journal1

  Instructions

Read the assigned reading from the chapter 9. Then choose ONE of the questions below to answer. Answer the question you chose in a response that is a minimum of 1-2 paragraphs.

Be sure to explain your answers and give reasons for your views. You should cite the textbook and use brief quotations and summaries from the textbook in your response. Do NOT use any other sources besides the textbook. 

1. According      to Bagini, how is God’s creating us for his purposes supposed to denigrate      human life? Do you agree?

HERE AND NOW
THIRD EDITION
POWERFUL IDEAS IN
EVERYDAY LI FE Lewis Vaughn

HERE AND NOW

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING ABOUT
PHILOSOPHY HERE AND NOW:
“Above all, Vaughn’s text does ,vhac few ochers are able co do, namely, co show chat ph ilosophy actually
matters ,vich respect co ho,v we ch ink and live in the wo rld. For all its brevity the book 1nanages co run
the gamut of critical topics, and to offer real-world (a nd often hu1norous) examples of each . He does not
offer the luxury of viewing d iffic ult questions fro1n a position of abstracted detachment and safety. Rather,
he hurls readers straight into the teeth of the sconn and allows che1n co feel the raw terror, wonder, and
exh ilaration chat rightly belong co the st udy of philosophy.”
– Daniel Bramer, Holy Family University
“Vaughn has chosen the mos t important topics in philosophy. His 1nenu can not be improved upon. W ith
a beautiful open ing chapter on the nature of ph ilosophical ch inking and remarkably concise chap ters on
the 1n osc engaging issues in philosophy, and with a nice 1n ix of classic and conce1nporary philosophers, chis
is a terri fic text. It is visually appealing as well.”
– Paul Herrick, Shoreline Community College
“Philosophy Here and Now is written in a clear, engagi ng, and lively style. The author does an excellent
job of explain ing abstract and conceptually intricate material to novices. The book introduces students to
philosophy as a living enterprise, full of intellectual surprises and relevance to everyday hu1nan concerns.”
– Phil ip Robbi ns, University of Missouri
“I can’t imagine not using Philosophy Here and Now. My experience w ith the textbook has been completely
posit ive. When st udents lee you know how much they like reading the text you know you 1n ade the right
decision in adopting the book.”
– Teresa Cantrell, University of Louisville
“Th is is the bes t text I have fou nd fo r my int roductory class. Q uest ions and exercises engage the st udents’
lives di rectly and ask chem co explain their own understand ing/beliefs about a matter. The appendix on
writing ph ilosophy papers can easily stand on its o,vn as the mos t valuable cool I use in my class. I have yet
co find anyth ing at chis price with a comparable content.”
– Stephen Orr, Solano Community College

PH L PHY
HERE AND NOW
POWER FUL IDEAS IN
EVERYDAY LIFE
THIRD EDITJC)~
Lewis Vaughn
NEWYORK [ OXFORD
OXFORD UN IVERS ITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a departmenr of the University of Oxford.
Ir furth ers the University’s o bjective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and ed ucatio n by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford U niversity Press in the UK an d certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
I 98 Madison Avenue, New York, NY I 00 I 6, United States of America.
©2019,20 16, 2013 by Oxford University Press
For titles covered by Sectio n I 12 of the US Higher Educatio n
Opportuni ty Act, please visit www.oup.com/us/he fo r the latest
in fo rmatio n about pricing and a lternate fo rmats.
All rights reserved . No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system} o r transmi tted, in any form o r by any means} w ith o u t the
prior permissio n in w riring of Oxford U niversity Press, or as expressly pcrmincd
by law, by lice nse, o r under terms agreed with the appropriate reproductio n
rights organization. Inq uiries concern ing reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Righ L< Department, Oxford University Press, at the add ress above. You must not ci rculate this work in any o cher fo rm an d you m ust impose this sam e condi tion on any acquirc r. Libr ary of Congress Cataloging-in -Publication Data Names: Vaughn, Lewis} auth o r. Title: Philosophy here and now : powerful ideas in everyday li fe I Lewis Vaughn. Description: T H IRD EDITION. J New York : Oxford University Press, 20 18. Identifiers: LCCN 20 18014409 I IS BN 9780 190852344 (pbk.) SubjecLs: LCSH: Philosophy- Textbooks. Classificatio n: LCC 8 031 .V38 2018 I DOC 100-dc23 LC record available ar https://lccn.loc.gov/20 180 14409 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I Printed by LSC Communicatio ns, Inc. Printed in the United States of America • PREFACE XXI CHAPTER 1 PHILOSOPHY AND YOU 1 CHAPTER 2 GOD AND RELIGION 57 CHAPTER 3 MORALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE 135 CHAPTER 4 MIND AND BODY 205 CHAPTER s FREE WILL AND DETERM INISM 240 CHAPTER 6 KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM 274 CHAPTER 7 AESTHETICS 332 CHAPTER 8 THE JUST SOCIETY 354 CHAPTER 9 THE MEAN ING OF LIFE 406 APPENDIX A THE TRUTH ABOUT PH ILOSOPHY MAJORS 431 APPENDIX B ANSWERS TO EXERCISES 437 APPENDIX c HOW TO WRITE A PHILOSOPHY PAPER 441 NOTES 451 GLOSSARY 457 CRED ITS 461 INDEX of MARGINAL QUOTATIONS 463 GENERAL IN DEX 465 VII Preface xxi CHAPTER 1 PH I LOSOPHY AND YOU l 1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING 2 The Good of Philosophy 2 Philoso phical Terra in 4 What Do You Believe? Your Philosophica l Beliefs 5 Essay/Discussion Questions 7 1.2 SOCRATES AND THE EXAMINED LIFE 8 Philosophers at Work: Pl ato 9 PLATO: The Republic 10 Philosophers at Work: The Pre-Socratics 12 Essay/Discussion Questions 14 1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY 14 Reasons and Arguments 15 Philosophy Lab 16 Philosophers at Work: Phi losophy Takes on Racism 20 Reading Phil osophy 27 Philosophers at Work: Hypatia 29 Philosophers at Work: Early Women Philoso phe rs: Themisto cl ea, Ar ignote, and Theano 31 Fallacious Reason ing 33 Philosophy Now: Phi losophy in the News 34 Essay/Discussion Questions 40 REVIEW NOTES 40 Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 42 KEY TERMS 42 ARGUMENT EXERCISES 43 ix x Cont ents NARRATIVE: Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates 47 PROBING QUESTIONS SS FOR FURTHER READING SS CHAPTER 2 GOD AND RELIGION 57 2.1 OVERVIEW: COD AND PHILOSOPHY 58 Why Religion Mat te rs 59 Ove rview: The Phi losopher's Quest 59 Philosophy Now: Who Believes in God? 60 What Do You Believe? H ard-W ired for God? 63 Belief and D isbelief 64 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l Views 66 2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COD 66 Cosmological Arguments 66 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica 67 Philosophers at Work: St. T homas Aquinas 68 Philosophy Now: Science an d the Uncaused Universe 69 CRAIG: Reasonable Faith 70 Design Argumen t s 72 PALEY: Natural Theology 72 HUME: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 74 Philosophy Now: Do Scientists Reject Religion? 78 On to logical Arguments 79 ANSELM: Proslogium 79 Philosophy Now: Evo lution and Intelligent Des ign 80 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason 83 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l Views 83 2.3 COD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 84 Rowe's Argumen t f rom Evil 84 ROWE: Philosophy of Religion 84 The Free W ill Defense 87 SWINBURNE: Is There a God? 87 The Sou l-Making Defense 88 HICK: Evil and the God of Love 88 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 91 2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 92 ST. TERESA OF AVILA: The Life of Teresa of Jesus 92 MACKIE: The Miracle of Theism 93 Philosophy Lab 94 ROWE: Philosophy of Religion 95 Philosophy Now: Proof of the Power of Prayer? 96 SWINBURNE: The Existence of God 97 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 98 2.5 BELIEF WITHOUT REASON 98 James: Pragmatic Fait h 99 JAMES: "The W ill t o Believe" 100 MARTIN: Atheism: A Philosophical Justification 106 Pasca l: Betting on God 106 What Do You Believe? Do You Live by Faith? 107 PASCAL: Pensees and Other Writings 107 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 109 2.6 EASTERN RELIGIONS 109 Buddh i sm 109 SUMEDHO: Buddha-Nature 11 2 RAHULA: What the Buddha Taught 11 2 Philosophy Now: Bu ddhi sm and Science 114 H induism 116 Philosophy Now: The Caste System 120 Daoism 123 CHUANG TZU: All Things Are One 123 LAO-TZU: Tao -te ching 124 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 126 Contents x 1 x i i Contents REVIEW NOTES 126 Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 129 KEY TERMS 129 FICTION: Art hur C. Clarke, "The St ar" 131 PROBING QUESTIONS 133 FOR FURTHER READING 134 CHAPTER 3 MORALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE 135 3.1 OVERVIEW: ETHICS AND THE MORAL DOMAIN 136 Eth ics and Moralit y 136 Moral Theo ries 139 Philosophy Now: Morality and the Low 141 Philosophy Now: The Moral ity of Human Cloni ng 144 Religion an d Morality 146 SHAFER-LANDAU: Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? 147 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l Vi ews 148 3.2 MORAL RELATIVISM 148 Su bjective Relativism 149 Cultural Relativism 151 What Do You Believe? Cu ltu ral Re lativi sm an d Women's Rights 152 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l Vi ews 155 3.3 MORALITY BASED ON CONSEQUENCES 155 Utilitar ian ism 156 MILL: "Wh at Uti lit arian ism Is" 158 Philosophy Now: Util ita riani sm an d the Death Penalty 160 Philosophy Lab 164 Eth ical Ego ism 165 Philosophers at Work: John Stuart Mill 165 Philosophy Now: To rture and the Tick ing Bomb Ter ro rist 166 Writing to Understand: Criti qui ng Philosoph ica l Views 169 3.4 M ORALITY BASED ON DUTY AND RIGHTS 169 KANT: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 170 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 175 3.5 MORALITY BASED ON CHARACTER 175 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics 176 SHAFER-LANDAU: The Fundamentals of Ethics 180 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 181 3.6 FEMINIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 181 JAGGAR: "Femin ist Eth ics" 182 CROSTHWAITE: "Gender and Bioethics" 182 HELD: The Ethics of Care 184 Philosophers at Work: M ar y Wo ll stonecraft 186 BAIER: "The Need for More T han Justice" 188 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 188 3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE 188 CAMUS: The Myth of Sisyphus 190 Writing to Understand: Criti qui ng Philosoph ica l Views 192 3.8 CONFUCIANISM 192 CONFUCIUS: Analects 193 NOSS: A History of the World's Religions 195 Writing to Understand: Criti qui ng Philosoph ica l Views 195 REVIEW NOTES 196 Writing to Understand: A rguing You r Own Views 198 KEY TERMS 198 FICTION: Ursula K. Le Guin, " The Ones Who Wa lk Away from Ornelas" 200 PROBING QUESTIONS 203 FOR FURTHER READING 203 Contents xi ii x iv Contents CHAPTER 4 MIND AND BODY 205 4.1 OVERVIEW: T HE M IND-BODY PROBLEM 206 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l Vi ews 211 4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM 211 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason 2 12 SCHICK: Doing Philosophy 212 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy 213 What Do You Believe? T he Immortal Soul 2 14 SEARLE: Mind 216 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l Vi ews 217 4.3 MIND-BODY IDENTITY 217 SMART: "Sensations and Brain Processes" 217 CHALMERS: The Conscious Mind 2 18 NAGEL: "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" 220 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l Vi ews 221 4.4 THE M IND AS SOFTWARE 222 FODOR: "T he Mind-Body Problem" 222 BLOCK: "Troubles with Functionalism" 223 What Do You Believe? Al an d Human Rights 224 SEARLE: Mind 226 Philosophers at Work: Alan Turing 227 Philosophers at Work: John R. Searle 228 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l Vi ews 229 Philosophy Now: A l, Ethics , an d War 230 4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES 230 CHALMERS: The Conscious Mind 232 Philosophy Lab 233 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l Vi ews 234 REVIEW NOTES 234 Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 235 KEY TERMS 236 FICTION: Terry Bisson, "They're Made out of Meat" 237 PROBING QUESTIONS 238 FOR FURTHER READING 238 CHAPTER 5 FREE WILL AND DETERMIN ISM 240 5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM 241 What Do You Believe? Fate 245 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l Views 246 5.2 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM 246 D'HOLBACH: "Of the System of Man's Free Agency" 246 Philosophers at Work: Will iam James 248 JAMES: "The Dilemma of Determin ism" 249 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l Views 250 5.3 COMPATIBILISM 250 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 251 STACE: Religion and the Modern Mind 251 Philosophy Now: Does Belief in Free Will Matter? 252 ROWE: "Two Conce pts of Freedom" 254 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l Views 255 5.4 LIBERTARIANISM 255 Philosophy Now: Science and Free Will 256 VAN INWAGEN: An Essay on Free Will 257 Philosophy Lab 258 TAYLOR: Metaphysics 258 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l Views 261 5.5 SARTRE' S PROFOUND FREEDOM 261 SARTRE: "Existen tialism Is a Humanism" 262 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l Views 266 Contents xv xvi Contents REVIEW NOTES 266 Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own V iews 268 KEY TERMS 268 FICTION: Thomas D. Davis, "A Little Omniscience Goes a Long Way" 270 PROBING QUESTIONS 273 FOR FURTHER READING 273 CHAPTER 6 KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM 274 6.1 OVERVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 275 What Do You Believe? Cognitive Re lativism Undone 277 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l V i ews 280 6.2 THE RATIONALIST ROAD 281 Plat o's Rat iona lism 281 PLATO: Meno 283 Desca rt es' Dou bt 284 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy 285 Philosophy Now: Livi ng in The Matrix 287 Philosophy Lab 288 Desca rt es' Ce rt ainty 288 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy 288 Philosophers at Work: Rene Desca rtes 290 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l V i ews 292 6.3 THE EMPIRICIST TURN 293 Locke 293 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 293 Ber keley 299 BERKELEY: Of the Principles of Human Knowledge 300 Hume 303 Philosophers at Work: David Hume 304 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 305 Writing to Understand: Crit iqui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 310 6.4 THE KANTIAN COMPROMISE 311 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason 312 Philosophers at Work: Immanuel Kant 313 Philosophy Now: Conceptua lizing the World 316 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 319 6.5 A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE 319 AINLEY: "Femin ist Phi losophy" 320 ANTONY: " Embod iment and Epistemology" 320 ANDERSON: "Fem inist Epi st emology an d Ph iloso phy of Science" 321 COLE: Philosophy and Feminist Criticism 321 Writing to Understand: Crit iqui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 325 REVIEW NOTES 325 Writing to Understand: A rguing You r Own Views 328 KEY TERMS 329 FICTION: Lewis Carroll, "Through the Looking- Glass" 330 PROBING QUESTIONS 330 FOR FURTHER READING 331 CHAPTER 7 AESTHETICS 332 7.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY OF BEAUTY 333 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 333 7.2 WHAT IS ART? 333 Philosophy Now: Is It Art? 334 BELL: Art 335 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 335 Philosophy Now: Controve rsia l Ar t 336 Contents xv ii xvii i Contents 7.3 AESTHETIC VALUE 338 Philosophers at Work: Ar thu r C. Dante 339 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l Vi ews 34 0 7.4 PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND HUME 340 ARISTOTLE: The Poetics 340 Philosophy Lab 341 HUME: Of the Standard of Taste 343 Philosophy Now: Fem ini st Art 344 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l Vi ews 34 8 REVIEW NOTES 349 Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 350 KEY TERMS 350 FICTION : Edgar All an Poe, "The Oval Portrait" 351 PROBING QUESTIONS 352 FOR FURTHER READING 352 CHAPTER 8 THE JUST SOCIETY 354 8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 355 What Do You Believe? Polit ica l Vi ews in Flux 358 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l Vi ews 359 8.2 PLATO 'S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT 360 PLATO: The Republic 361 Philosophy Now: Merit or Equa lity: Who Gets to Live? 363 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l Vi ews 364 8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES 364 Hobbes 365 Philosophers at Work: Thomas Hobbes 365 HOBBES: Leviathan 366 Locke 370 LOCKE: Second Treatise of Government 371 Rawls 375 Philosophers at Work: John Locke 375 RAWLS: A Theory of justice 376 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 378 8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES 379 Philosophy Lab 380 Philosophy Now: Is the Unit ed States a Socialist Country? 381 MARX and ENGELS: Manifesto of the Communist Party 381 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 387 8.5 FEMINISM ANO SOCIAL JUSTICE 387 OKIN: Justice, Gender, and the Family 388 MILLER: Political Philosophy 392 Writing to Understand: Crit iqui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 392 REVIEW NOTES 393 Writing to Understand: Argui ng You r Own Views 395 KEY TERMS 395 FICTION: Willi am Golding, "Lord of the Flies" 397 PROBING QUESTIONS 405 FOR FURTHER READING 405 CHAPTER 9 THE MEAN ING OF LIFE 406 9.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY ANO THE MEAN ING O F LIFE 407 Philosophy Lab 410 9.2 PESSIMISM: LI FE HAS NO MEANING 411 TOLSTOY: My Confession 411 Contents xix xx Content s SCHOPENHAUER: "On the Suffe rings of the Wo rl d" 413 BAGG/NI: What's It All About? 414 Philosophy Now: N ietzsche: Reflections on Meani ng 415 9.3 OPTIMISM : LIFE CAN HAVE MEANING 416 Meaning from Above 416 TOLSTOY: My Confession 416 Philosophy Now: Is Re li gion Necessary fo r a Meaningful Life? 4 19 BAGG/NI: What's It All About? 420 Meaning from Below 4 21 EDWARDS: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 421 REVIEW NOTES 426 What Do You Believe? What Can and Cannot Give Life Meaning? 427 Writing to Understand: Argu ing Your Own Vi ews 428 FICTION: Voltaire, "The Good Brahmin " 429 PROBING QUESTIONS 430 FOR FURTHER READING 430 Append ix A: The Truth about Ph ilosophy Majors 431 Append ix B: Answe rs to Exerc ises 437 Append ix C: How t o Write a Phil osophy Pa per 4 41 Notes 451 Glossary 457 Credits 461 Index of Margina l Quotat ions 463 General Index 465 PREFACE ................................... _. ........ _. .... .._ ............ ._ ............................................................... .-................................ _. ........ __. ._ ....................... __. ............... ............ __. ........ __. .......... ........... ......... ................. .... ..... _. ... . Th is third ed ition of Philosophy Here and Now stays true to the aspirations and char- acter of the first and second. From the beginning, the text has been designed to p rov ide a n extraordina ry amount of encouragement an d guidance to students \vho a re encountering p h ilosophy for the first (and perhaps last) time. !rs ambitious aim is to get such students to take some big steps tO\vard understa nd ing, appreciating, and even doi ng p hilosophy. Philosophy Here and Now thus tries to do a great deal more th an most other texts o r readers. To foster a serious understanding of philosophy, it includes solid coverage of critical th inking skills a nd argument basics as well as guid- a nce and p ractice in read ing p hilosoph ical works. Studenrs of cou rse can appreciate the point and power of philosophy as they comprehend p h ilosoph ical \vritings, but their app reciation blossoms when they see ho\v ph ilosoph ical issues and reason ing play out in contempora ry society a nd how ph ilosophical insig hts apply to their O\vn lives. So the book's coverage a nd pedagogical features help students grasp philoso- phy's relevance and t imel iness. Studenrs learn how to do ph ilosophy-to think a nd write p h ilosophically-\vhen they get encouragement and practice in analyzing a nd critiq u ing their own vie\vS a nd those of the ph ilosophers they study. To this end, Phiwsophy Here and Now emphasizes philosophical writi ng, reinforced with step- by-step coach ing in how to \vrite argumentative essays a nd supported by multiple opport unities to hone basic sk ills. I n add ition to these core elements, Philosophy Here and Now further engages today's learners \Vith abunda nt illustrations a nd colo r graph ics; marginal notes, questions, and quotes; p rofi les of a diverse a rray of p h ilosophers; and ample repre- sentation of non-Western and nont raditional sources. TOPICS AND READINGS N ine chapters cover the existence of God, morality and the moral life, mind and body, free wi ll and determinism, knowledge and skepticism, aesthetics, political philosophy, and the meaning of life. These topics are explored in read ings from seventy-five traditional a nd contemporary ph ilosophers integrated into the main text, featuring both indispensable standards a nd ne\ver selections. The standards include Plato, Aristotle, Aqu inas, Pascal, Anselm, Descartes, Hume, H obbes, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, d'H olbach, Paley, James, Sa rtre, Marx, and others. Among t he more recent voices are Sea rle, C halmers, C raig, Swinburne, H ick, Mack ie, Rowe, Ga rd- ner, Blu m, Dersho\vitz, Rahula, Jaggar, H eld, Baier, Nagel, Block, Van l n\vagen, Taylo r, D u Sau toy, Ducasse, Cole, Ainley, Rawls, O kin, a nd Schopen hauer. All these selections are juxtaposed with e nd-of-chapter pieces of fiction or narrative-stories meant to explore and d ramatize the philosoph ical issues encou ntered xxi xxii Preface in the chapters. They include some classic sto ries such as "The Good Brahmin" by Volta ire, "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas" by Ursula Le Gu in, and "They're Made Out of Meat" by Terry Bisson, as \veil as lesser-kno\vn fiction by notable writers like Arthur C. Clarke and William Golding. Each story is accompanied by discus- sion/essay questions designed to dra\v out irs philosophical implications. MAIN FEATURES • A comprehensive introductory chapter that lays the groundwork for philo- sophical thinking. Through examples drawn from philosophical literature and everyday life, th is chapter explains clearly the nature and scope of philosophy and ho\v it relates to students' lives. This much, of course, is \vhat any good text in this field should do. But this first chapter also shows how to devise and evalu- ate arguments and gu ides students in critically thinking, reading, and \vriting about philosoph ical issues. • Critical thinking questions that correspond to relevant passages in the main text or readings. These questions, located in the margins of the text, invite stu- dents to ponder the implications of the material and to th ink critical ly about the assumptions and arguments found there. The questions are numbered and highlighted and easily lend themselves to both \vriting assignments and class d iscussion. The po int of their marginal placement is to prompt students to think carefully and analytically as they read. • Four types o f text boxes that d emonstrate the value and relevance of philoso - phy in the modern world: • "Philoso p h y Now" -These boxes contain news items and research reports that illustrate ho\v each chapter's philosoph ical issues permeate everyday life. They demonstrate that philosophical concerns arise continual ly in science, society, eth ics, religion, politics, medicine, and more. Each box ends \vith questions that prompt critical thinking and philosophical reflection. • "What Do You Believe?"-Prompting student engagement and reflec- tion, these boxes explore issues related to the chapter's topics and challenge students' beliefs. • "P hiloso p hers at Work'' -These boxes profi le the lives and wo rk of com- pelling figu res in philosophy, past and present, Western and non-Western or nontraditional, men and women. Some feature philosophers from the past \vhose story adds a human and historical dimension to the ideas discussed in the chapter, and some profile contempo rary thinkers who are g rappling \vith the important issues of the day. The point of these features is, of course, to sho\v that philosophy is very much a living, relevant enterprise. • " Philoso p h y Lab"-These boxes present simple thought experiments chal- lenging students to think through scenarios that can reveal deeper philo- sophical insights or perspectives. • In-d epth coverage of philosophical writing includes step-by-step coaching in argument basics and multiple opportunities to hone critical thinking skills. • "Writing to Understand: Critiquing Philosophical Views" -These boxes appear at the end of each section and cons ist of essay questio ns that p rompt st udents to critically exam ine the strengths and weaknesses of th e vie\vS dis- cussed in the sections. • "Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views" - These boxes prompt studen ts to explain a nd defen d thei r O\vn views on the chapter's topics in short essays. • " How to Write a Philosophy Paper" -This append ix offers concise, step- by-step guidance in crafting an effective philosoph ical essay. • A final chapter on ''The Meaning of Life." Th is chapter discusses how philoso- p hers have clarified and explored the topic of life's meani ng. It covers th e main p hilosophical perspectives on the subject an d samples the views of ph ilosophers past and p resent. All these feat ures a re supplemented \Vith other elemen ts to make the material even more engaging and accessible: • Marginal quotes. These pithy, compelli ng quotes from an array of ph ilosophers appear th roughou t the text, inviting students to join the ongo ing conversation of philosophy. • Key Terms, m arginal d efinitions, and end -of-book Glossary. Key Terms in each chapter appear in boldface at their first appearance in a chapter, an d mar- gi nal defi nitions help st udenrs learn the terms with in th eir immediate context. A list of the chapter's Key Terms appears at the end of each chapter, along \vith th e page n umbers o n which the term and irs definition fi rst appear. Last, a Glossary of those Key Terms and defi nitions provides an essential reference for st udents as they review and prepare fo r tesrs as well as draft their own p hilosophical essays and argumenrs. • Chapter O bjectives. This list at the begin ning of each chapter helps to scaffold st udent learni ng by provid ing both structure and suppo rt for previewing, note taking, an d retention of content. • End-of-chapter reviews. Concluding each ch apter, th is feature revisits th e Chapter Objectives, e ncouraging students to reflect an d revie\v. • An index o f marginal quotes. This supplemental index helps studen ts locate th e wo rds of ph ilosophers th at seem especially insightful or inspiri ng to th em. • For Further reading. Located at the end of each chapter, these useful referen ces poi nt studen ts to sources that \viii enhance thei r understan d ing of chapter issues and argumenrs. • Tim eline. Featuring ph ilosophers' lives and important events, this visual learn- ing tool helps studen ts appreciate the histo ric significan ce of philosoph ical ideas by placi ng them \vithi n a larger context. • Charts, tables, and color photos. Appearing th roughout the book, these have been selected o r created to deepen studen t engagement with and u nderstanding of complex ideas and abstract co nceprs. In additio n, captions fo r these images incl ude b rief, open-ended questions to help studen rs "read" visuals \Vith the same critical attentio n they learn to b ring to written texrs. Preface xx11 1 xxiv Preface NEW TO THIS EDITION • An expanded chapter on aesthetics ( Chapter 7). Jc covers issues relating to the definition of art, objective and subjective standards, femi nist art, controvers ial artworks, on line art, and the philosophical exam inatio n of art by Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Gardner, Ducasse, and D an to. Several new photos illustrate fem inist art, co ntroversial art, and art that p rovokes discussion about what art is and isn't. • Expanded coverage in Chapter 9 {The Meaning of Life) . In addition to in- cluding readings by Tolstoy, Schopenhauer, Baggini, and Ed\vards {and com- mentary on Niet2Sche), the text now adds four more philosophers who debate the objectivity of meaning in life. Klemke and Lucretius lay o ut their case for subjectivist mean ing, and Wolf and Belshaw argue fo r objectivist meaning. • More history of philos ophy in Chapter 1. No\v there's coverage of the pre- Socratics Thales, Empedocles, and Parmenides, as well as fou r early women ph i- losophers: Hypatia, Themistoclea, Arignote, and Theano. • More text boxes adding depth to discussions or demonstrating how philo- sophical thinking can tackle tough contemporary issues. These cover human rights for robots, to rturing terrorists, racism, Buddhism and science, belief in God, and scientists and religion. ANCILLARIES The Oxford University Press Ancillary Resou rce Center {ARC) {www.oup-a rc.com/ vaughn-philosophy-here-and-no\v) houses a \vealth of instructor resources, includ- ing an Instructor's Manual with sample syllabi, read ing summaries, essay/discussion questions, s uggested Web links, and a glossary of key terms from the text; a Com- puterized Test Bank \Vith fifty or more multiple-cho ice and true/false questions per chapter {also available as a traditional "pencil-and-paper" Test Bank in the Instruc- tor's Manual); and PowerPoint lecture outlines. A compa nion website {www.oup.com/us/vaughn) contains study materials for students, including level-one and level-nvo practice quizzes with multiple-choice and true/false questions taken from the Test Bank, essay/discussion questions, read- ing s ummaries, flashcards of key terms from the text, and suggested Web links. All instructor and student resources are a lso available as cartridges for Learning Management Systems. For more information, please contact your Oxford University Press Sales Representative at 1-800-280-0280. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A text like th is is not possible \Vithout the help of a lot of talented and consci- entio us people. At the top of the list a re my fine editors at Oxford University Press-most notably Robert Miller and Meg Botteon, as well as Alyssa Palazzo and Sidney Keen. Throughout the fo rmative stages of this text, many astute re- viewers provided invaluable suggestions and criticisms, and the book is much the better for it. Many thanks to: Kristin Borgwald Miami Dade College Dan iel Bramer Holy Family University Jeremy Byrd Tarrant County College Teresa Cantrell University of Louisville A lberto Gonzalez College of the Canyons Aaron Rizzieri Yavapai College Stephen Russell Orr Solano Community College A llen Shonvell Ivy Tech Community College John Shuford Lin.field College Russell S\vanson Florida South Western State College Rabbi Doug Weber Castleton University Steve Wyre Mohave Community College Preface xxv CHAPTER PHILOSOPHY AND YOU CHAPT ER OBJECTIVES 1.1 PH ILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTAND ING • Know the p ractical and theoretica l benefits of studying philosophy. • Take an inventory of your philosophical belie fs. • Know the four main d ivisions of philosophy and the kinds of questions they examine. 1.2 SOCRATES ANO THE EXAMINED LIFE • Understand why Socrates declared that "the unexam ined life is not worth living." • Explain the Socratic method and how Socrates used it in search of understand ing. • Relate how Socrates showed that Thrasymachus's notion o f justice was wrong. • Exp lain how reductio ad absurdum arguments work. 1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY • Define argument, statement, conclusion, and premise. • Know the two conditions that must be met for an argument to be good. • Define deductive argument, inductive argument, valid, sound, cogent, strong, and weak. Understand inferences to the best explanat ion and how their strengt h is evaluated . • Be able to ident ify arguments in the fo rm o f modus ponens, modus to/lens, affirm ing the consequent, and denying the antecedent . • Be able to ident ify arguments in various contexts and tell whether they a re valid o r invalid , sound or not sound , strong or weak, and cogent or n ot cogent. • Understand the guidelines for reading and appreciating philosophy. • Be aware o f common fa llacies and know how to identify them in various contexts . 2 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You Science gives us know· ledge, bur o nly philosoph y can give us wisd o m. -Will Durant 1 Suppose you had a fundamen tal belief that t he mind, or soul, does not survive the death of the body. What other beliefs would this fundamen- tal belief be like ly to support? Philosophy sho uld be responsive ro human ex· pcricncc and yet c ritical of the defective thinking it sometimes encounte rs. -Martha Nussbaum 1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING The title of chis text, Philosophy Here and Now, is meant co emphas ize chat philoso- phy is, well, here and now-chat is, relevant and current. This means chat philoso- phy, even with its ancient lineage and seemingly remote concerns, applies co your li fe and you r times and your world. Philosophy achieves chis immediacy by being many good t hings at once: it is enlightening, choughc-provoking, life-changing, liberating, theoretical, and practical. The world is fu ll of scudencs and teachers ,vho can attest co these clai ms. More importantly, you will find p roof of chem in the remainder of chis text-and in the writings of the great philosophers, in you r g rasping what they say and the reasons they give fo r saying it, and in your o,vn honest accempcs co app ly philosophy co your life. Philosophy is the name chat philosophers have given co both a d iscipline and a process. As a discipline, philosophy is one of the humanities, a field of study out of which several ocher fields have evolved-physics, b iology, political science, and many ochers. As a p rocess, philosophy is a penetrating mode of reflection fo r understanding life's most important truths. This mode is what ,ve may call the philosophical method-the systemat ic use of critical reason ing co cry co find answers co fundamenta l questions about reality, morality, and kno,vledge. The method, however, is not a master key used exclusively by professional philosophers co unlock mysteries hidden from com mon fo lk. The philosophical method is the birthright of every person, fo r ,ve are all born with the cap acity co reason, co ques- tion, co discover. For thousands of years, great minds like Ar iscocle, Plato, Confu- cius, Descartes, Aqu inas, and Sa rtre have used it in their search for wisdom, and ,vhac they found has changed countless lives. Bue amateur philosophers like you have also used it-and continue co u se it-to ach ieve life-alte ring understanding chat ,vould have eluded chem othe rwise. The Good of Philosophy Ph ilosophy is not just about ideas; it's about fundamental ideas, chose upon which ocher ideas depend. A fundamental belief logically supporcs ocher bel iefs, and the mo re beliefs it supporcs the more fundamental it is. Your belief or disbelief in God, fo r exa mple, might support a hose of ocher beliefs about mora lity, life after death, heaven, hell, free will, science, evolution, p rayer, abortion, m iracles, homo- sexualit y, and more. Thanks co your upbringing, your culture, your peers, and ocher influences, you alread y have a head fu ll of fundam ental beliefs, some of chem true, some false. Whether true o r false, they constitute the framewo rk of your ,vhole belief system, and as such they help you make sense of a wide range of important iss ues in life-issues concern ing what exists and what doesn't, what actions a re right or ,vrong (or neither), and ,vhac kinds of things we can k no,v and not kno,v. Funda- mental beliefs, therefore, make up your "philosophy of life," wh ich informs your chinking and guides your actions. Perhaps now you can better app reciate philosophy's greatest practical benefit: it gives us che intellectual wherewithal co improve ou r lives by improv ing our Phi losophy: The Quest for Understand ing 3 philosophy of life. A faulty philosophy of life-that is, o ne that comprises a great many false fundamental beliefs-can lead to a misspent or m isdirected life, a life less mean ingful than it could be. Philosophy is the most powerful instrument we have for evaluating the worth of our fundamental beliefs and fo r ch anging them fo r the better. Through philosophy we exert control over the t rajectory of our lives, making major course corrections by reason and refl ection. The G reek philosopher Socrates (469-399 BCE), one of Wester n civil ization's great intellectual heroes, says, "An unexamined life is not \VOrth living." To examine your life is to scrutinize the core ideas that shape it, and the d eepest fo rm of scr utiny is exercised through philosophy. This search for answers goes to the heart of the tradi- tio nal conception of philosophy as a search for wisdom (the term phiwsophy is d erived from G reek words meaning " love of wisdom"). With the attainment of wisdom, we come to understand the true nature of reality and how to apply that understanding to living a good life. Philosophy's chief theoretical ben efit is the same one that most other fields of inqu iry pu rsue: understanding for its own sake. Even if philosophy had no p ract ical applications at a ll , it wou ld sti ll hold great value fo r us. We want to know how the wo rld works, what t ruths it hides, just for the sa ke of know ing. And philoso- Figure 1.1 Socrates (469-399 ace). phy obliges. Astronomers sea rch the s ky, physicists study subatomic part icles, and a rch aeologists search fo r ancient ruins, all the while knowing that what they find may have no practical implications at all . We humans wonder, and that's often all the reason we need to search for ans\vers. As the great ph ilosophe r Aristotle says, "Fo r it is owing to thei r wonde r that people both no\v begin and at first began to philosoph ize." For many people, the quest for understand ing through philosophy is a spiri- tual, transformative endeavo r, an ennobling pu rsuit of truths at the core of life. Thus, several philosophers speak of ph ilosophy as something that e nriches or nur- tu res the soul o r mind. Socrates, speaking to the jurors who condemned him fo r practicing philosophy on the streets of Athens, asked, "Are you not ash amed that, while you take care to acquire as much wea lth as poss ible, with honor and glory as \vell , yet you take no care or thought for understanding o r t ruth, or for the best poss ible state of your soul?" In a similar vein, the Greek ph ilosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE) said , "Let no young man delay the study of philosophy, and let no old man beco me \veary of it; for it is never too early no r too late to ca re fo r the well-bei ng of the sou l." And in our own era, the philosopher Walter Kaufmann (1921- 1980) declared, "Ph ilosophy means liberation from the two d imensions of ro utine, soa ring above the well kno\vn, seei ng it in ne\v perspectives, a rousing wonder and the wish to fl y." Along with ph ilosophical inquiry comes freedom. We begin our lives at a partic- u lar place and time, steeped in the ideas and values of a particular culture, fed ready- made beliefs that may or may not be true and that \Ve may never think to question. 2 Is it possib le to lead a mean ingfu l life w ith· out se lf-exam ination? Philosophy is the highest music. -Plato 4 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You If you pass ively accept such beliefs, then those beliefs are not really yours. If they are not really yours, and you let them guide your choices and actions, then they-not you-a re in cha rge of you r life. You thus forfeit your personal freedom. But phi- losophy helps us rise above th is p red icament, to transcend the narro,v and obstructed standpoint from which we may vie,v everything. It helps us s ift our hand-me-dow n beliefs in the light of reason, look beyond the prejudices that blind us, and see what's real and true. By using the ph ilosophical method, we may learn that some of our beliefs a re on solid g round and some a re not. In either case, through philosophy ou r beliefs become truly and authentically our own. Philosophical Terrain Figure 1.2 Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Philosophy's sphere of interest is vast, encompassing funda- mental beliefs drawn from many places. Philosophical ques- tions can arise anywhere. Part of the reason for th is is that ordinary bel iefs that seem to have no connection with philoso- phy can become philosophical in short order. A physiologist may ,vant to know ho,v our brains ,vork, but she ventu res into the philosophical a rena ,vhen she wonders ,vhether the bra in is the same th ing as the m ind-a quest ion that science alone To teach how to live w itho u t certainty and ycr w itho u t being paralysed by h esitation is perhaps ,he c hief thing that p hiloso· phy, in our age, can do fo r those wh o srudy it. -Benrand Russell 3 Has your thin king recent ly led you to reflect on p hilosophi- cal questions? If so, how d id the thought process beg in, and what f undamental belief d id you end u p contemplating? Metaphysics is the study of reality in ,he broadest sense, an inquiry into rhc clcmcnral naru rc of rhc u niverse a n d the things JO It. cannot answer. A lawyer studies how the death penalty is ad- min istered in Texas, but he does philosophy when he cons iders whether capital pun- ishment is ever morally perm iss ible. A med ical scientist wants to kno,v ho,v a human fetus develops, but she finds it d ifficult to avoid the ph ilosoph ical query of ,vhat the moral status of the fetus is. An astrophysicist studies the Big Bang, the cataclysmic explosion thought to have brought the un iverse into being-but then asks whether the Big Bang shows that God cause.cl the universe to ex ist. On CNN you see the horrors of ,var and famine, but then you find you rself g rappling with ,vhether they can be squared with the existence of an all-po,verful, all-knowing, and all-good God. Or you ,vonder ,vhat your mora l obligations a re to the poor and hungry of the ,vorld. O r you ponder whether government shou ld help people in need or leave them to fend for themselves. We can div ide philosophy's subject matter into four main divisions, each of ,vhich is a branch of inquiry in its o,vn right ,vith many subcategories. H ere's a b rief rundown of these divis ions and a sampling of the kinds of quest ions that each asks. Metaphysics is the study of reality in the broadest sense, an inqui ry into the elemental nature of the un iverse and the things in it. Though it must take into ac- count the findings of science, metaphysics generally focuses on basic questions that science ca nnot add ress. Questions of interest: Does the ,vorld consist on ly of matter, or is it made up of other basic things, such as ideas or minds? Is there a spiritual, ideal real m that exists beyond the material world? Is the mind the same thing as the body? Phi losophy: The Quest for Understand ing 5 WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE? Your Philosophical Beliefs Where do you stand on the fun d amencal issues in philosophy? Here is your chance co cake inventory of your vie,vs. After you finish chis course, cake the survey again co see if your perspective has changed or become ,nore nuanced. AnS\ver ,vich chese numbers: 5 = true; 4 = probably crue; 3 = neither probable nor i1nprobable; 2 = probably false; I = false. I. Ac lease so,ne 1noral nonns or principles are objectively true or valid for everyone. 2. Mora l standards are relative co what individuals or cu ltures bel ieve. __ 3. Mi nd and body consist of nvo fu nda,nencally d iffere nt kinds of scuff- non physical scuff and physica l scuff. __ 4. The 1n ind, or sou l, can exist ,vichouc che body. __ 5. Our mental scares are nothing bu r bra in scares (,n ind scares are identical co bra in scares). 6. No one has free ,vi ii. __ 7. Persons have free will (so,ne of our actions are free). __ 8. Although our actions are determined, they can still be free (free ,viii and decenn inis,n are nor in confl ict). __ 9. The God of crad icional Western religions (an all-knowing, all-po,verful, all-good deity) exists. __ 10. The a pparent design of the universe shows char it had an intell igent designer. __ 11. Right actions are chose co,nmand ed by God; ,vrong actions are chose forbidden by God. __ 12. God does nor ,na ke actions right or ,vrong by comma nd ing chem co be so. __ 13. We can know some th ings a bout che external world. __ 14. We cannot know anything about che externa l world. __ 15. The theory of evolution is a beccer explanation of t he apparent design of biologica l life chan che theory of "incelligenc design." __ 16. Truth about someth ing depends on what a person or culture believes. __ 17. Libercarianis,n is che correct political t heory. __ 18. Welfare liberalis,n is che correct moral theory. __ 19. Mean ing in life comes from outside ourselves, fro,n God or so,ne o cher transcendent real ity. __ 20. Mean ing in life comes from ,vich in ourselves. __ How are mind and body related? Do people have immortal souls? Do humans have free wi ll, or are o u r actions determ ined by forc es beyo nd our control? Can actions be both free and deter mined ? Does God exist? How ca n both a good God and evil exist simultaneously? What is the nat ure of causality? Can an effect ever precede its cause? What is the nature of time? Is time travel possible? And w hat, Socrates, is the food of che soul> Surely,
I said, knowledge is the
food of che soul.
– Plato

6 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
MAIN DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY
DIVISION
Metaphysics
Epistemology
A xiology
Log ic
Epistemology is the study
of knowledge.
Axiology is the study
of value, including bo th
aesthetic value and moral
value. Ethics is the study
of moral value using the
methods of philosophy.
QUESTIONS
Does the world consist only of matter, or is it made up of other basic th ings, such
as ideas or mind? Is there a spiritual, ideal realm that exists beyond the material
world? Is the mind the same thing as the body? How are mind and body related?
Do people have immorta l souls? Do humans have free wi ll, or are our actions
determ ined by forces beyond our control? Can actions be both free and deter-
mined? Does God exist? How can both a good God and evi l exist simultaneously?
What is the nature of causal ity? Can an effect ever precede its cause? What is the
nature of time? Is time trave l possible?
What is knowledge? What is truth? Is knowledge possible- can we ever know any-
thing? Does knowledge require certa inty? What are the sources of knowledge?
Is experience a source of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we gain
knowledge of the empirical world through reason a lone? If we have knowledge,
how much do we have? When are we justified in saying that we know something?
Do we have good reasons to believe that the world exists independently of our
minds? Or do our minds constitute reality?
What makes an action right (or wrong)? What th ings are intrinsically good? What
is the good life? What gives life mean ing? What makes someone good (or bad)?
What moral principles shou ld gu ide our actions and choices? Wh ich is the best
moral theory? Is killing ever mora lly perm issible? If so, why? Are mora l standards
objective or subjective? Is an action right merely because a culture endorses it?
Does morality depend on God? What makes a society just?
What are the ru les for drawing correct inferences? What are the nature and struc-
ture of deductive arguments? How can propositional or predicate log ic be used to
evaluate arguments? Upon what log ical principles does reason ing depend? Does
logic describe how the world is- or just how our minds work? Can conclusions
reached through inductive logic be rationally justified?
Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Questions of interest: What is knowl-
edge? What is truth? Is kno\vledge possible-can \Ve ever kno\v anythi ng? Does
knowledge require certainty? What are the sources of kno\vledge? Is experience a
sou rce of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we ga in kno\vledge of the
empi rical \vorld through reason alone? If \Ve have kno\vledge, how much do \Ve have?
When are we justified in saying that \Ve know something? Do we have good reasons
to believe that the \vorld exists independently of our minds? Or do our minds con-
stitute reality?
Axiology is the study of value, including both aesthetic value and moral value.
The study of moral value is kno\vn as eth ics. Ethics involves inquiries into the nature
of moral judgments, virtues, values, obligations, and theories. Questions of interest:
What makes an action right (or wrong)? What things are intrinsically good? What is
the good life? What gives life meaning? What makes someone good (or bad)? What
moral principles should guide our actions and cho ices? Which is the best moral

Phi losophy: The Quest for Understand ing 7
theory? Is ki lling ever morally perm issible? If so, why?
A re moral standa rds objective or subjective? Is a n ac-
t io n right merely because a cultu re end orses it? Does
morality depend o n God? W hat makes a society just?
Logic is the st udy of correct reasoning. Ques-
tions of interest: W hat are the rules for d raw ing cor-
rect inferences? W h at are the nature and structure of
deductive a rgumen ts? How can propositio nal o r pred-
icate logic be used to evaluate a rgumenrs? Upon wh at
logical principles does reasoning depend? D oes logic
describe ho,v the world is-or just ho,v our minds
work? Can conclusions reached through induct ive
logic be rationally justifi ed?
I n additio n to these divisions, there are subdivi-
s io ns of ph ilosophy whose job is to examine critically
the ass umptions a nd principles that u nderlie other
fi elds. Thus ,ve have the p h ilosophy of science, the
ph ilosophy of la,v, the ph ilosophy of mathematics,
the ph ilosophy of h istory, the ph ilosophy of language,
a nd many others. When those labo ring in a discipline
beg in question ing irs most basic ideas-ideas that
define irs subject matter and principles of inquiry-
ph ilosophy, the most elemental mode of investigation,
steps 1n.
Figure 1.3 Plat o, point ing u pward t oward t h e h igher realm
of i deas, and Aristotle, gesturing down toward t h e t h ings of
t his earth.
ESSAY/ DISCUSS IO N QUESTIO N S SECTION 1.1
1. W h at is the ph ilosophical method ? W ho can make use of this
app roach to important questions? Can on ly p hilosophers use it?
H ave you used it? H o,v?
2. W h at a re some funda mental beliefs that are part of your ph ilosophy of
life? H o,v do these beliefs influence you r life?
3. W h at is ph ilosophy’s greatest practical benefit? Do you think studying
ph ilosophy could ch ange you r life goals or your fundamental beliefs?
W hy or why not?
4. H ow can p hilosophy enhance you r personal freedom? What are some
of you r fu ndamental beliefs that you have never fully examined? What
might be the result of never examining a fu ndamental belief?
5. W h ich of the fo ur mai n divisions of ph ilosophy interests you the
most? W hy? W hat ph ilosophical ques tions listed in this section would
you most ,vant to have ans,vers to?
Logic is t he study of
correct reasoning.
There’s a d ifference
between a philosophy and
a bumper sticker.
– Charles M. Schulz

8 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
The point of philosophy
is to start with something
so simple as not to seem
worrh stating. and to end
with something so para-
doxical that no one will
believe it.
– Bertrand Russell
4 Socrates says that a
good man can never
be harmed. W hat do
you t hink h e means by
this?
The Soc ratic m ethod is
a q ucstion -and .. answcr
d ialogue in w hich proposi-
tions a rc method ically
scru tinized to uncover the
tru rh.
The chicfbcncfir, which
rcsuk< from philosophy, arises in an indirect man .. ncr, and proceeds more from its secret> insensible
inAucncc, than from its
immediate application.
– David Hume
1.2 SOCRATES AND THE EXAMINED LIFE
There is no better way to understand and appreciate the philosoph ical quest for
knowledge than to study the life and work of Socrates, one of philosophy’s greatest
practitioners and the most revered figure in irs history. Socrates wrote no ph ilosophy,
but ,ve know about his thinking and character through his famous pupil Plato, who
portrayed him in severa l dialogues, or conversations (notably in Euthyphro, Crito,
and Apology). For two and a half millennia Socrates has been inspi ring generations
by his devotion to philosophical inquiry, his relentless search for ,visdom , and his
deter mination to live according to his o,vn high standards. As mentioned earl ier, he
famously said that “the unexam ined life is not worth living,” and he became the best
example of someone living h is life by that maxim. Thus, at a time when most phi-
losophy was di rected at cosmological specu lations, he turned to critically examin ing
people’s basic conceprs, common beliefs, and moral thinking.
For Socrates, an unexamined life is a tragedy because it resulrs in grievous harm
to the soul, a person’s true self or essence. The sou l is harmed by lack of kno,vledge-
ignorance of one’s o,vn self and of the most important values in life (the good). But
knowledge of these things is a mark of the soul’s excellence. A clear sign that a per-
son has an unhealthy soul is her exclusive pursuit of social status, ,vealth, po,ver,
and pleasure instead of the good of the sou l. The good of the soul is attained on ly
through an uncomprom ising search for what’s true and real, through the wisdom
to see what is most vital in life. Such ins ight comes from rational self-exam ination
and critical questioning of facile assumptions and unsupported beliefs. To get to the
truth, Socrates thought, we must go around the fa lse certitudes of custom, tradition,
and superstition and let reason be our guide. Thus he played the role of philosophi-
cal gadfly, an annoying pest to the people of Athens, prodding them to wake up and
seek the wisdom within thei r g rasp.
We know very little about Socrates’ life. H e spent a ll his days in Athens except
for a term of military service in which he sold iered in the Peloponnesian War. H e
,vas married and had three sons. He spent much of his time roaming the streets of
Athens, speaking ,vith anyone who would listen. His habit was to ask people seem-
ingly simple questions about their views on virtue, religion, justice, or the good,
challenging them to think critically about their bas ic assumptions. This sort of
question-and-answer dialogue in which propositions are methodically scrutinized
to uncover the truth has become known as the Socratic method. Usually when
Socrates used it in conversations, or dialogues, with his fellow Athenians, thei r views
,vou ld be exposed as false or confused. The main point of the exercise for Socrates,
ho,vever, was not to w in arguments but to get closer to the truth. He thought people
,vho pursued this noble aim as he did should not be embarrassed by being sho,vn to
be wrong; they should be delighted to be weaned from a false opinion. Nevertheless,
the Socratic conversations often ended in the humiliation of eminent Athenians.
They were enraged by Socrates, ,vhile many youths grav itated to him.
Eventually Socrates ,vas arrested and charged ,vith disrespecting the gods and
corrupting the youth of the city. He was tried before five hundred jurors, a majority

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK
Plato
No p h ilosopher- with che possible exception of
Ariscocle-has had a deeper an d more lasting effect
on Western choughr chan Plato (c. 427- 347 BCE). He
,vas born in Athens in to an inAuen cial ariscocracic fa,nily
and grew up d uring che perilous years of che Peloponnesian
War, a s truggle between Athens and the Pelopon nesian scares.
He was a s tuden t and admirer of Socrates, who turned Plato’s
Socrates and the Examined Life 9
Figure 1.4 Plat o
(c. 427- 347 8C£).
m ind coward philosophy and che pursuit of wisdom. H e ,vas horrified by Socrates’
execution in 399 for irnpiery and corruption of Athenian youth, so he left Athens
and traveled ,videly, possibly co Sicily and Egypt. When he returned co Athens, he
founded the Acad emy, a reaching college regard ed as che firs t university, and devoted
che rest of his life co reach ing and writing p h ilosophy. (The Academy end ured for
hun dreds of years until ic ,vas abo lished by che Eastern Roman ernperor Justi nian I.)
The Acade,ny’s ,nose renowned studen t ,vas Ariscocle, who en tered the school a r age
seventeen and re,nained for C\ven ry years.
Plato’s ch inking is e,nbod ied in his dia logues, nvenry-five of which exist in
cheir co,nplece form. They were ,vrircen durin g a span of fifty years and have been
d ivided into t h ree periods: early, midd le, a nd lace. The early dia logues include
Eurhyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno , and Gorgias. Th ese early works portray Socrates
as a brill ia nt and principled deAarer of h is contemporaries’ bogus clai,ns ro k nowl-
edge. The midd le d ialogues include Phaedo, Republic, a nd Theneretur; che lace ones
consist of Critias, Pnrmenides, Sophirt, Laws, and ochers.
of whom voted co conv ic t h im . H is sentence was d eath o r exile; he chose death by
poison rather than leave h is beloved Athen s. In h is d ialogues Crito a nd Phaedo, Plato
recounts che events of che trial, including Socrates’ ad dress co che ju rors. Socrates is
portrayed as a man of brill iant intellect and unshakeable integrit y who wou ld not
compromise his principles, even co escape death.
In one form or another, che Socratic method has been pare of Western e.ducacion
fo r centuries. l e is one of che ways ch at ph ilosophy is done, a powerful procedure fo r
applying critical chinking co many scacemencs chat seem out of reason’s reach . As
Socrates used it, che method typically ,vould go like chis: (1) someone poses a q ues-
tio n abou t che meaning of a concept (for example, “What is justice?”); (2) Socrates’
companion gives a n answer; (3) Socrates raises questions about che answer, proving
chat che a nswer is inadequ ate; (4) co avoid che problems inherent in chis answer, che
companion offers a second ans,ver; (5) seeps (3) a nd (4) are repeated a nu mber of

10 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Figure 1.5 The Death of Socrates by Jacques-Louis David.
times, ultimately revealing that the companion does not kno\v \vhat he thought he
knew. To Socrates, this negative outcome is actually a k ind of p rogress. False answers
are elim inated, opinions are improved, and perhaps the truth is a little closer than
before.
Let’s watch Socrat es in action. Here is his conversation with Thrasymachus, a
teacher eager to demonstrate that Socrates is not as \vise as people say he is. The ques-
tion is “What is justice?” and Thrasymachus insisrs that justice is whatever is in the
interest of the strongest-that is, might makes r ight.
Pl ato, The Republic
Listen, then, he [Thrasymachus] said; I proclaim t hat justice is nothing else than the
interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won’t.
Let me first understand you, I [Socrates] replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest
of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You can not mean to say
that because Polydamas, the pancratiast [an athlete), is stronger t han we are, and fi nds
the eating of beef conducive to his bod ily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally
for our good who are weaker than he is , and right and just for us?
That’s abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense wh ich is most
damaging to t he argument.
Not at all , my good sir, I sa id; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you
wou ld be a little clearer.

Socrates and the Examined Life 11
Well , he said, have you never heard that fo rms of government differ; there are
tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?
Yes, I know.
And t he government is the ruli ng power in each state?
Certai nly.
And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical,
tyrannical, with a view to t heir several interests; and these laws, which are made by
t he m for t heir own interests, are the j ustice which they deliver to their subjects, and
him who t ransgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law and unj ust. And that
is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which
is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have
power, the on ly reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere t he re is one principle of
justice, which is the interest of the stronger.
Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover.
But let me re mark, t hat in defining justice you have yourself used the word ” interest”
which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words “of
t he stronger” are added.
A small addition, you must allow, he said.
Great or small , never mind about tha t: we must first inqu ire whether what you are
saying is the truth. Now we are bot h agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you
go on to say “of the stronger”; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore
consider further.
Proceed.
I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey t he ir rulers?
I do.
But are the ru lers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?
To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.
Then in ma king their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes
not?
True.
When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when
t hey are mistaken, contrary to their in terest; you admit t hat?
Yes.
And the laws which they ma ke must be obeyed by t he ir subjects- and that is what
you call justice?
Doubtless.
Then justice, according to your argument, is not on ly obedience to the interest of
t he stronger but the reverse ?
What is that you are saying? he asked.
I am on ly repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not
admitted tha t the rulers may be mistaken about t heir own interest in what they com-
mand, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?
Yes.
Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for t he interest of t he
stronger, when the rulers un in tentionall y command things to be done which are to
t he ir own injury. For if, as you say, just ice is the obedience which the subject renders to
t he ir commands, in that case, 0 wisest of men, is there any escape fro m the conclusion
t hat the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for t he interest, but what is for the
injury of the stronger?•
Astonishment is chc root
of philosophy.
-Paul Tillich
5 Socrates never seems
adversaria l or combat-
ive in h is d ia logues.
What effect do you
t h ink t h is approach has
on those who enter
into dialogue wit h
h im?

12 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK
The Pre-Socratics
Philosophy began in ancient Greece in rhe sixth century BCE a,nong thinkers ,vho
broke with age-old tradition co ponder important ,narrers in an entirely novel ,vay.
For centuries, hu,nans had been devising allS\vers co fundamental questions: What
is rhe nature of the world? Whar is ir ,nade of-one kind of scuff or ,nany kinds?
Does rhe ,vorld have an orig in or has it always existed? Why is the world rhe ,vay
it is? What ,nakes things happen-gods, magic, or something else? What is rhe
reality behind rhe appearances of reality? Their answers ,vere generally drawn fro,n
1nyrhology and rradirion, from old stories about rhe gods or from hand-me-down
lore and law. But rhe first philosophers-called pre-Socratics because most of the,n
came before Socrates (fifth century BCE)-refused to rake th is parh. It is mosrly
rheir way of seeking answers about the world, rather rhan the answers the,nselves,
char distinguished chem and 1nade chem rhe first philosophers. Once chis philo-
sophical fire was lie, ir spread co lacer thinkers in rhe ancient ,vorld, a period of
about a thousand years, from approximately 600 BCE co around 500 CE. Ir ,vas in
chis era char Western phi losophy first established itself, defined almost all irs main
areas of study, and gave us ph ilosophica l heroes (most notably, Socrates, Plaro, and
Arisrorle) who continue co inAuence our ch inking on imporranr ideas and issues.
So,ne of rhe more notable pre-Socratics:
Thales (c. 625-547 BCE). Accord ing co tradition, Thales ,vas rhe first philoso-
pher. In ancient Greece he and his new ,vay of chinking garnered a great deal of
Figure 1.6 Thales of Miletus (c. 625-547 ace).
respect for an odd reason: he ,vas
said co have predicted rhe solar
eclipse of 585 BCE and co have
derived his prediction ,virhour
appeals to d ivine or orherworldly
forces. On th is account he has
also been called rhe first scienrisr,
for in chose ri,nes rhere ,vas no
clear distinction between ph ilos-
ophy and science. Thales’ grearesr
conrriburion to both philosophy
and science ,vas his method. He
sec out co look for natural-nor
myth ic-explanations for natu-
ral pheno,nena, and he insisted
char such accounts be as simple
as possible, preferably accounting
for everyth ing by positing a sin-
gle substance or element. This, as
it turns our, is also rhe preferred
approach of ,nodern science.

Empedocks (c. 495- c. 435 BCE). In
rhe n inereenrh century Charles Danvin
propounded rhe theory of bio logical
evolution, explaining char evolution op-
erates through whar he called “natural
selection.” The basic ourlines of natural
selection, however, did n’t originate ,virh
Darwin. They ,vere first arriculared in
rough fonn rwenry-five centuries ago by
a pre-Socratic philosopher na,ned Em-
pedodes. Using observation and imagi-
nation, Empedocles ,nainrained char
an i,na ls were nor created whole by a deiry
and placed on rhe earrh-rhey evolved.
Parmenides (c. 515-450 BCE). Par-
menides ,vas rhe ,nose groundbreaking
and inAuenrial philosopher of rhe pre-
Socrarics. We know lirrle about his life-
nor much more rhan char he lived in Elea
(a Greek colony on rhe southern coast of
Italy) and raughr rhe famous master of par-
adoxes, Zeno. We also kno,v char through
rhe centuries he won rhe arrenrion and ad-
m iration of several em inent thinkers, fro,n
Plato co Plutarch co Hegel. Like rhe ocher
pre-Socratics, he conrribured more co rhe
shape of philosophica l inquiry rhan co its
conrenr. Parmen ides’ clai,n co fame rests
mosrly on his sysremaric e1nploy1nenr of
deductive argu,nenr. He seems co have
been rhe first thinker outside rhe fiel d of
marhe,narics co reason deductively and
consisrenrly from basic prem ises co inrer-
esring conclusions. In rhe process, he ce-
mented basic d istinctions char have been
essential co philosoph ica l inquiry co chis
day. For one rhing, he conrrasred reason
and rhe senses. He contended char knowl-
edge of rhe world could be acquired only
through reason, only through a deductive
chain of reasoning such as he himself used.
Figure 1.7 Empedocles
(c. 49x. 4 35 see).
Socrates and the Examined Life 13
The senses, however, were unreliable. Fig. 1.8 Parmenides (c. 515-450 see).

14 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Red11ctio ad abs11rdu111
is an argumc nr fo rm in
which a set of stateme nts
to be proved false is as·
sumed , and absurd or false
stateme nts arc d educed
from the set as a whole}
s howing that the original
stateme nt mus t be false .
Socrates uses h is famo us question-and-anS\ver approach to prove that Thrasy-
machus’s defin ition of justice is \vrong. In particula r, he applies a common form of
argument called redttctio ad absurdu»z. (Other a rg ument forms a re discussed in the
fo llow ing section.) The basic idea beh ind it is if you ass ume that a set of statements
is true, and yet you ca n deduce a false or absurd statement fro m it, then the o rigi nal
set of statements as a whole must be false. So, in the p receding d ialogue, Socrates
says in effect, Let’s ass ume that Thrasymachus is right that justice is whatever is in
the interest of the powerful, and that people a re just if they obey the laws made by
the powerfu l. It is clear, ho\vever, that the powerfu l sometimes make mistakes and
demand obedience to la\vS that a re not in their best interest. So if Thrasymachus’s
defi nition of justice is correct, then it is right for people to do what is in the interest
of the po\verfu l, a nd it is also right to do \vhat is not in the interest of the powerful.
H is id ea of j ustice then lead s to a logical contrad iction and is therefore false.
ESSAY/ DISCUSSION Q UESTIO NS SECTION 1.2
1. Could the execution of someone for saying u npopular things happen
in this country? W hy or why not? Are there countries in the \vorld
where such things happen regu larly? Is the execution of someone for
his o r her offensive speech ever justified? Expla in.
2. What do you th ink Socrates would think about modern consumer
societies?
3. Socrates is often regard ed as the noblest of the great ph ilosophers.
Is th is opinion justified? W hy or why not?
4. W rite an imaginary Socratic dialogue benveen yoursel f a nd a friend .
Imagine that your friend declares, “Everyone lies. N o one ever tells the
truth,” and you want to sho\v that those statemen ts are false.
5. W rite a Socratic dialogue between two fictional characters. Imagine
that the opening statement is, “C.ourresy to others is always a cynical
attempt to ser ve you r own interests. Respect for people has nothing to
do with courtesy.”
1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY
As we have seen, to think ph ilosophically is to b ring you r po\vers of critical reasoning
to bear on fundamental questions. W hen you do this, you are usually clarifying the
mean ing of concepts, constructing a nd evaluating ph ilosophical theories, or devis-
ing a nd evaluating logical argu ments. This latter task constit utes the principal labor
of ph ilosophy. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Desca rtes, a nd other great th inkers do not
deliver their p hilosoph ical insights to us without argument, as if we a re automatically
to accept their vie\vS \Vith no questions asked. Ph ilosophers provide reasons for think-
ing their ideas a re plausible-that is, they give us a rgumen ts. And if we believe wh at

Thinking Philosophically 15
they say, it should be because there are good reasons for doing so. Like\vise, if we
expect intelligent people co accept our philosoph ical vie\vS, \Ve must argue ou r case.
Since the ph ilosophy we read \vill most likely contain arguments, our understand-
ing of the text will hang on our abil ity co identify and understand chose arguments.
Reasons and Arguments
As you m ight have guessed, the term argument does not refer co heated d isagreemenrs
o r emotional squabbles. An a rgumen t is a group of statements in \vhich one of chem
is meant co be supported by t he others. A statem ent (or cla im) is an assertion chat
someth ing is or is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance chat is either
t rue or fa lse. In an argument, the statement bei ng supported is the con clu sion , and
the scacemenrs supporting the conclusion a re the premises. The p rem ises are meant
co p rovide reasons fo r believing chat the conclus ion is true. A good argument g ives
us good reasons for accepting a conclus ion; a bad argument fa ils co provide good
reasons. In philosophy-and in any ocher kind of rational inqui ry-accepting a
conclus ion (statement) \Vithout good reasons is an elementary mistake in reason ing.
Believing a statement w ithout good reasons is a recipe for error; believing a statement
for good reasons increases your chances of uncovering the truth.
When we do philosophy, then, we are likely at some point co be grappli ng with
a rgumenrs-we are trying co either (1) devise an argument co support a statement
o r (2) evaluate an argument co see if there really are good reasons for accepting irs
conclus ion.
Note chat argument in the sense used here is not synony-
mous with pem,asion. An argument provides us with reasons
for accepting a claim; it is an attempted “proof” fo r an asser-
tion. But persuasion does not necessarily involve giving any
reasons at all for accepting a claim. To persuade is co influence
people’s opinions, \vhich can be accomplished by offering a
good argument but a lso by misleading with logical fallacies,
explo iting emotions and prejud ices, dazzling with rhetori-
cal gimmicks, h iding or distorting the faces, threaten ing or
coercing people-the list is long. Good arguments prove
someth ing \vhether or not they persuade. Persuasive ploys
can change m inds but do not necessarily prove anything.
No\v consider these nvo s imple arguments:
Argum ent 1
It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent person.
Abortion takes the life of an innocent person .
Therefore abortion is wrong.
An a.rgume.nt is a s tate·
men, cou pled wh h o,her
statements that arc meant
to s upporr th at statemen t.
A s tatement (claim) is an
asscrrio n that something
is o r is not the case and L~
therefore the kind of urrer-
ancc that is either true or
false. A conclusion is the
sra,emen, being suppon ed.
A premise is a sratcmcn t
supporting the conclusio n.
Argum ent2
God does not exist. After a ll , most coll ege
stu dents believe that that is the case.
Figure 1.9 Hit ler was a master persuader, relying not
on good arguments but on emotional rhetoric. How
many people t oday would be persuaded by a contem-
porary politician w ith Hitler’s rhetorical talents?

16 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Philosophy asks ,he simple
question, what is it all
about?
-Alfred North \’qhicehead
II I II I II 111111111111 Ill II I II I II I II I II Ill 1111111
PHILOSOPHY LAB –
Do you live an examined life? The follo,ving srarements express some fundamenral
beliefs-beliefs char countless people have bur may never have thought much abour.
Read each sraremenr and select che ones char you sincerely believe. Then rry ro recall
if you have ever seriously questioned these beliefs. (Passing thoughts and idle revelry
do not counr.) Be honesr. Th is liule experiment could be very revealing-and help-
ful as you chink abour your life and values.
I. God exists and ,varches over me.
2. God somerimes answers prayers.
3. There is a heaven.
4. I have both a body and an im morral soul.
5. My emotions are not under my control; rhey just happen .
6. It is ,vrong co criticize ocher cultures.
7. It is ,vrong co judge or her people’s acrions.
8. The mora l principles chat I ,vas raised ro bel ieve are the right ones.
9. Political conservatives are wrong about most issues.
10. Political liberals are wrong about most issues.
11. I make free choices; all my decisions are up co me.
12. I can come ro kno,v some things by fa ith alone.
13. My emotions are my best guide co what is morally right or ,vrong.
14. People are basically bad.
15. People are basically good.
In Argument I, the conclusion is “abortion is wrong,” and it is backed by nvo
premises: “Ir’s ,vrong to take the life of an innocent person” and “Abortion t akes t he
life of an innoce nt person.” In Argument 2, the conclusion is ” God does not exist,”
,vhich is s upported by the premise “After all, most college students believe that that
is t he case.” D espite the differences between these nvo p assages (differences in con-
tent, the number of premises, and the order of their parts) , they are both arguments
because they exemplify basic argument struc ture: a conclusion supported by at least
one premise.
Though the compo nenrs of an a rgument seem clea r enough, people often fa il to
distingu ish benveen a rgumenrs and stro ng statemenrs t hat contain no arg uments at
all. Suppose we change Argument I into this:
Abortio n is wrong. I ca n’ t believe how m any people think it’s m orally
okay. The world is insane.
Now there is no a rgument, just an expression of exasperat io n or anger. There are
no statem ents giving us reasons to believe a conclusio n. What we h ave are some un-
suppo rted assertions that may m erely appear to make a case. If we ig no re t he distinc-
tion between genuine arguments and nonargumentative material, critical reason ing
is undo ne.

Thinking Philosophically 1 7
The simplest way co locate an a rgument is co find its conclusion first, then its
premises. Ze roing in on conclusions and p remises ca n be a lot easier if you keep an
eye out for indicator uJords. Indicato r words often tag a long \vich arguments and
ind icate that a conclusion o r premise may be nearby.
H ere a re a fe\v conclusion indicator \vords:
consequently
thus
therefore
it follows chat
as a result
hence
so
\vhich means chat
H ere a re some premise ind icator words:
in view of the fact assum ing chat
because since
due co the fac e that for
inasmuch as given that
Just remember chat indicator words do not guarantee the presence of conclusions
and prem ises. They are simply telltale signs.
Assuming we can recognize an a rgument when we see it, ho\v can we cell ifit is a
good one? Fortunately, the general criteria for judging the merirs of an a rgument are
s imple and clear. A good argument-one chat gives us good reasons fo r believing a
cla im-muse h ave (1) solid logic and (2) true p remises. Requi rement (1) means chat
the conclusion should follow logically from the p rem ises, chat there muse be a proper
logical connection between the supporting scacemenrs and the statement supported.
Requ irement (2) says chat what the p remises assert must in fact be the case. An a rgu-
ment that fails in either respect is a bad argument.
There are two basic kinds of arguments-deductive and inductive-and ou r
two requirements hold for both of chem, even though the logical connect io ns in
each t ype are distinct. D eductive argumen ts are incende.d co give logically conclusive
s upport co t heir conclusions so chat if the premises are true, t he conclusion absolutely
must be true. Argument I is a deductive argument and is therefore supposed co be
const ructed so that if t he two premises are true, its conclus io n cannot possibly be
false. H ere it is with irs structure laid ba re:
Argumen t 1
1 . It’s wrong to take the life of an innoce nt perso n.
2. Abortio n takes the li fe of an innocent person.
3. Therefore, abortion is wrong.
Do you see that, given t he form or structure of this argument, if t he premises
a re true, then the conclusio n has to be true? It would be very strange-illogical, in
fact-to agree that the two p rem ises are true but that the conclusion is fa lse.
One’s p hilosophy is no t
best expressed in word s; it
is exp ressed in chc ch o ices
o ne makes . .. and the
choices we make arc ultim ~
arcly out responsibility.
-£lea.nor Roosevelt
6 Recall some stat e-
ments t hat you have
heard or read in which
st rong assert io ns were
made but no argument
was p resented . Did the
asse rt ions p rove a ny-
thi ng? W hat was your
reaction at t he t i me?
We re you persuaded o r
imp re ssed by them?
A d eductive argument is
an argument inte nded to
give logically conclusive
support to its conclusio n.

18 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Ph ilosophy, when super-
fi cially studied, excite.< doubt; w hen t horoughly explo red, it dispels it. -Francis Bacon An inductive argume.nt is an argume nt intended to give probable support ro its conclus ion. Now look at this one: Argument 3 1. All dogs are mammals. 2. Rex is a dog. 3. Therefore, Rex is a mammal. Again, there is no way fo r t he premises to be t rue while the conclusion is fa lse. The deductive form of t he argument guarantees this. So a deductive a rgument is intended to have this sort of airtight st ructure. If it actually does have th is structure, it is said to be valid. Argument I is deductive because it is intended to p rov ide logically conclusive support to its conclusion. It is valid because, as a mat ter of fact, it does offer this kind of support. A deductive a rgu- ment that fails to provide conclusive s upport to its conclusion is said to be invalid. In such an argument, it is possible fo r the p remises to be true and the conclusion false. Argument 3 is intended to have a de.ductive fo rm, and because it actually does have this form, the argument is also valid. An elementary fact about deductive arguments is that their valid ity (or lack thereof) is a separate issue from the truth of the premises. Validity is a structu ral matter, depending on how an argument is put together. Truth concerns the nature of the claims made in the premises and conclusion. A deductive argument is s up- posed to be built so that if the p remises are true, the conclusion must be true-but in a particular case, the p rem ises might not be true. A valid argument can have true or false premises and a true or false conclusion. (By defin ition, of course, it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.) In any case, being invalid or having false premises dooms a deductive a rgument. Inductive arguments are supposed to g ive probable support to their conclusions . Unlike deductive a rgumenrs, they are not designe.d to s upport their conclusio ns deci- sively. They can establish only that, if their p rem ises are true, their conclusions are probably true (more likely to be t rue than not). Argument 2 is an inductive a rgu- ment meant to d emonstrate the p robable truth that "God does not ex ist." Like a ll in- ductive arguments (and unlike deductive o nes), it can have true p remises and a false conclusion. So it's possible for the sole p rem ise-"After all, most college studenrs bel ieve that that is the case"-to be true wh ile the conclusion is fa lse. If inductive a rgumenrs s uccee.d in lend ing very probable support to their conclu- sions, they are said to be strong. Strong a rguments are such that if their p remises are true, their conclusions a re very probably true. If they fail to provide th is probable support, they are terme.d iueak. Argument 2 is a weak a rgument because its prem- ise, even if t rue, does not show that more likely than not God does not ex ist. What college st udenrs (or any other group) believe about God does not constit ute good evidence for or agai nst God's existence. But consider this inductive argument: Argument 4 1. Eighty-fi ve percent of the students at th is univers ity are Republica ns. 2. Sonia is a student at this univers ity. 3. Therefore, Son ia is probably a Republican. Thinking Philosophically 1 9 This argument is strong. If its premises are true, irs conclusion is likely to be true. If 85 percent of the un iversit y's students are Republicans, and Sonia is a university student, she is more likely than not to be a Republican too. When a valid (d eductive) argument h as true prem ises, it is a good argument. A good d eductive argument is sa id to be sound. A rgument I is valid, but we cannot say whether it is sound until ,ve d eter mine the t ruth of t he premises. A rgument 3 is valid, and if its premises a re true, it is sound. When a st rong (inductive) argument h as true premises, it is also a good argument. A good inductive argument is said to be cogent. Argument 2 is ,veak, so there is no way it can be cogent. Argument 4 is st rong, and if irs premises are t rue, it is cogent. Checking the validit y or strength of an argument is often a plain, commonsense undertaking. Using our natural reasoning ability, ,ve can examine ho,v the premises a re linked to the conclusion and can see quickly whether the conclusion fo llows from the premises. We are most likely to make an easy job of it when the argumenrs are s imple. Many times, ho,vever, we need some help, and help is available in the form of methods and g u idel ines fo r evaluating arguments. Having a fam il iarit y with common arg ument patterns, or forms, is especially useful ,vhen assess ing the validity of deductive a rgumenrs. We are likely to encoun- ter these fo rms again and again. H ere is a prime example: Argument 5 1 . If the surgeon operates, t hen the patient will be cured. 2 . The surgeon is operating. 3. Therefore, the patient will be cured. This argument form contains a conditional premise-that is, a premise consist- ing of a conditional, or if-then, statement (actually a compound statement composed of nvo constituent statements). Premise 1 is a conditional statement. A conditional statement has two parrs: the part beginning with if (called the antecedent), and the part beginning ,vith then (known as the consequent). So the antecedent of Premise 1 is "If the surgeon operates," and the consequent is "then the patient w ill be cured." The best ,vay to appreciate the structure of such an a rgument (or any deductive ar- gument, fo r that matter) is to t ranslate it into traditional argument symbols in ,vhich each statement is symbolized by a letter. H ere is the symbolizatio n for Argument 5: , . If p, then q. 2 . p. 3. Therefore, q. We ca n see that p represenrs "the s urgeon operates," and q represents " t he patient wi ll be cured." But notice that we ca n use this same symbolized argument form to represent countless other arguments-arguments with different statemen rs but hav- ing the same basic structure. It just so happens that the underlying argument form for Argument 5 is extremely common-common enough to have a name, modus ponens (or affirming the anteced- ent). The truly useful fact about modus ponens is that any a rgument having this form is valid. We can plug any statemenrs we ,vant into the formula and the result will be a valid argument, a circumstance in which if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Philosophy is like trying to o~n a safe w ith a com~ bination lock: each linle adjustmen, of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only w he n everything is in place docs the doo, open. -Ludwig \'7iugenstein 20 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK Philosophy Takes on Racism So,ne people have no patience for philosophy's preoccupation ,vith conceptual anal- ysis, fine distinctions, and argument niceties- the fussy murmurings of pedants and bores, they might say. Bue chis attitude underesci,naces the power of philosophical precision and che good work it does on some of che weightiest issues of our rime. Consider the issue of racis,n, a 1nonscrous evil co d ispel from society and often a hard topic co discuss ,vichouc raising voices and elevating blood pressures. What can philosophy possibly say about ch is issue char cou ld be helpful or en lightening? Apparently, a great dea l. The distinguished phi losopher Lawrence Blu,n, au- thor of che book "I'm Nor a Racist But . .. ", dra,vs anencion co che "conceptual in- Aacion" of che terms racist and racism. He and ocher scholars observe char che words are so overused and 1nisapplied chat they are losing their moral po,ver co indict and co sha,ne. Their reckless use causes 1nisunderscanding and resenunent. Blum says: Some fee l that the word [racist] is t h rown around so muc h that anything involving "race" that someone does not like is liable to castigatio n as "racist." ... A loca l newspaper called certain blacks "racist" for criticizing other blacks who s u pported a white over a black cand idate for m ayor. A whi te girl in Virgini a said t hat it was "racist" for a n African Am erican teacher in her school to wear African attire .... Merely men tio ning som eone's race (or racial designatio n), using the word "Oriental" for Asians witho u t recog- nizing its origins and its capacity for insu lt, or socializing only with members of one's own racial group are called "racist.'" Blum cues through popu lar confusion about racis,n by offering a plausible definition of che word. All forms of racism, past and present, he says, involve cwo key elements: (I) an anicude or belief char another race is inferior or (2) antipathy (hatred, hoscilicy) coward char race. lnferiorizat io n is linked to historical racist doctrine and racist social systems. Slavery, segregatio n, imperiali sm, aparthe id, and Nazism all treated certain groups as inferior to other grou ps .... An equally prevalent argument fo rm is modus to/lens (or denying the consequent). For example: Arg ument 6 1. If the dose is low, the n the hea ling is slow. 2. The healing is not slow. 3, Therefore, the dose is not low. Thinking Philosophically 21 Though race-based antipathy is less related to the original concept of "racism," today the term unequivocally encompasses racial bigotry, hostility, and hatred. Indeed, t he racial bigot is many peop le's paradigm image of a " racist." . .. Historica l systems of racism d id of course inevitably involve racial antipathy as well as inferiorization. Hatred of Jews was cen- tral to Nazi philosophy; and it is impossible to understand Ameri- can racism without seeing hostility to blacks and Native Americans as integral to the nexus of attitudes and emotions that shored up slavery and segregation .t If racism ahvays involves either inferiorization or antipathy, as Blu,n argues, then 1nany actions t hat people call racist actually ,nay be so,neching else. Not every instance of racia l conflict, insensitivity, discomfort, miscommunication, exclusion, injustice, or ignorance should be called "racist." Not all racial incidents are racist incidents . . . . We need a more varied and nuanced mora l vocabulary for talking about the domain of race .. . . All forms of racial ill s should elicit concern from responsible individ uals. If someone displays racial insensitiv- ity, but not racism, people should be able to see that for what it is) Blum is careful co point out chat we can't conclude from this "conceptual inflation" chat racism and inequa lity have been overstated. Ind irect or veiled racism, he says, is likely worse cha n ,ve ,n ight think. The point here is not chat Blum is right about racism (he may or ,nay not be), but chat ph ilosophica l th inking like chis is powerful and can yield very useful in- sights into real problems. • Lawrence Blum, "I'm Not a Racist B11t . . . :" 7he Moral Quandary of Race {Ithaca, NY: Cornell Universiry Press, 2002), 1- 2. l Blum, 8. I Blum, 9. ···························································································································•••;yl'-. .. ,,. , . If p, then q. 2. Not q. 3. Therefore, not p. Modus tollens is a lso a valid form, a nd any argument using this form must also be valid. • 22 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You 7 Before read ing this chapter, would you have found any of t he invalid argument forms persuasive? Why or why not? The essence of philosophy is that a man sho uld so live that his happiness shall depend as little as possible o n external things. -Epictetus There are a lso common argument forms that are invalid. Here a re two of them : Argument 7 (Affirming the Consequent) 1. If the m ind is an immaterial substance, then ESP is rea l. 2. ESP is rea l. 3- Therefore, the mind is an immaterial substance. 1. If p, then q. 2. q. 3- Therefore, p. Argument 8 (Denying the Antecedent) 1. If morality is relative to persons (that is, if moral rightness or wrongness depends on what people believe), then moral disagree- ment between persons wou ld be nearly im poss ible. 2. But morality is not relative to persons. 3- Therefore, moral disagreement between persons is not nearly im poss ible. 1. If p, then q. 2. Not p. 3- Therefore, not q. The advantage of being able to recogn ize these and other common a rgument forms is that you can use that skill to readily determine the validit y of many deduc- tive arguments. You kno\v, for example, that any a rgument having the sam e fo rm as modus ponens or modus to/lens must be valid, and any argument in one of the com- mon invalid forms must be invalid. Inductive arguments also have distinctive forms, and being fam iliar with the forms can help you eval uate the arguments. In enumerative induction, we arrive at a generalization about an enti re g roup of things after observing just some members of the g roup. C,onsider these: Argument9 Every formatted disk I have bought from the computer store is defective. Therefore, a ll fo rmatted d isks sold at the computer store are probably defective. Argument 10 All the hawks in th is wild li fe sanctuary that I have observed have had red tai ls. Therefore, all the hawks in this sanctuary probably have red tails. Argument 11 Sixty percent of the Bostonians I have interviewed in various parts of the city are pro-choice. Therefore, 60 percent of a ll Bostonians are probably pro·choice. As you can see, enu merative induction has this form : X percent of the observed members of group A have property P. Therefore, X percent of all members of group A probably have property P. Thinking Philosophically 23 The observed members of the g roup a re s imply a sample of the entire g roup. So based on wh at we k now about this sample, \Ve can genera lize to all the members. But how do \Ve k no\v \vhether such an a rgument is strong? Everything depends on the sample. If the sample is large enough and rep resentative enough, \Ve can safely ass ume that ou r generalization dra\vn from the sample is probably a n accurate refl ec- tion of the whole g roup of members. A sample is represen tative of a n entire g roup o nly if each member of the group has an equal chance of being include.cl in the sample. In general, the larger the sample, the greater the p robability that it accur- ately refl ects the nature of the group as a \vhole. Often common sense tells us when a sample is too small. VALID AND INVALID ARGUMENT FORMS VALID ARGUMENT FORMS Affirming the Antecede nt (Modus Ponens) If p, then q. p . Theref ore, q. Example: If Spot barks, a burg lar is in t he house. Spot is bark ing . Theref ore, a burg lar is in t he house. INVALID ARGUMENT FORMS Denying the Co nsequent (Modus To/lens) If p, t hen q . Not q. Therefore, not p. Example: If Spot barks, a burg lar is in the house. A burg lar is not in the house. Therefore, Spot is not bark ing . Affirming the Consequent Denying the Antecedent If p, then q. If p, t hen q . q . Not p. Theref ore, p. Therefore, not q. Example: Example: If t he cat is on t he mat, sh e is asleep. If the cat is on the mat , she is asleep . She is asleep . She is not on th e mat. Theref ore, she is on t he mat. Therefore, she is not asleep. 24 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You We do not kno\v ho\v many formatted disks from the computer store a re in the sample mentioned in Argument 9. But if the number is several dozen and the disks \vere bought over a period of weeks or months, the sample is probably sufficiently large and representative. If so, the argument is strong. Like\vise, in Argument 10 \Ve don't kno\v the size of the sample or ho\v it was obtained. But if the sample \vaS taken from all the likely spots in the sanctuary where hawks live, and if several hawks \Vere ob- served in each location, the sample is probably adequate-and the argument is strong. In A rgument 11, if the sample consists of a handful of Boston ians intervie\ved on a few street corners, the sample is definitely inadequate and the argument is weak. But if the sample consists of several hundred people, and if every member of the whole group has an equal chance of being included in the sample, then the sample would be good enough to allo\v us to accurately generalize about the whole population. Typically, se- lecting such a sample of a large population is done by p rofessional polling organizations. In the argument form kno\vn as analogical induction (or argument by analogy), \Ve reason in this fashion: T\vO or more th ings are similar in several ways; therefore, they a re probably similar in one further \vay. Consider this argument: Argument 12 Humans can walk upright, use simple tools, learn new skill s, and devise deductive arguments. Figure 1.10 How much is a watch like the uni- verse? Everything depends on the relevant simi- larit ies and differences. Ch impanzees can walk upright, use s imple tools, and learn new ski ll s. Therefore, chimpanzees can probably devise deduc- tive arguments. This argument says that because chimpanzees are simi- lar to humans in several respects, they probably are sim ilar to humans in one furthe r respect. Here's an a rgument by analogy that has become a classic in ph ilosophy: Argument 13 A watch is a complex mechanism with many parts that seem arranged to achieve a specific purpose- a pur- pose chosen by the watch's designer. In s imilar fashion, the universe is a complex mecha- nism with many parts that seem arranged to achieve a specific purpose. Therefore, the universe must also have a des igner. We can represent the form of an argument by analogy in this way: X has properties P1 , P2, P3, plus the property P 4. Y has properties P1, P2, and P3, Therefore, Y probab ly has property P4. Thinking Philosophically 25 The strength of an analogical induction depends on the relevant similarities be- tween the two things compared. The more relevant similarities there are, the greater the probability that the conclusion is true. In Argument 12, several similarities are note.cl. But there are some unmentioned diss imilarities. The brain of a chimpanzee is smaller and more primitive than that of a human, a difference that p robably inhibirs higher intellectual funct ions such as logical argument. Argument 12, then, is ,veak. A common response co Argument 13 is chat the argument is weak because a lthough the universe resembles a watch in some ,vays, in ocher ,vays it does not resemble a watch. Speci fica lly, the un iverse also resembles a living thing. The thi rd type of inductive argument is kno,vn as inference to the best explanation (or abduction), a k ind of reasoning chat ,ve a ll use daily and that is at the heart of scientific investigations. Recall chat an argument gives us reasons fo r believing that someth ing is the case. An explanation, on the other hand, states how or ivhy some- thing is the case. It attempts co clarify or elucidate, not offer proof. For example: 1 . Megan definitely understood the material, for she cou ld answer every question on the test. 2. Megan understood the materia l because she has a good memory. Sentence 1 is an argument. The conclusion is " Megan definitely understood the material," and the reason (premise) given for believing chat the conclusion is true is "for she could answer every question on the test." Sentence 2, though, is an expla- nation. It does not try co present reasons for believing something; it has nothing co prove. Instead, it tries co sho,v why someth ing is the way it is (why Megan understood the material). Sentence 2 assumes chat Megan understood the material then cries co explain ,vhy. Sud, explanations play a crucia l role in inference co the best explanation. In inference co the best explanation, we begin with premises about a phenom- enon or state of affairs co be explained. Then ,ve reason from chose premises co an explanation for chat state of affairs. We try co p roduce not just any old explanation, but the best explanation among several possibilities. The best explanation is the one most likely to be true. The conclusion of the argument is that the p referred explana- t ion is indee.d p robably true. For example: Argument 14 Tariq flunked his philosophy course. The best explanation for his failure is that he didn't read the material. Therefore, he probably d idn't read the material. Argument 15 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant was found with t he murder weapon in his hand, blood on his clothes, and the victim's wallet in his pocket. We have an eyewitness putting the defendant at the scene of the crime. The best explanation for all these facts is that the defendant comm itted the murder. There can be very little doubt- he's gu il ty. The object of studying p hilosophy is to know one's own mind, not other people's. -Dean Inge 26 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You The t rue function of phil- osophy is to educate us in the principles of reasoning and not to put an end to fur the r reasoning by the introduction of fixed conclus ions. -George Henry Lewes Here's the form of inference to the best explanation: Phenomenon Q. E provides the best exp lanation for Q. Therefore, it is probable that E is true. In any argument of this p attern, if the explanation given is really the best, then the a rgument is inductively strong. If the explanation is not the best, the a rgument is inductively weak. If the p remises of the strong a rgument are t rue, then the argu- ment is cogent. If the argument is cogent, then we have good reason to bel ieve that the conclusion is true. The biggest challenge in using inference to the best explanation is determin ing ,vhich explanation is the best. Somet imes this feat is easy. If ou r car has a flat tire, we may qu ickly uncover the best explanation for such a state of affa irs. If we see a nail sticking out of the flat and there is no obvious evidence of tampering or of any o ther extraordinary cause (that is, there are no good alternative explanations), we may safely conclude that the best explanation is that a nail punctu red the tire. I n more complicated situations , we may need to do ,vhat scientists do to evalu- ate exp lanations, o r theories-use special criteria to sort through the possibilities. Scientists call these standa rds the criteria of adequacy. Despite this fancy name, these criteria are basica lly just com mon sense, standards that you have probably used yourself. One of these criteria is cal led conservatism. This criterion says that, all things being equal, the best explanation or theory is the one that fits best ,vith what is al ready kno,vn or established. For example, if a fr iend of yours says-in all seriousness-that she can fly to the moon ,vithout using any kind of rocket o r spaceship, you probably ,vouldn't bel ieve her (and might even think that she need ed psychiatric help). Your rea- sons for doubting her would probably rest on the criterion of conservatism-that ,vhat she says conflicts with everything science knows about spaceflight, human anatomy, aerodynamics, la,vs of nature, and much more. It is logically possible that she really can fly to the moon, but her claim's lack of conservatism (the fact that it conflicts ,vith so much of ,vhat we already know about the ,vorld) casts serious doubt on it. H ere is another useful criterion fo r judging the worth of explanations: simplicity. Other things being equal, the best explanation is the one that is the simplest-that is, the one that rests on the fe,vest assumptions. The theory making the fe,vest assump- tions is less likely to be false because there are fewer ,vays for it to go ,vrong. In the example about the flat tire, one possible (but strange) explanation is that space aliens punctured the tire. You probably ,vouldn't put much credence in this explanation be- cause you ,vould have to assume too many unknown entities and processes-namely, space al iens ,vho have come from who-kno,vs-,vhere using who-knows-what methods to move about and puncture your ti res. The nail-in-the-tire theory is much simpler (it assumes no unknown entities or processes) and is therefore much more likely to be t rue. When you a re carefully reading an argument (whether in an essay or some other context), you ,viii be just as intereste.d in whether the prem ises are true as in whether the conclusion fo llows from the prem ises. If the ,vriter is conscientious, he o r she Thinking Philosophically 27 will try to ensu re that each p rem ise is either well supported or in no need of sup - port (because the premise is obv ious or agreed to by all parties). The needed support will come from the citing of examples, statistics, research, expert opinion, and other kinds of ev idence or reasons. This arrangement means that each premise of the pri- mary argument may be a conclusion supported in turn by premises citing ev idence o r reasons. In any case, you as the reader \vill have to evaluate carefully the truth of all p rem ises and the support behind them. Reading Philosophy Unfortunately, arguments in philosophical essays rarely come neatly labeled so you ca n find and evaluate them. You have to do that \vork yourself, a task that requ ires careful reading and th inking. The process can be challenging because in the real world, a rgumenrs can be s imple or complex, clearly stated o r perplex ing, and apparent or hidden. This is t rue for philosophical essays as well as fo r any other kind of \vriting that cont ains arguments. In some ph ilosophical prose, the relatio nship between the conclusion (or conclusions) and the premises can be complicated, and even good arguments can be surrounded by material irrelevant to the arguments at hand. The remedy for these difficulties is instructive examples and plenty of p ractice, some of which you can get in this ch apter. Let's begin by identifying and analyzing the argument in the fo llowing passage. The issue is whether humans have free will or are compelled by forces beyond their control to act as they do (a topic we take up in C h apter 5). The statemenrs are num- bered fo r ease of reference. (1) The famous trial lawyer Clarence Darrow (1857- 1938) made a name for hi mself by using the "determi nism defense" to get his clients acqu itted of se rious crimes. (2) The crux of this approach is t he idea that humans are not reall y respo nsible for anything they do because they cannot choose free ly- they are "determi ned," predes- t ined , if you will , by nature (or God) to be the way they are. (3) So in a sense, Darrow says, humans are like wind-up toys with no control over any action or decision . (4) They have no free will. (S) Reme mber t hat Darrow was a renowned agnostic who was skeptical of all reli - gious claims. (6) But Darrow is wrong about human free wi ll for two reasons . (7) First, in our eve ryday moral life, our own commonsense experie nce s uggests that sometimes people are free to make moral decisions . (8) We shou ld not abandon what o ur commonsense ex- perience tells us without good reason- and (9) Da rrow has given us no good reason. (10) Second, Darrow's determinism is not con- fi rmed by science, as he cl aims- but actually conflicts with science. (11) Modern science says that there are many things (at the subatom- ic level of matter) that are not determined at all : (12) they just happe n. Indicator words are scarce in this argument, unless you count the words " fi rst" and "second" as signifying premises. But the conclusion is not hard t o find; it's 28 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You Statement 6: "Darrow is \vrong about human free \viii for nvo reasons." Locating the conclusion enables us to see that some statements (Statements 1 through 4) are neither conclusion nor premises; they a re just background information on Darrow's views. Most argumentative essays contain some supplemental in- formation like th is. Statement 5 is irrelevant to the argument; Da rrow's agnosticism has no logical connection to the premises or conclusion. Statement 12 is just a reword ing of Statement 11. After this elim ination process, on ly the fo llowing premises and conclusion (Statement 6) remain: (6) But Darrow is wrong about human free will for two reasons. (7) Fi rst, in our everyday moral life, our own common- sense experience suggests that sometimes people are free to make moral decis ions. Figure 1.11 Cl arence Darrow (1857-1938). (8) We shou ld not abandon what our commonsense expe- rience tell s us without good reason. Philosophy is a kind of jo urney, ever learning yet never arriving at the ideal perfection of t ruth. -Albert Pike (9) Darrow has given us no good reason. (10) Darrow's determ inism is not confirmed by science, as he cl aims- but actually conA icts with science. (11) Modern science says that there are many th ings (at the subatom ic level) that are not determined at all. Statements 7 t hrough 11 are the premises. They are all meant to provide support to Statement 6, but thei r support is of unequal weight. Statement 10 gives indepen- dent support to the conclusion without t he help of any other premises, so it is an independent premise. We ca n say the same t hi ng about Statement 11; it too is an independent premise. But notice t hat Statemenrs 7, 8, and 9 are dependent premises supporting the conclusion. That is, taken separately, they are weak, but together they constitute a p laus ible reason for accepting Statement 6. Statement 10 directly sup- porrs the conclusion and in turn is supported by Premise 11. Now take a look at th is passage: (1) As the Is lam ic clerics cli ng to power in Iran, students there are agita ting for greater freedom and less suppression of views that the clerics d islike. (2) Even though ultimate power in Iran rests with the mu ll ahs, it is not at a ll certain where the nation is headed. Here's a rad ical suggestion: (3) the Is lam ic republic in Iran will fall within the next five years. Why do I say this? (4) Because the majority of Iranians are in favor of democratic reforms, (5) and no regime can stand for very long when citizens are demanding access to the political pro- cess. (6) Also, Iran today is a mirror image of the Soviet Un ion before it broke apart- there's widespread d issatisfaction and d issent at a time when the regime seems to be trying to hold the people's loyalty. Thinking Philosophically 29 PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK Hypatia Hypacia (c. 370-415) was the greatest philosopher of her day. She lived in che Greek cicy of Alexandria, ,vhich in the fourth century was che incelleccual epicen- ter of che ,vorld, excelling in scientific and philosophical learning. Jc also ,vas the home of the famed Library, which contained thousands of scholarly manuscripts dra,vn fro,n the best thinkers of ancient times, including che works of Pla- Figure 1.12 Hypatia (c. 370-415). to and Ariscocle. In chis rich environment, Hypacia achieved fame as a Neoplaconisc philosophy teacher, an astronomer, and a mathematician. Ac around age C\Vency- five or thirty she became the director of che school of the reno,vned philosopher Plocinus-a very high honor, since women were cradicionally noc appointed co such offices. Another indication of her sterling reputation ,vas chat she was appointed by a Christian govenunenc even though she was known co be a pagan. She caught che works of che "pagan" philosophers such as Plato and Aristocle, and students ca,ne from far-Aung places for che privilege of being her students. She also is thought to have ,vricren three commentaries on noted mache,natical treatises. In 415, she ,vas brutally murdered by a mob of Christian zealots. She ,vas pulled from her chariot, hauled to a church, stripped naked, and skinned alive ,vith oyster shells. (7) Every nation that has taken such a path has imploded within five years. (8) Finally, the o ld Iranian trick of ga ining support for the government by fomenting hatred of America will not work anymore (9) because Iran is now trying to be friends with the United States. The conclusion is Statement 3, and the premises are Statements 4 th rough 9. The fi rst nvo statements are extraneous. Statements 4 and 5 are dependent premises and so are Statements 6 and 7. Statements 8 and 9 constitute an a rgument chat gives sup - port to the passage's ma in conclusion (Statement 3). Statement 8 is the conclusion; Statement 9, the premise. Notice also that the sentence " Why do I say this?" is not a statement. So remember: When you read a ph ilosophical essay, you are not simply trying to glean some facts from it as you might if you were reading a science text or tech- n ical report. Neither are you follo,ving a storyline as if you were reading a mystery novel (though philosophy papers sometimes contain their share of mysteries). In most cases, you are tracing the steps in an argument, trying to see ,vhat conclusion the ,vriter wants to prove and whether she succee.ds in proving it. Along the way, you 8 Suppose you are present ed w ith w ritten material containing statements and argu- ment s t hat strike you as irreverent or un- ort hodox. Would you be able to read such a text w ith an open mind? Can you recall a case in w hich you did just that? 30 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You Small am o unts of ph iloso· phy lead to arhcism , b u t la rger a mo unts bring us back to God. -Francis Bacon II I II I II 111111111111 II I II I II I II I II I II Ill I 111111 may encounter several premises with their accompanying analyses, clarifications, explanations, and examples. You may even run into a whole chain of arguments. In che end, if you have read \veil and che \vricer has \vriccen \veil, you are left not \vich a ne\v sec of data or a story ending, but a realization-maybe even a revelation-that a conclusion is, or is not, worthy of bel ief. The best way co learn how co read ph ilosophy \veil is co read philosophy often . You wi ll probably gee p lenty of chances co do chat in your current philosophy course. Having a fe\v rules co gu ide you in your reading, however, may help shorten che learning curve. As you read, keep che follo\v ing in m ind. 1. Approach the text with an open m ind. If you a re studying philosophy for che first time, you are likely-at lease at first-co find a good bit of che material diffi- culc, strange, or exasperating, sometimes all three at once. That's normal. Philosophy is an explo ration of che rugged frontiers of our kno\vledge of fundamental th ings, so much of chis new territory is likely co seem daunting o r unfamiliar. There's also an excellent chance chat your first visits co this terrain will be vex ing, perhaps even infuriating, because you may sometimes disagree \vich what you read. There is no shame in experienci ng any of these reactions. They come with che territory. Bue if you a re co make any head\vay in philosophy, you need co try your best co counteract these attitudes and feelings. Remember, philosophy at ics best is a fa ir-minded, fear less search for t ruth. Anyth ing chat interferes with this noble quest muse be overcome and case as ide. Avoid making a judgment about an essay's ideas or arguments until you fully un- dersta nd them and have fai rly considered them . Make sure you a re not reading with che intent co p rove che conclusions false (or true). Be open co che possibil ity that che essay could give you good reasons co change your m ind about someth ing. T ry co maintain a neutral attitude cowa rd the \vricer, p resum ing neither that she is right nor wrong, neither sinner nor sa int. Don't assume chat everything a renowne.d ph ilosopher says muse be true, and don't p resuppose that everything a philosopher you dislike says muse be false. Give the writer the same attention and respect chat you would give a friend who is discussing a serious issue with you. If you a re reading che work of a famous ph ilosopher and you find yourself think- ing chat h is or her ideas are obviously s illy o r ridiculous, think again. The odds are good that you a re misunderstanding what you read. Jc is wiser co assume chat the cexc offers something of value (even if you disagree with it) and that you need co read more carefully. 2. Read actively and critically. Philosophical reading is incense. Jc cannot be rushed. Jc cannot be cramme.d. Jc cannot be done while your mind is on automatic pilot. Philosophical read ing is active reading. Instead of reading just co gee through a p iece of writing, you muse cake your time and ask yourself what key terms and passages mean, ho\v che a rgument is structu red, what the central thesis is, \vhere che premises a re, how certain key ideas are related, whether che main conclusion conflicts \vich propositions you know are true, even how che material compares w ith ocher philosophical writing on the same subject. Thinking Philosophically 31 PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK Early Women Philosophers: Themistoclea, Arignote, and Theano Among the pre-Socratics, Pythagoras (c. 550- 500 BC E) is the most fa,nous (he gave us the Pythagorean theorem, a geo,netry-dass staple) and possibly the ,nose influ- ential. He inspired a long line of followers-Pythagoreans-dat ing fron1 the sixth century BC E ,veil into the ne,v rnillennium . What isn't so ,vell kno,vn is char n1any of these followers were ,vomen, distinguished philosophers in their own right. Here is pare of Mary Ellen Waithe's discussion of three of the,n: The ancient sources indicate t hat women were active in early Pythagorean societies and may have played a central role in the development of early Pythagorean philosophy. Diogenes Laertius reports that: Aristonexus asserts that Pythagoras derived the greater part of his ethical doctrines from Themistoclea , the priestess of Delph i. Ea rl y Pythagoreans viewed the cosmos or universe as orderly and harmon ious. Everyt hing bears a particular mathematica l relation- ship to everything else. Harmony and order exist when things are in their proper relationship to each other. This relationship can be expressed as a mathematical proportion. One of t he "sacred discourses" is attributed to Pythagoras' daughter, Arignote. According to Arignote: The eterna l essence of num ber is the most providential cause of the whole heaven, earth and region in betwee n. Likewise it is the root of the continued existence of the gods and daimones, as well as that of divine men. Arignote's comment is consistent with one attributed to her mother, Theano of Crotona, in that a ll that exists, a ll that is rea l can be distinguished from other things through enumeration. T he eternal essence of number is a lso directly related to the harmoni - ous coexistence of different things. This harmony can be expressed as a mathematica l relationsh ip. In these two ways, number is t he cause of all things .* • Mary Ellen Waithe, "Early Pythagoreans," in A History of\'(fome11 Philosophers (Dordrccht, The Netherlands: Marrinus N ijhoff, 1987), 11- 12. 32 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You Philosophical read ing is also critical read ing. In c ritica l reading, you ask not just \vhat something means but whether a statement is true and if the reasoning is solid. You ask if the conclusion rea lly follows from the premises, \vhether the p remises are true, if the a nalysis of a term really makes sense, if an argument has been overlooked, if an ana logy is weak, whether there are counte rexamples to key claims, and \vhether the claims agree with other things you have good reason to believe. 3. Identify the conclusion first, t hen t he premises. When you first begin reading philosophica l texts, they may seem to you like dark thickets of propos i- tions into \vh ich you may not ente r without losi ng you r way. But your situation is really not that bad. In a rg umentative \vriting (the kind you are most likely to encounter in philosophy), you can depend on there being, \veil, an argument, a conclusion backed by prem ises . The re could, of course, be severa l arg ume nts that support the main argument, a nd the arguments could be complex, but these sets of conclusion-plus-prem ises wi ll all serve as recognizable g uideposts. If you \Vant to penetrate the thicket, then, you must first identify the a rg ument (or a rg uments). And the key to doing that is to find the co nclusion first, then look for the p remises. When you find the main conclusion, you thereby identify the main point of the essay, and you then have the number-one clue to the funct ion of a ll the rest of the text. Once you uncover the point that the writer is tryi ng to prove, find ing the supporting premises becomes much easier. And when you isolate the premises, locating the text that explains and amplifies the premises gets easier too. Therefore, the first-and most important-question you can ask about a philosophical essay is, "What claim is the writer trying to prove?" 4. Outline, paraph rase, or summarize the argu ment. Understanding an essay's argument is so important that testing \vhether you really "get it" is crucial. You can test you r g rasp of the argument by outlin ing, paraphrasing, o r summarizing it. If you can lay out an argument's premises and conclusion in an outline, o r if you can accurately paraphrase o r summarize the a rgument, you probably have a pretty good understanding of it. Very often studenrs who think they comprehend an argu- ment are surp rised to see that they cannot devise an adequate outl ine or summa ry of it. Such failu res suggest that, although outl in ing, pa raphrasing, or summarizing may seem to some to be unnecessary, they are not-at least not to those who are ne\v to ph ilosophy. 5. Eval uate t he argument and formulate a tentative judgment. When you read philosophy, understa nding it is just the first step. You also must do something that many beginners find both difficult and alien : you must make an informed judg- ment about what you read. Simply reiterating what the writer has said wi ll not do. Your judgment is what matters here. Mainly, this judgment is you r evaluation of the argument presented by the writer-an assessment of (1) whether the conclusion fo l- lo\vS from the premises and (2) whether the premises a re true. Only when the answer to both of these questions is yes can you say that the conclusion of the argument is worthy of acceptance. This kind of evaluatio n is precisely what you r instructor expects when she asks you to critique an a rg umentative essay in ph ilosophy. Thinking Philosophically 33 Fallacious Reasoning You can become more p roficient in reading and ,vriting ph ilosophy if you kno,v ho,v to identify fa llacies ,vhen you see them . Fallacies are common but bad arguments. They are defective arguments that appear so often in w riting and speech that phi- losophers have given them names and offered instructions on how to recognize and avoid t hem. Many fallacies a re not just faile.d arguments-they are a lso deceptively p laus ible appeals. They can easily appea r sound o r cogent, mislead ing the reader. Their poten- t ial for slipperiness is another good reason to study fallacies. The best way to avoid being taken in by t hem is to study them until you can consistently pick them out of any random selection of prose. Here are some of the more prevalent ones. Straw Man The straw man fa llacy is the m isrepresentation of a person's views so they can be more easily attacked o r d ismissed. Let's say you argue that t he war in Afghanistan is too costly in lives and money, and your opponent replies th is way: My adversary argues that t he war in Afghanistan is much too difficult for the Un ited States, and that we ought to, in effect, cut and run while we can. But why must we take the coward's way out? Thus, you r point has been distorted, made to look more extreme or radical than it really is; it is now an easy target. The notion t hat ,ve ought to "cut and run" or "take the co,vard 's ,vay out" does not fallow from the statement that the war in Afghanistan is too costly. The straw man kind of distortion, of course, proves noth ing, though many people fa ll for it every day. This fallacy is probably the most common type of fa llacious reasoning used in politics. It is also popular in many other k inds of argumentation- including student philosophy papers. Appeal to the P erson C losely related to the straw man fa llacy is appeal to the p erson (also known as the ad hominem fallacy). Appeal to the person is the rejecting of a statement on the grounds that it comes from a particular person, not because the statement, o r claim, itself is false or dubious. For example: You can safely discard anything t hat Susan has to say about govern- ment. She's a dyed-in-the-wool socialist.
Johnson argues that our current welfare system is defective. But don’t
listen to him- he’s a conservative.
Ad hominem arguments often creep into student p hilosophy papers. Part of the
reason is that some appeals to the person are not so obvious. For example:
Swinburne’s cosmologica l argument is a serious attempt to show
that God is the best explanation for the existence of the un iverse.
A fallacy is a common but
bad a rgument.
This is paten rl y absurd ; b u t
w hoever wishes to become
a philosopher m ust learn
not to be fr ightened by
absurdities.
-Bercrand Russell
The straw man is t he fal –
lacy of mis re presenting a
person’s views so they can
be more easily a ttack ed o r
d is missed.
Appeal to the person is
th e fall acy of rejecting a
starcmcnr o n the grounds
that it comes from a par~
ticular pe rson, n ot because
the statement, o r claim,
itself is false o r d ubious.

34 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
PH I LOSO PHY NOW
Philosophy in the News
Very ofcen, behind rhe headlines ,ve see every day rhere lurks a deeper ph ilosophical issue.
And when people reAecr on rhe stories, rhey frequendy find themselves pondering fundame n-
tal questions and beliefs. Philosophy is hard ro avoid . Here is a sa,npling of possible headlines
paired ,virh rhe philosophical questions rhey raise.
Tea Parry Rejects Enridemenr and Welfare
Progra,ns
Man Claims Our-of-Body Experience
Residents De,nand D eath Penalty for Child
Killer
Christopher H itchens Book Says “God Is
Nor Grear”
Japan Tsuna,ni Kills Thousands
Scien risrn Say “Big Bang” Uncaused
Attorn eys Say Hormones Caused Woman
to Kill
Stem Cell Research Banned
Ch ina Says It Muse Be Judged by C hinese
Morality
Is libertarianism a v iable political rheory?
Can the mind (soul) exist independendy of
rhe body?
Is capital punishment ever morally
permissible?
Does God exist? Does religion do more
harm rhan good?
Does n atural evil show thar there is no God?
Is Aquinas’s fi rsr-cause argument doomed?
Do we have free will? Are all our actions
caused by factors beyond our control?
Is rhe fetus a person ,virh full moral righrs
fro,n the mo,nent of con ception?
Is morality relative to cultures? D oes
“human righrn” apply only to rhe West?
Are most perennia l debates in politics really about fundamenta l philosophi-
cal issues that are never discussed? Could these issues be resolved if people,
in good faith, applied the Socratic method?
However, he is a well -known theist, and this fact raises some doubts
about the strength of his case.
Dennett argues from the materia list standpoint, so he begins with a
bias that we need to take into account.
Some of the strongest arguments aga inst the death penalty come
from a few people who are actually on death row. They obviously
have a vested interest in showing that cap ita l punishment is mor-
all y wrong. We therefore are forced to take their arguments- however
convincing- with a grain of sa lt.

Thinking Philosophically 35
Figure 1.13 Politics is rife with fallacie-pecially straw man, appeal to the person, and slippery
slope. W hat fallacies in polit ics have you heard or read lately?
Each of these argumenrs is defective because it asks us to reject or resist a
cla im solely because of a pe rson’s character, backg ro und , or ci rc umsta nces-
things that are ge nera lly ir relevant to the truth of claims. A statem ent must
sta nd o r fall on its own merits. The personal characterist ics of the person espous-
ing the vie,v do not necessarily have a bea ring on its truth. Only if we ca n sho,v
that someo ne’s dubious tra its somehow make the c laim dubious are we justi-
fied in reject ing the claim because of a person’s pe rsona l characterist ics. Such a
. .
ci rc umsta nce 1s rare.
Appeal to Popularity
The appeal to popularity (or appeal to the masse.s) is another extremely common
fallacy. It is a rguing that a claim must be t rue not because it is backed by good rea-
sons, but simp ly because many people believe it. The idea is that, somehow, there is
t ruth in numbers. For example:
Of course there’s a God. Everyone believes that.
Seve nty percent of Americans believe that the pres ident’s tax cuts are
good for the economy. So don’t try to tell me the tax cuts aren’t good
for the economy.
Most people believe that Jo nes is guilty, so he’s gui lty.
In each of these a rgumenrs, the conclusion is thought to be t rue merely because
it is believed by an impressive number of people. The number of people ,vho bel ieve
a claim , ho,vever, is irrelevant to the claim’s truth. What really matters is how much
Appeal to popularity is
the fallacy of arguing that
a claim m ust be true not
because it is backed by
good reasons, but simply
because m any people
bel ieve it.

36 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Genetic fallacy is the
fal lacy of arguing that a
stateme nt can be judged
true o r false based on irs
source.
There arc mo re things in
heaven and earth, Horatio,
than arc d ream t of in you r
ph ilosophy.
-William Shakespeare
Eq u ivocation is rhe fallacy
of assigning two diffe rent
meanings to the same
s ignificant word in an
argum en t.
support che claim has from good reasons. Large groups of people have been-and
are-wrong about many things. Many people once believed chat the Earth is flat,
mermaids are real, a nd human sacrifices help crops grow. They were wrong.
Remember, however, chat the number of people who accept a claim can be rele-
vant co its truth if the people happen co be expercs. T wency professional astronomers
,vho p redict an ecl ipse are more reliable than one hundred nonexper cs ,vho swear
chat no such eclipse ,vill occur.
Gen et ic Fallacy
A p loy like t he appeal co the person is the gen eti c fallacy-arguing chat a statement
can be judge.cl t rue or false base.cl o n its source. In an appeal co the person, some-
one’s character or circumstance is thought co cell the tale. In che genetic fallacy, t he
truth of a statement is supposed co d epend on o rigins ocher than an individual-
organizacions, political platforms, g roups, schools of thought, even exceptional states
of m ind (like dreams and intuitio ns). Look:
That new military reform idea has gotta be bunk. It comes from a
liberal think tank.
At the city counci l meeting He rnando sa id that he had a plan to curb
the nu mber of car crashes on Highway 19. But you can bet that what-
ever it is, it’s half-ba ked- he said the plan came to him when he was
stoned on marijuana.
The U.S. Senate is considering a proposal to reform affirmative action,
but you know their ideas must be ridiculous. What do they know abou t
the rights of the disadvantaged? They’re a bu nch of rich , wh ite guys.
Equivocat ion
The fa llacy of eq uivocation is assigning two different meanings co the same sig-
nificant ,vord in an a rgument. The ,vord is used in one sense in a premise and in a
different sense in another p lace in the argument. The s,vicch in meaning can d eceive
che reader and disrupt che argument, rendering it invalid or weaker than it would be
ochenvise. H ere’s a classic example:
On ly man is rational.
No woman is a man.
Therefore, no woman is rational.
And one ocher:
You are a bad writer.
If you are a bad writer, then you are a bad boy.
Therefore, you are a bad boy.
The first argument equivocates on the word man. In the first premise, man means
humankind; in the second, male. Thus, the argument seems co prove chat ,vomen

Thinking Philosophically 37
a re not rational. You can see the trick better if you assign the same meaning to both
instances of man. Like th is:
Only humans are rational.
No woman is a human.
Therefore, no woman is rationa l.
In the second a rgument, t he equivocal term is bad. In the first premise, bad
means incompetent; in the second, immoral.
Appeal to I gn oran ce
As its name implies, this fallacy tries to p rove something by appealing to what ,ve
don’t kno,v. The appeal to ignorance is argu ing that eit her (1) a claim is true because
it hasn’t been proven fa lse or (2) a claim is false because it hasn’t been p roven true.
For example:
Try as they may, scientists have never been able to disprove the
existence of an afterlife. The conclusion to be drawn from th is is that
there is in fact an afterlife.
Super Green Algae can cure cancer. No scientific study has ever
shown that it does not work.
No one has ever shown that ESP (extrasensory perception) is real.
Therefore, it does not exist.
There is no evidence that people on welfare are hardworking and re-
sponsible. Therefore, they are not hardworking and responsible.
The fi rst two arguments try to prove a claim by pointing out that it hasn’t been
proven false. The second two t ry to prove that a claim is fa lse because it hasn’t been
proven true. Both kinds of arguments are bogus because they assume that a lack of
evidence proves something. A lack of evidence, however, can prove nothi ng. Being
ignorant of the facts does not enlighten us.
Notice t hat if a lack of evidence could p rove something, then you could prove
just about anything you wanted . You could reason, for instance, that s ince no one
can prove that horses can’t fly, horses must be able to fly. Since no one can disprove
that you possess super natural powers, you must possess supernatu ra l powers.
Fal se Dilem ma
In a dilemma, you are force.cl to choose between two unattractive poss ibilities. The
fallacy of false dilemma is arguing erroneously that since there are only two alterna-
t ives to choose from and one of them is unacceptable, t he other one must be true.
C-onsider these:
You have to li sten to reason. Ei ther you must sell your car to pay your
rent, or your landlord will throw you out on the street. You obvious ly
aren’t going to sell your car, so you will be evicted.
Appeal to ignorance is
th e fallacy of a rguing that
either ( I ) a claim is true
because ir hasn’r been
proven false o r (2) a claim
is false because i r has n’ r
been proven true.
False dilemma is rhe
fallacy of a rguing errone·
oudy that s ince there arc
o nly two alternatives to
choose fro m and o ne of
the m is unacceptable, the
o ther o ne must be true.

38 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Philosophy is at once the
most s ub lime an d th e most
trivial of h uman p ursuit’\.
-William James
Begging the q uestion
is the fallacy of trying to
p rove a conclus io n by us ..
ing chat very same con cJu ..
s 1o n as s up po rr.
You have to face the hard facts about the war on drugs. Either we
must spend bill ions of doll ars to increase military and law enforce-
ment operations aga in st drug cartels, or we mus t legal ize all drugs.
We obviously are not going to lega lize all drugs, so we have to spend
bill ions on anti-cartel operations.
The fi rst argument says chat there are only two choices co cons ider: either sell
your car or gee evicted, and since you \viii not sell your ca r, you wi ll gee ev ic ted. This
argument is fallacious because (pres umably) the first p rem ise is false-there seem
co be more than just nvo alter natives here. You could gee a job, borro\v money from
a friend, or sell your DVD player and TV. If the argument seems convincing, it is
because ocher possibilities are excluded.
The second argument asserts ch at there are only nvo ways co go: spe nd bil-
lions co attack drug car tels or legalize a ll drugs . Since we won’t legalize all d r ugs ,
\Ve must therefore spend billions co assault the cartels. The first (either/or) prem-
ise, however, is fa lse; t here are at lease three oche r options. The bi ll ions could
be spent co reduce and prevent drug use, drug produce rs could be given mon-
eta ry incentives co switch co non-drug businesses , or only some drugs could be
legalized .
Beggin g the Q u es tion
The fallacy of b egging the q uestion is cryi ng co prove a conclusion by using that
very same conclusion as support. It is a rg uing in a circle. Th is way of trying co prove
something says, in effect, “X is true because X is true.” Few people would fall fo r chis
fa llacy in such a simple fo rm, but more subtle kinds can be begu iling. For example,
here’s the classic instance of begging the question:
The Bible says that God exists.
The Bible is true because God wrote it.
Therefore, God exists.
The conclusion here (“God ex ists”) is s upported by premises that assume that
very conclusion.
Here’s another one:
All citizens have the right to a fair trial because those whom the state
is obli ged to protect and give consideration are automaticall y due
judici al criminal proceed ings that are equ itable by any reasonable
standa rd.
This passage may at first seem like a good a rg ument, but it isn’t. It reduces co
chis unimpressive assertion : “A ll citizens h ave the right co a fair trial because all cit-
izens have the right co a fai r t rial.” The conclusion is “All citizens have the right co a
fa ir trial,” but that ‘s more or less what the premise says. The premise-” chose whom
the state is obliged co p rotect and give consideration are automatically due judicial
crim inal proceed ings that are equitable by any reasonable scandard”-is equivalent
co “All citizens h ave the right co a fair trial.”

