way to produce the “biosphere,” but such a sce-
nario strikes us as extraordinarily unlikely, thus
making this alternative explanation unbelievable.
according to recent fmdings in physics. Almost
everything about the basic structure of the
universe-for example, the fundamental laws and
parameters of physics and the initial distribution of
matter and energy-is balanced on a razor’s edge for
life to occur. As the eminent Princeton physicist
Freeman Dyson notes, “There are many . . . lucky
accidents in physics. Without such accidents, water
could not exist as liquid, chains of carbon atoms
could not form complex organic molecules, and
\
between .molecules” 1~in short,dife as we know ,it
would be.impossible. ·
early 1970s,. with hundreds ofarticles and dozens
of books written on the topic; Today, it is widely
regarded as offering by far· the most persuasive cur•
rent argument for the existence ofGod: For•exam.,..
ple, theoretical physicist and popular science writer
Paul Davies-whose early writings were not partic-
ularly sympathetic to theism-claims that with
regard to basic structure of the universe, “the
impression of design is overWheli:ning:”2 Similarly,
in response to. the}ife-pemlittin,~ fine-;tuning of the
nuclear resonances responsible· for the oxygen and
carbon synthesis in sta~. the fam()~S astrophysicist
Sir Fred Hoyle de’dares that · ·
~f(aillined the evidence would fail to draw
the inf~rence that, the law~of nudearphysics
hav~ be~n deliberately.design~d with regard
t? .. th~. consequences ,they produce inside
srars:Ifthis is.so, thenmy apparently .
random ql!ir;ks haye become pirt of a deep-
lai1 sch~JJ1e, If not then .ye a~,bkck again at
a monstrous sequence of acddents.3
fer~d in strength by as little as one part ‘ih’l 060,
. theuniverse would have either quickly col-
laps~d back on itself, or expand~d .too rapidly for
stars to form. In’ either case,life would be . . ·
imp~ssible. (As John Jefferson Oavis po~ts qut,
ail accuracy of one part in 1060 can be compared
to firing a bull~t at a one-inch target on the
other side o( th~ observable univ~rse, twenty
bilhon light years away,and hl.tting the target/
force, the force that binds protons and neutrons
togetheLi11 an atom; h4d been st~onger or .
impossible,5 · · · , •
. gr
surr. could not exist. ‘This· wotild most’ likelY
niakeSlJ:fe in1possible.6 · · … •
mass of’the prot
stronger or weaker, life would he impossible,
for a variety of different reasons. 8
fine-“tuning as a radio dial: uriless’ all the dials are set
exactly ~ight, life would be ilnp6ssibk ‘Or, one
cotild think of the initial conditions of the universe
and the furidainellthl· parameters of physics as a dart
boatdthat fills the whole galaxy,’ai1d the conditions
necessary for life to ~exist as a ‘siTJill orie-f66t-wide
ta.fg({ unless the dart hits’the target; life would be
impossible: The tad that the dials ·ar~’J>erfectly set:
or. ‘that the datt has hit the target, strongly suggests
that sonieotie set the dials or aimed the dart’fot it
seerri~’ enormbusly itllprobable’that suth a ·~oinci..:
derice could have happened’by ‘chance. ·
are only’ approxiiilate and could be in error, the tict
that the universe ·’·is ‘fine~tuned ··for· life is \ilniost
beyond question ·hec~use. ohhe l~rge · number of
independent instances of; apparent.· fme’-tU:ning. As
philosopher Johh Leslie has pointed out, “Clues
heaped upon dues catFconstitll.t~ weightf evidence
despite doubts about eacli element in ;the pile.”9
which the fine-tuning proVides evidence for the exis-
tence of God. As.\t11P!:eS§tV.e.as the argument from
fine~tuning seems to be, atheists have raised several
significant objections to it. c8nsequeritly, those\vho
are aware of these objeCtions, “ot ·have thought of
them·. on their . own, often~ will·· fmd . the argument
unconvincing. This is’ n6t orily true of atheists; but
committed Christian Hollywood filrrimaker; and a
conunitted Christian biochemist . who remained
the ;J.rgurnent. Th.is,is unfortunate, partiqllarly since
the. firleHup.!ng argurner1t is probably tl}e, n~ost pow-
erfUl current argument for the existence qfGod. My
g()al. in this. ~htpter, therefc:~r~, to n1ake the fine,..
turung ar~ment . <1$, str9i':g )~ .. p9ssible; This will
involve developing the 'argttllient in as objective
;tQd rigor()US a way as I can,,an~ tl!en answering the
major atheist obj~ctions to. it. Be(ore launching into
this, hovyever, I will need to ~ake a preliminary
distinctiorL
is useful· to distinguish between what I shall call tile
atheistic.. single-universe hypoth~;sis and .• the • (ltheistic
many-uf!iverses hypothesis. Accordin,gto the. atheistic
single-upivel’Se hypothesis, ,there i~ only ~me uni-
vel’Se, ;;tll.d it is ultimately an inexplicable,. “brute”
fact th;;tt the. univel’Se exists, and.is.fine-tuned. Many
atheists, ho:wever, advocate another.hypothesis,one
which a~tempts to explain; how the ~eemingly
improb,a~le fine-tuning of the univel:’Se .. c;ould ,be
the I’esultof chance. )Ye will, call t~~ hypothesis
the atheistic many-worlds hypothesiS,, or !~e. atheistic
many-tmiverses hypothesi~:. Aq:ordjng to •this hypoth-
esi~, there exists. what could; be im~ginatively
thought ofas a “univel’Se generator” that produces
a very large or infinite number of .univel’Ses, with
e,ach univel’Se having a randomly selected set of ini-
tial condi~ons and . values for .. th~ . pararnetel’S of
physics. Bec;ause this generatqr produ,ces .so many
univel’Ses, just by 1=hance it will eventually produce
qne ~~;tt is fine-tuned for,intell,igent life to occur(
~t,heistic single,-l1~!vel’Se. hypothesi~ and the atheistic
many..-un.iverlies.hyp,qthesis to present; t:wO separate
argu111~n~ for theism based pn th~ fine~ tuning: one
which argues that the fine-tuning provides strong
fine-tuning argument against the’:athei~tic single-
univel’Se hypothesis in terms of what I Will call
the prime principle of conjinn~tion. The prime pi;inci-
ple of’ confirmation is a generdl principle reason-
ing which tells us \~hen some obse’rvati’on co lints as
evidence. in favor of one hypothe.sis bver arwther.
Simply put,’ the principle says that whenever 1.1/e. are con-
sidering two competing hypotheses, ati observation counts
as evidence in Javor oj the hypothesis i:nder ‘Which the
observation has the .highest probability (or is the. least
improbable). (Or, put slightly differen.tly, the princi-
ple says that whenever ‘we . ·;re considering two
competing hypotheses, H 1 and H 2, aiiobset:Vation,
0, counts as evidence in fa~or of H 1 over if 0 is
more probable urider H 1 than· it is .. urider. H2.)
