stakeholder Analysis
Read the
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress report.
Use the stakeholder analysis tool to identify key stakeholders. You can edit the document to add or delete rows. The major objective of this assignment is the identification of stakeholders. You should conduct reasonable background research to identify interests, positions and resources, but you are not expected to have a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of these items, yet. To help in this you may choose to focus on a specific policy issue listed in Table 4 in the reading.
Campaign and Election Security Policy:
Overview and Recent Developments
for Congress
January 2, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46146
Congressional Research Service
SUMMARY
Campaign and Election Security Policy:
Overview and Recent Developments
for Congress
In the United States, state, territorial, and local governments are responsible for most aspects of
selecting and securing election systems and equipment. Foreign interference during the 2016
election cycle—and widely reported to be an ongoing threat—has renewed congressional
attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions about the nature and extent
of the federal government’s role in this policy area.
This report provides congressional readers with a resource for understanding campaign
and
election security policy. This includes discussion of the federal government’s roles; state or
territorial responsibilities for election administration and election security; an overview of
potentially relevant federal statutes and agencies; and highlights of recent congressional policy
debates. The report summarizes related legislation that has advanced beyond introduction during
the 116th Congress. It also poses questions for consideration as the House and Senate examine
whether or how to pursue legislation, oversight, or appropriations.
In the 116th Congress, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; S. 1790; P.L. 116-92), enacted in December
2019, contains several provisions related to
campaign and election security.
Most provisions involve providing Congress or
federal or state agencies with information about election interference. It also requires the Director of National Intelligenc e, in
coordination with several other agencies, to develop a strategy for countering Russian cyberattacks against U.S. elections. In
addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93; H.R. 1158), also enacted in December 2019, includes
$425 million for payments to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to make general improvements to the
administration of federal elections, including upgrades to election technology and security.
As of this writing, 116th Congress legislation that has advanced beyond introduction in at least one chamber includes H.R. 1;
H.R. 753; H.R. 1158; H.R. 2500; H.R. 2722; H.R. 3351; H.R. 3494; H.R. 3501; H.R. 4617; H.R. 4782; H.R. 4990; S. 482; S.
1060; S. 1321; S. 1328; S. 1589; S. 1790; S. 1846; S. 2065; and S. 2524. Other bills also could have implications for
campaign and election security even though they do not specifically reference the topic (e.g., those addressing
cyber
security
generally or voter access). Several congressional committees also have held legislative or oversight hearings on the topic.
Federal statutes—such as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA); and the Voting
Rights Act (VRA)—all contain provisions designed to make campaign finance, elections, or voting more secure. Several
federal agencies are directly or indirectly involved in campaign and election security. These include, but are not limited to,
the Department of Defense (DOD); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of Justice (DOJ); Election
Assistance Commission (EAC); and Federal Election Commission (FEC).
Securing federal elections is a complex policy challenge that crosses disciplinary lines. Some of the factors shaping that
complexity include divisions of authority between the federal and state (or territorial or local) governments; coordination
among federal agencies, and communication with state agencies; funding; changing elections technology; and the different
needs of different sectors, such as campaigns, administrators, and vendors.
This report does not attempt to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign and election security should entail. The
report cites other CRS products that contain additional discussion of some of the topics discussed herein. The report does not
address constitutional or legal issues.
R46146
January 2, 2020
R. Sam Garrett,
Coordinator
Specialist in
American
National
Government
Sarah J. Eckman
Analyst in American
National Government
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American
National Government
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Defining Election Security ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2
Scope of the Report …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
Recent Legislative Activity ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Development of Federal Role in Campaign and Election Security …………………………………………. 5
Selected Federal Statutes ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
Selected Federal Agencies ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) ……………………………………………………………………… 10
Federal Election Commission (FEC) …………………………………………………………………………… 11
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ……………………………………………………………………. 11
Department of Justice (DOJ) ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
Intelligence Community (IC) …………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
Selected Other Federal Agencies………………………………………………………………………………… 12
Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies ………………………………………………. 13
Department of Homeland Security Coordination Roles …………………………………………… 14
Election Assistance Commission Coordination Roles ……………………………………………… 15
Intelligence Community Coordination Roles …………………………………………………………. 15
Coordination Roles and Selected Other Federal Agencies ……………………………………….. 16
Federal Agency Roles and Campaign Security …………………………………………………………….. 16
Federal Election Security Guidance …………………………………………………………………………………. 17
Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems ………………………………………………………………… 18
Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle …………………………………………………………. 18
Funding for Federal Agencies After the 2016 Election Cycle …………………………………………. 19
State and Local Role in Election Security …………………………………………………………………………. 20
Selected Recent Policy Issues for Congress ………………………………………………………………………. 22
Concluding Observations ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 28
Tables
Table 1. 116th Congress Legislation, Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber, Related
to Campaign and Election Security …………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Table 2. Selected Statutes Potentially Relevant for Campaign and Election Security ……………….. 8
Table 3. Selected Agency Roles in Campaign and Election Security …………………………………….. 13
Table 4. Selected Recent Policy Issues Related to Campaign and Election Security ……………….. 23
Appendixes
Appendix. Legislation Related to Campaign and Election Security That Has Advanced
Beyond Introduction, 116th Congress …………………………………………………………………………….. 30
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Contacts
Author Information ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
Election security is one of the most prominent policy challenges facing Congress. A November
2019 warning from the heads of several federal agencies illustrates the interdisciplinary and
ongoing nature of the threat to American elections. According to the joint statement, in the 2020
election cycle, “Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign malicious actors all will seek to interfere in
the voting process or influence voter perceptions. Adversaries may try to accomplish their goals
through a variety of means, including social media campaigns, directing disinformation
operations or conducting disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local
infrastructure.”1
These are just the latest challenges in securing American elections. Traditionally, election
administration emphasizes policy goals such as ensuring that all eligible voters, and only eligible
voters, may register and cast ballots; that those ballots are counted properly; and that the voting
public views that process as legitimate and transparent. Preserving election continuity is a chief
concern. Election officials therefore have long prepared contingency plans that address various
risks, such as equipment malfunctions, power outages, and natural disasters.
These traditional concerns remain, but have taken on new complexity amid
foreign interference in
U.S. elections. In addition to managing traditional security concerns about infrastructure and
administrative processes (e.g., counting ballots), mitigating external threats to the accuracy of
information voters receive, particularly from foreign sources, is a potential challenge for political
campaigns, election administrators, and the public.
Addressing any one of these topics might involve multiple areas of public policy or law. Doing so
also can involve complex practical challenges about which levels of government, or agencies, are
best equipped or most appropriate to respond. How those entities can or should interact with
political campaigns, the private sector, and voters, are also ongoing questions. Technical
complexity in some areas, such as cybersecurity, and the federal structure of shared national, state
or territorial, and local responsibility for administering federal elections
make election security
even more challenging.
Election security in general appears to be a shared policy goal, but debate exists in Congress
about which policy issues and options to pursue. Debate over the scope of the federal
government’s role in election security shapes much of that debate. State, territorial, and local
governments are responsible for most aspects of election administration, including security.
This report provides congressional readers with an overview that includes
how campaign and election security has developed as a policy field;
recent legislative activity, especially bills that have advanced beyond
introduction;
federal statutes and agencies that appear to be most relevant for campaign and
election security;
state, territorial,2 or local roles in administering elections, and federal support for
those functions; and
1 U.S. Department of Justice et al., “Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and CISA on Ensuring
Security of 2020 Elections,” press release, November 5, 2019, at https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/
Article/2009338/joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-
2/.
2 In general, campaign and election security policy matters are similar in states and territories, although specific statutes
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 2
highlights of recent policy debates, and potential future questions for
congressional consideration.
Defining Election Security
There is no single definition of “election security,” nor is there necessarily agreement on which
topics should or should not be included in the policy debate. Broadly speaking, election security
involves efforts to ensure fair, accurate, and safe elections. This can include a variety of activities
that happen before, during, and after voters cast their ballots.
A narrow definition of election security might address only efforts to protect
traditional election infrastructure, such as voter registration databases, voting
machines, polling places, and election result tabulations.
More expansive definitions might also address issues affecting candidates and
campaigns. This includes, for example, regulating political advertising or
fundraising; providing physical or cybersecurity assistance for campaigns; or
combating disinformation or misinformation in the political debate.
The policy debates discussed herein can affect different kinds of entities uniquely.
Perhaps most notably, security concerns affecting campaigns can differ from
those for safeguarding elections and voting. Campaigns in the
United States
are about persuading voters in an effort to win elections. They are private,
not governmental, operations and are subject to relatively little
regulation
beyond campaign finance
policy.
Elections are more highly regulated, although specific practices can vary, as
their administration is primarily a state- or local-level responsibility.
Provisions in state or local law, and, to a lesser degree, federal law, regulate
how voters cast ballots and who may do so. Some security discussions
include issues related to voter access, while others view access as a separate
elections policy matter. This report briefly notes that access can be a
component of campaign and election security policy debates, but the report
does not otherwise address access issues.3
This report does not attempt definitively to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign
and election security entails or should entail, nor does it fully address all aspects of the policy
issues discussed. Instead, it provides congressional readers with background information to
consider that debate and decide whether or how to pursue legislation (including appropriations) or
distinguish between states and territories in some cases. A discussion of how federal election law applies to territories
versus states is beyond the scope of this report. Unless otherwise noted, campaign and election security concerns
discussed in the text of this report are relevant for territories.
3 Because voter access is primarily a state-level responsibility, this report does not address the topic in detail, although
it does address some Voting Rights Act provisions. For 116th Congress discussion of access issues, see, for
example,
U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, Report on Voting Rights and
Election Administration in the United States of America, prepared by Chairperson Marcia L. Fudge, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., at https://cha.house.gov/report-voting-rights-and-election-administration-united-states-america, which includes
discussion of misinformation issues that are potentially relevant for election security; and U.S. Congress,
House
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections Voting Rights Act Findings: Minority Views, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., at https://republicans-cha.house.gov/voting-rights-act-minority-views. Both documents are undated and
were released in 2019. See also, for example, House debate on H.R. 4, “Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2019,”
House debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, December 6, 2019, pp. H9308-H9334. Most issues related to H.R.
4 do not specifically address campaign and election security and are thus beyond the scope of this report.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 3
oversight. Because all the topics noted above—and others discussed throughout the report—have
been components of the recent congressional debate over how to safeguard American campaigns,
elections, and voting, this report uses the general term campaign and election security.
Scope of the Report
This report discusses federal agencies, statutes, and policies designed to prevent or respond to
deliberate domestic or foreign security threats to campaigns, elections, or voting. Concepts
discussed in the report also have implications for some unintentional threats, such as natural
disasters or other emergencies that could affect campaigns, elections, or voting. Legislation cited
in the report contains specific references to campaign and election security. This includes bill text
that uses variations of terms such as campaign, election, or vote near variations of the terms
interference or security. Some readers might view areas addressed herein as more or less directly
related to campaign or election security, and alternative methodologies could yield other bills or
policy topics for consideration.
