Response to discussion with 250 words
Response with 250 words each.
Response 1:
Intergovernmental organizations were created for the nations to follow rules, norms but mostly to keep the peace amongst the world of course I believe the IGOs were created for the nations to meet at a common ground. Implying that the nations have to be functional on their own and keep evolving with the rest of the powerful nations. The authors have an optimistic view and tried to explain the institutional independence is important for the nations, more or less independent institutions may be more or less effective at promoting various objectives, such as reducing conflict or facilitating trade (Yoram, Thompson, 270). From a different scope the nations have to see all of the issues they have to be aware of if they are going to be independent from the rest of the nations like security, human rights, environment among others.
Intergovernmental Organizations have to play nice with each other and interact often in order to successfully attain mutual interests. In other words, socialization is not only a process but also an outcome (Kent,344). This is proof that cooperation is possible when negativity is set aside. Existing patterns of behavior within the nations show that coercion does not work effectively when trying to work together to bring peace and security within nations. There are consequences for every action regardless what a nation contributes as a whole, everyone can suffer negative consequences as a result of the bad actions.
China as a growing power country has been enhanced and working with the international organizations has facilitated the participation in globalization and modernization. It doesn’t seem like China is going to stop any time soon, China still has considerable goals to surpass the other great nations but meanwhile they have to play nice with the other nations. Participation has had the effect of protecting and extending China’s sovereignty, protecting and enhancing its international status, maintaining its strategic independence, preserving an external environment conducive to its own developmental goals, and promoting internal development aims through foreign investment, expanded trade, technology transfer, and development assistance (Kent, 348).
Globalization amongst business expansions are rapidly increasing but I don’t agree that power is used and abused as the authors Grant and Keohane claim. The authors are expressing their thoughts through their conventional standpoint. There are standards yes but when it comes to accountability the nations have to be responsible and held accountable for keeping in touch with the rest of the leaders. There might be some communication problems with a few of the international organizations but don’t blame the rest of the organizations. Checks and balances are mechanisms designed to prevent action that oversteps legitimate boundaries by requiring the cooperation of actors with different institutional interests to produce an authoritative decision (Ruth, Keohane, 30). If there is no checks and balances present, there will be an abuse of power even though the nations try to enforce accountability it all depends on leadership keeping track. This always falls back on the leadership if they are ethical or not. Accountability is only one way of constraining power, that there are many forms of accountability that are not particularly unique to democracy; and that there are various ways of conveying of democratic accountability, including delegation models as well as participation models (Ruth, Keohane, 41).
Response 2:
I would argue, that Intergovernmental Organizations does, create a convergence of a state’s interests. In furtherance, the deeper the interaction between state representatives and IGO’s are, the greater the influence and convergence of state interests. In a better world, interest convergence would be a great way to simplify cultural differences. However, today it is primarily about economics. The relationship between Africa and China (FOCAC), is one example of how IGO’s create a convergence of state interests. By using the framework of the FCOAC, both parties have created a “diffusion of interest surrounding economics, technology, infrastructure, and international trade” (Omaruyi 2018). According to sources, the two have maintained this strong diplomatic relationship for more than 70 years (Omaruyi 2018). China has offered “trust” as a binding factor for maintaining these relations. Nonetheless, the matter of peace, security, and democracy is always a concern when it comes to converging interests.
Countries like Africa are known to have maintained different ideas, cultures, and interest outside of western rational. But recently, the pressure to assimilate into “new cultural norms” has created challenges on multiple levels. For many African nations, convergence of interests, has led to a shift in their own economic, political, and national interests. It seems the more power they relinquish to IGO’s, the less control the state has over any decision-making processes and voting systems. The weaker their national identity is, the more at risk they are to be occupied and dominated by other countries with their own political agendas. As such a fragile nation is forced to depend heartily on IGOs. In return, IGO’s are expected to maintain some form of neutrality within the decision- making process. Theoretically speaking the problem here is as such, “interest convergence suggest that subordinate groups will never have their differences fully recognized and embraced until the dominate group sees how those distinctions further their interests as well” (Regan 2017).
In this week’s reading from Journal of Conflict Resolution, the authors suggests that, “Most arguments regarding the ability of international organizations (IOs) to promote cooperation and mitigate conflict, rely on the implicit assumption that such institutions possess some independence from states, and yet the field has failed to conceptualize-let alone measure-this institutional characteristic” (Haftel and Thompson 2006).