Moreover, the degree to \Vhich the ~vidence counts
in favor of one’ hypothesis o~er another’ is propor-
tional to the degree to ~hich the dbservadon is
more probable under t!’te o11e hypothesiS than the
other:10 ‘Por example,’ the. fine:..tuning much,
much more probable under theisrh ‘than under the
atheistic single-uni.Jerse ·hypothesis, so it· counts a’s
strong . evfdence for theism over this atheistic
hypothesis. In· the· b:ext major subsection; we will
\.
the :fme-;:turring argument in. terms of tlie prime
prinCiple .. First; however;lefs look-at a cbuple of
illustrations ofthe principle and therr.present. sowe
support for it.
first illustration,· suppose that .I weni hiking in the
mountains, and found underneath a certa.in .. cliff a
group: of rocks arranged in a· formation thaCdearly
forinedi the patterri ,”Welcome to the mountains;
Robin Collins,” One hypothesis is.that, by chance,
the rocks just happened to •be arranged in that
pattern–‘-ultimately, perhaps, because ofcertain ini-
tiaLconditions .ofthe universe. Suppose the only
viable alternative. hypothesis is that my brother,
who· ·was in the mountains before, me, arranged
the rocks in this way .. Most of us wouH,immedi..,.
ately take the arrangements. of rocks .. to_ be ·strong
evidence in favor of the “brother” hypothesis: over
the “chance” hypothesis. Why? Because it strikes us
as extremely improbable that the rocks would be
arranged that way by chauce; but no~ improbable at
all that my brother would place th:n1, in that con-
figuration. Thu~~ by the prime prinCiple of confir-
mation we would conclude that the arrangement of
rocks strohgly ·. ~upports. the ‘”brother” hypdthesis
over the chance’hypothesis;
defendant’s fingerprints on the; murder Weapon.
Normally, we would take such a finding as strong
evidenc~ ;that the .. defendant was guilty. Why?
Because we judge.that it. would be unlikely for
these fingerprints to- be on the murder weapon if
the defendant was. innocent,: but not unlikely if the
defendant. was guilty. That is, we-would go through
the same sort of reasoning as in the above case.
said in favor of the prime principle· of confirmation:
First; many· phildsophers think. that this . principle
can be derived from what is known as the probability
calculus, .the s.et ofmathe.matical rules that. are typi-‘
cally assumed to govern. probability. Second, there
does not appear to be any case of recognizably good
reasoning that violates this principle. Finally, the
bility,, unqergirding much of our reasoning in sci”‘
ertce”tand everyday Jife,. ,as the examples above
illustrate;· Indeed,· some have· even, claimed that a
slightly more .generahVersion of· this J>ririciple
undergirds all scientifi(;. reasoning. Because of all
these reasons in favor of the principle, we .. can be
very confident in it.
tuning 1 aq~~meh t, We ~ill· S:u’nunaii.ze; the argument
by explicitly listing it~ ‘ two premises · and ‘its
conclus1ol1: ‘
not improbable under theism.
very impri>bable l.lndet the atheistic single-
universe hypothesis.
prime principle of confirmation,, itfoii<)ws that
the fine-tuningdataprovide'st~ortg evidence to
favor the design hypothesis over the atheistic
single-universe hypothesis.
of this argument:·· First, the argument-does not say
that the. flne-tQning. evidence proves :that the uni~
verse was designed, or. ex en that it is likely t;hat the
uniyerse was designed. In. order to justifY tpese sorts
of claims, .we would have to look .at tQ.e full range
of evidence both for. and against the design hypoth~
esis, sowething .we .are not. doing in .this chapter.
Rather, the argqment merely .concludes -that the
fine-tuning strongly supports theism over the atheistic
single-universe hypothesis,
argument is mw::h Jike fiQ.gerpJ’ints found on. the
gun:.although they .. can ,proviqe· strong e.vid,ence
that the defendant coiilihitted the murder, .ope
could not copclude. merely frox:n them .alqne that
the defeqdant is guilty; one would also have to.look
at all the other e.vidence offered. Perhaps, for
instance, ten .·reliabl(‘! witnesses claimed to see the
1
i
206 PART II•TRADIHONAl:. ARGUMENTS FOR THE:EXISHNCEcOF GOD’
this case, the fingerprints would still count as signif-
icant evidence of guilt,’ but·this evidence would be
counterbalanced bythe testimony ofthe witnesses.
Similarly the evidence of fine-tuning strongly sup”
ports theism over the atheistic single-“universe
hypothesis; though iL does not itself show that,
everything considered, theism is the most plausible
explanation of the world. Nonetheless, as I argue in
the conclusion of this chapter, the evidence of fine-
tuning provides a :J:iuich stronger and more objec-
tive argument for theism (over the atheistic singl~;
universe hyp’Othesis) .than the strongest atheisti~
argumentcloes against theism. . , · , ..
note is that, given the truth of the prime principle cif
confirmation,. the conclusion of the argument follows
from the premises. Specifically, .jf the premises of
the argument. are true, then we_ are guaranteed
that the conclusion is. true: that is,. the ~rguiilent is
what philosophers call valid. Thus, insofar as we can
sho)V that the pre~ises of the, argu!Jlent are true, we_
~ili have shown that the conClusion is true. Our
next t~sk, therefore, is to atte~pt t~ show th~t the
premises are tru~, or at ‘least, that ~e have s~rong
reasons to believ~ them.
Support for Premise (1) Preniisei(T) is ea5y to sup-‘
port and fairly uncontroversial. One major : argu-
ment in support of it ·can be simply stated · as
follows: since God is an all good bt.?ing; and it is good
for intelligent, conscious beings to exist, it is not surprising
or improbable that God would create a world that- could
support ·intelligent life. Thus, the fine~tuning is not
improbable under theism, as premise (1) asserts.
many people find it very obvious that the fine-
tuning is. highly improbable under the atheistic
single-universe hypothesis. And•’ it is c easy to see
why when we think of the fine..:tuning in terms
of the •analogies offered earlier. •In the dart board
analogy,•for example; ‘the initial conditions of the
universe and the fundamental parameters of physics
ar~ thought •of as a dart board that fills the whole
as• a small one-foot-wide• target; Accordingly,.from
this. analogy• it ‘seems· obvious that it rwould be
highly• improbable ·for the fine-tiuiingno occur
under the atheistic single-universe . hypothesis,___
that is, for the dart to hit the target by chance.
ment are satisfied•with resting the justification of
premise (2); .or something like it; on this sort ofanal-
ogy; Many atheists and .theists;,.however, question
the legitimacy of this sort of’ahalogy;· and thus find
the argument unconvincing. For these people; ;the
appendixto this chapteroffers a rigorous and objec.:.
tive justification of premise (2) using standard prin-;
ciples of probabilistic reasohing, Aniong other things,
in the process of rigorously justifying premise (2), we
effectively answer the• common objection to the
fine-tuning argument that because the uhiverse is a
unique, unrepeatable event, we cannot meaningfully
assign a probability to its. being fine-tuned.