The report does not include detailed attention to more traditional aspects of campaign finance,
election administration, or voting, particularly voter mobilization. For example, the report
discusses Help America Vote Act provisions that authorize funding states may use to help secure
elections, but not provisions that authorize funding for the Election Assistance
Commission
generally.4 Similarly, the report briefly discusses Voting Rights Act provisions that prohibit voter
intimidation, but it does not discuss other federal statutes enacted to make
registration and voting
easier.5 In addition, the report briefly notes lobbying statutes that might be relevant for regulating
certain corporate or foreign activity related to U.S. election interference, but it does not
substantially address lobbying as a policy area.
The report emphasizes domestic implications of campaign and election security. This includes
attention to protections for U.S. campaigns and elections from the effects of foreign
disinformation and misinformation efforts. The Appendix at the end of this report includes
sanctions or immigration legislation that specifically references interference in U.S. elections, and
which has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress. However, foreign policy
implications of such interference, or a discussion of offensive operations and tactics that the
United States might or might not use against foreign adversaries, are otherwise beyond the scope
of this report.6
Because of the still-developing and complex policy challenges surrounding campaign and
election security, other areas of law, policy, or practice might also be relevant but are not
addressed here. The report references other CRS products that contain additional discussion of
4 Similarly, the report does not address funds for aspects of election security other than securing election systems, such
as Intelligence Community efforts to identify sources of election disinformation.
5 Other CRS products contain additional discussion. See, for example, CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S.
Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report RS20764, The Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Overview and Issues, by R. Sam Garrett (originally authored by Kevin J. Coleman); and
CRS Report R45030, Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent
Developments, by Sarah J. Eckman.
6 For additional discussion of foreign policy implications and key concepts, see CRS Report R45142, Information
Warfare: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary; and CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Information
Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary; CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act, by Dianne E. Rennack, Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An
Overview, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt; CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory
Welt; and CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, by Dianne E. Rennack,
Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 4
several such topics. The report does not provide legal or constitutional analysis. It also does not
attempt to catalog all alleged or established instances of campaign and election interference or
security concerns, or to independently evaluate allegations.
Recent Legislative Activity
Highlights of recent legislative activity include the following. Additional discussion appears
throughout
the report.
The 115th Congress (2017-2019) appropriated $380 million for FY2018 for
improvements to the administration of federal elections, including upgrades to
election technology and security.
The 116th Congress (2019-2021) appropriated $425 million for FY2020 in the
consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 1158; P.L. 116-93) enacted in December
2019. The “Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle” section of this
report contains additional detail.
The 116th Congress enacted S. 1790 (P.L. 116-92), the FY2020 National
Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), in December 2019. The legislation contains several
provisions related to campaign and election security.
Table 1 below lists bills that have passed at least one chamber. The Appendix in this report
briefly summarizes 116th Congress legislation containing
campaign and election security
provisions that has advanced beyond introduction.
Table 1. 116th Congress Legislation, Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber,
Related to Campaign
and Election
Security
See the “Scope of the Report” section and the Appendix of this report for additional detail.
Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action
H.R. 1 For the People Act
of
2019
Passed House
(234-193),
03/08/2019
H.R. 753 Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019 Passed House (voice
vote),
05/20/2019
H.R. 1158 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 Became P.L. 116-93,
12/20/2019
H.R. 2500 National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Year 2020
Passed House
(220-197),
07/12/2019
H.R. 2722 Securing America’s Federal Elections (SAFE) Act Passed House
(225-184),
06/27/2019
H.R. 3351 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations
Act, 2020
Passed House
(224-196),
06/26/2019; see also H.R.
1158
H.R. 3494 Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018,
2019, and 2020
Passed House
(397-31),
07/17/2019
H.R. 4617 Stopping Harmful Interference in
Elections for a
Lasting Democracy Act (SHIELD
Act)
Passed House
(227-181),
10/23/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 5
Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action
S. 1321 Defending the Integrity of Voting Systems Act
Passed Senate
(unanimous
consent), 07/17/2019
S. 1328 Defending Elections against Trolls
from Enemy
Regimes (DETER)
Act
Passed Senate (unanimous
consent),
06/03/2019
S. 1790 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020
Became P.L. 116-92,
12/20/2019
S. 1846 State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act
of 2019
Passed Senate (unanimous
consent),
11/21/2019
Source: CRS analysis of bill texts.
Notes: Bills in the table specifically reference campaign and election and security. Other legislation not included
in the table could be relevant for campaign or election security once implemented or in practice. See the “Scope
of the Report” section of this report and the Appendix for additional detail. The table excludes resolutions
(e.g., proposed constitutional amendments) and routine appropriations bills that propose funding for agencies
such as the Election Assistance Commission or Federal Election Commission, unless the appropriations bill also
contains additional provisions
specifically addressing campaign and election security.
In addition, during the 116th Congress, committees in both chambers have held
hearings on these and related campaign and election security topics.7 The
Committee on House Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration exercise primary jurisdiction over federal elections. Several other
committees oversee related areas, such as intelligence or voting rights issues.
Another CRS product contains additional discussion of committee roles in
federal campaigns and elections generally.8
Development of Federal Role in Campaign and
Election Security
Foreign interference is only the highest-profile and latest campaign and election security policy
challenge.9 Physical security, to protect voters, ballots, and vote counts, has been an ongoing
7 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional
Views, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume1 ; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns
and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume2 ; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Oversight of the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019, S. Hrg. 116-74 (Washington: GPO, 2019); U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Homeland Security, Defending Our Democracy: Building Partnerships to Protect
America’s
Elections, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial No. 116-1 (Washington: GPO, 2019); and U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Securing U.S. Election Infrastructure
and Protecting Political Discourse, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial no. 116-28 (Washington: GPO,
2019). See also, for example, discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22, 2019, House
Judiciary
Committee oversight hearing, “Securing America’s Elections Part II: Oversight of Government Agencies.” As of this
writing, the hearing record does not appear to have been published. Video and written materials are available on the
committee website, https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-
government-
agencies.
8 See CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns
and
Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam
Garrett.
9 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), foreign interference with U.S. elections falls
into “five distinct categories.” Collectively, these include “cyber” or “covert” operations. “Cyber operations” target
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 6
concern. Specifically, in modern history, the federal government’s first role in securing
elections
was primarily about access and voting rights.10 In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act
(VRA), which protects voters against race- or color-based discrimination in registration,
redistricting, and voting.11 More explicitly related to security, the VRA prohibits intimidation,
threats, or coercion in voting.12 Congress primarily tasked the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
with enforcing the statute and related criminal provisions. Federal law enforcement agencies,
especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also support states and localities—which
retain primary responsibility for election administration in the United States—in investigating
election crimes and providing physical security at the polls.
The federal role in election administration expanded after the disputed 2000 presidential election.
In response, Congress authorized federal funding for the states, the District of Columbia, and
territories13 to make improvements to the administration of federal elections. It also created the
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to administer those funds. Congress charged the agency
with overseeing a voluntary voting system testing and certification program, and providing states
and localities with voluntary election administration guidance, research, and best practices. These
developments notwithstanding, securing campaigns and elections historically was not a major
policy topic at the federal level, as most security matters were reserved for state- or local-level
policy.
The policy environment changed dramatically during the 2016 election cycle, when media reports
and subsequent congressional14 and federal-agency15 investigations documented Russian
election infrastructure, campaigns, parties, or public officials. “Covert” operations include efforts to “assist or harm”
groups such as campaigns, to influence public opinion or sow social or political division, or covertly influence
policymakers or the public. See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National
Counterintelligence and
Security Center, Foreign Threats to U.S. Elections: Election Security Information Needs, at https://www.dni.gov/files/
ODNI/documents/DNI_NCSC_Elections_Brochure_Final . The publication is not dated or paginated. The quoted
material appears on the first full page of text. For additional discussion on influence operations generally, see CRS
Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues,
by Catherine A. Theohary.
10 For an overview of the issues discussed in this paragraph, see CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns
and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.
11 52 U.S.C. §§10101-10702. For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Testimony TE10033, History and
Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, by L. Paige Whitaker.
12 52 U.S.C. §30107.
13 The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which contains many of the provisions noted in this section, does not include
coverage for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). When Congress enacted the statute in 2002,
there were no federal elections in the territory.
14 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional
Views, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume1 ; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns
and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views, 116th
Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume2 .
15 For example, Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation, GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian
Malicious Cyber Activity, joint analysis report, JAR-16-20296A, December 29, 2016, at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229 ; National
Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center, Department of Homeland Security, “Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE
Activity,” analysis report, AR-17-20045, February 10, 2017, at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
AR-17-20045_Enhanced_Analysis_of_GRIZZLY_STEPPE_Activity ; Director of National Intelligence, Assessing
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, Intelligence Community assessment, ICA 2017-01D, January
6, 2017, at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01 .
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 7
government interference with that year’s U.S. presidential election. According to Special Counsel
Robert Mueller’s report, these interference efforts targeted private technology firms that provide
election-related software and hardware; state and local government entities; and a major political
party and nominee.16
The investigations did not find that this activity was a determinative factor in the election
outcome. However, the possibility of such activity, and of additional efforts to affect political
attitudes or participation, remains. In July 2018 remarks at the Hudson Institute, then-Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) Dan Coats, a former Senator, said that the
Intelligence Community
(IC) reported “aggressive attempts to manipulate social media and to spread propaganda focused
on hot-button issues that are intended to exacerbate socio-political divisions” in elections.
To the extent that those efforts affect campaigns—including campaign security, or the information
voters receive from campaigns—campaign finance policy and law could be relevant. The
Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) originated in the 1970s amid concerns about limiting domestic
political corruption. The act also contains a wide-ranging prohibition on foreign-national
involvement in federal, state, or local U.S. elections.17 These provisions, and disclosure and
disclaimer requirements for all “persons” who raise or spend funds to influence federal elections,
are key elements of regulating both domestic and foreign efforts to affect political fundraising,
spending, and advertising. Political committees (campaigns, parties, and political action
committees [PACs]) are responsible for their own security measures, although, as noted
elsewhere in this report, federal agencies (or private-sector entities) provide assistance in some
cases.
Today, election security is one of the most rapidly evolving policy issues facing Congress and the
federal government. Both chambers have passed legislation on the topic during the 116th
Congress. Multiple House and Senate committees have held investigative and oversight hearings.