When a state cooperates with, the agenda of IGO’s, their behavior is rewarded. Of course, the opposite happens if a state is non-compliant. This system can be rewarding when attempting to manage human rights issues. But it can become a hinderance, towards a state’s sovereignty. Theoretically speaking, “to be independent, in a political sense is to be not under the control of another,” which he characterizes as a state of “autonomy” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Convergence influences one’s behavior at the point of either “control” or “punishment.” Unfortunately, IGO’s are known to abuse their power, creating a murky view of human rights practice.
Yet, the concept of compliance has its limits. Apparently, IGO’s are only a powerful as the vices they are able to use. In fact, “in most cases these organizations are unable to offer as rich a package of benefits to prospective members (and therefore have less potential to induce changes in states’ behavior)” (Greenhill 2005).
According to this week’s studies, Socialization is “the transmission or diffusion of rules and norms throughout states” (AMU, 2020). Today’s scholars often debate as to whether or not, states are influenced by the manner in which, various IO’s, IGO’s or NGO’s conduct business and issue regulations. Intergovernmental organizations include; NATO, the European Union, the World’s Health Organization, and many other entities. Based on various studies, I would undoubtedly argue that, almost all foreign entities like IGO’s either, directly or indirectly influence a state’s behavior.
Perhaps no greater expression of this is found than in the title of Greenhill’s review, identified as, The Company we keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms. Even today we live in a society whereas individuals are judged by the company they keep. If one keeps good company, then the influence is usually the same. On the contrary, if a person or group keeps bad company, then results can lead to, disastrous consequences. A wise man once said, “A mirror reflects a man’s face, but what he is really like is shown by the kind of friends he chooses”-Colin Powell. Nonetheless, “a new line of research on the possibility that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can change state behavior through a process of socialization calls for a more optimistic assessment of the effects of participation in international institutions” (Greenhill 2010).
Based on “cross-national data on abuses of “physical integrity rights for 137 countries over the period of 1982-2000; I would also argue that, “IGOs can promote the diffusion of human rights norms by providing venues for interstate socialization” (Greenhill 2010, p.1) This data suggests a robust amount of cooperation between States and IGO’s over an 18 year period. Not only does this influential process of socialization deeply impact the norms, and create a greater “convergence amongst states, but it also has the ability to negatively impact the states “human rights practices” (Greenhill, 2010, p.1). In fact, “some studies have even suggested that states’ commitment to international human rights treaties tends to be associated with worse levels of human rights behavior than would otherwise be expected” (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).
However, Greenhill isn’t convinced that these studies encompass the full picture. Instead, the author insists socialization amongst IGO’s and States are quite advantageous. Greenhill argues that through a system of punishment, IGO’s can help protect human rights. Reprimands, are issued in the form of sanctions, and other vices. In furtherance, the author believes, “States can in this sense be modeled as rational actors that carefully weigh the benefits of acquiring new or continuing IGO memberships against the domestic political costs of implementing the required human rights improvements” (Greenhill 2010). At this point, I would part from the author’s viewpoint. Given my own analysis of Colonized states (Africa in particular), I remain deeply skeptical of this form of cooperation. Just because IGO’s are empowered with the ability to discipline, doesn’t always mean states will always behave. In fact, states tend to lose interest in the relationship established by the IGO. According to source,
Quite naturally, in the goodness of humanity we always hope that IGO’s maintain the interest of the state in which they themselves represent. However, this week’s research clearly demonstrates the limitations of IGO’s to affect positive change, primarily because of political agendas. Perhaps even more concerning are studies that suggests “that states’ commitment to international human rights treaties tends to be associated with worse levels of human rights behavior than would otherwise be expected” (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Creating a convergence of state interests, is what makes the topic of “accountability” so widely used in our society today.
In most cases there appears to be little to no accountability amongst states. I.O’s abuse their rights to properly govern states in many ways, including delegation and participation. In participation, actors are, “affected by their actions, but under delegation, the principal agents or “power-wielders utilize their power to create policies of self-interest, further impacting states. In many cases the policies enacted by I. O’s, restrict the states behavior. In fact, organizations like the WTO, “issues rulings binding on states, which must often, in order to comply, enact or alter domestic laws or regulations applying to firms and their transactions” (Grant & Keohane 2005, p.35). On the one hand states are coaxed into participating on the world stage for their own interest, while on the other, they are really just serving as pawns in someone else’s game. In most cases the latter applies. In support of this we reflect on The American Political Science Review, Accordingly,
“The prevailing view in the international relations literature of multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), is that these entities are weak relative to states. But critics of globalization view such organizations as relatively uncontrolled, criticizing them as “unaccountable” while celebrating the democratic accountability of states” (Dahl 1999).
In order for International Organizations to foster accountability amongst states, they themselves must be held to responsible standards. Instead the same actors imposing sanctions and judging states for not fulfilling their responsibilities, are often more une