: ‘ – i. ~
argument is, . several major objection~ have been
raised to it, by both atheists :md .theists. In this sec-
tion, ,we will. consider these obje_ctions in tum.
far as we know, there could be a more fundamental
law under ·which, the parameters of physics must
have the values they do. Thus, given such a law,
it •is notimprobable that the knowncparameters of
physics fall within the life-permitting range.
with postulating such a law: is· that it· simply moves
the ·improbability of the fine’-tuning up one ·.level,
tothat of the postulated physical law itself. Unoer
this hypothesis, what is improbable is that of all the
conceivable fundamental physical laws ‘there could
\
\
constrains. the. cparameters of physics in a·.; life~
permitting way, ·Thus; trying to explain the fine:..
tuning by postulating this sort •offundamentallaw is
like trying to.explain why the pattern ofrocks below
a cliff spelL7~Wekome to the mountains, .Robin
Collins” by postulating,that an. earthquake occurred
and that all the rocks on the diff face were arranged
in just ~he right. configuration. to tall· into the· pattern
in qilestion .. Clearly this explanation merely transfers
the improbability up oneJevel; sihce now it seems
enomiously improbable that ,of all the possible con-
figurations the rocks could be in oil the cliffface, they
are in the one which results in the pattern •::w elcome
to the mountains, Robin Collins.”
claim that the fine-‘tUning is not. improbable
because .it:might he logically necessary for the para-
meters of physics to have life”‘pertnitting .. •values;
That is,· according to this .. claim;:the: parameters of
physics must have life-permitting values in the same
way 2 + Z must equal 4, or the interior angles of a
triangle. nmst add •UP to 180 degrees in Euclidian
geometry. Like the. 7’more ftmdamentallaw” •pro~
posal above, however; this postulate simply transfers
the improbability up one level: of all the lav.’S and
parameters of physics that conceivably could have
been logically nscess;uy, itseemshighh’ improbable
that it woUld be’ those that are life-permitting.11
fine.:.tuning a:rgufu.ent is that as: tar”aS we know;
other forms oflife could exist even if the parameters
ofphysicnvere different. So; itis’clairned, the fine.:.
tuning· •argument ends up presupposing that all
fonhs ofintelligeritlife musthe like tis. The answer
to this objection is that most cases of fine-tuning do
hot ···niake this · ptesuppositioll. Consider, for
instance, the case of the fine.:..tulling ()f the strong
nuclear force,: Jfit we’re Slightly smaller, h() atoms
could exist other than hydrogeri. ·Contrary to what
one might see on Star Trek;an.ind:~lligent life-form
cannot becomposedmerely ofhydrcigen gas: there
eial the.:fine”‘tuning argument merely, presupposes
that· intelligent ·.·life requires some, degree .oLstable;
reproducible organized complexity’: This iScertainly
a very reasonable a~sun.1ptiol1.
anthropic principle, if the l~ws of nat!Jre were; not
fine-tuned, we would not be here to corhmt;pt on
the fuct. Some have argued, therefore, that the fme-
tulJ.irig is’not really i;npiobable (irsuprisirig at all’ under
atheism, but simply follows from the fuct 1 thaC we
exist. Th~.; response .to tgis. ol;ljt:ction is to simply
restate the argument in te~ of.our e,xistt!I1Ce: our
existt;nce as eml?oQ.ied, intelligent beings is ex:tremely
unlikely under the atheistic single-univ~rse hypothe-
sis (since our existence r~quires fme-tuning), but not
improbable under theiSill: The11,•We sirpply ;:J.Rply the
prime principle 9f confirmation to dra}v tht: conclu-
sion thatol{r ,exjstf!!Ce strongly confinns th~ism over
the atheistic single:;:-upiv~rse hypothe~is,
followi~g “flring squad~’ ;malogy. As John .Leslie
points out,. if fifty sharpshooters all miss me, the
response ”if’they had riot rnissedtmel .wouldn’t
be here tb ·consider the tact” ·is’ ‘not adequate:
Instead, I wouldri~turally conclude that then! was
some reason why·theyall missed;suth as that they
never really intended to kill me. :Wh{would r con..:
dude this? Because my continued existence would
be· very improbable’ undet the hypothesis th~t•they
missed me by chance, but not’ improbable”. under
the . hypotfiesis. that there wa.s some reason ‘why
they missed me. Thus, bf the prime ·principle c:f
confirmation,·.···· tri.y . continued eXistence strongly
confirrhs the latter hypothesis. 12 ·
raise to th’e argument from design, of which .the
lating the existence. of God qoesnot solve· the prob”‘
Atheist George S!Uith; for example;>claiills that
surely God is even more wonderfully
desigiied. ‘He rimst, therefore, 1iiM~1iliad a
designer even m()re yv:qn~erful than He is.
If God did not require a designer, then
wonderful• thing as the ‘universe needed
one:B·
qbjection:
the complexity of the ;universe” “itself; and
we have in addition die at least equal
C()mplexit)r ofGod: (The desighefofari
artifact must be at leasHis eomplex as the
designed ai:tifact) …. if the theistiiin show the
atheist that postulating God ai:tually reduces
the complexitY of one’s total world vieiV; then
is to point out tqat the atheist c:laiffi. that the designer
of an arti£lct must be as c()tnplex; as the artifact
designed is ce~;tainly not obvim1s. }3tit I
that, at m~st,. the atheist objec:tion ~ply. works
agamst a version of the design argufii1en(t4at claim~
that all organized complexity needs an explanation,
and that God is the best explanation of the orga-
nized comple;xity f()t;IIf.d in the W()t:M. ‘fpe version
of the argu~en~J presented.
bits; tremendous internal complexity, tar exceeding
that o£ the universe.· Thus, even ‘if we wer~ :to· grant
the ‘atheist assumption· that. the· designer· of an· arti~
fact muSt be as complex as the •artifact, the finel
tuning would.still give us strongcreasons”~o prefer
theism over the atheistic’sirigle,.uriiverse h)’pothesis.
sphere1′ on .Mars presented at the beginning ofthis
paper, As; mentioned:above;.the ·existenceof.the
biosphere would be much ntore probable under the
.hypothesis that intelligent life 6nce visited
been on Mars, even though this alien life would
most. lilcely have’ to· be inuch more complex than
the ”biosphere” itself
tionis to show that a supermind such as God would
not require a high degree of unexplained organized
complexity to create the·· universe:. Although .. I have
presented. this response •elsewhere; presenting it •here
is beyond the scope ofthis•chapter. ·
uNivERsEs HYPOTHESIS
tuning ofthe cqsmos, many atheists ha:ve pffered
an alternative explanation, what I will call the athe-
~stic ·rnany-uJ1iVe;rses ~ypothesis, (In the, literatpre j~
is more. fX>mlllonly referred tq .as th~ many-worlds
hyppthesis;. th()ugh.l believe·, t}lis .. Qame is. s()mew}lat
misleading) Accordipg t() tNs hypothesis, there are
a very large-;cperhaps,.infinite~number of U1li::’
verse~, with the. fundaJI1ental paramete~ ,of physics
the vast. ma.jol(ity of these universe.s the parameters
of physics w,()p.ld .not have life-.perniitting values.
