Discussion 3 and Quiz 3 and 4
Discussion:
Turn to pp. 145 of your SFA text. Read the exchange between John and Abigail Adams. Why is Abigail so adament that women should be included in the new nation’s political structure? Why is it so important to have women’s voices in the new republic?
Link to the conversation:
https://www.homeworkmarket.com/files/conversation-pdf
Quiz 3:
According to the author, James Madison, what causes “factions” and why are they dangerous? Moreover, why does Madison think it makes sense to have a strong central government?
Use Federalist No.10 document to answer the central question of Quiz 3.
FederalistPapers: No. 10 – Full Text
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic
Faction and Insurrection
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerou s advantages promised by a well -constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break
and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments
never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fa te, as when
he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the
principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The
instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils,
have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments
have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful
topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their mo st specious
declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American
constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot
certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality,
to contend that they have as effectual ly obviated the danger on this side, as
was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most
considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private
faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,
and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearin g majority. However anxiously we may wish that
these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not
permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed,
on a candid review of our situation, that some of the di stresses under which
we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our
governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will
not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly,
for that prevailing a nd increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm
for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the
other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and
injustice with which a factious spirit has tainte d our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of factio n: the one, by
destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving
to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse
than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without
which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty,
which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would
be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it
imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As
long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise
it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists
between his reason and his self -love, his opinions and his passions will have
a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which
the latter will attach th emselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to
a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object
of
government.
From the protection of diff erent and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of
property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the
society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see
them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well
of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind
to fall into mutual anim osities, that where no substantial occasion presents
itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to
kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions h as been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are
without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who
are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized
nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different
sentiments and views. The regulation of these var ious and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be
both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so m any judicial determinations, not
indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but
advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law
proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors
are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold
the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the
judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful
faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be
encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures?
are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and th e
manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice
and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions
of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet
there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and
temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of
justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a
shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say th at enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases,
can such an adjustment be made at all without taking int o view indirect and
remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate
interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or
the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot
be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling
its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views
by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society;
but it will be unable to ex ecute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion
or interest both the public good and the rights of o ther citizens. To secure
the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and
at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government,
is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that
it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be
recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two o nly. Either
the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time
must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or
interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to
concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor
religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not
found to be such on the injustice and violence of individ uals, and lose their
efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in
proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by
which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for
the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence
and contention; have ever been found incompat ible with personal security
or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as
they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have
patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by
reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would,
at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the
cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies
from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure
and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are:
first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of
citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and
greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true i nterest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect
may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister
designs, may, by intrigue, by c orruption, or by other means, first obtain the
suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question
resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the
election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is cle arly decided in
favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may
be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to
guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they
must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion
of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not
being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being
proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the
proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small
republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a
greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number
of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for
unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which
elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more
free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on
both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too
much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little
acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little
fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and
aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to
the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of
territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of
democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which
renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the
latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and
interests, the more frequently will a majority be f ound of the same party;
and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where
there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication
is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose
concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over
a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over
a small republic,–is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Doe s
the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local
prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the
representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite
endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater
variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to
outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased
variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does
it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and
accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?
Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it th e most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a
part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire
face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that
source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
division of property, or for any othe r improper or wicked project, will be
less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of
it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a
particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being
republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit an d supporting the
character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS.