Week 4 Assignmt.

Assignment and article attached. Must use Headings provided in the assignment attached. Must have Apa citations and References. NO PLAGIARISM!!!

For this Individual Reflection, identify a plan that you would like to implement within the next few months. Perhaps you are working on a plan toward achieving a goal in your personal or professional life, or maybe there is another, more short-term goal that you need a bit of extra help to achieve. Whether it is within the workplace or a personal area, consider how an innovation might span more than one department, function, or group. Consider your stakeholders as an Innovative Team. There will be stakeholders who seem willing to support your plan, are neutral to your plan, and a few who might be resistant to or against your plan.

Note: Consider the rubric and the expectations for exemplary work for this and all of your course assignments. Often, an exemplary level of work is considered innovative in the workplace. Using this mindset, complete the aspects of this Individual Reflection as if you are preparing a stakeholder report for a leader at your company (or a company with which you are familiar), a mentor, or a community leader.

In the solution development stage of the creative process, you will be taking your time to analyze and test several alternative solutions. You will be adjusting and analyzing potential solutions, all the while moving your team toward convergence. Using the text, consider Chapters 20 and 21 that includes the POINt tool and the Stakeholder Analysis tool (Applegate) which provide ideas and techniques to devise creative solutions. Also consider Long (2010) who emphasizes the importance of engaging stakeholders in meaningful ways to achieve project goals.

Submit your Individual Reflection in which you describe the plan that you would like to implement, including:

· Your list of the stakeholders whose approval/support will be necessary for your success. Take the time to ensure your list of stakeholders is as complete as possible.

· Considering the various stakeholder perspectives, identify what is important to each of the stakeholders on your list.

· Your assessment of the risks to your plan and impact of stakeholders with different goals and interests. Explain how you might manage the impact and address any risks that emerge.

· The specific details of the strategy, or strategies, you will use to align stakeholder interests in your plan, with your rationale as to why you think these will be successful based on your analysis of stakeholder perceptions and interests. (
Hint:
 Strategies can include team-building exercises, conflict resolution methods, partnering, change management, best practices, etc. You will need to provide details to support your selected strategy or strategies.)

Guidance on Assignment Length: Your Week 4 Individual Reflection assignment should be 2–3 pages (1–1.5 pages if single spaced), excluding a title page and references.

Assignment Instructions:

You are required to use these headings. Under each heading provide your thoughts. The headings will help organize your assignments and facilitate my prompt marking. I will take off points if you do not use the headings. All the assignments must adhere to APA paper requirements and APA compliant references.

Abstract

Element 1: Description of Plan

Element 2: Stakeholders and their Interests

Element 3: Risks

Element 4: Strategy to Align Stakeholder Interests

References

References:

Long, S. (2010). The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation. Human Systems Management, 29, 205-215

Human Systems Management 29 (2010) 205–215
DOI 10.3233/HSM-2010-0716
IOS Press

205

The strategic implications of non-technical
stakeholder acceptance in high technology
system design and implementation

Suzanna Long
Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, Missouri University of Science
and Technology, 600 W 14th Street, 215 EMGT Building, Rolla, MO, USA
Tel.: +1 573 341 7621; E-mail: longsuz@mst.edu

Abstract. The introduction of change is frequently met with resistance, especially if that change involves a re-engineering of
basic work processes and the introduction of high technologies. This study examines the introduction of a complex software
system to standard work processes within an organization staffed by a largely non-technical, professional workforce. A case study
approach will be used to highlight high technology-driven change management and decision-making at the planning and early
implementation stages.

Keywords: High technology, technology-driven change management, sociotechnical system design, strategic planning

Suzanna Long is an Assistant Professor
with the Department of Engineering
Management and Systems Engineering,
Missouri University of Science and
Technology. Prior to joining Missouri
S&T she was an Assistant Professor
in the Departments of Management
and Marketing, Missouri Southern State
University and Coordinator of the
transportation-logistics program. She
holds a PhD and an M.S. in engineer-
ing management, B.S. in physics and a
B.A. in history from the University of
Missouri-Rolla (UMR) and an M.A. in

history from the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Her research
interests include strategic supply chain management, transportation
management systems, and sustainable change initiatives.

1. Introduction

The introduction of change is frequently met
with resistance, especially if that change involves a
re-engineering of basic work processes and the intro-
duction of high technologies. High technology is
defined as new technology requiring transformational
levels of learning and adaptation of organizational
culture [11, 12]. This study examines the introduc-

tion of a complex software system to standard work
processes within an organization staffed by a largely
non-technical, professional workforce. Existing litera-
ture explores the nature of change management from
the perspective of issues of organizational leadership
and communication. This study examines the bene-
fits of using an integrated approach in the face of
transformational change. It will consider the change
event as a system and explore the impact of non-
technical stakeholder acceptance on high technology
initiatives.

High technology-driven change initiatives are often
difficult to implement and have an approximately 75%
failure rate [2, 4, 10]. Lack of success is often linked
to failures in understanding the change environment
and level of learning required for the high technology,
accounting for human factors in the implementation or
acceptance of the new technology, and failure to adjust
the organizational structure or culture to truly manage
the change process [12].

This paper explores the impact of non-technical
stakeholder acceptance on high technology sociotech-
nical system design and implementation. A case study
approach is used. The case will illustrate technology-

0167-2533/10/$27.50 © 2010 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved

206 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

driven change management and decision-making at
the planning and early implementation stages for a
high technology initiative at a historically non-technical
national organization. Narrative interviews with key
stakeholders are used to capture opinions and attitudes
associated with emergent high technology and changes
in work patterns. Lessons learned offer insight that may
prove useful to managers and organizations faced with
managing high technology-driven change in organiza-
tions with significant percentages of stakeholders with
non-technical backgrounds.

2. Literature review

Change management requires careful planning and
communication for effective implementation. On some
levels an acceptance of risk may provide an advan-
tage to the organization. The organization may actually
increase its flexibility if it is willing to incorporate
“lessons learned” as part of the change management
process. Most stakeholders do not have high levels
of technical expertise. Sociotechnical systems design-
ers frequently ignore the social learning elements of
change and fail to consider the level of stakeholder
learning associated with complete comfort with the
technology.

The level of learning required for successful imple-
mentation of technology can serve as a change
management guide. This important theme is the
focus of several articles by Zeleny [11, 12]. High
technology-driven change management and transfor-
mational change calls for corresponding changes in
organizational learning and culture. Effective use of
technology must be considered as part of a series
of social, interactive relationships termed a technol-
ogy support net (TSN). The TSN enables the use
of the technology correctly through the creation of
interwoven physical, informational, and socioeconomic
relationships. High technology disruptions in the TSN
lead to change resistance. Individual perceptions of
what the technology means may be determined by
how the systemic rearrangement impacts their daily
schedules or power base. Business processes cannot
remain fragmented or isolated from the change pro-
cess. The TSN must be transformed to embrace new
patterns of work, organizational structures, and cross-
functionality for technology initiatives to fully succeed
[11, 12].

McCarter et al. promotes the need for training
and organizational education for any genuine change

in organizational culture. Integration of supply chain
systems is impossible without establishing appropri-
ate cultural pathways to “manage people”. Integration
is improved by accommodating existing culture and
including these structures as part of the change process.
New cross-functional skill sets are essential for creating
managers capable of leading this type of change [9].

Kontoghiorghes and Hansen examine organizational
dynamics that facilitate change. Sociotechnical sys-
tems that are open and interactive are considered the
most effective. Both the social and technical subsys-
tems are essential to managing the change process.
Modeling change behaviors based only on the technical
aspects results in re-engineering without the produc-
tion of competitive advantage. Redesign of work should
be included. “Change ready” cultures are built on the
visions of the organization’s leadership and the respon-
siveness of the employees and other stakeholders. The
nature of the change involved can offer insight as well.
Developmental change is a “fine tuning” of existing
structures and states. Transitional change involves the
controlled introduction of new processes and technol-
ogy. Transformational change is the emergence of an
unknown from an old state; this frequently requires
a “leap of faith” and occurs when dramatic change
is needed within the organization. An awareness of
the type of change envisioned offers the leadership
team guidance in decision-making and implementation
strategies [6].

Holti discusses change involving information and
communication technology. Known as ICTs, these new
technologies are often perceived as the “cure-all” for
the modern industrial organization. Implementation of
technological-driven change is far from a direct path
and that the possibility of organizational loss is very
real with improper implementation. “Team working” is
discussed as a means of building cooperative structures
for change management. Organizational restructuring
frequently revolves around one of three distinct ratio-
nales: business, which focuses on products produced
and mechanisms for reducing cost while improving
quality; manufacturing systems or technology, which
suggests strategies for achieving flexibility with tech-
nical resources, and motivational, which addresses
harnessing employee competencies and motivation.
The motivational rationale presents the greatest oppor-
tunities for managing change as the human element is
the most difficult to plan over the course of the business
cycle. Human behavior is shaped by myriad influences,
some conscious and some unconscious. These influ-
ences often become clear only after a change initiative

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 207

has been tried and failed. Change should be managed
at the strategic level in order to maximize success.
Interim reviews and the revisiting of priorities should
be scheduled as part of the strategic choices made by
organizations [5].

The dynamic changes resulting from the implemen-
tation of new technology can impact organizational
culture. Resistance to change may result from sev-
eral factors. Long-standing organizational traditions
and work processes have the benefit of familiarity.
Even if they are no longer effective, the work pro-
cesses are familiar and there is a level of resistance
due to the move outside of organizational norms and
comfort zones. Resistance may also result from fear
of disruption caused by the introduction of the new
technology and its impact on organizational structure
and staffing patterns as stated by Allen. Allen asserts
that organizational communication is a key to man-
aging change. Leadership teams should determine the
nature and timing of this communication and the level
of employee participative decision making. Leader-
ship teams should consider implementing an integrated
communications strategy. This strategy should accom-
plish five objectives: the creation of awareness, the
maintenance of that awareness throughout the process,
a tangible demonstration of leadership commitment,
solicitation of employee support, and the education of
stakeholders [1].

Establishing trust is an essential characteristic for
leading successful change initiatives according to Lines
et al. The freedom to speak out honestly during change
initiatives is determined by existing trust relationships
between managers and non-managers. In part this is
dependent on the managers’ willingness to empower
employees. Risk-taking is evidenced by the level of
freedom given to employees to make decisions and
the amount of “psychological safety” given to alle-
viate employee concerns of failure or personal harm
to their jobs. Suspicious watchfulness is not useful in
establishing this level of trust and does not encour-
age good judgment and appropriate action. Further,
it is difficult to establish the necessary depth of trust
needed for serious levels of change in a stable environ-
ment. Patterns of routine do not facilitate the need for
trust in the same way. In cases where trust levels are
low, change management processes should first under-
take trust-building exercises prior to introducing any
other types of change. This increases the argument that
actively involving stakeholders in meaningful ways is
essential in creating scenarios where positive change is
possible [7].

3. Case study methodology: Narrative
interviews

This case study investigates contemporary events
within real-life contexts. The National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) provide compre-
hensive information management services to federal
agencies and its constituent contractors. This impres-
sive task includes the identification and preservation
of records of many different origins and media types,
including the myriad forms of electronic information
[8]. NARA is headquartered in the Washington, D.C.
area and has branches throughout the country.

The Electronic Records Archives (ERA) initiative is
intended to expand NARA’s abilities to preserve and
grant access to new forms of electronic information.
This project builds on NARA’s thirty years of experi-
ence in dealing with simple electronic records. NARA’s
attempt to facilitate transformational change as it adopts
a new project-oriented organizational structure illus-
trates that contexts are not always easily distinguishable
from phenomena. NARA has attempted to update its
managerial focus by bringing in talent from outside of
the agency and overlaying project structures onto exist-
ing functional hierarchies. However, the context of a
change in leadership and reporting structures is not nec-
essarily representative of any level of transformational
change. Evaluating the success of change initiatives
within the Electronic Records Archives (ERA) project
is best explored from the richness of method possible
through the case study.

For this case study, a series of twenty four in-depth
narrative interviews were conducted with constituent
stakeholders to determine the effectiveness in project
planning at the social interfaces of the sociotechnical
system. Interviews were conducted during the plan-
ning phase of the project just after the awarding of the
design contract. This allowed an assessment of thresh-
old acceptance and understanding of the project goals
by the major stakeholders. A qualitative approach was
used for the following reasons:

1. ERA is an emergent process using emergent high
technologies. The perceptions of the stakeholders
are most easily captured in an interactive format.
This format allows the history of the project to be
included in the project analysis.

2. Narrative interviews allow the greatest possible
flexibility of questioning and create a venue for
allowing the interview to be refined as information
is presented by stakeholders.

208 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

3. Interviewer background in information logistics
and electronic records management created a nat-
ural rapport with the stakeholders and provided a
mechanism for reducing bias.

As attitudes frequently differ between headquar-
ters and field operations, NARA respondents included
staff from both elements. Internal stakeholders included
members of the ERA leadership team, top and mid-level
managers from within NARA, and non-managers from
affected program units. External stakeholders included
users from federal, state, and research communities.
A summary table of respondent characteristics is pre-
sented in Table 1.

3.1. Narrative interview protocol

Stakeholders were identified as essential constituen-
cies of the ERA virtual management system. These
constituencies included members of the leadership
team, internal staff, and external stakeholders, such

as agency records managers, historians, and other end
users. Such groups provide the basis for generating the
inputs and outputs of the virtual supply chain associ-
ated with ERA. Sample interview questions include the
following:

General, Demographic Information

• Describe your current position? How long have
you worked in this area?

• How long have you worked at NARA?
• What is your background?
Organizational Culture

• Describe NARA’s current organizational structure.
• How often is the organization chart revised?
• How open is NARA staff to change? Are the

changes effective? Why or why not?

Sociotechnical Systems Design

• What is ERA? Why is it unique?
• What is your role with the project?

Table 1

Summary of respondent characteristics

NARA/ HQ/ YRS of Manager/ Stakeholder set Back-ground Responsibility

Non-NARA Field service Non-Manager

R1 NARA HQ 14 Manager ERA Leadership Tech Tech

R2 Non-NARA HQ 6 Non-Manager External Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R3 NARA HQ 15 Non-Manager ERA Team Non-Tech Tech

R4 NARA HQ 30 Manager ERA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R5 NARA HQ 20 Manager External NARA Tech Tech

R6 NARA HQ 25 Manager NARA Leadership Tech Tech

R7 NARA HQ 19 Manager External NARA Non-Tech Tech

R8 NARA HQ 19 Manager External NARA Non-Tech Tech

R9 NARA HQ 20 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R10 NARA HQ 16 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R11 NARA HQ 29 Manager ERA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R12 NARA HQ 20 Non-Manager ERA Team Non-Tech Non-Tech

R13 NARA HQ 22 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R14 NARA Field 38 Manager External NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R15 NARA HQ 10 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R16 NARA Field 30 Manager External NARA Tech Non-Tech

R17 Non-NARA Field 20 Manager External Leadership Tech Tech

R18 Non-NARA Field 20 Manager External Non-NARA Non-Tech Non-Tech

R19 NARA HQ 20 Manager ERA Leadership Non-Tech Both

R20 NARA HQ 20 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R21 NARA HQ 8 Manager NARA Leadership Non-Tech Non-Tech

R22 Non-NARA Field 16 Manager External Non-NARA Non-Tech Both

R23 NARA HQ 20 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Both

R24 NARA HQ 15 Non-Manager External NARA Non-Tech Both

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 209

• Are you satisfied with ERA’s state of development?
• What impact will ERA have on your daily work-

load?
• What new technologies will be introduced?
• Is there value in developing an integrated system

for this project?
• Would the project be better served if components

were addressed one at a time?
• Did the creation of a systems engineering group

assist in the development of ERA?

High Technology Risk Assessment

• What risks are associated with the project?
• How were stakeholders identified?
• What training will/should be provided to stake-

holders?
• How were ideas communicated?
• What input did stakeholders have?
• What is the feedback process?
• How are changes implemented due to feedback?

Interviews with stakeholders were conducted face
to face whenever possible. When schedules and dis-
tance did not permit, telecommunications strategies
were used employing email and telephone as the
basic modes of communication. Interviews were sched-
uled with respondents in advance and a summary of
research objectives and a copy of the informed consent
form provided during this initial contact. Stakehold-
ers were given the opportunity to ask questions about
the research, its methodology, and any other aspect
of the project prior to the actual interview. Copies
of the signed consent form were provided to respon-
dents at the completion of the interview and permission
for follow-up conversations to clarify and confirm
responses obtained. Respondents were selected to rep-
resent major stakeholder groups from the gamut of ERA
constituencies.

Respondent participation levels were maximized by
confining interviews to 60 minute intervals, with per-
mission for follow-up requested. Respondents were
offered the option of completing the interview with the
door open or closed and were notified in advance that
the interviews would be recorded using a digital voice
recorder. In addition, hand-written notes were taken
during the interviews to emphasize critical points and
provide direction during the coding process. Transcripts
were created from the interviews and accuracy verified
by an independent reviewer trained in transcription.

4. Analysis methodology and limitations

This study used the standard issue-based, general-
ized approach for analysis of the narrative interviews.
Rather than presenting accounts of individuals, com-
mon themes and attitudes were described to maximize
the learning potential from all respondents. Logical
connections were identified between respondents as
they relate to particular areas surrounding the ERA
project. A generalized reporting scheme was used to
add layers of confidentiality necessary to preserve the
anonymity of interviewees.

Responses were coded using broad categories of
issues that examine levels of expertise, collabora-
tion and leadership, communications patterns, and
organizational culture. In addition, coding categories
covering project management, technology risk assess-
ment, and risk mitigation seemed vital for exploring
issues stemming from responses to questions concern-
ing organizational culture.

This study does not address change management in
all environments and may not be generalizable outside
of high technology-driven change management.
Findings may accurately reflect the partnering and
change processes within this particular organization
and project, but may not be indicative of processes in
other situations.