would, and consequently it is no longer improbable
that universes such as ours exist that are fine-tuned
for life to occur.
of models for where these universes came from. We
will present what are probably the two ‘most popu-
lar and plausible, the .so,-called . vacuum fluctuation
modelsand the osdllating big bang models. According
to the vacuum fluctuation models, our universe,
along with .these other universes,. were: generated
by’ quantum’ fluctuations in a preexisting ,super-
space}6 Imaginatively, one can think of this preex~
isting superspace as an infinitely extending ocean
full of soap, and each univenie generated out of
this superspace as a soap· bubble which. spontane-
ously forms on the ocean.
model,. is a version of the big bang theory. Accord..,
ing,to the .big bang theory, the universe came into
existence in an “explosion” (that is, ·a “bang”)
somewhere between ten and fifteen .. billion years
ago. According to the oscillating big bang the.ory,
our universe will eventually collapse back in ori
itself(what is called the·”big crunch’;) and then
from that “big .crunch” will arise another “big
bang,” forming a new universe, .which will in
tum itself collapse, and so OIL According .. to those
who ‘i use this model to attempt to • explain the fine’-
tuning, during every. cycle; the parameters of phys..:.
ics• and the. initial• conditions of the universe are
reset . at random. Since this ·process of collapse,
explosion, collapse, and explosion .has been going
on for all eternity, eventually. a fine-tuned universe
will occur, indeed infinitely many of them.
for rejectingthe atheistic many-universes hypothesis,
; > ” ,– – ‘
atheistic many..:. universes hypothesis, and preferring
the theistic hypothesis, is the following general rule:
everything else being equal; we s/Wuld prifer hypotheses
for which we have independent evidence or that are, natural
illustrate• and· support this. principle, and. then
apply it to the case of the fine~tuning:’
to. coum’ as , \Zery . strong evidence that dinosaurs
existed:in the .past. But suppose a dinosaur skeptic
claii:ped that she; could explain the bones by postu~
lating a ‘~dinosaur …. b,onec,producing-field”. that sim’-
ply materialized the bones out · of thin air.
Moreover, suppose further that; to· avoid objections
such as that there are nb,knownphysicallaws that
would allow. for such a •mechanism, the. dinosaur
skeptic simply postulated·that.we have· not yet dis-.
covered these laws or detected these fields. Surely,
none of us would let this skepticalilypothesis deter
us from inferring •the existence • of dinosaurs: Why?
Because although no one .. has· directly .. observed
dinosaurs, we do have experience of other animals
leaving behind ·fossilized remains, arid thus the
dinosaur explanation is a natural extrapolation from
our common experience. In contrast, to explain
the .dinosaur ·hones; the ; dinosaur skeptic has
invented a setofphysicallaws, and a set ofmechan-
isms that are. not; a natural extrapolation from any~
thing we• kriow or experience.
that minds ,often ·produce fine …. tuned: devices, such
as Swiss- watches:. Postulating God-a supenhind-‘-‘-
as the explanation of the fine-tuning~ therefore, is a
natural extrapolation from what we already observe
minds to. do. In contrast, it is difficult to see how
the atheistic many-universes hypothesis could be
considered· a natural extrapolation; from what we
observe. Moreover, unlike; the .atheistic . manr
universes hypothesis, we have. some experiential
evidence for the existence of God, namely religious
experience. Thus, by ;the above principle, we
sho.uld ·prefer· the · theistie:explanation of the fine-‘
tuning .over the atheistic manyc.universes explana-‘
tion, everything. else being. equal.
universes hypothesis is that the .. · “many-universes
generator” seems like it would need to be designed:
for 1whatthis . .”universe generator”; could b~uch
as the oscillating:big· barig and the vacuum fluctua-
tion models:~ explained abov~the ‘igenerator”
itself is.· governed by a comple:x:’ set of ·physical
laws that allow it to produce·the imiyet:Ses. It stands
to ·reason; therefore; that ifthese laws were .slightly
different the generator prqbablyiwould not be able
to produce any universes that could· sustain life:
After all, even my bread madiine· has to be made
just right in order to·work properly, and it only
produces loaves ofbread;not tmiverses! Or consider
a device as simple as .a mousetrap: it requires that all
the parts, such as the ‘spring and hammer, i be
arrangedjust right in order to function. It is doubt~
ful, therefore,.. whether· the·. atheisticmany’-universe
theory can entirely eliminate the problem of design
the atheist faces; rather, at least to some extent, it
seems simply to move the problem. of design up
onelevel.17
atheistic many-universes hypothesis is •that the uni-
verse generator must not only select the parameters
of physics at random, but· must actually randomly
create or select the very laws ofphysics themselves.
This makes. this hypothesis’ seem: even more far-
fetched since it is diffic~lt to see what:possible phys-c
ical mechanism could select or create laws.
must randomly select the’ laws of: physics is that,
just as the right:va:lues for the parameters of physies
are needed for life to’ occur, the right set:of laws is
also needed~ Ifi for instance, certain laws· of physics
were missing, life would be impos5ible. For exam-
ple, without the law of inertia, which guarantees
that particles do not shoot off at high speeds, life
would probably not be possible) 8 Another example
is the law of gravity: if masses did not attract each
other, there would be no .planets or stars; and once
again it seems that life would be impossible. Yet
another example is the Paj,ili Exclusion Principle,
the principle of quantltrh mechanics that says that
no two ferrnions~uch ·as electrons or protons-‘-,
can ~share the same quantum state; As prominent
Princeton physicist Freeman lJyson points out, 19
into· the .nucleus and; tnus atoms would’ be
impossible.
the atheistio•many~universes’hypothesiS .·is.;.that it
cannot explain other features of the •universe that
seem··to .. exhibit apparent· design,. whereas •·theism
can. ,for ·example; •many physiCists, such as Albert
Einstein,. have observed that the ;basic laws of
physics exhibit an ·extraordinary degree. of beauty,
elegance, >harmony, and ingenuity; NobeL prize:.
winning physicist ·Steven·. Weinberg,· for.,instance;
devotes. a:’whole chapter of his bookDreams;ofa
Final·Theory20 :explaining how the criteria of beauty
and elegance ate commonly used to guide physicists
in formulating the right laws. Indeed, one ‘
make sense lfthe universe was designed by God.
Under the atheistic riiany~universes hypothesis;
however; there is no reason tb expect the furida ..
meiitallaws to be elegant or beautifuL As•theoreti’–
cal iphysiCist ··Paul· Davies writes, ”.Jf nature is so
‘clever’ as to exploit mecfianisms that amaze ·US
with theiringenuity, is that not persuasive evidence
for the existence ofintelligent desigp;behind the
universe?·Jf the world’s··finest minds can unravel
only with difficulty the• deeper workihgs of nature;
how could it be·supposed that those .workings are
merely a mindless accident, a product of blind
chance?”22
rejecting the atheistic many-universes hypothesis,
which,tnay be the n~()st .diffi<;ultto gr<~,sp: namely,
neither the ath~istic 01any-universes,J1ypothesis
(nor the atheistic single:.:uJiiv~rse hyp<>‘thesis) can
at present adequately account for the improbable
initial· arrangement of matter, in the universe
required by the second·. law of thermodynamics.