Thinking Philosophically 39
When circular reasoning is subtle, it can ensnare even its O\vn creators. The
fallacy can easily sneak into an argument if the premise and conclusion say the same
thing but say it in different, complicate.cl ways.
Slippery Slope
The metaphor behind this fallacy suggests the danger of stepping on a dicey incline,
losing your footing, and slid ing to disaster. The fa llacy of slipper y slope, then, is
a rguing erroneously that a pa rticular action should not be taken because it wi ll lead
inevitably to other actions resulting in some dire outcome. The key word here is er-
roneously. A slippery slope scenario becomes fa llacious \vhen there is no reason to
believe that the chain of events pred icted wi ll ever happen. For example:
This trend toward gay marriage must be stopped. If gay marriage is
permitted, then traditional marriage between a man and a woman
wi ll be debased and deva lued, wh ich will lead to an increase in d i-
vorces. And higher divorce rates can only harm our children.
This argument is fallacious because there are no reasons for believing that gay
marriage will ultimately result in the chain of events descr ibed. If good reasons
could be given, the argument might be salvaged.
Composition
Sometimes what is true about the parts of a thing is a lso true of the whole-and
sometimes not. The fa llacy of composition is arguing er roneously that what can be
sa id of the parts can also be said of the whole. Consider:
Each piece of wood that makes up this house is lightweight. There-
fore, the whole house is lightweight.
Each sold ier in the platoon is proficient. Therefore, the platoon as a
whole is proficient.
The monthly payments on th is car are low. Hence, the cost of the car
is low.
Just remember, sometimes the \vhole does have the same p roperties as the parts.
If each pa rt of the rocket is made of steel, the whole rocket is made of steel.
D ivision
If you turn the fa llacy of composition upside down, you get the fallacy of division-
a rguing erroneously that what can be said of the whole can be sa id of the parts:
The house is heavy. Therefore, every part of the house is heavy.
The platoon is very effective. Therefore, every member of the platoon
is effective.
That herd of elephants eats an enormous amount of food each day.
Therefore, each elephant in the herd eats an enormous amount of
food each day.
Slip pery slo pe is , he fal –
lacy of arguing erroneously
that a particular action
sh ould no, be taken be-
cause it will lead inevitably
to other actio ns n:sulting
in some dire outcome.
Com position is the fallacy
of arguing erroneously ,hat
whar can be said of the
pan s can also be said of
the whole.
Philosophy should quicken
life, no, deaden it.
-Susan Glaspell
D ivisio n is the fallacy of
a rguing erroneously , hat
w hat can be said of the
w ho le cm be said of the
parts.

40 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
ESSAY/ DISCUSSION Q UESTIO NS SECTION 1.3
1. What is the difference between an argument a nd an explanation?
What is the difference between an argument a nd a set of accusations?
o r exp ressions of outrage?
2. H o\v is readi ng ph ilosophy different from, say, reading a physics text
o r readi ng a novel?
3. Thi nk about the political commentators you’ve read or listened to.
What fa llacies h ave they been guilty of using?
4. The straw man fallacy is rampant in political debates. G ive an examp le
of such a tactic being used by commentators or politicians, or make up
an example of your O\vn.
5. D evise a n a rgument in favor o f the proposition that people shou ld
(or should not) be punished as Socrates was for speaking their m inds.
Review Notes
1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING
• St udyi ng ph ilosophy has both p ractical and theoretical benefi ts. To some, the p ur-
suit of kno\vledge th rough p hilosoph y is a spirit ual quest.
• Taking an inventory of your p hilosophical beliefs at the beginning of th is cou rse
will help you gauge your progress as you st udy.
• The fo ur mai n d ivisions of ph ilosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and
logic. There are also subdivisions of philosophy that exam ine bas ic issues fou nd in
other fields.
1.2 SOCRATES AND T H E EXAMINED LIFE
• For Socrates, an u nexamined life is a tragedy because it res ults in grievous h ar m to
the soul , a person’s tr ue self or essence. The soul is harmed by lack of kno\vledge-
ignorance of one’s own self and of th e most important values in life (the good) .
• The Socratic method is a q uestion-an d-answer dialogue in wh ich propositions are
methodical ly scrutinized to u ncover the truth . Usually when Socrates used it in
conversatio ns with his fe llow Athen ians, thei r views \vould be exposed as false or
confused. The main poi nt of the exercise fo r Socrates, however, was not to wi n
argu ments, but to get closer to the truth.

• Socrates says, in effect, Let’s assume th at Thrasymachus is righ t that justice is \vhat-
ever is in the interest of the powerful, and th at people are just if th ey obey the laws
made by the powerful. But the powerful sometimes make mistakes and demand
obedience to laws that are not in their best interest. So if Thrasymach us’s defi n ition
of justice is correct, then it is right for people to do what is in the interest of
the po\verful, a nd it is also righ t for them to do what is not in th e interest of th e
po\verful. His idea of justice then leads to a logical contradiction.
• The basic idea beh ind reductio ad absurdum is if you assume that a set of statements
is true, and yet you can deduce a false o r absurd statement from it, then the o rig inal
set of statements as a whole must be false.
1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPH ICALLY
• An argument is a g roup of statemenrs in which one of them is mean t to be sup-
po rted by the others. A statement (or claim) is an assertion that someth ing is o r
is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance that is either true o r false. In
an argument, the Statement being suppo rted is the co ncl usion, and the statements
supporti ng the conclusio n are the prem ises.
• A good argumen t must have ( I) solid logic and (2) true premises. Requi rement
( I) means that the co nclusion should follo\v logical ly from the p remises. Requi re-
ment (2) says that what the prem ises assert must in fact be the case.
• A deductive argument is intended to give logically conclusive suppo rt to its con-
clusio n. An inductive argumen t is intended to g ive probable support to its con-
clusio n. A deductive a rgument with the p roper struct ure is said to be valid; a
deductive a rgument that fails to have this structu re is said to be inval id. If ind uc-
tive argumenrs succeed in len d ing p robable suppo rt to their co nclusio ns, they a re
said to be strong. If they fail to provide this p robable support, they are termed
\veak. When a valid (deductive) a rgu ment has true p remises, it is said to be sound.
When a strong (i nd uctive) argument has true p remises, it is said to be cogent. In
inference to the best explan ation, we begin \Vith premises about a phenomeno n o r
state of affai rs to be explained. Then we reaso n from those premises to an explan a-
tion for that state of affairs. We try to produce not just an y explan atio n, but th e
best explanation amo ng several possibilities. The best explan ation is th e one most
like! y to be true.
• The guidel ines for reading p hilosophy are: ( I) Approach the text with an open
m ind; (2) read actively and critically; (3) identify the conclusion first, then th e
p remises; (4) o utline, paraphrase, or summarize the argument; and (5) evaluate th e
argument and formulate a tentative judgment.
Review Notes 41

42 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 1
1. Do you believe, as Thrasymachus did, that might makes right, that
morality is not about objective right and wrong but about who has the
most po\ver? Devise an argument to support your belief.
2. C hoose one of you r fundamental beliefs that you have not thought
much about and write an argument defend ing it or rejecting it.
3. Socrates said to his ju rors, “Are you not ashamed that, while you take
care to acqui re as much wealth as possible, \vith honor and glory as
well, yet you take no ca re or thought for understanding or truth, or for
the best possible state of your soul?” Do you agree with this attitude?
Why o r \vhy not?
4. What is the difference between the way philosophy approaches impor-
tant questions and the \vay that religion does?
5. Argue the case for using (or not using) the Socratic method in
education.
Key Terms
appeal to ignorance The fallacy of argu-
ing that either ( 1) a claim is true because
it hasn’t been p roven fulse or (2) a claim is
fulse because it hasn’t been proven true. (37)
appeal to popularity The fallacy of
arguing that a claim must be true not
because it is backed by good reasons,
but s imply because many people be-
lieve it. (35)
appeal to the person The fallacy of re-
jecting a statement on the grounds that
it comes from a particular person, not
because the statement, or claim, itsel f is
false or dubious. (33)
argument A statement coupled with
other statements that are me.ant to sup-
po rt that statement. ( 15)
axiology The study of value, including
both aesthetic value and moral value. (6)
begging the question The fallacy of try-
ing to prove a conclus ion by us ing that
very same conclusion as support. (38)
composition The fallacy of arguing er-
roneously that \vhat can be said of the
parts can also be said of the \vhole. (39)
conclusion In an argument, the state-
ment being supported. (15)
deductive argument An argument in-
tended to give logically conclusive sup-
po rt to its conclusion. (17)
division The fallacy of arguing errone-
ously that what can be said of the whole
can be said of the parts. (39)
ep istemology The study of knowledge. (6)
equivocation The fal lacy of assigning
two different meanings to the same sig-
nificant word in an argument. (36)

ethics (moral philosophy) The study
of morality using the methods of
p hilosophy. (6)
fullacy A common but bad argument. (33)
false dilemma The fallacy of argu ing
erroneously th at since there are o nly
nvo alt ernat ives to choose from, and one
of them is unacceptable, the oth er one
m ust be t rue. (37)
genetic fallacy The fallacy of argu ing
that a statement can be judged tru e o r
false based on irs source. (36)
inductive argument An argument in-
t ended to give probable support to irs
conclus ion. (18)
logic The st udy of co rrect reasoning. (7)
metaphysics The study of reality, an in-
quiry into the fundamen tal nature of th e
un iverse an d the th ings in it . (4)
premise In an argument, a statement
supporting th e co nclusion. (15)
A rgument Exe rcises
(Answers in Appendix B)
Exercise 1.1
redttctio ad absttrdtt»i An argument
of th is form : If you assume th at a set of
st at ements is t rue, and yet you can de-
d uce a false o r absurd Statement from it,
then the original set of statements as a
wh ole must be false. (14)
slippery slop e The fallacy of argu-
ing erroneously that a particular action
should not be taken because it w ill lead
inevitably t o oth er actio ns resulti ng in
some di re out come. (39)
Socratic method Q uest ion-an d-ans\ver
dialogue in w hich propositions are me-
thodical ly scrutinize.cl t o u ncover th e
t r uth. (8)
statement (claim) An assertio n that
someth ing is or is not th e case and is
therefore th e ki nd of utterance that is ei-
ther t r ue o r false. (15)
straw man The fallacy of misrepresent-
ing a person’s views so they can be mo re
easily attacked or dismissed. (33)
For each of the passages that follow, indicate whether it constitutes an argu ment. For
each argument, sp ecify both t he conclusion a nd t he premises.
1. Faster-than-light t ravel is not possible. It would violate a law of nature.
2 . You h ave neglected your duty on several occasions, and you have been absent
from work too many times. Therefore, you a re not fit to serve in you r current
capactty.
3. Racial profili ng is not an issue for white people, but it is an issue for blacks.
4. The flu ep idemic on t he East C,oast is real. Govern ment health officials say so.
A nd 1 personally h ave read at least a dozen ne,vs stories t hat characterize the
sit uatio n as a “flu epidemic.”
5. C,ommunism is bu nk. On ly na”ive, impressionable p inheads believe that stuff.
Argument Exercises 43

44 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
6. C urrent-day Christians use violence to spread thei r right-to-life message.
These C h ristians, often referred to as the relig ious right, are well k nown for
violent demonstrations against Plan ned Parenthood and other abortion cl in-
ics. Docto rs and other personnel are threatened with death, clinics have been
bombed, there have even been cases of doctors being murdered.-Letter to
the editor, Arizona Daily Wildcat
7. I am writi ng about the cost of concert tickets. I am outraged at how much
ticket p rices are increas ing every year. A few years ago, o ne cou ld attend a
popular concert for a decent price. Now some musicians are ask ing as much
as $200 to $300.-Letter to the edito r, Buffalo News
8 . H omela nd security is a cruel cha rade for unborn child ren. Some 4,000 per
day a re ki lled in thei r mother’s \vomb by abortion. This American holocaust
\vas legalized by the Supreme Cou rt in an exercise of raw judicial power.-
Letter to the ed itor, Buffalo News
9. W itches are real . They a re mentioned in the Bible. There are ma ny people
today \vho claim to be witches. A nd h isto rical records reveal that there \vere
\Vitches in Salem.
10. Stretched upon the dark sil k night, bracelets of city lights glisten brig htly.
Exercise 1 .2
For each passage that fo llows, list the conclusion and p remises.
1. There a re those \vho mainta in .. . that even if God is not required as the
autho r of the moral la\v, he is nevertheless required as the enforcer of it, for
\Vithout the threat of divine punish ment, people wi ll not act morally. But
this pos ition is [not plausible]. In the first p lace, as an empirical hypothesis
about the psychology of huma n beings, it is questionable. There is no u n-
ambiguous ev idence that theists are more mora l than no ntheists. Not only
have psychological st udies failed to fi nd a sign ificant correlation between
frequency of religious worsh ip and moral conduct, but convicted criminals
are much [more] likely to be theists than atheiscs. Second, the threat of divine
punishment can not impose a moral obligation, for might does not make right.
Threats extort; they do not create a moral duty.-Free Inquiry, Summer 1997
2. I love Reason [magazine], but [regarding a previous article by Nick G illespie]
I’m wondering if al l the illegal drugs that Nick Gillespie used to take are fi nally
getting to him. He has a right to speak out against President Bush, but \vhen
he refers to him as “the m illionaire president \vho waited out the Vietnam War
in the Texas A ir Natio nal Guard,” it rem inds me of the garbage rhetoric that
I might see if I \vere readi ng Ted Rall, o r Susan Sontag, or one of the other
hate-mongering, America-bashing, leftist wh iners. That k ind of ad homi nem
attack is not o nly disrespectful to a man who is doing a damned good job as
commander-in-chief (with approval ratings of more than 80 percent); it detracts
from the whole poi nt of the article.-Letter to the edito r, Reason, July 2002
3. The fi fth way [of p roving that God ex ists) is taken from the governa nce of the
\vorld. We see th at things which lack k nowledge, such as natu ral bodies, act

for an end, and chis is evident from their acting a hvays, o r nearly always, in
the same \vay, so as co obtain che best result. H ence it is p lain chat they achieve
their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now \vhacever lacks knowledge
cannot move cowards an end, unless it be directed by some being endo\ved
with knowledge and intelligence; as che a rrow is directed by the archer. There-
fore some intelligent being exists by \vhom all natural things are di rected co
their end; and chis bei ng we call God.-Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica
4. The fi rst thing chat muse occur co anyone studying mora l subjectivism [the
view that the rightness o r \vrongness of an action depends on che beliefs of
an individual o r g roup] ser iously is chat che view allows che possibility that
an action ca n be both right and not right, or wrong and not wrong, etc. Th is
possibility exists because, as \Ve have seen, the subjectivist claims chat che
moral character of an action is determined by individual subjective states;
and these states can vary from person co person, even \vhen di rected coward
the same action o n che same occasion. H ence one and che same action can
evidently be determined co have-simultaneously-radically different moral
cha racters . … [If] subjectivism … does generate such contradicto ry conclu-
sions, the position is certainly uncenable.-Phillip Montague, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, June 1986
5. A Flo rida judge dismissed a la\vsuit that accused che Vatican of hiding instances
of sexual abuse by priests. The suit was thro\vn out because Florida’s statute of
limitations had run out on the case. I submit that the d ismissal was proper and
ethical considering che community stature and funct io n of priests and che ben-
efits chat accrue co society in the aftermath of che decision. Lee’s consider com-
mun ity stature first. The community st ature of priests muse always be t aken into
account in these abuse cases. A priest is not just anybody; he performs a special
role in society-namely, co provide spiritual guidance and co remind people
that there is both a moral o rder and a divine order in the \vorld. The priest’s role
is special because it helps co underpin and secure society itself Anything that
could undermine this role muse be neutralized as soon as possible. Among those
things that can weaken the priestly role a re publicity, public debate, and legal
actions. Abuse cases a re better handled in private by those who are keenly a\vare
of the importance of a positive public image of priests. And what of che benefits
of cu rtail ing che legal proceedings? The benefits co society of dismissing che
legal case outweigh al l the alleged disadvantages of continuing with public hear-
ings. The primary benefit is the continued nurturing of che community’s fa ith,
without \vhich che community would cease co function effectively.
Exercise 1.3
In the following passages, identify any fallacies. Some passages may contain more
than one fallacy.
1. The New York Times reported that o ne-chi rd of Republican senators have been
guilty of Sen ace ethics violations. But you know chat’s fa lse-the Times is a
notorious liberal rag.
Argument Exercises 45

46 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
2. Geraldo says that st udenrs who cheat on exams should not automatically be
expelled from school. But it’s ridiculous co insist chat students should never
be pu nished for cheating.
3. My sweater is blue. Therefore, the acorns chat make up the sweater a re blue.
4. Kelly says chat many women who live in predomi nantly M uslim countries a re
discriminated against. Bue how the heck would she know? She’s not a M uslim .
5. The st udy fou nd that 80 percent of women ,vho cook the d rug daily had no
recurrence of b reast ca ncer. But that doesn’t mean anything. The study ,vas
funded in part by the company chat makes the dr ug.
6 . The only proof capable of being g iven chat an object is visible, is that people
actually see it. The on ly p roof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it:
and so of the ocher sources of ou r experience. I n like ma nner, I apprehen d, the
sole evidence it is possible co p roduce chat anything is desirable, is chat people
actually desire ic.-John St uart Mill
7. Grem lins ex ist, chat’s for sure. No scientist h as ever proved that they
don’t exist.
8 . The fo rmer mayor was convicted of drug possession, a nd he spent ti me in jai l.
So you can safely ignore a nything he has to say about legalizing drugs.
9. I believe chat baby-carrying storks a re real creatures. N o one h as ever p roved
chat they don’t exist.
10. O nly man has morals. No woman is a man. Therefore, no woman has morals.

The Tria l and Death of Socrates 47
NARRATIV E
The Trial and Death of Socrates
Plato
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427- 347 see} is one of the most influe ntial
thinkers of Western civilization. He was the student of Socrates, teacher of Aristotle,
and timeless inspiration to a ll who sought wisdom through phi losophy. In this nar-
rative, one of his many d ialogues, Plato relates Soc rates’ address to the jury at his
famous trial for corrupting Athenian youth and d isrespecting the gods.
How you, 0 Athenians, have been affected by my ac-
cusers, I cannot tel l; but I know that they almost made
me forget who I was- so persuasively did they speak;
and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. Bu t
of the many falsehoods told by them, there was one
which quite amazed me- I mea n when they said that
you shou ld be upo n your guard and not a ll ow your-
selves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To
say this, whe n they were certain to be detected as soon
as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anyth ing
but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most
shameless- un less by the force of eloquence they
mea n the force of truth; for if such is their meaning,
I admit that I am e loquent. But in how different a way
from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarce ly
spoken the truth at all ; but from me you shall hear the
whole truth: not, however, delivered after their man-
ner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and
phrases. No, by heaven ! bu t I sha ll use the words and
arguments which occur to me at the moment; for I
am confident in the justice of my cause: at my time of
life I ought not to be appearin g before you, 0 men of
Athens, in the character of a juveni le orator- let no
one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me
a favo ur: lfl defend myself in my accustomed man ner,
and you hear me using the words which I have been
in the habi t of using in the [market], at the tables of
the money-changers, or anywhere e lse, I would ask
you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on
this account. For I am more than seventy years of age,
and appearing now for the first time in a court of law,
I am qu ite a stranger to the language of the place; and
therefore I would have you regard me as if I were real ly
From Plato, The Apology, in Dialogues of Plato, trans.
Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, 1896.
a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his
native tongue, and after the fashion of his country:
Am I maki ng an unfair req uest of you? Never mind the
ma nner, which may or may not be good; but t hi nk on ly
of the truth of my words, and give heed to that : let the
speaker speak truly and the jud ge decide justly ….
Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavor
to clear away in a short time, a slander which has lasted
a long time. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my
good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The
task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature
of it. And so leaving the event with God, in obedience
to the law I will now make my defence.
I will begin at the beginni ng, and ask what is the
accusation which has given rise to the slander of me,
and in fact has encouraged Meletus to prefer this
charge aga inst me. Well, what do the s landerers say?
They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their
words in an affidavit: ‘Socrates is an evi l-doer, and a
curious person, who searches into things under the
earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear
the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doc-
trines to others.’ Su ch is the nature of the accusation:
it is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy
of Aristophanes, who has introduced a man who m he
calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks
in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning mat-
ters of which I do not pretend to know either much or
little- not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any
one who is a student of natural philosophy. I s ho uld
be very sorry if Meletus cou ld bring so grave a charge
aga inst me. But the simple truth is, 0 Athenians, that
I have nothing to do with physical specu latio ns. Very
many of those here present are witnesses to the truth
of th is, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have
heard me, and tell your neighbo urs whether any of you
have ever known me hold fort h in few words or in many

48 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
upon such matters …. You hear their answer. And
from what they say of th is part of the charge you will be
able to judge of the t ruth of t he rest.
As little foundation is there for the repo rt t hat
I am a teacher, and ta ke money; this accusation has
no more truth in it than t he other. Although, if a m an
were really able to instruct mankind , to receive money
for giving instruction would, in my op inion, be an hon –
our to him. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prod icus
of Ceos , and Hipp ias of Elis , who go the round of
t he cities , and are able to persuade the young men
to leave t heir own citizens by whom they might be
taught for nothing, and come to them whom they not
on ly pay, but are t hankful if t hey may be allowed to
pay them ….
I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you
will reply, ‘Yes , Socrates , but what is the origin of
t hese accusations which are brought against you;
t here must have been something strange which you
have been doing? All these rumours and t his talk
abo ut you wou ld never have arisen if you had been
li ke other men: tell us , t hen, w hat is the cause of them,
for we shou ld be sorry to judge has tily of you.’ Now
I regard this as a fa ir cha ll enge, and I wil l endeavour
to exp lain to you the reason why I am ca ll ed wise and
have such an evil fame. Please do attend the n. And
althou gh some of you may thin k that I am joki ng,
I declare that I will tell you t he entire truth. Men of
Athens, this reputation of m ine has come of a certa in
sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what
kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps
be attained by man , for to t hat extent I am in cli ned to
be li eve t hat I am wise; whe reas the persons of whom
I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which
I may fa il to describe, because I have it not myself ;
and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is
takin g away my cha racter. And here, 0 men of Athens,
I m ust beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to
say something extravagant. For the word which I wil l
speak is not mi ne. I w ill refer you to a witness who
is worthy of credit; t hat w itness shall be the God of
Delphi- he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have
any, and of what sort it is. You must have known
Chaerephon; he was ea rly a friend of m ine, and also a
friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exil e of t he
people , and returned with you . Well , Chaerephon , as
you know, was very impetuo us in all his doings, and
he went to Delphi and boldly asked t he oracle to tell
him whether- as I was saying, I must beg you not to
interrupt- he asked t he o racle to tell him w hethe r any
one was wiser t han I was , and the Pythian prop hetess
answered, that there was no man w iser. Chaerep hon
is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will
confi rm t he truth of what I am saying.
Why do I mention this? Because I am going to ex-
plain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard
t he answer, I said to myself, W hat can t he god mean?
and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know
t hat I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he
mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And
yet he is a god , and cannot lie; that wou ld be against his
nature. After long consideration, I thou ght of a method
of trying the question. I reflected t hat if I cou ld only
fi nd a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the
god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him,
‘Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that
I was the wisest.’ Accord ingly I went to one who had the
reputation of w isdom, and observed him- his name
I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected
for examination- and the resu lt was as foll ows: When
I began to talk with him, I cou ld not help thinking that
he was not really wise, although he was t hought wise by
many, and still wiser by himself; and t hereupon I tried
to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was
not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated
me, and his enm ity was shared by several who were
present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself,
as I wen t away: Well, although I do not suppose that
either of us knows anything really beautifu l and good ,
I am better off than he is- for he knows nothing, and
t hinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that
I know. In this latter particu lar, then, I seem to have
slightly the advan tage of him.
Then I went to another who had still higher preten-
sions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the
same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and
of many others besides him. Then I went to one ma n af-
ter another, being not unconscious of t he enmity w hich
I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: Bu t necessity
was laid upon me,-the word of God, I thought, ought
to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must
to all who appear to know, and find ou t the meaning of
t he oracle. And I swea r to you, Athen ians, by the dog
I swear!- for I must tell you the truth- the result of my
mission was just this: I found t hat the men most in re-
pute were all but the most foolish; and that others less
esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the
ta le of my wanderings and of t he “Herculean” labou rs,

as I m ay call them, which I endu red on ly to find at last
t he oracle irrefutab le. After the poli ticians, I went to the
poets; tragic, dithyramb ic, and all sorts. And there, I
sa id to myself, you will be ins tan tly detected ; now you
will find out that you are more igno ran t than t hey are.
Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate
passages in their own writings, and asked what was the
meaning of them – thi nking that they would teach me
something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed
to confess the truth, but I must say that there is ha rdly a
person present who would not have talked bet ter about
t heir poetry than they d id t hemselves. Then I knew that
not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of
genius and inspiration; t hey are like diviners or sooth-
sayers who also say m any fine things, bu t do not under-
stand t he meaning of them . The poets appeared to me
to be much in the same case; and I fu rther observed
t hat upon the strength of their poetry they believed
t hemselves to be the wisest of men in other t hings in
which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving
myself to be superior to t hem for t he same reason that
I was superior to the politicians.
At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious
t hat I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure
t hat they knew many fine things; and here I was not mis-
ta ken, for they did know many things of which I was ig-
norant, and in thi s they cer tain ly were wiser than I was.
But I observed that even the good ar tisans fell in to the
same error as t he poets;- because they were good
workmen they th ought t hat they also knew all sorts of
high mat ters, and this defect in them overshadowed
t heir wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf
of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was , nei-
t her having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or li ke
t hem in both; and I made answer to myself and to the
oracle t hat I was better off as I was .
This inquisition has led to my having many enem ies
of the worst and most da ngerous kind , and has given
occasion also to m any ca lumnies. And I am called wise,
for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the
wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the tru th
is, 0 men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his
answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is
wor th little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates,
he is on ly using my name by way of illustrat ion , as if
he said , He, 0 m en, is the wisest, who, like Socrates,
knows that his wisdom is in truth wor th nothing. And
so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search
and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether
The Tria l and Death of Socrates 49
citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is
not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him
t hat he is not wise; and my occupa tion quite absorbs
me, and I have no time to give either to any public m at-
ter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in
utter pover ty by reason of my devotion to the god.
There is anot he r th ing: Young m en of the richer
cl asses, who have not m uch to do, come about m e of
t heir own accord; they like to hear the pretenders exam-
ined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to exam-
ine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly
discover, who thi nk that they know something, but really
know little or nothi ng; and then those who are examined
by them instead of bei ng angry with themselves are an –
gry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say, t his vil-
lainous misleader of youth!- and then if somebody asks
t he m, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do
not know, and cannot tell ; but in order th at they may
not appear to be at a loss , they repeat the ready-made
cha rges which are used against all phi losophers about
teaching things up in the clouds and under the ea rth,
and having no gods, and ma king the worse appea r the
better cause; for they do not like to confess that their
pretence of knowledge has been detected- which is
t he truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and
energetic, and are d rawn up in battle array and have
persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their
loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason
why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon,
have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me
on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the crafts-
men and poli ticians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians:
and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid
of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And t his,
Omen of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have
concealed noth ing, I have d issembled not hing. And yet,
I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate
me, and what is their hatred bu t a proof that I am speak-
ing t he truth?- Hence has arisen the prejudice against
me; and this is the reason ofit, as you w ill find out either
in this or in any fu ture enq uiry.
I have said enough in my defence against the first
class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are
headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his
country, as he calls himself. … He says that I am a doer
of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, 0 m en of Athens,
that Meletus is a doer of evi l, in that he pretends to be in
earnest when he is only in j est, and is so eager to bring
men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about

50 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
matters in which he really never had the smallest interest.
And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.
Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of
you. You think a great deal about the improvemen t of
youth?
Yes, I do.
Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you
must know, as you have taken the pains to d iscover
their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before
them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their im-
prove r is .- Obse rve, Meletus, that you are silent, and
have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgracefu l,
and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that
you have no interest in the matte r? Speak up, friend,
and tell us who their imp rover is.
The laws.
But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to
know who the person is , who, in the first place, knows
the laws.
The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.
What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are
able to instruct and improve youth?
Certainly they are.
What, all of t hem , or some only and not others?
All of them.
By the goddess He re, that is good news ! There are
plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the
aud ience- do they improve them?
Yes, they do.
And the senators?
Yes, the senators improve them.
But perhaps t he members of t he assem bly corrupt
them?- or do they too improve them?
They improve t hem.
Then every Athenian im proves and elevates them;
all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their
corrupter? Is that what you affirm?
That is what I stoutly affirm.
I am very unfortunate if you are right. Bu t suppose I
ask you a question: How about horses? Does one man do
them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact op-
posite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at
least not many- the trainer of horses, that is to say, does
them good , and others who have to do with them rather
injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any
other animals? Most assured ly it is; whether you and Any-
tus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition
of youth if they had one corrupter on ly, and all the rest of
the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have
sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the
young: you r carelessness is seen in your not caring about
the very things which you bring against me.
And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question –
by Ze us I will: Which is better, to live among bad citizens,
or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question
is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good
do their neigh bours good, and the bad do them evil?
Ce rtain ly.
And is there any one who wou ld rather be injured
t ha n benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my
good friend, t he law requires you to answer- does any
one like to be injured?
Ce rtain ly not.
And w hen you accuse me of corrupting and dete-
rioratin g the youth, do you allege t hat I corrupt them
intentionally or unintentionall y?
Intentionally, I say.
But you have just admitted that t he good do their
neighbours good, and evil do t hem evil. Now, is that
a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized
t hus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness
and ignora nce as not to know that if a man with whom
I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be
harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and in tention-
ally, too- so you say, although neither I nor any other
human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. Bu t
either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unin-
tentionally; and on either view of t he case you lie. If my
offence is uninten tional, the law has no cognizance of
unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me
privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had
been better advised, I shou ld have left off doing what
I only d id un intentiona lly- no doubt I shou ld; but you
would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach
me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a
place not of in struction, but of punishment.
It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying,
t hat Meletus has no care at all , great or small , about the
matter. But still I shou ld like to know, Meletus, in what I
am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean,
as I infer from your ind ictment, that I teach t hem not to
acknowledge the gods which t he state acknowledges,
but some other new divin ities or spiritual agencies in
t heir stead. These are the lessons by w hich I corrupt the
youth, as you say.
Yes, t hat I say emphatically.
T hen, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speak-
ing, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms,

what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether
you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some
gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and
am not an entire atheist- th is you do not lay to my
charge- but on ly you say that they are not the same
gods which the city recognizes- the charge is that they
are different gods. O r, do you mean that I am an atheist
sim ply, and a teacher of atheism?
I mea n the latter- that you are a complete atheist.
What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think
so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the
godhead of t he sun or moon , like other men?
I assure you, judges , that he does not: for he says
t hat the sun is stone, and the moon earth.
Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing
Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the
judges, if you fancy them illi terate to such a degree as
not to know that these doctrines are found in the books
of Anaxagoras t he Clazomenia n, which are full of them.
And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them
by Socrates, when there are not infrequently exh ib i-
t ions of t hem at the theatre (price of adm ission one
drachma at the most) ; and they might pay t hei r money,
and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these ex-
t raordinary views. And so, Meletus, you really t hink t hat
I do not believe in any god?
I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none
at all.
Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty
sure t hat you do not believe yourself. I cannot help
t hinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and
impudent, and that he has wri tten this in dictment in a
spirit of mere wantonness and youthfu l bravado. Has
he not compounded a riddle, th inking to try me ? He
said to hi mself: I sha ll see whether the wise Socrates
will d iscover my facetious contradiction, or whet her
I sha ll be ab le to deceive him and the rest of t hem. For
he certain ly does appear to me to contrad ict him self
in the ind ictment as much as if he said t hat Socrates
is guilty of not be lieving in t he gods, and yet of be-
lieving them – bu t this is not like a person who is in
earnest.
I should li ke you, 0 men of Athens, to join me in ex-
amining what I conceive to be his in consistency; and do
you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience
of my req uest that they wou ld not make a disturbance
if I speak in my accustomed manner:
Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of
human th ings, and not of human beings? … I wish, men
The Tria l and Death of Socrates 51
of Athens, t hat he wou ld answer, and not be always try-
ing to get up an interruption. Did ever any ma n believe
in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing,
and not flute-p layers? No, my friend; I will answer to
you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for your-
self. There is no man who ever did. But now please to
answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritua l
and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
He cannot.
How lucky I am to have extracted t hat answer, by
t he assistance of t he court! Bu t the n you swear in t he
ind ictment that I teach and bel ieve in divine or spiri-
t ual agencies (new or old, no matter for t hat) ; at any
rate I bel ieve in sp iri tual agencies- so you say and
swear in t he affidavit ; and yet if I believe in divine be-
ings, how can I help believing in sp iri ts or demigods-
m ust I not ? To be sure I must; and therefore I may
assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are
spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or t he
sons of gods ?
Ce rtain ly they are.
But this is what I call t he facetious riddle invented
by you: the dem igods or spirits are gods, and you say
first t hat I do not believe in gods, and then again t hat
I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in dem igods.
For if t he demigods are t he ill egitim ate sons of gods,
whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of
whom they are said to be the sons- what human being
will ever believe that there are no gods if t hey are the
sons of gods? You migh t as well affirm the existence of
m ules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such non –
sense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you
to make trial of me. You have put this into the indict-
ment because you had nothing real of wh ich to accuse
me. But no one who has a particl e of understanding
will ever be convinced by you that the same men can
believe in d ivine and superhuman things, and yet not
believe that there are gods and dem igods and heroes.
I have said enough in answer to the charge of
Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but
I know only too well how many are the enmities w hich
I have incurred, and this is what wi ll be my destruction
if I am destroyed – not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but
t he envy and detraction of the world, which has been
t he death of man y good men, and will probably be t he
death of many more; there is no danger of my being
t he last of them.
Some one will say: And are you not ashamed,
Socrates, of a course of life wh ich is likely to bring you

52 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There
you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything
ought not to calcu late the chance of living or dying; he
ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is
doing right or wrong- acting the part of a good man
or of a bad .. . .
Strange, indeed , wou ld be my conduct, 0 men of
Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the genera ls
whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and
Amph ipoli s and Deli um , remained where they placed
me, like any other man, facing death – if now, when, as
I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfill the phi-
losopher’s mission of searching into myself and other
men, I were to desert my post through fear of death,
or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I
m ight just ly be arra igned in court for denying t he exis-
tence of the gods , if I d isobeyed the oracl e because I
was afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was
not wise. For the fear of death is indeed t he pretence
of wisdom , and not rea l wisdom , being a pretence of
knowing t he unknown; and no one knows whether
death, which men in their fea r apprehend to be the
greatest evil, may not be the greatest good . Is not th is
ignorance of a d isgracefu l sort, t he ignorance which is
the conceit that man kn ows what he does not know?
And in this respect only I beli eve myself to differ from
men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than
they are- that whereas I know but li ttle of the world be-
low, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that
injustice and disobedience to a bette r, whether God or
man , is evil and d ishonourable, and I will never fear or
avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And
therefore if you let me go now, and are not convinced
by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted
I must be put to death … – if you say to me, Socrates,
th is time we will not mi nd Anytus, and you shall be let
off, but upon one condition , that you are not to enquire
and specu late in this way any more, and that if you are
caught doing so again you shall d ie- if this was the
cond ition on w hich you let me go, I should reply: Men
of Athens, I honou r and love you; but I shall obey God
rather than you, and while I have li fe and strength I
shall never cease from the practice and teaching of ph i-
losophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to
him after my manner: You , my friend – a citizen of the
great and mighty and wise city of Athens- are you not
ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money
and honour and reputation, and caring so li ttle about
wisdom and truth and the greatest im provement of the
sou l, which you never rega rd or heed at all ? And if the
person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do
care; t hen I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I
proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine
him , and if I th ink that he has no virtue in him, but
on ly says that he has, I reproach him with undervalu-
ing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And I sha ll re-
peat the same words to every one whom I meet, young
and o ld , citizen and alien, but especially to t he ci tizens,
inasmuch as t hey are my brethren. For know that th is
is the command of God; and I believe that no greater
good has ever happened in the state than my service
to the God . Fo r I do noth ing but go about persuad ing
you all , old and young alike, not to take thought for your
persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care
about the greatest improvemen t of the sou l. I tell you
that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue
comes money and every other good of man, public as
well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the
doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous
person. Bu t if any one says that this is not my teach-
ing, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, 0 men of
Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Any-
tus bids, and either acquit me or not; but wh ichever
you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not
even if I have to die many times . .. .
And now, Athen ians, I am not going to argue for my
own sake, as you may t hink, but for yours, that you may
not sin against the God by condemning me, who am
his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find
a successor to me, who, if I may use such a lud icrous
figure of speech , am a sort of gadfly, given to the state
by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is
tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires
to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly wh ich God has
attached to the state, and all day long and in all places
am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuad ing
and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like
me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me ….
Now do you th in k that I cou ld have remained alive
all these years if I had taken part in publi c affa irs, and
had always maintained the cause of justice like an hon-
est man, and had held it a paramount duty, as it is, to
do so? Certainly not, Athen ians, nor cou ld any other
man. But t hroughout my w hole life, bot h in private
and in public, w henever I have had to ta ke part in pub-
lic affairs, you will find I have always been the same
and have never yielded unjustly to anyone; no, not to
those whom my enem ies falsely assert to have been

my pupils. Bu t I was never anyone’s teacher. I have
never withheld myself from anyo ne, young or old, who
was anxious to hear me disc uss while I was making my
investiga tion ; neither do I discuss for pay ment, and
refuse to discuss without payment. I am ready to ask
questions of rich and poor alike, and if any man wishes
to answer me, and t hen listen to what I have to say, he
may . . ..
I believe in t he gods as no one of my accusers be-
lieves in them: and to you and to God I commit my
cause to be decided as is best for you and for me.
[The vote is taken and he is found guilty by 281 votes
to 220.)
There are many reasons why I am not grieved,
O men of Athens, at t he vote of condemnation. I ex-
pected it, and am on ly surprised that the votes are
so nearly equa l; for I had t hou ght that t he majority
against me wou ld have been far larger; but now, had
t hirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have
been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have
escaped Meletus. I may say more; for without t he
assistance of Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that
he would not have had a fi fth part of the votes, as t he
law req uires, in which case he would have incurred a
fine of a thousa nd drachmae.
And so he proposes death as t he penalty. And what
shall I propose on my part, 0 men of Athens? Clearly
t hat which is my due. And what is my due? What return
shall be made to t he man who has never had the wit to
be id le during his whole life; but has been careless of
what the ma ny care for- wealth, and family interests,
and m il itary offices, and speaking in t he assembly, and
magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting t hat
I was really too honest a ma n to be a politician and
live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or
to myself; but where I could do t he greatest good pri-
vately to every one of you, t hither I went, and sought to
persuade every man among you that he must look to
himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks
to his private interests, and look to the state before he
looks to t he interests of t he state; and that t his shou ld
be t he order which he observes in all his actions . What
shall be done to such an one? Doubtless some good
t hing, 0 men of Athens, if he has his reward; and t he
good shou ld be of a kind suitab le to him. What would
be a reward suitable to a poor ma n who is your bene-
factor, and w ho desires leisure that he may instruct
you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance
in the Prytaneum, 0 men of Athens, a reward which
The Tria l and Death of Socrates 53
he deserves far more than the ci tizen who has won t he
prize at O lympia in the horse or chariot race, whether
t he chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For
I am in want, and he has enough; and he on ly gives you
t he appearance of happiness, and I give you the rea lity.
And if I am to estimate t he pena lty fairly, I shou ld say
t hat maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.
Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am
saying now, as in what I said before about t he tears and
prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather because I am
convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one,
although I cannot convince you- the time has been too
short; if there were a law at Athens, as t here is in other
cities , t hat a capital cause should not be decided in one
day, then I believe that I should have convinced you.
But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and,
as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will
assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself t hat
I deserve any evi l, or propose any penalty. Why shou ld
I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which
Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death
is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty
which wou ld certain ly be an evi l? Shall I say imprison –
ment? And why shou ld I live in prison , and be t he slave
of the magistrates of the year- of t he Eleven? Or sha ll
t he penalty be a fi ne, and imprisonment until the fine is
paid? There is t he same objection. I shou ld have to lie
in prison, for money I have none, and cannot pay. And
if I say exi le (and this may possibly be t he penalty which
you will affix) , I mus t indeed be blinded by the love of
life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who
are my own citizens , cannot endure my di scourses and
words, and have found them so grievous and odious
t hat you will have no more of them, others are likely to
endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very
likely. And what a life shou ld I lead, at my age, wander-
ing from city to city, ever changing my place of exi le,
and always being driven out! For I am qu ite sure that
w herever I go, there, as here, t he young men will flock
to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive
me out at their request ; and if I let them come, their
fathers and friends will drive me out for t heir sakes.
Some one will say: Yes, Soc rates, but cannot you
hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign
city, and no one will interfere wi th you? Now I have
great difficulty in maki ng you understand my answer to
t his. For if I tell you t hat to do as you say would be a dis-
obedience to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold
my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and

54 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
if I say again that da ily to discourse about virtue, and of
those other things about which you hear me exam ining
myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and
that the unexam ined life is not worth living, you are still
less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although
a th ing of which it is ha rd for me to persuade you. Also,
I have never been accustomed to think t hat I deserve to
suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated
the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been
mu ch t he worse. But I have none, and t herefore I must
ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, per-
ha ps I could afford a m ina , and therefore I propose that
penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my
friends here, bid me say thir ty minae, and they will be
the sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for which
sum they will be ample security to you .
{2nd vote: The jury decides for the death penalty by a
vote of 360 to 141.J
Not much time will be gained, 0 Athen ians, in re-
tu rn for t he evil name which you will get from the de-
tractors of the city, who will say that you kill ed Socrates,
a wise man; for they will call me wise, even although I
am no t wise, when they want to reproach you. If you
had waited a little while, your desire would have been
fu lfill ed in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in
years, as you may perceive, and not far from death . …
The difficulty, my friends , is not to avoid death ,
but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than
death. I am o ld and move slowly, and t he slower runner
has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick,
and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has
overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned
by you to suffer t he penalty of death- they too go their
ways condemned by the truth to suffe r the penalty of
villainy and wrong; and I mus t abide by my award – let
them ab ide by theirs . I suppose that these things may
be regarded as fated- and I t hink that they are well. . ..
Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like
also to talk with you about the thing which has come
to pass, while t he magistrates are busy, and befo re I
go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a little,
for we may as well ta lk with one another while there is
time. Yo u are my friends, and I should like to show you
the mean ing of t his event which has ha ppened to me.
O my judges- for you I may tru ly call judges- I shou ld
li ke to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. H itherto
the divine faculty of which t he in ternal oracle is the
source has constantly been in the habit of opposing
me even about triAes, if I was going to make a slip or
error in any matter; and now as you see there has come
upon me that which may be thou ght, and is generally
believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle
made no sign of opposition, either when I was leaving
my house in the morning, or when I was on my way to
the court, o r while I was speaking, at anything which
I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped
in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either
said or did touching t he matter in hand has t he oracle
opposed me. What do I take to be t he explanation of
this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what
has happened to me is a good , and t hat those of us
who think that death is an evil are in error. For t he cus-
toma ry sign wou ld surely have opposed me had I been
going to evil and not to good.
Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that
there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for
one of two thi ngs- either death is a state of noth ing-
ness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there
is a change and migration of the soul from this world to
another. Now if you suppose that there is no conscious-
ness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is und isturbed
even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For
if a person were to select the night in which his sleep
was undistu rbed even by dreams, and were to compare
with th is the other days and nights of his life, and then
were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed
in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than
this one, I th ink that any ma n, I will not say a private
man, but even the great ki ng will not find many such
days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if
death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain; for
eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the
journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the
dead abide, what good, 0 my friends and judges, can be
greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in
the world be low, he is delivered from the professors of
justice in this world , and finds the true judges who are
said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus
and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God
who were righteous in thei r own life, that pilgrimage
will be worth making. What would not a man give if he
m ight converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hes iod
and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and
again. I myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in
there meeting and conversing w ith Pala medes, and Ajax
the son ofTelamon, and any other ancient hero who has
suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there
will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my

own sufferings with t heirs. Above all , I shall then be a ble
to continue my search into true and fa lse knowledge; as
in this world, so also in the next ; and I shall find out who
is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What
would not a man give, 0 judges, to be able to examine
the leader of the great Trojan exped ition; or Odysseus or
Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too!
What infi nite delight would there be in conversing with
them and asking them questions! In another world they
do not pu t a man to death for asking questions: assur-
edly not. For besides being happier than we are, they will
be im mortal, if what is said is true.
Wherefore, 0 jud ges, be of good cheer about dea th,
and know of a certainty, that no evi l can happen to a
good m an , either in life or after death. He and his are
not neglected by t he gods; nor has my own approach-
ing end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly
t hat t he t ime had arrived when it was bette r for me to
Probing Questions
For Further Reading 55
die and be released from trouble; wherefore t he oracle
gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry
with my condemners, or with my accusers; t hey have
done me no harm , although they did not mean to do
me any good; and fo r this I may gently blame them.
Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are
grown up, I would ask you, 0 my fr iends, to punish them;
and I would have you trouble them , as I have troubled
you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more
than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something
when they are really nothing,-then reprove them , as
I have reproved you, for not caring abou t that fo r which
they ought to care, and thinking that they are something
when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both
I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.
The hou r of departure has arrived, and we go our
ways- I to die, and you to live. Wh ich is better God
only knows .
I. Whar d oes Socrates ,nean by “The unexamined life is nor worth living”? How does chis
vie,v relate co Socrates’ accivicy as rhe cicy’s in rellecrual gadAy? Socrates see,ns ro chink chat
many of his jurors lead unexam ined lives. Why does he chink chis?
2. Socrates ,vas executed because he deal t in offensive and dangerous ideas. Have there been
o chers in h istory ,vho have also suffered because sociecy thought their ideas ,vere unaccept-
able? Is a sociecy ever justified in punishing people for expressing such ideas?
3. Socrates d ied for his principles. Whar ideas in your life would you be ,villi ng ro d ie for?
For Further Read ing
S imo n Blackburn, Oxfo,d Dictionary of Phiwsophy (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press,
1994, 2005). A concise guide to hundreds of philosophy t opics, w ith many of the
ent ries being of substantial length.
N icholas Bunn in an d E. P. Tsui-James, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, I 969) . A one-volume student reference covering th e
major divisions of philosophy.
Eliot D. Cohen, Phiwsophers at W0rk (Ne,v York: H olt, Rinehart, and W insto n,
1989). Repo rts of how people in d ifferent professions use philosophy.
Edward Craig, e.d., Routledge Encycwpedia of Phiwsophy, IO vols. (New York:
Routledge, 1998) . A fi ne source of information o n a vast number of philosoph ical
topics.

56 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You
Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxfo rd: Oxfo rd Univer-
sity Press, 1995). A good one-volume philosophy reference featuring many excellent
ar ticles on ph ilosophical issues.
Brooke Moore and Richard Parker, Critical Thinking, 8th e.dition (New York:
McGraw-Hill , 2007). A comprehensive and readable treatment of critical chinking
skills.
Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, e.ds., Classics of Philosophy, 3rd edition (Ne,v
York: Oxfo rd University Press, 20 IO). The most comprehens ive anthology of Western
philosophy available.
Bertrand Russell , The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1959). A very readable classic work by an emi nent philosopher. Focuses mostly on
issues in epistemology.
Lewis Vaughn, Great Philosophical Arguments: An Introduction to Philosophy (Ne,v
York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 20 12). A text with readings o rganized by topic and by
th e standard a rguments chat have occupied thinkers throughout the centuries.

1 , ‘ ‘ I
CHAPTER
2
GOD AND RELIGION
CHAPT ER OBJECTIV ES
2.1 OVERVIEW: GOD AND
PHILOSOPHY
• Understand t he importance of
relig ious be liefs in the world
and how t hey can influence
what people t hink, do, and
value.
• Know how ph ilosophy tries
to understand and evaluate
relig ious claims.
• Give an overview of t he
trad itional arguments fo r the
existence of God and object ions
to them.
• Define theism, atheism,
agnosticism, monotheism,
polytheism, deism , pantheism,
and panentheism.
2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
• Exp lain and evaluate Aquinas’s
fi rst-cause argument and Craig’s
Kalam cosmological argument.
• Exp lain and evaluate Paley’s
analogical design argument
and the best-explanation design
argument.
• Exp lain and evaluate Anselm ‘s
ontological argument .
2.3 GOD AND THE PROBLEM
OF EVIL
• Understand Rowe’s a rgument
from evil and some major
critic isms of it.
• Critically examine the free will
defense.
• Explain and evaluate Hick’s
sou l-making theodicy.
2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE
• St ate and evaluate the argument
from relig ious experience.
• Summarize Swinburne’s
argument from relig ious
experience and assess
critic isms of it.
• Assess the claim that the
argument from relig ious
experience fa il s because
religious experiences are
incom patibl e.

58 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
2.5 BELI EF WITHOUT REASON
• Summarize and evaluate
James’s pragmatic argument
for believing the religious
hypothesis.
2.6 EASTERN RELIGIO N S
• Explain how Buddhism
diffe rs from Western religious
traditions.
• Explain the natu re and
signifi cance of the Veda s, the
Upanishads , and the
Bhagavad-Gita.
• State and evaluate Pascal’s
wager.
• St ate and explain t he Buddha’s
Four Noble Truths.
• Know how t he Chuang Tzu
cha racterizes t he Dao.
• Defi ne samsara, atman,
brahmin, and Brahman.
• Id enti fy the pa rallels to t he Dao
in Western philosophy.
2.1 OVERVIEW: GOD AND PHILOSOPHY
What does ph ilosophy have to do w ith religion? Th roughout h istory they have
often been intertw ined. At t imes the two have bowed respectfully to each other
(although sometimes from a distance), thrown stones at each other’s conceptua l
temples, \vo rked in each other’s backyards, and chased w isdom along d ivergent
paths that often crossed. For Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, doing philosophy is
not merely a sea rch for t ruth ; it is a spiritua l quest, a journey to h ighe r, invaluable
things . From the Easte rn religious traditions of Buddhism, Hindu ism, Confu-
cian ism, and Daoism come p h ilosoph ical insights t hat have influenced m ill ions
and ea rned the respect of Western thinkers. To the great ph ilosophers of t he
med ieva l period-Augustine, Boethius, Av icenna, Anselm, Maimon ides, Aqui-
nas, and othe rs-reason is a g ift from God, and p h ilosophy can reveal h idden
knowledge and sacred t ruths. In mode rn philosophy, f rom Descartes to the pres-
ent, p h ilosophe rs (both religious and secu lar) examine cla ims about God, immor-
tality, good and evil, and ultimate reality. Many contempora ry thinkers \vould
insist that ph ilosophy, us ing irs own distinctive methods of inqu iry, seeks t ruth
and, through t ruth, transcendence.
What some of the great ph ilosophers have to say about God and rel igion is t he
subject of t his chapter. Of course, being p hilosophers, they do not simply declare
their views to be correct-they a rgue thei r cases. It is then up to us to evaluate their
a rgumenrs to see if their claims are \VOrthy of our acceptance. To embrace a vie\v
merely because it is comfortable, fam iliar, and emotionally satisfying is to violate the
spir it of ph ilosophical inquiry, wh ich asks us to bel ieve for good reasons.
God is not what you
imagine or what you
thin k you understand. If
you understand, you have
failed.
-Augustine
1 Are reasons or
arguments relevant to
your current religious
beliefs? If so, how? If
not, do you t hink your
beliefs are nonethe less
rationa l? Expla in.

Overview: God and Phi losophy 59
Why Religion Matters
Belief in God o r in a spiritual reality has shape.cl civil izations and a ltered history. In
che name of che divine, devotees have raised up and laid low m ighty empires. They
have built temples, creace.d arc, produced sacred cexcs, and crafted ceremony and
song. They have bequeathed co che world mora l and legal codes, explanations of
how che universe works, and conceptual maps sho\ving \vhere ind ividuals belong in
a d ivine plan. From such t hings, councless mi llions have dra\vn a sense of purpose,
meaning, and courage in che face of loss.
Bue there is also a dark side of che religious realm. Faith has often engendered moral
blindness, intolerance, narro\v-mindedness, and cr uelty. With unshakeable confidence
in a transcendent po\ver, believers have burned places of \vorship, books, heretics, and
unbelievers. In che name of their gods they have trampled on human rights, blocked sci-
entific inquiry, oppressed \vomen, waged holy \vars, and infl icted terrorism on innocents.
le seems chat ho\vever we tally these lists of good and evil, we muse conclude chat
che impact of religion on earth is incalculably large. This face alone is reason enough co
examine che claims of religion critically and dispassionately-chat is, philosophically.
Religious belief or disbelief moves not just societies, but also individual lives. What-
ever your ideas about God and religion, they will surely influence your chinking about
some very important matters. Based on these beliefs, you may decide \vhac sore of
entities exist in che universe, what claims a re true or false, and what things are good or
bad. And from such views, your choices flow, and from your choices, your life is made.
Overview: The Philosopher’s Quest
You may a lready have strong views about che existence of God and about che merics
of a specific religious tradition. Where d id chose vie\vS come from? Chances are
good chat you bel ieve what you do because you were ra ise.cl chat \vay, craine.d in a
particular faith by your parencs or culcure. If so, you came by you r religious beliefs
accidentally. Out of che many religions of che \vorld (and che thousands of fa ith
groups), you found yourself in one of chem. And che mere face chat your pa rents o r
your society hande.d chose beliefs co you does not mean they are true. The point is
not chat che religious vie\vS \Ve inherit are false, but chat blindly accepting chem is a
poor \vay co discover che t ruth about chem.
To judge che worth of any religious claims, co decide among che many compet-
ing assertions, we need che objective sea nce and critical reasoning of philosophical
inqu iry. The \vay of che ph ilosopher is not co ask how you came co have a belief, but
iuhether the belief is supported by good reasons. She kno\vS chat co judge a religious view
from che standpoint of che rel ig ious trad ition chat spa\vned it is co beg che question
and co b ias her inqu iry from che scare. She strives instead for che ph ilosoph ical ideal
of unbiased evaluation in che cour t of reason.
This cou rt has been in session for hundreds of years as philosophers and theolo-
gians have debated religious issues, pa rticularly che existence or nonexistence of God.
They have put fo rth a number of argumencs co cry co demonstrate che latter, several
of wh ich are discussed in chis chapter and ics readings. The a rgumencs concern che
2 How has your belief
o r non belief in God
influenced t h e major
choice s you ‘ve made in
your life? How has you r
belie f or nonbelie f
a ffected you r attitude
toward science, mor-
a lity, your educat ion,
peop le who don’t
share you r b e lie fs,
a t heist s, abort ion, and
te rrorist acts?
I do no t feel o bliged to
believe that ,he same God
who has endowed us w ich
sense, reason} and intdlccr
has intended us to forgo
their USC .
-Galileo Galilei
3 Suppose you, like
many people, have
come by your beliefs
about religion acciden-
t a lly (because you were
born a t a part icula r
p lace and t ime). How
do you think you
should re spon d t o
t h is fact ? Should you
(1) st ill assu me your be-
lie fs are tru e, (2) re ject
a ll your current beliefs,
(3) suspend ju dgment
about t he beliefs, o r
(4) evalu ate your be-
lie fs usin g reason and
evidence?

60 Chapter 2 God and Religion
PH I LOSO PHY NOW
Who Believes in God?
According ro many surveys, belief in God, or gods, is ,videspread on rhe p laner bur is neither
universal nor unchang ing.
2007
20 14
% of American adults who say
Believe in God ;
absolutely certain
7 1 o/o
63%
Believe in God ;
fairly certain
17%
20%
Pew Research Center, 2014
Belief in God by Level of Education
D o not believe
in God
5%
9%
Believe in God;
absolutely certain
Believe in God; not t oo/
not at all certain
High school or less
43%
Some college
33%
College
9%
38% 28% 19%
Pew Research Center, 2014
Percentage of people who do not identify with any religion
Percentage of people who do
not identify with any religion
Pew Research Center, 2012
2007
15.3%
2009
16.8%
Certainty of God’s existence vs. atheism
J apan
Percentage of people who said they 4 .3%
were certain of God’s existence
Atheist 8.7%
Live Science, 1991- 2008
Sweden France
10.2% 15.5%
19.3% 23.3%
2011
18.6%
20 12
19.6%
Great United
Britain States
16.8% 60.6%
18.0% 3.0%
Why do you think “absolutely certain” belief in God in the United States
declined slightly between 2007 and 2014? Does the fact that the vast major-
ity of Americans believe in God provide evidence for God’s existence? Why
or why not? Why do you think “absolutely certain” belief in God declines
the more education a person has? European countries have much lower
rates of belief in God (and higher rates of atheism) than the United States
does. What conclusions can you draw from this?

Overview: God and Phi losophy 61
Figure 2.1 Most people probably acquire their religi ous beli efs in childhood. Did you come by
your current relig ious beliefs that way? If so, do you think you should critically exam ine them in
adulthood? Why or why not?
God of the th ree main Western religious traditions-Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam. This being is thought to be the creator of the universe, a person (as opposed to
an impersonal force or substance, as in some Eastern religions) \vho is a ll-powerful
(omnipotent), a ll-kno\ving (omniscient), and a ll-good (omnibenevolent).
To try to prove the existence of this God, many th inkers have advanced
cosmological arguments, which reason from the existence of the universe, or cos-
mos (or some fundamenta l feature of it), to the conclusion that God exists. For ex-
ample, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) argues that some th ings in the universe are
caused to exist, and that nothing can cause itself to exist or come into being through
an infinite series of causes. So there must be a first uncaused cause of everyth ing-
and this fi rst uncaused cause is God.
Ph ilosophers, of course, aren’t the only ones \vho a rgue this way. Many people-
perhaps you are one of them-have thought or said something along these lines: ” If
God doesn’t exist, how d id the un iverse come into being? Ho\v did we come into
being? To say that the \vorld \vasn’t caused by anyone or that it was the result of an
accident makes no sense. Only a supreme being cou ld have caused it to exist.” Phi-
losophers have simply given this k ind of argument more precision and coherence, as
well as more critical scrutiny.
Many try to make their case for God through teleological arguments, which rea-
son from apparent signs of design or purposeful creation in the \vorld to the existence
of a supreme designer. William Paley (1743-1805), an English theologian and moral
philosopher, presents a classic version of this approach. Arguing by analogy, he asserrs
that a \Vatch is devise.cl by an intelligent designer; the un iverse resembles a \Vatch in
IClritic ism of religious
belief., is often considered
im polite o r even uncon·
stitutional (alth o ugh it
isn’t). Religion is treated
like a senile rdacivc whose
b izarre statements arc not
to be questio ned.
-\X’alter Sinnott-Armstrong
Cosmological arguments
arc arguments that cry m
show thar fro m the fact
that rhc universe exists}
God exists.
Teleological arguments
arc argumen ts that try to
show that God must exist
because featu res of the
universe show signs of pur·
pose o r design.

62 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
An ontological argument
is an argume nt that tries to
demonstrate God ‘s exis t·
ence by logical analysis of
the concept of God.
I t h ink we must atrack-
whcrcvcr we meet it- the
no nsensical idea that mu –
tually exclusive pro posi-
t ions about God can bot h
be true.
-C. S. lewis
An argum ent from
relig ious experience is an
argum ent of this fo rm: A
p er.son seems m have ex-
perien ced God; the experi-
e nce m us t have actually
been a genuine e n counter
with God; t herefore, God
p robably exists.
that it too looks as if it were designed by some intelligent being; therefore, the universe
\vas probably also created by an intelligent designer-in ocher words, by God.
Some p hilosophers have case the design argument as an inference co the best
explanat ion. This version begins by pointing co some impressive features of the uni-
verse such as the intricate workings of biological systems or the just-so calibration
of physical properties chat allo\vS the un iverse co exist. le then claims chat t he best
explanat ion of such amazing faces is chat God designed t he universe. God muse be
the best explanation fo r these facts because it seems utterly improbable that they
could have just happened without t he intervention of a deity. So if God is the best
explanat ion, then God muse exist.
Ontolog ical arguments appeal not co empirical facts about the cosmos, but co
the concept of God itself. From the definitio n of God, we prove \vith logic alone
that a supreme deity is a reality. St. Anselm (1033- 1109) \vas t he first to articulate
such an argument, and ever since, ocher philosophers have been offering their O\vn
versions. He first posies a definition of God as the g reatest poss ible being. This asser-
tion, Anselm says, implies chat God muse act ually exist, because ifhe did not exist in
reality (and on ly existed in ou r minds), he would not be t he greatest possible being.
(Ex ist ing in reality is thought co make something greater than if it ex ises merely in
someone’s mind.) Therefore, God exises.
Anselm’s a rgument is not easy co grasp on a quick reading. To appreciate it, you
may need co read it several times and spend some extra time \vich it. Just keep this in
mind: There are good reasons why intrigued philosophers have been exami ning and
reexamin ing Anselm’s argument for the past nine hund re.d yea rs. (We \vill t ake a
closer look at the argument lacer in chis chapter.)
For Anselm and ochers, the strongest ar-
gumenes for God’s existence spring from
pure reason. But for many people, definitive
evidence chat God ex ises comes from personal
experience-from direct a\vareness of what
seems co be God’s divine presence. People ex-
perience something chat t hey believe is God or
is of God, and chis apparent encounter fo rms
t he basis of an argument from relig ious ex-
p erien ce. The a rgument says chat a person
seems co have experienced God; the experience
muse have actually been a genu ine encounter
with God; t herefore, God probably exists. Th is
way of a rguing is essentially an inference co the
best expla natio n. The best explanation of the
person’s experience is chat God’s presence \vas
somehow sense.cl, and if so, God likely exists.
Figure 2.2 Some people think the world so wondrous that a d ivine
designer must have brought it forth, but others have thought the
world so thoroughly f lawed in its design that we might well con-
clude that the designer was incompetent. Which view are you more
sympathetic to?
Philosophers have subjected all the preced-
ing arguments co critical examination, ques-
tion ing both thei r conclusions and the truth
of their premises. In the following sections, we

Overview: God and Phi losophy 6 3
wi ll review some of t hese criticisms as well as reasoned responses to them. For now,
it is important to understand t hat even if the argu ments fa il t o p rove their case, t hat
doesn’t demonstrate t he nonexistence of God. If scientisrs have so far fa iled to fi nd
evidence fo r life outside our sola r system, t hat doesn’t prove t hat life doesn’t exist
somewhere o ut there. The fail u re of t hese arguments wou ld sho\v on ly that they g ive
us no good reasons to believe in t he traditio nal God of West ern religion.
But t here is a nother kind of argu ment that does purport to establish God’s non-
ex istence: t he argu m ent from evil. You have p robably heard this a rgument, or t he
compla int that insp ires it, before. When you have see n people confro nted \Vit h u n-
bearable ev il- p ain, suffering , and injustice-you may have heard them say some-
thing like this: “Why did t his trage.dy happen? W hy d id God allo\v my mother-a
WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE?
Hard-Wired for God?
An argument from evil is
an argume nt purpo rting
to show that sin ce there
is unnecessary evil, an
all-powerful , all-knowing,
and all-good God mus,
no t c:xi ,;:t.
D o you bel ieve in God? If so, \vhy? So,n e scientists chink they know why. Here is a recent
report o n rhe issue:
Humans are programmed to bel ieve in God because it gives t hem a bet-
ter chance of surviva l, researchers cla im. A s tudy into the way ch ild ren’s
bra ins develop s uggests that du ring the process of evolution those with
re ligious te ndencies began to benefit fro m their beliefs- possibly by wo rk·
ing in groups to e ns ure the future of the ir community.
The fi ndings of Bruce Hood, professor of deve lopmental psycho logy at
Bristol Un iversity, s uggest that magica l and su pernatural beliefs are hard –
wired into our bra ins fro m birth, and that religions are therefore t appi ng into
a powerful psychologica l fo rce. His work is supported by other researchers
who have found evidence li nking religious fee lings and experience to par-
ticu lar regions of the brain. They s uggest people are programmed to re-
ce ive a fee ling of spirituali ty from electrical activity in these areas.
The fi ndings chall enge atheist s such as Richard Dawkins, t he author of
The God Delusion, who has long argued t hat re ligious beliefs resu lt from
poor education and ch ildhood “indoctrinatio n.”- Oaily Mail, Septe m ber
7, 2009
Suppose it is true that we are all programmed to be lieve in God. Would
t his fact support or undermine the proposition that God exists? If theism
has evolutionary advantages, would this fact constitute a good reason for
believing in God? Why or why not?

64 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
4 Th in k about t h e fou r
types o f a rgume nt s for
the e xiste n ce of God
glo ssed here. At this
po int in your readi ng
of this chapter, which
type do you thin k
makes the strongest
case for God? Why?
Which d o you think
makes the weakest ?
5 If you were to have
a religious experience
that seemed to be
o f God, would you r
experie nce be strong
evidence fo r God’s
existence? Why or why
not? Would you be able
to d isting uish a genu –
ine exp erien ce o f God
from a fa lse one-say,
inst ance s of w ishful
thinking, hallucination,
or fa ntasy? If so, how?
If no t, would this fact
change your degree o f
confi dence that t he ex-
perie nce was gen uine?
I don’t want a God that
would go arou n d ki lling
people’s little girls. Neither
do I want a God w ho
would kill his own son.
-Bishop John Spong
A theodicy is a d efense of
the traditional conceptio n
of God in light of the
exis te nce of evil.
A theist L~ som eone w ho
believes in God.
Theism is belief in , he
existence of God.
An atheist L\ som eone w ho
denies God’s existence.
devout and loving person-to suffer so horribly fo r so long and then die so young? If
there is a God, \vhy does he permit such evils?” Believers in every age have struggled
to reconcile the existence of ev il with their belief in an a ll-powerfu l, a ll-kno\ving,
and all-good God. The argument from evil asserts that these two things cannot be
reconciled, and we are therefore forced by reason to abandon our bel ief.
Stated more precisely, the a rgument from evil says t hat if an all-powerful, a ll-
kno\ving, and all-good God ex isted, unnecessa ry evil \vould not exist. (Some ev il
is deemed necessary, as \vhen a child is given a painfu l injec tion to save her life, or
\vhen a farmer endures months of backbreaking wo rk to assure a good harvest to
fee.cl his family. Unnecessary evil is t hought to h ave no s uch excuses fo r occurring.)
An all-powerfu l and all-kno\ving God would kno\v about, and be able to p revent,
evil, and an all-good God \vou ld want to prevent it. But there is in fact unnecessary
evil in the world. Therefore, an all-powerfu l, a ll-knowing, and a ll-good God does
not exist.
Philosophers have tried to answer the argument from evil in a variety of ways.
Probably the most d ramatic response is that unnecessary evil exisrs because God
cannot or \vi ll not prevent it; that is, he is a finite deity, lacking one or more of the
trad itional divine attributes. This line, ho\vever, would seem to most people to make
God u n\vOrthy of worship.
Other approaches t ry to defend against the argument from ev il while retain-
ing all the attributes in the trad itional notion of God. These counterarguments are
known as theodicies. They adm it that evil ex isrs but claim that it is necessary evil,
required to achieve some greater good. So they d eny that unnecessary evil exists in the
\vorld, \vhich is the crucial premise in the argument from evi l. The point of a theo-
dicy is not to p rove that God ex isrs, but to show that the argument from evil does
not succeed. It tries to demonstrate that there may be good reasons to think that the
crucial premise is fa lse-that is, to think that all the ev il in the world is necessary.
Among the possibilities a re that evil is necessary to effect the moral improvement of
individuals, to better the human race, to punish humans for sin, or to help people
understand the true nature of evil.
Perhaps the most promising theodicy is the free will defense. It maintains that
evil is a necessa ry result of humans having free will. God created people with the
free.dom to choose between good and evil, but he could not give people free wi ll and
at the same time ensure that they \vou ld never do evil. That’s impossible even for
God. So the evil produced by humans is a necessary result of thei r enjoying God ‘s
gift of free.dom.
Belief and Disbelief
A \vide spectrum of beliefs regard ing the existence of God is possible, and fortu-
nately there is some standard terminology to help us sort them out. A person who
bel ieves in the existen ce of God is a theist , and belief in the existence of God is
theism . Someone who denies the existen ce of God is an atheist, and such denial
is atheism . A person \vho neither bel ieves nor disbelieves in God is kno\vn as an
agnostic. If you a re an agnostic, you may thi nk that the evidence for or against

Overview: God and Phi losophy 6 5
Bahai Buddh ist Buddhist
Christian Ch ristia n Confucia n Confucian/Daoist
Hindu Judaic Judaic Judaic
Islamic Sikh Shinto
Figure 2.3 There are thousands of religious g roups in the
world, worshiping thousands of gods in countless ways. Do you
believe that one of these g roups is the true one? Is one of these
gods the right god?
theism is inconclusive, that you do not know what is the case. Or you may take the
more radical agnostic view that knowledge of the existence or nonex istence of God
is impossible. That is, the truth about God is unknowable.
Belief in God or the divine ca n take different forms, and there are terms to reflect
that fact. The vie\v taken by many religions, including C h ristianity, Juda ism, and
Islam, is monotheism, belief in one God. Belief in several gods is polytheism , also
prevalent throughout the world. A doctrine that arose among prom inent thinkers in
France and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is d eis m , the notion
that there is one God who is essentially an “absentee landlord.” This God created
the universe but put it on autopilot and now ignores it, taking no interest in human
affairs. Prominent deists of the past include George Washington, Thomas Paine,
Thomas Jefferson, and Voltaire. Pantheism is the view that God and the universe
a re one and the same, a divine Whole. God and the world are basically identical. The
great philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) held this view, and other thinkers,
including A lbert Einstein (1879-1955), were sympathetic to it. Pantheism is distinct
from panentheism , the idea that God is in the universe and the universe is in God.
Some thinkers have questioned the basic approach to the God question that
most ph ilosophers have taken. They reject the notion that has guided much of tradi-
tional philosophical inqu iry-the vie\v that rational belief in God requires reasons
o r evidence. They insist that we may rationally believe in the existence of God even
though we have no good reasons for doing so. Others believe that faith and reason
Atheism is , he d enial of
the existen ce of God.
An agnostic L~ som eone
who neither accepts nor
denies God’s cxisrcncc.
A man can no more
diminish God’s glory by
refusing m worship Him
than a lunatic can put out
the sun by scribbling the
word, ‘darkness’ on rhc
walls of his cell.
-C. S. Lewis
6 Do you think the
argument from evi l is
a strong argument fo r
t he nonexist ence of
God? Why or why not?
If you believe in God,
how do you reconcile
t hat belief with the
existence of evil? If you
don’t believe in God,
is the a rgument from
evil a factor in your
nonbelief?
Mon o theism is a bel ief in
o ne God.
Po lytheism is a belief in
many gods.
D eis m is a belief in o ne
God w ho c reated the
world b u t lefr it unat-
tended to run o n its own.
Panthe.ism is the view that
God and the universe arc
o ne and the same ,hing,
a divine \'(!hole.
Pane ntheis m is the view
that although God and
the world arc distinct, rhc
world is part of God.

6 6 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
If God lived o n earth,
people would break his
windows.
-Jewish Proverb
7 Rabbi Ha rold Kush –
ner, a uthor of When
Bad Things Happen to
Good People, a rgues
t hat u n necessary evil
exist s in t he world
beca use God is not
able to prevent it. That
is, God is fin ite, a less
powerful deity t han
t he traditio na l God.
Do you think this is a
good exp lanat ion of
unn ecessary evil? Why
or why not? Wou ld a
fin ite God deserve your
respect and devot ion?
A God that can be under-
stood is no God. Who
can explain the Infinite in
word\?
-\Y/. Somerset Maugham
Reason in man is rather
like God in the world.
-1homas Aquinas
are incompatible, and that we can legitimately come to k no,v religious truths, in-
cluding the existence of God, on ly th rough a leap of faith.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQU ING PHI LOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2 .1
I. Do you bel ieve in God? If so, can you state reasons for your belief? Do
you think you r bel ief is rational? Would you bel ieve in God whether o r
not you had good reasons? Expla in your position on these questions.
2. Wou ld you consider yourself an agnostic or atheist? If so, do you have
reasons for your lack of bel ief in God? Is your lack of bel ief rational?
Do you think that bel ievers are irrational? Explain.
3. What is Wi ll iam Paley’s teleological argument? Do you think the
analogy between a watch and the universe is strong enough to prove
the existence of a designer?
4. What is the a rgument from evil? Do you think the existence of evil
shows that God doesn’t exist? Why or why not?
5. Some ph ilosophers and theologians believe that reason is a g ift from
God and should be used in the search fo r truth about God. Do you
agree?
2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
We ca n sort the a rgumenrs for God’s ex istence into two categories: (1) those that
appeal to the ev idence of experience (,vhat philosophers call a posteriori arguments)
and (2) those that appeal to logical relations (called a priori argumenrs). A poste-
riori arguments reason from empirical facts about the world to the conclusion that
God exisrs . Cosmological, teleological, and religious-experience argumenrs are of
this k ind. A priori argu ments logically derive the conclusion that God exisrs from
conceprs of God. Ontological a rgumenrs take this form.
Cosmological Arguments
Cosmological arguments can boast a long lineage, h aving been set out by many
theorisrs from A ristotle, Plato, Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, and Spinoza to contem-
porary philosophers such as Richard Swinburne and William Lane C raig. They a ll
begin ,vith the empi rical fact that the universe, or one of its essential properties,
exisrs-and end with the conclusion that only God could be responsible for this fact.
In his masterpiece Summa Theologica, the Roman Catholic schola r Thomas Aquinas

Arguments for the Existence of God 67
offers five “proofs” (his famous “Five Ways”) of God ‘s existence, the first th ree of
wh ich are cos mological arg uments. This is how Aqu inas lays out the first two:
Thomas Aquinas , Summa Theologica
The existence of God can be shown in five ways.
The first and mo re manifes t way is the argument from motion. It is certa in, and
evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is
in motio n is pu t in motio n by another, fo r nothi ng can be in motion except it is in po-
tentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it
is in actuali ty.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actu-
ality. Bu t nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a
state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fi re, makes wood, which is potentially
hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the
same thing shou ld be at once in actuality and potentiali ty in the same respect, but only in
different respects. For what is actuall y hot cannot simu ltaneously be potentially hot; but
it is simu ltaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect
and in the same way a thing shou ld be both mover and moved , i.e. that it should move
itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which
it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by
another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infi nity, because then there
would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent mov-
ers move only inasm uch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves
only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefo re it is necessary to arrive at a fi rst
mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is fro m the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we
fi nd there is an order of effici en t causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed,
possible) in wh ich a th ing is found to be the effi cient cause of itself; fo r so it would be
prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to
infinity, because in all effi cient causes fo llowing in order, the first is the cause of the in-
termed iate cause, and the intermed iate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
in termed iate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away
the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no
ultimate, nor any intermed ia te cause. Bu t if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to
infinity, there will be no first effi cient cause, neither will the re be an ultimate effect, nor
any intermed iate efficient causes; all of which is plainly fa lse. Therefo re it is necessary
to adm it a first efficient cause, to wh ich everyone gives the name of God.’
Aquinas’s argument from motion (his first way) goes like this: It is obvious that
some things in the universe are moving (that is, changing), and if they a re mov-
ing, something else must have cause.d them to move. And this “something else”
must also have been moving, set in motion by yet another thing that \vas moving,
and this thing set in motion by another moving th ing, and so on. But th is series of
things-moving-other-things cannot go on fo rever, to infin ity, because then there
8 Why does Aqu inas
t h ink t here cannot
be an infin ite chain
of movers? Do you
accept his reasons fo r
t h is? Can you conceive
of a series o f movers
st retching infin itely
into t he past ? If so,
can you detect any
cont radictions inherent
in your concept ion?
9 Why does Aqu inas
insist t hat there must
be a firs t cause? Does
h is a rgument show
t hat t he fi rst cause is in
fact God? Does it show,
fo r example, that the
fi rst cause could not
be an evil demon o r an
impersonal fo rce?

68 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
Believe nothing, no matter
w here you read it, or w ho
said it, no matter if I said
it, unless it agrees with
your own reason and your
own common sense.
-The Buddha
PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK
St. Thomas Aquinas
Tho,n as Aq uin as (1225-1 274) was born in to a no-
ble family in sourbern Italy ro even tually become che
greatest philosopher of che medieval period and , co rbis
day, che official rbeologian of che Ro,nan Catholic Church.
Because his fa,nily had decided char he should be a Figure 2.4 Thomas Aqu inas
great church leader, they packed him off before rbe (1225- 1274), the phi losopher who
age of six co che Bened ictine rnonascery of Mon re fused Aristotle with Christian ity.
Cassino for train ing. Ar fourteen, he was sent co rbe
University of Naples for furrber study, an d there h is life rook ,vhar his fa,nily con-
sidered a radical turn. Ar age nvency, he joined che scholarly Dominican order and
pursued, not a leadership position in che church, but rbe rarefied life of rbe in tellect.
Becoming alarmed at Aquinas’s change of plans, his fami ly had him k id –
napped and locked in che fam ily castle for several ,nonths. When it became clear
chat he was not goin g ro relinqu ish his scholarly a,nbit ions, they released h irn, and
he contin ued h is s tud ies a n d h is writing at t he University of Paris and in Cologne,
Ro,ne, Naples, Virerbo, and Orvieco.
Aqu inas’s great concribucion co both p hilosophy and Chris tian ity ,vas h is
fus ion of Aris totle’s phi losophy with Chris tian doctrines. In theology he distin-
guished between reason and faith, g iving each its o,vn domain of inqu iry. Reason
ca n be used co prove che existence of God , he says, bu r only ch rough fa ith can we
kno,v such rnysceries as che incarnation and the trin ity.
,vould not be something that scarce.cl all che movi ng. There muse therefore be an ini-
tial mover (a ” Fi rst Mover”), an extraordi nary being that sea reed che un iverse mov ing
but is not icsel f move.cl by anything else-a nd chis being we call God .
Aquinas’s second ,vay is h is famous first-cause argument. H e maintains chat ev-
erything we can observe has a cause, and it is clear chat nothing can cause icsel f. For
something co cause itself, it would have co ex ist prior to itself, which is imposs ible.
N eit her can something be caused by a n infinite regress of causes-chat is, a series
of causes screeching co infinity. In any series of causes, Aquinas says, there muse be
a first cause, which causes che second, ,vh ich causes the thi rd, and so o n. Bue in a n
infinite series of causes, there ,vould be no fi rst cause and t hus no subsequent causes,
including causes existing now. So infinite regresses make no sense. Therefore, there
muse be a first cause of everything, and chis first cause we call God. (H ere Aqu inas is
not thinking of a first cause of a temporal series of causes, as in a sequence of fa ll ing
domi noes, but of a fi rst cause chat sustains che whole series of causes, like t he bottom
building block chat holds up a ll che others in a stack.)

Arguments for the Existence of God 69
Against these two arguments, philosophers have lodged several criticisms. One
of the strongest takes a im at Aquinas’s claim that an infinite regress is not possible.
Aqu inas thinks that a chain of causes must have a first cause; othenvise there \vou ld
be no subsequent causes in the \vorld. In an infin ite regress of causes, he contends,
there would be no fi rst cause and therefore no subsequent causes. Critics reply that
just because an infinite chain of causes has no first cause, that doesn’t mean that the
chain of causes has no cause at all: in an infinite chain of causes, every link has a
cause. Many philosophers, includ ing David Hume (17 11-1776), see no logical con-
t radiction in the idea of an infin ite regress. They hold that the universe need not have
had a beginning; it may be eternal, without beginning, and without a first cause o r
a fi rst mover. The universe may have s imply always been.
PHILOSOPHY NOW
Science and the Uncaused Universe
My religion consists of a
h u mble admiration of the
illimitable superior spirit
who reveals himself (or
herself) in the slight derails
we arc able to perceive
with our frail and feeble
minds.
-Albert Einstein
The notion chat so,ne events in che universe are entirely uncaused is now \Videly accepted
a,nong quantum physicists, the scientists \Vho study the realm of subaco,nic particles (such
as electrons, positrons, and quarks). According co quantum physics, subatomic particles fre-
quently pop in and out of existence random ly-chat is, they appear and disappear uncaused
out of a perfect vacuum. From these findings, some scientists have speculated chat che uni-
verse itself ,nay have arisen uncaused. This is how two physicists describe che pheno,nenon:
[T]he idea of a First Cause sounds somewhat fishy in light of the modern
theory of quantum mechanics. According to the most commonly accepted
interpretation of quantum mechanics, ind ividual subatom ic particles can
behave in unpredictable ways and there are numerous random, uncaused
events.- Richard Morris, Achilles in the Quantum World, 1997
[Q]uantum electrodynam ics reveals that an electron, positron, and photon
occasionall y emerge spontaneously in a perfect vacu um. When this hap-
pens, t he three particles exist for a brief t ime, and then annih il ate each
other, leaving no trace behind …. The spontaneous, temporary emergence
of particles from a vacuum is called a vacuu m fluctuation, and it is utterly
commonplace in quantum fi eld t heory.- Edward Tryon, “Is t he Universe a
Vacuum Fluctuation?” Nature, Vol. 246, Dec. 1973, pp. 396- 397.
Suppose some subatomic events are uncaused . Does this show that the
universe is uncaused? What bearing does the phenomenon have on the
cosmologica l arguments of Aquinas and Craig? How might Craig reply to
the physicists quoted above?

70 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
10 Does t he Big Bang
prove that the uni-
verse must have had
a beg inning? Some
scientists have t hought
that t he Big Bang
was not the beg in-
ning of t he universe,
because t he un iverse
is “oscillating”-that
is, it expands and
cont racts continua lly
in an eternal cycle of a
Big Bang fo l lowed by
periods of expansion
then contraction and
another Big Bang.
There is now reason to
think t hat the universe
is not oscillating, but if
oscillation were a plau-
sible possibility, wou Id
this undermine t he
claim t hat the universe
began t o exist?
Some claim that the worst problem \Vith Aquinas’s a rgumenrs is that at best they
prove only that the universe had a first mover o r first cause-but not that the first
mover or first cause is God. For a ll the arguments show, the first mover or first cause
could be an impersonal substance o r energy, o r several minor deities, or a supreme
but evil demon. Perhaps the universe is, as many scientisrs and philosophers allege,
simply an eter nal, uncaused brute fact.
I nspired by recent findings in scientific cosmology (the study of the origin and
structure of the universe), some philosophers have been interested in another kind
of cosmological argument. Scientifi c ev idence suggests that the universe sudden ly
came into existence about fourteen billion years ago in an unimaginably massive
explosion known as the “Big Bang.” Until that moment, the universe that \Ve ex-
perience today simply was not. Using th is fact as a starting po int, William Lane
Cra ig defends the Ka/am cosmological argument (a name derived from medieval
Islamic scholars):
William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith
In particular, I find the kalam cosmological argument for a temporal first cause of the
universe to be one of the most plausible arguments for God ‘s existence … . The argu-
ment is basically t his: bot h philosophical reaso ning and scientific evidence show that
the un iverse began to exist. Anyth ing that begins to exist must have a cause that brings
it into being. So t he universe must have a cause. Philosophica l analysis reveals that
such a cause must have severa l of t he principle theis tic attributes.
Figure 2.5 Was the Big Bang the beginni ng of the universe? Did the Big Bang have a cause?

Arguments for the Existence of God 71
The argument may be formulated in th ree s im ple steps.
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The un iverse began to exist.
3. Therefore, the uni verse has a cause.
The logic of the argument is va lid and very simple; the argument has t he same
logical structure as th e argument: “All men are morta l; Socrates is a man; the refore,
Socrates is mortal. ” So the questio n is, are there good reasons to beli eve t hat each of
t he steps is true? I think there are.•
Cra ig chinks che first premise is obviously true: Nothing scares co exist w ithout
a cause. Bue many d ispute chis, insisting chat t here is no logical reason why che
u n iverse could not be u ncaused. They as k why che notion of a n u ncaused origina-
t ion of things makes no sense while che idea of a god creati ng things out of noth-
ing does.
Some argue agai nst Premise 1 o n empi rical grounds, pointing co findings in
quantum phys ics suggesting chat some events involving subatom ic pa rticles a re un-
caused. This evidence has prompted theorises co speculate chat che universe itself
may be uncaused. Ac che very lease, t hey say, it proves chat someching’s com ing into
ex istence uncaused is not impossible. (See che box ” Philosophy Now: Science and
che Uncaused Universe.”)
Craig a rgues for Prem ise 2 (“The universe began co exist”) in much che same way
chat Aqui nas a rgues fo r a first cause: The universe m use have begun co exist because
che alternative is a n infi nite regress of past events, wh ich is impossible. H e maintai ns
chat che very idea of an actual infinit y of t h ings involves logical contradictions:
[W]hat is infinity minus infin ity? Well, mathematically, you get self-contradictory a n-
swers . .. . [l]nfin ity minus infinity is infinity. But suppose instead you subtract all t he
num bers grea ter than 2- how many are left? Three. So infinity minus infinity is 3! …
This implies that infinity is just an idea in your mind, not something th at exists in
rea li ty.3
Many philosophers reject chis u nderstand ing of infinit y. They agree chat infinity
can be perplexing, but t hey point out chat mathematicians k no\v how co work \vich
infinit y without invit ing contrad ictio ns. More co che point, they hold chat there is no
logical absurd icy in che notion of a series of even es screeching into an infin ite fut u re.
We can easily conceive of ch is. Likewise, they say, there is no logical absurd icy in che
idea of a series of events continuing into a n infin ite past. We can scraighcfo rwa rdly
conceive of chis as \veil .
Craig says chat in fin it ies may ex ist in mat hematics (as in che series 0, l , 2, 3, . . . ),
but chat t hey a re merely potential infinities, not actual infinities. Pot ential infinit ies
“approach infinity as a limit, but they never actually gee there . . . . [E)xiscen ce in che
mathematical realm does not imply ex istence in che real world.'” Ochers reply chat
we may not be able co actually count co infinit y or measure a n infi n ite number of
segments bet ween two poines, but chat does not mean chat che numbers or segmenes
a re nonex 1scenc.
11 Is it obvious to
you, as it is to Cra ig,
t hat nothing starts to
exist without a cause?
Do you think that
t he universe cou ld be
uncaused? Why or why
not?
12 Can you conceive
of a series of event s
stretching infin itely
into the future? Can
you conceive of a series
of event s cont inuing
infinitely int o the past?
Do you think there is a
contradiction lurking
in the idea of an infi-
nite series of causes?
Does th e weirdness of
infinity in mat hematics
show that infin ities in
t he empirica l world
cannot exist?
What we need is no t the
will m believe, b u t ,he w ill
to fin d out.
-Bercrand Russell

72 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
Figure 2.6 In his book The Grand Design, world-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking declares,
“Because there is a law such as gravity, the Universe can and will create itself from nothing.
Spontaneous creati on is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the Universe
exi sts, why we exist …. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the bl ue touch paper and set
the Universe going.” Is Hawking’s view plausible? Why o r why not?
Design Arguments
Teleological, o r design, arguments for the ex istence of God are straightforward, the
gist being chat since the world seems co show signs of purposeful des ign, it most
likely was purposefully designed-chat is, intentionally made by an intelligent be-
ing, wh ich we call God. A popular version takes che form of an argument from
analogy and was famously laid down by che eighceench-cencury Anglican clergyman
W illiam Paley:
William Paley, Natural Theology
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the
stone came to be there, I might poss ibly answer that, for anything I knew to the con-
trary, it had lain there forever; nor wou ld it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurd ity
of this answer. But suppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it shou ld be inqu ired
how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hard ly think of the answer which
I had given- that, for anyth ing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet
why shou ld not this answer serve for the watch as well as for t he stone? W hy is it not
as adm issible in the second case as in the first? For this reason and for no other; viz.,
that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we cou ld not discover in

Arguments for the Existence of God 73
the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together fo r a purpose, e.g., that
they are so fo rmed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated
as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently
shaped from what they are, if a diffe rent size from what they are, or placed after any
other ma nner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, e ither no motion
at all would have been carried on in the mach ine, or none which would have answered
the use t hat is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of t hese parts, and
of their offices, all tending to one resu lt: We see a cylindrical box conta ining a coiled
elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We nex t ob-
serve a fl exib le chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) commun icating t he
action of the spring from the box to the fuse. We t hen fi nd a series of wheels, the teeth
of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting t he motion from the fuse to the
balance, and from the ba lance to the pointer, and, at t he same time, by t he size and
shape of t hose wheels, so regulating t hat motion as to terminate in causing an index,
by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time.
We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; t he
springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over t he face of the watch there
is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of
wh ich, if there had been any other t ha n a transpare nt substance, the hour cou ld not be
seen without opening the case. This mechan ism being observed (it requ ires indeed an
examination of the instru ment, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject,
to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and under-
stood), the infe rence, we think, is inevi tab le, that t he watch must have had a maker;
that there must have existed, at some t ime, and at some place or other, an artificer or
artificers who formed it fo r the purpose which we find it answer; who comprehended
its construction, and designed its use ….
Every ind ication of contrivance, every manifesta tion of design, wh ich existed in the
watch, exists in the works of nature; wi th the d ifference, on the side of nature, of being
greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that
the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the comp lexity, subtlety,
and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if poss ible, do they go beyond them in
number and variety; yet in a mu ltitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not
less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to
their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity.1
It is obvious, Paley says, that the “several pares [of the watch] are framed and put
together fo r a purpose,” \vhich suggests that it h ad an intelligent designer. Likewise,
t he un iverse manifescs countless parts, all seemingly formed and arranged to achieve
various ends. From this he concludes that t he universe also probably has an intel-
ligent des igner, but one that surpasses immeasurably the po\ver and understanding
of humans. This great designer must be God.
Before Paley made h is case in Natural Theology (1802), David Hume (17 11-
1776) had launched a famous critique of design arguments in his Dialogues Concern-
ing Natural Religion (1779), and it has been echoed and amplified by thinkers ever
since. In Dialogues, Hume presents a discussion of the issues among th ree fic tional
characters-Demea, the orthodox believer ; C leanthes, the theologian; and Philo,
the skeptic. Using Philo as h is mouthpiece, Hume assaults the design argument from
analogy on nvo broad fronts. H e fi rst contends that the argument fails because the
As the poet said, “O nly
God can make a tree• –
probably because it’s so
hard to fi gure ou t h ow to
get the bark o n.
-Woody Allen

74 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
13 Is Hume’s argument
about reasoning from
parts to the whole cor-
rect? We certainly can’t
reason that because
the bricks of a house
are light in weight, t he
whole house is light in
weight. But can’t we
legitimately argue that,
say, because a bucket
of water from a pond
is polluted, the whole
pond is poll ut ed?
14 Do you agree w ith
Hu me that we can
draw no conclusions
about the cause of
phenomena that are
“sing le, individual.
w ithout parallel or
specific resemblance”?
Wou ld contemporary
scientists accept Hume’s
view?
15 Is Hume’s sugges-
tion t hat the universe
is like a living th ing at
least as plausible as the
view t hat it is I ike a
machine? Why o r why
not? Suppose Hume
is right. What would
the implications be for
Pa ley’s argument?
analogy is \veak, hampered by too fe\v relevant s imilarities and too many d issimi-
larities. He then reasons that even if the argument demonstrates that the universe
has a designer, the designer may not be the trad it ional God of theism. Here is Philo
argu ing the first point:
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natu ral Religion
If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with t he greatest certainty, that it had an
arch itect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have expe-
rienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the
universe bears such a resemblance to a house t hat we can with the same certa inty infer
a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so
striking t hat the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presump-
tion concern ing a similar cause; and how that precision will be received in the world, I
leave you to consider ….
But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and ph ilosophy have been pre-
served in so wide a step as you have taken when you compared to the universe houses,
ships, furniture, machines; and, from their similarity in some circumstances, in ferred a
similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we d iscover in men and
other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well
as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hund red others which fa ll under daily o b-
servation. It is an active cause by wh ich some particu lar parts of nature, we find, produce
alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from
parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion ba r a ll comparison and inference?
From observing the growth of a ha ir, can we learn anyth ing concerning the generation
of a man? Would the manner of a leaf’s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us
any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? …
When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I
can infer, by custom, t he existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and
this I call an argument from experience. But how th is argument can have place where
the objects, as in t he present case, are single, individual, withou t parallel or specific
resemblance, may be difficu lt to explain . And will any man tell me with serious counte-
nance that an orderly universe must arise from some t hought and art like the human
because we have experience of it? To ascerta in this reasoning it were requisite t hat we
had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen
ships and cities arise from hu man art and contrivance ….
Now, if we survey the un iverse, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great
resemblance to an an im al or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of
life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder; a continual
waste in every part is incessantly repaired; the closest sympathy is perceived throughout
the entire system; and each part or member, in perform ing its proper offices, operates
both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an
anim al; and the Deity is the soul of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.6
Philo asserts that trying to draw a conclusion about the cause of the un iverse based
on what \Ve know about the cause of, say, a house is pointless because the dissim ila rit ies

Arguments for the Existence of God 75
benveen the two phenomena are enormous. We cannot make any firm inferences
about the a rchitect of the un iverse from \vhat we know about the a rchitects of houses.
Further, he says, the intelligence that we observe in mankind is just one of the many
forces that produce changes in the world. We therefore have no reason to presume
that intelligence is the one th ing that is responsible for the universe as a whole. If we
contend that it is, \Ve commit the logical fallacy of arguing from the part to the \vhole:
because a part of a syst em has a particular characteristic, the entire system must have
that character istic too. As Ph ilo purs it, “From observing the growth of a hai r, can we
learn anyth ing concerning the generation of a man?” In a sim ilar \vay, he says, we err
if \Ve conclude that one event always causes another just because \Ve observe a single
instance of such a pairing. We would need to encounter many instances of headaches
p receded by a change in the \veather before we could plausibly infer that the latter
caused the fo rmer. Likewise, we can establish no firm conclusions about the cause of
the universe, because \Ve have only a single universe to examine. Finally, Philo tries
to underm ine the machine-universe analogy by offering what he considers a better
comparison. The universe, he argues, is more like a living thing than a machine. In the
world, as in living things, there is a continual circulation of matter, damage and waste
a re remedied, and each part operates to preserve itself and the \vhole. Living things cre-
ate and regulate themselves, unlike mach ines, which requi re designers and technicians.
On the second point-that even if the un iverse h as a designer, he may not be
God-Philo has th is to say:
Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph , mark the consequences.
First, by this method of reasoning you renounce a ll cla im to infin ity in any of the at-
tributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought o nly to be proportioned to the effect, and
the effect, so far as it fa ll s under our cognizance, is not in finite: What pretensions have
we, upo n your suppositions, to ascribe that at tribute
to the Divine Being? You will insist t hat, by removing
him so m uch from all sim il arity to human creatures,
we give in to the mos t arbitrary hypothesis, and at the
same time weaken all proofs of his existence.
16 If there are
many imperfections
in nat ure, as Hume
suggests, woul d we
necessarily be forced
t o conclude t hat the
designer was also
imperfect?
David Hume,
Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion
Secondly, you have no reason, on your theory,
for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his fi.
nite capacity; o r for supposing him free from every
error, mis take, or incohere nce in his underta kings.
The re are many inexplicab le difficulties in the works
of Nature which if we all ow a perfect au thor to be
proved a priori, are easily solved, and become on ly
seem in g difficu lties from the narrow capacity of man,
who can not trace infinite relations. But accord ing to
your method of reason ing, these difficulties become
all real; and, perhaps, will be insisted on as new in –
stances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At
least, you must acknowled ge that it is impossible fo r
us to tell , from our limited views, whether this system
contains any great fau lts or deserves any cons ider-
able pra ise if compared to other poss ible and eve n
Figure 2. 7 Was the world designed by God w ith h umans in
mind? If so, some have claimed, God must have erred, because
the earth seems more hospitable to insects than to humans.
The famous agnostic and tr ial l awyer Clarence Darrow once
said, “There are some millions of different speci es of animals
on th is earth, and one-half of these are insects …. If t he l and
of the earth was made for life, it seems as if it was intended for
insect life, whi ch can exist almost anywhere.” Do you agree?

76 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
17 Hume suggests
that, for a 11 we know,
there cou ld have been
many designers of the
universe instead of
one supreme deity. Is it
reasonable to suppose
that this is a genu ine
possibility?
David H ume,
Dialogues Concern ing
Natural Religion
real systems . Could a peasa nt, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to
be absolutely fau ltless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the productions of
human wit, he who had never seen any other production?
But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remai n uncertain
whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey
a ship, what an exalted idea must we for m of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed
so complicated, useful, and beautifu l a machine? And what surprise must we feel when
we find him a stupid mechanic who imitated others, and copied an art which, through a
long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and
controversies, had been gradually improving? Many world s might have been botched
and bungled, th roughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labor lost;
many fr uitless trials made; and a s low but continued improvement carried on d uring
infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine where the
truth, nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hy-
potheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?
And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce from your
hypothesis to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a
house or ship, in rea ring a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several dei-
ties combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity
to human affa irs. By sharing the work among severa l, we may so much further limit the
attributes of each , and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge which must be
supposed in one deity, and wh ich, according to you, can on ly serve to weaken the proof
of his existence. And if such fool is h, such vicious creatures as man can yet often un ite
in framing and exec uting one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we
may suppose several degrees more perfect? . ..
And why not become a perfect anthropomorp hite? Why not assert the deity or dei-
ties to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? Epicurus mai ntained
that no man had ever seen reason bu t in a hum an fi gure; therefo re, the gods must have
a hu man fi gure. And this argume nt, which is deserved ly so much ridicu led by Cicero,
becomes, accord ing to you, solid and phi losoph ical.
In a word, C/eanthes , a man who fo llows your hypothes is is able, perhaps, to as-
sert or conjecture the uni verse sometime arose from somethin g like design. Bu t be-
yond that position he cannot ascertain one single ci rcumstance and is left afterwards
to fi x every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothes is. This
world , fo r aught he knows, is very fau lty and imperfect, compared to a superior stan-
dard, and was on ly the fi rst rude essay of some infa nt deity who afterwards abandoned
it, ashamed of his lame performance. It is the work on ly of some dependent, infer ior
deity, and is the object of derision to his superiors. It is the production of old age and
dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever s ince his death has run on at ad ve n-
tures, from the first impul se and active fo rce which it received from hi m … .7
Philo declares that if we carefully and consistently apply the kind of reason ing
used in the design argument (as Cleanthes would have us do), \Ve would have to
accept some uncomfortable conclusio ns about the nature of the designer. Accord-
ing to Cleanthes, \Ve are supposed to judge the natu re of the cause by the nature of
the effect, and we a re to reason from the attributes of human designers to the at-
tributes of God. By this logic, Philo says, \Ve \vould have to conclude that God (the
cause) may not be infinite, because the universe (the effect) is not infin ite. We \vould
be fo rced to adm it that God may not be perfect, because the universe is itself not

78 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
PH I LOSOPHY NOW
Do Scientists Reject Religion?
The answer is yes and no. A 2009 Pew Research Center survey showed that just over half of
scientists (51 percent) believe in a deicy or higher po,ver, while belief in God or a higher po,ver
among Americans is much higher- 80 ro 95 percent in some surveys. Bur scientists’ spiritual
and religious beliefs (and disbelief) are diverse and often illuminating. Here’s a sampling of
rhe views of so,ne of che more em inent and influential figures.
Science is not only compatible with spirituality; it is a profound source of spiri-
tuality. When we recognize our place in an immensity of lig ht-years and in the
passage of ages, when we grasp the intricacy, bea uty, and subtlety of life, then
that soaring feel ing, that sense of elation and hu mility combined, is surely
spiritual. So are our emotions in the presence of great art or m usic or litera-
ture, or acts of exemplary selfless courage such as those of Mohandas Gandhi
or Martin Luther King, Jr. The notion that science and spirituality are somehow
mutually exclusive does a disservice to both.- Carl Sagan (1934- 1996)
What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to
be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to
appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn’t prove that there
is no God, only that God is not necessary.- Stephen Hawking (1942- 2018)
Science is … a powerfu l way, indeed to study the natural world. Science is
not particu larly effective … in making commentary about t he supernatu-
ral world. Both worlds, for me, are quite real and qu ite important. They
are investigated in different ways. They coexist. They illuminate each other.
– Francis Coll ins (1950- )
I am very astonished t hat the scientific picture of the real world around me
is very deficient. It gives a lot of factua l in formation, puts a ll our experi-
ences in a magnificently consistent order, but is ghastly silent about all and
sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot
tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physica l pain and physi-
cal delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, god and
eternity.- Erwin Schrodinger (1887- 1961)
I find it as difficult to understand a scientist who does not acknowledge the
presence of a superior rationality behind the existence of the universe as it
is to comprehend a theologian who would deny the advances of science.
– Wernher von Braun (1912- 1977)
Why do you chink chat only half of scientists believe in a deity or higher po,ver? Wh ich
scientist’s belief quoted above is closest co your own view of God and rel igion? Why?

Arguments for the Existence of God 79
Ontological Arguments
C-osmological and teleological appeals rest ultimately o n the evidence of experience.
Ontological a rgumencs rest on logic alone. Logic tells us that some th ings can not
possibly ex ist-round squares and married bachelors, for example. They ca nnot ex-
ist because they involve logical contrad ictions. A nd logic tells us that it is (logically)
possible that golden mounta ins and flying horses ex ist (tho ugh they are not actual),
fo r they involve no logical contrad ictions. So isn’t it at least plaus ible that \Vith logic
alo ne we could someho\v prove the ex istence of God? Anselm thought so. H e was the
fi rst to articulat e a precise statement of an ontological argument, and other thinkers
s ince h im have offered thei r O\vn vers ions. H e reasons that since God by defin it ion
is the greatest possible being, God must actually ex ist, because if he did not exist in
reality (a nd merely ex isted in our m inds), he \vould not be the greatest possible be-
ing. Here is the argument in A nselm’s own \vords:
Anselm , Proslogium
And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understand ing to faith, give me, so far as thou
knowest it to be profitable, to understand t hat t hou art as we believe; and that thou art
t hat which we believe. And, indeed , we believe that thou art a being t han which noth-
ing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, s ince the fool hath said in his
heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv.1). Bu t , at any rate, this very foo l, w hen he hea rs of
t his being of which I speak- a being t ha n which nothing greater can be conceived –
understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although
he does not understand it to exist.
For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to under-
stand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards
perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it
to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the paint-
ing, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists,
because he has made it.
Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the under-
standing, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when
he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the
understand ing. And assured ly that, than which nothing greater can be con-
ceived, cannot exist in the understand ing alone. For, suppose it exists in the un-
derstand ing alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.
18 Does exist ence al-
ways add greatness to
an ent ity? That is, is it
always g reater to exi st
t han not to exist? Why
or why not ?
Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in
the understand ing alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be
conceived , is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this
is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which
nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understand ing and
in reality.
And it assured ly exists so t ruly, t hat it cannot be conceived not to exist.
For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to ex-
ist; and this is greater t han one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence,
Figure 2.8 St. Anselm (1033-1 109),
medieval philosopher and theologian
and the Archbishop of Canterbury. He
held that reason was a friend of faith,
not a source of religious skepticism.

80 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
PHILOSOPHY NOW
Evolution and Intelligent Design
Science maintains char che best explanation for the apparent design of biological life is rhe the-
ory of evolution, which says char living things, in all their variery and co,nplexiry, arose ch rough
natural processes. Bur some dai,n char life
on earth is best explained by the interven-
t ion of a supreme intelligence. Michael
Behe fainously argues char some biologi-
cal systems are so profoundly incricace-
so “irreducibly co,nplex”-rhac they could
nor have been produced by gradual evo-
lutionary changes. Only an intelligent de-
signer can account for such complexiry.
The consensus among scientists is char
evolution operates through ,vhat Danvin
called “natura l selection.” The basic idea is
char offspring of organisms differ physically
fro,n their parents in various ,vays, and
these differences can be passed on generi-
cally co their offspring. If an offspring has
an inherited trait (such as sharper vision or
a larger brain) char increases its chances of
Figure 2.9 Could the human eye- a very complex surviving long enough to reproduce, the in-
system- have evolved through natural selection? dividual is more likely co survive and pass
Anselm,
Proslogium
rhe craic on co che next generation. After
severa l generations, th is useful trait, or adaptation, spreads throughout a whole popu lation
of individua ls, differentiating che population from its ancestors. Behe’s claim is char it is
i1npossible for irreducibly co,nplex systems to be produced through natural selection. He
says chat an irreducibly complex system (for example, the eye) is co,nposed of several inter-
connected, perfectly marched pares such char if even one part is 1nissing, the sysre,n will nor
funct ion . An eye can i1nprove the surviva l prospects of organis,ns on ly if it functions, and
if that, than wh ich nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it
is not that, than wh ich noth ing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable
contradiction . There is, then, so tru ly a being than which noth ing greater can be con-
ceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art,
O Lord , our God.
So tru ly, therefore, dost thou exist, 0 Lord, my God , that thou canst not be con-
ceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind cou ld conceive of a being better than
thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absu rd. And, indeed ,
whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone,
therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher

Arguments for the Existence of God 81
proper functioning requires char each of irs pares is rhere co do its job. Accord ing to evolu-
tion, rhe eye ca,ne abour through slow, incre,nenca l changes. Bur, Behe asks, how can an
unfin ished, nonfuncrioning eye improve survival? Th is shows, he argues, char the eye and all
ocher irreducibly complex sysrems ,vere created ,vhole-nor ch rough evolution, bur by so,ne
grear inrell igence.
But most biologists deny that rhe development of irreducibly complex systems ch rough
natura l selection is physically impossible. Behe chinks natural selection requires that a coin-
plex sysrem be fonned by gradua l addition of components until a functioning model is
achieved. But critics point out char rhe components can be present all along or arise ar dif-
ferent t imes, performing tasks that improve various processes. Then, because of a change in
the genome, the pares may be put to new uses, fonning an irreducibly complex structure.
From the face that biologists generally do not kno,v precisely how each step of such a
process happens, ir does nor follow chat the process is impossible or unknowable. Phi lip
Kircher th inks that rhe remedy for our ignorance of these marrers is more and betrer re-
search, not the presumption of an inrell igenr designer:
Even if intelligent designers were right in supposing that the phenomena
they indicate cou ldn ‘t have evolved by natura l selection, only a more explicit
identification of the causal mechan ism that was at work cou ld justify the
conclusion that that mechanism is intelligent.- Philip Kitcher, Living With
Darwin, 2007
Suppose evolution is t rue and intelligent design t heory is false. Would this
mean that there is no supreme being w ho made biological life possible?
Can someone consistently believe in both evolution and God?
degree than all others. For, whatever else ex ists does not exist so truly, and hence in a
less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no
God (Psalms xiv. ir), since it is so evident, to a rationa l mind , that thou dost exist in the
highest degree of all ? Why, except that he is du ll and a fool?’ 0
Here’s che a rgument seated more fo rmally:
1. God, by definition, is the greatest being possible.
2. Suppose che greatest being possible exiscs only in the understanding (in the
mind, as a mental object).

82 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
19 What is t he most
plausible me a n ing of
“exist s in the u nd e r-
standing a lone “?
Cou ld it me a n t hat the
concept of the greatest
be ing possible is not
a ctually exemplifie d,
that it d o es not refer t o
anyth in g exist in g in re-
a lity? If so, how wou ld
such an int e rpreta-
tion affect Anselm’s
arg ument ?
If God did not exist, i,
would be ncccs.sary ,o
invent him.
-Voltaire
I cannot conceive of a God
wh o rcv.oards and p unishes
his creatures, or has a w ill
of ,he kind that we experi-
ence in o urselves. Neither
can I nor would I want to
con ceive of an ind ividual
tha, survives his physical
death; let feeb le souls,
from fca, o, absurd ego-
ism, cherish such th o ughrs.
I am satisfied with the
mys,cry of the eternity of
life and with the aware-
ness and a glimpse of the
marvelous structure of the
existing world} together
with the devoted striving
to comprehend a portion,
be it ever so tiny, of th e
Reason ,hat manifests itself
in nature.
-Albert Einstein
3. Then a greater being than the g reatest being possible can be conceived, o ne
existi ng not just in the understanding, but a lso in reality (for a being is greater
if it ex ists in reality tha n if it exiscs on ly in the understa nding).
4. But this yields a contradiction, fo r a being g reater than the greatest being
poss ible is impossible.
5. Therefore, God, the greatest being poss ible, must ex ist in reality, not just in
the understanding.
Ma ny have fo und fa ult with th is li ne of reasoning. The fi rst major criticism came
from an eleventh-cent ury monk named Gaunilo, who thought that A nselm ,vas try-
ing to define God into existence. He maintained that if Ansel m’s argument were a
good piece of reasoning, we could use it to prove the existence of many thi ngs that
obviously do not exist-for instance, the greatest island poss ible. We could argue
that the g reatest isla nd possible must actually exist because if it existed only in the
understanding, there could conceivably be an island that is greater, namely, one that
exists in reality as ,vell as in the understand ing.
Anselm replied that h is reason ing does not pertain to things li ke Gaunilo’s
isla nd, but o nly to God, the greatest being possible. Others have suggested th at
Gau n ilo’s critique fails because h is island is not a possibility. To them it seems that
for a ny island thought to be the greatest possible, ,ve ca n ahvays imagine how it can
be greater by enhancing its properties. Such an island could therefore never be the
g reatest. C ritics have rejected both of these suggestions, and some have countered
that Ansel m’s line could prove the existence of absurd things other tha n a perfect
isla nd-like a supremely evil superbeing.
In putting forth his a rgu ment, Ansel m makes nvo assumptions: (I) ex istence
makes someth ing greater (th at is, someth ing is greater if it exists in the ,vorld th an ifit
exists only in the m ind as an idea) and (2) existence can be a defi ni ng property. C ritics
have questioned both of these. On the firs t cou nt, they contend th at there is no good
reason to thi nk that existence adds to the value of a n entity. After all, it is not obvious
that it is better fo r, say, a thorough ly evil being to exist th an not to exist. On th e second
count, they doubt that existence can be any k ind of defi ning property at all. Anselm
assumes that one th ing can be greater th an another thing even though they h ave ex-
actly the same properties, d iffe ring only in th at the fi rst th ing exists a nd the second
does not. In his view, existence is another defi ni ng p roperty-the essential attribute
that the one thi ng has a nd the other lacks. But is th is p lausible? Suppose you imagine
an incred ibly beautifu l beach, detailing in your m ind its every property (,vhite sand,
–
Figure 2.10 Could t here be such a t hing as t he g re atest possible beach?

Arguments for the Existence of God 83
lovely palm trees, blue \Yater, etc.). Then you add one more attribute-actual exis-
tence. Does this last step change the defining p roperties of you r beach-or does it
simply indicate that the beach with al l irs defining properties is actual? Many philoso-
phers, including Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), would choose the lat ter. As Kant says,
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
“Being” is obvious ly not a rea l pred icate [term designating a property]; that is, it is not
a concept of something wh ich cou ld be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely
t he pos iting of a thing, or of certai n determi nations, as existi ng in themselves …. By
whatever and by however many pred icates we may think a thing- even if we com pletely
determ ine it- we do not make the least add ition to the t hing when we further declare
t hat this th ing is.”
I n any case, some detractors t h ink t he weakest link in Anselm’s chain of reason-
ing is Premise 2, the s upposition t hat t he greatest being possible exists on ly in t he
understanding. Th is claim gives rise to the contrad iction t hat a g reater being t han
the greatest being possible ca n be conceived (one existing in realit y) . But t hey argue
that the contrad ic tion d issolves if we take Premise 2 to mean not that the greatest
being possible exisrs in some sense in the m ind (the vie\v that Anselm seems to take),
but simply that the concept of the g reatest being poss ible does not refer to any act u-
ally existing thing. The latter, t hey insist, is the more reasonable reading of “exisrs
only in the understanding,” and it does not yield any contradictions about the nat ure
of God. W ith th is reading of Prem ise 2, Anselm’s argument does not go th rough .
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.2
1. What is Aquinas’s first-cause argument? Does it prove the ex istence of
the traditional God of theism? Does it prove that t he universe h ad a
firs t cause?
2. What is Craig’s cosmological argument? C ritique irs two premises. Are
they t rue? Explain why you think they are true (or false). If the argu –
ment is sound, what does it prove? Does it prove that God exists?
3. What a re the releva nt similarities and d ifferences benveen Paley’s
\Vatch and the universe? Is the \Vatch an alogy a good o ne?
4. A re Hume’s criticisms of the design argument cogent? Does he suc-
cessfully refute it?
5. Are the assumptions behind Anselm’s argument justified? That is, are
there good reason s for accepting them?
If trian gles made a god,
th ey would give h im three
sides.
– Charles de Montesq uieu

84 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
M oral evil is evil that
comes fro m h uman
c hoices and actions an d
the bad things t hat ar ise
from them .
Natural evil is evil that
resuk s from t he workings
of naru rc.
2.3 GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Some people doubt the existence of God because they bel ieve t hat the traditional ar-
guments for theism fa ll short and that no other evidence in God’s favor seems forth-
coming. Others take a stronger stand against theism by setting forth the argument
from evi l. They ask, in effect, “If God existS, how can there be so much unnecessa ry
evil in the ,vorld? An a ll-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God might allo,v some
evils because they a re necessary to bring about some g reater good. But much of the
,vorld ‘s ev ils seem to be entirely and blatantly g ratu itous. So ho,v can ,ve conclude
anything other than that there must be no such God?”
Philosophers and theologians have genera lly concerned themselves with nvo
types of evil. Moral evil comes from human choices and actions and the bad things
that arise from them. Injustice, murder, deceit, theft, and torture are moral ev ils
from wh ich flow pa in, suffering, inju ry, loss, and death. Natural evil results from
the workings of natu re. From hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, fires, d isease, and
drought come vast sums of ev il in the fo rm of human and animal suffering. To make
thei r case, atheists have usually appealed to both k inds of evil, challenging theistS to
explain why a perfectly good and powerful God would allow such horrors.
Rowe’s Argument from Evil
One of the more influential versions of the a rgument from evil is provided by philo-
sopher Wi lliam L. Rowe, ,vho focuses on evil as ” intense human and an imal suffering”:
W il li a m L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion
Taking human and an ima l suffering as a clear instance of evil wh ich occurs with great
frequency in our world, the … problem of evil can be stated in terms of the following
argument for atheism.
1. There exist instances of intense suffering wh ich an omn ipotent, omniscient
being cou ld have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any
greater good.
2. An omn iscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any in-
tense suffering it cou ld, unless it cou ld not do so without thereby preventing
the occurrence of some greater good.
Therefore,
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
What are we to say about th is argument for atheism, an argument based on the
profusion of one sort of evil in the world? The argument is valid; therefore, if we have
rationa l grounds for accepting its prem ises, to that extent we have rational grounds for
accepting atheism. Do we, however, have rationa l grounds for accepting the premises
of th is argument?

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 85
Figure 2.11 Does a fawn’s suffering a lone in t he fo rest lead to a greater good? Could an
omnipotent God obtain th is greater good some other way?
The second premise of the argument expresses a belief about what a morally good
being would do under certain circumstances . Accord in g to this belief, if a morall y good
being knew of some in tense suffering that was about to occur and he was in a position
to prevent its occurrence, he would prevent it unless he cou ld not do so withou t thereby
losing some greater good of which he was aware. This belief (or something very close
to it) is, I thi nk, held in common by theists and nontheists. Of course, there may be
disagreement about whether something is good, and whether, if it is good , one would
be morally just ified in permitting some intense suffering to occur in order to obtain it.
So meone might hold, for example, that no good is great enough to justify permitting
an innocent ch ild to suffer terribly. To hold such a view, however, is not to deny premise
2 which claims on ly that if an omniscient, wholly good being permits intense suffering
then there must be some greater good (a good which outweighs the sufferin g in ques-
tion) which t he good being cou ld not obtain without permitting the intense suffering.
So stated, 2 seems to express a belief that accords with our basic moral principles,
principles shared by both theists and nonthe ists . If we are to fau lt th is argument, there-
fore, we mus t find some fault with its first premise.
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest
fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped , horri bly burned, and lies in terrible agony for severa l
days before death relieves its sufferin g. So far as we can see, t he fawn’s intense suffer-
ing is pointless, leading to no greater good . Cou ld an omnipotent, omniscient being
have prevented the fawn’s apparently pointless suffering ? The answer is obvious, as
even the theist will insist. An omn ipotent, omn iscient being cou ld easily have pre-
vented the fawn from being horribly burned, or, given the burning, cou ld have spared
the fawn t he intense suffering by quickly ending its li fe, rather than allowing the fawn to
lie in terri ble agony for several days. Since no greater good, so far as we can see, would
have been lost had the fawn’s intense suffering been prevented, doesn’t it appear that
premise 1 of the argument is t rue, t hat there exist instances of intense suffering which
an omnipotent, omniscient bein g could have prevented without thereby preventing the
occurrence of any greater good? .. .
20 Do you agree wit h
Rowe t hat it seems u n-
likely that all instances
of intense h uman and
animal suffering lead
t o g reat er goods? And
do you thin k t hat if
all that suffering does
lead to greater goods,
t hat “an omnipo tent,
omniscient being could
not have achieved at
least some of t hose
goods without perm it-
t ing the instances of
suffer ing that lead to
t hem”?

