Power and Influence
Assignment: We discussed that “Leadership is the process of influencing people…” While influence might be the essence of leadership, it is not the start point. It all begins with power, the capacity an individual has to influence the attitude or behavior of others. When analyzing the application of power to gain commitment an individual must consider these areas;
- The sources of power (position and personal) within an organization;
- The correlation of power (position and personal) to compliance and commitment;
- The role of influence tactics (techniques) in achieving compliance and commitment;
- The use of emotional intelligence in influencing others; and
- Leadership Styles
Topic: Describe the relationship of power and influence in gaining organizational commitment. Your response should incorporate all elements of the “Big Six” as discussed in your readings (L201). Provide an example to support your response.
Instructions: Post a substantial essay response, with at least 3 cited sources and a minimum of 400 words, to the topic above.
L201 Reading B 1
US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY
Sergeants Major Course (SMC)
L200: Developing Organizations and Leaders
Lesson Plan for L201
Organizational Power and Influence
Reading L201RB
Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down?1
The vast, empty foyer of the American Red Cross’s stately headquarters in Washington seemed as
remote from ground zero as white marble from rubble. That was my inescapable, if facile, thought as I
glided up the Tara-like central staircase one morning in early November. The holy hush was misleading,
though. It gave no hint of the passionate, even viperous intrigue that was playing out behind closed
doors. At a moment when the Red Cross was supposed to be absorbed with ministering to a nation in
crisis, it was confronting an internal crisis of its own making.
It had been just over a week since Dr. Bernadine Healy, 57, had announced her resignation under
pressure as Red Cross president. I sat waiting for her in the president’s office wing, which was still her
domain but increasingly provided her little sanctuary. Healy, baldly showcasing her impatience toward
Red Cross sanctities about tradition, had long displayed a saying attributed to Clara Barton above the
mantle: ”It irritates me to be told how things have always been done. . . . I defy the tyranny of precedent.”
Sweeping into the room, Healy sank into a cranberry-colored chair and exhaled. Healy is a fine-
boned, exquisitely tailored woman who, with her crisp blond coif and colorful blazers, looked more like
the Republican senator she once aspired to be than a cardiologist who ran a humanitarian organization.
That day, she was showing the jittery strain of the previous two months, in which she first commanded a
huge disaster-relief effort and then suffered the humiliation of rejection by the Red Cross’s 50-member
board of governors. Under her severance agreement, Healy was supposed to stay on through year’s end
while the general counsel, Harold J. Decker, took over as acting C.E.O. But it was already getting pretty
uncomfortable.
”I can’t believe it,” she said, a great sigh collapsing her small frame. ”They’ve just fired my chief of
staff. Poor Kate. They gave her a few hours to pack up and be gone. They want to get rid of us that
badly?” Over the next couple of hours, there were many knocks at the door and sniffles outside it as
Healy’s assistants were reassigned, a first step toward their eventual firing. Healy, who had spent the
previous day at a grueling Congressional subcommittee hearing, was agitated. She believed that the Red
Cross might be seeking to deflect criticism — and avoid self-criticism — by scapegoating her. She could
feel it coming, she said. The board was going to reverse course and blame unpopular decisions on her.
Healy decided that day to pack up her office and return to her Ohio home as soon as possible.
It was a terribly intimate moment to observe, and Healy later said that she regretted I had been there.
Her eyes watery, Healy had stared at a portrait of Barton, her heroine, who founded the American Red
Cross in 1881. ”You know Clara Barton was fired, too,” she said, coughing up a dry laugh. ”The
difference is, she lasted 20 some years and I only lasted two. They got her on a trumped-up charge that
she used lumber left over from a disaster recovery program in her home. It tarnished her reputation,
although history ultimately redeemed her.” Healy paused, hearing herself. ”Not that I’m Clara Barton.”
She shook her head and rolled her eyes. ”Far from it.”
The Red Cross has come a long way since Barton established it ”to afford ready succor and assistance
1 By Deborah Sontag and reproduced by permission and may not be further reproduced – New York Times Magazine – 23 December 2001
L201 Reading B 2
to sufferers in time of national or widespread calamities.” It now generates about $3 billion in revenues a
year as a quasi-governmental bureaucracy with a split personality. On the one hand, it is what Barton
intended, a nonprofit disaster-relief organization, and that chapter-based service side gives the Red Cross
its identity as an icon of volunteerism. But the Red Cross is also a blood business, which after a history of
indebtedness and regulatory troubles has come to operate like a centralized corporation. Tensions between
the two sides are echoed in other turf battles: between the 1,034 local chapters and the national
headquarters, between veterans who believe their ”mission” is good deeds and newcomers who believe
theirs is good management and between the president and a board so big that Decker said his first
impression was ”politburo.”
In a confidential memo to the board in late October, Healy bitterly described how the organization’s
internecine dynamic was summed up for her by another executive when she arrived in September 1999:
”Red Crossers will give you the shirt off their back, but will as easily put a knife in your back.”
All this makes the Red Cross a difficult, unwieldy institution to head. Since 1989, there have been
three leaders and four interim leaders, counting Decker. Healy succeeded Elizabeth Dole, the first female
president since Clara Barton. Dole spent much of the 1990’s at the helm, taking a year off when her
husband ran for president, then returning and eventually leaving to prepare her own presidential bid. The
Red Cross board chairman, David T. McLaughlin, said that Dole’s departure was ”not terribly dissimilar”
from Healy’s. Dole ”got out ahead of the game and stepped down,” he said, ”but she, too, left under some
pressure,” the result of combustible internal politics. Unlike Dole, McLaughlin said, Healy ”more than
brought on” her own departure, but both women were ”fighting a culture, a culture that had grown up over
a long period of time.”
In two years on the job, the biggest disasters under Healy’s watch as Red Cross president were
Hurricane Floyd and Tropical Storm Allison. On Sept. 11, she stood outside on the headquarters’ marble
steps as snipers positioned themselves on the White House roof and, in the distance, smoke rose in
blankets from the Pentagon. She knew in her gut that the day would have serious consequences for the
organization that she commanded and for her personally.
McLaughlin would say later that Healy, the first physician-president of the organization, went at the
initial Sept. 11 response ”very clinically, and I have to say not emotionally. She was totally in action, on
point.” That intensity of focus, however, was not a quality of Healy’s that was roundly admired within the
Red Cross. Some thought her too driven and steely for an organization that they considered an affair of
the heart. The previous Red Cross president, they say, had more of a politician’s human touch. ”Elizabeth
Dole would notice the pin you were wearing, and Dr. Healy would notice the stain on your jacket,” the
director of one chapter said. ”Dr. Healy was not people-oriented, and the Red Cross is all about people.”
That day, however, the Red Cross had to be all about performance. And Healy found what she
considered a serious wrinkle in an operation otherwise shifting into high gear efficiently. At noon, Healy’s
office received a call from the Pentagon: ”Where the hell are you guys? Where’s the Red Cross?” The
Pentagon requested ”water, food and other things we typically provide,” according to an internal memo.
Charles DeVita, the organization’s security chief, placed a puzzled call of inquiry on Healy’s behalf to the
Disaster Operations Center, a corporate-style bunker known as the DOC, which is the Virginia-based
command center for all disasters. The DOC was run by two women with 60 years of experience between
them. They resented DeVita’s phone call, a colleague of theirs told me: DeVita was a former assistant
Secret Service director whom Healy had recruited just last year. What did the two of them know about
activating the DOC?
roy.d.middlebrook
Sticky Note
This is a good paragraph to discuss!
L201 Reading B 3
That evening, Healy, believing the problem resolved, took a police escort to the site. She arrived at a
scene of breathtaking devastation, with an army of firefighters ”doing everything possible” to battle the
blazing building. She saw ”the Sallies,” as the Salvation Army is called in charity circles, out in full force.
But, to echo the caller from the Pentagon, where the hell was the Red Cross?
Healy expected to find the specialized teams usually dispatched by the DOC after plane crashes.
Instead she found only four volunteers from the small, local Arlington County chapter — bless their
hearts” — earnestly trying to provide assistance to hundreds of emergency workers. There was no E.R.V.,
or emergency response vehicle, because Arlington’s was in the shop. They didn’t have any cots, so some
firefighters were stretched out on the ground. Stunned, Healy punched out the phone number of a senior
administrator who oversaw the two women at the DOC. She suggested the administrator report
immediately to the scene, ”get down on his knees and pray to God for forgiveness that we’re not here.”
Over the next week, Healy also stumbled on other serious problems that originated in the DOC — a
failure to dispatch chaplains to the Pennsylvania crash site and a failure to realize that a confidential
database of hospitalized victims existed. And by the professional standards of Healy and her executive
team, the problems demanded a swift, sure response: the two women had to go. Although it was not
Healy who actually fired the women, she was held responsible by many for what was seen as a
coldhearted, ill-timed attack on two women who meant well. Adding a touch of melodrama, one of the
women collapsed after she was dismissed and ended up in an intensive-care unit. All told, the incidents
served to accelerate opposition to Healy.