To see. th~,· note that acc:ording to the second.
law of thermodynamics, the entropy of the
\
of understanding this .entropy increase is to say that
the universe is going from a state of order to· dis-”
order. ‘We observe this entropy increase all the
time around us: things, such as a child’s·bedroom,
that start out highly organized ;tend to “decai’. and
become disorganized unless. something or some-
one intervenes to. stop it.
think of the universe as· a.· scrabbkcboa:rd ·that ini~
tially starts out in a highly ordered state in which:all
the letters are aminged to form words; .but which
keeps getting randomly shaken. Slowly, :the board,
like the universe, moves from a state. of .order to
disorder. The problem for the atheist is to explain
how the universe could have started out in a highly
ordered state, since it is extraorciinarily improbable
for such states to occur by chance?3 If, for example,
one were to dump. a bunch of letters at random on
a scrabpk-board, it would be very unlikely for most
of them.to form ·into words. At best, we would
expect. groups of letters to form into words in a
few places on the board .
many’-universes hypothesis explain the high deg~ee
of initial order of our universe by clailliing that
given enough universes, eventually one will arise
that is ordered and in which intelligent life occurs,
and so it is no surprise that we find ourselves in an
ordered universe? The problem with this explana-
tion is that it is overwhelmingly more likely for
local patches oLorder to form ih one or two places
than for the whole universe to be ordered, just as it
is ‘overwhelmingly more likely for a few letters on
the scrabble-board randomly to form words than
for . all the letters throughout the board randomly
to form words. Thus, the. overwhelming majority
of universes in whichintelligent life occurs will be
ones in which the intelligent life will be surrounded
by a small patch .oforder necessary for its existence,
but in which the rest. of the universeis. disordered.
Consequently, even under the atheistic many-”
universes hypothesis, it would· still be enormously
improbable fot intelligent beings to find the111Selves
in a universe such as ours which is highly ordered
throughout.24
tively ~efute ‘the.atheistic n1al1y-universes’pypot~e
sis, “they do show that it·. has .soni~ sevJ~e
disadvantages· ~dative to theis~. This meaps that’if
~theists adopt the atheistic many-universe~hypotfl~
esis’ to defend their positiori,then’ ;.theism has
be~on1e muc.h ‘less, plausible . th~n it used to·. be:
Modifyiflg a turn ofphqse C()ilie’d by’p~ilo~ophei:
Fred Dr~tske: these are.iritlationary times: arid the
cost of ~theism has just gorie llP·.
objective. reasons• for claiming that the fine-tuning
provides strong evidence for theism. Lfil:stpresented
an argument for thinking that the fine’-‘tuning pro.,
vides strong evidence for preferring theism: over the
atheistic single-universe hypothesis, and then • pre-‘
sented a variety of different· reaSOllS’ ‘for rejecting
the ath~istk: many-universes hypothesis as an ex:pla~
nation of the fine’-funing, In order to help one
appreciate the strength · ofthe arguments’ presented,
lwould.like.to end by comparillgthe strength of:the
core version’ of the argument::fromthe· fine'”‘tuning to
what is widely regarded as the stiongesf atheist argu~
ment against theism, the argunierit from evil. ~5
based: on evil takes a similar form to the core ver~
sion of. the . fine-tuning ·argument. Essentially, the
atheist argues that the existence of; the. kinds of
evil we• find in the world is very improbable
under theism, but not improbable under atheism,
Thus, by the prime principle of confirmation; they
conclud.e that the exiStence of evil provides strong
reasons for preferring atheism over theisin.
t() the core version •of the fine~tuning argument is
that, unlike in the case of the fine-luning, the athe-
ist does not have a significant objective basis for
claiming that the existence of the kinds of evil we
find in the world is highly improbable under the-
ism. In fact, their judgment that it is improbable
see. t~is, .. note that i11 order< to .. show that jt . is
Improbable, atheists ~oul
that it assumes that the· various explanations.people
have offered for why an all good God would create
evilc-:-such as the free will theodicy—“ultirnately fail.
But even if we grant that these theodicies fail, the
argument is •still very:.weak. To •see why; wnsider
an ana1ogy. Suppose someone tells me thauhere. is
a rattlesnake in my, garden, and J examine .. a portion
ofthe; garden and do..not find.the,snake. I w~uld
only be justified in concluding that there was prob-
ably no snake in the garden’ iCeither:: i) · L had
searched ·at least halUhe garden; or ii). I had good
reason to believe that ·if the snake were in the gar-
den, it would likely be in the portion of the garden
that I examined. If, for :instance, Iwere randomly to
pick some small segment of the • garden to· search
and did not firid the snake, I would be unjustified
in concluding from my search that there was prob~
ably no snake in the>garden. Sitriilarly, if I were
blindfolded· and did not have any idea of how
large the garden was (e.g., whether it was.ten square
feet or several square triiles), I would be unjustified
in concluding that it was unlikely thauhere was a
rattlesnake in the garden, evert if I had searched for
hours with my .rattlesnake-detecting dogs. Why?
Because·:! would not have any idea of what per-
centage ·of the garden· I had searched.
of how large the realm .is of passible greater pur-
poses for evil that an ‘all .good, omiiipotent..being
tion ‘/of this realm w,e have: actually •searched.
Indeed, ‘ considering the finitude of our own
minds, we have good :reason to believe;:.thav we
have> so far only searched a small proportion, and
we do not have significa:h:t reason to believe that all
the purposes ·God might have for allowing evil
would be in the proportion we searched. Thus,
we have ·little·· •objective .·· basis ·for . saying.··. that the
existence of the types ofevil we find in:tne• world
iS highly improbable. under theism:
that the relevant probability estimates in i:he.,case .of
the fine~tuning are much more secure than those
estimates in the probabilistic version of the atheist’s
argument fromevil; since unlike the latter, we can
provide>a fairly rigorous, objective basis for them
based on actual calculations ofthe relative ran~;e of
life~permitting values for the parameters of:physics,
(See the appendix to this chapter for a •rigorous
derivation of the probability of; the fine’-‘tuning
under the atheistic single~ universe , hypothesis.)