Relationships among stakeholders may be indica-
tive of issues resulting from organizational patterns
other than those associated with change management.
Because many of these groups and individuals have
long-established histories, findings may be linked to
personalities rather than issues. Examples of shared
goals may not illustrate shared values for implemen-
tation strategies or may be linked to questions of gain
and authority levels rather than the benefits of the new
technology.

The relatively small sample size further decreases the
ability to draw broad conclusions. Despite the sweeping
implications for the project, direct stakeholder sets are
limited at this point. Although validity and reliability
constructs have been addressed in the study, statistical
inferences that can be drawn from the results are lim-
ited. The value of the study rests more with identifying
planning horizons and threshold acceptance measures
than with the size of the sample.

This study includes methodological weaknesses
inherent in qualitative studies. The study design is
impacted by researcher biases regardless of attempts
to minimize that bias. One such bias results from a pos-
sible perception by the interviewees of the researcher’s

210 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

“insider” status. The researcher has almost fifteen years
of experience in electronic records management includ-
ing almost four years with NARA. Examples of positive
benefits include the level of contacts within NARA
and other members of the federal information commu-
nity. These contacts provided access to the principle
stakeholders of the Electronic Records Archives (ERA)
and were used to open additional doors. One strong
advantage was the existence of levels of trust with the
leadership team of ERA, as well as key external stake-
holders. The mutual respect facilitated open dialog.
However, there is no question that this impact may have
had negative components as well.

In the same way that those who are resistant to change
may choose to ignore it in the hopes that it will go
away, some interviewees may have found it easiest to
“tell her what she wants to hear” so that the interview
would end or may have mistrusted the motivations for
the study depending on their relationship with the orga-
nization. Perception of an “insider” researcher as a mole
to uncover hidden pockets of resistance was a danger
to the study. This problem was reduced because the
goals of the researcher were strictly based in the com-
pletion of research and did not include any authority
to make changes to the project or its funding levels.
This was fully explained to all interview subjects in
advance of the conversations. In addition, those who
may have hoped to use past connections to paint a
rosy picture of the project, may have tried to steer
the interviews toward or away from certain individu-
als. Cross-checking interviews lists with a variety of
independent sources minimized this possibility.

Respondents comments used in the study were repre-
sentative of the attitudes and opinions of the perceptions
of the interviewees. This was independently verified
through the use of multiple coders to minimize the
impact of researcher judgments and opinions on the
study.

Moreover, assumptions about what “insider status”
means in terms of terminology and current knowledge
base may negatively impact accurate communications
flow and interpretation. Rather than taking comments
at face value, interpretation and assumptions may be
added that place a biased or incorrect assessment
of respondent remarks. Additional study on current
archival theory and practice, along with asking respon-
dents to define terms lessened this possibility.

4.1. Stakeholder perspectives

The ERA project is ambitious and is considered by
some external stakeholders to be the first practical appli-

cation of new technology to existing archival theory
and practice. All stakeholders agree that the change is
necessary and all agree that this change can only be
accomplished with considerable planning and commu-
nication.

This is consistent with the change methodology sug-
gested by the literature. Organizational planning should
include attempts to accurately assess the attitudes and
concerns of all stakeholder groups. NARA and the ERA
team have attempted to accomplish this important task
through a series of “town-hall” meetings and forums
with internal and external stakeholders. Their success
has been limited. Many stakeholders complain of a level
of forced participation and state emphatically that their
voices are either not heard or are silenced with the label
of “trouble-maker” if they raise objections.

This echoes a pitfall presented by Clegg and Walsh
[2]. The ERA team has excellent intentions but are
“pushing” change rather than “pulling” stakeholders
into the process. Stakeholders are not truly assuming
ownership of the change process. The partiality sug-
gested in the literature is clearly evident as stakeholders
hope for the best but expect the worst.

Woodward and Hendry [10] stress that this begins
with top levels of management. Stakeholder comments
reveal a perceived negative bias from the agency lead-
ership team and suggest that these top managers view
themselves as “outside” the project rather than a critical,
integrated component of the change process.

Support at the highest managerial levels is essential
for project success. Even perceptions of negativity or
ambivalence on the part of top managers can shift the
balance in terms of goal acceptance by non-managerial
stakeholders. This perception clearly exists at NARA.
Stakeholders commonly suggest that top management
is publicly supportive, but ambivalent or even com-
pletely antipathetic to the ERA project behind closed
doors. Representative respondent comments are pre-
sented in Table 2.