Some of the reaction was anxiety. ”We’re all afraid for our jobs,” one senior official at the DOC wrote
in an e-mail message that ended up circulating widely through the Red Cross’s quite gossipy e-mail
system. Some of it was resentment. ”We have been silent up to now, but the deeply disturbing news of Dr.
Healy firing two of our top people in Disaster Services is just too much,” one couple, former co-
chairpeople of the volunteer system, wrote in another e-mail message. Referring to themselves as
previous victims of Healy’s, they asked: ”Why isn’t the board of governors doing something about her?”
Well before Sept. 11, some Red Cross governors were growing uncomfortable with what they told
Healy in her July evaluation was her hard-charging style. She had been encountering mounting resistance
from the chapters too. The chapters had always operated pretty autonomously. They did not like it when
Healy, who was aghast to learn how much of their financial reporting to headquarters was voluntary,
sought to oversee them more closely. Although the Red Cross is effectively a public trust, it has never
been a particularly transparent organization, not even internally.
Some chapter directors opposed her oversight for philosophical reasons; they feared that it
represented the first steps toward centralization in an organization that should belong to the grass roots.
Others didn’t want Big Brother peering into their affairs. Or streamlining the chapter system in a way that
would reduce their power or cut jobs. And then there were those with something to hide, like the
administrator in Jersey City.
Healy thinks that her downfall probably began, improbably, right there in Jersey City when all these
tensions exploded. An audit of the small, poor Hudson County, N.J., chapter had uncovered irregularities,
suggesting embezzlement by the director; he was a longtime Red Crosser who apparently had treated his
fief as a personal charity ward. Healy was horrified, suspended the man and his bookkeeper without pay
and hired an outside firm to do a forensic audit. The auditors found what appeared to be significant theft,
and the Red Cross turned the matter over to the local prosecutor’s office. In mid-December, a grand jury
handed up indictments of Joseph Lecowich, the director, and Catalina Escoto, the bookkeeper, on charges
L201 Reading B 4
of stealing $1 million in Red Cross funds.
The fact that Healy’s suspicions were proved right in the end did not matter. Several board members
and veteran administrators thought that she should have suspended the employees with pay, and they
objected to involving external auditors. During her July evaluation, some members criticized her for being
”too fast and too tough” in Jersey City. She asked them, ”What should I have been, too soft and too slow?”
And they said, ”See, you’re too defensive.”
When the Red Cross board hired Healy, a Harvard Medical School graduate and mother of two
daughters, ages 15 and 22, it understood exactly whom it was getting. From her stints as the first female
director of the National Institutes of Health and as dean of the Ohio State University medical school, she
had an established track record. A blunt-talking New Yorker born and bred in working-class Queens, she
was not known as a diplomat. Rather, she was known as a driven professional who ruffled feathers but
made things happen.
Dimon R. McFerson, then the C.E.O. of Nationwide, was the Red Cross governor who oversaw the
1999 search. He said that Healy was selected because she was the best candidate and that he would make
the same choice again now. The board was unconcerned about Healy’s ”head-on style,” he said, although
in retrospect it seems inevitable that the board and Healy would end up on a collision course. ”We hired a
change agent for a culture resistant to change,” one board member said.
Under the Red Cross’s Congressionally established charter, seven of its 50 board members are senior
government officials, like cabinet secretaries, who almost never participate. Another 12 are corporate,
business and academic leaders who are not Red Cross lifers. Neither is McLaughlin; he is a former
chairman of CBS, president of Dartmouth College and president of the Aspen Institute who, like his
predecessors, was appointed Red Cross chairman by the president of the United States.
The remaining 30 governors, who are selected by local Red Cross chapters through a competitive
nomination process, really control the organization. They tend to be lifelong Red Crossers who have
worked their way up from local to national prominence within the organization; they also tend to be
protective of traditions — and of veteran employees with whom they have longstanding relationships. Not
all of them, McLaughlin said, straining to be diplomatic, ”possess strong governmental or financial or
programmatic experience on top of their incredible loyalty to the Red Cross.” But because they are willing
to give so much of their time, many of them end up presiding over the board’s internal committees — for
as long as six years — and those committee chairmen dominate the executive committee whose decisions
tend to be rubber-stamped by the full board.
During the year that Dole took a sabbatical, the executive committee started playing a more hands-on
role, and quickly took to it. When Dole returned, according to many Red Crossers, she did not exercise
the same strong leadership she had previously. (Dole did not return several calls to her Washington
office.) Then, during the year between Dole and Healy, there was another interim president. And so by
the time Healy arrived, the board was acting like a hydra-headed C.E.O., ”overstepping its role and
authority,” McLaughlin, who took over last May, said.
”I tried to pull them back,” he added. ”I tried to help her.”
The board hired Healy at the hefty salary of $400,000, twice what Dole made, because that was
Healy’s value in the marketplace. According to McFerson, the board was attracted to Healy’s medical
background and the fact that she ”knew blood,” since ”blood was the area that needed the most attention.”
L201 Reading B 5
The board’s sole concern was that Healy was coming off ”a medical challenge,” as McFerson put it. She
had just recovered from a brain tumor.
When the tumor was diagnosed, Healy told me, she had, in true medical-drama style, been given three
months to live. Her unexpected recovery played a role in her decision to take the Red Cross job. In her
grateful, post-illness state of mind, she was drawn to the chance to ”do good.” And in a way, some Red
Cross veterans were a bit taken aback by Healy’s insta-passion about the Red Cross itself. She was an
outsider with the zeal of an insider; she came on so strong and fast with designs for the organization’s
”greatness” that some grew suspicious that Healy, who had waged a failed campaign for the United States
Senate in Ohio, was motivated more by personal ambition.
It wasn’t long after Healy moved to Washington from her home in Ohio, where her husband, Dr.
Floyd Loop, runs the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, that she realized she would be butting heads with the
board.
”She was an entrepreneur, and entrepreneurs don’t like boards or controls,” McLaughlin said. ”She
kept getting out ahead of the board, and the board was chasing after her. In hindsight, her decisions were
right. But her personal style was uneven.”
Healy, in turn, did not like what she found organizationally. In a confidential memo that she sent the
board shortly before her resignation, Healy laid out a withering analysis of the Red Cross that she had
inherited. She described ”a corporate culture steeped in silos, turf battles, gossip and very little teamwork.
Management structure was almost militaristic . . . [but] unlike the military, there were few commonly
understood performance measures, and almost no system of reward or consequences for performance.”
On the ”Blood Side” of the Red Cross, which outsiders know so little about, such a corporate culture
was not only costly but also potentially dangerous. The Red Cross began ”sticking” people on a large
scale during World War II, when it was called on to provide blood for soldiers. Now, the Red Cross
collects blood donations at thousands of sites, tests and processes the blood at its regional plants and then
sells the blood products — red blood cells, platelets and plasma — to hospitals. It is an almost $2 billion a
year industry. But for years, Red Cross officials say, they underpriced their blood, thinking of themselves
as a charity. With that mind-set, they went deeper and deeper into debt, underpaying employees and
ignoring infrastructure and quality controls.
Food and Drug Administration inspectors found egregious problems: some Red Cross blood centers
would keep testing blood until the tests delivered the desired results; for instance, blood that tested
borderline-positive for a given virus would be retested five or six times until the numbers came out
negative. ”That was a huge issue,” said Dr. Jerry E. Squires, the chief scientific officer of the Red Cross.
In 1993, after eight years of listening to the Red Cross promise to reform, the F.D.A. obtained a court-
supervised consent decree, forcing the organization to improve its practices to ensure the safety of the
national blood supply — 45 percent of which is provided by the Red Cross.
Dole oversaw an administrative and financial ”divorce” of blood from the chapters and centralized it
so that it would operate more like a business. It was such a radical overhaul that the Red Cross was
”declaring victory long before we should have,” McLaughlin said. Even though the Atlanta blood center
had just been cited for multiple violations, the violations did not seem to Red Cross executives as ”critical
or dangerous” as the ones from previous years, a senior official said. So when Healy took over, the board
told her that the organization’s battle with the F.D.A. was nearing resolution and that Atlanta was an
L201 Reading B 6
isolated case.
After Healy had been on the job five months, however, F.D.A. inspectors paid an unexpected visit to
national headquarters. They stayed almost two months. In the end, they delivered a 21-page notice listing
all the violations at headquarters itself. These included inadequate ”tracking of inventory”: pints of blood
that were supposed to be quarantined because of their donors’ medical histories ended up released for
distribution. There were also labeling problems: blood testing positive for cytomegalovirus (CMV), for
instance, was labeled negative.
Healy was ”stunned,” she told a senior F.D.A. official. Subsequently, in a meeting with F.D.A.
officials, Healy candidly acknowledged widespread ”infrastructure, quality and auditor problems,”
including a headquarters computer system that periodically ”lost functionality,” according to an affidavit
in the court file. Healy also said that some Red Cross staff members treated the F.D.A.’s demands with a
”willful lack of urgency.”