Thus, I conclude, the core argument for. preferring theism
over the probabilistic version ofthe atheistic sin,gle”universe
hypothesis is much. stronger than the atheist . argument
.126 rom evr ·’
pretriise (2) of the main argumen’t;/ that is, the
claim that i:he fine,turiing is very improbable
under the atheistic
\
\
a ·unique, ;unrepeatable .event’ as assumed ,by the
atlieistic single~ universe hypothesis, The .appendix
will in effect ~nswer the common atheist qbjection
that theists can neither justify the claim that the fme-”
tuning is. improbable under, the atheistic single-”
universe hypothesis,. nor can ~they provide.; an
account of what it could possibly mean to·•say that
the fme~tuning is·improbab}e;
E Gm1m2ll. Here G is what is known as·. the
gravitational constant, and is basically a ·number that
detennjnes the force .of gravity in any given circum.,.
st;mce. For instance, the gravitational attraction
between the moon and the. earth is given by first
multiplying the mass. oLthe moon (m1) times the
mass of the.earth (m2), and then dividing by the dis.,-
tance between them squared(?). Finally, one multi-‘
plies this result by the number G to obtain • the’ total
force. Clearly the force is directly;propol:tional to G:
for example, if G were to double, the force.between
the moon and the earth would double.
calculations indicate that the force ofgravicy must
be fine~ tuned to one part in 1040 in order for.life to
occur. • What does such fine~ttining ··mean? To
understand it, imagine a radio dial, going .from 0
to 2Go, where. C 0 represents the current value ·of
the gravitational constant. Moreover, imagine the
dial being broken up into 1040-that is, ten thou~
sand, billion, billion, billion; billion-c-evenly spaced
tick marks: To claim that the strength of gravitY
must ·be fine~tuned to one part in 1040 is simply
to claim that; in order forlife to exist, the constant
ofgravity cannot vary by even one tick mark along
the dial from its current v:alue of Go-
In the following subsections, we will use the princi,
ple of indijference to justifythe· assertion that the fine”‘
tuning is .. highly improbable under the ‘;atheistic
single.,.universe hypothesis ..
which there is. a finit.e number of alternatives; the
principle of indifference can be formulated as the
claim that we. should assign the same proBability, tq
what are called equipossible alternatives,· where. two or,
more alternatives are said to be equipos5iblel”if we
have_ no reason .to prefer one .of the alternatives over
any ofthe others.,(In anotherversion oftheptinci-
ple; alternativ:es that are’ relevantly symmetrical are
considered equipossible and hence the .ones :that
should be assigned equal probability.) For instance;
in the case•ofastandard two~sided coin, .we have
no. niore reason to think that the .coin will. land on
heads than that it will land on tails, and so We assign
them each an equal probability. Since the total
·probability must add up to one; this· mi:fans that
the coin has a 0.5 chance oflanding oii heads. and a
0.5 chance oflanding.on tails, Similarly, ip. the case
of a standard six,..sided die, we have no more reason
to think that it will land on one number, Say a. 6,
than-any flf.ilie’other. numbers, such as a•4 .. Thus,
the principle of indifference .tells us to assign each
possible way of landing an equal probability~
namely 1k.·
only when there are a finite number ofalternatives;
for e.Kample six.sides on a ,die, In the. case of the
fine~tuning, however, the alternatives are not finite
but form a··continuous magnitude. The value of G;
for instance,• conceivably could have been• any
number between 0 and infinity. Now, continuous
magnitudes are ;•usually thought oLin ternis of
ranges, areas, or volumes depending on whether
or not we. are: considering’ one, furo., three, or
more dimensions. For example, :the amount of
water in an .8 oz. glass could fall anywhere within
the range 0. oz. to 8oz., such as. 6.012345645 oz, Or,
the .exact position thatxdart hits 1a dart boaro .can
fhll anywhere within the area of; the dart ::board,
With some qualifications to be discuss.ed below,
the principle ofindifference becomes in the contin~
uous case. the ,principle that when we have no reason t.o
prifer any one ·value if. a parameteY. over anoth(!.r,. we
should, :assign equal probabilities to equal ranges, areas,
or volumes . . So, for instance;: suppose one aimlessly
throws a dart at a dart board .. Assuming the dart hits
the bulrs eye? Since the .dart;is:thrown aimlessly,
we have no more reason to believe it will hit one
part of the •·dart. board than any other part. The
principle of indifference, therefore; .tells Us that
the probability of its hitting the hull’s eye is the
same as the probability .of hitting any•other·partof
the dart board of equal< area; This •means• that the
probability of its hitting the bull's·,eye is Simply
the ratio of the area• ofthe hull's eyeto the rest of
the ·dart board. ·So, for instance', ifJhe bull's• eye
fornis · only S percent of the total area of the
board, tnen the probability ofits· hitting· the ·hull's
eye will be 5 percent.
the firre”‘tlining; we have no more reason to think
that the parameters of·physics will fall within the
life”-permitting range than within any other range,
given the atheistic single-universe hypothesls:t Thus
according to the prinCiple of indifference,·equal
ranges• of these parameters should be . assigned
equal>probabilities. As in the’ case of the dart
board mentioned in the last section, this means
that the probability of the . parameters of physics
falling• within· the life-pennitting range • under. the
atheistic . singk-universe• hypothesis . is . simply the
ratio of the range• oflife.:.permitting yalues. (the
“area of the hull’s eye”) to the total relevant range
of possible values (the “ielevanuarea of·rhe• dart
board’?).
the range of l!fo-permitting values .for the parameters
of physics, as discussed above in the case of gravity,
for instance. But what is the “total relevant range of
possible values’!? At first one might think that this
range cis infinite, since. the values of.the parameters
could conceivably be anything: This, however, is
not cbrrect, ·for although the possible range of
values’ could be infmite, for most. of these values
we
know; a new form of matter might come into•exis-
tence that could sustain·· life. Thus( as far as we
fat” n~n1oved from the actual values that the para’-‘
meters ‘have.iConsequently, aU we caw say is that
the ·lif~;permitting. range is very, very small relative
to the limited range of values for which we tan
make estimates, a range that •we will here’-‘aftet
refer to as the. ‘:illuminated’~ range;
affect the overall argument~ The .reason is that;
based on the principle of indifference, we can still
say that it is yery ~PI”Obj!ble.for tl1e .:v:Uues for the
parameters o(physics to have· faJlen ·in the life-
permitting range instead· of some other part of the
‘.’illuminated’~ range.27 And thiS •impro.bability is an
that is actually needed’ for our main•argument•to
work. To see this, consider an analogy. Suppose•a
dart landed on the hull’s eye at the center of a huge
dart board, Further, suppose that this hull’s eye is
surrounded by a very large empty, bull’s:.:.eye.:.free,
area. Even if.there were many other hull’s eyes on
the dart boarO., we would still take the fact that the
dart landed on the hull’s eye instead 6fsome other
part of the large empty area surrounding the hull’s
eye.· as., strong evidence·. that it ,was ainie:d. Why?
Because we wouH reason that gillen ·that the· dart
landed in the empty area,. it was very improbable for
it to land• in the· hull’s eye by chanceubut not
improbable. if it wete aimed. Thus, by the prime
principle of confinrration;.we could colldude that
the dart landing oh the rbull’ s eye •strongly confirms
the.hypothesis that it .was aimed over the .chance
hypothesis. ·
familiar with the principle of indifference, and
mathematics; will recognize . that one ·important
qualification rieeds to be ;made to. the above account
of how to apply the principle of .indifference.
(Those who are not mathematically adepFrhight
want to skip this and perhaps the next paragraph.)
To understand tile q ualific;atign, note that the ratio
of ranges . used’ in ca.iculatirig the probability is
dependent on/how one parameterizes; ·or writes,
the • physical laws, For example, suppose· for. the
sake of illustration that the range of life c. permitting
values for the gravitational constant is 0 to.·G0; and
-., .. -4·
; where
universe o Then, the range .of Iife~permitting ·values
would be• 0 to U0, and the ‘~illuminated” range of
possible values would be 0 to 4U0 on the U scale
(which.is equivalent to 0 to 2G0 on the G scale).
Hence; calculating the ratio of life.-permitting
values using the U scale instead of the G scale yields
a ratio of J4 .instead oL~ Indeed, for almost any
ratio one chooses~uch as one in which the life-
permitting range is about the same $ize as ·the
“illuminated?’ . rang~there exist mathematically
equivalent forms of Newton’s law that will yield
that ratio. So, why choose the standard.way ofwrit~
ing: Newton’s law :to calculate the. ratio instead
of one in which the fine-tuning is not improbable
at aU?
the proportion used in calculating the probability
be between real physic;al· ranges, areas, or volumes,
not merely· mathematical.· representations· of them.
That is, the proportion given by the scale used in
one’s representation must directly correspond to the
proportions actually existing imphysical reality, As
an illustration, consider how we might calculate the
probability that a meteorite will fall· in New ·York
state instead of somewhere else in the horthern,
contiguous United States. One way ofdoing this
is to take a standard map of the northern, contigu~
ous United States; measure. the area covered by
New ·York on the map (say 2 square inches) and
divide it by the total area ofthemap (say 30 square
inches). If we were to do ·this, we would get
approximatelythe right answer because the propor-
tions on a•.standard map direc;tly correspond to the
actual froportions of land areas in the United
States. 2 0n the other . hand, . suppose we had a
map made by some lover of the east coast in
toohup half the map.df.we used the proportions
of areas.as represented• };>y this map we would· get
the wrong: answer since .the scale ·used would not
correspond to · .. ·real ; proportions: • of. land ···areas.
Applied to the. fine-tuning; this means that our.cal;,.
culations. of these proportions .must .be done• •using
parameters ;that. ;directly correspond .to physical
quantities in.order to yield valid probabilities. ·In
the case ; of gravity; for instance, the gravitational
constant G directly corresponds · to the force
between two unit masses a unit distance apart,
whereas U does not. (Instead, Ucqrresponds to
the square.· of the. force.) . Thus,· G is the correct
parameter to use •in calculating the probability}9
principle of indifference has been criticized on yar-,
ious grounds, several powerful reasons can • be
offered for its soundness if if is restricted i in; the
ways explained in the last subsection. ·First; it has
an extraordinarily wide range of applicability. As
Roy Weatherford notes ·in his hook;. Philosophical
Foundations· of Probability; Theory,· “an. astonishing
number of extremely complex problems itt proba”‘”
bility theory have been solved, and usefully so, by
calculations based entirely on the assumption of
~quiprobable ‘alternatives [that is, •the:, principle ·()[
indifference].”~0 Second, at least for• the. discrete
case,·· the .. principle can be given •a significant •theo’-
retical grounding in information . theory;+ being
derivable from Shannon’s important ilnd well-:
known measure ofinjormation, or negative: entropy. 31
indifference seems the only justification we haye
for assigning. pr0bability. To illustrate;
b:y. hypothesis no one has yet’ rolled such ;dice to
detennine the relative frequency with which they
come up on each side. ·Rather, ‘it seems our only
justification for assigning this probability is the prin’-
ciple ofindifference: that is, given that every side of
the die is· relevantly macroscopically: symmetriCal
with every other side, we have no reaSon to believe
that the die will land oh one·side •over any other
side, and th1,1s·we assign them all1an equa1’probabil-
. f . fifty 32 1ty o one m, :
In the·last section we used •the principle ofindiffer:..
ence to rigorously justify the claim that the fine-
tuning is highly improbable under the atheistic
single-universe, hypothesis. We did ;not explain;
however, what it could . mean ·to say that it ·is
improbable, especially given that the universe is a
unique, unrepeatable event. To address this issue,
we shall’now show how the pr()hability invoked
in the fine-tuning. argument can be straightfor-
wardly understood either as what· could be called
classical probability •or as’ what is known as epistemic
probability.·
probability defines probability in terins . of the • ratio
ofnumber of·~·’favorable casesn to the total number
of equipossible cases,~? Thus, for instance, to say the
p’robability of a die• coming up ”4″ is one out of six
is simply to say that the nuniber of ways a die
could come up “4” is one-sixth the number -of
equipossible ways· it could come up. Extending
this definition· to the continuous case; .classical
probability can be defined in terms of the relevant
ratio of ranges, areas, or volumes :over whiCh the
principle of indifference applies. Thus, under this
extended· definition, to say that the probability of
the parameters of physics falling into. the life-
permitting value is very improbable· simply tneans
that the ratio of life-,perrilitting values to the range
of possible yalues is very, very small. Finally, notice
that this definition of probability implies the prin-‘
ciple of indifference, and thus we can be certain
probability~
widely ;recognized·type of probability that applies
to claims; ‘statements, •and. hypotheses..,.,_.:.that> is;
what philosophers • call. propositions. 34 (A proposi:…
tion is any daim, assertion, statement, or hypothesis
about the world.): Roughly, the epistemic pro-
bability ‘of a proposition can be thought of as the
degree of credence–that is, degree of confidence
or belief……;:;we rationally should have in the propo:.:
sition. Put differently, , episterhic probability is a
measure of our rational degree of belief under a
condition ofignorance concerning whether a prop-
osition is true or false. For example, wh~n,one •says
that the special theory of relativity is probably true,
one is making a statement of epistemic probability.
After all; the theory is actually either true or false.
But, we do not know for sure whether it! is true ot
false; so we say it is probably true to indicate that
we should put more confidence in, its being true
than>in its: being false. It is also comrhonly argued
thatthe probability of a· coin toss is best understood
as a case of epistemic probability. Since the side the
win will land ‘(m. is determined by the laws of phys-
ip, itis argued that our assignment of probability is
simply a measure of our rational· expectations con-
cerning· which side the ,coin will land on:
losophers also,speakofwhat is known as the condi-
tional epistemic probability of one proposition on
ariother. The conditional epistemic probability of
a propositionR on another,proposition 5–:–written
as P(R/ S)-can,be defined as the degree to which
the proposition S of itself should rationally lead us to
expect that R is true. For example, there is a high
conllitional probability that it will rain today on
the hypothesis that the weatherman’has predicted
a 100 percent chance of rain, whereas ‘there is a
low conditional probability that it will rain today
on the hypothesis that the weatherman has pre.,.
diCted only a 2 percent cQ.ance of rain. That is,
the hypotl:iesis’that the weatherman has predicted
.a 100 percent chance of rain today should strongly
lead us td expect that it wilh rain, whereas .the
\
2 percent chance should lead us to expect that it
will riot rain; Under the epistemic conception of
probability; ther’e£ore, the statement, that the fine-
tuning of the CosttUJS is very improbable uniler the atheis-
tic single-universe hypothesis makes perfect serise’: it is
to be \inderstood as making a statement about the
degree tO which the. atheistic ?ingle..:imiverse
hyp~thesis would or should, of itself, rationally
lead us .to expect the cosmic fine:-tuning ..
two , ways. of understandiq.g imprqpability:, inv.oked
in our main argu111ent: as ·classicaJ probab~lity or
episte111ic. probability .. This un,dercuts the.