This reflects an ingrained rigidity based on long-term
association with the agency. Organizational judgment is
frequently reactive rather than proactive in cases where
past criticisms make “recovery from past mistakes” the
order of the day. NARA has been frequently criticized
for its policy concerning electronic records and there
is a real feeling of a “last chance” effort on the part
of the agency with respect to the ERA project and
the attempt to deal with electronic records. Respon-
dent comments suggest that escalating commitment and
high funding levels have added a level of desperation
and encouraged the blame-centered culture discussed
in the literature. This leads to the problems discussed

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 211

Table 2

Lack of top management support

Respondent Response

R2 A feeling that efforts are wasted and repeated over and over reduces credibility

Tug of war between different administrative units

NARA believes they are collaborative but instead of collaboration, more frequently achieve consensus w/o foundational support

Long-standing grudges among managers: I won’t work with you because I don’t like you

R3 Lack of shared vision between ERA team and Top Mgmt in terms of goals for facilities and systems development

Top management does everything they can to undermine the ERA team in private forums, not publicly however

R4

Internal NARA environment is not conducive to collaboration

Turf wars between Project Management Office (PMO) and NARA leadership has added to the challenge of ERA

R8 Disagreement over priorities and funding levels inside NARA

R10 Ambiguity of roles and commitment across collaborative groups

R11 Lack of consistency with top management; based in lack of common needs and objectives across program lines

R12

Fighting opinions of top management over whether project is important; still have to do it!

Top management in particular is entrenched and unhelpful; playing own little turf games

R15 NARA and ERA team did not speak with one voice

Leadership did not send consistent message

above of poor decision channels and the labeling of
dissenters as troublemakers.

Most stakeholders are cautiously optimistic but do
not feel that they have a full understanding of the pro-
cess or how the project will evolve. There is some
concern that top management has conveyed enthusi-
asm, but not necessarily tangible support. Moreover,
the positioning of ERA is telling in terms of NARA’s
understanding of dedicated project teams. The project
management literature suggests that projects of strate-
gic importance should be placed outside of regular
functional units. Their authority and autonomy levels
should increase with relative importance. NARA has
identified ERA as strategically important yet it is posi-
tioned within a functional unit. Authority and autonomy
levels exist in a confusing blend of traditional functional
structures overlaid with aspects of dedicated project
teams. Samples of representative respondent comments
are presented in Table 3.

In essence, NARA has tried to maintain its past
reporting structures and relationships at the expense of
needed new risk-taking management structures it has
tried to adopt. Few non-technical stakeholders outside
of the leadership team have any awareness of systems
engineering or project management principles. Even
when awareness is present, the implementation has
fallen short of proper project management procedures.

Stakeholders clearly understand the importance of
the project and ERA project leaders possess the infor-
mation required for determining project direction.
Other members of the leadership team are best consid-
ered as internal member stakeholders when considering
the technical requirements of the project.

The project has a lengthy planning horizon due to
the technical requirements of the project and the federal
contracting process. This allows adequate time for pre-
planning, group identification, and work processes.

Differences in technical knowledge and expertise
are clearly present in the risk identification process.
The nature of the technology is a cause for great con-
cern among those with engineering backgrounds, but
is rarely addressed by those with non-technical back-
grounds. Most express their fear that the new system
will fail and that NARA will not be given a second
chance, but don’t understand how to prevent this or what
technologies will be introduced.

Stakeholders seem to share project goals for ERA
but not necessarily the full vision presented by the
ERA leadership team. The leadership team consists of
ERA project members and key management personnel
within the agency. The belief that enough information
is not being presented to stakeholders may be rooted
in a lack of understanding of the project interfaces
by external managers with limited technical expertise.
However, it may also reflect a lack of expertise on the
part of the subordinate stakeholders.

Stakeholders with technical experience suggest that
a new, hybrid archivist is needed. The lack of relevant
experience and common vocabulary has increasingly
become a source of frustration. When asked for process
maps and system requirements, long lists of individual
requirements are returned rather than clear definitions
of process and information flows. These stakehold-
ers recommend the creation of a new specialty within
archives education with training in computer science
or computer engineering. Many archivists also hold

212 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

Table 3

Comments showing TSN disconnect for ERA

Respondent Response

R1 Relatively little influx of fresh experience in new managerial styles

R2 Highest levels of non-appointee leadership need to be more involved and committed to project

Tug of war between different administrative units
NARA believes they are collaborative but instead of collaboration, more frequently achieve consensus w/o foundational support

No collaboration between levels of interface with ERA team and NARA as a whole

R3 Lack of shared vision between ERA team and Top Mgmt in terms of goals for facilities and systems development

PMO and ERA team do not speak with one voice; ERA staff spread out all over the building

NARA doesn’t take advantage of knowledge across functional units

ERA program management will go away; absorbed into NARA as a whole

Top management does everything they can to undermine the ERA team in private forums, not publicly however