Congress and the Obama and Trump Administrations have tasked federal agencies with new
responsibilities for supporting states and thwarting future possible interference. The
Intelligence
Community has warned that countering foreign interference in U.S. elections “will require a
whole-of-society approach, including support from the private sector and the active engagement
of an informed public.”18
Selected Federal Statutes
The U.S. Constitution and federal statutes regulate the division of governmental responsibility for
elections. No existing statute is devoted specifically to election security, although, as discussed
below, some statutes address aspects of the topic.19 Most broadly, the Constitution’s
Elections
16 Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, U.S.
Department of Justice, Special Counsel report submitted pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §600.8(c), vol. 1, Washington, DC,
March 2019, pp. 49-51.
17 52 U.S.C. §30121. For additional discussion of historical and recent campaign finance policy developments, see CRS
Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam
Garrett. See also CRS Report R45320, Campaign Finance Law: An Analysis of Key Issues, Recent Developments, and
Constitutional Considerations for Legislation, by L. Paige Whitaker.
18 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Foreign Threats to
U.S. Elections: Election Security Information Needs, at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/
DNI_NCSC_Elections_Brochure_Final . The publication is not dated or paginated. The quoted material appears on
the first full page of text.
19 For example, certain provisions of HAVA address election security. For more on those provisions, see the “Federal
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 8
Clause assigns states with setting the “Times, Places and Manner” for House and Senate
elections, and also permits Congress to “at any time … make or alter such Regulations.”20 As
discussed in the “State and Local Role in Election Security” section of this report, the federal
government thus plays a largely supporting role in election administration generally, and in
election security specifically.
Two election-specific statutes can be particularly important for campaign and election security.
Relevant legislation typically proposes amending one or both. First, the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA, 2002) is the only federal statute devoted to assisting states with election administration.
Congress relied on HAVA to establish the Election Assistance Commission, provide for a
voluntary federal voting system testing and certification program, and authorize federal
funding
states could use to help secure their elections. Second, FECA’s
disclaimer and disclosure
provisions, and the prohibition on foreign national fundraising or spending in U.S. elections, can
be particularly relevant for concerns about foreign interference in U.S. elections. Several other
statutes could be relevant in specific cases. Table 2 below provides a brief summary.
Table 2. Selected Statutes Potentially Relevant for Campaign and Election Security
Statute U.S. Code Citation
Brief Relevance for Campaign
and Election Security
Criminal code Various provisions in 18 U.S.C. Prohibits various practices in
elections/voting, such as use of
intimidation or threats, election
fraud, etc.; some provisions also
prohibit computer fraud, which is
referenced in some campaign and
election security
legislation
Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA)
52 U.S.C. §§30101-30146 Campaign finance statute; regulates
disclaimer and disclosure
requirements; prohibits foreign-
national fundraising or spending;
provides Federal Election
Commission with civil enforcement
authority; provides criminal
penalties for knowing and willful
violations
Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA)
22 U.S.C. §§611-621 Relevant for some campaign and
election security proposals/policy
debates, such as disclosure of
certain activity by foreign entities,
or domestic entities with certain
foreign ownership interests;
primarily developed to address
foreign propaganda; establishes
disclosure requirements
Election Security Guidance” section of
this report.
20 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §4.
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Statute U.S. Code Citation
Brief Relevance for Campaign
and Election Security
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145 Primarily devoted to supporting
state- and local-level election
administration; authorizes funding
for election administration-related
purposes; establishes Election
Assistance Commission; sets certain
federal election administration
requirements; and provides for a
voluntary federal voting system
testing and certification program
Homeland Security Act (HSA) Various provisions in 6 U.S.C. Established Department of
Homeland Security; some election
security bills, particularly regarding
cybersecurity or government
information-sharing, cite the HSA
(note: see also 42 U.S.C. §5195c on
critical infrastructure)
Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) 2 U.S.C. §§1601-1604 Primarily devoted to lobbying
regulation generally; lobbyist
reporting requirements (e.g.,
bundling disclosure) contained in
act could be relevant for some
campaign finance legislation
National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA)
52 U.S.C. §§20501-20511 Primarily devoted to registration
access; prohibits intimidation or
coercion in registration, or
knowingly providing false
registration or tabulation
information; establishes Chief State
Election Official designation, which
often is referenced in campaign and
election security legislation
Telecommunications law Various provisions in 47 U.S.C. Primarily devoted to
telecommunications provisions
generally; political advertising
disclaimer and disclosure
requirements (e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§315,
317) can be relevant in some cases,
and sometimes are referenced in
campaign and election security
legislation
Voting Rights Act (VRA) 52 U.S.C. §§10101-10702 Primarily devoted to voting access;
prohibits intimidation, threats, or
coercion in voting; authorizes
deploying election observers and
monitors to prevent discrimination
based on race, color, or, in some
cases, minority-language status
Source: CRS analysis of cited statutes, and adapted from CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and
Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.
Notes: See the report cited above for additional discussion of some of these statutes and of other campaigns
and elections statutes. The table excludes general intelligence or law enforcement authorities that could be
relevant in specific enforcement scenarios. It also excludes appropriations law. In some cases, agencies rely on
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Congressional Research Service 10
non-elections statutes or other authorities to support campaign and election security. This includes, for example,
the January 2017 “critical infrastructure” designation from then-Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson. See
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector,” press release, January 6, 2017, at https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical; and CRS In Focus
IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys. The designation is still
in effect, although Congress has not codified it. Some legislation proposes to do so, as noted in the Appendix.
Selected Federal Agencies
No single federal agency has responsibility for providing election or campaign security. Only two
federal agencies—the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Election
Commission (FEC)—are devoted entirely to campaigns and elections.
The EAC administers congressionally appropriated federal funding, oversees a
voluntary voting system testing and certification program, and provides voluntary
election administration guidance, research, and best practices.
The FEC is responsible for administration and civil enforcement of FECA.
Other departments and agencies, primarily with responsibilities for other areas of
public policy, support campaign and election security in specific cases.
Some agency roles developed from a January 2017 “critical
infrastructure”
designation.21 Additional detail appears below.
Additional information about agency roles appears below, and in the “Coordination By and
Among Selected Federal Agencies” section of this report.
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
The EAC is the only federal agency focused specifically on assisting states with election
administration. Congress has charged the EAC with administering funding states may use to help
secure their elections.
The EAC also provides states and localities with election administration
assistance, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG, discussed
below), providing for systems to be tested to the VVSG, and certifying systems
as meeting the guidelines. It also conducts research about state election
administration and voting, and shares information about best practices.
Although not mandated by Congress, the EAC also participates in activities
related to the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure, such as
serving on the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating
Council (EIS-GCC) and on the EIS-GCC executive committee.22
21 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical
Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys. For additional background on critical infrastructure designations generally, see
CRS Report RL30153, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation, by John D. Moteff; and CRS
Report R45809, Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress, by Brian E.
Humphreys. Elections is a “subsector” within
the Government Facilities sector.
22 See Election Infrastructure Subsector, Governing Coordinating Council, Charter, October 18, 2017, at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/govt-facilities-election-infrastructure-subsector-gcc-charter-2017-
508 .
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Federal Election Commission (FEC)
The FEC enforces civil compliance with FECA provisions and commission regulations regarding
campaign finance. This includes activities related to fundraising, spending, advertising
disclaimers, and financial disclosure reports. These provisions are relevant for some aspects of
security affecting political candidates or campaigns, parties, political action committees (PACs),
or other entities (e.g., independent spenders that are not political committees) that raise or spend
funds to affect federal campaigns.23 The FEC does not regulate election administration or voting
matters.24
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
DHS provides states and localities with assistance mitigating risks to their election systems,
especially concerning cybersecurity.
DHS is the sector-specific agency (SSA) responsible for securing the election
infrastructure subsector. Additional information appears later in this report.
DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is
responsible for most of the department’s election security activities,
including the Election Security Initiative (ESI).25
DHS protects major presidential candidates through the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS).26 The Secret Service is also the lead security agency for “national
special security events” (NSSEs), such as presidential nominating
conventions.27
Department of Justice (DOJ)
The Department of Justice enforces several federal statutes, discussed above, that could be
relevant for campaign and election security. Within DOJ, the FBI is the lead federal law
enforcement agency supporting state and local election administration, and is the lead federal
agency in investigating and prosecuting foreign influence campaigns.
23 Political committees include candidate campaigns, parties, and PACs. See 52 U.S.C. §30101(4).
24 Congress transferred the FEC’s previous responsibilities in election administration and voting to the Election
Assistance Commission in HAVA. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R45770, The U.S. Election Assistance
Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress, by Karen L. Shanton; and CRS Report R44318, The Federal
Election Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett. It is possible that prohibited
foreign spending to affect election administration or voting could fall under the FEC’s jurisdiction. FEC commissioners
have debated the agency’s jurisdiction on matters not directly related to campaigns, a topic that is beyond the scope of
this report.
25 Before Congress established CISA in June 2018, the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
served these functions. For background on CISA and other DHS cybersecurity roles, see CRS In Focus IF10683,
DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview, by Chris Jaikaran.
26 For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS Report RL34603, The U.S. Secret Service: History and Missions, by
Shawn Reese; and CRS In Focus IF10130, U.S. Secret Service Protection, by Shawn Reese.
27 CRS Report R43522, National Special Security Events: Fact Sheet, by Shawn Reese.
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Intelligence Community (IC)
Several agencies contribute to or produce intelligence about election security threats.28 For
example, a declassified version of a January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)
documenting Russian attempts to influence 2016-cycle U.S. elections contained information and
analysis from the CIA, FBI, and NSA.29 The “Coordination By and Among Selected Federal
Agencies” section below provides additional discussion of the IC campaign and election security
roles.
Selected Other Federal Agencies
The State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) is charged with
coordinating federal efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation
efforts aimed at undermining U.S. national security interests. The GEC partners
with other U.S. government agencies, including those within the State
Department, at the Defense Department, and elsewhere. 30
The Departments of Justice, State, and the Treasury all can be involved in
administering sanctions for election interference. As noted previously, sanctions
policy generally is beyond the scope of this report.31
Via the FY2020 NDAA bill (S. 1790; P.L. 116-92), Congress assigned various
agencies, especially DHS and the DNI, additional campaign and election security
responsibilities. Most provisions involve providing Congress or federal or state
agencies with information about election interference. The Appendix of this
report provides additional detail.
Table 3 provides a brief overview of selected agency roles in campaign and election security.
28 As CRS has explained elsewhere, the Intelligence Community (IC) includes “17 component organizations” within
the federal government. These include, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and
intelligence divisions within other departments and agencies. For additional detail, see CRS In Focus IF10525, Defense
Primer: National and Defense Intelligence, by Michael E. DeVine and Heidi M. Peters; CRS In Focus IF10527, U.S.
Intelligence Community Elements: Establishment Provisions, by Michael E. DeVine and Heidi M. Peters; and CRS In
Focus IF10470, The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), by Michael E. DeVine.
29 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, ICA 2017-01D, January 6, 2017, at
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01 . For additional CRS discussion of these activities as a
component of Russian foreign policy, a topic that is beyond the scope of this report, see, for example, CRS Report
R44775, Russia: Background and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
30 For background on the GEC, see CRS Insight IN10744, Global Engagement Center: Background and Issues, by
Matthew C. Weed. See also U.S. Department of State, “Global Engagement Center,” at https://www.state.gov/r/gec/.
31 For additional discussion, see, for example, CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act, by Dianne E. Rennack, Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on
Russia: An Overview, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt; CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia,
coordinated by Cory Welt; and CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, by
Dianne E. Rennack, Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt.
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Table 3. Selected Agency Roles in Campaign and Election Security
Agency Brief Description of Security Role
Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) advises
EAC on technical and scientific matters, including voting
system testing laboratory accreditation recommendations and
assistance with developing the VVSG
Department of Defense U.S. Cyber Command and other services provide
cybersecurity and intelligence in some cases; U.S. Cyber
Command and National Security agency Election Security
Group task force tracks certain foreign threats; Federal
Voting Assistance Program director included in EAC Board of
Advisors; some National Guard units assist states with
cybersecurity
Department of Homeland Security Assists states on cybersecurity matters; Sector-Specific
Agency (SSA) for Elections Infrastructure Subsector (EIS);
Secret Service protects major presidential candidates
Department of Justice Enforces criminal law and civil aspects of some elections
statutes; DOJ included in EAC Board of Advisors; Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigates election crimes and
participates in Intelligence Community; FBI Foreign Influence
Task Force (FITF) investigates foreign influence operations;
works with State Department and Treasury Department to
administer sanctions for elections
interference
Department of State Global Engagement Center (GEC) coordinates federal efforts
to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation, including
in elections; State Department works with DOJ and Treasury
Department to administer sanctions for elections
interference
Department of the Treasury Works with DOJ and State Department to administer
sanctions for elections interference; can also participate in
investigations of prohibited foreign interference in U.S.
elections, such as through the department’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
Election Assistance Commission Administers most HAVA funds, oversees a voluntary voting
system testing and certification program, and provides
voluntary election administration guidance, research, and best
practices
Federal Election Commission Administers and enforces civil campaign finance law; including
disclaimer, disclosure, and foreign-national provisions that can
be relevant for campaign and election security
Intelligence Community Includes multiple agencies; assesses foreign efforts to
influence U.S. campaigns and elections; Election Threat
Executive is the principal elections adviser to Director of
National Intelligence (DNI)
Source: Adapted from CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam
Garrett.
Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies
Because no single federal agency is solely responsible for campaign and election security—and
because state and local governments have most practical responsibility for election security—
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coordination among agencies and governments is an ongoing congressional concern.32 Adding to
the complexity of the election security challenge, government agencies, in some cases, both
support and regulate private actors—such as political campaigns—and sometimes rely on those
private entities to provide threat information.
Highlights of federal coordination issues appear below. Because some of these relationships
appear to be in development, some information about agency coordination, or the lack thereof,
remains unclear in the public record. Similarly, some information about coordination among
intelligence-gathering agencies is publicly unavailable, beyond the scope of this report, or both.33
As such, other formal or information coordination among or by agencies likely occurs but is not
reflected here.
Department of Homeland Security Coordination Roles
DHS takes a lead role in coordinating the federal support for campaign and election security.
Most of the DHS coordination role stems from a January 2017 “critical infrastructure”
designation that treats election infrastructure as an essential service requiring federal support and
protection. The designation established the Elections Infrastructure Subsector (EIS) within the
Government Facilities Sector, which includes various government buildings and equipment.34
As a result of the critical infrastructure designation, DHS prioritizes support for
the subsector, including to those state and local election jurisdictions that choose
to accept such assistance. This includes sharing information about threats; and
conducting cyber hygiene and risk and vulnerability assessments.35
The critical infrastructure designation applies to physical and technical resources
related to elections, such as communications technology, voting equipment, and
32 See, for example, discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22, 2019, House Judiciary
Committee oversight hearing, “Security America’s Elections Part II: Oversight of Government Agencies.” As of this
writing, the hearing record does not appear to have been published. Video and written materials are available on the
committee website, https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-
government-agencies. See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Oversight of the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019, S. Hrg. 116-74 (Washington: GPO, 2019); U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Defending Our Democracy: Building Partnerships to Protect
America’s Elections, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial No. 116-1 (Washington: GPO, 2019); and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Securing U.S. Election
Infrastructure and Protecting Political Discourse, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial no. 116-28
(Washington: GPO, 2019).
33 For additional information on federal cybersecurity coordination (although not limited to elections issues), see CRS
Report R41927, The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law
Enforcement, by Kristin Finklea.
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector,” press release, January 6, 2017, at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/
01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical. For additional discussion, see CRS In
Focus IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys. For additional
background on critical infrastructure designations generally, see CRS Report RL30153, Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation, by John D. Moteff; and CRS Report R45809, Critical Infrastructure:
Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress, by Brian E. Humphreys. Elections is a “subsector” within
the Government Facilities sector.
35 For an overview of DHS CISA services to state and local election jurisdictions, see, for example, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Election Infrastructure Security Resource
Guide, May 2019. This document and several related publications are available for download on the agency’s “Election
Security Resource Library,” at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/election-security-resource-library.
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polling places. It does not apply to political campaigns. The designation does not
give DHS regulatory authority over federal elections.36
DHS serves as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the EIS. As SSA, the agency plays various
coordinating roles among public and private entities, as highlighted below.
As SSA, DHS coordinates information sharing among various governmental and
nongovernmental entities (e.g., vendors) responsible for election administration.
In this role, DHS also coordinates activities for the EIS Government
Coordinating Council (GCC).
The EIS-GCC includes representatives from DHS, EAC, and state and local
governments.
DHS also works with a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), which consists of
industry representatives (e.g., voting-machine manufacturers).
DHS also funds the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (EI-ISAC), a voluntary membership organization of state and local
election jurisdictions run by the private Center for Internet Security. The EI-
ISAC coordinates security information sharing among these entities.
Election Assistance Commission Coordination Roles
As the only federal agency devoted specifically to election administration, the
EAC helps facilitate communication between state or local election
administrators and other federal agencies, and vice versa.
EAC commissioners serve on the EIS Government Coordinating Council (EIS-
GCC), coordinated by DHS, and on the EIS-GCC executive committee.
Intelligence Community Coordination Roles
As noted previously, the IC includes more than a dozen agencies from throughout the federal
government. Highlights of the IC role in coordination surrounding campaign and election security
appear below.
In July 2019, then-DNI Coats created an IC Election Threats Executive (ETE)
position to serve as the DNI’s principal elections adviser and to coordinate IC
election security work. Coats also directed IC agencies to assign a senior
executive to serve as the point-of-contact for that agency’s election security work
and to serve on a new IC Election Executive and Leadership Board.37
U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA monitors foreign threats to U.S.
elections.
This reportedly includes a recently established Election Security Group.38 In
36 For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical
Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys. See also CRS In Focus IF10683, DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview,
by Chris Jaikaran.
37 It appears that the board could include representatives from non-IC agencies. For example, the press release
announcing the ETE and board notes that “[m]embers of this board are senior-executive leads from across the IC and
all relevant U.S. government organizations.” See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Director of
National
Intelligence Daniel R. Coats Establishes Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive,” press release, July 19,
2019, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2023-director-of-national-intelligence-daniel-r-
coats-establishes-intelligence-community-election-threats-executive.
38 See, for example, Dustin Volz, “NSA Forms Cybersecurity Directorate Under More Assertive U.S. Effort,” Wall
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addition, the FY2020 NDAA bill requires the DNI to appoint a national
counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center to coordinate election security counterintelligence, particularly regarding
foreign interference and equipment issues.39
Coordination Roles and Selected Other Federal Agencies
In addition to coordination on IC threat assessments noted above, multiple
federal agencies have collaborated on campaign and election security educational
resources for political committees, election administrators, or voters.40 Agencies
also have issued joint warnings.41
The State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) is charged with
coordinating federal efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation.
The State Department also works with the Treasury Department and Justice
Department to administer sanctions for election interference.
The FY2020 NDAA and Coordination Roles
The FY2020 NDAA bill (S. 1790; P.L. 116-92), enacted in December 2019,
requires the DNI to “develop a whole-of-government strategy for countering the
threat of Russian cyberattacks and attempted cyberattacks against election
systems and processes in the United States.”42
Congress specified that the strategy should include protecting federal, state, and
local election systems, voter registration databases, voting tabulation equipment,
and systems for transmitting election results.
Congress also required the DNI to develop the strategy “in coordination” with the
Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury, and with the
Directors of the CIA and FBI.43
Federal Agency Roles and Campaign Security
Perhaps because the 2017 critical infrastructure designation does not apply to political campaigns
or other political committees, it appears that no federal agency has specific responsibility for
Street Journal, July 23, 2019, accessed via CRS subscription; Olivia Gazis, “The NSA Prepares to Defend 2020
Elections, Drawing Lessons From 2018,” CBS News Online, September 7, 2019, at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
the-nsa-prepares-to-defend-2020-elections-drawing-lessons-from-2018-midterms/; and Martin Matishak, “NSA, Cyber
Command Reveal New Election Security Task Force Leaders,” Politico Pro, November 7, 2019, accessed via CRS
subscription. For additional discussion, see, for example, Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Explores Information Warfare to
Check Russia,” The Washington Post, December 26, 2019, p. A1.
39 See §6508, S. 1790; P.L. 116-92 (116th Congress).
40 See, for example, a fact sheet jointly issued by eight federal agencies: Cyber Incident Reporting: A Unified Message
for Reporting to the Federal Government, n.d., at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/cyber-incident-reporting-unified-
message-reporting-federal-government.
41 See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, et al., “Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and
CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections,” press release, November 5, 2019, at https://www.nsa.gov/news-
features/press-room/Article/2009338/joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-
2/.