8 6 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
William L. Rowe,
Philosophy of Religion
The truth is that we are not in a position to prove that 1 is true. We cannot know with
certainty that instances of suffering of the sort described in 1 do occur in our world. But
it is one thing to know or prove that 1 is true and quite another thing to have rational
grounds for believing 1 to be true. We are often in the position where in the light of our
experience and knowledge it is rationa l to believe that a certain statement is true, even
though we are not in a position to prove or to know with certainty that the statement is
true. In the light of our past experience and knowledge it is, for example, very reason-
able to believe that neither Goldwater nor McGovern will ever be elected president, but
we are scarcely in the position of knowing with certainty that neither wil l be elected
president. So, too, with , , a lthough we cannot know with certainty that it is true, it per-
haps can be rationa lly supported, shown to be a rational belief.
Consider again the case of the fawn’s suffering. There are two distinct questions
we need to ra ise: “Does the fawn’s suffering lead to some greater good?” and “Is the
greater good to which it might lead such that an omnipotent, omniscient being cou ld
not obtain it without perm itting the fawn’s suffering?” It may strike us as unlikely that
the answer to the first question is yes. And it may strike us as quite a bit more un likely
that the answer to the second question is yes. But even if we shou ld think it is reason-
able to beli eve that the fawn’s suffering leads to a greater good unobtainable withou t
that suffering, we must then ask whether it is reasonable to believe that all the instances
of profound, seemingly pointless hu man and animal suffering lead to greater goods.
And, if they shou ld somehow all lead to greater goods, is it reasonable to believe that
an omnipotent, omn iscient being could not have brought about any of those goods
without permitting the instances of suffering which supposed ly lead to them? When we
consider these more general questions in the light of our experience and knowledge of
the variety and profusion of human and animal suffering occurring daily in our world,
it seems that the answer must be no. It seems quite unli kely that all the insta nces of
intense human and animal suffering occurring daily in our world lead to greater goods,
and even more unlikely that if they all do, an omnipotent, omniscient being could not
have achieved at least some of those goods without permitting the instances of suffer-
ing that lead to them. In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and
scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of those instances
of suffering cou ld have been prevented by an omnipotent being without the loss of a
greater good seems an extraord inary, absurd idea, qu ite beyond our belief. It seems
then that a lthough we cannot prove that premise 1 is true, it is, nevertheless, altogether
reasonable to believe that 1 is true, that it is a rational belief.”
Some theisrs reject Premise 1 by appealing to human ignorance. They argue that
there could be goods unkno\vn to us that justify the evil we see-goods compre-
hended by God but beyond ou r ken. O r our concept of good may not be God’s, for
his morality is of a higher, purer kind than ours. In God’s eyes, then, \vhat we believe
is ev il might be good, or what \Ve think is good might be evil.
Defenders of Premise 1 reply that we may indeed be una\vare of goods that God
discerns, but none of the goods we do know about could ever compensate for life’s
vast burden of seemingly g ratuitous evil. We need not know what God knows to be
justified in believing Premise 1. As Rowe says,
That things appear to us to be a certain way is itself justificat ion for
thinking things are this way. Of course, th is justificat ion may be de-
feated. But apart from such defeat, the fact that th ings appear to us

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 87
to be a certa in way renders us rationally justifi ed in bel ieving that they
are that way.’l
And co assert that God’s morality is higher than ours, some argue, is co case
doubt on a ll our moral judgments and co render meaningless our terms good and
evil. J. L. Mackie observes chat on chis higher- morality vie\v, ” When the theist says
that God is wholly good he does not mean chat God has anything like the purposes
and tendencies chat would count as good in a human being. But then why call him
good? Is not chis d escription m isleading?”14
The Free Will Defense
To many theists, the best way co counter the argument from evil is co present a theo-
dicy, an explanation of why God perm its evil. The point is co provide good reasons
why evil may be a necessary part of God’s creation, thereby showing that the argument
from evil fails. Chief among such approaches is the free \viii defense, which is usually
offered as an explanation of moral evi l. It says that human free will is an enormous
good, so much so chat a universe \vhere humans have free will is better than one \vhere
they don’t, even if thei r exercise of freedom brings about much evil. Moral evil is the
unavoidable byproduct of God’s gift of free will. According co Richard S\vinburne,
Richard Swinburne, Is There a God?
The free-w ill defence cla ims that it is a great good that humans have a certain sort of
free will wh ich I shall call free and responsible choice, but that, if they do, then neces-
sarily there will be the natural possibility of moral evil. … A God who gives humans
such free will necessarily brings about the possibili ty, and puts outside his own control
whether or not that evil occurs. It is not logical ly possible- that is, it wou ld be self.
contrad ictory to suppose- that God cou ld give us such free will and yet ensure that we
always use it in the right way.’s
H ere free w ill may sound like a serious restriction of God’s po\ver (a denial of
h is omn ipotence), but most philosophers, \vhether theist ic or not, have not taken
that vie\v. They have interpreted God’s omnipotence not as the power co do any-
th ing whatsoever, but as the po\ver co do anything chat is logically possible. They
h ave ackno\vledged that God cannot make a square circle or a married bachelo r,
cause 2 + 2 co equal 5, o r create a triangle w ith four sides. But logical impossibili-
t ies are fundamenta l faces about rea lity and are not thought co sec any restrictions
on God’s power.
Against the free will defense, two main objections have been raise.cl. The first is the
contention chat there is no reason why an omnipotent God could not have created free
agents \vho ahvays choose the good. As Mackie says, “If God has made men such that
in their free choices they sometimes prefer \vhac is good and sometimes what is evil,
why could he not have made men such chat they always freely choose the good?”16 Bue
What mean and crud
things men do for ,he love
of God.
-Vl . Somerset Maugham
21 Is Mackie correct in
saying that an omnipo-
tent God could have
created people with
free will who always
choose the good? Is
such a state of affairs
logically possible?
You can say rhat you trust
God a nyway- that no
arguments can undermine
your fai th. But th at is just
a statemen t describing
how s tubborn you arc; it
has no bearing w hatsoever
o n the questio ns of God’s
goodn ess.
-B. C. Johnson

88 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
many theisrs assert that to ensu re people ahvays freely do what is right, God would
have to farce them to do so-and forcing people to act freely is logically impossible.
The second objection is that even if God could not have made humans so they
always freely choose the good, he could have at least made people such that they
do less evil than they actually do. In this vie\v, God could have given people bet-
ter moral character so their desire to do good would be stronger and their desi re to
do evil would be weaker. Such an a lteration in their character would not diminish
their capacity to act freely, and even a slight change \vould reduce the amount of evil
in the world. Many theists would object to this line, however, charging that such
man ipulation of character by God would indeed curta il free wil l. God’s t inkering
with people’s psychological makeup would be analogous to controlling a person’s
behavior t hrough hypnosis or d rugs.
The Soul-Making Defense
In any case, free wi ll is not the only good that has been offered as a justification
fo r God’s per m itting ev il. The philosopher John Hick says that t he greatest good
is “soul-making.” In h is theod icy, he argues that evil in t he fo rm of sufferi ng is
necessary to provide humans w ith a world \vhere moral and spiritual progress is pos-
sible. Personal growth-soul-mak ing-can take place only when people make free
choices in response to the pain and anguish of living. Hick expla ins:
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love
Instead of regarding man as having been created by God in a fin ished state, as a finitely
perfect being ful fi ll ing the divine intention for our hu man level of existence, and then
fa lli ng disastrously away from t his, the [minority view) sees man as still in process of
creation. lrenaeus himself expressed the point in terms of the (exegetically d ubious)
distinction between the ‘image’ and the ‘likeness’ of God referred to in Genesis i. 26:
‘Then God said, Let us make man in o ur image, after our likeness.’ His view was that
man as a personal and mora l being already exists in the image, but has not yet been
formed into the fi nite likeness of God . By t his ‘likeness’ lrenaeus means something
more than personal existence as s uch; he means a certain valuable quality of personal
life which refl ects finitely the divine life. This represents the perfecting of man, t he ful-
fi lment of God’s purpose for hu man ity, the ‘ bringing of many sons to glory’, t he creat-
ing of ‘children of God’ who are ‘fellow heirs with Christ’ of his glory.
And so man , created as a personal being in the image of God , is on ly the raw mate-
rial for a furt her and more difficult stage of God’s creative work. This is the leading of
men as relatively free and autonomous persons, through their own dealings with life in
the world in which He has placed them, towards that quality of persona l existence that
is the finite likeness of God . . . .
In the light of modern anthropological knowledge some form of two-stage concep-
tion of the creation of man has become an almost unavoidable Christian tenet. At the
very least we must acknowledge as two d istinguis hable stages the fas hioning of homo

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 89
sapiens as a product of the long evolutionary process, and his sudden or grad ual spiri-
tua lization as a ch ild of God. But we may well extend the first stage to include the devel-
opment of man as a rational and responsib le person capable of personal relationship
with the personal Infinite who has created him. This first stage of the creative process
was, to our anthropomorphic imaginations, easy for divine omn ipotence. By an exer-
cise of creative power God caused t he physica l un iverse to exist, and in the course of
countless ages to bring forth within it organic life, and fina lly to produce out of organic
li fe personal li fe; and when man had thus emerged out of the evolution of t he forms of
organic life, a creature had been made who has t he possibility of existing in conscious
fell owship with God . But the second stage of t he creative process is of a different kind
altogether. It cannot be performed by omnipotent power as such. For personal life is
essentially free and self-directi ng. It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only th rou gh
the uncompelled responses and will ing co-operation of hum an individuals in their ac-
tions and reactions in t he world in which God has placed them . Men may eventually
become t he perfected persons whom the New Testament ca ll s ‘chi ldren of God ‘, but
they cannot be created ready-made as th is.
The value-judgement that is im plici tly being invoked here is t hat one who has
atta in ed to goodness by meeting and eventua lly mastering temptations, and thus by
rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more
valuab le sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or
of virtue. In the former case, wh ich is that of the actual moral achievements of man –
kind, the individua l’s goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a
stability based upon an accumu lation of right choices, and a positive and responsible
character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort. I suggest, then, that
it is an ethically reasonable judgement, even though in the nature of t he case not one
that is capable of demonstra tive proof, that human goodness slowly bu il t up t hrou gh
personal histories of mora l effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies
even the long travai l of t he sou l-making process … .
If, then, God’s aim in making the world is ‘the bringing of many sons to glory’, that
aim will natu rally determine the kind of world t hat He has created. Antitheistic writers
almost invariably assume a conception of t he divine purpose which is contrary to t he
Christian conception. They assume that the purpose of a loving God must be to create
a hedo nistic paradise; and therefore to the extent that the world is other than this, it
proves to t hem that God is either not lovin g enough or not powerfu l enough to create
such a world. They think of God’s relation to the earth on t he model of a human being
building a cage for a pet ani ma l to dwell in. If he is hu mane he will naturall y make his
pet’s quarters as pleasant and healthfu l as he can. Any respect in which the cage fall s
short of the veterinarian’s ideal, and contains possib ilities of accident or disease, is
evidence of either li mi ted benevolence or limited means, or bot h. Those who use the
problem of evil as an argument against belief in God almost invariab ly thin k of the
world in this kind of way. David H ume, for example, speaks of an architect who is try-
ing to plan a house that is to be as comfortable and convenient as poss ible. If we fi nd
that ‘the windows, doors, fi res, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of t he bu ild-
ing were t he source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat
and cold’ we shou ld have no hesitation in blami ng the arch itect. It wou ld be in vain
for him to prove that if t his or that defect were corrected greater ill s wou ld resu lt: ‘sti ll
you would assert in general, that, if t he architect had had skill and good intentions, he
might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such
a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences’.
22 According t o Hick,
what is t he ” soul –
making process”? Is
it, as he says, of such
great va lue that it
justifies all the human
and animal suffering
involved in it?

90 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
John Hick,
Evil and the God of Love
Bu t if we are right in supposing that God’s purpose for man is to lead him from
hu man Bios, or the biological life of man, to that quality of Zoe, or the personal life of
eternal worth, wh ich we see in Christ , t hen the question that we have to ask is not, Is
this the kind of world that an all-powerfu l and in finitely loving being wou ld create as an
environment for his human pets? or, Is the architecture of the world the most pleasant
and convenient possible? The question that we have to ask is rather, Is this the kind
of world that God m ight make as an environment in wh ich moral beings may be fash-
ioned, through t he ir own free insights and responses, into ‘children of God’?
Such critics as Hume are confusing what heaven ought to be, as an environment
for perfected finite beings, with what this world ought to be, as an environment for be-
ings who are in process of becoming perfected. For if our general conception of God’s
purpose is correct the world is not intended to be a paradise, but rather the scene of a
history i n which hu man personality may be formed towards the pattern of Christ. Men
are not to be t hought of on the ana logy of ani ma l pets, whose life is to be made as
agreeable as possible, but rather on the analogy of human chi ldren, who are to grow
to adu lthood in an environment whose primary and overriding purpose is not immedi-
ate pleasure but the realizing of the most valuable potentia lities of hu man personality.
Need less to say, this characterization of God as the heavenly Father is not a merely
random illustration but an analogy that lies at the heart of the Christian faith. Jesus treated
the likeness between the attitude of God to ma n and the attitude of human parents at
their best towards their children, as provid ing the most adequate way for us to thi nk
about God. And so it is altogether relevant to a Christia n understanding of this world to
ask, H ow does the best parental love express itself in its infl uence upon the environment
in which chi ldren are to grow up? I think it is clear that a parent who loves his children,
and wants them to become the best hu man beings that they are capable of becoming,
does not treat pleasure as the sole and supreme value. Certainly we seek pleasure for our
children, and take great delight in obtaining it for them; but we do not desire for them
unalloyed pleasure at the expense of their growth in such even greater values as moral
integrity, unselfishness, compassion, courage, humour, reverence for the truth, and per-
haps above all the capacity for love. We do not act on the premise that pleasure is the su-
preme end of life; and if the development of these other values sometimes clashes with
the provision of pleasure, then we are willing to have our ch ildren miss a certain amount
of this, rather than fail to come to possess and to be possessed by the finer and more
precious qualities that are possible to the hu man personali ty. A child brought up on the
principle that the on ly or the supreme va lue is pleasure would not be likely to become an
ethically mature adu lt or an attractive or happy persona lity. And to most parents it seems
more importa nt to try to foster quality and strength of character in their children than to
fill their lives at all times with the utmost possible degree of pleasure. If, then, there is any
true analogy between God’s purpose for his hu ma n creatures, and the purpose of loving
and wise parents for their children, we have to recognize that the presence of pleasure
and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for which the world
exists. Rather, this world must be a place of sou l-making. And its value is to be judged,
not primarily by the quantity of pleasure and pain occurring in it at any particular mo-
ment, bu t by its fitness for its prim ary purpose, the purpose of soul-making ….
If, then, the evi l in human life finally reveals its nature according as it becomes or
fa ils to become a phase in t he fu lfilment of God’s purpose, we must conclude, so far
as the present life is concerned, that there are both good and evi l suffering, and that
there are redeemed and unredeemed sinners. Any revision of the verdict m ust depend
upon lengthening t he perspective out until it reaches a new and better conclusion.

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 91
If there is a ny eventual resolutio n of the interplay between good and evil, any deci sive
bringing of good out of evil , it m ust lie beyond this world and beyond the enigm a of
death. Therefore we can not hope to state a Christian theod icy witho ut taking seriously
the doctrine of a life beyond the grave. This doctrine is not, of course, based upon a ny
theory of natural immortality, but upon the hope th at beyond death God will resurrect
or re-create or reconstitute the human personality in both its inne r a nd its outer as-
pects. The Christian cla im is that the ultimate life of m an- after what further scenes of
‘sou l-making’ we do no t know- lies in that Kingdom of God which is depicted in the
teachi ng of Jesus as a state of exultant and blissful happiness, symbolized as a joyous
banquet in which all and sund ry, having accepted God’s gracious invi tation, rejoice to-
gether. And Ch ris tian theodi cy must point forward to th at final blessed ness, a nd claim
that th is in fin ite future good will render worthwhile all the pain and t rava il a nd wicked-
ness that has occurred on the way to it. Theod icy cannot be conte nt to look to the past,
seeking an explanation of evil in its origin s, but must look toward s the future, expecting
a triumphant resolution in the eventual perfect fu lfilment of God’s good purpose.’7
Critics have assa iled Hick’s view on several fronts, arguing t hat suffering can
warp character as well as build it, that God’s allo\ving people to suffer fo r t heir own
good constitutes morally repugnant paternalism , a nd that H ick’s t heodicy has the
bizarre implication t hat our trying to erad icate evil would be \vrong. Rowe’s main
criticism is t hat far more evil afflicts people than is required for soul-mak ing:
The problem Hick’s theodicy leaves us is that it is altogether rea-
sonable to believe that some of the evil s that occur could have been
prevented witho ut either d im inishing our mora l and s piritual devel-
opment or undermi ning o ur confidence tha t the world operates ac-
cording to natural laws .18
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.3
1. Do you th ink H ick’s soul-making theodicy is an adequate response to
the argu ment from evil? Explain.
2. Do you believe that Rowe’s argument from ev il is sound? Do you
accept his fi rs t prem ise? Why or w hy not?
3. Consider this view: The evil experienced on this earth is n il when
compared to the infin ite and eternal happiness that Christians will ex-
perience a fter death. If t his assertion is true, does it successfully rebut
the argu ment from evil?
4. Some say that \vhat humans m ight consider ev il is actually good in the
eyes of an omn iscient God with infinite wisdom. Evaluate this claim.
5. Do you believe that p hysical good is impossible without p hysical evil?
That is, is evil necessar y for good to ex ist? Alter natively, is evil needed
so we can understand and appreciat e the good?
Woe unto them that call
evil good, and good evil.
– Isaiah 5:20 (King James
Vers ion)
23 Do you thin k
Rowe’s criticism of t h e
soul-making t heod icy
is cogent? Ca n you
conceive of a world
t ha t has slight ly less
suffer ing than o u r
wo rld has, yet in which
p le nty of soul-making
t akes p la ce?

92 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
24 Can all relig ious ex-
periences be expla ined
in naturalistic t erms?
Are t he naturalistic ex-
planations better than
the theistic one? What
crit eria would you use
to decide?
God is real since he pro·
duces real effects.
-William James
2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Many people affi rm that thei r belief in God does not rest on the k inds of appeals we
have just examined. The cosmological, teleological, and ontological a rgumenrs carry
no \veight with them. They believe in God because they have had a religious exper i-
ence that they think gives them kno\vledge of God’s existence. For them, it is this
religious experience t hat justifies thei r theism.
Some mainta in that their encou nters with t he divine involve sensory content-
they hear a voice, feel a touch, o r see a light or a face o r a form. Many biblical
accounrs-such as St. Paul’s encounter on the road to Damascus and Moses’ hearing
a voice from a burning bush-are like th is. Other people report hav ing no sensations
at a ll but nonetheless sensing a d ivine p resence. Here is one such description from
St. Teresa of Av ila:
St. Teresa of Avila, The Life of Teresa of Jesus
I was at prayer on a fest ival of the glorious Saint Peter whe n I saw Christ at my side-
or, to put it better, I was conscious of Him, for neither with the eyes of t he body nor
with those of the soul did I see anything. I thought He was quite close to me a nd I saw
that it was He Who, as I t ho ught, was speaking to me.’9
And here, from Wi lliam James, is another:
[A]II at once I experienced a feeling of being raised above myself, I fe lt
the presence of God- I tell of the thing just as I was conscious of it-
as if his goodness and his power were penetrating me altogether. The
throb of emotion was so violent that I could barely tell the boys to pass
on and not wait for me …. Then, slowly, the ecstasy left my heart;
that is, I felt that God had withdrawn the comm union which he had
granted, and I was able to walk on, but very slowly, so strongly was I still
possessed by the interior emotion …. I thi nk it well to add that in thi s
ecstasy of mine God had neither form, color, odor, nor taste; moreover,
that the fee li ng of his presence was accom panied with no determinate
loca lization. It was rather as if my personality had been tra nsformed
by the presence of a spiritual spirit . … At bottom the expression most
apt to render what I fe lt is thi s: God was present, though invis ible; he
fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived him.’0
Since such occurrences a re thought to justify belief in God, we can dev ise an
argument from religious experience that looks like this:
1. Religious experiences occur in \vhich God seems to be sensed.
2. The best explanation for these experiences is that God is indeed sensed (God
caused the experience).
3. Therefore, God probably ex ists.

Theism and Religious Experience 93
Premise I is true. Few deny that people have experiences that they take co be of
God. Premise 2, however, is not obv iously true and is often concesce.d. Some critics
reject it on che g rounds that natu ralistic explanations of religious experiences are as
good as, o r better than, theistic explanations. J. L. Mack ie, for example, points out
chat religious experiences are generally ind istinguishable from experiences \vich a
kno\vn psychological or physical cause.
J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism
We are all fam iliar with dreams. Waking visions and hallucinations are relatively infre-
quent, but still common enough . Many people have occasionally had the impression of
hearing words spoken when there have been no such physical sounds in the neighbour-
hood. Many religious experiences closely resemble, even in their sequences of contrast-
ing phases, the almost universal human experience of being in love. Hysteria, delusions,
cycles of man ia and depression are known and reasonably well understood psychopathic
phenomena in innumerable cases where there is no religious component; but experi-
ences which have such components, which count as religious par excellence, share many
features with these pathological ones. Experiences of the mystical kind are often induced
by certain drugs. Some of the experiences reported by mystics almost irresistibly invite in-
terpretation as expressions of violent sexual passion. From a psychological point of view,
as [William] James himself makes clear, the phenomena of conversion,
‘mind-cure’, sensory or motor automatisms (such as hearing voices) , in-
spiration, mysticism, and so on lend themselves very readily to being un-
derstood in terms of the operation of unconscious or subconscious parts
of the mind …. Theologians themselves have long recognized that it is
not easy to decide, about particular visions and messages, whether they
come fro m God or from the devil. As James says … ‘No appearances
whatever are infallible proofs of grace …. The good dispositions that a vi-
sion, a voice, or other apparently heavenly favor leave beh ind them are the
only marks by which we may be sure that they are not possible deceptions
of the tempter’. Admittedly these alternatives, God and the devil, would
both fall under the broad heading of ‘some supernatural source’. But it
will be fa irly read ily admitted today that the experiences initially ascribed
to the devil are fully explicable in terms of purely human but su bconscious
motives; since it is also admitted that those which the theologian would
ascribe to God are not intrinsically distingu ishable from those which he
would in itially ascribe to the devil, it follows that even what he classes as
genuinely religious experiences do not intrinsically resist explanation in
purely human terms. And this in itself seems fata l to any argument from
religious experience to any supernatural conclusions whatever.”
Seil!, some contend chat a rel igious experience can give us good
reasons for believing chat God exists, just as ord inary sense experience
can give us good reasons for believing chat a cat is on che mac. Richard
S\vinbu rne takes chis line. He maintains that by applying a basic prin-
ciple of rationality (\vhac he calls the “p rinciple of credulity”), we can
Figure 2.12 The Bible tells of Paul’s con-
version to Christianity after being struck
bl ind during an encounter w ith God on
the road to Damascus. Was it possible for
Paul to know that he experienced God
instead of, say, a very powerfu l Greek or
Roman deity?

94 Chapter 2 God and Religion
PHILOSOPHY LAB –
Read the rwo sets of statements below. On the left is a list of sensory or perceptual
experiences char people have from rime ro rime. There is no question about the re-
ality of these experiences; both common sense and science show char they do in face
occur. On the right is a list of experiences char religious people often report. Noc
everyone agrees char these experiences have a spiritual or religious cause.
They sometimes feel a “sense of
presence,” a psychological stare
char engenders a fee ling char
someone unseen is nearby, even
though no one is really there.
They sometimes fee l certain about an idea
or claim even when they are facrually
,vrong. This sense of certainty often
arises from strong emotions.
They sometimes feel rhac something
or someone unseen is touching
rhem even when nothing is
there- a known psychological or
physiological reaction.
They sometimes feel che presence
of God.
They sometimes have a strong feeling
of certainty about religious
matters.
They sometimes have seemingly
physical sensations chat suggest
chat God is touching chem.
Suppose you are religious and you have the experiences listed on
the right. How do you distinguish these from the natural occur-
rences on the left? Saying that you “just know” does not answer
the question. Do you have a special faculty unknown to science that
helps you distinguish the two? What exactly allows you to separate
the natural phenomena from the genuinely spiritual? Does faith en-
able you to tell the difference between the two kinds of events? Is it
possible to misidentify your sensations?
be justified in believing chat o ur e xpe rie nce reveals God ‘s presence. The principle
is ro ug hly this: In the absence of reasons co the contra ry, if some t hi ng seems co be
present, then it probably is present. Whe n applied co religious experiences, t he prin-
ciple cells us that “in t he absence of s pecial considerations, a ll religious e xpe rie nces
o ught co be taken by thei r subjects as ge nuine, and hence as substantial grou nds for
bel ief in t he e xist ence of their appare nt object-G od, Mary, o r Ultimate R ealit y,
or Poseidon.” 22 The special conside ra t ions include doubts abou t t he reliabil ity of t he

Theism and Religious Experience 95
perception (for example, when t he person involved is known to hallucinate or to be
under the influence of alcohol o r d rugs) and strong evidence that the object of the
perception does not exist.
Clearly, to make sense of ou r o rdinary experience and to acquire true beliefs, we
must apply an epistemological rule like Swinburne’s principle of credulity. But his
principle is fau lty, some say, inclin ing us to believe that an object is present when it
isn’t. Others doubt that any such p rincip le could ever justify us in bel ieving that a
religious experience accu rately reveals reality. As W illiam L. Ro,ve says,
Will iam L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion
[T]he Principle of Credulity presu pposes that we have some understand ing of what
reasons there might be for questioning our experiences and some way of telling whe-
ther or not these reasons are present. Consider aga in our example of your experience
which you take to be a perception of a large, coiled snake. Like other physical objects
that make up the world we perceive by our fi ve senses , snakes are publi c objects that
are observable by others who satisfy certa in conditio ns. That is, we can pred ict t hat
people with good eyesight will see a snake (if o ne is there) provided there is good li ght
and t hey look in the right directio n. It is because physica l objects are subject to such
predictions that we ca n understa nd what reasons t here might be for questio ning an
experience which seems to be a perceptio n of a snake and ca n often tell whether such
reasons are present . In the case of divine beings, however, matters are quite d iffere nt.
Presumably, it is entirely up to God whether to revea l his presence to some hum an be-
ing. If God does so, he may or may not d isclose him self to others who are in a similar
situation. What this means is that it is quite difficu lt to discover reasons for t hinking
that someone’s ordinary religio us experience is delusive. But s ince t he Principle of
Credu lity supposes that we understand what reasons t here might be to question an
experience, some dou bt exists as to whether the principle can be fair ly applied to ex-
periences whose subjects take them be perceptions of t he presence of a d ivine being.’3
By the lights of any adequate p rincip le of rationality, we generally have good
reason to doubt the t ruth of an experience if those ,vho have it disagree about it.
That is, we rightfu lly doubt experiences if they a re not rel iable. Many point to the
apparent incompatibil ity of religious experiences as p roof that they a re indeed un-
reliable. Generally, religious experiences in Western trad itions are of a God who is
a divine person separate from the world. But experiences in Eastern trad itions a re
often of a d ivine something that is entirely impersonal or identical with t he world.
Believers may have an experience of God as one being, God as a trinity of persons,
God as many, God as emptiness o r noth ingness, or God as an ultimate reality. If
someone experiences God as a person and another experiences God as impersonal,
how can both of these experiences be true? H o,v can both of them p rov ide a window
on reality? Religious experiences tend to arise o ut of and support specific rel igious
t raditions-trad itions that differ drastically and disagree substantially in their views
of spiritual reality. Conflicts among experiences o r t raditions that spa,vn experiences
seem to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of all alleged encounters with the divine.
25 Why does Rowe
doubt t hat Swinburne’s
principle of credulity
can be successfully
applied to religious ex-
perience? Do you agree
with him?

9 6 Chapter 2 God and Religion
PH I LOSO PHY NOW
Proof of the Power of Prayer?
Praying for ochers (intercessory prayer) is a com,non practice of millions world,vide, and its
efficacy is an article of faith for nu,nerous religious groups. For ,nose, it isn’t necessary co prove
so,nehow that prayer works; they have faith that it does, and that’s that. Bur a few have sought
proof through science, hop-
ing to uncover evidence that
praying for sick people can
make them well.
A fa,nous 1988 study by
cardiologist Randolph Byrd
looked at medical cornpl ica-
rions in heart patients, some
of,vho,n were prayed for and
so,ne nor. Those who ,vere
prayed for seemed to do bet-
ter chan rhe ochers. In 1999,
a larger, simi lar study of
heart patients found that the
prayed-for group had fewer
medica l problems than a
group nor prayed for. In a Figure 2.13 Can science prove that prayer works?
200 1 study of eight hundred
heart patients, researchers found no significant effect of intercessory prayer on the patients’
health. In 2006, researchers stud ied eighteen hundred people ,vho had undergone heart
surgery and d iscovered char prayer had no effect on their recovery.
Unfortunately, most prayer studies have been too Aawed for their results to be taken seri-
ously. The upshot is char so far, science has nor shown that intercessory prayer can improve
people’s health.
Many critics (both religious and nonrel ig ious) think th is kind of research is hopelessly
misgu ided. To them, since intercessory prayer is neither well defined nor explained, studying
it see,ns like chasing shadows. Son1e ask, Do the effects of prayer depend on the number or
the faith of the people praying? If a deity can intervene in human affairs at any rime, how
can researchers ever crust study results? How can scientists cake into account che inAuence
of prayers fro,n people nor involved in the studies?
Do you believe that intercessory prayer works? What are your grounds for
believing or not be liev ing? Could science ever prove that prayer has rea l
effects?

Theism and Religious Experience 97
Swinburne, ho\vever, thinks othenvise:
Richard Swin b urne, The Existence of God
Now, of course, devotees of different religions describe their religious experiences in
t he religious vocabu lary with which they are fam iliar. Bu t in itself th is does not mean
t hat their d ifferent descriptions are in confl ict- God may be known under different
names to different cultures (as both Old and New Testaments acknowledge- see Exo-
dus 6:2- 3 and Acts l]:23). Likewise a Greek’s cla im to have talked to Poseidon is not
necessaril y in conflict with a Jew’s claim to have talked to t he angel who watches over
t he sea; it is so only if to admit t he existence of Poseidon is to comm it one to a whole
polytheistic theology, and there is no need to suppose t hat generally it is.
Adm itted ly, sometimes t he giving of one description to the object of religious ex-
perience does carry comm itment to a doctrine regarded as fa lse by devotees of another
religion. Claiming to have experienced the heavenly Christ commits one to a belief in
an Incarnation that an orthodox Jew wou ld not adm it. Bu t in these cases, if t he oppo-
nent of t he doctrine can produce good grounds for regard ing the doctrine as false, that
is reason for the subject of the experience to withdraw his original claim. Among those
grounds may be that others have had confl icting experiences and that their experiences
are more numero us and better authenticated; but t here may be many grounds of other
kinds as well. The subject of the religious experience need not in such a case withdraw
his original cla im totally; he need only describe it in a less committed way- for ex-
ample, claim to have been aware of some supernatura l being, not necessarily Dionysus
(as originally claimed). The fact that sometimes … descriptions of t he object of a
religious experience are in conflict with descriptions of the object of another rel igious
experience means on ly that we have a source of challenge to a particular deta iled claim,
not a source of scepticism about a ll claims of rel igious experience.'”‘
S uppose, then, that religious experiences did not clash in any important way.
C-ould \Ve then conclude that such experiences sho\v that God ex isrs? Perhaps, but
agreement among experiences in itself cannot sho\v that they yield knowledge of the
divine, for we know that people ca n have the same sensory experience that turns out
to be illusory (s uch as seeing a mirage).
Skeptics give another reason for denying that harmony among religious experiences
attests to d ivine presence: the d ifficulty of recognizing God. They ask, How can you ever
be sure that you are perceiving or experiencing God? Can you recognize an all-po\verful,
al l-knowing, and all-good being when you encounter it? How can you distinguish such
a being from one that is incredibly powerful but finite, or one that is enormously power-
ful and knowledgeable but demonic? In any case, ho\v can \Ve use our senses to detect
God, since he presumably cannot be sensed? Some say their experiences come \vith a
feeling of certainty that God is present. But ho\v can such fee lings give us knowledge?
Feelings are not a reliable source of kno\vledge, for \Ve can feel certain about many
things and still be wrong. Some think we can recognize God th rough a kind of spiritual
sixth sense. But unlike our ord inary senses, which have been tested again and again fo r
reliability, no extra sense has been shown to be trusnvorthy. So ho\v can we rely on it?
In man y areas of u nd e r ..
standing. none so much
as in ou r understan d ing of
God, we bump u p against
a simp licity so profou nd
tha t we must assign com-
plexities to it to comprc·
hcnd it at all. It is mindful
of h ow we paste decals to
a slid ing glas.s d oor ro keep
fro m b umping our nose
agai ns t it.
– Robert Brault

98 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion
Theists have tried in various ,vays to answer these questions. O ne frequently
heard defense is that the validity of religious experien ce does not depend o n agree-
ment or disagreement among va rious descriptions of it, for the true religious experi-
en ce can not be describe.cl at a ll. The experience is the same fo r everyone, but it gives
rise to d ifferent descriptions because it is ineffable. It simply is not possible to put
into word s an encounter ,vith the divi ne.
Perhaps an experience of God is indeed ineffable, but if so then nothing at a ll
can be truthfully asserted about it, including the claim that religious experience
can give us k nowledge of God ‘s existence. If nothi ng can be truthfully stated about
something, then any statement about it would be false. So to affirm that ineffable
religious experience gives us knowledge of God is to likewise assert something false.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.4
1. Some a rgue that the truth of rel igious experiences is corroborated by
positive effects in the lives of those who have them-such as leading
a morally better life. But consider: People can be inspired to be more
virt uous by read ing compel ling works of fiction, but that doesn’t show
that the ,vorks a re true. If an alleged experience of God inspires some-
o ne to lead a better li fe, is that reason enough to conclude that the
experience is indeed of God?
2. W h at is the best explanation of religious experiences? Evaluate these nvo
rival hypotheses: (1) religious experiences are caused by God; (2) religious
experiences arise from people’s o,vn m inds (due to hallucinations, wish-
ful thi nk ing, drugs, etc.). Which explanation is better? W hy?
3. What is S,vi nburne’s principle of credulity? W hat is Ro,ve’s criticism of
it? Do you agree ,vith Rowe?
4. Do disagreemenrs among religious experiences cast doubt on the trust-
worthi ness of those experiences? Do you agree ,vith Swinburne’s view
that such disagreemen rs do not necessarily underm ine the truth of the
experiences?
5. Is it possible for someone to d istinguish between an experience of an
omnipotent God and an experience of a bei ng that is extremely power-
fu l but fi n ite?
2.5 BELIEF WITHOUT REASON
The point of the arguments we’ve cons idered so far is to provide epistemic justification
for believ ing (or not believing) in God-that is, reasons for believ ing that theism is
tr ue (or false). But there are a lso argu ments intended to offer pragmatic justificatio n

Bel i et Without Reason 99
fo r belief.-reasons to think that believing in God offers practical advantages. Many
who make pragmatic appeals d eny that there can be any rational grounds for theism.
They are convince.cl that the best-made arguments for God’s ex istence are doomed to
fail, but that \Ve should believe anyway because belief brings \vith it certain invalu-
able benefits. In this way they can maintain that even though the truth of theism is
not backed by reasons, belief in God can nevertheless be rational.
The best examples of such arguments come from William James (1842-1910),
the distinguished American philosopher and psychologist, and Blaise Pascal (1623-
1662), the French philosopher and mathematician who devise.cl what we no\v call
” Pascal’s wager.”
James: Pragmatic Faith
C-ontrary to his scientifically m inde.d colleagues, James argues that sometimes \Ve
may be justified in making a leap of faith to embrace a belief that is entirely unsup-
ported by evidence. In the absence of any evidence t hat could help us decide an is-
s ue, when we are p resented with a t rue choice between opposing beliefs (a “genuine
option”), believing on faith may be the rational thing to do. To James, a genuine
option is one that is live, forced, and momentous. A live option presents someone
with alternatives that he believes could possibly be actualize.cl. A forced option is
one that is unavoidable because the two poss ibilities are mutually exclusive, and not
deciding is the same as choosing one of the alternatives. (An example from James is,
“Eit her accept this truth or go \Vithout it.”) A momentous option is one that really
m at ters, because t he stakes are high, the decision is irrevers ible, or the choice offers a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. When we are confronted with a genuine option \Vit h
no evidence to go by, James says, \Ve have the right to let our “passional natu re”-our
feelings and d esires-decid e.
James thus repud iates eviden tialism , the vie\v that we a re justifi ed in believing
someth ing only if it is supported by sufficient evidence. In James’s day, the fo remost
champion of evidentialism was W. K. C lifford, \vho d eclared, ” It is \vrong ahvays,
everywhere, and fo r anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”15 In
other words, it is morally zurong to believe beyond the evidence. Aga inst th is position
James asserts, “Our passional nature not only la\vfully may, but must, decide an op-
tion between p ropositions, whenever it is a genu ine option that cannot by its nature
be decided on intellectual grounds.”26
To James, the decis ion to believe or not to believe in a d ivine reality (the “reli-
gious hypothesis”) is a genuine option that the intellect cannot help us decide. It is
indeed momentous, for ‘\ve are supposed to gain, even no\v, by our belief, and to
lose by ou r nonbelief, a certain vital good.”17 The skeptic, out of fear of being wrong,
would have us refra in from believing and wait until evidence tilts one way or the
other. But James insists that the w iser choice-and the more advantageous-is to
believe the religious hypothesis, to refuse to forfeit you r “sole chance in life of get-
t ing upon the winning side.” Moreover, to discover whether a divine being exists,
we may fi rst have to have faith t hat it does. Unless we first believe, we may not be
able to confirm t he truth through our O\vn experience. One who insists on evidence
Believe ,hat life is worth
living, and your belief will
help c rca>
Dershowirz therefore favors a fonn of legalization in which agents of che scare may tor-
ture soineone if they first obtain judicial pennission in che form of”corture ,varrancs” simi lar
co the judicial ,varrancs required for the police co legally rap someone’s phone. Such a warrant
system, he says, ,vould “decrease che amount of physical violence directed against suspects,”
and “che rights of che suspect would be beccer protected ,vich a warrant requiremenc.”t
What is the nonconsequentialist argument against torture mentioned here?
Do you accept the first premise in the consequentialist argument? Do you
believe it could be morally permissible to torture the ticking bomb terrorist?
Why or why not?
• Alan M. Dershowitz, “Tortured Reason ing,” in Torture: A Collection , ed. Sanford Levison (Oxford:
Oxford U n iversity Press, 2004), 257.
t A lan M . Dershowirz, “The Case for Torturing the T icking Bomb Terrorist,” in \W,y Terrorism \Vorks:
Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale Un iversity Press, 2002), 61 – 62.
when motivated by self-interest. The argument is based on a simple face about the
moral life: We a re not morally obligated co do the impossible. We have no duty co
make our loved ones live nvo hund red years, because chat is beyond our power. We
have no obligation co ensure chat everyone is healthy, because chat feat is not pos-
s ible. L ike,vise, we are not capable of acting a ltruistically, so we have no obligation
co do so. We a re duty bound co do on ly what we can do-,vhich is co ace purely out
of self-interest.
Critics have rebutted ch is argument by rejecting psychological egoism (Prem-
ise 2). They point out chat our experience suggests chat we don’t a lways ace out of
self-interest. We often look out for number one, but we a lso sometimes choose co
inconvenience ou rselves, incu r ser ious disadvantages, or put ourselves at risk-co
13 Do people always
act out of sel f-interest?
Do you always act out
of self- int erest?

1 68 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
The p ursuir of happiness is
a most ridiculous phrase;
if you pursue happiness
you’ll never fin d it.
-C. r. Snow
He wh o lives o nly to
benefi t himself confers on
the world a benefi t whe n
h e d ies.
-Tertullian
14 If you devoted your
life sole ly to the pursu it
of happi ness, would
you ever obtain it? If
you have e xperienced
moments of happiness,
what was their cause?
Were you trying to
ach ieve happine ss, o r
did you experience it
because you were pur-
su ing something e lse?
Self-interest is but the sur-
vival of th e anim al in us.
Hum ani ty o nly begi ns fo r
man w ith sclf~surrc ndcr.
-Henri Frederic Amyl
help someone else. People rush into burning buildings to save complete strangers.
Mothers starve themselves so their child ren will have food. H usbands and wives sell
everything they O\vn to pay for their spouse’s urgent medical care.
Ethical egoists are likely to respond to this li ne by declaring that such experi-
ences are deceptive, fo r actions that seem pu rely altruistic a re in fact done to achieve
social advantage, to feel personal satisfaction, o r to p revent some future calamity.
In fact, fo r every instance of apparent altru istic behavior, ethical egoists must say
that we are seriously mistaken about the motivation behind it.
This reply may save psychological egoism from refutation, but it does so at a
cost. It means that the theory is untestable. No ev idence could ever count against
it; all possible ev idence is consistent w ith it. Psychological egoism is thus completely
uninformative and conceptually \VOrthless, so it cannot be used as a premise in the
argument fo r ethical egoism.
On the other hand, if we have no preconceptions about which way the evidence
points, and we take it at face value, it seems to count against psychological egoism .
The only evidence we have regard ing our motivations for acting is people’s behavior
and their introspective reports about \vhy they behave as they do. And this evi-
dence, though not a lways reliable, suggests that \Ve sometimes do act selAessly and
altruistically.
A common fo rm of psychological egoism says that people perform actions solely
to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasu re-even actions that appear to be altru is-
tic or selAess. But this vie\v of the matter, philosophers ins ist, is muddled. It is much
more likely that \Ve act to obtain particular th ings, not satisfaction itself, and that
\Ve experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obta ining those things. We don’t seek
satisfaction; we seek certain things that g ive us satisfaction \vhen \Ve acquire them. If
the th ings themselves were not the object of our desires, it \vould be difficult to see
ho\v we cou ld get any satisfaction from our attaining them.
Of all the a rguments put forth against ethical egoism, the one that is probably
most damaging boils down to this: The theory runs afoul of moral common sense.
In judging a moral theory, we have good reason to doubt irs \VOrth ifit conAicts w ith
\vhat we take to be our plausible mora l intu itions. As we have seen, ou r intuitions
may be mistaken, but we are entitle.cl to accept them at face value unless \Ve have
good reason to m istrust them. Critics maintain that ethical egoism clashes w ith
moral common sense in two important ways.
First, the theory seems to be inconsistent \Vith ou r considered moral judgmenrs.
Eth ical egoism implies that if secretly mu rdering and robbing a rich stranger \vould
be in your best interests, then you should do so. The same could be said about your
betraying you r best fr iend, or fa lsely accusing someone of a serious crime, or bu rn ing
do\vn a facto ry owne.d by your business competitor. All these actions would be con-
demned by our considered moral judgments, but eth ical egoism could countenance
them. Commonsense morality says they are wrong; ethical egoism says they may be
right. This objection to the theory is not undercut by the claim that morally \vrong
actions are never in one’s best interests, fo r we can easily imagine counterexamples
in \vhich immoral acts are to a person’s advantage.

Morality Based on Duty and Rights 1 6 9
Second, ethical egoism appears co conflict \vich an essential element of the moral
life: impartiality. As \Ve saw earlier, morality entails that equals be created equally
unless there is a morally relevant reason co treat chem differencly. Each person’s inter-
ests muse be given equal \veighc. But, by definition, ethical egoism insists chat some
people’s interests should be regarded as more worthy of consideratio n than chose of
others-specifically, one’s own interests are co be given h igher p riorit y t han chose
of anyone else in t he \vorld. Discrimination aga inst ochers fo r no good reason is
required by the t heory.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 3.3
1. H ow does Mill respond co the charge chat utilitarianism is a pig ph il-
osoph y? W hat is meant by ” Better co be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied”? D o you agree with this order ing of values?
2. W h at is Mi ll ‘s “proof” of the t rut h of u tilita rianism? Is it a good argu-
men t? Explai n.
3. Suppose that by k illing one innocent person you could g reacly increase
the health and \veil-being of a t housand . Wou ld it be morally perm is-
sible co k ill chat person? How might a utilita rian decide chis question?
4. Evaluate chis statemen t: “Everyone is an egoist, for everyone ahvays
tries co do wh at will bring h im or her satisfaction.”
5. Suppose you are a n ethical egoist. Can you make you r view p ublic?
Can you teach t he t heory co your child ren? Can you wish that every-
one adopted t he t heory?
3.4 MORALITY BASED ON DUTY AND RIGHTS
The moral theory of Immanuel Ka nt is p rofoundly opposed co consequential ism on
nu merous counts. Utilita ria ns ins ist chat the morality of a n action depends entirely
on its effects-whether it maxim izes hu man \veil-being. No action whatsoever is
inherently right or wrong; o nly irs costs a nd benefits make it so. Kant wi ll have none
of chis. H e maintai ns chat right actions do not depend on their consequences, the
p roductio n of h appiness, people’s a ims, or t heir des ires and feelings. Right actions
a re those chat a re right in themselves because they are cons istent with un iversal moral
ru les derive.cl from reason, and the actions have moral worth only if we do chem out
of a sen se of dut y, simply because they are our duty. For Kant, the moral law cannot
be something contingent, cha ngeable, or relative. The moral law is absolute, un-
cha ngeable, and universal, a rock-solid struc ture builc o n eternal reason.
Two rhings fill the m ind
w ith ever new an d inc rcas ..
ing admiration and awe:
th e starry heavens above
and the mo ral law with in .
-Immanuel Ka.m

1 70 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
15 What does Kant
mean by his assertion
that morality cannot
have an empirical
basis? Is he right about
this?
16 What is Kant ‘s argu-
ment for his view that
nothing can be good
w ithout qualification
except a good will ? Is
his argument sound?
Here is K ant on the subject:
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
As my concern here is with moral ph ilosophy, I li m it the question suggested to th is:
W hether it is not of the utmost necessi ty to construct a pure moral ph ilosop hy, per-
fectly cleared of everyth ing w hich is on ly empirical, and wh ich belongs to anthropol-
ogy? For that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of
duty and of the moral laws. Everyone must adm it that if a law is to have mora l force,
i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for
example, the precept, ” Thou shall not lie,” is not va lid for men alone, as if other ratio-
nal be ings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so
called; that, therefore, the basis of ob ligation must not be sought in t he nature of man,
or in the circumstances in the world in w hich he is placed, but a priori simply in the con-
ception of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on princi ples
of mere experience may be in certa in respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even
in t he least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a precept,
while it may be a practica l ru le, can never be called a moral law ….
Nothing can poss ibly be conceived in the world, or even out of i t, which can be
called good, without quali fication, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and
the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, per-
severance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubted ly good and des irable in many
respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if
the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called
character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour,
even health, and the genera l well-being and contentment with one’s cond itions which
is ca lled happiness, inspire pride, and, often presumption, if there is not a good will
to correct the infl uence of these on t he m ind, and with this also to rectify the whole
principle of acting, and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with
a single feature of a pure and good will , enjoying un broken prosperity, can never give
pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the
ind ispensable cond ition even of being worthy of happiness.
There are even some quali ties wh ich are of service to this good will itself, and
may faci litate its action, yet which have no intrinsic uncond itional value, but always
presuppose a good will, and this qua lifies the esteem that we justly have for them, and
does not perm it us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in t he affections
and pass ions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not on ly good in many respects,
but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far
from deserving to be called good without qua lification, although they have been so
uncond itiona lly pra ised by the ancients. For without the princi ples of a good will , they
may become extremely bad; and the coolness of a vill ain not on ly ma kes him far more
dangerous, but also d irectly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he wou ld
have been without it.
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness
for the atta inment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is,
it is good in itself, and cons idered by itself to be esteemed much higher than all that
can be brought about by it in favour of any incl ination, nay, even of the sum-total of

Morality Based on Duty and Rights 171
all inclinations. Even if it shou ld happen that, owing to specia l d isfavour of fortune, or
t he niggard ly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will shou ld wholly lack power to
accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it shou ld yet ach ieve nothing, and
there shou ld remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summon-
ing of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it wou ld still shine by its own light,
as a th ing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefu lness or fru itlessness can neither
add to nor take away anythi ng from this value. It would be, as it were, on ly the setting
to enable us to hand le it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to
it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true
connoisseurs , or to determine its va lue . . .. s
In Kant’s system, all our moral duties a re expressed in the form of categorical im-
peratives. An imperative is a command to do something; it is categorical if it applies
without exception and \Vithout rega rd for particular needs o r pu rposes. A categori-
cal imperative says, “Do this-rega rdless.” In contrast, a hypothetical imperative is a
command to do something if \Ve want to achieve particular aims, as in “If you want
good pay, work ha rd.” The moral la\v, then, rests on absolute directives that do not
depend on the contingencies of desire or utility.
Kant says that through reason and reflection \Ve can derive our duties from a
s ingle moral p rinciple, \vhat he calls the c ategorical imperative. He formu lates
it in different ways, the first one being: “I am never to act orher\vise than so that
I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”6 For Kant, our ac-
tions have logical implications-they imply general rules, or max ims, of conduct.
If you tell a lie for financial gain , you are in effect acting according to a max im like
“Jr’s okay to lie to someone when doing so benefits you financia lly.” The question is
whether the maxim corresponding to an action is a legitimate moral law. To find
out, \Ve must ask if we could consistently w ill that the maxim
become a universal law applicable to everyone-that is, if ev-
eryone could cons istently act on the max im and we would be
willing to have them do so. If we could do this, then the action
described by the maxim is morally permissible; if not, it is pro-
h ibited. Thus, moral laws embody t\VO characteristics thought
to be essentia l to morality itself: universality and impartiality.
•
•
> –
All that an y of us has ro do
in this world is h is simple
d u ty.
-H. C. Trumbull
The categorical imperative
is Kan t’s fun damental
moral p rinciple, w hich he
fo rm ulares as (I) ” I am
never m act otherwise than
so that I could also will that
11ty maxim should become a
universal law”; an d (2) “So
act as to treat hu m ani ty,
whe ther in th ine own
person o r in that of any
o the r, in every case as an
end with al, never as a
means o nly.”
Do not do unto others as
you would rhey should do
u n to you. Their tastes may
not be the sam e.
-George Bernard Shaw
J
i:::, •
t,:j
‘ c::: –
…. —-
‘ ‘
To sho\v us how to apply this formu lation of the categori-
cal imperative to a specific situation, Kant uses the example of
a lying promise. Suppose you need to borrow money from a
fr iend, but you kno\v you could never pay her back. So, to get
the loan, you decide to lie, falsely prom ising to repay the money.
To find out if such a lying promise is morally permissible, Kant
would have you ask if you could consistently will the maxim of
your action to become a un iversal la\v, to ask, in effect, “What
would happen if everyone did this?” The maxim is “Whenever
you need to borrow money you cannot pay back, make a lying
promise to repay.” So what would happen if everyone in need of
a loan acted in accordance with this max im ? People \vould make
Figure 3.11 An old canceled German stamp
w ith Kant’s image.

1 72 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
17 In Kant’s view,
is lying to someone
to spare her feelings
morally permissible?
Do you think it is
permissible?
Imman uel Kant,
Groundwork of the
Mela physic of Morals
18 In these passages,
does Kant make clear
how we are supposed
to apply his principle of
respect for persons? For
example, how exactly
do you show respect
fo r a person who is ter-
minally ill and in great
pain who begs you to
help him end his life?
lying promises to obt ain loans, but everyone would a lso know that such promises
\vere worthless, a nd the custom of loaning money on p romises would disappear. So
\villing the maxim to be a universal law involves a contradiction : If everyone made
lying promises, prom ise-making itself would be no more; you ca nnot consistently
\viii the maxim to become a un iversal la\v. Therefore, your duty is clear: Mak ing a
lying p romise to borro\v money is morally wrong.
Kant’s first formu lation of the categorical imperative yields several other impor-
tant duties. He a rgues that there is an absolute moral proh ibition against killing the
innocent, lying, committing suicide, and fa iling to help others \vhen feas ible.
Perhaps the most reno\vned fo rmulation of the categorical imperative is the prin-
cip le of respect for persons (a fo rmulation d istinct from the first one, though Kant
thought them equivalent). As he expresses it, “So act as to t reat human ity, whether
in thine O\vn person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as
a means only.” 7 People must never be treated as if they were mere instruments for
ach ieving some further end, for people a re ends in themselves, possessors of ultimate
inherent worth. People have ultimate value because they are the ultimate source of
value fo r other things. They besto\v value; they do not have it bestowed upon them. So
\Ve should treat both ourselves and other persons with the respect that all inherently
valuable beings deser ve .
. . . Now I say: man and genera lly any rationa l being exists as an end in hi mself, not
merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether
they concern himself or other rational beings, m ust be always regarded at the same
time as an end. All objects of the in clinations have on ly a cond itional worth; for if the
incl inations and the wants founded on them d id not exist, then their object would be
without value. But the inclinations themselves being sources of want are so far from
having an absolute worth for which t hey should be desired, t hat, on the contrary, it
must be t he universa l wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus
the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always cond itional.
Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature’s, have nevertheless,
if t hey are non rational beings, on ly a relative value as mea ns, and are therefore called
things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature
points t hem out as ends in themselves, that is as someth ing wh ich must not be used
merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of
respect). These, t herefore , are not merely subjective ends whose ex istence has a worth
for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is things whose existence is an
end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can be substituted , which t hey shou ld
subserve merely as means, for otherwise noth ing whatever would possess absolute
worth; but if all worth were cond itioned and therefore contingent, then t here wou ld be
no supreme practical principle of reason w hatever.
If t hen there is a supreme practical princip le or, in respect of t he hu man will , a
categorica l imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of
that which is necessari ly an end for everyone because it is an end in itself. constitutes
an objective principle of will, and can t herefore serve as a universal practical Jaw. The
fo undation of th is principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself Man necessa rily
conceives his own existence as being so: so far then this is a subjective principle of hu-
man actions. But every other rationa l being regards its existence s imilarly, just on the

Morality Based on Duty and Rights 1 7 3
same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at t he same time a n objective
principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of t he will must be capable
of being deduced. Accord ingly the practica l im perative will be as fo llows: So act as to
treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end
withal, never as a means only . . .. a
According co Kane, the inherent worth of persons derives from thei r nature as
autonomous, rational beings capable of directing their own lives, determin ing their
own ends, and decreei ng their own rules by wh ich co live. Thus, the inherent value
of persons does not depend in any ,vay on thei r social status, wealth, talent, race, o r
culture. Moreover, inherent value is someth ing that all persons possess equally. Each
person deserves t he same measure of respect as any ocher.
Kane explains chat ,ve treat people merely as a means instead of an end-in-
chemselves if ,ve disregard these characteristics of person hood-if we thwart people’s
freely chosen actions by coercing chem, underm ine their rational decision-making
by lying co them, or discount their equality by d iscrim inating against them .
Notice chat chis formu lation of the categorical imperative does not actually p ro-
hibit creating a person as a means but fo rbids creating a person simply, or merely, as
a means-as nothing but a means. Kane recogn izes chat in daily life we often muse
use people co achieve our various ends. To buy milk we use the cashier; co find books
we use the librarian; co gee well ,ve use the doctor. Bue because their actions are freely
chosen and ,ve do not undermine their status as persons, we do not use chem solely
as instru ments of our will.
Kane’s principle of respect for persons captures what seems co most people an
essential part of moralit y itself-the notion that some t h ings muse not be done co a
person even if they increase the well-being of ochers. People have certa in rights, and
these rig hts cannot be violate.cl merely for the sake of an overall increase in util ity.
We tend co ch ink chat there is someth ing terribly wrong wit h jailing an innocent
person just because her imprisonment ,vou ld make a lot of ocher people very happy,
o r with seizing a person’s possessions and giving them co the poor co max imize
overall happiness, o r with enslaving a race of people so the rest of the ,vorld can have
a higher standard of living. Over the principle of respect fo r persons, Kancians and
util itarians part company. Utilitarians reject the concept of rights, o r they define
rights in terms of utility. Kancians see respect fo r r ig hts as centra l co the moral life.
Kane’s theory, however, does have its detracto rs. Many philosophers argue chat
it is not consistent with our considered moral judgmenrs. A major cause of the
problem, they say, is Kane’s ins istence that ,ve have absolute (or “perfect”) d ucies-
obligacions chat muse be honored ,vichouc exception. Thus, in Kantian ethics, we
have an absolute duty not co lie o r co break a p romise or co k ill the innocent , come
what may. Imagine chat a band of ki llers wanes co murder an innocent man who has
taken refuge in your house, and t he k illers come co your door and ask you point-
blank if he is in your house. To say no is co lie; co answer truthfully is co guarantee
t he man’s death. What should you do? In a case like chis, says Kane, you muse do
your duty-you muse cell the truth, though murder ,vi ii be the resu lt and a lie would
save a life. Bue in ch is case such devotion co moral absolutes seems completely askew,
H istory is a voice forever
sounding across the
centuries the laws of right
and wrong. Opinions
airer, manners change,
creeds rise and fall, but the
moral law is written on the
tablets of eternity.
-James A. Froude
19 Is Kant’s view
clearly su perior to utili-
t arian ism? Or is ut ili-
t arian ism the su perior
o ne? Or does each
th eory offer something
o f value that should be
part of any adeq uate
system of morality?
Do not be too moral. You
may cheat yourself o ut of
much life. Aim above mor ..
aliry. Be not simply good;
be good for something.
-Henry David 1horeau

174 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
::,
CD ANNE
~ FRANK
CD
,—
Figure 3.12 Imagine that in 1944 you own the house where the young Anne Frank and her
family are h id ing from the Nazis, and the Nazis ask you if anyone lives there. You can lie and save
Anne and her family from death in a concentration camp, or you can tell the truth and doom
them. Kant would have you tell the t ruth no matter what. Is he right? (In 1944 in t he Nether·
lands, the authorities did in fact d iscover the hid ing place of Anne and the ot her members of her
family. They were all shipped off to concentration camps; only Anne’s father survived.)
for saving an innocent life seems fa r more important mora lly than blindly obeying a
rule. Moral common sense suggests that sometimes the consequences of our actions
do matter more than adherence to the letter of the law, even if the law is genera lly
\VOrthy of our respect and obedience.
Some have thought that Kant’s theory can yield implausible results for another
reason. Recall that the first formulation of the categorical imperative says that an
action is perm issible if persons could cons istently act on the relevant max im, and
\Ve \vould be w illing to have them do so. This requirement seems to make sense if
the maxim in question is someth ing like “Do not kill the innocent” or “Treat equals
equally.” But \vhat if the maxim is “Enslave all Christians” or “Kill all Eth iopians”?
We could-without contradiction-will either one of these precepts to become a
universal law. And if \Ve \vere so inclined, \Ve could be \vi lling for everyone to act
accordingly, even if we ou rselves were Christians o r Eth iopians. So, by Kantian
lights, these actions could very well be mora lly perm iss ible, and their permissibil-
ity \vould depend on \vhether someone was willing to have them apply universally.
Critics conclude that because the first formu lation of the categorical imperative
seems to sanction such obv iously immoral acrs, the theory is deeply fla\ve.d. Defend-
ers of Kant’s theory, on the other hand, view the problems as reparable and have
proposed revisions.
This apparent a rbitra riness in the first formu lation can significantly lessen the
theory’s usefulness. The categorical imperative is supposed to help us discern moral

Morality Based on Character 1 75
d irectives that a re rational, universal, a nd objective. But if it is subjective in t he way
just described, irs helpfulness as a guide for living mora lly is du bious. There may be
remedies for this difficulty, but Kant’s theory in irs original form seems problematic.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.4
I. Is Kantian ethics too rigid because it fails to take consequences in to
accou nt? Or is Kant correct t hat consequences a re irrelevant? Expla in.
2. Is it possible to un iversalize any of t he fo llowing max ims-and if so,
does t hat fact raise d oubts about Kant’s theory? (1) All senile peop le
(i ncluding me, if I shou ld become sen ile) should be executed by t he
state; (2) Anyone \vho is not a Ch r istian (including me) should be
k illed; (3) Anyone (includ ing me) \vho da mages my ca r shou ld be shot.
3. Is Kant right not to make any exception s in applying categorical
imperatives? A re there times when a n exception shou ld be made? For
example, wou ld you lie to save an innocent person’s life?
4. Suppose t wo people save a friend from dro\vn ing. The fi rst person acts
on ly because she t h inks it is her dut y. The second person acts out of
sincere compassio n for his friend. Is Kan t right t hat t he first person
\vould be morally super ior to the second? W hy or why not?
5. Kant seems to assume that ou r moral duties can not confl ict. Is he right?
3.5 MORALITY BASED ON CHARACTER
The moral t heories just discussed are theories of obligation. They mai nly are con-
cerned with p roviding an ans\ver to this question: What should we do?That is, what
is our moral d uty? What actions are we mora lly obligated to p erform or not perform?
These theories t herefore emphasize knowing and doi ng wh at’s right, a nd their chief
guide to these aims is moral p rinciples or directives.
Virtue ethics, ho\vever, is a d iffe rent ki nd of moral theory a ltoget her. It focuses
not on dut y, but on the development of vir tuous character-not on what to do, but
on what to be. Accordi ng to virtue et hics, character is the key to the moral life, for it
is from a vir tuous character that moral conduct a nd values nat u ral ly arise. Virtues a re
ingrai ned dispositio ns to act by standards of excellence, so havi ng the p roper vir tues
leads as a matter of course to right actions properly motivated. The central task in mo-
rality, then, is not knowing and applying principles, but being and becomi ng a good
person, someone possessi ng the virtues that defi ne moral excellence. In vi rt ue ethics,
someone determ ines right action not by consulting rules, but by asking what a t ruly
virtuous person would do or whether an action would accord with the relevant virtues.
V irtue e thics is a moral
theory that focuses o n the
dcvdopmc nt of v irtuo us
character.
With virtue you can’t be
enti rely poor; w ithout
virtue you can’t really be
rich.
-Chinese Proverb