In her meeting with the F.D.A., Healy said she found that some Red Cross officials possessed a
startling ”lack of concern for patients.” The F.D.A. wanted the Red Cross to move from an ”ear stick” to a
”finger stick” method of drawing blood for testing, for instance; the ear-stick method often overestimated
the blood count, deeming some with low blood counts eligible for donation. ”In one instance in the past,
this caused a perfectly healthy donor to require an emergency blood transfusion hours later,” Healy wrote
in a memo, adding that the reason the Red Cross was resisting the change was that it would decrease
blood collections by 5 to 6 percent.
”Although the blood supply was safe,” Healy wrote in her memo, ”the near misses that had occurred
presented a clear risk for the future.” The gravity of the findings propelled the board to set aside $100
million to upgrade the blood business. Healy hired several high-profile executives to oversee the process.
One new executive was Decker, who had been associate general counsel at Pharmacia. He and others
moved quickly into positions of power within the organization, which some veteran Red Crossers found
threatening, although in fairness, Healy was promoting insiders too. Would the Red Cross be overtaken
by bloodless professionalism?
McLaughlin said that he considered Healy’s ”brilliant” hires to be her legacy, ensuring a solid future
for the American Red Cross — if the individuals stay. The F.D.A., however, is dubious about the Red
Cross’s ability to follow through on its intended reforms. Despite Healy’s concern and investment of time,
money and personnel, the F.D.A. also found serious problems under her watch, citing the troubled Salt
Lake City blood center for multiple violations last spring. In mid-December, the F.D.A. for the first time
asked a judge to hold the Red Cross in contempt of the 1993 consent decree and to authorize serious
financial penalties — $10,000 a day per violation, which could amount to more than $10 million a year.
In the days after Sept. 11, Healy oversaw the transformation of the Red Cross’s austere headquarters
into what looked like the stage set for a field hospital. Medical technicians were stationed at gurneys
beneath stained-glass windows, drawing blood in assembly-line fashion. Outside in the garden, the Red
Cross choir performed ”God Bless America” and received a standing ovation from hundreds of
phlebotomists and donors. Healy found it moving. ”It was like a temple of healing and grieving,” she said.
At first, the Red Cross sought to impose a system on would-be donors, urging them to make
appointments to return as needs arose. But people would not be turned away. They wanted to wait in long
lines and give of their vital fluids. It was a spiritual thing, Healy said, and her intuition told her to respect
those feelings, even if it wasn’t the most logical way to proceed.
L201 Reading B 7
Over the following two weeks, the Red Cross’s three-day reserve of blood built to a 10-day reserve
because the demand was less than expected: there were relatively few wounded. Nonetheless, the Red
Cross continued to collect blood, having decided it should stockpile in anticipation of another attack or a
military deployment. Eventually, some red blood cells, which expire after 42 days, had to be thrown
away, which engendered considerable criticism of the Red Cross for being overzealous in its collections.
Healy shrugs this off: ”Look, the plasma was saved and frozen. People don’t realize that red blood cells
are perishable commodities. They expire. It happens. Better to have had too much than too little.”
It is that kind of crisp logic that Healy’s critics found off-putting — even when she was right and
especially when she displayed a certainty that she was right. It bothered the board again and again. She
would not walk them through the paces of her decision making; she didn’t like stupid questions; she
wanted action — yesterday. Then Healy, after taking insufficient time to explain herself, would end up
feeling misunderstood. It happened with her subordinates too.
On Sept. 13, for instance, Healy boarded an Amtrak train for New York. The head of Amtrak had lent
five mail cars to the Red Cross to transport supplies to the World Trade Center relief effort. Healy pushed
her subordinates to load up the cars by 11 a.m., which required working through the night. Some of the
workers thought her haste was excessive and that she simply wanted the glory of personally delivering the
goods. But she was unaware. She was elated as she watched the Red Cross executives on the train
working their cellphones, like Ramesh Thadani, her new ”C.E.O. of blood,” who was trying to line up
freezers for plasma. ”I was thinking, ‘Hey, we did it guys,”’ she told me wistfully. ”I didn’t know they were
irritated.”
That same week, Healy taped a first batch of solicitations for donations. Many Americans believed
that she was asking them to use the Red Cross as a conduit for cash assistance to the Sept. 11 victims
themselves. But she never said any such thing. Her appeals were vague, the essence of which was that
Americans should give of their blood and their dollars to help the American Red Cross provide
”lifesaving assistance.” ”Together, we can save a life,” each public service announcement ended.
Healy’s appeals were purposely general because the American Red Cross sees its role in a disaster as
broad. It is not a charity per se but a disaster-relief organization that sets up mess halls and respite centers
for emergency workers while providing food, comfort, counseling and safe haven for survivors and their
families. The Red Cross never solicits funds just for individual victims.
In fact, until Sept. 11, it had never solicited donations for individual disasters, either, but rather — and
this is mandated language — for this and other disasters.” Since the Red Cross can raise serious money
only in the wake of a high-profile disaster, it uses the high-profile disasters to beef up general disaster-
relief funds. That way, there is money in the pot to assist, as Decker puts it, ”the little old lady in
Philadelphia who loses her home to fire” — and to cover some of the operating expenses of the DOC.
This practice of the Red Cross has come under fire many times — after the San Francisco earthquake
of 1989, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, the Red River floods of 1997, the wildfires in the San
Diego area last January. Some communities just didn’t like the idea that the money being raised because
they suffered an earthquake, say, was going to be used elsewhere or tucked into the Red Cross’s coffers.
In several instances, the Red Cross ended up having to redirect funds back to disaster-struck communities
because the pressure grew too intense.
But the Red Cross stuck by its approach until Healy declared Sept. 11 an extraordinary disaster that
belonged in a class of its own. It didn’t make sense to her to treat Sept. 11 as if it were an earthquake.
L201 Reading B 8
Americans were responding quite specifically to the enormity of a terrorist attack. They were donating
buckets of money, over $600 million in the end, because she believed they were heartbroken and scared.
She thought that to commingle those emotions and those funds with the money set aside for more
plebeian disasters would never stand up to public scrutiny. Besides, she did not want huge sums of money
deposited in a general disaster-relief fund that is sometimes used as a ”piggy bank” for the chapters. So
she created a stand-alone fund for Sept. 11 and whatever might follow it. The Liberty Fund, with its own
team of 800 outside auditors, was born.
This set off alarms throughout the Red Cross system. What about the little old lady in Philadelphia?
Was Healy single-handedly changing a Red Cross commitment to equity for all victims? Was she making
Sept. 11 victims into a special class whose treatment would raise difficult demands from other disaster
victims down the road? Was she unwittingly creating public expectations that all money raised would go
to Sept. 11 victims?
Healy didn’t think she was creating such expectations, not among reasonable people. She didn’t call it
the Sept. 11 Fund, after all. And Healy said she felt that the Red Cross needed to plan ahead at the same
time as it dealt with the crisis of the moment creatively. So while she set up a cash gift program for
victims’ families, which was novel for the Red Cross, she also seized the opportunity to beef up some
expensive pet projects that had gained new urgency — like the weapons-of-mass-destruction-preparedness
program and the creation of a strategic reserve of frozen blood. She thought this was logical, but she
didn’t initially bother to explain herself to the American public. She didn’t even bother to explain herself
to the board, which turned out to be a fatal lapse. For while the governors ended up endorsing the Liberty
Fund, they were forced to do so after Healy had already made it a fait accompli. And they would never
forget that.
On Oct. 3, as if the Red Cross didn’t have enough to deal with, a board member from Louisiana
placed a big thorny issue on the table: Israel, or specifically the Israeli Red Shield of David, Israel’s
disaster-relief organization. The executive committee asked Healy to leave the room so that they could
discuss the matter freely. Members were concerned that she would stifle open discussion because of her
intense, domineering views on the subject.
The American Red Cross has long opposed the exclusion of Israel’s Red Shield of David, called
Magen David Adom (M.D.A.), from the international federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.
But Healy decided to give teeth to that quiet opposition. She believed that the international movement
needed to be prodded to clear the legal and diplomatic hurdles preventing it from accepting the Star of
David as an emblem. If the Geneva Convention — which recognizes only the cross and the crescent as
internationally protected symbols of humanitarian aid societies — needed to be amended, then amend it,
she believed. If not, then skirt it.
Two months after assuming command of the American Red Cross in September 1999, Healy flew to
Geneva to address a large assembly of the International Red Cross movement. And, in the eyes of
international officials, she charged in like a bull in a china shop.
”She comes in and makes a speech in which she harangues the assembled membership about the
inequity of the exclusion of M.D.A. and how the American Red Cross is going to make inclusion happen
now, whether we liked it or not,” said Christopher Lamb, an executive of the international federation.
”She spoke about the movement, describing everyone as cowards and failures and people who didn’t
understand.”
L201 Reading B 9
Healy nominated Lawrence Eagleburger, the former secretary of State, to the commission that
governs the international movement. After her speech, he lost the election. Officials in Geneva postulated
that Healy felt humiliated, which in turn fueled a redoubling of her commitment to Israel. But
Eagleburger, who went on to serve as her ambassador on the Israel issue, wrote in a Washington Post op-
ed column recently that Healy simply refused to turn ”a blind eye on a moral wrong.” And persuaded by
her passion, the American Red Cross board went right along with her. It agreed to start withholding its
$4.5 million annual dues to the international federation; that money is 25 percent of the federation
headquarters’ budget.