42 See §6504, S. 1790; P.L. 116-92 (116th Congress).
43 See §6504, S. 1790; P.L. 116-92 (116th Congress).
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coordinating security preparations for these entities.44 However, federal law enforcement
agencies, particularly the FBI, can and do receive reports of, and investigate, suspected criminal
activity. In preparation for the 2020 elections, the FBI also established a “Protected Voices”
program that provides political campaigns,45 private companies, and individuals with information
about how to guard against and respond to cyberattacks and foreign influence campaigns. In
addition, DHS (CISA), the FBI, and ODNI have jointly briefed some 2020 federal political
campaigns on security threats and best practices.46
Federal Election Security Guidance
Federal election law takes a mostly voluntary approach to election security. Congress has set
some security requirements for federal elections, such as directing election officials to provide a
certain level of technological security for their HAVA-mandated computerized voter registration
lists.47 Most election security standards are set at the state or local levels.48
Some examples of the voluntary election security guidance the federal government provides are
the research, best
practices, and technical assistance
described in the “Selected Federal Agencies”
section of this report. HAVA also charges the EAC—with assistance from the agency’s advisory
bodies and NIST—with developing voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG), accrediting
laboratories to test voting systems to the VVSG, and certifying systems as meeting the VVSG.49
The proposed update to the VVSG that was in development as of this writing (VVSG 2.0)
includes some security-related principles and guidelines, such as ensuring that voting systems are
auditable, limiting and logging access to voting systems, and preventing or detecting
unauthorized physical access to voting system hardware.50
Participation in the federal voting system testing and certification program is voluntary under
federal law.51 The testing and certification program covers the “voting system” as defined by
44 CISA offers assistance to campaigns on a voluntary basis. U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary,
Testimony of Matthew Masterson, Senior Cybersecurity Advisor, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for a Hearing on Securing America’s Elections Part II: Oversight of
Government Agencies, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019, p. 6.
45 The program also appears to provide services to political parties, and perhaps to other political committees (e.g.,
political action committees).
46 See testimony from CISA Senior Cybersecurity Advisor (and former EAC Commissioner) Matthew Masterson, at an
October 22, 2019, House Judiciary Committee oversight hearing, “Security America’s Elections Part II: Oversight of
Government Agencies.” As of this writing, the hearing record does not appear to have been published. Video and
written materials are available on the committee website, https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/securing-
america-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-government-agencies.
47 52 U.S.C. §21083; 52 U.S.C. §21081.
48 For more on the role states and localities play in setting election security standards, see the “State and Local Role in
Election Security” section of this report.
49 52 U.S.C. §§20961-20971. Technical Guidelines Development Committee, Project Charter: VVSG Version 2.0, June
26, 2016.
50 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Voluntary Voting System Guidelines VVSG 2.0: Draft
Recommendations for Requirements for Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0, October 29, 2019, at
https://collaborate.nist.gov/voting/pub/Voting/VVSG20DraftRequirements/vvsg-2.0-2019-10-29-DRAFT-
requirements .
51 Some states have chosen to make part or all of it mandatory under their own state laws. According to the
Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee and Research and Technology Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, 12 states required full federal certification of their voting systems as of 2019, and 8
states did not require any federal testing or certification. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, Space, and
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HAVA, which does not include some components of the election system, such as voter
registration databases and election night reporting systems.52 Changes to one part of a voting
system, such as updating software to patch security vulnerabilities, might require recertification
of the system under the policies in effect as of this writing,53 and updates to the VVSG require
approval by a three-vote majority of the EAC’s commissioners.54
Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
Congress has responded to the threats that emerged during the 2016 election cycle, discussed
above, in part with funding. Since the 2016 elections, it has provided funding for helping secure
election systems both to states, territories, and the District of Columbia (DC), and to federal
agencies.
Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (H.R. 1158; P.L. 116-93), and the
Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), included $425 million and $380 million, respectively,
for payments under provisions of HAVA that authorize funding for general improvements to the
administration of federal elections. The explanatory statements accompanying the bills listed the
following election security-specific purposes as potential uses of the funds:
replacing voting equipment that only records a voter’s intent electronically with
equipment that utilizes a voter-verified paper record;
implementing a post-election audit system that provides a high level of
confidence in the accuracy of the final vote tally;
upgrading election-related computer systems to address cyber vulnerabilities
identified through DHS or similar scans or assessments of existing election
systems;
facilitating cybersecurity training for the state chief election official’s office and
local election officials;
implementing established cybersecurity best practices for election systems; and
Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Election
Security: Voting Technology Vulnerabilities, hearing charter, 116th Cong., 1st sess., June 25, 2019, p. 2.
52 52 U.S.C. §21081; House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight and Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Election Security: Voting Technology Vulnerabilities, p. 5.
53 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Testing & Certification Program Manual, Version 2.0, May 31, 2015, at
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Cert_Manual_7_8_15_FINAL . Some observers have suggested that VVSG
certification policies complicate decisions about patching vulnerabilities in voting system software. See, for example,
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
and Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Written Testimony of Josh Benaloh, Senior Cryptographer, Microsoft
Research, Microsoft Corporation, hearing on Election Security: Voting Technology Vulnerabilities, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., June 25, 2019, p. 7. The EAC issued a notice of clarification about de minimis changes to voting system software
on November 15, 2019. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, NOC 19-01: Software De Minimis Changes, Silver
Spring, MD, November 15, 2019, at https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/NOC19.01_SoftwareDeMinimisChanges_11-15-
2019 .
54 The VVSG was adopted by the EAC in 2005 and updated in 2015. As of this writing, another update is in
development. The EAC lacked the quorum required to adopt an update from December 2010 to January 2015 and from
March 2018 to February 2019. For more on the VVSG and quorums at the EAC, see CRS Report R45770, The U.S.
Election Assistance Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress, by Karen L. Shanton.
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Congressional Research Service 19
funding other activities that will improve the security of elections for federal
office.55
The 50 states, DC, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were
eligible for both FY2018 and FY2020 payments. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI) was eligible for FY2020 funding.56 Each recipient was guaranteed a minimum
payment amount each year it was eligible—$3 million for each of the 50 states and DC and
$600,000 per eligible territory—with the remainder of the appropriated funding distributed
according to a formula based on voting-age population. Recipients are required to provide a 5%
match for the FY2018 funds within two years of receiving a federal payment and a 20% match
for the FY2020 funding.57
The EAC, which was charged with administering the payments, reported that all of the FY2018
funds were requested by July 16, 2018, and disbursed to the states by September 20, 2018.58 Each
state has five years to spend the funds, according to the EAC, and must report on its spending
each fiscal year.59 The EAC posts links to the states’ reports—and spending plans—on its website
and issues its own overview reports of state spending.60
Funding for Federal Agencies After the 2016 Election Cycle
As noted in the “Selected Federal Agencies” section of this report, multiple federal agencies are
involved in helping secure election systems. Congress has designated some of the funding it has
appropriated to such agencies specifically for election system security.61 For example, following
the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure in January 2017, the report language
for DHS appropriations measures has specified funding for the department’s election security
55 Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen, “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen, Chairman of the House
Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H.R. 1625,” explanatory
statement, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 164, part 50 (March 22, 2018), p. H2519.
56 CNMI did not hold federal elections when HAVA was enacted and, unlike the other territories listed here, was not
covered by the act’s funding provisions. The FY2020 appropriations bill includes a provision that extends its funding to
CNMI.
57 Agencies are permitted to waive matching fund requirements for certain U.S. territories. For information on previous
disbursements to states, territories, and the District of Columbia, see U.S. Election Assistance Commission, HAVA
Funds State Chart View, at https://www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/hava-funds-state-chart-view/; and U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, Payments & Grants, at https://www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/managing-requirements-
payments/.
58 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Election Security Grant Funding Requests Received as of 7/16/2018, at
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/ES_Requests_Received ; The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Grant
Expenditure Report: Fiscal Year 2018, April 4, 2019, p. 10, at https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/
FY2018HAVAGrantsExpenditureReport .
59 Mark W. Abbott, 2018 HAVA Election Security Grants, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, July 2018,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a665c98017db2b60bc22084/t/5b5f7eda03ce644ee283b688/1532985050697/
HAVA+Funding_Mark+Abbott_July+2018 ; U.S. Election Assistance Commission, HAVA Funds State Chart View,
at https://www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/hava-funds-state-chart-view/; and U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
For more on states’ spending of the FY2018 HAVA funds, see CRS In Focus IF11356, Election Security: States’
Spending of FY2018 HAVA Payments, by Karen L. Shanton.
60 See, for example, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Grant Expenditure Report, Fiscal Year 2018, Silver Spring,
MD, April 4, 2019, at https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/FY2018HAVAGrantsExpenditureReport .
61 Congress has also designated funding for other purposes that might be relevant to election security, such as funding
for the State Department’s GEC, to address propaganda and disinformation. As noted above, funding for aspects of
election security other than securing election systems is outside the scope of the report.
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initiative.62 The explanatory statement for the FY2018 spending bill also directed the FBI to use
some of its funding to help counter threats to democratic institutions and processes.63
Agencies may also spend some of the funding they receive for more general purposes on
activities related to election system security. The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has provided funding under its System Security
Integrated Through Hardware and Firmware (SSITH) program to advance development of a
secure, open-source voting system, for example, and the EAC applies some of its operational
funding to the federal voting system testing and certification program described in the “Federal
Election Security Guidance” section of this report.64
State and Local Role in Election Security
Some threats to U.S. elections—including both intentional interference efforts and the unintended
threats posed by errors and natural disasters—involve the state and local systems used to
administer elections.65 Other election security threats involve efforts to spread disinformation
about elections or the integrity of the electoral process.66
States and localities may play a role in countering both types of threat.67 First, states and localities
take the lead on defending their election systems. As noted previously, states and localities have
primary responsibility for administering elections in the United States. The federal government
has provided some funding and technical support to help them secure the systems they use to run
elections, but states and localities have primary responsibility for ensuring that their systems are
physically and technologically secure.68
62 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector,” press release, January 6, 2017, at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/
01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical; Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen,
“Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations,
Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H.R. 1625,” p. H2557; U.S. Congress, House
Committee
on Appropriations, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for Fiscal
Year 2019, and For Other Purposes, conference report to accompany H.J.Res. 31, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13,
2019, Report 116-9 (Washington: GPO, 2019), p. 492. For more on the designation of election systems as critical
infrastructure, see CRS In Focus IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure, by Brian E.
Humphreys.
63 Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen, “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen, Chairman of the House
Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H.R. 1625,” p. H2091.
64 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Hacker Community to Take on DARPA Hardware Defenses at DEF
CON 2019,”” press release, August 1, 2019, at https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-08-01; U.S. Election
Assistance Commission, Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification, March 18, 2019, p. 11, at
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/EACFY2020BudgetJustification .
65 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in
the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 2019. As used
in this section, “state” is intended also to include U.S. territories.
66 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in
the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 2019.
67 For more information about the role states and localities play in election administration in general, see CRS Report
R45549, The State and Local Role in Election Administration: Duties and Structures, by Karen L. Shanton.
68 For more information about federal election security funding, see the “Federal Funding for Securing Election
Systems” section of this report. For more on the technical assistance the federal government provides for securing state
and local election systems, see the “Selected Federal Agencies” and “Federal Election Security Guidance” sections of
the report.
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Congressional Research Service 21
That includes primary responsibility for funding election system security measures. Securing
election systems may involve capital expenditures, such as replacing voting machines, that
exceed funding provided by Congress. It may also involve ongoing costs—from identifying and
addressing emerging security threats to renewing software licenses, paying election security staff,
and conducting post-election audits—that extend beyond the period for which federal funding is
available. Such expenses are covered, if they are covered, by states and localities.
State and local responsibility for election system security also includes primary responsibility for
making and implementing most decisions about how to secure election systems. Federal law sets
some general standards for the administration of elections, such as the voter registration list
digitization requirement noted in the “Federal Election Security Guidance” section of this
report.69
States and localities decide—within the broad parameters set by such general standards—which
election equipment and procedures to use and how to mitigate risks to them. They choose, for
example,
whether to use electronic devices to capture or count votes; whether, when, and
how to conduct post-election audits;
whether and how to set security standards for election equipment vendors;
whether to have in-house security staff in local jurisdictions or rely on state or
vendor IT support;
which cybersecurity tools and procedures to use;
whether and how to train election officials and poll workers on election security;
how to secure election materials between elections and ensure a secure physical
chain of custody on Election Day; and
what cyber and physical security standards to set for election equipment.
Second, states and localities can help combat disinformation or misinformation about elections or
the integrity of the electoral process. They can, for example,
use official websites and social media accounts to share accurate information
about elections or counter false information; and
help educate the public about the steps they take to safeguard the electoral
process.
States also can work through their professional associations—using initiatives such as a public
education campaign launched by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) in
November 2019—to help direct voters to trustworthy sources of election information.70
These efforts might occur as part of or in parallel with responses to dis
information or
misinformation by the federal government or private entities like social media companies.71 States
69 For more information about federal standards for election administration, see CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in
U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report RS20898, The Help America Vote Act
and Election Administration: Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election, by Arthur L. Burris and Eric A.
Fischer; and CRS Report RS20764, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Overview and Issues,
by R. Sam Garrett (originally authored by Kevin J. Coleman).
70 National Association of Secretaries of State, NASS Launches #TrustedInfo2020: A Public Election Education
Initiative, at https://www.nass.org/node/1749.
71 See, for example, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, #Protect2020, at https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/
protect2020; and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Protected Voices, at https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
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Congressional Research Service 22
might partner with social media companies to remove posts containing election disinformation,
for example, or adopt disclosure requirements that supplement or override the companies’
policies on digital political advertising.72
Selected Recent Policy Issues for Congress
Table 4 below briefly summarizes selected policy issues and options that have shaped recent
policy debates in Congress. In addition, the Appendix at the end of this report briefly summarizes
legislation primarily devoted to campaign and election security that has advanced beyond
introduction during the 116th Congress. The table reflects recent policy debates, but is not
intended to be exhaustive. Some observers might consider other issues not reflected here to be
relevant for campaign and election security.
counterintelligence/foreign-influence/protected-voices.
72 See, for example, “California Launches New Effort to Fight Election Disinformation,” Capital Public Radio,
September 23, 2018; Kevin Collier, “As Feds Struggle, States Create Their Own Anti-Election Propaganda Programs,”
CNN, July 11, 2019; and Jim Brunner and Christine Clarridge, “Why Google Won’t Run Political Ads in Washington
State for Now,” The Seattle Times, June 7, 2018.
CRS-23
Table 4. Selected Recent Policy Issues Related to Campaign and Election Security
Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options
Coordination among federal agencies
See also Notification of election
interference row.
No single federal agency responsible for
campaign and election security; see
report text for additional discussion
Whether or how much additional
coordination is needed between
agencies to improve information sharing
about security threats; whether an
expanded federal role is appropriate for
federal elections or could usurp state
authority to administer elections;
whether additional federal role or
regulation could be unnecessary,
expensive, or both
Maintain status quo; provide additional (or
less) funding to federal agencies; create
new campaign and election security
agency, office, or position to enhance
coordination among federal agencies;
expand (or reduce) campaign and election
security enforcement authorities in federal
law or for specific agencies; provide
additional (or less) funding to states in
addition to or in lieu of additional federal
agency funding; provide additional federal
agency support to states; focus on
enforcement of existing statutes
Election equipment and procedures States and localities primarily
responsible for selecting, acquiring, and
securing election equipment and
procedures within broad parameters set
by federal law; EAC oversees voluntary
voting system testing and certification
program, including VVSG that contain
certain security-related
recommendations; some HAVA funding
provided to states may be used to help
secure election equipment and
procedures; DHS, EAC, and NIST
provide other assistance with securing
state and local election equipment and
procedures, such as best practices and
technical assistance, and FBI and IC
provide investigative and intelligence
support
What the security threats to election
equipment and procedures are, and
whether or how the federal government
is best positioned to help address them;
whether it is appropriate for the federal
government to be more involved in
funding election equipment and
procedures and/or making decisions
about them; whether states and
localities need additional assistance to
address security threats to election
equipment and procedures, and, if so,
which types of assistance would be most
effective; whether existing federal
assistance, such as the voluntary federal
voting system testing and certification
program, is sufficiently responsive to
changes in the election security
landscape; whether election services
vendors should be subject to federal
regulation
Maintain status quo; provide federal
agencies or states and localities with
additional funding to help secure election
equipment and procedures; reduce the
funding federal agencies receive to help
secure election equipment and
procedures; expand or codify nonfinancial
federal assistance, such as research, best
practices, technical assistance, and
investigative or intelligence support;
require use of specific election equipment
or procedures; require use of election
equipment or procedures that meet
certain security standards; amend
procedures for certifying and recertifying
voting systems and/or updating the VVSG;
require disclosure of or prohibit foreign
ownership or control of election services
vendors; require election services vendors
to meet certain federal security standards
CRS-24
Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options
Election system security funding States and localities primarily
responsible for covering costs of
implementing and maintaining election
system security measures; some HAVA
funding provided to states may be used
to help secure election systems; some
appropriations to federal agencies
designated for use in helping secure
election systems; some more general
agency appropriations may also be
applied to election security-related
purposes
Whether additional funding should be
provided to help secure elections, and,
if so, how much; which entities or
agencies should receive funding; what
purposes funding should or may be used
for; whether funding should be provided
on an ongoing basis; whether funding
recipients should be required to meet
additional conditions in order to receive
funding
Maintain status quo; provide states,
localities, federal agencies, and/or
independent researchers with additional
funding to help secure election systems;
reduce the funding federal agencies receive
to help secure election systems; designate
funding for general improvements to
election security and/or specific security-
related purposes, for meeting federal
election security requirements and/or
carrying out voluntary security activities,
and/or for identifying new security
solutions and/or implementing or
maintaining established best practices;
provide for limited duration and/or
ongoing funding; set conditions on funding,
such as spending deadlines, state match or
maintenance of effort requirements, or
plan, performance, or reporting
requirements
Election security standards and guidance States and localities primarily
responsible for setting election security
standards within broad parameters set
by HAVA; EAC oversees voluntary
voting system testing and certification
program, including VVSG that contain
certain security-related
recommendations; DHS, EAC, and NIST
provide other voluntary guidance on
election security, such as research, best
practices, and technical assistance
Whether the federal government should
set additional federal standards or
guidance for election security, and, if so,
who should develop them; whether
additional standards or guidance should
be mandatory or voluntary; whether the
voluntary federal testing and
certification program should cover
more of the election system; whether
the federal testing and certification
program is sufficiently responsive to
changes in the election security
landscape
Maintain status quo; mandate specified
federal standards for election security;
charge EAC, NIST, DHS, or other agency
or commission with developing federal
standards for election security; expand the
HAVA definition of “voting system” to
include parts of election system that are
not currently covered by the federal
testing and certification program; amend
procedures for certifying and recertifying
voting systems and/or updating the VVSG;
expand or codify voluntary federal election
security guidance, such as research, best
practices, and technical assistance
CRS-25
Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options
Electronic poll books (e-poll books) Used in at least one jurisdiction by 36
states and in 26.2% of jurisdictions
nationwide during the 2018 election,
representing a 48.0% increase in usage
since 2016, according to the 2018 EAVS
report; no federal guidelines; state
cybersecurity or certification standards
vary
How to maintain the integrity of real-
time voter information; how to provide
for continuity of election if e-poll book
used to check in voters is offline or
accessing invalid data
Maintain status quo; include e-poll books
as part of HAVA voting systems; establish
security standards or guidelines for e-poll
books; require or encourage use of paper
poll books or other backup systems
Foreign money
See also Influence operations row.
Campaign finance law (FECA) prohibits
fundraising or spending by foreign
nationals (except permanent resident
aliens) in federal, state, and local U.S.
elections.
Potential for prohibited foreign funds to
surreptitiously affect U.S. elections,
particularly through entities that do not
publicly disclose donors (e.g., politically
active tax-exempt organizations, such as
501(c)(4) groups); whether existing
FECA prohibition is sufficient; whether
additional enforcement of existing
prohibitions needed; whether foreign
money is most appropriately addressed
through lobbying or antipropaganda
policy, rather than through campaign
finance policy
Maintain status quo; pursue additional civil
or criminal enforcement; increase donor
disclosure; increase disclaimers through
campaign finance or lobbying law; impose
sanctions or immigration restrictions;
increase reporting or government
coordination to detect such funds
Influence operations (e.g.,
disinformation, misinformation)
See also Foreign money row.
No current overarching federal statute;
statutes such as FECA, FARA, and the
Homeland Security Act contain
provisions that can be relevant in
specific circumstances. FBI
Foreign
Influence Task Force (FITF) lead agency
for investigating foreign influence
campaigns; DHS and EAC offer
assistance to election administrators
Extent of emphasis on domestic versus
foreign sources; whether government
agencies or nongovernmental entities
are best-equipped to combat influence
operations; extent to which regulation
should apply only to election-related
information versus more general issue
advocacy
Maintain status quo; require additional
federal agency monitoring or enforcement;
encourage or rely on voters or
nongovernmental entities (e.g., advocacy
groups, universities, etc.) to pursue civic
literacy efforts; impose sanctions or
immigration restrictions; increase
reporting or government coordination to
detect such operations
CRS-26
Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options
Notification of
election interference
See also Coordination among federal
agencies row.
In general, there does not appear to be
standard practice among various federal,
state, and local agencies and political
groups (e.g., campaigns) about sharing
election-threat information; FY2020
NDAA (S. 1790; P.L. 116-92) enacted in
December 2019 specifies some
additional agency reporting
requirements to Congress; DHS and FBI
can provide consultations and
investigations to election jurisdictions or
political committees (e.g., campaigns).
Whether election-specific notification
processes are necessary, and if so,
whether they should be mandatory or
recommended; how broadly such
requirements should apply (e.g.,
governments versus political
committees); how widely such
information should be publicized and
when; timeliness, consistency, and level
of detail provided from federal agencies
to states and local election jurisdictions;
state and local and/or political
committee capacity to utilize federal
threat information
Maintain status quo; require federal
agencies to notify each other of suspected
election interference; require federal
agencies to notify state/local election
officials, political committees, or voters
about election interference; provide
additional or expedited security clearances
for election officials;
require political
committees (e.g., campaigns) to notify FBI
or other federal agency of suspected or
offered foreign interference or “things of
value”
Online political advertising FEC regulations apply disclaimer and
disclosure requirements to paid
advertising relating to federal candidates
(independent expenditures, public
communications, and electioneering
communications); issue advocacy
generally is not regulated under
campaign finance law.
Whether funding sources already are
sufficiently disclosed; whether existing
law provides sufficient regulation of
issue-oriented ads about the political
process but that do not trigger
campaign finance law/regulation;
whether additional disclosure
requirements would produce sufficient
information to warrant additional
compliance burden
Maintain status quo; increase donor
disclosure; add disclaimer requirements
through campaign finance law or other
federal statutes; require platforms to
disclose content or targeting data
Protecting voter information and
records
States vary on voter registration
database (VRDB) cybersecurity
practices and policies for obtaining
voter lists.
Whether or how to utilize other
sources of information (e.g., agency
records; other states) to update voter
data; how individuals can update or
access their own information without
hampering election administration or
enabling unauthorized access to voter
data; whether existing (primarily state-
level) processes to verify data accuracy,
or update data, are sufficient
Maintain status quo; require security
standards for VRDB access; specifying
permissible uses for voter data; require or
encourage opportunity to update
information at the time of voting
CRS-27
Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options
Relationship between campaign and
election security and voter access
States determine registration and voting
requirements. NVRA and VRA prohibit
intimidation, threats, or coercion in
registration, voting, and elections (in
addition to other provisions that are
beyond the scope of this report)
Whether or how to alter federal role in
the relationship between security and
access; whether voter access should be
pursued as a component of campaign
and election security or as a separate
policy debate
Note: Much debate in this area occurs
at the state level (e.g., over voter-
identification requirements; the issue of
voter fraud; access to absentee ballots,
etc.)
Maintain status quo; make changes to the
federal role or federal policy regarding
election security that would have
implications for voter access; pursue voter
access as separate policy area from
campaign and election security
Verifying election results 2018 EAVS report notes 29.6% of states
used direct-recording electronic (DRE)
voting machines with no voter-verified
paper trail in at least one jurisdiction
during the 2018 election. A majority of
states require some type of post-
election audit to ensure that votes are
counted correctly, but there is no
federal requirement. EAC provides
guidance and VVSG that states may use
addressing certain voting system
features.
Whether current state-level verification
processes are sufficient; what equipment
or standards help voters ensure their
ballot is cast correctly and help election
officials ensure that vote results are
complete and accurate; whether states
have sufficient resources to purchase
voting machines or other equipment
that would help meet these standards
Maintain status quo; encourage or require
auditing standards, such as risk-limiting
audits; provide additional (or less) funding
for states to implement audits; require
paper ballots and/or voter-verified paper
ballot trails
Voter registration databases (VRDBs) HAVA requires states with voter
registration to have a “centralized,
interactive computerized statewide
voter registration list” containing certain
information. NVRA provides some
circumstances for removing an
individual from a VRDB, but states vary
on other list maintenance practices.
Whether cybersecurity standards or
guidelines are needed to protect
database access, contents, storage, or
information sharing; how to ensure
information remains accurate for eligible
voters; how to ensure ineligible voters
cannot vote and are removed from
VRDB
Maintain status quo; provide funding to
states for upgraded equipment; resources
for VRDB threat assessments; require
information-sharing requirements if a
vulnerability is detected; require VRDB
access logs or offline backups; require or
encourage: automatic voter registration,
list maintenance requirements, or criteria
for removing ineligible voters from lists
Source: CRS analysis of recent legislation and policy debates.
Notes: The table reflects recent policy debates, but is not intended to be exhaustive. Some observers might consider other issues not reflected here to be relevant for
campaign and election security.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 28
Concluding Observations
Campaign and election security are developing fields that cross policy and disciplinary
boundaries. This complexity is reflected in the various statutes, agencies, and congressional
committees that share responsibility for policymaking and administrative matters relevant for
security U.S. campaigns and elections. Questions such as those that follow reflect themes
discussed throughout this report. These and other questions could help congressional readers
decide whether they want to maintain the status quo, appropriate funds, or pursue oversight or
legislation.
Federal Role. A key question for Congress is whether, where, and how it
chooses to be involved in campaign and election security. Most broadly, this
potentially includes how to define this rapidly developing policy area, and in so
doing, considering which issues are most appropriately addressed at the federal
level versus at the state or local levels. This report has emphasized the federal
role because those topics are most relevant for Congress. As the report also
explains, states, localities, and territories are responsible for making many of
their own election security decisions—just as political campaigns, parties, and
PACs are responsible for their own security. Therefore, there are important
debates about what campaign and election security includes that the federal
government can influence, but that are primarily addressed below the federal
level, in the private sector, or both. Examples include, but are not limited to, how
election security might affect voter access, and vice versa; whether states require
voter identification at the polls and whether or to what extent alleged vote fraud
exists; how much and on what jurisdictions choose to spend available funds; and
whether states, localities, or political campaigns and parties have sufficient
resources to secure their elections or organizations.
Communication. Does Congress want to encourage or require additional
information sharing about campaign and election security matters between the
federal government and nonfederal elections agencies? Similarly, do state,
territorial, and local elections officials feel that they have or need clear points of
contact within federal agencies, and do they know which agencies to contact in
various circumstances? If it determines that the status quo is inadequate, does
Congress want to encourage or require different reporting protocols, agency
outreach, etc.?
Coordination. Various agencies have reported to Congress that they have
improved coordination among themselves, particularly through working groups
or task forces.73 Less clear, at least from publicly available information, is
73 For an overview, see, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Oversight of the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019, S. Hrg. 116-74 (Washington: GPO, 2019);
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Defending Our Democracy: Building Partnerships to Protect
America’s Elections, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial No. 116-1 (Washington: GPO, 2019); and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Securing U.S. Election
Infrastructure and Protecting Political Discourse, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial no. 116-28
(Washington: GPO, 2019). See also discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22, 2019, House
Judiciary Committee oversight hearing, “Security America’s Elections Part II: Oversight of Government Agencies.” As
of this writing, the hearing record does not appear to have been published. Video and written materials are available on
the committee website, https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-
government-agencies. See also, for example, Martin Matishak, “NSA, Cyber Command Reveal New Election Security
Task Force Leaders,” Politico Pro, November 7, 2019, accessed via CRS subscription.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 29
specifically how such coordination works and whether current coordinating
mechanisms are sufficient or whether agencies need additional resources or
mechanisms to improve coordination. If it determines that the status quo is
inadequate, does Congress want to exercise oversight in this area, provide
additional information-sharing authorities, funding, etc., or does it consider
current coordination authorities and mechanisms sufficient?
Sectors. Much of the federal government’s attention to campaign and election
security appears to emphasize outreach to election administrators in states,
territories, and localities. With respect to the private sector (such as political
campaigns and equipment manufacturers), is federal agency support sufficient?
To what extent are information-sharing practices among federal agencies and the
private sector (or voters) similar to or different from those that shape
communication between federal agencies and state, territorial, or local
governments? If it determines that the status quo is inadequate, does Congress
want to encourage or require additional federal agency support for
nongovernmental entities in campaign and election security, or reporting
requirements for those entities to the federal government?
Voters. Some federal public education campaigns, such as those to counter
disinformation in elections, are aimed at individual voters. Overall, however,
much of the federal role in campaign and election security emphasizes
communication among government agencies or, in some cases, the private sector.
If it determines that the status quo is inadequate, does Congress want to task
federal agencies—and if so, which ones—with additional responsibility for
educating voters about campaign and election security; to provide funding for
nongovernmental organizations to do so, etc.?
The scope of potential campaign and election security threats, and the federal government’s role
in responding to those threats, has changed substantially in less than five years. The foreign
interference revealed during the 2016 cycle—and widely reported to be an ongoing threat—has
renewed congressional attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions.
Whatever Congress determines about whether these or other questions are relevant for its
consideration of campaign and election security policy, the issue is likely to remain prominent for
the foreseeable future.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 30
Appendix. Legislation Related to Campaign and
Election Security That Has Advanced Beyond
Introduction, 116th Congress
See the “Scope of the Report” section for additional detail.
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
H.R. 1 Sarbanes For the People
Act of 2019
House
Administration;
Intelligence;
Judiciary;
Oversight and
Reform;
Science, Space,
and
Technology;
Education and
Labor; Ways
and Means;
Financial
Services; Ethics;
Homeland
Security
Codify DHS “critical
infrastructure”
designation; authorize
federal funding to assist
states to upgrade election
equipment or otherwise
enhance security,
including by implementing
risk-limiting audits; include
electronic poll books in
HAVA voting systems
standards; require paper
ballots in federal elections;
require election-threat
reports among federal and
state governments;
require developing a
national strategy to
safeguard democratic
institutions; expedite
security clearances for
election officials; amend
FECA foreign national
prohibition to include
state and local ballot
initiatives; and require
FEC reporting to
Congress on foreign funds
in federal elections
Passed House
(234-193),
03/08/2019
H.R. 753 Castro Global
Electoral
Exchange Act
of 2019
Foreign Affairs Direct Secretary of State
to establish a Global
Electoral Exchange
Program to promote and
exchange international
best election practices
(including, among other
practices, cybersecurity;
transmitting results; data
transparency; election
dispute resolution)
Passed House
(voice vote),
05/20/2019
H.R. 1158 McCaul
Consolidated
Appropriations
Act, 2020
Appropriations In addition to providing
some relevant agency
appropriations,
appropriate funds (Title
V) to EAC for
disbursement to states to
Became P.L. 116-
93, 12/20/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 31
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
“improve the
administration of elections
for Federal office,
including to enhance
election technology and
make election security
improvements”
H.R. 2500 Smith
(WA)
National
Defense
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Year 2020
Armed Services
Among other provisions,
require DNI, in
consultation with FBI,
NSA, and CIA directors,
to report to Congress on
Russian
interference with
U.S. elections (§1240B)
Passed House
(220-197),
07/12/2019
See also S. 1790.
H.R. 2722 Lofgren Securing
America’s
Federal
Elections
(SAFE) Act
House
Administration;
Space, Science,
and
Technology
Among other provisions,
amend HAVA to
authorize grants to states
for upgrading election
equipment cybersecurity,
and risk-limiting audits;
require use of voter-
verified paper ballots;
specify ballot printing and
accessibility requirements;
and require states to
“seek to ensure” that
voting equipment is
manufactured in the
United States
Passed House
(225-184),
06/27/2019
H.R. 3351 Quigley Financial
Services and
General
Government
Appropriations
Act, 2020
Appropriations In addition to providing
some relevant agency
appropriations,
appropriate funds (Title
V) to EAC for
disbursement to obtain
“qualified” election
equipment (including
voter-verified paper audit
trail)
Passed House
(224-196),
06/26/2019
See also H.R.
1158.
H.R. 3494 Schiff Damon Paul
Nelson and
Matthew
Young Pollard
Intelligence
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Years 2018,
2019, and 2020
Intelligence Among other provisions,
require (Title XXV)
development of national
strategy for countering
Russian interference in
U.S. election; require DNI
designation of
counterintelligence officer
to
coordinate election
security
counterintelligence;
specify various reporting
and congressional briefing
requirements concerning
election interference
Passed House
(397-31),
07/17/2019
See also S. 1790.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 32
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
H.R. 3501 Engel Safeguard our
Elections and
Combat
Unlawful
Interference in
Our
Democracy
Act (SECURE
Our
Democracy
Act)
Foreign Affairs;
Judiciary;
Financial
Services
Impose financial and
immigration sanctions on
all foreign individuals who
have engaged in U.S.
election interference since
January 2015; State
Department would
identify individuals who
have engaged or assisted
in interference efforts to
appropriate congressional
committees
Foreign
Affairs
Committee
ordered to be
reported,
07/17/2019
H.R. 4617 Lofgren Stopping
Harmful
Interference in
Elections for a
Lasting
Democracy
Act (SHIELD
Act)
House
Administration;
Judiciary
Among other provisions,
require political
committees to report to
the FBI and FEC offered
or proposed
contributions,
coordination, or
collaboration with foreign
nationals; require political
committees to establish
foreign contact reporting
compliance system;
require FBI reporting to
Congress of foreign
interference; contains
Honest Ads Act
provisions extending
certain disclaimer
requirements to online
political advertising, and
requiring online platforms
to maintain publicly
available advertising data;
clarify various aspects of
FECA foreign-national
prohibition; require FEC
independent report on
“media literacy” and
“online political content”
consumption; amend
FECA foreign national
prohibition to include
providing or offering
nonpublic campaign
material; contains
Deceptive Practices and
Voter Intimidation
Prevention Act of 2019
provisions prohibiting
providing false elections
information or
interference with
registration; amend
Immigration and
Passed House
(227-181),
10/23/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 33
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
Nationality Act to
prohibit U.S. admission
for persons believed to
have interfered with
elections; require FEC to
notify states of foreign
national disinformation
campaigns; amend FECA
to prohibit “materially
deceptive media”
(including “deepfakes”) 60
days before elections,
unless media contains a
disclaimer noting such
manipulation
H.R. 4782 Thompson
(MS)
National
Commission
on Online
Platforms and
Homeland
Security Act
Homeland
Security;
Energy and
Commerce
Establish National
Commission on Online
Platforms and Homeland
Security to examine how
or whether online
platforms have been used
to promote violence,
terrorism, or foreign
influence campaigns
(including in elections);
require DHS Under
Secretary for Science and
Technology to conduct
research on such topics
Homeland
Security
Committee
ordered to be
reported,
10/23/2019
H.R. 4990 Sherrill Election
Technology
Research Act
of 2019
Science, Space,
and
Technology;
House
Administration
Direct NIST, in
collaboration with
National Science
Foundation, to carry out a
research program on
voting systems, including
cybersecurity, end-to-end
verifiable systems;
accessibility and human-
technology interface;
voter privacy and data
protections; and audit
methods; direct NIST, in
collaboration with the
EAC, to update the
HAVA voting system
certification process;
amend HAVA voting
systems definition to
include other elements of
election system; and for
other purposes.
Science, Space,
and Technology
Committee
ordered to be
reported,
11/14/2019
S. 482 Graham Defending
American
Security from
Kremlin
Foreign
Relations
Among other provisions,
prohibit damaging a
critical infrastructure
computer, including those
Reported,
12/18/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 34
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
Aggression Act
of 2019
(DASKA)
related to voter
registration and voting
machines; impose
immigration restrictions
and financial restrictions
for foreign interference in
U.S. elections; require
Secretary of State and
DNI to report to
Congress on Russian
election interference
S. 1060 Van Hollen Defending
Elections from
Threats by
Establishing
Redlines Act of
2019
Banking,
Housing, and
Urban Affairs
Among other provisions,
require regular federal
government assessments
of foreign interference in
U.S. elections, and require
imposing sanctions in such
cases
Hearing held,
07/18/2019
S. 1321 Blumenthal Defending the
Integrity of
Voting Systems
Act
Judiciary Amend Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA) to
add voting systems and
elections
Passed Senate
(unanimous
consent),
07/17/2019
S. 1328 Durbin Defending
Elections
against Trolls
from Enemy
Regimes
(DETER) Act
Judiciary Designate foreign persons
as ineligible for entry to
the United States, or
subject to deportation, if
those persons are
believed to have
interfered with U.S.
elections or to be seeking
entry to interfere in U.S.
elections
Passed Senate
(unanimous
consent),
06/03/2019
S. 1589 Burr Damon Paul
Nelson and
Matthew
Young Pollard
Intelligence
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Years 2018,
2019, and 2020
Intelligence Require (Title IV)
assessments by DNI of
foreign interference in
elections (§ 408) and
(Title V) reports to
Congress from (1) Under
Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence
and Analysis on
cyberattacks on election
infrastructure during 2016
U.S. presidential election
foreign interference and
anticipated future attacks
(§ 501); (2) DNI on
Intelligence Community
posture and analytical
capabilities during 2016
election interference
(§502); (3) and DNI, in
consultation with various
other agency heads, pre-
Reported (S.Rept.
116-47),
06/11/2019
See also S. 1790.
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 35
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
election foreign
intelligence threats (§503);
DNI, in consultation with
various other agency
heads, on Russian
influence campaigns
directed at non-U.S.
elections (§505); require
DNI, in consultation with
various other agency
heads, to develop “whole-
of-government” strategy
for protecting U.S.
“electoral systems and
processes” from Russian
interference (§504);
require DNI in
consultation with various
other agency heads, to
make publicly available
pre-election reports on
counterintelligence and
cyber threats to federal
campaigns (§506); require
DNI to assist DHS in
providing security
clearances and share
information with state
election officials (§507);
require DNI, FBI
Director, and Secretary of
Homeland Security to
brief Congress if they
jointly determine that
“significant cyber intrusion
or active measures
campaigns” intended to
influence federal elections
(§508); require DNI
designation of
counterintelligence officer
to coordinate election
security
counterintelligence (§509)
S. 1790 Inhofe National
Defense
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Year 2020
Armed Services Among other provisions,
require reports to
Congress from (1) Under
Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence
and Analysis on
cyberattacks on election
infrastructure during 2016
U.S. presidential election
foreign interference and
anticipated future attacks
(§6501); (2) DNI on
Became P.L. 116-
92, 12/20/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 36
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
Intelligence Community
posture and analytical
capabilities during 2016
election interference
(§6502); (3) DNI, in
consultation with various
other agency heads, on
pre-election foreign
intelligence threats
(§6503); and DNI in
consultation with various
other agency heads, on
Russian influence
campaigns directed at
non-U.S. elections
(§6505); require DNI, in
consultation with various
other agency heads, to
develop “whole-of-
government” strategy for
protecting U.S. “electoral
systems and processes”
from Russian interference
(§6504); require DNI to
assist DHS in providing
security clearances and
share information with
state election officials
(§6506); require DNI, FBI
Director, and Secretary of
Homeland Security to
brief Congress if they
jointly determine that
“significant cyber intrusion
or active measures
campaigns” intended to
influence federal elections
(§6507); require DNI
designation of
counterintelligence officer
within National
Counterintelligence and
Security Center to
coordinate election
security
counterintelligence
(§6508)
S. 1846 Peters State and Local
Government
Cybersecurity
Act of 2019
Homeland
Security and
Governmental
Affairs
Among other provisions,
add “entit[ies]” that
collaborate with state and
local “election officials” as
permissible participants in
DHS National
Cybersecurity and
Counterintelligence
Center (NCCIC)
Passed Senate
(unanimous
consent),
11/21/2019
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service 37
Bill
Number Sponsor Short Title
Committee
Referral
Brief Summary of
Security-Related
Provisions
Latest Major
Action
S. 2065 Portman Deepfake
Report Act of
2019
Homeland
Security and
Governmental
Affairs
Require reports from
Secretary of Homeland
Security about the state of
“digital content forgery
technology”
Passed Senate
(unanimous
consent),
10/24/2019
S. 2524 Kennedy Financial
Services and
General
Government
Appropriations
Act, 2020
Appropriations In addition to providing
some relevant agency
appropriations,
appropriate funds (Title
V) to EAC for
disbursement to states to
“improve the
administration of elections
for Federal office,
including to enhance
election technology and
make election security
improvements”
Reported (S.Rept.
116-111,
09/19/2019)
See also H.R.
1158.
Source: CRS analysis of bill texts.
Notes: Bills in the table specifically reference campaigns or elections and security. Other legislation not included
in the table could be relevant for campaign or election security once implemented or in practice. See the “Scope
of the Report” section for additional detail. The table excludes resolutions (e.g., proposed constitutional
amendments) and routine appropriations bills that propose funding for agencies such as the Election Assistance
Commission or Federal Election Commission, unless the appropriations bill also contains additional provisions
specifically addressing campaign and election security.
Author Information
R. Sam Garrett, Coordinator
Specialist in American National Government
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American National Government
Sarah J. Eckman
Analyst in American National Government
Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress
Congressional Research Service R46146 · VERSION 1 · NEW 38
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
- 2020-01-02T17:13:54-0500
POLICY STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS TOOL
POLICY STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS TOOL
This tool is used to focus on one specific issue. It is best used when stakeholders from different sectors are brought together to conduct a more comprehensive analysis.
Policy issue: __________________________________________________________________________________
Organization/ Group/Individual
Group or individual’s vested interest in the policy issue
Level of Knowledge about the issue
(Enter Low, Medium or High)
Resources Available
Resource
Mobilization
Capacity
(Enter Low, Medium or High)
Position
On Issue
Enter one rating only. If not known, enter DK.
Complete name of the organization or group. Please indicate if it is a national, regional or oblast/local group.
Identify reason or nature of group’s or individual’s interest in the issue.
Indicate the level of knowledge of the group about the issue
Identify specific resources held by group or to which it has access. (Resources include staff and volunteers, financial, technology, information, legal, religious/moral or others)
Estimate of which and how easily groups can mobilize resources in pursuit of objectives.
Support
+3 Very strong support
+2 Moderate support
+
1
Weak support
Neutral
Enter 0
Oppose
-3 Very strong opposition
-2 Moderately opposed
-1 Weakly opposed
Date:
�Adapted from Brinkerhoff, D. and B. Crosby, “Managing Policy Reform: Concepts and Tools for Decision-makers in Developing and Transitioning Countries”, Kumarian Press, CT, 2002 and POLICY, “Networking for Policy Change: An Advocacy Training Manual, 1999.
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