1 76 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
20 To Aristotle, is
happiness subjective
{something on ly in
one’s mind) or objec-
tive (someth ing that
has characteristics
regard less of how one
fee ls)?
Virtue ethicists have a ready answer to the age-old question, Why be moral? We
should strive to be moral-to be virtuous persons-because developing virtues is the
key to living a good life. Virtues help us fare better in life; they enable us to attain
\vhat is truly valuable. Thus, virtues are both the traits that make us good persons
and the dispositions that enable us to live good lives.
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) is the prima ry inspiration for contemporary versions
of virtue ethics. For h im, as fo r many moder n virtue ethicists, the highest goal of
humanity is the good life, o r “human flou rishing” (\vhat he calls eudaimonia, or hap-
piness), and developing virtues is the way to ach ieve such a rich and satisfying life.
The good life is the virtuous life.
Aristotle defends this vie\v in his masterpiece on morality, Nicomachean Ethics
(named after h is son N icomachus):
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Every art and every inqu iry, and s imilarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at
some good; and for this reason t he good has rightly been declared to be that at which
all t hings aim …. If, then, there is some end of the t hings we do, which we desire for
its own sake (everyth ing else be ing desired for the sake of this) , and if we do not choose
everyth ing for the sake of something e lse (for at that rate the process would go on to
infinity, so that our des ire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and
the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, t hen, have a great influence on life? Shall
we not, like archers who have a mark to a im at, be more likely to hit upon what we
should? If so, we must try, in outli ne at least, to determine what it is . . ..
Now we call t hat which is in itself worthy of pursu it more com plete than that which
is worthy of pu rsu it for the sake of som eth ing else, and that which is never desirable
for the sake of something else more complete than the thi ngs that are desirable both in
themselves and for the sake of that other th ing, and therefore we call complete without
qua li ficat ion that which is always des irable in itself and never for the sake of someth ing
else.
Now such a thing happiness, above a ll else, is held to be; for t his we choose a lways
for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason , and
every excellence we choose indeed for t he mselves (for if nothi ng resulted fro m them
we shou ld still choose each of them) , but we choose t hem also for the sake of happi-
ness, judging that t hrou gh them we sha ll be happy. Ha ppiness, on the other hand, no
one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anyth ing other than itself . . ..
Happiness, then, is someth ing complete and self-sufficie nt, and is the end of
action . .. .
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude,
and a clearer account of what it is is still desired . Th is might perh aps be given, if we
could first ascerta in the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or
any artist, and, in general, for all thi ngs t hat have a funct ion or activity, the good and
the “well” is thought to reside in the funct ion, so would it seem to be for man, if he
has a funct ion . Have the carpenter, t hen, and the tanner certa in functions or activities,
and has man none? Is he naturally function less? O r as eye, hand, foot, and in general
each of t he parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man s imi larly has a

Morality Based on Character 1 77
function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to
plants, but we are seeking what is pecu liar to man . Let us exclude, therefore, the life of
nutrition and growth. Next there wou ld be a li fe of perception, but it also seems to be
common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life
of the element that has a rational principle …. Now if the function of man is an activity
of sou l in accordance with, or not without, rational prin ciple, and if we say a so-and-so
and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and
a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of
excellence being added to the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the
lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the
function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the
sou l implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be t he good and
noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in
accordance with the appropriate excell ence: if th is is t he case, huma n good turns out
to be activity of sou l in conform ity with excell ence . . ..
In everything that is continuous and d ivisib le it is possible to take more, less, or
an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thin g itself or relatively to us; and the
equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the in termediate in t he object I
mean that which is equ idistant from each of the extremes, wh ich is one and the same
for all men; by the intermed iate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too
li ttle-and th is is not one, nor the same for all. .. .
Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the in termediate and
chooses t his- the intermed iate not in the object but relatively to us.
If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate
and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it
is not possible either to ta ke away or to add anything, implyi ng that excess and defect
destroy the goodness of works of art, wh ile the mean preserves it; and good artists, as
we say, look to this in thei r work), and if, further, excellence is more exact and better
than any art, as nature also is, then it must have the quality of aim in g at the intermed i-
ate. I mean moral excell ence; for it is this t hat is concerned with passions and actions,
and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and
confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in genera l pleasure and pain may be
felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at t he
right times , with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right
aim, and in the right way, is what is both in termediate and best, and this is character-
istic of excellence. Simi larly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the
in termediate. Now excell ence is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess
is a form of failure, and so is defect, while t he in termediate is praised and is a form of
success; and both these things are characteristics of excellence. Therefore excellence is
a kind of mean, since it aims at what is intermediate ….
We must, however, not on ly make t his genera l statement, but also apply it to t he
ind ividual facts …. With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean;
of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the
states have no name) , whi le the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who
exceeds in fear and falls short i n confidence is a coward. W ith regard to pleasures and
pa in s- not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pa ins- the mean is tem-
perance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are
not often found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call them
” insensible.”9
21 What does Aristotle
mean by “human good
turns out to be activity
of soul in conformity
with excell ence”?
22 Is Aristotle’s notion
of virtue (the mean
between two extremes)
coherent? Can all
virtues be considered a
mean?
We arc nor concerned to
know whar goodness is,
bu t how we arc to become
good me n, fo r this alone
gives the study (of ethics)
its practical value.
-Aristotle

178 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
It has been my experience
t hat fo lks w ho have no
vices have very few vi rtucs.
-Abraham Lincoln
23 Do statements
a bout virtu es really
give u s adequate g uid-
ance in d eciding what
actions to perform ?
Figure 3.13 Raphael’s renowned painting The School of Athens shows an array of g reat moral
exemplars, including Ari stotle (center, in blue robe), Plato (conversing with Arist otle), Socrates,
Epicurus, Hypatia, and Pythagoras. Who is your moral exemplar?
Aristotle argues chat che good life is one of happiness-a li fe not merely of plea-
sure, but of optimal well-being. H appiness is the one thing chat is good in itself a nd
not, like wealth o r power, just instrumen tally good (good as a means co something
else). Happ iness is about doing what is inherently valuable, which means fulfi lling
che funct ion un ique co human beings: acting through reason. To excel in the use of
reason in all of life’s e ndeavors is co possess che virtues in full, and the virtues are the
key co a flouris h ing, happy life. For A ristotle, a virtue is che m idpoint (the “golden
mean”) between che extremes of excess and deficit, and the extremes are the vices.
Courage, for example, is the virtue chat comes midway benveen the vices of CO\vard-
ice (coo much fea r) and rashness (coo liccle fear).
Unlike theories of obligation, virtue ethics asks us co do much more than just
observe minimal moral rules-it insists chat we aspire to moral excellence, chat we
cu ltivate che virtues chat wi ll make us better persons. I n chis sense, virt ue ethics is
goal-directed, not rule-guided. The moral virtues-benevolence, honesty, loyalty,
compass ion, fairness, a nd the li ke-are ideals chat we muse ever strive co atta in. By
the lighrs of both Aristotle and modern virt ue ethicists, cha racter is not static. We
can become more virtuous by refl ect ing o n our lives and chose of ochers, p racticing
virtuous behav ior, or imitating mo ra l exempla rs such as Gandhi, Buddha, Jesus,
M uhammad, H ypacia, and Socrates. We can-and should-be better tha n we are.
To the virtue ethicist, possess ing the right virtues mea ns having the proper mo-
tivations chat nat urally accompany chose virtues. To ace morally, we muse ace from
virtue, and acting from virtue means acting w ith che appropriate motives. Jc is not

Morality Based on Character 179
enough to do right; we must do right fo r the right motivating reasons. If \Ve save a
drowning friend, \Ve should do so out of genuine feel ings of compassion, kindness,
or loyalty-not merely because of the prodding of moral rules o r social expectations.
In contrast, some moral theories (notably Kant’s) maintain that acti ng morally is
solely a matter of acting for duty’s sake-performing an action simply because duty
requ ires it. Virtuous motives are irrelevant; we act mora lly if \Ve do ou r duty regard-
less of our motivations. But this notion seems to many to offer a ba rren pictu re of
the moral life. Surely, they say, motivations fo r acting are often relevant to ou r evalu-
ations of people’s character and actions. The friend we save from drown ing \vou ld
p robably be appalled if \Ve declared that we save.cl her out of duty, even though \Ve
did not really care whether she lived or d ied. Many moral ph ilosophers agree that
motivations are indeed important considerations in moral judgments, and they have
incorporated virtues into their theories of obligation.
Little \Yonder, then, that virtue ethics has been lauded for emphasizing what
duty-based theories neglect. Many theorists say it deserves a great deal of cred it fo r
contain ing a more plausible conception of motivation in moral conduct, for doing a
better job of explain ing the role of virtue in the moral life, and for focusing on the
goal of living a good life.
But philosophers have also accuse.cl virtue eth ics of harbori ng defects that lim it
irs usefulness. For one th ing, some critics argue that the theory doesn’t give us nearly
enough help in deciding \vhat to do. They say, for example, that a woman may possess
all the right virtues-and still not kno\v whether to t ry in vitro fert il ization, or help an
illegal imm ig rant hide from the authorities, or be tested for a genetic defect.
On the contrary, virtue eth icists contend, the theory gives much more guidance
to mora l decision-making than critics assume. Embedded in statemenrs about vir-
tues and vices a re d irectives about performing o r refraining from certain actions. As
the virtue eth icist Rosalind Hu rsthouse says, “[A) great deal of specific action guid-
ance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (‘v-rules’) such as
‘Do what is honest/charitable; do not do \vhat is dishonest /uncha ritable.”‘ 10
A related d ifficulty is that virtue ethics seems to be hobbled by conflicts that arise
among vi rtues. Suppose you see a coworker, a good friend, steal money from your com-
pany. You know that he desperately needs money to pay for medicine for his daughter,
and you are sure that if h is theft is discovered, he will be fired and likely p rosecuted.
Your employer asks you point-blank if your fr iend is guilty of theft, and you r answer
will determ ine his fate. Should you tell the t ruth or lie? To tell the truth is to be honest
yet d isloyal (to your friend); to lie is to be dishonest yet loyal. Vi rtue ethics expects you
to be both honest and loyal, but you cannot be both in th is situation-and the theory
gives ver y little guidance in resolving the conflict.
But, the virtue ethicist says, every theory is confronted with such conflicts. Duty-
based theories must deal \Vith confl icrs among rules o r principles, but the ex istence
of such clashes does not show the theories to be defective beyond repair.
Another kind of confl ict appears when virtuous people-those moral exemplars
after \vhom we a re to model ou rselves-disagree about the correct action in the
same ci rcumstances. Virtue ethics says that right actions are those that virtuous
people would do. But even moral exemplars sometimes differ on \vhat to do in the
Vices arc sometimes only
virtues carried to excess!
-Charles D ickens

180 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
same situation. When that happens, how are we to decide which model of virtue
\Ve are to follo\v? Even more worrisome is that such a difference of opin ion among
moral exemplars seems to reveal a logical contradiction \vith in the theory. If in the
same situation one virtuous person would perform a particu lar action while an-
other virtuous person \vould not perform it, then the same behav ior would seem to
be simultaneously r ight and wrong. After all, right actions are by definition what
moral exemplars do. But if virtuous people \vould do different things in the same
ci rcumstances, the action would appea r to be both permissible and not permiss ible.
Detractors say that the possibility of such contradictions casts serious doubt on the
coherence of the theory. If so, it’s open to virtue ethicists to somehow mod ify the
theory to avoid the problem.
As critics see it, the most ser ious weakness in virtue ethics is that it cannot help
us decide what to do because it focuses exclusively on virtues and leaves notions of
duty out of account. We can see the difficulty by fi rst noting that the theory claims
both that right actions a re those done by virtuous persons and that virtuous persons
are those who do right actions. If we ask what is the right thing to do, the answer is
that it is \vhatever the virtuous person does. And if \Ve ask who the virtuous person
is, the answer is that she’s the one who does right actions. But th is is circular reason-
ing. If virtue is defined in terms of action, we cannot then define action in terms of
virtue. The result, theorists say, is that virtue ethics cannot tell us which actions are
r ight o r \vrong. To avoid such circular reasoning, \Ve have to introduce some inde-
pendent moral standards of conduct.
Russ Shafer-Landau thinks this problem is sim ilar to the one faced by the divine
command theory (Section 3.1):
Russ Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics
Virtue ethics and the divine command theory share a basic structure. And they share a
basic weakness. We can see t his by posing a familiar dilemma. Virtuous people either
have, or don’t have, good reasons for their actions. (1) If they lack good reasons, then
their actions are arbitrary, and can’t possibly serve as the standard of mora lity. (2) If
they do have good reasons to s upport their actions, then these reasons, and not the
actions themselves, determine what is right and wrong.
The second option is the better one. We must suppose that virtuous people act on
good reaso ns, or else they wou ldn’t really be virtuous. Consider again the immorality of
rape, and the many reasons why it is wrong. A virtuous person is one who is aware of
these reaso ns and ta kes them to heart. Rape is not wrong beca use good people oppose
it. They oppose it because it is wrong.
This approach preserves the integrity, the wisdom, and the goodness of the virtu-
ous person. But there is naturall y a cost. And it is steep. The cost is that the virtue ethi-
cist’s account of right action is directly t hreatened . That account tell s us that acts are
mora lly right just because all virtuo us people would perform them in t he circumstances,
and wrong just because s uch people wou ld refra in. But as we have seen, the choices of
virtuous people do not make actions right or wrong.”

Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care 181
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 3.5
I. Aristotle a rgues that because every action aims at some end, there
must be an end to which all actions aim. Is this a good argument?
Why or why not?
2. Is virtue ethics sufficiently action g uid ing? Explain.
3. Do you think that morality is a matter of both d uty and vir tues?
Why or why not?
4. What a re the advantages and disadvantages of virtue ethics? Cou ld
virtue ethics be integrated into a duty-based theory like Kant’s to
produce a more plausible theory? If so, how \vould you merge
the two?
5. Can virtue ethics be used to guide your actions? If so, how?
3.6 FEMINIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE
In recent decades, an important development has challenged the traditional theo-
ries and concepts of moral philosophy: the rise of fe mi n ist ethics. Feminist ethics
is an approach to morality aimed at advancing \vomen’s interesrs, underscoring
their distinctive experiences and cha racteristics, and advancing the obvious truth
that women and men are mora lly equal. It is defined by a d istinctive focus on
these issues, rather than by a set of doctrines or common ideology among femi-
n isrs, many of whom may disagree on the nature of feminist ethics o r on particula r
moral issues.
Feminist ethics generally downplays the ro le of moral p rinciples and tradi-
t ional ethical concepts, insisting instead that moral reflection must take into ac-
count the social realities-the relevant social practices, relationships, institutions,
and power arrangements. Many feminists think that the familiar principles of
Western ethics-autonomy, utility, freedom, equality, and the like-a re too broad
and abstract to help us make moral judgments about specific persons who are
enmeshed in concrete social situations. It is not enough, for example, to respect
a woman’s decision to have an abortion if she is too poor to have one, or if her
cultu re is so opp ress ive (or opp ressed) as to make abortion impossible to obtain,
o r if social conditioning leads her to believe that she has no choice or her views
don’t count. Theoretical autonomy does not mean much if it is so t horoughly un-
de rm ined in rea lity.
Many feminist \vriters maintain that the values and virtues inherent in most
t raditional moral theories reflect a typically masculine perspective-and thus offer
a one-s ided (or wrong-sided) view of the moral life. What’s needed, they say, is a
moral outlook that takes into account values and experiences that usually have been
Feminist ethics is an ap ..
p roach to morality aimed
at advanci ng wome n’s
in tcrr:sts, un derscoring
their dis tinctive experi-
ences an d ch aracteristics,
and advancing the obvio us
truth that women and men
arc morally equal.
All virtue is s um med up in
dealing justly.
-Aristotle
24 Is t here such a t h ing
as “the fema le perspec-
t ive “? That is, do all
women have t he same
basic outlook or style
of reason ing?

182 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
Ethics of care is a moral
p erspective cha t e mpha-
s izes the unique demands
of s pecific s ituario ns and
the virtues a nd feeli ngs
that arc central m close
p ersonal relatio n ships.
identified with women. According to Alison Jaggar, a feminist philosopher, femi-
nists claim that trad itional ethics favors the
Alison Jaggar, ” Femin ist Eth ics”
s upposed ly masculine or male-associated values of independence, autonomy, intellect,
will , wariness, hiera rchy, dom ination, culture, transcendence, product, asceticis m, war
and death over the supposedly fe minine or fema le-associated values of interdependence,
community, connection, sharing, emotion, body, trust, absence of hierarchy, nature, im-
manence, process, joy, peace and li fe.’2
Some proponents of feminist eth ics a lso reject the trad itional concept of the
moral agent. Jan C rosthwaite says that the old notion is that of “abstract ind ividuals
as fund amentally autonomous agents, a,vare of their own preferences and values,
and motivated by rational self-interest (though not necessarily selfish) .”13 But, she
says, many feminists
Jan Crost hwa ite, ” Gender and Bioet hics ”
present a richer conception of persons as historically and cu ltura lly located , socially
related and esse ntially e mbodied. Ind ividuals are located in and fo rmed by specific
relationsh ips (chosen and unchosen) and ties of affection and respons ibility .. . . Such
a conception of socially embedded selves refocuses th inking about autonomy, shifting
the e mphasis from independe nt self-determ ination towards ideals of integrity within
relatedness …. Respecting au tonomy becomes less a matter of p rotecting individua ls
from “coercive” infl uences than o ne of positive em powerment, recognizing people’s
interdependence and supporting individua ls’ development of their own understand ing
of their situation and options.’•
Many of these themes run th rough the et h ics of care, a moral perspective
that a rose out of feminist co ncerns and grew to ch allenge co re elemenrs of most
other moral theories. Generally, those theories emphasize abstract principles, gen-
er al duties, ind ividual rights, justice, utility, impartial judgments, and delibera-
tive reason ing. But the ethics of ca re shifrs the focus to the unique demands of
specific situations and to the virtues and feeli ngs that are centra l to close personal
relationships-empathy, compassio n, love, sympathy, and fid elity. The heart of
the moral life is fee ling for and cari ng for those ,vith whom you h ave a special,
. . .
1nttmate connection.

Feminist Eth ics and the Ethics of Care 183
Ea rly on, the eth ics of care dre\v inspi ra-
t ion from the notion that men and \vomen have
d ramatically different styles of moral decision-
making, with men seizing on principles, duties,
and righrs, and women homing in on persona l
relationships, caring, and empathy. This differ-
ence was highlig hted in research done by psy-
chologist Carol Gilligan and published in her
1982 book In a Different Voice. 15 Typically, men
recognize an ethic of justice and rights, she says,
and \vomen are guided by an ethic of compas-
s ion and care. In her view, the latter is as legiti-
mate as the former, and both have their place
in ethics.
Other research has sugges ted that the d iffer-
ences between men and women in styles of moral
thinking may not be as g reat as G illigan suggesrs.
But the credibility of the empi rical claim does not
affect the larger insight that t he research seems
to some w riters to suggest: Ca ring is an essential
part of morality, and the most influential theories
have not fu lly taken it into account.
These points get support along several lines.
First, virtue ethics reminds us that virtues are
part of the moral life. If caring is viewed as a
Figure 3.14 Virginia Held, feminist, author, and distinguished
professor of philosophy at City University of New York Graduate
School.
virtue-i n the form of compass ion, empathy, or kindness-then caring too must be
an element of morality. A moral theory then would be deficient if it made no room
fo r care.
Moreover, many argue that unlike the ethics of care, most mora l theories push
the p rinciple of impartiality too far. Recall that impa rtiality in morality requires
us to consider everyone as equa l, counting everyone’s interesrs the same. The prin-
ciple applies \videly, especially in matters of public justice, but less so in personal
relationships of love, fam ily, friendship, and the like. We seem to have special obli-
gations (partiality) to close friends, family members, and others we ca re for, duties
that \Ve do not have to strangers o r to universal human ity.
Most moral theories emphasize duties and downplay the role of emotions, at-
t itudes, and motivations. Ka nt, for example, \vould have us do our duty for duty’s
sake, \vhatever o u r feelings. For him, to be a morally good pa rent, we need only act
from duty. But taking care of our children as a matter of moral obligation a lone
seems an empty exercise. Surely, being a morally good parent also involves having
feelings of love and attitudes of caring. The ethics of ca re eagerly takes these emo-
tio nal elements into account.
The crhics of care confirms
the prioriry that we nacur~
ally g ive to our family and
friends , and so it seems a
more plausible conception.
– James Rachels

184 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
25 Does Held su ggest
a way t o decide which
emotions to heed a nd
which to ignore? If
the eth ics of ca re can-
not help us sort out
our emotions, should
we consider it a bad
theory?
A man’s ethical behavior
shou ld be based effccti vcly
o n sympathy, education,
and social relatio nships; no
religious basis is necessary.
Man would indeed be in
a poor way if he had to
be restrained by fear of
punishmenr and h ope of
reward after death.
-Albert Einstein
II I II I 11111111111111111 Ill II I II I II 111 Ill 1111111
The femin ist ph ilosopher Virgin ia Held offers this synopsis of the main elements
of the ethics of care:
Vi rgin ia Held , The Ethics of Care
I think one can discern among various versions of the ethics of care a nu mber of major
feat ures.
Fi rst, the central focus of the ethics of care is o n the compell ing moral salience of
attend ing to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take respons i-
bility. Caring for one’s child, for in stance, may well and defensibly be at the forefront of
a person’s mora l concerns. The ethics of care recogn izes that hu man beings are depen-
dent for many years of their lives, that the moral claim of those dependent on us for the
care they need is pressing, and that there are highly important moral aspects in develop-
ing the relations of caring that enable human beings to live and progress. All persons
need care for at least their early years. Prospects for human progress and fl ourishing
hinge fundamentally o n the care that those need ing it receive, and the eth ics of care
stresses the moral force of the responsibili ty to respond to the needs of the dependent.
Many persons will become ill and dependent for some periods of their later lives, incl ud-
ing in frai l old age, and some who are permanently d isabled will need care the whole
of their lives. Mora li ties bu ilt on the im age of the independent, autonomous, rational
individual largely overlook the reali ty of human dependence and the morality for which
it call s. The ethics of care attends to this central concern of human li fe and delineates
the moral values involved. It refuses to relegate care to a realm “outside mora lity.” …
Second, in the epistemological process of trying to understand what morality
wou ld recommend and what it wou ld be morally best for us to do and to be, the ethics
of care va lues emotion rather than rejects it. Not a ll emotion is valued, of course, but in
contrast with the dominant rationa list approaches, such emotions as sympathy, empa-
thy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are seen as the kind of moral emotions that need to
be cultivated not only to help in the im plementatio n of the dictates of reason but to bet-
ter ascertain what morality recommends. Even anger may be a component of the moral
ind ignati on that s hould be fe lt whe n people are treated unjustly or inhumanely, and it
may contribute to (rather than interfere with) an appropriate interpretation of the moral
wrong. This is not to say that raw emotion can be a guide to morality; fee lings need to
be reflected on and educated. Bu t from the care perspective, moral inquiries that rely
entire ly on reason and ratio na listic deductio ns or calcu lations are seen as deficient ….
Th ird, the eth ics of care rejects the view of the dominant moral theories that the
more abstract the reasoning about a mora l problem the better because the more li kely
to avoid bias and arbitrariness, the more nearly to ach ieve impartiality. The eth ics of
care respects rather than removes itself from the clai ms of particu lar others with whom
we s hare actual relatio nships. It ca ll s in to questio n the uni versalistic and a bstract rules
of the dominan t theories. When the latter consider such actua l relatio ns as between a
parent and child , if they say anythi ng about them at all , they may see them as permit-
ted and cultivatin g them a preference that a person may have. Or they may recogn ize
a uni versal obli gatio n for all parents to care for their ch il dren. But they do not perm it
actua l relations ever to take priority over the requirements of impartiali ty . . ..
To most advocates of the eth ics of care, the compell ing moral claim of the par-
ticular othe r may be valid even when it confl icts with the requirement usually made by

Feminist Eth ics and the Ethics of Care 185
moral theories that moral judgments be un iversalizeable, and this is of fundamental
moral importance.
Dominant moral theories tend to interpret moral problems as if they were confl icts
between egoistic ind ividua l interests on the one ha nd, and universa l moral principles on
the other. The extremes of”selfish individual” and “huma nity” are recognized, but what
lies between these is often overlooked . The ethics of care, in contrast, focuses especial ly
on the area between these extremes. Those who conscientiously care for others are not
seeki ng primarily to furt her their own individual interests; their interests are intertwined
with the persons they care for. Neither are they acting for the sake of all others or hu-
manity in general; they seek instead to preserve or promote an actual human relation
between themselves and particular others. Persons in caring relations are acting for self-
and-other together. Their characteristic stance is ne ither egoistic nor altruistic; these are
the options in a confl ictual situation, but the well-being of a caring relation involves the
cooperative well-being of those in the relation and the well-being of the relation itself. . . .
A fourt h characteristic of the ethics of care is that like much fem inist thought in
many areas, it reconceptualizes traditiona l notions about the public and the private. The
traditional view, built into the dom inant moral theories, is that the household is a priva te
sphere beyond politics into which government, based on consent, shou ld not intrude ….
Dominant moral theories have seen “public” life as relevant to morality whi le miss-
ing the moral significance of the “private” domains of fami ly and friends hip. Thus the
dominant theories have assumed that morality should be sought for unrelated, inde-
pendent, and mutuall y indifferent individua ls assumed to be equal. They have posited
an abstract, fu lly rational “agent as such” fro m which to construct morali ty, while miss-
ing the moral issues that arise between interconnected perso ns in the contexts of fami ly,
fr iendship, and socia l groups. In the context of the fami ly, it is typica l for relations to be
between persons with highly unequal power who did not choose the ties and obligations
in which they find themselves enmeshed. For instance, no child can choose her parents
yet she may well have obligations to care fo r them. Relations of this kind are standard ly
noncontractual, and conceptualizing them as contractual wou ld often undermine or
at least obscure the trust on which their worth depends. The ethics of care addresses
rather than neglects moral issues aris ing in relations among the unequal and depen-
dent, relations that are often laden with emotion and involuntary, and then notices how
often these attributes apply not only in the household but in the wider society as well. . . .
A fift h characteristic of the ethics of care is the conception of persons with which
it begins . . .. The ethics of care usually works with a conception of persons as rela-
tiona l, rather than as the self-sufficient independent ind ivid uals of the dom inant moral
theories. ‘6
Many philosophers, includ ing some who favor traditional theories, think the eth-
ics of care is surely right about certain aspects of the moral life. Caring, they say,
is indeed a vital part of morality. Sometimes the most important factor in moral
decision-making is not justice, utility, or righrs, but compassionate consideration.
Impartiality is a basic requ irement of morality, an ideal that guides us to fairness and
justice and away from prejudice and inequality. But it often does not apply in ou r
relationships ,vith friends and loved ones, for to those close to us we may have special
obligations that we do not have to,vard others. And, contrary to Kant, feelings do
matter. They can alert us to impo rtant moral issues and give us a deeper understand-
ing of morality’s point and purpose. T rue, reason must hold the reins of our emotions,
but there can be no denying that emotions have a legitimate place in the moral life.
I reject t he notio n of
universal caring- that is,
caring for everyone-on
th e grounds that it is
impossib le to actualize
and leads us to substitute
abstract problem solving
and mere talk fo r genuine
carmg.
– Ne) Noddings

1 86 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK
Mary Wollstonecraft
Mary Wollstonecraft ( 1759-
1797) ,vas a political radical,
a social critic with a strong
egalitarian bent, a distin-
guished novelist, and one of
the great fore bears of fem i-
nise thought. What she wrote
then about WOJnen’s rights
and ,vomen’s situation in so-
ciery is still relevant coday-
and still considered radical by
,nany. By law and by cusco,n,
1niddle-dass English women
in her day ,vere thought co be
subordinate to 1nen in count-
less ,vays. They lived under
the ,veight of a damaging
presumption: W0mm exist for
the sake of mm. Wo,nen were
denied properry o,vnership,
Fig. 3.15 Mary Wollstonecraft (1759- 1797). expected co defer to men in
important ,naccers, barred
from almost all professions,
excluded from voting and govern,nen c poses, deprived of higher education, and
judged by different 1noral standards than those applied to men. Fe,v societies in che
rest of che ,vorld created women any beccer.
Wollstonecraft studied the conditions chat women found themselves in, and
she read ,vhat prominent 1nen had co say about the character, duties, and education
of ,vOJnen. Thus much of her literary output ,vas in response co che views of che
famous Edmund Burke, who ,vroce in support of aristocratic rights and privileges,
and co Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who considered ,vo,nen inferior to men.
Her greatest works are A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) and A Vindica-
tion of the Rights of Woman (1792). In che laccer, she envisions a society of e.quals
freed from the tyranny of unreason and spurious authority. Such a society requires
che full develop1nent of the moral and rational facult ies of both 1nen and women.
For coo long, she says, ,vomen have had their powers of reason obstructed by men

Feminist Eth ics and the Ethics of Care 187
,vho believe char reason is the do,nain of ,nales and ,vho define women in ,vays
that serve men. Men have ensured chat women are uneducated, molded by male
expectations, judged by appearances instead of incellecc, and obl iged to subm it to
the preferences of men instead of the dictates of reason. As Wollsconecrafc puts it:
I have turned over various books written on t he subject of educa-
t ion, and patiently observed the conduct of parents and t he man –
agemen t of schools; but what has been the result?- a profound
conviction that the neglected education of my fellow-creatures is
t he grand source of t he misery I deplore; and that women, in par-
t icu lar, are rendered weak and wretched by a variety of concurring
causes, originating from one hasty concl usion. The conduct and
manners of women, in fact, evidently prove that t heir minds are
not in a hea lthy state; for, like the flowers which are planted in too
rich a soil , strength and usefu lness are sacrificed to beauty; and
t he flaunting leaves, after having pleased a fastidious eye, fade,
disregarded on t he sta lk, long before t he season when they ought
to have arrived at maturity.- One cause of this barren blooming I
attribute to a fa lse system of education, gathered from the books
written on this subject by men who, considering females rather as
women than human creatures, have been more anxious to make
t hem alluring mistresses than affectionate wives and rationa l
mothers; and the understanding of t he sex has been so bubbled
[deluded] by this specious homage, t hat the civilized women of the
present century, with a few exceptions, are only anxious to inspire
love, when t hey ought to cherish a nobler ambition, and by their
abilities and virtues exact respect.*
Wollsconecrafc argues that hu,nan icy’s true happiness and ultimate perfection
lie in the develop,nenc of reason, virtue, and knowledge. Yet in women, these hu-
man capacities have been deliberately stunted, and che resu lt is a deform icy of che
soul char society muse correct. If women have souls just as men do, they can- and
should- aspire co possess these sa,ne qual ities and in the sa,ne measure.
• Mary Wollst onecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of \'(/0111011 , ed. Deidre Shauna Lynch
( New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), 8- 9.
‘ . •:
,,

188 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
To these concess ions many moral philosophers would add a cautiona ry note: The
ethics of ca re is not the whole of morality, and to view it that ,vay is a mistake. To
decide on the right action, we often ca nnot avoid applying the concepts of justice
and rights. Sometimes impartiality is the best (or only) policy, ,vithout which our
moral decisions would be m isguided, even tragic. And abstract principles or ru les,
though un,vieldy in many cases, may be essential to reconciling confl icting obliga-
. .
ttons or 1ntu1t1ons.
So shou ld plausible moral theories try to accommodate both an ethic of obliga-
tion and an ethic of care? Many theorists, includ ing several writing from a femin ist
perspective, th ink so. Annette Baier, fo r example, says:
Annette C. Baier, “The Need for More Than Justice”
The best moral theory has to be a cooperative product of women and me n, has to ha r-
monize justice and care. The morality it theo rizes about is after all for all persons, fo r
men and for women, and will need their combined insights. As Gill igan said , what we
need now is a “marriage” of the old male and t he newly articulated female insights.’7
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND :
CRITIQU ING PHI LOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.6
1. Is it possible to combine Kant’s theory with the ethics of care? If so, how?
2. Do you think there are innate differences benveen men and women in
the ways they think about morality or moral issues? Are there cultur-
ally ingrained differences in moral thinking?
3. Do you think it possible to arrive at plausible mora l judgments based
entirely on emotion and personal experience? Expla in.
4. What features of the ethics of ca re do you find p lausible? Are t here any
important elements missing? If so, what elements?
5. What role do you think emotions p lay in the moral li fe and moral
think ing?
3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE
Lo ng before the ethics of care and feminist eth ics began to strongly challenge tradi-
tional moral theories, an even more influential and revolutionary moral outlook arose
in post-World War II Europe. This vie,v came to be known as existentialism, a per-
spective that quickly spread throughout the intellectual world and is still compelling

Albert Camus: An Existentialist Voice 189
to ma ny thoughtful people in the nventy-first century. Several noted t hinkers have
been ident ified as existentialist, includ ing Jean-Paul Sartre (1905- 1980), S0ren Ki-
erkegaard (1813- 1855), Albert Camus (1913- 1960), Fried rich Nietzsche (1844-
1900), and Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986). These a nd other existen tialist writers
differ dramatically o n some major issues (for example, some are atheists, like Sa rtre,
Camus, and N ietzsche; and some, like Kierkegaard, are C hristians). But most of
t hem also add ress common themes t h at are characteristic of ex istentialism, ,vhich
itself is difficult to straightforwardly define.
U nlike deontological and consequentialist theories, existentialism does not offer
ru les or p rincip les to g uide moral action. Instead it provides a broad analysis of the
ind ividual’s predicament in a n u ncaring u niverse and expla ins ho,v to fi nd meaning
in such a forlor n world. Thus, a central existentialist t heme is t h at our existence is
absurd: There is a n unbearable conflict between our need for meani ng and purpose
in life and t he meaningless, indifferen t universe. Our sit uation is impossible, and
t here is no hig her po,ver or govern ing principle to help us make sense of it. There is
just us and the cold, silent universe, ,vhich cares nothing about our needs and de-
s ires. Moreover, our conditio n is terminal; our death is g uaranteed. So ,ve must live
a n absurd existence, and at the last we get no a nswers, just a n ending. W hat makes
t h is predicament even more intolerable is brought out by a nother theme-existence
precedes essence. The traditio nal view is that we come into existence with a n essence,
a human nature, that is in a sense already set before ,ve come into t he world. A nd we
h ave no say in this; what we are as ind ividuals is p redetermined. But existentialists
a rgue t hat reality is t he other ,vay arou nd. We first come into ex istence, and then ,ve
define ourselves (establish our essence) through the choices ,ve make. It is we who a re
totally responsible for what ,ve become. We a re totally respons ible because ,ve have
absolute freedom to do as we ,viii. We are radically and painfully free to choose what
we ,viii be and how ,ve will respond to the absurdity of living. As Sartre says, “We
a re condem ned to be free.” The responsibility of self-defi nition rests heavily upon us.
To many, the weight is terrifying. But those who accept their responsibility a nd free-
dom, who recognize that they alone are the ultimate designers of their lives, ,vho a re
b rave enough to make the best of an absurd ex istence-they a re living authentically.
Those ,vho allow society, religion, history, mass cult ure, or their own fea r to define
t hem are living inau t hentically.
In h is famo us essay “The Myth of Sisyphus,” Camus dramatizes t h e absurd ity
of human existence by li ken ing it to that of the myth ica l Sisyphus, ,vho is fo rced
by the gods to repeat a pointless task for all eternity: to push a boulder to t he top
of a mountain only to have it tu mble do,vn agai n to the bottom. Yet Sisyphus
fi nds meaning in th is seem ingly meaningless bu rden by courageously embraci ng
it and refus ing to be over,vh elmed by despai r. The implicat io n fo r huma ns is that
we too can live meaningfully a nd bravely by accepting o ur freedom and sh api ng
ou r ow n lives through free cho ices. To Camus, Sisyphus is a h ero because he
accepts h is fate and valia ntly p ush es o n anyway. Likewise, h u mans too ca n be
h eroic by carryi ng on w ith life even though it has no inheren t mea ni ng a nd w ill
soon be over.

1 90 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
26 Does Camus’s
perspective leave open
the possibil ity of mora l
relativism? If we have
absolute freedom of
choice, does that mean
we ca n make any moral
choice a t all? Does
Camus set any limits on
moral decisions?
Albert Ca mus, The Myth of Sisyphus
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly roll ing a rock to the top of a moun-
tain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought with some
reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labor.
If one believes Homer, Sisyphus was the wisest and most prudent of mortals. Ac-
cording to another tradition, however, he was disposed to practice the profession of high-
wayman. I see no contradiction in this. Opinions differ as to the reasons why he became
the futile laborer of the underworld. To begin with, he is accused of a certain levity in re-
gard to the gods. He stole their secrets. fEg in a, the daughter of )Esopus, was carried off by
Jupiter. The father was shocked by that disappearance and complained to Sisyphus. He,
who knew of the abduction, offered to tell about it on condition that )Esopus wou ld give
water to the citadel of Corinth. To the celestial thu nderbolts he preferred the benediction
of water. He was punished for this in the underworld . Homer tells us also that Sisyphus
had put Death in chains. Pluto could not endure the sight of his deserted, silent empire.
He dispatched the god of war, who liberated Death from the hands of her conqueror.
It is said also that Sisyphus, being near to death, rashly wanted to test his wife’s love.
He ordered her to cast his unburied body into the midd le of the public square. Sisyphus
woke up in the underworld. And there, annoyed by an obedience so contrary to human
love, he obtained from Pluto permission to return to earth in order to chastise his wife.
Bu t when he had seen again the face of this world, enjoyed water and sun, warm stones
and the sea, he no longer wanted to go back to the in fernal darkness. Recall s, signs of
anger, warnings were of no avai l. Many years more he lived facing the curve of the gulf,
the sparkling sea, and the smiles of earth. A decree of the gods was necessary. Mercury
came and seized the impudent ma n by the collar and, snatching him from his joys, led
him forcibly back to the underworld, where his rock was ready for him.
You have a lready grasped that Sisyphus is the absurd hero . He is, as much through
his pass ions as through his torture. His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his
passion for life won him that unspeakable penalty in which the whole being is exerted
toward accomplishing nothing. Th is is the price that must be paid for the pass ions of
this earth. Nothing is told us about Sisyphus in the underwo rld. Myths are made for
the imagination to breathe life into the m. As for th is myth, one sees merely the whole
effort of a body strain in g to raise the huge stone, to roll it and push it up a s lope a
hundred times over; one sees the face screwed up, the cheek tight agains t the stone,
the shou lder braci ng the clay-covered mass, the foo t wedging it, the fresh start with
arms outstretched, the wholly human security of two earth-clotted hands. At the very
end of his long effort measu red by skyless space and tim e without depth, the purpose
is achieved. Then Sisyphus watches the stone rush down in a few moments toward tha t
lower world whence he wi ll have to push it up again towards the summit. He goes back
down to the plain.
It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests me. A face that toils so
close to stones is already stone itself! I see that man going back down with a heavy yet
measured step toward tha t torment of which he will never know the end. That hour like
a breathing-space which returns as surely as his suffering, that is the hour of conscious-
ness. At each of those moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks towa rd
the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his fate. He is stronger tha n his rock.

A lbert Camus: An Existentialist Voice 19 1
If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where wou ld his torture
be, indeed , if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him ? The workma n of today
works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic
only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods,
powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he
thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same
time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot be su rmou nted by scorn.
If the descent is thus sometimes performed in sorrow, it can also take place in j oy.
This word is not too much. Aga in I fancy Sisyphus returni ng toward his rock, and the
sorrow was in the beginn ing. When the images of earth cl ing too tightly to memory,
when the call of hap piness becomes too in sistent, it happens that melancholy rises in
man ‘s hea rt: this is t he rock’s victory, this is the rock itself. The bound less grief is too
heavy to bear. These are ou r nights of Gethsemane. But crushing truths perish from
being acknowledged. Thus, CEdipus at t he outset obeys fate without knowing it. But
from the moment he knows, his tragedy begins. Yet at the same moment, blind and
desperate, he realizes that the only bo nd linking hi m to t he world is the cool hand of
a girl. Then a tremendous rema rk rings out: “Despite so many ordeals, my advanced
age and the nobili ty of my sou l make me conclude that all is well.” Sophocles’ CEdipus,
li ke Dostoevsky’s Kirilov, thus gives the recipe for the absurd victory. Ancient wisdom
confirms modern hero ism.
O ne does not d iscover the absurd without bein g tempted to write a man ual of hap-
piness . “What! by such narrow ways- ?” There is but one world , however. Hap piness
and the absurd are two sons of the same earth . They are insepa rable. It would be a mis-
ta ke to say that happiness necessa rily sprin gs from t he absurd discovery. It happens as
well t hat the feeli ng of the absurd springs from happiness. “I concl ude that all is well ,”
says CEdipus, and that remark is sacred. It echoes in the wild and li mited un iverse of
man . It teaches that all is not, has not been, exhausted . It drives out of t his world a
god who had come into it with dissatisfaction and a preference for futile sufferings. It
makes of fate a hu man matter, which must be settled among men.
All Sisyphus’ silent joy is conta ined therein. H is fate belongs to him. His rock is
his thing. Likewise, the abs urd man when he contemplates his torment, silences all
the idols. In the un iverse suddenly restored to its silence, the myriad wondering little
voices of the earth rise up. Unconscious, secret calls, invitations from all the faces, they
are the necessary reverse and price of victory. There is no sun without shadow, and it is
essential to know the night. The absurd man says yes and his effort will henceforth be
unceas ing. If there is a persona l fate, there is no higher destiny, or at least there is but
one which he concludes is inevitable and despicable. For the rest, he knows himself
to be the master of his days. At that subtle moment when ma n glances backward over
his li fe, Sisyphus return ing toward his rock, in that slight pivoting he contemplates that
series of unrelated actions which becomes his fate, created by him, combined under
his memory’s eye and soon sealed by his death. Thus, convinced of the wholly human
origin of all that is human , a bli nd man eager to see who knows t hat the night has no
end, he is still on the go. The rock is still rolli ng.
I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the moun tain! One always finds one’s burden again.
But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity tha t negates the gods and raises rocks. He
too concludes that all is well. Th is universe he nceforth without a master seems to him
neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each minera l flake of that night-fi lled
mountain , in itself forms a world . The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fi ll
a man ‘s heart. One must imagi ne Sisyphus happy. ‘8

192 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.7
1. What are some of the main themes of existentialism? Are they an
accurate d epiction of the human predicamen t? Why o r \vhy not?
2. Can li fe h ave mean ing even if there is no God ? Support your anS\ver.
3. Are we absolutely free to live ou r lives according to ou r ow n p refer-
ences? Are we “condem ned to be free”? Exp la in.
4. H o\v does the myth of Sisyphus d ramatize the absurdity of the hu man
condition? Do you agree \vith Camus’s assessment of human existence?
5. According to Camus, how can life be lived meaningfully in a mean-
ingless world? Can your life be lived mea ningfu lly? If so, how?
3.8 CONFUCIANISM
Con fucianism is a school of thought that arose out of ancient Chi na and, along \vith
Daoism, has been a dom inant ph ilosophical system there for hu ndreds of years. Its
effect on C hinese and East As ian life, cult ure, and government has been enormous-
compa rable to the influence of Christianity, J udaism, and Islam in the West. Until
the early nventieth cen tury, C-onfucian virtues and trai ning were requi red of anyone
entering C h inese civil service, and even now under Communist rule C h ina holds to
ics Confuc ian roocs in everyday life. Elsewhere in the East (especially in Korea, Japan,
and Vietnam), C-onfucian ethics and ideals h ave remodeled society, provid ing moral
underpi nning and g uidance to social relatio nships at all levels.
Figure 3.16 Confucius (551~ 79 ea).
Part of the appeal of Confucian ism is that in ti mes of ideological con-
fusion it has offered plausible answers to essential philosophical questions:
What kind of person shou ld I be? W h at k ind of society is best? W h at are
my mora l obligations to my family, those who rule, and the rest of hu-
manit y? In the twenty-fi rst cent ury, mi llio ns of people are attracted to the
answers supplied by this two-thousand-year-old tradition .
Ma ny of the elemencs of Confucianism were part of Chinese cultu re
long before Conf uc ius arrived on the scene. In fact, he cla imed merely
to tra nsmit the wisdom of the anciencs to new gen erations, but what he
transmitted plus wh at he added became the distinctive Confu cia n world-
view. From early Chinese civilization came the C-o n fucian emphas is o n
rituals and their correct performance; the veneration of ancesto rs; social
and cosmic harmony; virtuous behavior and ideals; and the \viii of Heaven
(or Tian), the u ltimate power and o rganizing p rinciple in the universe.
Into this m ix of cha racteristically Eastern ideas and practices there
appeared in 551 BC E the renowned thinker \Ve call C-on fucius (the Western-
ized spelling), othenvise k nown as K’u ng C h ‘iu or as K’ung Fu-tzu (Master
K’ung). According to legend a nd very sketchy in formatio n about h is life,

he \vas born to a poor family in the tiny C hinese state of Lu. He served briefly at
age fifty in the Lu government as police comm issioner, and during the next thirteen
years he visited oth er Ch inese states t rying to persuade their rulers to implement h is
philosophy of \vise government. One leader after another turned him down. He spent
the rest of h is life teaching his philosophy and contributing to the Confucian \vorks
known as the Five Classics. He died in 479 BCE \Vithout his ideas having achieved wide
acceptance. Only later did his vie\vS become a major influence.
C-onfucianism, especially later forms of it, has ahvays feature.cl some rel igious
o r d ivine aspecrs. C-onfucius himself believed in t he supreme deity H eaven, assert-
ing that we should align ourselves with its \vill. But in general he veered away from
the supernatu ra l bel iefs of the past, for h is ma in interest was teaching a humanistic
doctrine centered on social relationsh ips. H is aim was the creation of harmony and
virtue in the world-specifically in individuals, in the \vay they interacted with one
another, and in how they were treated by the state. He sa\v his teachings as a remedy
for the social d isorder, corruption, and inhuman ity existing all a round him , from
the lowest levels of societ y to the highest.
ln Confucianism, the ideal world is generated through the practice of Ii and ren. Li
has several meanings, including ritual, etiquette, principle, and propriety, but its essence
is conscientious behavior and right action. To follow Ii is to conduct yourself in your
dealings with others according to moral and customary norms, and to act in this \vay is
to contribute to social stability and harmony. Ren is about social vi rtues; it encompasses
benevolence, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for others, and human-heartedness.
At its core is the imperative to \vork fo r the common good and to recognize the essential
worth of others regardless of their social Status. The expression of these virtues is governed
by the notion of reciprocity (shu), what has been called Confucius’s (negative) golden
rule: “Never do to others what you \vould not like them to do to you.” (The Ch ristian
golden rule is stated positively: ” Do unto others as you \vould have them do unto you.”)
C-onfucius u rges people not merely to try to live according to Ii and ren but to
excel at such a life, to become a “superior person” (a junzi), a noble. C-ontra ry to his-
tory and custom, Confucius’s idea of nobility has nothing to do with noble blood;
t rue nobility, he says, comes from noble virtues and \visdom, and these anyone can
acquire. He refers to a man who embodies th is kind of nobility as a gentleman. We
get a glimpse of the gentleman in the Analects, the main Confucian text:
Confucius, Analects
Tzu -kung asked about t he true gentleman . The Master [Confucius] said , He does not
preach what he practises till he has practised what he preaches . …
The Master said, A gentleman can see a question from all s ides without bias. The
small man is biased and can see a question on ly from one side.
The Master sa id , the Ways of the true gentleman are three. I myself have met with
success in none of them. For he that is really Good is never un happy, he that is really
wise is never perplexed , he that is really brave is never afraid. Tzu-kung sa id, That,
Master, is your own Way!
Confucianism 193
By three methods we may
learn w isdom: First, by
rc.Acctio n, w h ich is no ..
blcst; second, by imitatio n,
which is eas iest; and th ird ,
by experience, w hich is the
b itterest.
-Confucius
27 Consid er the
Confu cian emphasis on
t h e noble or superior
person. Do you t hink
striving to become such
a person is a la udable
goa l? Wou ld it de-
crease or increase the
enjoyment of life?
Li In early Confucianism,
ritual, etiquette, principle,
and p ropriety; conscicn ..
t ious behavior and right
action.
Ren The essential Confu-
cian virtues, including
benevolence, sympat hy,
kindn ess, generosity,
respect for o the rs, and
h uman .. hcarrcdncss.
To be wealthy a nd h o no red
in an unjust society L\ a
d isgrace.
-Confucius

194 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
Ar fifteen I scr my heart
upon learning.
Ar rhirry, I had planted my
feet firm upon the ground.
Ar forry, I no longer suf-
fered fro m perplexit ies.
Ar fifty, I knew whar were
the biddings of Heaven.
Ar sixry, I heard them with
docile car.
Ar seventy, I could follow
the dictates of my own
heart; for what I desired
no longer overstepped rhc
boundaries of right.
-Con(udus
28 Is the Confucian
prescription for har-
mony li kely to be fu lly
implemented in West-
ern countries? That is,
could there ever be a
democratic, capit a list,
consumer society
that was also strictly
Confucian?
The noble-minded arc
calm and steady. Lirtlc
people arc foreve r fussing
and frcrting.
-Confucius
Confucius, Analects
Tzu-kung as ked about the qualities of a true gentleman. The Master said, He
cultivates in himself t he capacity to be di ligent in his tasks …. The Master sa id, He
cultivates in himself the capacity to ease the lot of other people …. The Master said,
He cultivates in himself the capacity to ease the lot of the whole popu lace.•9
So living by Ii and ren requires self-cultivation and action-learning the moral
norms, understa nding the vi rtues, and acting to apply these to the real world. Being
a superio r person, then, demands kno\vledge and judgment as well as devotion to the
noblest values and virtues.
I n Co nfucianism, individuals a re not like atoms: They are not discrete, iso-
lated un its of stuff defined only by \vhat they’re made of. Individua ls are part of
a complex lattice of socia l relationsh ips that must be taken into account. So in
Co nfuc ian ethics, ren tells us what virtues apply to social relationships gene rally,
a nd the text ca lled the “Five Relat ionships” details the most important connec-
tions and the specific duties a nd virtues associated w ith particular relationships.
These relationships a re bet\veen parent and c hild , elder brother and younger
brothe r, husband and wife, elder and junior, a nd ruler and subject. Harmony
\viii pervade society, says Confucius, \vhen (1) parents provide fo r their c hildren,
a nd ch ildren respect and obey their parents and care for them in their old age;
(2) e lder brothers look afte r younger brothe rs, and the younge r s how deference
to the elder; (3) husbands support a nd protect wives, a nd w ives obey husba nds
a nd tend to children and the household; (4) elders sho\v cons ide ration for the
younger, and the younger respect and heed elde rs; and (5) ru lers care for and
protect s ubjects, and s ubj ects are loyal to rulers.
The relationship on \vhich all others are based is that of parent and child, or, as
Confucius would have it, fathe r and son. The son O\ves the fat her respect, obedi-
ence, and support-an obligation that Confucian ism calls “filial piety.” The central
feature of this relationship is that it is h ierarchical. Father and son are not equal part-
ners; the son is subo rdinate. The other four relationsh ips are also hierarch ical, with
the wife subordinate to the husband, the younger brother to the older, the junior to
the elder, and the subject to the ruler. And as in fi lial p iety, the subordinates have
a duty of obedience and respect, and the superiors a re obligated to treat the subor-
dinates with kindness and autho rity, as a father would. C-onfucius believes that if
everyone conscientiously assumes his o r her p roper role, harmony, happiness, and
goodness wi ll reign in the land.
Confucius, Analects
On fi lial piety, Confucius had t his to say:
Meng I Tzu asked about the treatment of parents. The Master sa id, Never dis-
obey! When Ch’ ih was driving his carriage for hi m, the Master said, Meng asked m e
about the treatment of parents and I said, Never disobey! Fa n Ch’ ih said, In what
sense did you mean it? The Master sa id, While t hey are alive, serve t hem according
to ritual. When they die, bury them accord ing to ritua l and sacrifice to them accord ing
to ritual. …

Tzu-yu asked about the trea tment of parents. The Master said, “Filial sons” nowa-
days are people who see to it that their parents get enough to eat. But even dogs and
ho rses are cared for to that extent. If there is no feeling of respect, wherein lies the
differe nce?•0
The virtue of filial p iet y is sti ll a strong force in China today, as this schola r
explains:
John B. Noss, A History of the World’s Religions
In China, loyalty to t he fam ily has been one’s first loyalty. No lad in Ch ina eve r comes of
age, in the Western sense. It is still true that his whole service is expected to be devoted
to the family unti l death, and he is expected to obey his fa the r and, whe n his fat her
d ies, his e ldest brother, wi th a perfect compli ance. This has meant in the past that ev-
ery fat her has a great and grave responsibili ty to fu lfill toward his fam ily. He m ust seek
to produce virtue in his sons by being himself the best example of it. The fact that the
prese nt communist government speaks of making itself “father and elde r brother” and
claims for itself the firs t loyalty of every citizen has not totally inva lidated the personal
virtue of fi lial piety in t he context of fam il y life.”
Today the influence of the Confucian virtue of fili al p iet y helps co explai n \vhy
there is in much of Asia a g reater emphasis on meeting obligatio ns co family, com-
munity, a nd state than on ensuring individual r ights and personal freedom.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 3.8
1. What a re Ii a nd ren? How would society change if everyone acted
according co t hese two virtues?
2. If you a hvays strived co become a super ior person, would your life be
better than it is now or worse?
3. Con fucia nism dow np lays ind ividual liberty a nd emphasizes t he im-
portance of yielding co the group in many matters. Is chis an attractive
aspect of Confucianism? W hy or why not?
4. Does Confucianism fi t easily \vich a Western society chat has a strong
respect for individual righrs? Expla in .
5. Wou ld you prefer t o live in a strict Confucia n culture rather than the
culcure you live in now? Why or why not?
Confucianism 195

196 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life
Review Notes
3.1 OVERVIEW: ETHICS AND THE MORAL DOMAIN
• Eth ics, or moral philosophy, is the st udy of morality using the methods of p hiloso-
phy, a nd morality consists of our beliefs about righ t an d wrong actions an d good
and bad persons o r character. Morality has to do with our moral judgments, pri n-
ciples, values, a nd th eo ries; eth ics is the careful, philosophical exam inatio n of th ese.
• Morality is a normative enterprise \vith a distinctive set of p roperties: overridi ng-
ness, impartiality, universal ity, and reasonableness.
• A mo ral th eo ry explains not \vhy o ne event causes a nother, b ut why an action is
right o r \vrong or why a person or a perso n’s character is good o r bad. Some theories
are co nsequentialist (like utilitarian ism an d ethical egoism), and some theories are
deontological (like Kant’s th eo ry) .
• We can evaluate th e worth of mo ral theories by applying th e moral criteria of
adequacy-<:o nsistency \vith o ur considered moral judgments, co nsis tency \Vith the faces of the moral li fe, and resourceful ness in moral problem-solving. • The doctrine th at r ight and wro ng are constituted by God's will is known as the divine command th eo ry. It raises the specter of the Euthyphro d ilemma and implies that the doctrine is guilty of arbitrariness. 3.2 MORAL RELAT IVISM • Moral objectivism is the view th at at least some moral norms o r principles are objectively valid o r t rue fo r everyone. Moral relativism says that moral standards are not objective b ut a re relative to \vhat ind ividuals o r cultures believe. Moral rela- tivism pertai ning to individuals is known as subjective relativism, more precisely stated as the view th at right actio ns are those san ctioned by a person. Moral relativ- ism regarding cultures is called cultu ral relativism, the view that right actions are those sanctioned by one's cult ure. Both forms of relativism face serious difficulties. 3.3 MORAL ITY BASED ON CONSEQUENCES • Utilitarian ism judges the morality of conduct by a single stan dard, the p rinciple of utility-right actions are those th at result in greater overall \veil-bei ng (o r util- ity) fo r the people involved th an any other poss ible actio ns. The theory has man y attractive feat u res but also some problems, the most serious being th at it seems to confl ict with o ur cons idered moral judgments. • Eth ical ego ism says that right actio ns are those that maxim ize one's own well-being. It is thought to be supported by the empirical theory cal led psychological ego ism . Both theo ries have been subjected to intense criticism. 3.4 MORALITY BASED ON DUTY AND RIGHTS • Kant's theory says that righ t actions are those that are right in themselves because th ey are consistent with universal moral r ules derived from reason, an d the actions have moral \vorth only if we do them o ut of a sense of d uty. Kant's cen tral mo ral tenet is th e categorical imperative. Like utilitarian ism, the th eo ry has been accused of fly ing in the face of our considered mo ral judgmenrs. 3.5 MORA LITY BASED ON CHARACTER • Virtue ethics focuses not o n duty but o n the development of virtuous character-not on \vhat to do but on \vhat to be. According to virtue ethics, character is the key to the moral life, for it is from a virtuous character that moral conduct and values naturally arise. 3.6 FEM INIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE • The eth ics of care is a moral perspective that arose out of femin ist concerns an d g rew to challenge core elemen ts of most other moral theories. Th is approach shifts th e focus from abstract principles an d rules to the u nique deman ds of specific sit u- ations and to the virtues an d feeli ngs th at are central to close personal relationships. The heart of the moral life is feeli ng fo r and caring for those with whom you have a special, intimate con nection . 3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE • Several themes are p romi nent in existential ism, including the absurdity of human existence, the idea that existen ce precedes essence, and the beliefs that we are to- tal ly responsible for how we live our lives and we are radically and painfully free to choose what we will be and how we will respond to the absu rd ity of living. 3.8 CONFUCIANISM • Confuc ian ism is a school of thought that arose o ut of ancient C hina and, alo ng \vith Daoism, has been a dominant philosophical system there for h undreds of years. !rs effect on Chi nese and East Asian li fe, cultu re, and government has been enormous- comparable to the influe nce of C hristianity, J udaism, and Islam in the West. • Confucius veered away from th e supernat u ral beliefs of th e past, for his mai n inter- est \vas teaching a humanistic doctri ne centered o n social relationships. His a im \vas th e creatio n of harmony a nd vi rtue in the world-speci fically in individuals, in the way they interact with o ne another, an d in how th ey are treated by the state. Review Notes 197 198 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life Key Terms • Li has several meanings, including ritual, etiquette, p rinciple, and propriety, but its essence is conscientious behavior and right action. To fo llow li is co conduce yourself in your deali ngs \vich ochers according co mo ral an d customary no rms. Ren is about social virtues; it en compasses benevolen ce, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for ochers, a nd human-heartedness. Ac its co re is che imperative co work for the commo n good an d co recognize ch e essential worth of ochers regardless of their social status. WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 3 1. Accordi ng co Kane, right actions do not depend on consequences. H e says, fo r example, chat celling a lie is \vrong even if it will save some- o ne's life. Bue many people think that in this case not lying is w rong, because it's more importa nt co preserve life than co blindly follo\v a moral r ule. Do you agree with this assessment or \vich Kane? Give reasons for your a nswer. 2. Does it make sense co use utilitarian reasoni ng in decid ing how co fight a war? H o\v m ight a deoncologisc and a utilitarian differ in decid- ing on che morality of dropping t he A-bomb on Hiroshima during World War II? Which approach seems more plausible? Why? 3. Is Aristotle's eth ics su ffic iently action guiding? Does it help us make decisions? If \Ve ask \vhac we should do in situation X, Aristotle would seem co say, " Do what che virt uous person would do." Bue if I ask how I am co recognize the virtuous person, he would seem co say, "He is o ne who acts justly." Is there somethi ng circular about chis reasoning? Does virtue ethics need s upplementation from other ethical sys tems, o r can it solve chis problem? 4. Is it p lausible chat we have d uties o nly co chose we ca re about? Don't \Ve have d uties co some people we don't care about? Don't we have obliga- tions co deal justly with others and respect thei r rights, even if t hey are not pare of our family o r community? Give reasons fo r your answers. 5. What is your O\vn vie\v of what makes actions right or wrong? What reasons support chis position? act-utilitarianism The idea chat the rightness of ac- tions depends solely o n che overall well-being pro- duced by individual actions. (156) categorical imperative Kant's fu ndamental moral principle, wh ich he fo rmulates as (1) " I am never to ace och envise than so that I could also ivill that my maxim should become a universal law"; an d (2) "So ace as co treat humanity, \vhether in thine O\vn perso n or Analects Confucian text co ntain ing the conversations of Co nfuci us and his fo llo\vers. (193) in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." (17 1) consequentialist theory A moral theory in \vh ich the rightness of actions depends solely on their co nse- quences or results. ( 140) cultural relativism The view that right actions are those e ndorsed by one's culture. ( 149) deontological (nonconseq uentialist) theory A moral theo ry in which the rightness of actions is d eterm ined not solely by their co nsequen ces, but partly or enti rely by their intrinsic nature. (140) divine command theory The doctrine chat God is che creator of morality. ( 146) ethical egoism The vie\v ch at right actions are chose that further one's O\vn best interests. (140) ethics (moral philosophy) The study of morality us- ing the methods of philosophy. (136) ethics of care A moral perspective that emphasizes che unique demands of specific situations and the virtues and feelings that are central co dose perso nal relation- ships. (142, 182) feminist ethics An app roach co morality aimed at ad- vanci ng women's interests, undersco ring thei r distinc- tive experiences and characteristics, and advancing che obvious truth that women and men are mo rally equal . (181) Kant's theory The theory that right actions are chose that accord with the categorical imperative. ( 14 1) Ii In early Confucianism, rit ual, etiquette, princi- ple, and propriety; conscientio us behavio r and right action. ( 193) Key Terms 199 moral abso lutism The belief that objective moral p rinciples al low no exceptions o r must be applied the same way in al l cases and cultures. ( 148) moral objectivism The view that there are moral standards that are true or correct for everyone. (148) moral relativism The view that moral standards do not have independent status but are relative to \vhat individuals or cultures believe. (149) moral theory A theory chat explains why an action is right o r wrong or why a person o r a person's character is good or bad. (139) morality Beliefs about right and wrong actions and good and bad persons or character. ( 136) psychological egoism The theo ry that people always act out of self-interest. ( 166) ren The essential Confucian virtues, including be- nevolence, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for oth ers, and human-heartedness. (193) r ule- utilitarianism The doctrine that a right action is one th at confo rms to a rule that, if follo\ve.d con- siscencly, \vould create fo r ever yone involved che most beneficial balance of well-being over s uffering. (156) s ubjective relativis m The view that right actions are those endorsed by an individual. (149) utilitarianis m The view that right actions are those that result in che most beneficial balance of good over bad consequences for everyo ne involved. (140) virtue ethics A moral theory chat focuses on the de- velopment of virtuous character. (142, 175) 200 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life FIC TIO N The Ones Who Wa lk Away from Ornelas Ursula K. Le Guin Born in 1929, Ursula K. Le Guin is an award-winn ing author of several genres, most notably realistic fiction, science fiction, and fantasy. Her best-known works include the six Books of Earthsea, the science fiction masterpiece The Left Hand of Darkness, and the novels The Dispossessed and Always Coming Home. With a clamor of bells that set the swa llows soaring, the Festival of Summer came to the city Ornelas, bright- towered by the sea. The rigging of the boats in harbor sparkled with Aags. In t he streets between houses with red roofs and painted wall s, between o ld moss-grown gardens and under avenues of trees, past great parks and public buildings, processions moved . Some were decorous: old people in long stiff robes of mauve and grey, grave master work-men, quiet, merry women car- rying their babies and chatting as they walked. In other streets the music beat faster, a shimmering of gong and tambourine, and the people went dancing, the pro- cession was a dance. Children dodged in and out, their high call s rising like the swallows' crossing Aights over the music and the singing. All the processions wound towards the north side of the city, where on the great water-meadow called t he Green Fields boys and girls, naked in the bright air, with mud-stained feet and an- kles and long, lithe arms, exercised their restive horses before the race. The horses wore no gear at all but a hal- ter without bit. Their manes were braided with stream- ers of silver, gold, and green. They Aared their nostrils and pranced and boasted to one another; they were vastly excited, the horse being the on ly anima l who has adopted our ceremon ies as his own. Far off to the north and west the mountains stood up ha lf encircl ing Ornelas on her bay. The air of morning was so clear that the snow still crowning the Eighteen Peaks burned with white-gold fire across the miles of sun lit air, under the dark blue of the sky. There was just enough wind to make the banners t hat marked the racecourse snap and Autter now and then. In the silence of the broad green meadows one cou ld hear the music winding through the city streets, farther and nearer and ever Copyright© 1973 by U rsula K. le Guin Fi rst appeared in "New Dimension 3'' in 1973, and then in THE WIND'S TWELVE QUARTERS, published by HarperCollins in 1975. Reprinted by permission of Curtis Brown, Ltd. approaching, a cheerful faint sweetness of the air that from time to time trembled and gathered together and broke out into the great joyous clanging of the bell s. Joyous! How is one to tell about j oy? How describe the citizens of Ornelas? They were not simple folk, you see, though they were happy. But we do not say the words of cheer much any more. All smi les have become archaic. Given a description such as this one tends to make certa in as- sumptions. Given a description such as this one tends to look next for the King, mounted on a splend id sta l- lion and surrounded by his nob le knights, or perhaps in a golden litter borne by great-muscled slaves. But there was no king. They d id not use swords, or keep slaves. They were not barbarians. I do not know the rules and laws of their society, but I suspect that they were singu- larly few. As t hey did without monarchy and slavery, so they also got on without the stock exchange, the adver- tisement, the secret police, and the bomb. Yet I repeat that these were not simple folk, not dulcet shepherds, noble savages, bland utopians. They were not less com- plex than us. The troub le is that we have a bad habit, encouraged by pedants and sophisticates, of consider- ing happiness as something rather stupid. Only pain is intellectual, on ly evil interesting. This is t he treason of t he artist: a refusal to admit the banality of evi l and the terrible boredom of pain. If you can't lick 'em, join 'em. lfit hurts, repeat it. But to praise despair is to con- demn delight, to embrace violence is to lose hold of everything else. We have almost lost hold; we can no longer describe a happy man, nor make any celebration of joy. How can I tell you about t he people of Ornelas? They were not naive and happy children- though their children were, in fact, happy. They were mature, intell i- gent, passionate adu lts whose lives were not wretched . O miracle! but I wish I could describe it better. I wish I cou ld convince you. Ornelas sounds in my words like a city in a fairy ta le, long ago and far away, once upon a time. Perhaps it would be best if you imagined it as your own fancy bids, assuming it will rise to the occasion, for certainly I cannot su it you all. For instance, how about technology? I t hink that there wou ld be no cars or he- licopters in and above the streets; th is foll ows from t he fact that the peop le of O rnelas are happy people. Happiness is based on a just discrimin ation of what is necessary, what is neither necessary nor destruc- t ive, and what is destructive. In the middle category, however- that of the unnecessary but undestructive, t hat of comfort, luxury, exuberance, etc.- they cou ld perfectly well have central heating, subway trains, washing machines , and all kinds of marvelous devices not yet invented here, fl oating light-sources, fuelless power, a cure for t he common cold . Or they could have none of t hat: it doesn't matter. As you like it. I incline to think that people from towns up and down the coast have been coming in to Ornelas during the last days before the Festival on very fast little trains and double- decked trams, and that the train station of Ornelas is actually the handsomest bu ild ing in town, t hough plainer t ha n the magnificent Farmers' Market. Bu t even granted train s, I fear t hat Ornelas so far strikes some of you as goody-goody. Smiles, bell s, parades, horses, blah. If so, please add an orgy. If an orgy would help, don't hesitate. Let us not, however, have temples from which issue beautifu l nude priests and priestesses al- ready half in ecstasy and ready to copulate with any man or woman, lover or stra nger, who desires un ion with the deep god head of the blood, although that was my first idea. Bu t really it would be better not to have any temples in Ornelas- at least, not manned temples. Rel igion yes , clergy no. Surely the beautifu l nudes can just wander about, offering themselves like divine scuf- fl es to the hunger of t he need y and t he rapture of the fl esh. Let them join the processions. Let tambourines be struck above the copulations, and t he glory of desire be proclaim ed upon t he gongs, and (a not unimport- ant point) let the offspring of these delightful rituals be beloved and looked after by all. One th ing I know t here is none ofin Ornelas is guilt. But what else shou ld t here be? I thought at first there were no drugs, but that is pu- ritanical. For those who like it, the fa in t in sistent sweet- ness of drooz may perfume t he ways of the city, drooz which first brings a great lightness and bril liance to the mind and limbs, and then after some hours a dreamy languor, and wonderful visions at last of the very arcana and inmost secrets of the Universe, as well as exciting t he pleasure of sex beyond all belief; and it is not hab it- form ing. For more modest tastes I th ink there ought to be beer. What else, what else belongs in the joyous city? The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas 20 1 The sense of victory, surely, the celebration of courage. But as we did without clergy, let us do without soldiers. The joy built upon successfu l slaughter is not the right ki nd of joy; it will not do; it is fearful and it is trivial. A boundless and generous contentment, a magnani - mous trium ph felt not against some outer enemy but in commun ion with the finest and fairest in the souls of all men everywhere and the sp lendor of the world's summer: t his is what swells the hearts of the people of Ornelas, and the victory t hey celebrate is that of life. I really don't t hink many of them need to take drooz. Most of the processions have reached t he Gree n Fields by now. A marvelous smell of cooking goes forth from the red and blue tents of the provisioners. The faces of small children are amiably sticky; in the benign grey beard of a man a couple of crumbs of rich pastry are entangled. The youths and girls have mounted their horses and are beginning to group around the starting lin e of the course. An old woman, small, fat, and laugh- ing, is passing out flowers from a basket, and tall young men wear her flowers in their sh in ing hair. A child of nine or ten sits at the edge of the crowd , alone, play- ing on a wooden flute. People pause to listen, and t hey smile, but t hey do not speak to him, for he never ceases playing and never sees them, his dark eyes wholly rapt in the sweet, thin magic of the tune. He fin ishes, and slowly lowers his hands hold ing the wooden flute. As if t hat little private silence were the signal, all at once a trumpet sounds from t he pavilion near t he start- ing li ne: imperious, melancholy, piercing. The horses rear on their slender legs , and some of t hem neigh in answer. Sober-faced , the you ng riders stroke t he horses' necks and soothe them, whispering, "Quiet, quiet, t here my beauty, my hope .. . . " They begin to form in rank along t he starting line. The crowds along the racecourse are like a field of grass and flowers in t he wind. The Festival of Summer has begun. Do you believe? Do you accept t he festival, the city, the j oy? No? Then let me describe one more th ing. In a basement under one of the beautifu l public bu ildings of Ornelas , or perhaps in t he cellar of one of its spacious private homes, there is a room. It has one locked door, and no window. A li ttle li ght seeps in dustily between cracks in the boards, secondhand from a cobwebbed w indow somewhere across the cellar. In one corner of the li ttle room a couple of mops, with stiff, clotted, foul-smell ing heads, stand nea r a rusty bucket. The floor is dirt, a li ttle damp to t he touch, as cell ar d irt usually is. The room is about t hree paces long 202 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life and two wide: a mere broom closet or disused tool room. In the room a child is sitting. It cou ld be a boy or a girl. It looks about six, but actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps it was born defective, or per- haps it has become imbecile through fear, malnutrition, and neglect. It picks its nose and occasionally fumbles vaguely with its toes or genitals, as it sits hunched in the corner farthest from the bucket and the two mops. It is afraid of the mops. It finds them horrible. It shuts its eyes, but it knows the mops are still standing there; and the door is locked; and nobody will come. The door is a lways locked; and nobody ever comes, except that sometimes- the child has no understand ing of time or interval- sometimes the door rattles terribly and opens, and a person, or several people, are there. O ne of them may come in and kick the child to make it stand up. The others never come close, but peer in at it with frightened, disgusted eyes. The food bowl and the wa- ter jug are hastily filled, the door is locked, the eyes dis- appear. The people at the door never say anything, but the child, who has not always lived in the tool room, and can remember sunlight and its mother's voice, sometimes speaks. "I will be good ," it says. "Please let me out. I will be good !" They never answer. The child used to scream for help at night, and cry a good deal, bu t now it only makes a kind of wh in ing, "eh-haa, eh- haa," and it speaks less and less often. It is so thin there are no calves to its legs; its belly protrudes; it lives on a ha lf-bowl of cornmeal and grease a day. It is naked. Its buttocks and thighs are a mass of festered sores, as it sits in its own excrement continually. They all know it is there, all the people of Ornelas. Some of them have come to see it, others are content merely to know it is there. They all know tha t it has to be there. Some of them understand why, and some do not, but they a ll understand that their happ iness, the beauty of their city, the tenderness of their friend- ships, the health of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the skil l of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kind ly weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery. Th is is usually exp lained to children when they are between eight and twelve, whenever they seem capa- ble of understanding; and most of those who come to see the child are young peop le, though often enough an adu lt comes, or comes back, to see the child. No matte r how well the matte r has been explained to them, these young spectators are a lways shocked and sickened at the sight. They fee l d isgust, which they had thought themselves superior to. They fee l anger, outrage, impotence, despite all the explanations. They wou ld like to do something for the child. Bu t there is nothing they can do. If the child were brought up into the sunlight out of tha t vile place, if it were clea ned and fed and comforted, that wou ld be a good thing, indeed; but if it were done, in that day and hour all the pros- perity and beauty and delight of Ornelas would wither and be destroyed. Those are the terms. To exchange all the goodness and grace of every life in O rnelas for that single, small im provement: to throw away the hap pi- ness of thousands for the chance of the happiness of one: that would be to let guilt within the walls indeed . The terms are strict and absolute; there may not even be a kind word spoken to the child. O ften the young people go home in tears, or in a tearless rage, when they have seen the child and faced this terrible paradox. They may brood over it fo r weeks or years. Bu t as time goes on they begin to rea lize that even if the chi ld cou ld be released, it wou ld not get much good of its freedom: a little vague pleasure of warmth and food, no doubt, but little more. It is too degraded and imbeci le to know any real joy. It has been afraid too long ever to be free of fear. Its habits are too uncouth for it to respond to humane treatment. Indeed, after so long it would probably be wretched without wall s about it to protect it, and darkness fo r its eyes, and its own excrement to sit in. Their tears at the bitter injustice dry when they begin to perceive the terrible justice of reality, and to accept it. Yet it is their tears and anger, the trying of their generosity and the accep- tance of their helplessness, which are perhaps the true source of the splendor of their lives. Theirs is no vapid, irrespo nsible ha ppi ness. They know that they, li ke the child, are not free. They know compassion. It is the exis- tence of the child, and their knowledge of its existence, that makes possible the nobi lity of their architecture, the poignancy of their music, the profund ity of their sci- ence. It is because of the child that they are so gentle with children. They know that if the wretched one were not there snivell ing in the dark, the other one, the Aute- player, could ma ke no joyful music as the young riders li ne up in their beauty for the race in the sunlight of the first morning of summer. Now do you believe in them ? Are they not more credib le? But there is one more thing to tell , and this is quite incredible. At times one of the adolescent girls or boys who go to see the child does not go home to weep or rage, does not, in fac t, go home at all. Sometimes also a man or woman much older fa ll s silent for a day or For Further Reading 203 two, and then leaves home. These people go out into t he street, and walk down the street alone. They keep walking, and walk s traight out of the city of O rnelas, t hrough the beau tiful gates. They keep walking across t he farm lands of O rnelas. Each one goes alone, youth or girl, man o r woma n. Night fall s; t he traveler mus t pass down vill age streets, between the houses with yell ow-lit windows, and on out in to the darkness of the fields. Each alone, they go west or north, towards t he mountains. They go on. They leave O rnelas , they walk ahead into the darkness, and they do not come back. The place they go toward s is a place even less imagin- ab le to most of us than the city of happiness. I cannot describe it at all. It is possible that it does not exist. But they seem to know where they are going, the ones who walk away from O rnelas. Prob ing Questio ns I . Ho,v does chis story apply ro utilitarian ,n oral theories? Does it put these theories in a good light or bad-or son1ething in benveen? 2. Does our happiness in a relatively prosperous nation depend on the suffering of the poorer people of the ,vorld who work for low wages co support our consu,n er society? 3. If you were a citizen of Ornelas, ,vould you walk away from ic as a few have done? Would you chink char che suffering of one child, though regreccable, was justified ro create a utopia for so many ro enjoy? Explain. For Further Reading Robert Audi, Moral Knoiuledge and Ethical Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) . A carefully argued defense of a mo ral theory that int egrates natural ist and rationalistic elemencs. Steven M . Cilin and Joram G . Haber, 1iuentieth Century Ethical Theory (Upper Sad- dle River, NJ : Prentice-Hall, 1995) . A comprehensive an th ology of some of the most influential moral theorizing of th e twent ieth century. William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd e.dit ion (Englewood Cliffi, NJ: Pren tice-H all, 1973). A h ighly regarded concise introduction to eth ics. C. E. H arris, Applying Moral Theories (Belmont, CA: Wadswo rth, 1997). An intro- duction to ethics that covers moral theories and how they can be applied to real issues. Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1973). A concise, read- able defense of the proposition that ethics does not require th eism. Jennifer O ldstone-Moore, Confucianism: Origins, Beliefi, Practices, Holy Texts, and Sacred Places (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2002). Ono ra O'Neill, "Kantian Eth ics," in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Pet er Si nger (Cambridge: Black,vell , 1993), 175-185. An informative perspective o n Kants ethical theory. Lou is P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 4th edition (Belmo nt, CA: Wadsworth, 2002) . An introduction to ethics that lays out a case for objective morality. 204 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th edition (Ne\v York: McGra\v- H ill , 2003). A co ncise guide co eth ics an d eth ical theories. Russ Shafer-Landau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (New York: Oxford Un i- versity Press, 2004). A readable, carefully crafted defense of objective ethics. Peter Si nger, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993). A topical an th ology covering man y issues, including mo ral th eo ry, theory applications, and challenges co commonsense ethics. Lewis Vaughn, Contemporary Moral Arguments: Readings in Ethical Issues (New York: Oxford University Press, 20 10) . A moral- issues a nth ology organ ized by topic and by infl uential, classic arguments. Lewis Vaughn, Doing Ethics: Moral Reasoning and Contemporary Issues, 4th editio n (Ne\v York: W. W Norto n, 20 10) . An introd uction co eth ical issues feat uring a wide range of readings a nd thorough coverage of moral reason ing and ethical th eo ry. MIND AND BODY CHAPTER OBJECTIVES 4.1 OVERV IEW: THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM • Understand the nature and importance of the m ind-body problem . • Deline substance dualism , Cartesian dualism , materialism, logical behaviorism, identity theory, multiple realizability, functionalism , epiphenomena/ism, and property dualism. 4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM • Articu late Descartes' conceivability and d ivisibility arguments and the main o bjections to them . • Explain why the issue of m ind- body interaction is a problem for Cartesian dualism. • Understand why Descartes' theory seems to violate the principle o f the causal closure of the physical and t he law of the conservation of mass-energy and be ab le to explain why such violatio n s would render the theory implausib le. 4.3 M IND-BODY IDENTITY • Articulate the advantages of the identity theory over Cartesian dua lism . • Understand Chalmers's zombie argument and why it seems to pose a threat to the identity theory. • Underst and Nagel' s bat argument and how it seems to undermine materialist theories. 4.4 THE MIND AS SOFTWARE • Explain functionalism and how the theory differs from substance dualism and the identity theory. • Describe Ned Block' s absent qualia argument, explain how it is supposed to show functiona lism to be false, and articulate possible responses to the argument from functionalists. • Deline strong Al and explain how funct iona lism is supposed to make it possible. • Underst and Searle's Chi nese room thought experiment, his d istinction bet ween syn tax and seman tics, and how h is argument is supposed to show that strong Al is not possib le. 4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES • Underst and how philosophers have reasoned from t he fa ilure of prom inent mind -body theories to the p lausibility of property dualism. • Explain the main philosoph ica l chall enge to property d ualism. 206 Chapter 4 Mind and Body T is true, tis certain; man t hough dead retains, Part of himself: the immortal mind remains . -Alexander rope The mind- bod y p ro blem is the issue of what mental phenom ena arc and how they rdarc m the physical world . Subst ance dualism is the no rio n that mind a nd body consist of rwo funda- mentally diffcrcnr kinds of stuff, o r s ubstances. Cartesian d ualism is the view t har mind (or soul) an d body arc completely independent of o ne an~ o ther and inte ract causally. M aterialism (or physical- ism ) is the doctrine that every object and event in the world is p hysical. 4.1 OVERVIEW: THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM Philosophy is notorious for intruding into facets of life that seem at fi rst glance to get along just fine without philosophical inqu iry. People may very well ,vonder, Why do we need philosophy to help us understand what a lready seems obvious? Why does philosophy see problems where nothing seems problematic? A prime example of a subject matter that may appear to many not to need any philosophical help (but gets it anyway) is mind and body. After a ll, if there is anything that ,ve seem directly and intimately acquainted with, it's our own m inds and our own bodies. And our commonplace theory about these things (usually derived from our culture or religion) seems to be perfectly consistent with our personal experience. So what's the p roblem? Well, several hund red years of philosophical work have shown that many of our commonplace notions about mind and body are suspect or wrong, and that, for many reasons, we very much need to get them right. The commonplace view goes like this: You have a physical body, a thing that has shape, size, and ,veight, an entity ,vith a physical structure running physical processes subject to physical laws like any rock, tree, o r star. You also have a nonphysical m ind (or soul), a mental thing that cannot be ,veighed, measu red, or dissected, an entity that thinks, feels, and senses. Your body (brain) is nothing like your mind; you r mind is nothing like your body. Yet somehow you r physical body affects your nonphysical mind, as when your drop- ping a brick on your foot causes you to feel a sharp pain and to ask yourself how you could be so clumsy. And your mind affects you r body, as when you experience th irst and then decide to ,valk to the k itchen fo r a drink of water. Moreover, according to this view, your mind and body are independent of one another, so it's possible for your mind or soul to continue existing after your body dies. But how are interactions between body and mind (or soul) possible? Ho,v ca n our phys ical b ra ins cause something to happen in our seemingly nonphysical minds and vice versa? Ho,v can somethi ng enti rely physical have anything to do with an entity without any physical characteristics? This is like asking how smoke could interact ,vith a rock-except that the problem is ,vorse than that, because, unlike smoke, the mind is supposed to have no physical properties at all. Has the nature of mind been entirely misconceived? A re the ,videly accepted ideas about the relation- ship benveen mind and body d rastically mistaken? These are the central concerns in what is called the m ind- body problem- the issue of what mental phenomena really a re and how they relate to the physical ,vorld. The most important responses to it constitute the foremost theories of m ind in West- er n thought. The commonplace theory-the one that you likely hold and may never have doubted-is known as substa n ce d ualism . It says that mind and body consist of two fundamentally different kinds of stuff, or substances-the mind being of non- physical stuff, and the body of physical stuff. The mind's mental states-desires, sensations, emotions, and thoughts-are states of nonphysical (or immaterial) stuff. The body's phys ical states-electrochem ical and b iomechanical-are states of physi- cal (material) stuff. Together these two substances-this dualism of stuff-make Overview: The Mind- Body Problem 207 up a person. In fact, for substance dualiscs, the enti re universe is constituted by just these nvo substances. Beginning ,vich Plato, many g reat thinkers have been substance dualiscs, but the most influential proponent of the theory in the mod ern period (begin ning in the seventeenth century) is Rene Descartes (1596-1650). H e argues not only chat the body and sou l a re composed of nvo distinct and independent substances (mental and physical) , but chat these two pares of a person interact causally. (Li ke many ocher s ubstance dualisrs, D esca rtes uses the ,vord soul instead of mind, but both terms refer roughly co the nonphysical, mental aspect of a person.) The mind, though immaterial, can in- flu ence the material body, and the body can affect the mind. Th is doctrine of distinct but interact ing s ubstances is known, for obvi- ous reasons, as Cartesian dualism o r inceractionism . It underp ins belief in an immortal soul chat lives on after death. Among contemporary ph ilosophers, however, Descartes' dual- ism has very little credibility (for reasons discussed in the next sec- tio n). Mose of chem hold instead co va rious fo rms of materialism (or physicalism), the doctrine chat ever y object and event in the world is physical. So mental states must be physical states or some- how reducible co physical states. Figure 4.1 Is th e mind identical to the brain? Or a re they two entirely diffe rent things, as Descartes th ought? If so, how do they inte ract? One materialise theory is logical b ehaviorism, the idea chat mental states are dispositions co behave in particular ways in certain circumsta nces. To be in a mental state is just co be disposed co certa in kinds of behavior. So co h ave a headache is co be d isposed co wincing and caking an aspirin. To be afraid of thun- der is to be disposed co crying out and covering you r head with a blanket when the sky rumbles . The central cla im is not that we come co know about a person's mental states by caking note of her behavior, but chat her mental states are d ispos itions co behavior. To its credit, logical beh av iorism avoids Cartesian dualism's problem of explain- ing mind-body interaction. But co critics, the theory seems co be in den ial about the nature of our mental states, for many of ou r mental states have a particular subjective feel or quality to chem (what philosophers call qualitative content or qualia). It feels a certain way co us co be in pain, to be thi rst y, co want a chocolate sundae, co see and smell a rose, or co experience happiness. Logical behaviorism, however, says chat mental states have nothing co do ,vich ou r interior feelings; dispositions co behave are all that matter. But chis seems co many people co d eny the obv ious. Sim ilarly, logical behaviorism is at odds with our commonsense intuition chat mental states often cause behavior. We feel hungry, so we eat lunch. We fantasize about a d ream vacation in Aruba, so ,ve look up Aruba on a map. But because the logical behaviorist recogn izes o nly behavior and essentially discounts the ex istence of subjective mental states, he can not counten ance any cause-and-effect relationship between ou r inner life and our outer behavior. A more widely accepted materialist approach co the mind-body problem is the identity theory, the view that mental states are id entical co physical brain states. The Consciousness L\ the g lo ry of creation. - James Broughton Logical behaviorism is the idea that mental s tates arc d L\posicions m behave in particular ways in ccr .. rain circumstances. Identity theory is , he view that mental s tates arc identical to p hysical brain stares. 1 At this point in you r read ing, does Carte- sian d u a lism strike you as a plausib le t heory of mind? Is it obvious t o you that people have both a physical body and a nonphysica l mind? What reasons do you have fo r your views? 208 Chapter 4 Mind and Body Consciousness is what makes the m ind- body proble m really intractable. -11,omas Nagel 2 Do you t hink it is possible to know everything about a person's mental states just by knowing all the facts regarding his physical states? Do physical states and mental states amount to the same thi ng? Brain: an apparatus w ith w hich we think we t h ink. -Ambrose Bierce central claim is not t hat t he meaning of mental terms ca n be expressed or defined in physical (bra in) terms, but rather that it is an empirical fact that mental states are nothing but brain states. The mind and body (bra in) are not distinct substances as substance dualism holds; the mind is t he brain. Thus the identity t heory offers a better explanation of mind-body interaction than Cartesian dualism does because the m ind is the body. It prov ides a better ac- count of mental causation than logical behaviorism does, because mental states are brain states and brain states cause behavior. It also fits well with a massive amount of scientific evidence showing correlations benveen brain states and mental func- tion. Brain research h as sho,vn in countless ways that if a p erson's brain is damaged or physically stimulated, there are corresponding changes in psychological activit y. And ,vhen a person engages in some psycho logical activity (remembering or imagin- ing, for example), there are predictable a lterations in b ra in activity. But several arguments have been lodged against the identity theory, most of them being attempts to show that mental states can not possibly be b ra in states. The common argument pattern is this: If the identity theory is true, then we ca n know or explain everything about a person's mental states by kno,ving or explaining everything about the person's brain states. But it is not poss ible to know or expla in mental states by knowing o r explaining brain states. Therefore, the identity theory is false. Another kind of argument appeals to our intuitions about the possibility of non- humans having minds. The identity theory claims that since the mind is identical to Figure 4.2 Cou ld a space alien have a mind without having a brain like ours? Overview: The Mind- Body Problem 209 the brain, no being can have a mind unless it has a brain. Bue co some critics, chis conclusion is implausible. Jc seems possible, they argue, chat a being (an alien life- fo rm, for example) could possess a mind (have desires, ideas, emotions, sensations, etc.) without having a brain (the human organ). Cons ider che fi ctio nal alien E.T. o r Star Treks android Mr. Data. Jc is conceivable chat such creatures could have m inds but be made of an e ntirely different kind of scuff than \Ve are. If so, there muse be someth ing wrong \vich che identity theory. The assumption behind chis argument is chat mental scares have what philoso- phers call multiple realizability, the capacity co be realized or instantiated in a va riety of fo rms and materials. In che theory of mind kno\vn as fu n ctionalism , mulciple realizability is a core doctrine. Logical behaviorism cla ims that che m ind is behav ioral dispositions, che identit y theory holds chat the mind is che bra in, but functionalism asserts chat che mind is che functions that the b ra in performs. The theory maintains chat a mental state is defined by its causal role-by che stimuli that initiate it, che resu lting interactions \vich ocher mental states, and che behav- ior chat is subsequently produced. A mental state, then, is just a d istinctive sec of inputs and outputs. Thus functionalism says chat che material or substa nce chat gives rise co a mind is unimportant; che scuff chat produces a mind ca n be al most anyth ing. What matters are the functiona l relations embodied in che scuff. So func- t ionalism can be case as a materialise view (and usually is) or given a nonmacerialisc . . 1ncerprecat1on. Inspire.cl by the insight behind funct ionalism, some theorists have come co ch ink of che mind as a sophisticated computer chat's running some sore of soft- ware. Functiona lism holds chat che mind is the performance of functio ns, the processing of in- puts and oucpucs-\vhich is what any computer does. A computer runs software chat determines what and how che inputs and outputs are pro- cessed. So some functionalists claim that co have a mind is just co run che approp riate type of soft- ware. The bra in is hardware; the mind software. If so, it is possible for computers co have minds as long as they process inputs and outputs in che right way. Multiple realizab ili ty is the capacity to be realized o r instantiated in a variety of forms an d ma terials. Functionalism is the view that the mi nd is the functio ns that t he brain performs. 3 Is it concei vabl e that a space a lien coul d have a mind (feel pa in, percei ve colors, etc.) despite h i s being made out o f st uff t hat i s nothing like our brain stuff? Suppose, for exampl e, he is not a ca rbon-based life-form like us, but a silicon- based creatu re. This vie\v has come co be known as strong ar- tificial intelligence, or strong AI. (Weak artificial intelligence refers not co che making of a m ind but co che use of computer simulations co study the mind.) Many assume that it is only a mat- ter of time before scientists develop a computer so sophisticated chat it will be able co think on its O\vn, co have \vhac \Ve would descr ibe as a mind. After all, don't we already have computers that can do astounding calculations, simulations, and problem solving? H asn't an IBM computer called Figure 4.3 World chess champion Garry Kasparov playing Deep Blue. The computer beat him. Does this show that Deep Blue has a mind or that it could eventually become conscious? 210 Chapter 4 Mind and Body C uriously enough m an's body a nd h is mind appear to d iffer in th e ir climatic adaprations. -Ellsworth Humington Property dualism is the view that mental pro per .. tics arc nonphysical p ropcrrics arising fro m, bur not reducible to , p hysical p roperties. Min ds arc simply what brains do. -Marvin Minsky Epiphenomenalism is the no rio n that me n tal proper- ties do not cause anyth ing, but merely accompa ny p hysical p rocesses. Deep Blue already defeated the ,vorld 's best chess player, Ga rry Kasparov? And hasn't a computer calle.d Watson beaten nvo human opponents in a game of Jeopardy? But although such fears a re indeed impressive, many ph ilosophers remain unconvinced that a computer mind is possible. These theorists take issue with funct ionalism on the grounds that it does not do justice to the subjective, qualitative nature of ou r experience-to what is called phenomenal consciousness. They argue that it is possible to be in a mental state that does not correspond at a ll with a specific funct ional state. For example, consider the mental state of being in pain. It has a certain qualitative feel to be su re, but it does not seem to be equivalent to any part icular functional situation. Many times pain doesn't seem to have a causal role at all; it just hurrs. Some critics put forth what a re called absent qualia objections to functionalism . These arguments try to demonstrate that it is possible for a system to be in a par- ticular functional state and yet be in no mental, qualitative state at all. The system has the right inpurs and outpurs, but no mental state seems to be present. If such arguments are correct, then the notion that an appropriately programmed computer is a mind (the central claim of strong AI) is mistaken. Many philosophers dra,v a similar conclusion about all materialist theo- ries: Materialism is fa lse. If that is the case, they contend, the ,vo rld must have both physical and nonphysical featu res, a nd the latter can not be reduced to the former. But if the world contains both physical and nonphysical things, aren't we led back to Cartesian dualism, a reality consisting of two substances that may or may not interact? Not necessa rily. Some theorisrs defend a different kind of dualism- not Descartes' dualism but property dualism, the view that mental properties, or features, are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, phys ical properties. The idea is that there are properties of individuals-mental, experiential properties-that do not constitute an independent substance and that ca nnot be reduced to physical properties, even though they may somehow depend on phys ical properties. We may see the color red, feel a pain, or remember ou r first kiss, and none of these is the same thing as a physical process, although the latter may give rise to the former. Property dualism, ho,vever, has been accused of having some of the same weak- nesses as substance dualism and raising some of the same questions. How can a physical property g ive rise to a mental property? How can mental events interact ,vith physical events? If mental events produce physical evenrs, doesn't this fl y in the face of the laws of physics? Modern physics says that physical matter/energy in the universe ca nnot be added to or subtracted from . But this seems to rule out any addi- tion of nonphys ical energy. If mental evenrs do not cause physical events, we are left ,vith epiphenomenalism, the notion that mental properties do not cause anything, but merely accompany physical processes. This theory suggesrs, fo r instance, that thinking about being late for an appointment is not what causes you to run. But epiphenomenalism seems to conflict with our commonsense intuitions about ho,v our minds and bod ies are related. WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4.1 I. Is Cartesian d ualism plausible? Can you chink of a \vay chat a non - physical mind and p hysical body could influen ce each ocher-chat is, interact causally? 2. H ow do you chin k scientists view che notion of m ind-bod y interac- tion? Are they likely co be skeptical of physical thin gs causally in teract- ing with nonp hysical en tities? If so, \vhy? 3. Is multiple realizabilit y a genuine proper ty of m inds? That is, do you chink it p lausible chat a m ind can be realized in a variety of physical systems? 4. Do you ch ink che mind is essen tially sofnvare running on a p hysical system like che human brain? W hy or why n ot? 5. Is epiphenomenalism a credible t heory of mi nd ? D oes it make sense, for exa mple, chat every time you d ecide co cross che screec, you r body \valks across che street-and yet you r d eciding co walk has nothing co do with your act ually walking? 4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM For Descartes, che universe consists not merely of che kind of scuff chat science st udies, che physical, but also of che nonphysical. The chief characteristic of physical t hings, he says, is chat they have extemion-ch ey have length, width, a nd height and are located in physical space. They are things li ke pebbles, molecules, water, desks, and scars. Bue no np hysical entities have no molecules, no p hysical dimensions, and no lo- cation in space. Our bodies are p hysical chi n gs, matter extended in space. O ur mi nds are nonphysical, mental things-consciousness. O ur true selves consist enti rely of chis mental scuff; our bodies are adj uncts. Despite che profound difference between che mental a nd physical, t hey interact causally. The body collects sensory data, which cause che mind co experience sighcs, sounds, text ures, a nd odors; and che cho ices, be- liefs, a nd desires of che m ind cause che body co respond co che world. A human being, then, is a fusion of body a nd mi nd, but che essential person, che self, is pure mind, an immortal soul. You a re, in che famous ph rase, a "ghost in che machi ne." Desca rtes fo rmulated his t ype of d ualism in che seven teenth century \vhen che find ings of science and che doctrines of traditional religion seeme.d co be in conflict. H is dualism helped co ease che tens io n benveen chem by placi ng science and rel ig ion in different, noncompeti ng realms. Science cou ld concern itself w it h che p hysical- wich biology, physics, astronomy, a nd che like. Religio n could focus on che men tal, on che domai n of immor tal sou ls and religious mora lity. Substance Dualism 2 11 You d o n't h ave a soul. You arc a Soul. You have a body. - C. S. Lewis 212 Chapter 4 Mind and Body 4 Is your existing w ith· out a body really con · ceivable? That is, can you conceive of your mind existing without any physical properties at al I, w ithout even a ghostlike quasi· physica l presence? D escart es offers several a rg umenrs to support his theory of m ind, including \vh at philosophers call his conceivability argument. In it Descartes contends that \Ve cannot be just phys ical bod ies, as the materialists believe. We must be distinct from ou r bod ies-we must be nonphysical m inds. This is ho\v D escart es lays out the argument: Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason And then , examining attentively that wh ich I was, I saw that I cou ld conceive that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I m ight be; but yet that I could not for all that conceive that I was not. On the contrary, I saw from t he very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other th ings, it very evidently and certain ly followed that I was; on the other ha nd if I had only ceased from th inking, even if all the rest of wha t I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for th inking that I had existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of wh ich is to th ink, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material th ing; so that this 'me,' that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the sou l would not cease to be what it is.' Descartes reasons that it is conceivable that he could exist without his body, and that whatever is conceivable is logically possible. (For example, s ilver unicorns are conceivable and thus logically possible; square circles are inconceivable and therefore logically impossible.) So it is logically possible that he cou ld exist without h is body. If it is logically possible t hat he could exist \Vithout his body, then he is not identical to his body. His nonphysical mind and his physical body are distinct; he is therefore an immaterial, th inking thing. Dualism is true. Philosophers have t aken issue w ith th is argument. Their main criticism is that Descartes' first prem ise (that it is conceivable that he could exist without h is body) is dubious. Theodore Schick, Jr., states the complaint like this: Theodore Schick, Jr., Doing Philosophy The crucial prem ise here is that d isembod ied existence is conceiva ble. Is it? Try the thought experiment yourself. Imagine you have no body- no arms, no legs, no hands, no eyes, no ears, and so on. Can you do it? If so, are you really imagining existing with- out a body, or are you im agining existing in a ghostlike quasi -physical body? Remem- ber, Cartesian m inds have no physica l attributes, not even a location in space. You wou ld n' t be able to do anyth ing (besides th ink) or fee l anything because you wou ldn't have a body. You wouldn't be able to commun icate with others unless you were given Substance Dualism 213 some sort of telepathic ability. But, even then , it's unclear how you wou ld identify () . . . f h c h Id h · h b d I · · My m md 1s incapable o t em , ,or t ey, too, wou ave ne1t er a o y nor a ocat1on in space! . . h h. If disembodied existence is not conceivable, then it is not logically possible and Descartes' argument fa ils. Desca rtes also cries co prove his dualist theory us ing che divisibility argument. The crux of chis reasoning is chat bodies and minds muse be different things (and thus dualism is true) because bodies can be divided into pares but minds cannot. As Descartes says, Rene Descartes, Meditations on Fir,t Philosophy In order to begin th is exam ination, then , 1 here say, in the fi rst place, that there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by natu re a lways d i- vis ible, and the mind is entirely ind ivisible . For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a th inking th ing, 1 cannot distingu ish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clea rly one and entire; and a lthough the whole mind seems to be un ited to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the facult ies of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc . cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind wh ich employs itself in wi lli ng and in feeling and understanding. But it is qu ite oth- erwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these imaginable by me which my mind cannot eas ily divide into parts, and which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible; this wou ld be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already lea rned it from other sou rces.1 H ere Descartes uses che logical principle chat if two chin gs are one and che same, then they muse have exactly che same properties; conversely, if they have different properties, they muse not be one and che same. So he argues chat if minds are not divisible into pares, and if bod ies are divis ible into parts (since they a re spatially ex- t ended), then minds and bodies do not have che same properties. They are t herefore distinct, and dualism is true. Bodies are divis ible, but is it really true chat minds are indivisible? Two faces give critics reason co chink chat minds are actually div isible. First, psychiatrists have idencifie.d a form of mental illness known as multiple personality disorder in \vhich a person has at lease one a lternate personality that can direct behavior. Those \vho have this disorder a re said to lack the normal unity of consciousness; their m inds appear co be divided. Second, a person's consciousness ca n apparently be divided through a kind of brain surgery known as cerebral comm issurocomy. The procedu re, often performed co treat epilepsy, severs che cord of nerves linking t he b ra in's two hemispheres . The result is a breakdown in communication between che hemispheres, concc1vmg s ue a c mg as a soul. I may be in e rro r, and man may have a soul; bur I simp ly do not believe ir. -Thomas A. Edison Though t is a secretion of th e b rain. -Pierre-Jean Georges Caban is 5 Is Descartes cor- rect t hat the mind is ind ivisib le? Do the counterexamples of mu ltiple personalities and cerebral commis- surotomy show that t he min d can in fact be d ivided? 214 Chapter 4 Mind and Body WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE? The Immortal Soul Notions about che soul and its possible i1n1nortalicy have changed through che centuries and have been subject ro intense debate and philosophical inquiry. Many ancient Greeks thought chat the soul is a mate- rial thing char animates bodies and is dispersed (and thus destroyed) like s,noke after che body d ies. Plato taught chat che soul is an essential, nonphysical part of an organism and, unlike 1narerial things, is not subject co dissolution. The soul then is immortal, although it is fused with the body for awh ile. Bue souls are nor restricted co persons; living things of all kinds can also have souls. Aristotle had very differen t ideas about souls. To him, che soul is the form of che body- that is, che abil it ies or capacit ies 1nanifesred through che living body. And since che sou l requires a body to ,nan ifest itself, rhe sou l perishes when che body dies. Aristotle therefore rejects che possibility of i,nmorcaliry, che trans,n igracion of sou ls, and disembodied existence. The biblical account of che soul is ar odds with che sou l- body dual ism of 1nuch contemporary choughc. Biblica l scholars generally agree that che scriptural view of body and soul is monisric, not dual istic. The Figure 4.4 A depiction of the soul leaving the body- a dualism at odds with the biblical account of the soul. person is a sing le, undivided entity- a un ity of soul and body. Ir is nor che case chat che sou l takes up residence in the body then departs at death co live a separate, im,norca l existence. Body and sou l are one, both therefore being subject co d isintegration ,vhen a person d ies. The prevai ling Christian view closely follows Plato's and Descartes' dual istic notion: The sou l is che essentia l component of a hu,nan being, a substance both im,nacerial and immor- tal, ,vhile che body is ,nacerial and inessential. Most contemporary philosophers are materia lises regarding ,n ind and body and there- fore reject che substance dualism of Descartes and Western religion. They are also skeptica l of a ny claims of im,norcalicy. Do you believe that you have an immortal soul? If so, on what grounds? If you do not, why not? Of the theories of soul just mentioned, which do you think is most p lausible? Why? third ventric.:_:le>,r;:—-
optic chiasm
hypophysis
(pituitary gland)
cerebral cortex
pineal gland
hypothalamus
optic chiasm \ Ii,..,,;.~””
hypothalamus
Figure 4.5 Descartes t hought that th e material and immaterial substances came together in
the pineal g land . Does this notion remove the mystery of how interaction happens?
which in tu rn leaves the patient with nvo d istinct domains of consciousness. Th is
seems to sho\v that the mind is indeed divisible.
In add ition to trying to underm ine Descartes’ arguments for his theory of mind,
philosophers have also launched some strong arguments against it. The primary at-
tack of th is kind concerns the problem of mind-body interaction. In Cartesian du-
alism, mind and body are thought to be two radically different kinds of substances
that someho\v interact causally. But ho\v is s uch interactio n possible? H o\v can an
object w ith physical properties affect somethi ng \vith no physical properties what-
soever? H o\v can a mysterious, nonphysical reality influence any event involvi ng
atoms, cells, blood, a nd bone? D escartes’ theory doesn’t expla in how m ind-body
interaction occurs and is therefore regarded by many philosophers as inadequate.
He does posit a weak explanation of the causal con nection benveen m ind and body
by claim ing that the nvo substa nces intermingle in a small appendage of the brain
kno\vn as the pineal gland. But many find this incredible. Whatever the gland’s
function (which was unknown in Descartes’ day), it still is a physical thing, and p ro-
posing it as the site of physical/nonphysical interaction does not banish the mystery
of ho\v the material can affect the immaterial.
A nother common charge against Car tesian dualism (or any kind of dualism
in which the physical and nonphys ical affect each other) is that it is incompatible
with science. For example, the theory is said to violate the scientific pr inciple of the
causal closure of the physical, \vhich affirms a phys ical cause for every physical
Substance Dualism 215
6 Is it possib le that
nonphysi ca l (mental)
causes do not exist,
t hat the world conta ins
on ly physical causes
and physica l effects?
Causal closure of t he
physical is the p rinciple
that , he world is a closed
sysrem of physical cause.,
and effecLs.

216 Chapter 4 Mind and Body
Am ong the facts of the
u niverse to be accoun ted
for, it m ay be said, is
Min d; and it is self evident
that noth ing can h ave p ro·
duced M ind but M ind .
-John SLuart Mill
John R. Searle,
Mind
effect. The world is a closed system of physical causes and effects; nonphysical
(mental) causes are superfluous. It seems that \Ve can explain every event without
reference to the immaterial. For any physical effect, scientists can in principle map
out a detailed series of physical causes leadi ng up to that effect. If so, there seems
to be no need for mental causes.
In addition, substance dualism, with its insistence on nonphysical causes of phys-
ical even rs, seems to con flict with a basic law of science-the law of t he conser vation
of mass-energy. John Searle explains the problem like this:
John R. Searle, Mind
All forms of substance dualism inherit Descartes’ problem of how to give a coherent
account of the causal relations between the soul and the body, but recent versions have
an additiona l prob lem . It seems impossible to make substance duali sm consistent
with modern physics. Physics says that the amount of matter/energy in the universe is
constant; but substance dua lism seems to imply that there is another kind of energy,
mental energy or sp iritual energy, that is not fi xed by physics. So if substance duali sm
is true then it seems that one of the most fundamental laws of physics, the law of con-
servation, must be fa lse.•
One way that dualists of any stripe can respond to criticisms concerning mind-
body interaction and incompatibility \vith science is to embrace epiphenomenalism,
the view that mental p roperties do not affect physical p roperties. If the body impacts
the mind, but the mind does not impact the body, then there is no problem with
ho\v the m ind and body interact, and the principle of the causal closu re of the physi-
cal is not violated.
But epiphenomenalism seems to many theorisrs to be a denial of common sense.
Searle is one of them :
On this view [epiphenomena lism] consciousness exists alright, but it is like the froth
on the wave or the flash of sunlight reflected off the surface of the water. It is there but
it does not rea lly matter. It is an epiphenomenon. But th is seems too counter intuitive.
Every time I decide to raise my arm, it goes up. I do not say, “Well , that’s the th ing
about the old arm. Some days she goes up and some days she doesn’t.” s

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4 .2
I. What is Descartes’ conceivability argument? Do you think it is
successful in showing that some form of dualism must be true? Why
or why not?
2. Evaluate Descartes’ divisibility a rgument. Are its p remises true? Does
it show that bodies are divisible but minds are not?
3. What is Descartes’ explanation of ho\v m ind and body interact? Is it
plausible?
4. Suppose Descartes is right that bodies are divisible and minds are not.
Would this sho\v that minds can exist independently from bodies?
Why or why not?
5. What is epiphenomenalism? Is it an adequate explanation of the rela-
tionship between mind and body? Is it a better or \vorse explanation
than Cartesian d ualism?
4.3 MIND- BODY IDENTITY
The favorite view among materialists is the identity theory, \vhich says that mind
states are brain states. Our apparent sensations, thoughts, perceptions, and emotions
(so-called phenomenal consciousness) are not immaterial phenomena d istinct from
the material brain. These mental states are identical to physical brain states, just as
lightning is identical to an electrical discharge. A pai n or a perception is nothing
more than a certain process going on in the brain’s neu rons. J. J.C. Smart, one of the
first philosophers to articu late the identity theory, explai ns it like th is:
J. J. C. Sm art, “Sens ations a nd Bra in Proce sses”
Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain processes.
It is not the thesis that, for example, “after-image” or “ache” means the same as “brain
process of sort X” (where “X” is replaced by a description of a certain sort of brain
process). It is that, in so far as “afterimage” or “ache” is a report of a process, it is a
report of a process that happens to be a bra in process. It follows that the thesis does
not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain
processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that
of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is
a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are noth-
ing over and above bra in processes. Nations are noth ing “over and above” citizens,
but this does not prevent t he logic of nation statements being very different from t he
Mind- Body Identity 2 1 7

21 8 Chapter 4 Mind and Body
7 It seems that
thought s and mental
images are not located
in physical space. Does
this show that Smart
is mistaken about
thoughts and mental
images being bra in
processes?
logic of citizen statements, nor does it insure the translata bility of nation statements
into citizen statemen ts. (I do not, however, wish to asser t that the relation of sensation
statements to brain-process statements is very like that of nation sta temen ts to citizen
statements. Nations do not just happen to be nothing over and above citizens, for ex-
ample. I bring in the “nations” example merely to ma ke a negative point: that the fac t
that t he logic of A-statements is different from that of B-statements does not insure
that A’s are anything over and a bove B’s .)
When I say that a sensa tion is a brain process or that lightning is an e lectric dis-
charge, I am using “is” in the sense of strict identity. Oust as in the- in this case
necessary- proposition “7 is identical with the small est prime number greater than 5.”)
When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an e lectric discharge
I do not mean just t hat the sensation is somehow spatia lly or tem po rally continuous
with the brain process or th at the lightn ing is just spa tiall y o r tem porall y continuous
with the di scharge.6
The identity theory avoids some of t he cr iticisms directed at Cartesian dualism
(that m ind-body interaction is mysterious and that the causal closure principle is
violated) and at logical behav iorism (that mental causat ion is ignored or denied).
And it explains how ment al states affect behavior, ho\v mental states can cause other
mental states, and \vhy many mental states are known to be correlat ed with b ra in
processes.
But some philosophers reject the t heory using conceivability arguments (a la Des-
cartes) to t ry to show that the theory is deeply fla\ved. A well-known vers ion of
such an argument comes from David Chalmers, who wields it against all materialist
views, not just the identity theory. His argument is based o n, strangely enough, the
poss ibil ity of zombies:
David J. Cha lmers , The Conscious Mind
.. . [C]onsider the logical possibility of a zombie: someone or something physically
identical to me (or to any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences
altogether. At the global level, we can consider the logica l possib il ity of a zombie world:
a world physically identical to ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences a t
all. In such a world, everybody is a zombie.
So let us consider my zombie twin . This creature is molecule for molecule identical
to m e, and identical in all the low-level properties postulated by a completed physics,
but he lacks conscious experience en tirely. (Some might prefer to call a zombie “it,”
but I use the persona l pronoun; I have grown qui te fond of my zombie twin.) To fix
ideas, we can imagi ne that right now I am gazing out the window, experiencing some
nice green sensa tions from seeing the trees outside, hav ing pleasant taste experiences
through munching on a chocolate bar, and fee ling a du ll ach in g sensa tion in my righ t
shoulder.
What is going on in my zombie twin ? He is physica lly identical to me, and we may
as well suppose th at he is embedded in an identical environment. He will certainly be
identica l to me functionally: he will be processing the same sort of information, reacting

in a simi lar way to inputs, with his in ternal configurations being mod ified appropriately
and with indistinguishable behavio r resulting. He will be psychologically identical to
me .. .. He will be perceiving the trees o utside, in t he functio nal sense, and tasting the
chocolate, in the psychological sense. All of this foll ows logica lly from th e fact that he
is physically identical to me, by virtue of the functional analyses of psychologica l no-
t io ns. He will even be “consci ous” in t he functio nal senses described earlier- he will
be awake, able to report the contents of his internal states, able to focus attention in
va rious places, and so on. It is just t hat none of this fun ctioni ng will be accompanied
by any real conscious experience. There wil l be no phenomenal feel. There is no thing it
is like to be a zombie.7
Chalmers asserts chat it is conceivable chat such a zombie cou ld exist. That is, it
is conceivable chat there could be a creat ure physically identical co him in every \vay
but lack ing the mental states that constitute conscious experience. If chis zombie is
conceivable, he says, then it is logically possible that the zombie could exist. If it is
logically possible chat the zombie could exist, then p hysical states muse not be es-
sential co conscious experience. Materialism, therefore, must be false.
This is how Chalmers outlines the a rgument:
1. It is conceivable that t here be zombies .
2. If it is conceivable that t here be zombies, it is metap hysicall y possible that
t here be zombies .
3. If it is metap hysically possible that there be zombies, t hen consciousness is
nonphysical.
4 . Consciousness is no nphysical.8
How m ight a materialise respond co this a rgument? One
way is co charge chat C halmers is mistaken, that h is zom-
bies are actually inconceivable and therefore not logically
possible. Many people, ho\vever, \vou ld probably disagree.
Can you imagine an android like Star Trek’s Mr. Data chat
is phys ically identical co you but lacking any trace of inter-
nal conscious experience?
Another kind of attack aga inst the identity theory
(as \vell as ocher materialise vie\vs) comes in t he form of
knowledge arguments. The bas ic line is chat bra ins have
t he p roperty of being k nown t h rough empirical investi-
gation, but mental states cannot be known chis way. The
qualitative content of mental states has co be experienced
subjectively, from the inside. And s ince bra in states and
mental states have different properties in th is way, b rain
states and mental states are not identical. So the identity
theo ry is fa lse.
M ind- Body Identity 2 1 9
8 Can you conceive
of your zombie twin?
If so, w hat does that
prove?
If the h uma n mind was
simple e nough to u nder-
stan d, we’d be too simple
to understand it.
-Emerson Pugh
Thomas Nagel makes such an a rgument using a pro-
vocat ive thought exper iment about bats . Presumably bats
have expe rience (some level of consciousness), he says, al-
though it is radically diffe rent from our own. To say chat
bats have experience is co say chat “there is something
Figure 4.6 David Chalmers, d istinguished prof es-
sor of philosophy and d irector of the Centre for Con-
sciousness at the Australian National University.