R4 Highly entrenched, stove-piped bureaucracy with little change in attitudes

Organization is not fully behind ERA despite its vitality and necessity

Internal NARA environment is not conducive to collaboration

Turf wars between PMO and NARA leadership has added to the challenge of ERA

Mismatch in cultures between NARA (dated business processes) and Contractor (modern business processes)

No cross-organizational planning; friction between corporate and project change officers

R5 ERA PMO does not contain all of the admin units and supports necessary

R9 ERA PMO doesn’t understand that their role is much greater than building the tool; tend to isolate themselves

CM roles not properly defined at either PMO or NARA level

R10 Oversight groups formed w/in NARA to try to integrate ERA PMO with agency goals and objectives

Change Management needs to be at agency level, not within PMO

R12 Why is PMO physically split? It wasn’t originally but now, some groups seem delegated to the cheap seats

ERA’s physical space illustrates top managements lack of commitment; PMO director should be more assertive in gaining

visibility

Fighting opinions of top management over whether project is important; still have to do it!
Top management in particular is entrenched and unhelpful; playing own little turf games
R11 Lack of consistency with top management; based in lack of common needs and objectives across program lines

R12 Don’t speak with one voice

R15 NARA and ERA team did not speak with one voice

an MLS (master of library science) and have some
experience with managing information contained in
databases. However, knowledge of how to manipulate
databases is not adequate training for establishing an
equal dialog with technologists. It is hard to ask the
right questions or understand the answers if you don’t
have common experiences, terminology, and reference
bases. These opinions are echoed by those with non-
technical backgrounds as well.

Stakeholders agree that ERA is a welcome change in
the area of electronic records management and believe
that NARA has taken a proactive stance to correct
any real or perceived deficiencies in their electronic
records policies. Approval notwithstanding, all stake-
holder groups express concerns about potential risk and
NARA’s ability to manage these risks. As one ERA team
member stated, there are “risks all over the place”.

The man-machine interface is of prime concern
among these risks. The lack of a common vocabu-
lary between records managers and technical specialists
leads many to speculate that the system design will be
flawed as a result. Moreover, the importance given to
ERA by NARA may not reflect the opinion of agency
stakeholders or agency officials outside of records man-
agement. Put simply, those making the decisions for
ERA may not have the ability to enforce decisions or
have access to the appropriate stakeholders to secure
information needed for high quality decisions in the cor-
rect use of the proposed high technology. Mismatches
in the TSN are presented in Table 4.

In addition to concerns over the man-machine inter-
face of the ERA system, stakeholder risk identification
includes the belief that archivists and information pro-
fessionals use the same vocabulary in different ways.

S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation 213

Table 4

Sample comments on expertise deficiencies for the TSN

Respondent Response

R1 Lack of new types of skill sets needed for dealing with technology

R3 Need new skill sets to accomplish tasks of the future

R5 Problems of ER are rooted in the hard sciences: physics, chemistry, computer science; current staff lack skill sets to understand

and cope with mandate of preserving and granting access

Relies on research created externally w/o an understanding of how it works

ER staff base judgments on media stability, etc on what they’ve heard w/o having any genuine understanding of fact

R6 Naïve culture in terms of technology users from IT application; limited experience with major IT systems

R8 No inside expertise in how to actually build the system; had to contract

R14 Little relevant expertise exists in the field. No budget provided for off-setting this deficiency

R17 NARA lacks the breadth of training for high-level technology projects

Need to create new, hybrid staff: archival engineers capable of understanding both technology/historian skill sets

R18 Feel unskilled and uncomfortable with the technological elements of the project

Need new, technically competent archivists

R19 Need new technologies and skill sets to accomplish the task of dealing with ER

R22 Need new skill sets to manage the challenges of modern ER

Moreover, there is concern that the training may be
inadequate or that the supporting information technol-
ogy professionals may not find the project “interesting
enough” to devote the required time to creating system
interfaces at the agency level.

Records management may be of critical importance
for NARA, but for another agency, it is a legal neces-
sity rather than a primary goal. Decisions on technical
systems are not made to accommodate records manage-
ment functions but to accomplish the work assigned in
the real task environment of the agency. The amount
of time spent on records management will be fluid, as
will the level of participation. It is not important from
the standpoint of the agency’s mission; therefore, solu-
tions are explored in terms of “good enough”, instead
of what is optimal. Known as satisficing, this approach
merely adds to the complexities of records management
for the ERA team [4]. Moreover, this reflects problems
identified in the literature by Dasher [3] and others.
Common sense heuristics are inadequate when proper
understanding of the systems engineering principles
involved does not exist. Concerns exist as well over
the level of training. This training should be adaptable
to the needs of the users at differing points in the ERA
virtual management system.