Officials in Geneva contend that they had been proceeding quietly, on a diplomatic track, to include
Israel since 1995. Yet just two months after the Americans began withholding their dues, there was
progress. An international working group decided the world needed a neutral emblem to stand alongside
the cross or crescent. Switzerland was laying the groundwork for a diplomatic conference when the latest
wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence broke out in September 2000, stalling things.
After Sept. 11 this year, a high-ranking official from Geneva flew to the United States to try to
persuade the American Red Cross to resume dues payments before the federation’s fall assembly. The
American policy was counterproductive, causing unhealthy tensions within the international movement,
he said. The board member from Louisiana was persuaded to reconsider, and so were others. They didn’t
like the idea that Healy was forcing the American Red Cross to take a strong political stance, because one
of its credos was neutrality.
In an Oct. 3 closed-door meeting, the executive committee voted 9 to 1 to second the Louisiana board
member’s motion to stop withholding dues. The vote was tentative, pending future discussions. But Healy
found out about the vote as the board members emerged from their session, considered it decisive and
exploded.
”I said, ‘This is not the time to do this,’ she told me. ”I said, ‘You can’t overturn this principle in a
secret proposal in a secret session. Deserting Israel right now — what’s the signal that you’re sending?’
They got mad at me. Later, they said I was insubordinate. It was all downhill from there.”
At about that time, Terry J. Sicilia, a chapter director in Denver, wrote a letter to a senior vice
president at headquarters to express his disappointment in Healy’s leadership since Sept. 11. He asked,
”Do you really feel the need to raise more money and blood?” He was concerned in part that the Sept. 11
fund-raising drive would make it more difficult for local chapters to raise money for their own needs.
Sicilia’s letter was leaked to the Chronicle of Philanthropy Web site, which is checked daily by those
in the charity world. It opened up the internal drama of the Red Cross to the public eye, and it helped
create a drumbeat against Healy.
Healy, however, was getting mixed signals from within the Red Cross. In mid-October, she received a
huge bouquet of flowers from the Watergate Florist with a card that read, ”Thank you for being a truly
great boss.” It was signed by 11 senior Red Cross executives, including Decker, ”and our 1.6 million
colleagues.” She placed the card on her mantel — and later gave it to me, saying, ”I don’t want this
anymore.” Shortly after getting the flowers, Healy received a standing ovation from Red Cross executives
who traveled to Washington to attend a weapons-of-mass-destruction-preparedness seminar. ”I could have
gotten a sunburn from all that warmth,” she said.
Nonetheless, after the firing of the DOC women, the creation of the Liberty Fund by fiat and the
L201 Reading B 10
blowup over the Israel issue, Healy’s departure was becoming inevitable. ”Bernadine brought discipline,
authority and accountability to the American Red Cross,” McLaughlin said. ”But every time she took a
strong position, a little more of her capital with the board was spent. At a certain point, you can’t recoup.”
On Tuesday, Oct. 23, the governors met to vote on whether they had confidence in Healy’s leadership.
Some sat in the board room in D.C.; others were piped in by speakerphone. In the end, six members voted
for Healy, three abstained and about 27 voted against her, according to McLaughlin. By that count, 14 of
the board members did not participate in the vote. Gloria White, a retired vice chancellor at Washington
University, was one of very few board members who spoke on the record about the decision. She gave me
a succinct statement about Healy: ”She was one of the finest leaders the Red Cross has ever had.” Then
she said: ”It will have to rest there. There’s nothing to be served by going beyond that. They have made
their decisions.”
McLaughlin said that he recommended that Healy’s departure be put off for six months, but that he
did not prevail. Three days later, McLaughlin and Healy appeared together publicly to announce her
resignation. Healy told me that McLaughlin wanted her to say that she was exhausted; as someone who
prides herself on her stamina, she bristled at the very notion. So instead, she and McLaughlin gave no
reason for her departure. Reporters were puzzled; they pushed Healy to explain why she was
”abandoning” the Red Cross. Healy, growing teary-eyed, said that she had no choice; she was forced out.
McLaughlin, sticking to the original script in which they were going to keep this fact hidden for the sake
of her dignity, then denied this. It was, she said later, the ”press conference from hell.”
A few days later, she wrote a letter to the board: ”Maybe you wanted more of a Mary Poppins and
less of a Jack Welch.”
Shortly after healy’s resignation, hundreds of Red Cross executives from around the country gathered
in an all-white ballroom on E Street NW in Washington for another ”W.M.D.,” or weapons-of-mass-
destruction workshop. This time, Healy was not invited. But her face stared up from the cover of The
Humanitarian magazine at every place setting. ”If they were trying to disappear her, they should have lost
the magazine,” one woman in a red jacket whispered. Her colleague pointed to a faux balcony hanging
over the ballroom, saying that he kept expecting Healy to appear. ”Don’t cry for me, disaster relief
workers,” someone joked.
The workshop did not impart a tremendous amount of new information. But it did serve unofficially
as a kind of pep rally for those who felt, in a nondenominational way, that they had been doing God’s
work since Sept. 11 and did not deserve to have their good intentions maligned. The public questioning of
the Red Cross had intensified in the wake of Healy’s departure, and while some in the room resented her
for that, most resented the ”negativity of the media” instead.
Barry White from South Carolina passed around a cartoon from The Oregonian that elicited groans
and ”darns!” The cartoon showed the Statue of Liberty lying on a cot waiting for blood as Dracula, on the
next bed, sucked from the donations. The blood bag was labeled ”Sept. 11th Aid,” and the vampire wore
the Red Cross logo on his chest.
There was an air of defiance — and denial — in the ballroom that day as national officials set out to
pump up spirits. Some sounded almost like preachers. ”Since Sept. 11, the network has been working in
miraculous ways,” an executive vice president told the crowd. He intoned a sacred tenet: ”As we all know,
we’re the first on the scene and the last to leave.” A Philadelphia chapter executive told a story about a
volunteer who ”forever changed” the life of a little boy, as ”Red Cross volunteers do again and again and
L201 Reading B 11
again.”
Only at the end of the day did some rise to interrupt the cheerleading, like a New Jersey executive
who began by suggesting that his colleagues realize the Red Cross is not ”omnipotent.” At this point, I
was hustled out of the room by a senior public-relations executive (who later left the Red Cross) so that
the assembled could have a ”free and open discussion.”
It had taken me weeks to penetrate the Red Cross, which seemed excessively skittish of observation,
much less of scrutiny. Eventually, McLaughlin intervened and got me into the ballroom that day and later
inside the Red Cross’s new, post-Sept. 11 call-in center outside Washington. In its nervousness about
media scrutiny of its troubles, the Red Cross had been hiding its assets too — people like Cyndi Sadler, a
volunteer from Louisiana who was, weirdly, sitting in a converted Levitz furniture store in suburban
Virginia fielding calls from World Trade Center widows.
As I approached, Sadler was signing off a call to New Jersey. ”I couldn’t get you off my mind all
weekend,” she said into the phone. ”It just breaks my heart for y’all.” Hanging up, Sadler shook her frosted
blond mane. ”She ended with ‘God bless you,”’ Sadler said. ”Now that’s some progress.”
”This case I’m working?” she continued, taking a swig of Diet Dr Pepper. ”The woman called
Saturday irate, and I mean, iiii-rate. She was going to call the press. She had lost her sister in the World
Trade Center, and she’d been trying to get benefits for her nephew. But somehow her paperwork got lost.
Just plain fell through the cracks. So I let her vent; I took her lashes. And before long, she was eating out
of my hands.”
Sadler has a big heart and an easy laugh, and she was like many of the Red Cross volunteers I met:
earnest and industrious and Middle American. The kind of person who will follow you into the ladies’
room to continue a conversation and talk right through the stall door. ”I think it’s awesome that we live in
a country like this, with a Red Cross to reach out,” she said. It was hard not to be touched by her and by
the massive display of volunteerism that she is part of, the people who didn’t know much of anything
about Healy or McLaughlin or the F.D.A. or the Liberty Fund. They just knew about giving three weeks
of their time when disaster struck and about how it made them feel queasy when the goodness of an
institution like the Red Cross was questioned.
I talked to Sadler the day after a grueling hearing in November, during which congressmen suggested
to Healy that the Red Cross was punch-drunk with donations and pig-headedly ignoring its donors’ desires
for all their money to go directly to the victims. Representative Peter Deutsch, Democrat of Florida, told
Healy, ”I don’t think anybody who wrote a check for the Red Cross expected it would be used for frozen
blood.”
At that point, the Red Cross was already doing a pretty good job of getting money directly to the
victims’ families — it had handed out emergency cash grants averaging $14,500 to 2,700 families — but it
was making mistakes, and the mistakes were highlighted during the hearing. Russa Steiner of New Hope,
Pa., the widow of a World Trade Center victim, had received only $1,244 for incidentals until her name
was put on the witness list for the hearing. That listing prompted the Red Cross to discover that Steiner
had ”fallen through the cracks.” Luis Garcia, manager of the gift program, told me later that Steiner’s
application had been approved but that a Red Cross worker had accidentally left the requisition for her
check inside her case file and closed it up. So just before the hearing began, the Red Cross hurriedly
handed her $27,000, which made the organization look bungling.
L201 Reading B 12
Healy’s testimony, a lame duck’s defense of an institution that had just thrown her out, was almost
painful to watch. Smiling through clenched teeth, she tried to explain why the Liberty Fund was never
meant solely for victims of Sept. 11. She talked about why she thought the Red Cross needed to be
girding itself for future terrorist acts. But her logic did not pierce the emotion in the room.
During the hearing, the Red Cross began receiving an onslaught of angry e-mail messages. Some
1,500 arrived between 6:30 p.m. and 8 a.m. the following day. A man named Philip wrote: ”I am
thoroughly disgusted and disappointed over your failing the families of victims from Sept. 11. I’ll never
contribute another penny or drop of blood.”
To McLaughlin and Decker, it was becoming clearer by the day that the Red Cross had to do
something. It could not simply lament that it was being misunderstood. It could not just say: ”Trust us.
We’re the disaster professionals.” That trust was shattered.
So the Red Cross backpedaled away from controversy as fast as it could. In a stunning reversal,
McLaughlin and Decker held a news conference in Washington on Nov. 14 — carried live by CNN — to
say that it would spend the entire Liberty Fund to care for the victims of the Sept. 11 attacks, their
families and the rescue workers. ”With this action, we hope to restore the faith of our donors and the trust
of the American public,” McLaughlin declared.
Two weeks earlier, McLaughlin had told me that Healy’s concept for the fund was ”just right.” In fact,
the Red Cross could have stuck by it, if it were not for its desire to repent. A senior official explained it to
me rather crudely, insisting it was ”moronic” to use the whole Liberty Fund as ”an A.T.M. machine for the
victims’ families.” Almost half of the fund was pledged by corporations, he said, and the corporations may
well have agreed to redirect their money toward, say, a blood reserve. This would have allowed the Red
Cross to respect the public’s desire to support the victims, and only the victims, while sticking to its plan.
But the Red Cross needed to quell the furor and so chose a concrete, sentimental response rather than
what might well have been a wiser policy.
It also decided — after many angry e-mail messages from American Jews — to continue to withhold its
dues from the international federation and reaffirm its commitment to Israel’s equivalent of the Red Cross.
(”They didn’t want to make Healy a martyr is what we heard,” an official in Geneva said.)
Those actions took the public pressure off the American Red Cross, and as McLaughlin and Decker
had hoped, the organization faded from the spotlight. What will happen inside remains to be seen.
Clearly, the American Red Cross’s problems transcend Healy and will outlive her unless the stresses of
Sept. 11 succeed in shocking the organization through a real transformation.
McLaughlin and Decker are ambitious about reform, along the same lines that Healy was, although
they hope to accomplish more by using gentler tactics. Still, Decker, who expects to serve from six
months to a year as interim C.E.O., is talking tough. ”People will be held accountable for performing,”
Decker says. ”If we have to change some culture here, that’s what’s going to have to happen. People can
vote with their feet if they don’t like it.”
McLaughlin, for his part, said he does not want to recruit a replacement for Healy until he restructures
the governance system that keeps undermining Red Cross presidents. He cannot slim down the board
unless he goes to Congress and asks it to revise the Red Cross charter, which is cumbersome. So he will
L201 Reading B 13
seek to make the powerful executive committee more representative of the board at large — that is, to
reduce its dominance by Red Cross insiders. He also wants to establish qualifications for board members
so that loyalty to the Red Cross alone, while honorable, is not enough.
Inside the Red Cross, these are fighting words. And McLaughlin and Decker are not Red Cross lifers.
There is no telling what kind of resistance they will encounter and how they will handle it.
Back in Ohio, Healy’s moods shift as she tries to understand how she went from commanding a
historic relief effort to overseeing her suburban household. When she is her usual confident self, she
declares that it is common for boards and presidents to clash. But when she is blue, an uncharacteristic
state for Bernadine Healy, she laments that she was all wrong for the Red Cross and that she failed at
something very important. ”So much potential for greatness,” she says, her voice trailing off. And though
she is talking about the organization, it sounds for one moment as if she is talking about herself.
Deborah Sontag is a staff writer for the magazine.
L201 Reading B 14
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L201-RA-1
US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY
Sergeants Major Course (SMC)
L200: Developing Organizations and Leaders
Lesson Plan for L201
Organizational Power and Influence
L 1 Reading A:
The Application of Power and Influence in Organizational
Leadership
1
1 By Dr. Gene Klann. Reproduced by and for the USASMA (2010)
L201-RA-2
For the uninformed, military leadership is all about giving orders and expecting instant obedience.
Followers of this mental model believe if there is any hesitation in compliance from Soldiers, they will
inevitably be punished or even thrown in the brig.‖ This was best epitomized in a discussion I had
when assigned to NATO with Dr. Michel Liu, a noted sociologist and professor at Paris-Dauphine
University. He felt leadership in the military was all about enforcing compliance, and no need existed for
more advanced influencing skills. It was his opinion that military leaders merely relied on rank, position,
service rules, and regulations to get things done, and military leadership was really a myth! We wish it
was only that simple.
Military leaders are responsible for achieving any and all assigned missions. That is the expected
result or outcome of their leadership. They can do this through either commitment or compliance-focused
influence.
Compliance
-focused is directed at follower behavior. It is generally effective for gaining
short-term and immediate results. It also works well in time-constrained environments with basic tasks
that require a specific action or behavior, and there is little need for follower understanding.
Noted leadership researcher Peter Senge
believes ninety percent of the time what
passes for employee commitment is really
compliance.1 According to Senge, there
are various levels of compliance ranging
from genuine compliance to
noncompliance. In genuine compliance the
followers do what is expected and are
considered good employees. During
routine operations, genuine compliance
may be all that is required to successfully
accomplish the mission. In grudging
compliance employees make only
minimum effort and their heart is really not
in it. They only do the least amount of
work because they have no personal
ownership or buy-in. They are really not convinced the leader’s decision or action is the best one, that it
will be effective, or that it is even worth doing in the first place.2 They also have no problem letting others
know they are not on board.
Long-term and lasting change requires a different focus. Leaders must move beyond compliance-
prompted behavioral changes and focus on influencing follower attitudes, beliefs, and values in order to
gain commitment. Commitment implies the followers want the organization to succeed and positive
changes to occur. Committed followers make a decision to take personal ownership of mission tasks,
have internal buy-in to the leader’s decisions and orders, and proactively dedicate themselves to mission
accomplishment. They feel a shared responsibility for the successful completion of the task at hand. It
could be said that both their mind and heart are really in it.‖ The critical point is that the commitment is
self-initiated. It is a cognitive, thought-based process. The leader can create an environment that
promotes and encourages follower commitment but the bottom line is that the individual must make a
personal, internal, thought-out decision to fully sign on to the mission.
A historical example of the contrast between follower commitment and compliance can be taken from
the experience of Major General George Armstrong Custer. During the American Civil War, Custer had
the total commitment of the highly motivated volunteers he commanded in the 3rd Michigan Cavalry
Compliance vs.
Commitment
Compliance: Conforming to a specific requirement or demand
Commitment: Dedication or allegiance to a cause or organization
Compliance
&
Commitment
– FM 6-22
Change in
behavior
Change in
thinking
L201-RA-3
Division. He was convinced he could accomplish any mission with these troops, and had a proven track
record of success during the war. This was quite different from the troopers he later commanded in the 7th
Cavalry Regiment during the American Indian Wars. These Soldiers were generally from the lower
elements of society and some were even former criminals. Many were immigrants who could barely
speak English or even ride a horse. They had joined the Army simply to have a job. Custer was
constantly frustrated with them and, to gain their compliance, reverted to extremely harsh disciplinary
measures to include executions. This lack of commitment in his Soldiers impacted their level of
competence and was one of many factors that contributed to Custer’s devastating defeat at the Little
Bighorn.
The challenge for the organizational-level leader is gaining this commitment from subordinate leaders
and followers for the health and future of the organization. How do they do it? It all begins with power.
POWER
A core tool or means the leader can leverage to gain follower commitment is the power available to
them. We define power as the capacity to influence others and implement change. It is not the actual
influencing action. Influencing is the application of power. Without power, there is little influencing;
and with no influencing, there is no opportunity to gain genuine compliance or commitment from others.
The practical question must then be
asked, What are the sources of a leader’s
power?‖ According to Dr.’s Gary Yukl
and Cecelia M. Falbe, there are two
independent sources of power: position and
personal.3 The first is the authority that
comes from the position the leader is
filling. This gives them position or
positional power. With this form of power
comes the authority of the position.
Position power promotes follower
compliance. The second source of power
is personal power. This power comes from
the leader’s followers and is based on their
trust, admiration, and respect for the leader.
It is tied to the leader’s expertise and
personality. Personal power encourages and connects with follower commitment.
Position Power
Position power is derived from a particular office or rank in a formal organization. According to
taxonomy of social psychologists John R.P. French and Bertram Raven, it can be divided into further
subcategories such as legitimate, reward, and coercive.4 When this power is applied through the use of
appropriate influence techniques,* it can be very effective in changing the behavior of followers. In other
words, it is excellent in gaining compliance.
* ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, uses the term influence techniques.‖ The majority of the professional leadership
community uses the term influence tactics‖ coined by University of Albany researcher and professor Dr. Gary
Yukl. I use both terms interchangeably in this article.
Power
The capacity an individual has to influence
the attitude or behavior of others
POSITION
POWER
PERSONAL
POWER
• Coercive
• Legitimate
• Reward
• Information
• Expert
• Referent
Compliance
&
Commitment
8
L201-RA-4
Legitimate power comes from the leader’s formal or official authority. Individuals with legitimate
power influence others through orders and requests that are consistent and appropriate with their position.
In the exercise of legitimate power, the followers respond because they believe the leader has the right to
make requests or give orders, and they have an obligation to comply.
Command is a form of legitimate power. According to ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, “command is the
authority a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or
assignment.‖5 It grants military leaders both the right and obligation to make decisions, give orders, and
exercise control of resources such as budgets, equipment, vehicles and other assigned materials.
Trappings of legitimate power may include office size and layout; professional assistants, drivers; and
aides; uniform insignia and accouterments; and so on.
Reward power involves the capacity of leaders to use highly desired resources to influence and
motivate their followers. These include promotions; selection for special duties, activities, or privileges;
“be st‖ competitions; medals; letters of appreciation or commendation; and so on. On a lesser but still
significant scale, the reward could be public or private verbal praise, a thank you note, time off, an
intercession on another’s behalf, or a simple recognition by handshake or personal acknowledgment.
When soldiers realize their leaders in the chain of command know who they are, it can be highly
motivational. In reality, the rewards leaders generate for followers are limited only by their creativity and
originality.
Coercive power is the opposite of reward power. Whereas reward power offers something positive
and desirable, coercive power presents something negative and undesirable. As the old quote says, I t is
the difference between gain and pain.‖ Coercive power is the capacity to influence others through
administering negative sanctions such as punishments, removal of privileges, fear tactics, public
embarrassment, or being placed in a bad light among one’s peers. Coercive power has been traditionally
associated with the military and stereotypical toxic military leaders. Countless movies have been made
depicting military leaders of all ranks and particularly drill sergeants using coercive power tactics.
American General Joseph Vinegar Joe‖ Stilwell commanded in the China-Burma-India Theater in
World War II and was known for his demanding nature and caustic remarks. He excelled in the use of
coercive power tactics. One of his British brigade commanders, John Masters, recalled Stilwell
specifically detailing a staff officer to visit subordinate commands to chastise their officers for being
y ellow.‖ 6 Obviously there was some truth to the nickname Vinegar Joe.
Coercive power has serious limitations and disadvantages. It may bring temporary compliance but
undermines long-term commitment. It could result in passive-aggressive behavior, retaliation, and formal
complaints against the chain of command leading to disciplinary or relief actions.
An additional form of position power described by Yukl is information power. It includes access to
critical information, control over its dissemination, and the ability to act on that information. Based on
rank and position, organizational leaders routinely have access to information that subordinates do not.
Thus a leader who controls the flow of information has the opportunity to interpret events for
subordinates and influence both perceptions and attitudes.7 Leaders can present information anyway they
like and even distort it to their advantage. They may do this to cover up mistakes, bad decisions, or
potential failures. Information is also vital in crisis situations because it is essential to the emotional well
being of those being led. When information is not readily available, many followers will inevitably
M SU‖ it mean make stuff up.‖ What they make up generally will be better than reality though the
consequences will be much worse.
Personal Power
L201-RA-5
In additional to positional power, leaders can also leverage personal power. Personal power is
derived from the followers based on their trust, admiration and respect for the leader. It is the power
given to the leader by the followers based on the leader’s personality or expertise. It can be subdivided
into two categories: expert power and referent power. When this power is applied through the use of
appropriate influencing techniques, it can be very effective in gaining commitment in others. This is
because it allows the leader to influence not just the followers’ behavior but their thinking as well through
an appeal to personal attitudes, beliefs, and values. It is important to remember that followers can
withdraw this power just as easily as they give it. Whereas position power encourages follower
compliance, personal power promotes follower commitment with the use of proper influence tactics.
Expert power is based on the knowledge and expertise one has in relation to those being led. It is
being the subject matter expert or SME. The more knowledge, skills, talents, and proficiencies leaders
have, the more power they can leverage. Those selected for battalion command successfully served in
KD jobs such as a battalion XO or S3. These jobs should have provided the knowledge and expertise
essential for their success as a battalion commander. The challenge at the organizational level is that
there may be many individuals in a battalion possessing more expert power than the battalion commander.
This could include assigned warrant officers, various noncommissioned officers, and those whose
assignments have given them special knowledge or experiences. Part of leveraging expert power, is the
leader’s effective utilization of all available expert resources to accomplish the mission.
Post World War II research studies indicate that junior enlisted Soldiers had much more confidence in
their noncommissioned officers than in their commissioned officers, i.e. platoon leaders. Understandably,
this was because of the experience the NCOs possessed in comparison to the lieutenants, experience the
Soldiers felt would keep them alive.8 This was expert power in its highest form.
The second category of personal power is that of referent power. Leaders can offset a lack of expert
power by leveraging their referent power. Referent power refers to the strength of the professional
relationship and personal bond leaders develop with their followers.9 When followers admire leaders and
view them as role models or even friends, they imbue them with referent power. People will work hard
for such leaders simply because they want to look good in their eyes and not let them down. To put it
another way, referent power is the power generated by relationships the brick and mortar of solid
organizations. The stronger the relationship, the higher the probability things will get done and get done
well. Also, referent power has the highest potential of all the forms of power to gain a strong
commitment from the followers.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower had exceptional interpersonal skills. Despite the fact that he did not
deploy overseas in World War I, serve in combat, or command a unit larger than a battalion, he was
selected in 1942 by President Roosevelt and General Marshall to be the Commanding General, European
Theatre of Operations. This appointment was due as much to his relational skills as his professional or
administrative competencies. Eisenhower did not disappoint. Through his interpersonal and social skills,
he was able to gain the trust and confidence of both the allied and U.S. military and political leaders.
Though he had fundamental disagreements with Churchill and other allies, it did not seem to affect their
relationship.
INFLUENCE
Influence is the application of power. Leaders can use their power to affect and change the behaviors,
values, attitudes, morale, and commitment level of those they lead. The research of Dr. Gary Yukl
indicated the application of the leader’s power comes principally through a variety of influence tactics
(influencing techniques).10 The type of influence tactics applied to a given situation depends on the
L201-RA-6
amount of power the leader has, the target group being influenced, the degree of resistance expected, and
the rationale behind the various influencing tactics.11 Influence tactics can be placed into three broad
categories: hard, soft, and rational tactics.12
Influence Tactics
Hard tactics are generally associated
with positional power and include
coalition, legitimate requests, and pressure.
They are very effective at gaining follower
compliance. They are generally used
when the leader is expecting significance
resistance, the leader or influencer has the
upper hand, or when the person being
influenced violates the protocols of
appropriate behavior with the leader.
Coalition tactics are used when the
leader asks for the assistance or
support of others to influence the
target. It may include getting the endorsement of someone the target person likes, respects, or
views as an expert. Coalition tactics are routinely used in combination with one or more other
influence tactics such as rational persuasion, ingratiation, or apprising. It can also be described as
g anging up.‖ This tactic can make the target extremely uncomfortable.
Legitimate requests or legitimizing tactics occur when the leader makes requests based on their
rank, position, or authority. The leader first establishes his or her authority as part of the request
process. It is generally used when the request is unusual, resistance is expected, or the target
person may not know who the leader is or what authority she has.13 This is a tactic that is best
used sparingly as it loses its impact and effectiveness if overused. Pu ll ing rank‖ is a type of
legitimizing tactic.
Pressure tactics include threats, warnings, relentless reminders, persistent demands, constant
checking, bothersome micromanagement, and other aggressive behaviors from the leader. These
tactics are generally used if the commitment of those being led is low and compliance is an
acceptable alternative. The problem with pressure tactics is that they have the tendency to
undermine relationships. They may be effective in the short term but generally have a negative
long-term effect. Pressure tactics are closely associated with the pre-volunteer military and also
Hollywood’s stereotype of military leaders. Experience has shown that, overall, pressure tactics
have very low effectiveness.
Soft tactics are associated with personal power and include ingratiation, personal appeal,
inspirational appeal, participation, relational, and building consultation. All are effective at gaining
follower commitment or at least placing the follower in a position where they are more willing than not to
commit to an action or change. Besides the focus of gaining commitment, they can be used when the
influencer is at somewhat of a disadvantage, when they expect minor resistance, or when they will
personally benefit if the influencing effort is a success.
Ingratiation is an attempt by the leader to make those being influenced feel better about the
leader and the request he or she is about to make. Ingratiation is done by giving praise, acting
Influence: The Application of Power
POSITION
POWER
PERSONAL
POWER
Compliance
&
Commitment
Influence Techniques
Hard Rational Soft
– Coalition
– Legitimate requests
– Pressure
– Ingratiation
– Personal appeals
– Inspiration
– Participation
– Relationship building
– Consultation
– Exchange
– Apprising
– Collaboration
L201-RA-7
friendly, giving unexpected favors, or saying things to make those being influenced feel special or
be in a better mood. Sales representatives use ingratiation as one of their primary influencing
tactics. Another common phrase for ingratiation is s ucking up!‖ In a World War II period
cartoon by Bill Mauldin, infantryman Willie says to his buddy Joe, The Captain was acting real
friendly this morning. Guess that means we’re moving back up to the [front] line again.‖ The
captain’s action was a form of ingratiation. While the word ingratiation‖ has a negative
connotation, it can be effectively used in moderation, for example, when meeting new people and
attempting to make a good first impression. If successfully employed, it will increase the referent
power of the user.
Personal appeals are leader requests based on friendship, loyalty, or trust. It generally occurs
when the leader is faced with a difficult situation and mutual trust and confidence are essential to
their success. The leader would appeal to the follower by highlighting the special skills or talents
he or she has that would insure the task would be successfully accomplished. Personal appeals
are directly connected to referent power. Many times they are made when the task is not part of
the person’s normal duties or responsibilities.
Inspiration or inspirational appeals are designed to stir up the emotions and enthusiasm in
others to gain their commitment. It appeals to the target audience by connecting the request to a
person’s values, needs, hopes, and ideals. Examples would be the commander’s speech before
the big battle or a coach’s speech to the team before the big game. To effectively use this
influence tactic, the leader must clearly understand the hopes, dreams, and values of those being
influenced. Leader’s can use imagery, metaphors, and rousing animated gestures in the process
of the appeal. However, this must be consistent with how the leader is generally viewed. If it is
not, it will come across as phony and inauthentic and could have the reverse effect of what was
intended. During World War II, General Patton would routinely travel to his army’s subordinate
units and give rousing inspirational appeal speeches. This was realistically captured on film in
the 1970 academy award-winning movie Patton. In the movie’s opening scene George C. Scott,
acting as Patton, gave a stirring inspirational speech that was in fact drawn from the Patton
historical archives.
Consultation occurs when the leader asks another person how a mission should be accomplished,
a task carried out, or a difficult change implemented. This is done to leverage the expertise and
knowledge of the target person as well as gain a higher level of commitment for the project.
There are situations in which the leader already knows what he or she is going to do and
consultation is really a subtle form of manipulation. But this is not true in all cases. There are
times when the expert power of subordinates is needed to insure the plan is solid. An example of
this was in the movie, Saving Private Ryan. Prior to the film’s final battle, Captain John Miller
(Tom Hanks) asked Sergeant Mike Horvath (Tom Sizemore) what he thought they should do. It
was the only time in the movie when he called Sergeant Horvath by his first name. This is a
classic consultation technique.
Participation occurs when the leader asks a follower to take part in a planning, brainstorming,
problem solving, consensus building, or decision making process. Unlike with the consultation
tactic, the follower does not have any unusual expertise on the topic. The participation generally
increases the follower’s personal sense of value and worth to the organization. This recognition
is important in building follower commitment and increasing their ownership and buy-in. Since
the follower has participated in the planning or problem solving process, this tactic also enhances
the enabling and empowerment process.
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Relationship Building is a technique in which leaders build positive rapport and a relationship of
mutual trust, making followers more willing to support requests. Examples include showing
personal interest in a follower’s well-being, offering praise, and understanding a follower’s
perspective. This technique is best used over time. It is unrealistic to expect it can be applied
hastily when it has not been previously used. With time, this approach can be a consistently
effective way to gain commitment from followers.
Rational tactics are associated with both personal and positional power and include rational
persuasion, exchange, apprising, and collaboration. These tactics are generally used when the two parties
of are equal rank or power, when no resistance is expected, or when both the organization and the
influencer will benefit. These tactics initially appeal to compliance but can lead to commitment because
they typically generate short-term wins that can, if consistently applied, sway the attitudes and beliefs of
the followers or targets.
Rational persuasion is the most common and one of the most effective influencing techniques.
It commonly uses logical arguments, facts, details, specific evidence, data, and various forms of
proof to convince the target audience. Rational persuasion is commonly used by lawyers in legal
arguments. It focuses on one’s reason, rationale thought, and common sense. It is perhaps the
most difficult to counter and can also be effectively used by subordinates when attempting to
influence their leaders. At the Pacific Strategy Conference in Hawaii in July of 1944, General
Douglas MacArthur masterfully used rational persuasion to influence President Franklin
Roosevelt regarding the strategic way ahead in the Pacific War. With Admiral Chester Nimitz
present, MacArthur skillfully outlined to the President why liberating the Philippines made more
sense than the navy’s recommended strategy of bypassing those islands and advancing on
Formosa. Roosevelt decided in favor of MacArthur’s strategic approach, which was somewhat
surprising since he was a strong advocate of the navy, sea power, and had previously been
Secretary of the Navy. Such was the strength of General MacArthur’s rational persuasion.
Exchange or quid pro quo is a very common influence tactic. The leader knows the subordinate
wants or desires something that is highly valued by them. As a result the leader will give them
what they want if the subordinate will comply with a request from the leader. This tactic will
only work if what the subordinate is promised is of value to them, and they believe the leader
doing the promising can and will follow through. Exchange is quite common in politics. One
elected official will vote for a law if they are promised something in value by another
representative in return for their vote. Former U.S. Senator Bob Dole, R-Kansas, a thrice
decorated World War II 10th Mountain Division veteran, was a master of this tactic during his
twenty-seven years in the Senate.
Apprising occurs when the leader tells the target how complying with his or her request will
benefit the target personally or professionally or both. Not unlike rational persuasion, this often
involves logic and facts. In apprising, the person being influenced will receive a certain benefit
by doing what the leader is requesting. It is not, however, something the leader will provide.
That is just the opposite of exchange tactics in which the person being influenced is being
provided something by the leader. The benefits of apprising may include increased opportunities
for advancement, greater visibility to influential people, highly desired skill training, the selection
for special duties, activities, or privileges, and the like.
Collaboration occurs in situation in which the leader offers the resources, equipment, or
assistance that will be needed to successfully complete a request. This would be resources that
the person being tasked may not have. In collaboration there is a joint effort by both the leader
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and the target to accomplish a mission or task. An example in an operational environment would
be the senior commander offering additional artillery, air, or armor resources to the subordinate
commander in the support of a very tough offensive action.
Given the forms of power a leader possesses, positional and/or personal, how does the leader know
what influencing
techniques
to use? What happens if a leader with positional power but no personal
power attempts to use a soft influencing technique? Probably not very much will happen. Imagine a boss
you dislike or do not respect attempts to influence you through an inspirational speech or a personal
appeal. You would probably find the actions somewhat offensive and quickly identify the insincerity.
If a leader who has personal power uses a hard influencing technique, it might not be well received by
the followers. It will seem out of place and the followers will probably ask, W hat’s wrong with the boss
today? He must have had a fight with his wife!‖ Many leaders will avoid using hard tactics in fear of
jeopardizing the referent power they already have with their followers.
Some leaders have various forms of power but do not have the will to use them. This is generally
because of a lack of moral courage. Some leaders apply the correct tactic to the correct form of power
but, because it is done so ineffectively, no one is influenced. Then there are other leaders who do not
understand either power or influence and therefore do not properly leverage any of these leadership tools
available to them.
Emotional Intelligence
How can the leader insure that the
appropriate form of power and
influence
tactics are used in a given situation? It is
through the use of emotional intelligence
or EQ skills. Emotional intelligence is the
ability or skill to identify, assess, manage,
and control the emotions of one’s self, of
others, and of groups.14
According to EQ researcher and
leadership writer, Dr. Daniel Goleman, EQ
has four components: self-awareness, self-
management, social awareness, and social
skills. The first two components deal exclusively with the leader. Self-aware leaders can read and
understand their emotions. They understand how their emotions impact their work performance and
relationships. They have an accurate self-assessment of themselves to include strengths and weaknesses.
Self-management means they can control their emotions and manage their behavior, even under stressful,
trying conditions.
The last two components of EQ have specific application to the use of power and influence. Social
awareness is the sensing of emotions, perspectives, and needs in others, both at the individual and
organizational level. It is the Army leadership attribute of empathy. By recognizing and understanding
the emotions in others, leaders have clear signals and indicators of the values, beliefs, and attitudes that
drive behavior and actions in an organization. By understanding these signs and indicators, leaders can
select the appropriate influence tactics commensurate with the situation and their individual power.
EQ stands for emotional quotient. Dr. Daniel Goleman uses the acronym as an antithesis to the more traditional
measure of intelligence, IQ – intelligence quotient.
Emotional Intelligence
• Self-Awareness: Knowing one’s
emotions
• Self-Management: Managing one’s
emotions
• Social Awareness: Recognizing
emotions in others
• Social Skill: Handling relationships
The application of
influence techniques
Critical for
determining
effective
influence
techniques
jenki
Highlight
jenki
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Social skill, the fourth component of EQ, is the application of the appropriate influence tactics and relies
heavily on the Army leadership competency of ―communicates,‖ which involves the clear articulation of
ideas, active listening, and the ability to recognize and resolve misunderstandings.
To put it simply, EQ is a clear enabler to the proper selection and application of influence tactics. An
excellent example of EQ failure is provided by one of the Army’s most famous generals, General George
S. Patton, Jr. General Patton was rated by the Germans as the best allied general in the European Theatre
of Operations in WWII. He was, however, seriously lacking in EQ skills as evidenced by his slapping of
two soldiers suffering from PTSD during the 1943 campaign in Sicily. As a result, from 3 August 1943
until 1 August 1944 General Patton was effectively on the sidelines while the greatest war in history was
being waged without his active participation. This war was something he had prepared for his entire life.
His lack of emotional intelligence skills also eliminated his involvement in the Normandy invasion and
selection for command of an army group.
Emotional intelligence is a skill set that can be learned and mastered. Leaders can improve their EQ
skills in a number of ways. They can observe and imitate emotionally intelligent role models (as well as
learn from the emotionally inept); seek and obtain feedback on their EQ skills from superiors, peers, and
subordinates; take any number of personality assessment instruments focusing on EQ; read any of the
countless offerings of commercial books available on the subject; or attend an EQ workshop or seminar.
Leadership Styles
The application of influence tactics is
also demonstrated through one’s leadership
style. While the Army doctrinally does
not advocate specific leadership styles, six
of the most recognized styles were
discussed by Dr. Goleman in his emotional
intelligence research.15 The coercive and
pacesetting styles are effective at gaining
short-term follower compliance but
generally have negative long-term
consequences. The coercive style demands
immediate compliance and can be
described by the phrase, Do w hat I tell
you!‖ It is a toxic, disrespectful, and
bullying style that almost always results in
low follower morale and productivity. The pacesetting style on the other hand sets very high standards of
performance. It is the Do as I do and do it now‖ style. It is characterized by a leader who is a
workaholic, role models high standards, wants everything to be better and faster, and promptly replaces
those who do not measure up. Pacesetting leaders expect followers to know what to do and, if they need
to be told what to do, they are the wrong fit for the job. Pacesetters usually believe follower development
is a waste of time and resources. Legitimate requests and pressure are common influencing tactics
employed by these two leadership styles.
Dr. Goleman believes the other four leadership styles are much more effective at achieving a positive
climate, high levels of performance, and deeper follower commitment. Probably the most effective of the
four is the authoritative style. The authoritative (not authoritarian) style mobilizes people toward a
common vision and says, Come with me.‖ The leader enthusiastically works to get people on board with
the vision. The leader’s focus is follower ownership and buy-in of the vision. It is a style that is noted for
very effective communication skills. Next, the affiliative leader says, People come first.‖ It is a style
Leadership Styles*
Authoritative: Mobilizes people toward a vision
“Come with me”
Affiliative: Creates harmony and builds emotional bonds
“People come first”
Democratic: Forges consensus through participation
“What do you think?”
Coaching: Develops people for the future
“Try this”
Pacesetting: Sets high standards for performance
“Do as I do, now”
Coercive: Demand immediate compliance
“Do what I tell you”
* From Leadership That Gets Results, by Daniel Goleman, Harvard Business Review, Mar-Apr 00
Commitment
Compliance
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that creates harmony, emotional bonds, trust, honesty, and teamwork. Followers are given the freedom to
do their jobs and flexibility is always enhanced by this style. Then there is the democratic style. It builds
consensus through participation and asks, What do you think?‖ The democratic style is noted for open
dialogue, effective listening, and collective decision making. There are also high levels of follower
frustration resulting from this style because of endless meetings and the time required to arrive at a final
decision. Finally, the coaching leadership style develops people for the future and is characterized by the
phrase, Try this.‖ It focuses more on personal development than immediate work related tasks. It is the
least used style because leaders indicate they do not have the time to engage in the slow process of
helping followers grow. Soft influencing tactics such as participation, consultation, personal appeals, and
relationship building are the hallmark of these four styles.
Many field grade officers do not put a lot of thought into their style of leadership beyond the
traditional military maxim of c ome in hard‖ when entering a new organization. The point of the
Goleman styles is not that one is better than another, but that they all have a purpose and an associated
methodology that can prove very effective when aligned with the leaders’ sources of power, selection of
appropriate influencing techniques, and application of those techniques through the use of EQ skills.
When considering your style as a leader, you must analyze it from this broader perspective to ensure you
have properly aligned all the components of power and influence to support your actions and behavior. If
not, the consequential misalignment will achieve results you probably never wanted or expected.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that military leadership
is much more complex than simply giving
orders and expecting instant compliance.
Leaders have a variety of tools to utilize in
the pursuit of successful mission
accomplishment. They can use position
power to gain compliance or personal
power to gain commitment. Various
influence tactics support the use of either
position or personal power. These tactics
can be categorized as being hard, soft, or
rational. The leaders’ emotional
intelligence skills help determine which
category of tactic would be most
appropriate to use in a given situation.
The application of influence tactics is also demonstrated through one’s leadership style.
Gaining commitment from followers, especially the key leaders, is the ultimate prize of
organizational-level leadership. It anchors the organizational culture, creates a positive command
climate, forms the foundation of a learning organization, and ensures a unity of effort for achieving the
most challenging of missions. Position power is important for accomplishing this but personal power is
essential. An organizational-level leader cannot be an expert in all fields because of the complexity of the
position, meaning the primary source of personal power available to the organizational-level leader is
referent power. This is why Goleman puts so much emphasis on the importance of the authoritative
leadership style. It rallies followers to a shared vision and creates a bond between leader and follower.
The bond is strengthened by the use of rational and soft influence tactics that solidifies the cohesion and
unity of the organization. On paper, this sounds easy; in practice, it is incredibly hard. But it is a worthy
objective that all field grade officers should strive for as they face the intricate challenge of aligning the
components of power and influence within an organization.
The Integration of Power and Influence
POSITION
POWER
PERSONAL
POWER
Compliance
&
Commitment
Hard Rational Soft
Emotional Intelligence
application
Leadership Style
I n f l u e n c e T e c h n i q u e s
L201-RA-12
ENDNOTES
1 Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. (New York,
NY: Broadway Business Publishers, 2006), p. 218.
2 Yukl, Gary. Leadership in Organizations, Sixth Ed. (Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2006),
p.147.
3 Yukl, G., & Falbe, C.M. (1990). Influence tactics in upward, downward, and lateral influence attempts.
Journal of Applied Psychology, #75, pp. 132-140.
4 French, J. R. P., Raven, B. The Bases of Social Power. In D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds.), Group
Dynamics. (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 150-167.
5 Army 6-22 . (Washington D.C.HQ DA 2012, pp 1-3
6 Masters, John. The Road Past Mandalay. (London, UK: Bantam Press,1979), p. 309-310.
7 Yukl, 156.
8 Stouffer, Samuel; Edward A. Suchman; Leland C. DeVinney; Shirley A. Star; Robin M. Williams. The
American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volume II.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 347.
9 Ginnett, Robert C.; Richard L. Hughes; Gordon J. Curphy. Leadership, Enhancing the Lessons of
Experience. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2006), p.114.
10 Yukl, pp.164-169.
11 Ginnett, 128.
12 Ginnett, 125.
13 Yukl, 169.
14 Bradberry, Travis and Jean Greaves. “Emotional Intelligence 2.0”. (San Francisco: Publishers Group
West, 2009), pp.2-3.
15 Goleman, Daniel. Leadership That Gets Results. Harvard Business Review, March-April 2000, p.78.
.
“Leadership is the process of influencing people…” This is a fundamental concept from ADRP 6-22 we are all familiar with. While influence might be the essence of leadership, it is not the start point. It all begins with power, the capacity an individual has to influence the attitude or behavior of others. Influence without power is like a car without an engine—no matter how good it looks, it still won’t get you anywhere. This lesson focuses on understanding the interrelationship of six critical concepts: power, influence, commitment/compliance, influence tactics, emotional intelligence, and leadership styles. A critical leadership thread runs through each of these concepts and, if inculcated into your thinking, will make you very effective organizational-level leaders.
Our case study to illustrate these ideas is from the American Red Cross. The president of the organization in 2001 was Dr. Bernadine Healy, one of the most talented and successful leaders in the field of American medicine; a woman with the attitude and drive that would be the envy of any Sergeant Major. In her two years at the Red Cross, she unerringly identified critical organizational shortfalls and the necessary fixes to modernize this American institution. The result of her actions? She was fired. By studying the context of Dr. Healy’s situation and the events leading to her dismissal, you will better understand the relationship between power and influence, and how it can be harnessed to change attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of followers to gain commitment within an organization.