Harper and Row, 1979), 251.
Nature’s Creative Ability to Order the. Universe (New
quoted in T1Je Anthropk Cosmological Principle,· ed. ·
University Press, 1986), 22.
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniveJ;Sity Press, 1982),
9{}-.91. John Jefferson Davis, “The Design Argu-
ment, Cosmic ‘Fine-tuning,: and the Anthropic
Principle,” The International Journal ~fPh(losophy of
Religion .22 (1987): 140 ..
1989), 4, 35; Anthropic Cosmologica/Principle, 322.
Unified Theory~{ Ndwre (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984), 242.
Fine-Tuned Cosmos,” in. Physics, Philosophy and
Theology: A Common Quest for Understattding, ed.
Robert Russell et·aL (Vatican City State:·Vatican
Observatory Press, 1988), 299.
a p~ecise staternent of the degre~. to w~ich ~vidence
counts in favo~ ,of qp.e hypothesis over .another
can be given in terms pfthe odds form of Bayes’s
Theorem: that is, P(H1/E)/P(H2/E) = [P(H1/P
the principle stated h~r~, h~we~er,do~s not’ require
the applicability or truth 0 fBayes’s Theorem.
want t9 • note. that· the .kinde ofprobabi!ity;invoked
which is a measure .ofthe rational degree o(belief
we should hav;e ina proposition(see app,endix,
su’bsectioniii). Since ot1r rational degree ofb~lief in
a)lecessary tr\Jth qa~ b~ less ·than l, we can sel’)sibly
speak ()f it b~ing impropable fora,.given law. of
nature to exist necessarily. for example, we <;an
suchas Goldbach’s conjecturF that every even
number greater than 6 is the ~urd df twoodd
prirlles_._.as, being pi:oba:bfy true. or probably talse
given. our cu~rent eviden2e, even though’ all
niatherriat’ical hypothe;es are either necessarily true
or necessanly false. .
13. George Smith, ”The Case.Against God,”reprl~tedin
Stein (Buffalo: Ptometheus.Prek 1980), 56.
Coinciden~e,” Tize Philwophical Quarterly 35
(JulyJ985): 275)-76,italics added. ·
that is disconnected from other regions in such a
way that the, parameters ofphysi9in thatregion
could differ.;significantly ~rom th~ other r¢gions.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 6 7 (1986): 82.
universes hypothesis could not avoid this problem
by hypothesizing that: the many universes always
existed as “brute fact” without being p’roduced by a
universe gerl.erator. This would sitnply add to the
problem: it would not orily leave’Unexplained ‘the
·fine~tuning or.our.own univei:se;but would leave
unexplained the existence of these other universes.
Picture of Nature,” Scientific Amen”can (May
1963): 47.
and the ·second law· of thermodynamics in general,
is given a precise formulation in a branch of
fundamental’physics called statistical fileclwnics,
actording to which a state· of high order represents
a very improbable state; and a: state of disorder
represents a highly probable state.
.. pliical Issues in the Foundation of Statistical Mechanics
chapter 8, for a review cif the nontheistic
universe and the severe difficu!fies’they face.
ment fro~ evil is presented in Daniel Howard-
Snyder’s chapter (pp. 76:._ 115), and a discussion
of 9ther atheistic arguments is give~ ir1]9hn’
O’Leary-Hawthom’s chapter (pp. 116-:-:34).
Institute grant for the fiscal year 1997-1998.
probability is known as a conditional probability. In
the case of G, calculations indicate th~t this
conditional probabiliry of the fine.:. tuning would be
less than 10~40 since the life-perml.tting range is less
than 10-40 ohhe range 0 to 2G0, the latter range
being:certainly smaller than the total “illuminated”
range for G.
principle of indifferenc~ only applies to strips of
The reason for this is ‘that only strips of land
11rea~ .should be assigned approximat~ly eq~~~ ··.
well-known Bertrap.d P~radoxes illustrate (e.g., see
Roy W,e<1therford, ·Fo11ndations of Pro~ability :Theory
[Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982], 56);
sometimes there are tw'o eqtia:lly' g0od and 'con-
flicting parameters that directly correspond to a
physical quantity and to which the principle of
indifference applies. In these cases, at best we can
say that the probability is somewhere between that
given by the two conflicting parameters. This
problem; however, typicallydoes not seem to arise
for most cases of fine-tuning. Also, it should be
noted that the principle of indifference applies best
to classical or epistemic probability, not other kinds of
probability such as relative frequency: (See subsection
iii below.)
Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 345.
with items such as coins and dice teaches us that
‘whenever two alternatives ‘are macroscopically
syintn-;:trical, we should assign them an eqtial
probability, unless we hive. a: particular reason
not to. All this claim implies, however, is that
we have· experiential justification for the prin-
ciple of indifference; and· thus it does, not take
away from. our ,main point that in • certain
practical situations we must rely on the principle
of indifference to justify our assignment of
probability. ·
see Richard Swinburne, An .Introduction to Con-
firmation Theory (London: Methuen, 1973); Ian
Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philoso-
phical Study of Ea~ly I1eas Abo11t Probability, Induction
and Statistica( Inference (Cambridge:· Cambridge
University Press, 1975); and Alvin ‘Plantinga,
Wa”ant and Proper FiJnction (Oxford: Oxford
University Pr~ss; 1993), ch~pters 8 and 9. \
expectation should not be confused with the
degree to which one should expect the parameters
of physics to full within the life-permitting range if
one believed the atheistic single-universe hypoth-
esis. For even those who believe in this atheistic
hypothesis should expect the parameters of physics
to be life-permitting since this follows from the fact
that we are alive. Rather, the conditional epistemic
probability in this case is the degree to which the
atheistic single-universe hypothesis of itself should
lead us to expect parameters of physics to be life-
permitting. This means that in assessing the
conditional epistemic probability in this and other
similar cases, one must exclude contributions to our
expectations arising from other information we
one way of doing this is by means of the following
sort of thought experiment. Imagine a disembodied
being with mental capacities and a knowledge of
physics comparable to that of the most intelligent
physicists alive today, except that the being does
not know whether the parameters of physics are
within the life-permitting range. Further, suppose
that this disembodied being believed in the
atheistic single-universe hypothesis. Then, the
degree that being should rationally expect the
parameters of physics to be life-permitting will be
equal to our conditional epistemic probability,
since its expectation is solely a result of its belief in
the atheistic single-universe hypothesis, not other
factors such as its awareness of its own existence.