The feedback process has received mixed results. The
ERA team understands the necessity of open forums,
discussion groups, and other methods of communi-
cating project goals. The willingness or interest of
stakeholders in providing key feedback is uncertain.
Despite monthly meetings and published updates, infor-

mation flows do not adequately cement virtual teams
into cohesive units.

Virtual teams have not been formed to bridge orga-
nizational lines. Task leaders exist, but social leaders
have not emerged to build the required levels of trust
and commitment for risk mitigation. Stakeholders do
not have a common sense of how to accomplish the
tasks ahead or how to manage the interests of the var-
ious groups most efficiently. This is contrary to the
“best practices” presented in the literature [11, 12] for
organizations implementing high technology change
initiatives.

5. Conclusions

People are far more resistant to change when it
involves loss of control over long-standing work pat-
terns or exposing weakness resulting from a lack of
understanding of the proposed change. ERA incorpo-
rates exactly this type of change making understanding
the interfaces of this sociotechnical system critical.
ERA is not confined to one organizational culture. It
crosses organizational culture lines of every federal
agency. There are commonalities involved but differ-
ences as well. These should be understood by the
systems designers and system users alike.

NARA hopes that ERA will be an adaptive system
capable of adjusting to this dynamic environment. ERA
has grown from a series of technological advances over
the past thirty years. Rather than a systemic applica-

214 S. Long / The strategic implications of non-technical stakeholder acceptance in high technology system design and implementation

tion of these technologies to records management, each
agency has adapted its own choice of advances from
the numerous sets of solutions. The problems driving
ERA for NARA are a creation of ambiguity in enforce-
ment and interpretation that reflects the level of time and
importance placed on the task environment of records
management. This limited rationality reflects organiza-
tional constraints within the federal government.

NARA’s authority rests on offering a format for
transfer of permanent electronic records, not on their
creation. Agencies postpone questions of how to
achieve this transfer until later in the performance cycle.
These choices are contrary to best practices indicated
for virtual management systems. Rather than a com-
mon series of goals and strategies, solutions emerge
from a set of often previously abandoned choices rather
than deriving from a well-constructed plan. Moreover,
there are no “outs” for unhappy partners, no way to end
relationships. Change management in high technology-
driven processes adds an added level of complexity
because of the technology involved and the difficulties
of determining stakeholder readiness for adoption and
understanding.

There is tremendous potential for communications
disconnect between systems designers and archival
or agency users. The breakdown in information flow
between stakeholders should be addressed. Study
results indicate that additional training will reduce this
disconnect whether it is top-down or down-up direction-
ally. This training should be undertaken immediately
to reduce project risks identified in the change man-
agement plan. This should prove especially beneficial
in addressing the problems of communication between
stakeholders with distinct differences in knowledge of
technology or engineering practices.

Despite the necessity of the change, the form of ERA
is still somewhat vague. The risks are many and require
due diligence to plot their severity against project suc-
cess. The fragility of the high technology used is a
key source of risk for most engineers, but rarely is
considered as important by those with non-technical
backgrounds. It is unclear whether groups are being
used at optimal levels for participative decision mak-
ing. Stakeholder unrest and dissatisfaction are indicated
based on study findings. However, change management
has been built into the project and an understanding
exists of its importance. Modeling the system to pro-
vide access and understanding of the interface points
will uncover the areas with the greatest chances for fail-
ure. This commitment to conscientious management of
change will improve chances of overall project success.

The decision making challenge rests with engag-
ing the stakeholders in a meaningful way to achieve
project goals. Training will help non-technical stake-
holders find a comfort level with terminology and the
system itself. The diversity of the stakeholders can be
used as part of the systems model to manage risk. The
disparate perceptions of system will offer a stronger
risk assessment than would be possible from a team of
stakeholders with the same background. Team-building
exercises can help develop trust and team identity issues
that will guarantee thoughtful, truthful responses to
learning scenarios and potential system problems. Even
the conflict that is inevitable can be harnessed to more
properly model man-machine interface points.

The management of high technology-driven change
initiatives is an area of critical importance in today’s
global environment. Work processes and partnering are
increasingly electronic or virtual in nature. Understand-
ing “best practices” in the face of these changes is vital
in the strategic planning and implementation of the
modern organization. The significant failure rate of high
technology-driven change suggests that organizations
continue to struggle with these issues [2, 10].

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the key stakeholders from
the ERA project who generously gave of their time
and expertise in completing the narrative interviews for
this research. She also expresses sincere appreciation
to Milan Zeleny, Editor, Human Systems Management,
for his insight in the final development of this paper.

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