220 Chapter 4 Mind and Body
Aristotle was fam ous fo r
knowing everything. He
taught ,hat the brain cxisL< merely to cool ,he blood and is not involved in the process of thinking. This is ttuc o nly of certain per.sons. -Will Cuppy Figure 4 .7 Ho llywood zombies like these a re a fa r cry f rom Chalmers's kind of zombies, which are physically ide nt ical to normal people. Does t he possib ility of such zombies show that mate· rialism is false? that it is like t o be a bat." Th ro ugh scientific st udy, we could co me to know everything there is t o know about bat neurophysiology and all the othe r facts of bat biology. N evertheless, there would still be something that ,ve ,vou ld not a nd could not know: what it feels like to be a bat. The bat's conscious experience ,vou ld be beyond our ken. We could say the same about humans. If we knew all the facts about thei r phys ical states we still would not know all there is to kno ,v about their m enta l states. The refore, it cannot be the case that physical states and mental st at es a re identical. Nagel decla res, Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, o r a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that em body a particu lar point of view .... Th is bears directly on the mi nd- body problem. For if the facts of experience-facts about what it is like for the expe riencing organ ism- are accessible only fro m one point of view, then it is a myste ry how the true cha racter of experiences cou ld be revea led in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domain of o bjective facts par excellence- the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with diffe ring perceptual systems. There are no comparable imagi· native obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat ne urophysiology by hu man scientists, and inte lligent bats or Martians might learn more about the human brain t han we ever will. .. . In the case of experience, on the other hand , the connexion with a particular point of view seem s m uch closer. It is difficu lt to understand what cou ld be m ea nt by the objective character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view fro m which its subject apprehends it. After all, what wou ld be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat? But if experience does not have, in additio n to its subjective character, an objective nature that can be apprehended from many differ- ent points of view, then how can it be supposed that a Martian investigating my brain might be observing physical processes which were my mental processes (as he m ight observe physica l processes which were bolts of lightn ing) , only from a different point of view? How, fo r t hat matter, cou ld a human physiologist observe them fro m another point of view?9 Some mater ialises rebut this kind of argu ment by insisting chat, contrary co Nagel and ochers, consciousness is not a k ind of experience (qualia) that is over and above the b ra in's cogn itive or behavioral funct ions. Consciousness just is che b ra in's cogn it ive or behavioral functions. Once we k now a ll about the brain's basic functions-how it accesses information, d iscrim inates stimuli, controls behavior, monit ors its internal states, and the li ke-\ve k no\v all there is co know about con- sciousness . And we can know about these things th rough object ive, third-person . . . 1nvest1gat1ons. WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4.3 1. If Nagel chi nks chat bats have m i nds (chat is, conscious experience), \vhac ocher creatures m use he admit have m inds? Do wrens have minds? G rasshoppers? Lobsters? 2. M use humans have immat erial m inds in o rde r co fa ll in love, \vrice a song, o r remembe r smelli ng a rose? Smart chinks not. Do you agree? 3. Imagine a space alien coming co earth and scientists being able co exam ine its internal organs. And suppose nothi ng resembli ng che huma n b ra in could be fo und. Accord ing co che identit y theory, \vou ld chis being have a mind? Imagine t h at its behavior was in most ways indistinguishable from human behavior. Wou ld you conclude chat it had a mind? 4. Brain phenomena have a location in space, but thoughts and percep- tions seem not co have a location in space. Does t h is show chat the ident it y theory is fa lse? W hy or w hy not? 5. When your body dies, w ill you r mind sti ll exist ? H ow would identity theorises answer chis? Is their answer plausible? Mind- Body Identity 221 9 Do bats have con - sciou s experience? Why o r why n ot? Figure 4.8 Is there so mething that it is like to be a bat ? If there is a nd w e nonbats could never know w hat it fe e ls like to be a bat despite our expert knowle dge of objective bat facts, what does that prove about t he plausibi lity of materialism? 222 Chapter 4 Mind and Body The b rain may be regard ed as a kind of parasite of the . . o rganism, a pensio ner, as it were, w ho dwells w ith the body. -Arthur Schopenhauer 4.4 THE MIND AS SOFTWARE Func tionalism says that mental states are neither b ra in states nor behavioral states. They are states that h ave causal functions, and it's possible for these functions to play out in just about any kind of stuff, physical or no nphysical (although contempora ry funct ionalists say the stuff is physical). That is, a mind is the functions that t he b ra in carries out, a system of causal relationships that is multip ly realizable. A mental state is therefore a causal sequence of inputs and outputs-initial stimuli that cause certain internal events or states (such as beliefs o r d es ires) that in turn cause exter nal behavior. For example, pain is what is caused by some kind of unpleasant stimu li (such as a burn to Rosa's h and), which causes other mental states (s uch as Rosa's be- lieving that she should put ice on the burn), which causes external behavior (as when she reaches fo r ice in the freezer). Pain is whatever manifests such t ypical fun ctional roles in an organ ism, and anyth ing that exhibits these kinds of functions is a mind. H ere is Jerry Fodor explain ing the theory and the reasons why he thinks it is superior to both logical behaviorism and the identity theory: Jerry A. Fodor, " T he M ind-Body Problem" In the past fifteen years a philosophy of mind called functionalism that is nei ther du - alist nor materialist has emerged from philosophical reflection on developments in artifi cial intell igence, computational theory, linguistics, cybernetics and psychology. All these fields, which are collectively known as the cognitive sciences, have in common a certain level of abstraction and a concern with systems that process information. Functio nalism, which seeks to provide a philosophical acco unt of this level of abstrac- tion, recognizes the possibi lity that systems as diverse as hum an beings, calculating m achines and disembodied spiri ts co uld all have mental states. In the funct ionalist view the psychology of a system depends not on the stuff it is made of (living cells, m ental or spiritual energy) but on how t he stuff is put together .... All of this emerged ten or fifteen years ago as a nasty d ilemma for the materialist progra m in the phi losophy of mind. O n t he one hand the identity theorist (and not the logical behaviorist) had got right t he causa l character of t he interactions of mind and body. On t he other the logical behaviorist (and not the identity t heo rist) had got right the relatio nal cha racte r of mental properties. Functionalism has appare ntly been able to resolve the d ilemma. By stressing the distinction compu ter science draws between hardware and software the functional ist can make sense of both the causa l and the relationa l character of the mental. The in tu ition underl ying functionalism is that what determines the psychologi- cal type to which a menta l particular belongs is the causal role of t he particu lar in the m ental life of the organism. Functional individu ation is differentiation with respect to causal role. A headache, fo r exam ple, is iden tified with the type of m ental state that among other things causes a dispos ition for taking aspirin in people who believe aspi· rin relieves a headache, causes a desire to rid oneself of t he pain one is feeling, often causes someone who speaks English to say such things as " I have a headache" and is brought o n by overwork, eyestrai n, and tension . This list is presumably not complete. The Mind as Software 223 More will be known about t he nature of a headache as psychologica l and physiological research discover more about its causal role. Functionalism construes the concept of causal role in such a way that a mental state can be defined by its causa l relations to other mental states. In th is respect funct iona lism is comp letely d ifferent from logical behaviorism. Another major dif- ference is that funct iona lism is not a reductionist thesis . It does not foresee, even in principle, the elim ination of mental istic concepts from the explanatory apparatus of psycho logical theories.'0 Despite these advantages of functionalism, critics claim that it has a fatal flaw: It fa ils to account for the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. Thus, the most common arguments against it (absent qualia a rgumenrs) try to show that the theory leaves out conscious experience, or qualia, the seemingly obvious, essential feature of mind. The gist of these arguments is that functionalism must be false because it is possible to introduce an appropriate functional organ ization into some system and yet, contrary to functionalist claims, no mental states are brought into existence. Consider Ned Block's absent qualia argument in the form of a famous thought experiment: Ned Block, "Troubles with Functional ism" Suppose we convert t he government of Ch ina to funct iona lism, and we convince its of- ficia ls that it wou ld enormously enhance their international prestige to realize a human mind for an hour. We provide each of the bill ion people in China (I chose Ch ina be- cause it has a bill ion inhabitants) with a specially designed two-way radio that connects t hem in the appropriate way to other persons and to [an] artificial body .... [W]e ... arrange to have letters displayed on a series of satellites placed so that they can be seen from anywhere in China. Surely such a system is not physically impossible. It could be funct ionally equivalent to you for a short time, say an hour .... What makes the homuncu li-headed [many-headed] system ... just described a prima facie counter example to (machine) functional ism is that there is prima facie doubt whether it has any mental states at all-especially whether it has what philosophers have variously call ed "qualitative states," "raw feels," or "immediate phenomenological quali- ties." (You ask: What is it that ph ilosophers have called qua litative states? I answer, on ly half in jest. As Louis Armstrong said when asked what jazz is, "If you got to ask, you ain't never gonna get to know.") In Nagel's terms, there is a prima facie doubt whether there is anyth ing which it is like to be the homunculi-headed system." If functiona lism is true, the proper arrangement of inputs and outputs among the billion people should produce a mind having qualitative mental states. That is, from the one billion Chinese people there shou ld arise one more person-the one b rought forth by the ,vhole system's funct ional organization. But, says Block, what makes the Chinese brain a counterexample to functionalism is that it is logically possible that th is "brain" has no qualitative mental states at a ll. If th is is the case, then m erely being in certain funct ional states does not guarantee being in any quali- tative mental states, and functionalism is false. 10 Is functiona lism really a better theory of mind than logical behaviorism and t he ident ity t heory, as Fodor says? 11 Does it seem to you t hat the Chinese brain lacks qualitative states? If not, why not? I have a theory about the human mind . A brain is a lot like a compu te r. Ir will o nly take so man y facts, and the n it will go on overload and blow u p. -Erma Bombeck 224 Chapter 4 Mind and Body WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE? Al and Human Rights Should machines with very advanced artificial intelligence be granted the same rights as hu- 1nan persons? Should conscious robots be created with the sa1ne respect char we ,vould give an adult human? In che Al ,vorld, such questions are being taken seriously right now-and the answers are, as you 1nighr expect, varied. Here's a story about a knowledgeable Oxford 1nache1nacician who has so,ne answers of his o,vn: With huge leaps taking place in the world of artificia l intell igence (Al) , right now, experts have started asking questions about the new forms of protec- tion we might need against t he formidable smarts and potential dangers of computers and robots of t he nea r future. But do robots need protection from us too? As the "m in ds" of machines evolve ever closer to something t hat's ha rd to tell apart from human intel- ligence, new generations of technology may need to be afforded the kinds of mora l and legal protections we usually thin k of as " hu man" rights, says mathematician Marcus du Sau toy from t he University of Oxford in t he UK. Du Sautoy thinks that once the sophistication of computer th inking reaches a level basica lly akin to huma n consciousness, it's our duty to look after the welfare of machines, much as we do that of people. Figure 4.9 The intell igent humanlike machine Sonny from the movie I, Robot. The Mind as Software 225 "It's getting to a point where we might be able to say this thing has a sense of itself, and maybe there is a threshold moment where sudden ly this consciousness emerges," du Sautoy told media ... t his week. "And if we understand these things are having a leve l of consciousness, we might well have to in troduce rights. It's an exciting time." Du Sautoy thinks the conversation about Al rights is now necessa ry due to recent advancements made in fields such as neuroscience. The mathema- tician, who appeared at t he literature festival to promote his new book, What We Cannot Know, says new techniq ues have given us a clearer understand - ing than ever before of t he nature of mental processes such as thought and consciousness- meaning t hey're no longer reserved solely for philosophers. " The fascinating thing is that consciousness for a decade has been something that nobody has gone anywhere near because we didn't know how to measure it," he said. " But we're in a golden age. It's a bit like Ga lileo with a telescope. We now have a telescope into the brain and it's given us an opportunity to see things t hat we've never been able to see before." That greater in sight in to what consciousness is means we shou ld re- spect it in all its forms, du Sautoy argues, regardless of whether its basis for being is organic or synthetic. While the notion of a machine being protected by human rights sounds like something out of science fiction, it's actually a fast-approach ing pos- sibil ity that scientists have specu lated about for decades. The big question remains, when will computer systems become so advanced that t heir artifi- cial consciousness ought to be recognised and respected? Various commentators put t he timeframe from 2020 through to some time in the next 50 years, although the rapid pace with which Al is progressing- be that playing games, learning to communicate, or operat- ing among us undetected- means that nobody really kn ows for sure.* In the 2004 movie/, Robot, the robot called Sonny seems to be both con- scious and intelligent. lf that's so, is he a person with full moral rights, and should any human regard him as such? Can an intelligent machine be right· fully regarded as a person even though it is made of metal and plastic, not biological tissue? If in the future, you meet a superintell igent, conscious ro- bot, would you regard her as a person-or treat her as you would a personal computer or cell phone? If you owned such a robot, would it be morally right for you to, say, dismantle her to use her parts for some other purpose? *Peter Dockrill, "Artificial Intelligence Should Be Protected by Human Rights, Says Oxford Mathcmaticiant Science Alert, May 3 1, 2016, hnps://www.scicncc-alcrt.com/artificial· intdligcncc· should-be-protected-by-human· rights·says· oxford·mathematician. 226 Chapter 4 Mind and Body John R. Searle, Mind It is open to opponenrs of th is argument to show that it is somehow incoherent, harboring a crippling contradiction. They would need to establish that the condi- tions set forth in the Ch inese brain scenario (and similar thought experiments) are not possible. They can also allege bias: They can claim that the intuition behind Block's thought experiment seems strong only because we are prejudiced in favo r of minds like ours that arise naturally from human brains. The doctrine of functiona lism has led many ph ilosophers and researchers to see the mind as computer software. John Searle describes the early days of heady specu- lation about this ne,v perspective: John R. Sea rle, Mind It seemed that we knew the answer to the question that faced us: the way the system works is that the brain is a digital computer and what we call the "m ind" is a digital computer program or set of programs ... . [MJental states are computational states of the bra in . ... A principle that formed the foundat ion for any number of textbooks was this: the m ind is to the brain as the program is to the hardware." Searle dubbed this vie,v of the mind strong artificial intelligence (strong AI). "On the strong AI vie,v," he says, "the appropriately programmed digit al computer does not just simu late having a mind; it literally has a mind."13 The appropriately pro- grammed computer can demonstrate genuine intelligence, achieving any cognitive capacity such as understanding and believ ing. It ,vas this astonishing possibility that engendered the field of cognitive science. Many in the discipline also believed there was a way to test ,vhether a p rogrammed computer had attained true intelligence. This test is derived from the work of Alan Turing (19 12-1954), the father of contemporary computer science and the genius be- hind today's computers. He invented the Turing mach ine, a theoretical model that became the blueprint for modern digital computers (,vhich are al l basically Turing machines), and then he devised the Turing test, a method that he thought could deter- mine ,vhether the machines are intelligent. Searle expla ins: There are different versions of [the test], but the basic idea is this: we can side-step all the great debates about the other minds problem , about whether or not there really is any thinking going on in the machine, whether the machine is really intelligent, by simply asking ourselves , Can the mach ine perform in such a way that an expert cannot distingu ish its performance from a human performance? If the machine responds to questions put to it in Chinese as well as a native Chinese speaker, so that other native Chinese speakers could not tell the difference between the machine and a native Chi- nese speaker, then we wou ld have to say that the mach ine understood Chinese.'• Those who took the strong AI pos ition bel ieved that eventually a digital com- puter would be able to pass t he Turing test and thus prove that it had a mind. Searle, ho,vever, rejects strong AI and tries to refute it with his classic thought experiment The Mind as Software 227 PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK Alan Turing Alan Turing ( 1912-1954) was the father of che 1nod- ern con1pucer, inventor of che Turing ,nachine, and breaker of che "unbreakable" codes produced by che Gennan Enigma cipher machine in World \Xfar II. Long before his forn1al education at King's College, Cambridge, he ,vas chinking about difficult ques- t ions in philosophy, logic, machen1acics, and science. Figure 4.10 Alan Turing (19 12- 1954). Some say his greatest criu1nph was the invention of the Turing ,nachine, a theorized device (nor actually in existence ar che rime) char could compute the answers co any co1npucable problem. Today's computers are essentially Turing n1achines ,vith universal application. In World War II, Turing ,vorked for che British government deciphering codes. Germany was using a code 1nechanism, che Enigma ,nachine, char could create advanced codes for ,vartime messages. The Enigma codes were thought co be unbreakable-bur Turing broke che,n anY'vay. By doing so, he ,nay have helped co shorten the war. In 1950 Turing publ ished a groundbreaking paper in a major philosophy jour- nal. In it he details che Turing rest, a procedure for discovering ,vhecher machines can ,nake a believable simulation of rhe human 1nind. The Turing rest (also known as the imitation game) had a powerful influence on che field of AI and ,vas even featured in che 2014 1novie about Turing called (what else?) 1he Imitation Game. Despite his genius and his contributions ro che ,var effort, Turing ,vas arrested and stripped of his security clearance by the British government for his homosexu- al icy (then a crime in che UK). He ,vas jai led and subjected co chemical castration through huge doses of estrogen. After che authorities released him from jail, he cook his own life. In 2013 he ,vas given a posthumous royal pardon. kno,vn as che "Chinese room." The idea is chat if strong AI is true, then a person should be able co attain a cognit ive capacity (chinking, understanding, believing, ecc.) simply by implementing an appropriate computer p rogram. Searle chinks che thought experiment shows chat no such capacities are achieved. C -onsider: I do not, as a matter of fact, understand any Chinese at all. I cannot even tell Chi· nese writing from Japanese wri ting. But, we imagine that I am locked in a room with boxes fu ll of Ch inese symbols , and I have a ru le book, in effect, a computer program, that enab les me to answer questions put to me in Chinese. I receive symbols that, unknown to me, are questions; I look up in the rule book what I am supposed to do; I pick up symbols from the boxes , manipu late them according to the ru les in the pro· gram, and hand out the requ ired symbols, which are interpreted as answers. We can John R. Searle, Mind 228 Chapter 4 Mind and Body John R. Searle, Mind PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK John R. Searle John Searle (b. 1932), an American philosopher, has had an extraordinary influence on che ph ilosophy of language, che philosophy of mind, and philosoph ical ideas about social reality. He was born in Denver, Colo- rado, but was educated moscly a t the Universicy of Oxford, where he obtained h is first teaching position Figure 4.11 John Searle (b. 1932), professor of the philosophy of mind and language at the University of California, Berkeley. at Christ Church. For over forty years he has been a philosophy professor at che University of Cal ifornia , Berkeley, ,vhile occasionally serving as a visiting pro- fessor at ,nany ocher universities both in che United Scares and abroad. In che philosophy of mind, Searle has ,nade his mark by offering a widely read and debated criticism of strong AI and by developing innovative theories of consciousness and incencionalicy. Against strong Al , he launched h is most fa,nous salvo- the Chinese room argument. Through it, he argues chat an appropriately program,ned computer cannot acquire a cogn itive capacity such as understanding a nd believi ng. That is, stron g AI is fa lse. A progra,nmed co,npurer, he says, works by manipulating che syntax of formal symbols, but char is a far cry fro,n semantics, which concerns che ,neaning of che sy,nbols. His vie,v of consciousness is chat it cannot be reduced co che physica l (brains or neurons). Ir is a pheno,nenon chat can only be observed fro,n a subjective, first- person perspective. Ir has a qualitative feel to it chat ,nay e,nerge fro,n che physical bur cannot be reduced to it. Searle is the author of Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004); 7he Rediscovery of the Mind (1994); 7he Mystery of Consciousness (2002); Mind, language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (1998); and Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983). suppose t hat I pass the Turi ng test for understand ing Ch i nese, bu t, all t he same, I do not understand a word of Ch inese. And if I do not understand Ch inese on the bas is of imp lementing the right comp uter program, then neithe r does any other comp uter just on t he bas is of implementing t he program, beca use no computer has anyth ing tha t I do not have. You can see t he d ifference between computation and real understa nd ing if you imagine what it is li ke for me also to answer question s in Engli sh. Imagine that in the same room I am given questions in En glish, which I then answer. From the outs ide my answers to the Engl ish and the Ch inese questions are equa lly good. I pass the Turing test for both. But from the ins ide, there is a tremendous difference. What is the d iffer- ence exactly? In Engli sh , I understand what the words mea n; in Ch inese, I understand nothing. In Ch inese, I am just a computer. •s The Mind as Software 229 For Searle, the reason a computer cannot think or understa nd (and \vhy people can) is that a computer processes symbols by their physical properties (like shape, size, and order), and people process symbols by their meaning. That is, computers m anipulate symbols syntactically, according to what they look like or where they are positioned; people use symbols semantically, accord ing to \vhat they mean. "Having the symbols by themselves-j ust having the syntax-is not sufficient for havi ng the semantics," Searle says. "Merely manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee kno\vledge of \vhat they mean." 16 Searle's influential thought experiment has drawn both praise and censure. The objections a re many, and he has responded to several of them. Some say that the man in the room doesn't understand Chinese, but he \vould if the sys tem \vere con nected appropriately to the rest of the \vorld. Many others argue that the pro- gram \vould understand C hi nese if it simulated the brain processes of a C hinese speaker. Probably the most common counterargument is this: In the scenario, the man doesn't understand Chinese, but the \vhole room (the entire computational system) does. In other words, the man is merely pa rt of the whole system made up of the man, the room, the boxes of Ch inese symbols, the ru le book, and everyth ing else. The man doesn't understand Chinese, but the iuhole system does understand. Searle replies that \vhether we consider just the man in the room or the \vhole sys- tem, the result is the same: The man doesn't have access to sema ntics (the meaning of symbols), just syntax (the physical form of symbols). And if the man doesn't have any semantics, neither does the whole room. Without semantics, the system doesn't understand anything. WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4.4 1. Does the Chinese brai n thought experiment sho\v that func tionalism is fa lse? If so, how? If not, \vhere does it go wrong? 2. Searle t hinks that even if a computer passed the Turing test, that \vouldn't prove that the machi ne had cognitive capacities. W hy does he think this? Do you agree with his reasoning? 3. Is it possible for a computer to process symbols semantically the way people do? Why or why not? 4. Does Searle claim that no machine of any kind can thi nk? Is it physically possible to build a machine that is so advanced that it has conscio us experience? 5. Suppose that i nstead of hand ling symbols, the man in the Chinese room somehow s imulated nerve firings like the kind i n the hu man brain. Would the ma n then understand C hinese? 12 If a computer passed t he Tu ring test, wou Id that demonstrate t hat the computer had genui ne intell igence? If not, would passing the t est be evidence that t he computer might have genuine intelligence? 13 Does this t hought experiment show t hat functionalism is fa lse? 230 Chapter 4 Mind and Body PHILOSOPHY NOW Al, Ethics, and War Wherher strong AI (artificial intelligence) is true, and wherher advanced AI sysce,ns ,viii prove it true, is an open quesrion. But autorwmous AI sysrems- chose char can decide and act on their own-are already close at hand. They are expected co prolif- erare rapidly in rhe future, especially for milirary purposes. Patrick Lin, an expert on rhe milirary uses of aucono,nous robors, declares, "Robors are now replacing human soldiers in dull, d irry and dangerous missions, like searching runnels and caves for rerrorists, rescuing ,vounded soldiers, spy- ing on ene,nies and even killing hu,nans. In Iraq, ' • robors have defused over 10,000 roadside bombs, Figure 4.12 An Explosive ordnance Disposal Robot ,vhich are responsible for 40% of U.S . casualties gripping a mortar round. there. In 2003, rhe U.S . had no ground robots in Iraq or Afghanisran; no,v we have over 12,000 robots on the ground and 7,000 in the air in chose conAicr areas. By all accounrs, the Robotic Revolution is here." And ,vich the revolution, Lin says, comes a host of erhica l questions char were almost unrhinkable a few years ago17: • Who should be blamed and punished for imprope r robotic conduct, such as illega l or accidental killings, if a robot can make its own attack decisions? • Does the option of m ilitary robots make it easier for one nation to wage war, since t hey help reduce risk and friendly casualties , which both bear a heavy poli tica l cost? Just-war theory, wh ich dates back to Aristotle and 4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES After pondering the full range of mind-body theories (including chose covered in the p rece.ding sections), some philosophers reason like chis: Whatever che m ind is, it cannot be a Ca rtesian immaterial s ubstance that interacts causally w ith the physi- cal world. For it seems p rofoundly puzzling (not co mention highly improbable) that these two could affect one another. In addition, D escartes' dualism violates the principle of che causal closure of the physical and the law of the conservation of mass-energy. The main a lternative co D escartes' view is che identity theory, which The Mind as Properties 2 31 other ancient philosophers, requ ires war to be the very last option, since it is so terrible. • Should we allow robots to make some attack decisions by themselves- choices that would lead to human deaths? • If we seek to gu ide robots in an ethica l framework, which ethical theory shou ld we use? The obvious choices have both advantages and serious li - abilities. Shou ld we let a robot decide that it is permissible to sacrifice one innocent person (for instance, a child) to save ten or a hundred others? • If robots advance to t he point of having animal-level intelligence, or can m im ic human decision-making capabilities, or perhaps satisfy cond i- tions for personhood, wou ld we be morally requ ired to give rights to these th inking machines? After all, we already count as legal persons, and give rights to, such things as corporations and ships. And some an imals, such as dolphins and chimpanzees, arguably deserve rights, especially since they may be more capable than some rights-endowed humans who are born with or suffer severe cognitive impairments. Patrick Lin, "The Ethical War Machine, • Forbes.com, June 29, 2009, hrtp:!/1uww.forbes. com/2009!06/J8/milirary-robors-ethics-opinio11s-contrib11tors-artificial-intellige11ce-09-patrick-li11.hrml. Do you t hink autonomous robots should be trusted to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield without human supervision? Is it possible to build good moral decision-making into them? tells us that mental states are identical to phys ical brain states. But thought experi- ments featur ing Chalmers's zombie and Nagel's bat suggest that mind-brain iden- t ity is implausible. Likewise, arguments using scenarios like N ed Block's Chinese brain and John Searle's Chinese room show that functionalism is also dubious, fo r it seems poss ible to introduce an appropriate functiona l organ ization into a system and still not attain conscious experience or a cognitive capacity. According to these philosophers, the failure of these views suggests an a lternative theory of mind, one that posits no mysterious immaterial substance, den ies no scientific principles, and is neither materialist nor functiona list. We are driven, they say, to the hypothesis that It seems impossib le to make s ubs tance dualism consistent w ith modern p h)"'iCS. -John R. Searle 232 Chapter 4 Mind and Body 14 Do you agree that there is no room for a '"ghost in the machine' to do any extra causa l work"? Why or why not? No explan atio n given wh o lly in physical te rms can ever account for the e me rgence of conscious cxpcnc ncc. -David J. Chalmers the mind is an arrangement of nonphysical properties arising from-yet dependent on-physical properties. We are led, in other words, to property dualism (or nonre- ductive materialism). As Chalmers says, David J. Cha lmers, The Conscious Mind The best evidence of contemporary science tells us that the physica l world is more or less causally closed: for every physical event, there is a physical sufficient cause. If so, there is no room for a mental "ghost in the mach ine" to do any extra causal work .... In any case ... it remains plausible that physical events can be explained in physical terms, so a move to a Cartesian dualism wou ld be a stronger reaction than is warranted. The dualism implied here is instead a kind of property dual ism: conscious experi- ence involves properties of an ind ividual that are not entail ed by the phys ical properties of that individua l, although they may depend lawfu lly on those properties. Conscious- ness is a feature of the world over and above the physical features of the world. Th is is not to say it is a separate "substance"; the issue of what it would take to constitute a dualism of substances seems qu ite unclear to me. All we know is that there are proper- ties of individua ls in this world- the phenomenal properties- that are ontologically independent of physical properties.'8 The biggest challenge fac ing property dual ism is ho\v to explain the relationship benveen the mental and the physical. The main worry is that how mental properties could ever cause any changes in the physical \vorld is extremely puzzling. If the mind is entirely physical (that is, if the m ind is the brain), ho\v it causes physical move- ments of the body is no mystery: The phys ical brain causes effects in the phys ical body. But how are nerves, blood, and bone supposed to be altered by nonphys ical properties of the mind? (This p roblem is essentially the same one that Descartes faced in explain ing ho\v a nonphys ical, spiritual substance could affect a physical, extended substance.) Some property dualisrs avoid these difficulties by accepting epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that the mental does not influence the physical. But others reject epi- phenomenali.sm because it conRicrs with com monsense intuitions about the nature of human actions. It seems obvious to them that the mind does indeed bring about changes in the body-that, for example, thinking about a friend causes you to call her on the phone, o r that having a headache leads you to reach for aspirin. So these theorisrs usually embrace \vhat is called downward causation, the vie\v that causal sequences can run from mind to body (from higher levels do\vn to lower ones) as \veil as from body to mind (from lower levels up to higher ones). Their task, then, is to explain ho\v do\vnward causation can occur without runn ing afoul of the causal closure of the physical or the conservation of mass-energy. Much is riding on the outcome of the debate between materialists and property dualists. If the materialists are right, human beings are physical through and through; there is no immaterial essence or soul or self Survival after death is impossible. If The Mind as Properties 233 PHILOSOPHY LAB - Imagine chat all che critics have been ,vrong, and Bigfoot lives! One specimen- which appears co be che only one on the planet- is locked away in a government laboratory. You, however, have fu ll access ro Bigfoot because you are che scientist who muse decide how the world is supposed co creac the creature. If he has roughly the same physical and mental makeup as an ape, you ,viii recommend chat we creac him accordingly- keep him in captivity, perhaps in a zoo, and maybe do some experiments on him. He would have the same righrs char an ape does. Bue if he is obviously inrelligenr (even able ro reason) , self-conscious, self-aware, and self- mocivaced, you ,viii recommend- what? He has all the high-level characcerisrics chat we see in humans, che same rraics chat oblige us ro crear humans ,vich respect, co grant chem fu ll moral righcs- ro call chem perJons. Bue Bigfoot is not a human, though he seems co be a person. You are faced with deep philosophical questions: Can a nonhuman be a person? Do only humans have full moral rights? To answer no to the first question and yes to the second is to take the traditional view embraced by many cultures and religions. To answer yes to the first question and no to the second is to say that personhood does not depend on what species a creature is. So what are you going to do with Bigfoot? epipheno menalism is true, then our mental states can cause nothing; ou r cho ughcs have no effect on our behavior. If pro perty dualism is true, then the world is more com- plicated than most scientists believe. In addition co physical objects, the universe con- t ains nonphysica l consciousness, a mysterious something chat we barely understand. And how this immaterial reality relates co m aterial things such as human bodies and the external world is al most as baffling as D escartes' interacting substances. 234 Chapter 4 Mind and Body WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 4.5 1. Which is the better theory of mind-proper ty dualism or substance d ualism? Why? 2. Is property dualism a better theory than identity theory? Why or why not? 3. Is epiphenomen alism an adequate theory of mind? What consid era- tions count against it? 4. Is downwa rd causation possible? Can you think of a way that the m ind cou ld affect beh avior without violating the causal closure of the p hysical or the conservation of mass-energy? 5. What \vou ld be the religious or scientific implications of the identity theory? Review Notes 4.1 OVERVIEW: THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM • The mind-body problem is the iss ue of what mental phenomena really are and how they relate to the physical wo rld. The most important responses to it constitute the foremost theories of m ind in Western thought. • Substance dualism is the doctrine that mind an d body co nsist of n vo fundamen- tally d ifferent kinds of stuff, o r substances. The most influential form of this view is Cartesian dualism, \vhich says that the separate substances interact. Most philoso- phers hold to various forms of materialism (or physical ism), the vie\v that every ob- ject and event in the \vorld is physical. Major materialistic theories include logical behaviorism (the idea that mental states are dispositions to behave in a particular way in certain circumstances) and identity theory (the view that mental states are identical to physical brain states). Functionalism (the doctrine that the mind is the functions that the brain performs) is usual ly interpreted as a materialist theory. Property dualism is the vie\v that mental properties, o r feat ures, are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties. 4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM • To defend his brand of su bstance dualism, Descartes offers argumenrs based o n conceivab ility and divis ibility. Critics have found fault \Vith both of these and charge that Cartes ian dualism violates the principle of the causal closure of the physical and the law of co nservation of mass-energy. 4.3 M IND- BODY IDENTITY • The identity th eo ry avoids some of th e p roblems th at beset Cartesian d ualism, bu t th eo rists have rejected it using conceivabil ity argumenrs (such as Chalmers's zombie th ought experiment) an d kno,vledge argumenrs (such as Nagel's bat scenario). 4.4 THE M IND AS SOFTWARE • Functionalism has been accused of faili ng to account for th e subjective, qual itative feel of co nsciousness. Absent qualia argumenrs (such as Ned Block's C hinese brain th ought argument) try to demonst rate th is. Searle's Chi nese room argu ment tries to debunk th e funct ional ist view th at the mind is essentially software. 4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES • For some philosophers, property d ualism is th e most plausible th eo ry of mind, in ligh t of the fa ilures of substan ce dualism, id entity theory, and functionalism. !rs big- ges t challenge is expla ini ng the relationsh ip between th e mental and the ph ysical. WRITI NG TO UNDERSTAND: ARGUING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 4 1. Critique D escartes' substance dualism. Expla in t he t heory, discuss t he strengths a nd weaknesses of Descartes' conceivability and divisibil ity argu ments, and defen d your verdict regarding the theory's adequacy. 2. Examine C halmers's zombie a rgument against t he identity theory. Do you t hink t he a rgumen t is successfu l? Why o r ,vhy not? 3. Do you think the brai n is a computer r unni ng some so rt of sofnvare? Defend your view by evaluating the standard argumenrs for and against function alism. 4. Do you think epiphenomenalism is t rue? Evaluate what you take to be the strongest argu ments for and agai nst it and then render your verdict. 5. Do you believe t h at you have a n immortal soul? Explain a nd d efend your view, tak ing into account t he principle of the causal closure of the physical, the la,v of conservation of mass-energy, and the brain research sho,vi ng countless correlations between mental properties (bel iefs, perceptio ns, etc.) and physiological activity. Review Notes 235 236 Chapter 4 Mind and Body Key Terms Cartesian dualism The view that m ind (or soul) and body are completely in- dependent of one a nother and interact causally. (206) causal closure of the physical The prin- ciple that the ,vorld is a closed system of physical causes and effeccs. (215) epiphenomenalism The notion that mental properties do not cause anything, but merely accompany physical pro- cesses. (21 O) functionalism The view that the m ind is the functions that the brain performs. (209) identity theory The view that men- tal states are identical to physical brain states. (207) logical behaviorism The idea that men- tal states are dispositions to behave in particular ways in certain ci rcumstances. (207) materialism (o r physicalism) The doc- trine that every object and event in the ,vorld is phys ical . (206) mind- body problem The issue of what mental phenomena are and how they re- late to the physical world. (206) multiple realizability The capacity to be realized or instantiat e.cl in a variety of forms and materials. (209) property dualism The view that men- tal properties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, phys i- cal properties. (210) substance dualism The notion that m ind and body consist of two funda- mentally different kinds of stuff, o r sub- stances. (206) They're Made out of Meat 237 FICT ION They're Made out of Meat Terry Bisson Terry Bisson is a much-lauded science fiction writer, author of seven novels (includ- ing Talking Man, Fire on the Mountain, and Voyage to the Red Planet) and numerous short stories (includ ing "Bears Discover Fire" and the following selection). "They're made out of meat." 0 Meat?" "Meat. They're made out of meat." 0 Meat?" "There's no doubt about it. We picked up severa l from different parts of the planet, took them aboard our recon vessels, and probed them all the way through. They're completely meat." "That's impossible. What about the radio signa ls? The messages to the stars?" "They use the radio waves to talk, but the sig- nals don't come from them. The signals come from machines." "So who made the machines? That's who we want to contact." "They made the machines. That's what I'm trying to tell you. Meat made the machines." "That's ridiculous. How can meat make a machine? You're asking me to beli eve in sentient meat." "I'm not asking you, I'm telling you. These creatures are the only sentient race in that sector and they're made out of meat." "Maybe they're like the orfolei. You know, a carbon- based intell igence that goes through a meat stage." "Nope. They're born meat and they die meat. We studied them for several of their life spans, which didn't ta ke long. Do you have any idea what's the life span of meat?" "Spa re me. Okay, maybe they're on ly part meat. You know, like the weddilei. A meat head with an electron plasma brain inside." "Nope. We thought of that, s ince they do have meat heads, like the weddilei. But I told you, we probed them. They're meat all the way through." Terry Bisson, Omni, 1990. From http://www.terrybisson .com/page6/page6.html. "No bra in? " "O h, there's a brain all right. It's just that the bra in is made out of meat! That's what I've been trying to tell you." "So ... what does the thinking?" "You're not understanding, are you? You're refusing to deal with what I'm tell ing you. The brain does the thinking. The meat." "Thinking meat! You're asking me to believe in thinking meat!" "Yes, thinking meat! Conscious meat! Loving meat. Drea ming meat. The meat is the whole dea l! Are you beginn ing to get the picture or do I have to start a ll over?" "Om igod. You're serious then. They're made out of meat." "Thank you. Finally. Yes. They are indeed made out of meat. And they've been trying to get in touch with us for almost a hundred of their years." "Om igod. So what does this meat have in mind?" "First it wants to talk to us. Then I imagine it wants to explore the Un iverse, contact other sentiences, swap ideas and information. The usual." "We're supposed to talk to meat." "That's the idea. That 's the message they're send - ing out by rad io. 'Hello. Anyone out there. Anybody home.' That sort of thing." "They actual ly do talk, then. They use words, ideas, concepts?" "O h, yes. Except they do it with meat." "I thou ght you just told me they used radio." "They do, but what do you think is o n the rad io? Meat sounds. You know how when you slap or flap meat, it makes a noise? They talk by flapp ing their meat at each other. They can even sing by squ irting air through their meat." "Om igod. Singing meat. Th is is altogether too much . So what do you advise?" "Officially or unofficially?" 238 Chapter 4 Mind and Body "Both." "Officially, we are required to contact, welcome and log in any and all sentient races o r multibeings in th is quadrant of t he Universe, without prejud ice, fear or fa. vor. Unofficially, I advise that we erase t he records and forget the whole thing." "I was hoping you wou ld say that." "It seems harsh, but there is a limit. Do we really want to make contact with meat?" "I agree one hund red percent. What's there to say? 'Hello, meat. How's it going?' But will th is work? How many planets are we deali ng with here?" "Just one. They can travel to other planets in special meat containers, but they can't live on them. And being meat, they can only t ravel through C space. Which lim· its them to the speed of light and makes the possibility of their ever making contact pretty sli m. Infinitesima l, in fact." "So we just pretend t here's no one home in the Universe." "T hat's it." Probing Questions "Crue l. But you said it yourself, who wants to meet meat? And the ones who have been aboard ou r ves- sels, the ones you probed? You're sure they won't remember?" " They'll be considered crackpots if they do. We went into their heads and smoothed out their meat so that we're just a dream to them ." "A dream to meat! How strangely appropriate, that we should be meat's dream." "And we marked the entire sector unoccupied ." "Good. Agreed, officially and unofficially. Case closed. Any others? Anyone interesting on that side of the galaxy?" "Yes, a rather shy but sweet hydrogen core cluster intelligence in a class nine star in G445 zone. Was in contact two galactic rotations ago, wants to be friendly again." " They always come around." "And why not? Imagine how unbearably, how un- utterably cold the Universe wou ld be if one were all I .. a one . .. I. Why is chis srory cold from rhe perspective of inrelligenr bur alien (co us) beings? Whar can you learn about minds from ch is way of looking ar realiry? 2. What point does chis srory make about the relationship between menral scuff and physical scuff? 3. Are alien bur inrelligenr beings ,virhour brains conceivable? Thar is, is ir logically possible char such creatures exist? For Further Reading David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Ne,v York: Oxford University Press, 1996). A clear introduction to issues regarding consciousness by one of the leading thinkers in the field. Offers a sustained critique of physicalism. David J. C halmers, ed., Phiwsophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Ne,v Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 2002). A comp rehensive collection of readings covering all the key issues. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer, "The Mind-Body Problem," in Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New Yo rk: Macm illan, 1982). A straightfo rward examina- tion of many of the main arguments in philosophy of mind. Dan iel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Bro,vn, and Company, 1991) . A plainspoken discussion of consciousness as a physicalist phenomenon. Brian P. McLaughlin, with Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter, The Oxford Hand- book of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2009). A large, com- prehensive set of readings. Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind· A Beginner's Guide (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2005). A clear and concise introduction to the central theo ries in th e philoso- p hy of mind. John R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (Ne,v Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 2004). A fine int roduction fo r beginners to al l the lead ing theo ries of mind. For Further Reading 239 CHAPTER 5 FREE WILLAND DETERMINISM CHAPT ER OBJ ECTIVES 5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM • Understand the nature and im portance of the free will problem. • Define determinism , hard determinism , incompatibilism, indeterminism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. • Give an overview of the t hree majo r philosophical responses to t he free wil l problem. • Understand the main reasons why peop le think t he issue of free wil l matters. 5.2 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM • Understand d'Holbach' s position on free will and the main reason he takes it. • Explain how scie n ce is used to argue for determin ism . • Understand how quantum physics seems to p rovide a counterexample to determinism. • Summa rize James's indeterminist view and why some philosophers have rejected it. 5.3 COMPATIB ILISM • Exp lain the com patibil ist position on free w il l. • Understand how compatibilists define "could do otherwise." • Summa rize Rowe' s object ion to compatibilism. • Critically examine Stace' s compatibilism. 5.4 LIBERTARIAN ISM • Understand t he three types of arguments that libertarians have put forth to support their view. • Understand the Consequence Argument . • State and evaluate the libertarian's a rgument from experience. • Explain agent causation and know the main arguments for and against it. 5.5 SARTRE'S PROFOUND FREEDOM • Understand Sartre's existentia list freedom. • Explain his notion of "existence precedes essence." • Evaluate h is idea of radical freedom. Overview: The Free Will Problem 241 5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM Few th ings in life are more valuable co us than freedom. We ,vane it, we demand it, we say we cannot live without it. We yearn for and expect social or political freedom, the freedom co go where we wane, say what we please, and do as we may w ith in broad legal and social limits. Bue we a lso want-and usually assume ,ve have-a more profound kind of freedom, ,vhac ph ilosophers call free wil l. This type of freedom is the power of self- decerminacion : If we possess it, then at lease some of ou r choices are not decided fo r us o r forced upon us but are up to us. If we don't possess it, our social and political freedoms would seem co be considerably less valuable. If ou r actions are not our own because, say, someone h as brain,vashed o r d rugged us co control how ,ve vote, then being free co vote would seem co be an empty liberty. So the central question in free w ill debates is whether we in face have chis more fundam ental fo rm of freedom. The question arises because, as in many ocher issues in ph ilosophy, nvo of our basic beliefs about ourselves and the ,vorld seem co con fli ct. On one hand, ,ve tend co chink we have free wi ll in the sense just described. On the ocher, we also usually assume chat ever y event has a cause. Or, as ph ilosophers would say, we accept determinis m , Figure 5.1 Are all of our actions produced by a chain of events that stretches back into t he indefinite past? the doctrine chat ever y event is determ ined or necessitated by preced ing events and the laws of nature. D eterminism says chat all events-including ou r choices and actions-are produced inexorably by previous events, ,vhich are cause.cl by sti ll ea r- lier events, wh ich are caused by still ochers, the chain of causes leading back into the indefinite past. Since every cause always results in the same effect, the futu re can unfold in on ly one ,vay. Everyth ing chat h appens must happen in an unalterable, preset fashion. Bue if determ inism is true, ho,v can any choices we m ake or any ac- tions we perform be up co us? How can we do anything "of ou r own free w ill"? If determinism is true, your read ing chis book right now was caused by p rior events such as certain states in your brain, body, and e nvironment, and these events were in turn caused by sti ll ochers , and the causal sequence muse screech back councless years co a time before you ex isted. You had no say in the movement or d irection of chis causal t ra in, no control over how it went. Your reading ch is book rig ht no,v could not have tu rned out any ocher way. You could not have done otherwise. How, then, cou ld your actions be free? D eterminism is the doctrine that every cvcnr is de,ermined by p receding even rs an d , he laws of nature . 242 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism You must believe in free w ill~ the re is no choice. -Isaac Bashevis Singer The p r oblem of free will is the challenge of reconcil· ing d etermi nism w ith o ur intuitions o r ideas abou t personal freedo m . 1 Are yo u bothe re d by the tho ug ht of a rig idly dete rmine d exist e n ce? Do e s the id ea t hat a ll yo ur actio ns are dete r- mine d d isturb yo u - o r re assu re you? Men arc deceived if rhcy think themselves free, an opinion which consists o nly in this, that they arc conscious of their ac~ tions and ignorant of the cau.

Plato’s Theory: Justice as Merit 3 6 1
Plato, then, envisions an aristocracy (a society ruled by the best cit izens)-
not an a ristocracy of the rich, landed, or well-born, but of the intellectual. The
guardians a re true philosopher-kings. They wield all the political power by virtue
of their greater talents a nd intellige nce. In the ideal republic, the g ua rd ians-
contrary to the usual custom-cannot own property, for O\vning p roperty might
tempt them to govern for persona l gain rathe r than for the good of societ y. This
po\verful elite can include women and anyone from the lower classes , because the
only qualification for becoming a ru ler is simply to be of superior intelligence and
character.
To modern minds, some of the elements of Plato’s society may sound both wrong
and alien. H is ideal state rests on massive inequality among citizens who are sorted
into three classes marked by unequal sha res of power and privilege. Granted, people
a re assigned to different classes according to merit, but inequality is still the rule.
Plato maintains that equals should be treated equally, but to him the classes d eserve
different treatment because they are different. All men a re not created equal . Then
there is the autho ritarianism of Plato’s republic, in which no one gets to choose his o r
her own role in life. In general, once assigned to a social role, citizens ca nnot jump to
another. There is no social mobility, except within a class and in the case of guardians
being chosen from lower classes.
In the follo\ving selection from The Republic, Plato (through the character of
Socrates) is expla ining his concept of j ustice to companions. The discuss ion is nar-
rated by Socrates .
Plato, The Republic
Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You rem ember the original prin-
ciple which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man
shou ld practise one th ing o nly, the th ing to which his nature was best adapted;- now
justice is this principle or a pa r t of it.
Yes, we often said that one man shou ld do one thing on ly.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one’s own business, and not being a
busybody; we sa id so aga in and aga in, and m any others have sa id the sa me to u s.
Yes, we said so.
Then to do one’s own bus iness in a certa in way may be assumed to be justice. Ca n
you tell me whence I derive th is inference?
I can not, but I should like to be told.
Because I thi nk that t his is the only virtue wh ich remains in the State when t he
other virtues of tempera nce and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that th is is
t he ultimate cause and cond ition of the existence of all of them, and whil e remaining in
t he m is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by
us, justice would be the fourth or rema ining one.
That foll ows of necess ity.
Aristocracy is a socicry
ruled by the best citizens.
4 To determine cit-
izens’ aptitudes and
t alents (and thus their
place in society), Plato
favored testing t hem
whil e they are young.
Is it possible t o discover
t he best career for
someone t his way?
What about people
who d iscover or de-
velop their true talents
lat e in lif e-those, for
example, who are poo r
st udent s but turn out
t o be gen iuses in adult-
hood like Einst ein? Is
Plat o t oo optimist ic
about t he ease of
discovering a person’s
t rue ca lli ng?
Justice in t he li fe an d con-
d uc t of th e State is pos.sible
o nly as firs t it resides in
th e hearts and souls of rhe
citizens.
-Pla,o
5 Don’t we reward ath-
let es, doctors, lawyers,
and business executives
according to their merit
and not by democratic
vote? Should ou r lead-
ers be chosen the same
way, as Plat o suggests?
Why or why not?

362 Chapter 8 The Just Society
6 Do you th ink Plato
exaggerat es t he conse-
quences of allowing a
person to abandon his
own career path and
do another person’s
job? Explain.
If we are asked to determ ine which of these four qualities by its presence contrib-
utes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreem ent of rulers and subjects
or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about t he true
nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness i n t he ru lers, or whether this o ther
which I am mentioni ng, and which is found in ch ildren and women, slave and freeman,
artisan, ruler, subject,- the qua li ty, I mean, of every one doing his own work and not
being a busybody, wou ld claim the palm- t he question is not so easily answered.
Certa inly, he replied, there wou ld be a difficu lty in saying which .
Then the power of each individua l in t he State to do his own work appears to com-
pete with t he other politica l virtues, wisdo m, temperance, courage.
Yes, he sa id .
And the virtue which enters into this com petition is justice?
Exactly.
Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not t he rulers in a State
those to whom you wou ld entrust the office of determ ining suits at law?
Certa inly.
And are su its decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what
is another’s, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.
Which is a just princi ple?
Yes.
Then on t his view also justice will be adm itted to be t he having and doi ng what is
a man’s own, and belongs to him ?
Very true.
Think, now, and say whether you agree wi th me or not. Suppose a cobbler to be
doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a ca rpenter; and su ppose them to ex-
change their implements or t heir duties, or the same person to be doing the work of
both, or whatever be the change; do you t hink that any great harm wou ld result to the
State?
Not much.
Bu t when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, hav-
ing his heart lifted up by wea lth or strength or the num ber of his foll owers, or any like
advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrio r into that of
legislators and guard ians, for wh ich he is unfi tted, and either to take the im plements
or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one,
then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this medd li ng of
one with another is the ruin of t he State.
Most true.
Seeing then, I said, t hat there are t hree distinct classes, any medd ling of one with
another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may
be most justly termed evil-doi ng?
Precisely.
And the grea test degree of evil-doing to one’s own city wou ld be termed by you
injustice ?
Certainly.
This t hen is injustice; and on the o ther hand when the trader, t he auxiliary, and the
guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make t he ci ty just.
I agree with you.•

Plato’s Theory: Justice as Merit 363
PHILOSOPHY NOW
Merit or Equality: Who Gets to Live?
Organ transplant operations are incredibly expensive, organs are in very short supply, and
transplants are d esperately needed by far ,nore people than can be acco1n1nodared. The ,vaic-
ing list for transplants is long, and thousands die every year for their lack. Screeni ng commit-
tees a t transplan t centers decide whether someone should be placed on the ,vairing list and
,vhac ranking he or she should receive. They use
various criteria to make these decisions, some
explicit, so,ne inforrnal or unspoken, some
plausible (such as che patient’s need and likel i-
hood of benefit), and so,ne controversial (such
as abil ity co pay, social ,vorthiness, and health
habits).
A,nong these, social or ,noral
,vorth iness-,nerit-is probably rhe ,nose
contentious. Here the questions are: Which
potential recipients-if g iven che chance co
live-are expected co contribute most co the
good of society? Or ,vhich possible recipients
do nor deserve transplants, because they have
indu lged in habits (like excessive alcohol use
or dangerous activities) char contributed to
their irnpend ing organ fai lure? To scare che is-
sue concretely: All th ings being equal, should
rhe medical student or priest gee che transpla nt
instead of che prostitute or alcohol ic?
Figure 8.5 Who should get the only available liver
or heart- t he person chosen by lottery, the upright
citizen, the man who donates thousands of dollars to
the hospital, the priest, or the homeless child ?
Many reject such appeals co merit and insist char the proper criteria are egalitarian- a
matter of justice and che moral equality of persons. They argue char all persons have equal
,vorth. Morally, che medica l student is nor worth ,nore than the prostitute or alcohol ic, and
vice versa. Education, achievement, occupation, and the like are nor ,norally relevant.
Nevertheless, ,vh ile generally taking the egalitarian approach, son1e ph ilosophers ,nain-
rain char in very rare cases, social worth can outweigh egalitarian concerns. It seems reason-
able that in a natural d isaster involving ,nass casualties, injured physicians or nurses should
be created first if they can aid the o cher survivors.
Should socia l or moral worth ever be taken into account in deciding
who should get a transplant? Suppose the question is whether to give a
transp lant to a Nobel laureate or to a hard-working, honest truck driver.
Assuming that all other factors are equal, which one should get the
transp lant? Why?

364 Chapter 8 The Just Society
Social contract t heory
is the view that justice is
secured, and the stare is
made legi, imate, through
an agreeme nt amo ng
citizens of the state or
between rhc cirizcns and
the rulers o f ,he sratc.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPH ICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.2
1. Plato thinks d emocracy is no better than mob rule. D o you agree?
What are you r reasons?
2. Plato believes that it’s possible for a society to be just w itho ut equality
among irs citizens. D o you agree? W hy or why not?
3. Plato believes h is just society to be well ord ered, rational, and ha rmo-
nious. But are these trairs su ffic ient to ensure justice in a society? Can
we plausibly call such a society just \vhen the state decides wh at kinds
of lives its citizens must live? Give reasons fo r your view.
4. In Plato’s republic, the guardians d eserve to be r ulers because they are
the most intelligent a nd intellectually g ifted. But do such attributes
g uarantee \visdom? Are intellectually superior people a hvays good
leaders?
5. Would you want to live in a state patterned after Plato’s just society?
Why or why not?
8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES
In the seventeenth centu ry, ph ilosop hers defied tradition by d efending a new k ind
of theory of justice and a novel way of justify ing the existence of the state: social
contract theory. This vie\v says that justice is secured , and the state is made legiti-
mate, through an agreement among citizens of the state or between the citizens a nd
the rulers of the state. The people consent explicitly or implicitly to be governed-to
be subject to the d ictates and the power of the state-in exchange fo r the state’s
providing security, righrs, a nd liberties. The state’s exi.sten ce is justifi ed by the bind-
ing contract that a ll pa rties accept. This understa nd ing of the role and justification
of the state was incorporated into the Constitut ion of the Un ited States, a nd in the
twenty-fi rst century, th is idea of a social contract is now taken for granted by much
of the world.
Nevertheless, when fully formed social contract theories were fi rst introduced,
they \Vere thought by many to be radical, scand alous, and wrong. In medieval Europe,
the prevailing vie\v had been that states a re supposed to be d om inated by monarchs
\vho r ule by the” divine right of k ings .” God sanctions the monarch’s authority a nd
ordains that society be ranked in a hierarchy of positions, from the k ing or queen
do\vn to the poorest serfs, with each perform ing his o r her p reordained function . As
in Plato’s republic, people h ave their p roper place in society, and no one is perm itted
or expected to deviate from it. The governed cannot consent to anything, and monarchs
have absolute power over a ll their subjects.

Social Contract Theories 365
Among the most influential social contract t heorists are Thomas H obbes (1588-
1679), Joh n Locke (1632-1704), a nd John R awls (192 1-2002). We take up thei r
views in t he fo llowing pages.
Hobbes
Hobbes \vas the fi rst p h ilosopher in mod ern t imes to systematically articulate a social
contract t heory. It was a major d eparture from received vie\vS about society, and t hat
fact alo ne \vas enough to infuriate many. It a lso conta ined a rejection of both the
divine right of k ings a nd the notion of a divinely est ablished moral la\v-points that
gave his critics even more reasons to attack him .
I n his famo us Leviathan, H obbes cont ends that a social cont ract is necessary
in hu ma n affa irs because living w ithout one wou ld be a horrific nightmare of ex-
istence. H e begins by assuming a pessimistic view of hu ma n beings: At their co re,
he says, t hey a re sel fis h , t reacherous, dishonest , a nd violent . H e argues that when
PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK
Thomas Hobbes
Charity begins at h ome,
and justice begins next
door.
– C harles Dickens
7 Hobbes is a pessimist
abo ut h u man nature;
h e thinks people
are basica lly greedy
and treachero us. Do
you thin k he’s right
abo ut t h is? Or are
peop le f undame ntally
sociable, coope rative,
and benign? Exp lain
your reasonrng .
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) ,vas more than an em-
inent English philosopher whose cheories in Auenced
future generations. He ,vas also a li nguist, poet, classical
scholar, cranslacor, logician, critic, and 1nache1nacical cucor
co Charles II. Figure 8.6 Thomas
(1588-1 679), polit ical
a nd polymath.
Hobbes
H e ,vas born into a poor rel igious fa,n ily and
liked co say char when his ,nocher was pregnant ,vich
hi,n, she went into labor on hearing char che Span-
theorist
ish Armada was chreacen ing England. He joked char “fear and I ,vere born nvins
cogecher.” He was educated at Oxford and spent most of his years as secretary and
tutor co che fami ly of che ch i rd earl of Devonshire. D uring chis employment, he
mer che fore,nosc European thi nkers (Gal ileo and Francis Bacon a,nong chem) and
,vroce on a wide range of issues, both scientific and philosophical. Many of these
,vorks were extremely controversia l. H is pol itica l phi losophy ,vas offensive co boch
sides in che English Civil War; che Ron1an Catholic C hurch and Oxford Un iver-
sity forbade che reading of his books; and he went against che gra in of his era by
advancing macerialis,n, egoism, and (\vhac some considered) heresy.
H is most fa,nous creation is leviathan (1651), ,vhich has had an enorn1ous in-
Auence on English ,noral and pol itica l chi nking. His ocher ,vricings include Philo-
sophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (1651), On the Body (1655),
and On Man (1658).

366 Chapter 8 The Just Society
8 Do you t h ink Hobbes
is rig ht about humans
being ro u gh ly equal
p hysica lly a nd men –
tally? W hy o r why n ot?
Ir is better to lose every ..
thing you have to keep the
balance of justice level,
than to live a life of petty
privi lege devoid of true
freedo m .
-Bryant H. McGill
these tendencies a re left u nchecked by enforced laws o r agreements, humans sink
into a “state of nature”-a “war of every man aga inst every man.” In the state of
nature, there is no code, culture, or comfort. There is no justice. There is o nly
“continual fea r, and danger of violent death; and the life of man [is) solita ry, poor,
nasty, brutish, and shor t.”2
But, Hobbes says, humankind also has a st rong instinct for self-interest and
self-preservatio n, and fortunately th is impulse is coupled with the power of reason.
Through reason, he says, people see that the on ly ,vay to escape this “war of a ll
against a ll ” is to enter into a social contract ,vith o ne another. In the name of self-
interest, they agree to turn over much of their autonomy, freedom, and power to an
absolute sovereign that will forcib ly keep the peace, restrain antisocial actions, and
compel people to keep their agreements. H obbes calls this sovereign the Leviathan
(the name of a sea monster mentioned in the Bible), wh ich symbolizes great power
and evil. Its authority over those bound by the social contract is absolute, its po,ver is
fearsome (enough to deter any tendency to disorder), and irs contractual agreement
,vith irs s ubj ects is irrevocable. Once po,ver is g iven up to th is despot, there is no
going back, and there is ahvays the chance that the sovereign will create an environ-
ment worse than the state of nature. But that is the chance people must take.
So the state’s authority is justified by a social contract, and justice comes into be-
ing as the Leviathan assumes power. For H obbes, justice is a matter of the keeping
of covena nrs (contracrs), and the only ,vay to e nsure that covenants are kept is to let
the Leviathan reign. Without the Leviathan to enforce covenants, there is no justice.
As H obbes says, “Where there is no common power, there is no la,v; where no law
no injustice.” 3
H ere is Hobbes arguing for his theory in Leviathan:
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
CHAPTER 13. OF THE NATU RAL CONDITION OF MANKIND
AS CONC ERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND M ISERY
Nature hath made me n so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though
there be found one man sometimes man ifes tly stronger in body, or of quicker mind
than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the d ifference between man, and man ,
is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit,
to which another may not p retend , as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the
weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by
confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.
And as to the facu lties of the mind (setting aside the arts grounded upon words,
and especially that skill of proceed ing upon general, and infa ll ible rules, called sci-
ence; which very few have, and but in fe w thi ngs; as being not a native facu lty, born
with us; nor attained, [as prudence], while we look after so mewhat else), I find yet a
greater equality amongst me n, than that of strength. For prudence, is but experience;

Social Contract Theories 367
which equa l t ime, equally bestows on all men, in t hose th ings they equally apply t hem –
selves unto. Tha t which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain con-
ceit of one’s own wisdom, which almost all men t hink t hey have in a grea ter degree,
t han t he vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame,
or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men , that
howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent,
or more learned ; yet t hey wil l hard ly beli eve t here be many so wise as themselves: For
t hey see their own wit at hand , and other men ‘s at a distance. But this proves rather
t hat men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign
of the equa l d istribution of any th ing, than that every man is contented with his share.
From this equa li ty of ability, arises equa lity of hope in the atta in ing of our ends.
And therefore if any two men desire t he same thing, which nevertheless they cannot
both enjoy, they become enem ies; and in the way to their end (which is principally
t he ir own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), endeavor to destroy, or
subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no
more to fear, than another man’s single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a
convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united,
to dispossess, and deprive him, not on ly of t he fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or
liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.
And from t his diffidence of one another, there is no way fo r any man to secure
himself, so reasonab le, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to mas ter the persons
of all men he can, so Jong, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him:
and this is no more than his own conservation requi res, and is
generall y all owed. Also because there be some, that taki ng plea-
sure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest,
which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others,
t hat otherwise wou ld be glad to be at ease within modest bo unds,
shou ld not by invas ion increase their power, they wou ld not be
able, long t ime, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And
by consequence, such augmen tation of dominion over men, be-
ing necessa ry to a man’s conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Aga in , men have no pleasure (but on t he contrary a great
deal of grief) in keeping company, where there is no power able
to over-awe them all. For every man looks that his companion
shou ld va lue him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and
upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavors,
as far as he dares (which amongst t hem that have no common
power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy
each other) , to extort a greater value from his condemners, by
damage; and from others, by the example.
So t hat in the nature of man, we find three principa l causes
of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, d iffidence; third ly, glory.
9 Does the existence of
st able democracies
in the twenty-fi rst
centu ry show that
Hobbes is wrong about
human nature?
The fi rst, ma keth men in vade for gain ; the second, for safety;
and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make them-
selves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle;
t he second to defend them; the t hird, for t rifles, as a word, a smile,
a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct
in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends,
t he ir nation, their profession, or t heir name.
Figure 8. 7 Frontispiece to Leviathan or the
Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth
Ecclesiastical/ and Civil, 165 1, by Thomas Hobbes.

368 Chapter 8 The Just Society
Thomas Hobbe s,
Leviathan
10 Suppose the world
is suddenly left w ith
no government al au-
thority anywhere; no
formal restraints on
human behavior exist.
Speculate on how you
think people would act.
Wou ld chaos and sav-
agery ensue, or would
people more or less live
in peace and harmony?
Hereby it is manifest, t hat during the ti me men live without a common power to
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is
of every man , aga inst every man . For WAR, consists not in battle only, or the act of fight-
ing; but i n a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known :
and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the natu re of war; as it is in the
nature of weather. For as the natu re of fou l weather, lies not in a shower or two of rain;
but in an incli nation thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consists not
in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no
assurance to the contrary. All other ti me is PEACE.
W hatsoever t herefore is consequent to a t ime of war, where every man is enemy
to every man; the same is consequent to the time; wherein men live withou t other
security, t han what thei r own strength, and t heir own i nvention shall furnis h them
withal. In such cond ition , there is no place for industry; because the fru it t hereof is
uncertain: and consequently no cu lture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the
commodities t ha t may be imported by sea; no commodious bu ild ing; no instruments
of moving, and removing such thi ngs as requi re much force; no knowledge of the
face of t he earth; no account of t ime; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is
worst of all, continual fear, and danger of vio lent death; and the l ife of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish , and short . .. .
To th is war of every man against every man , th is also is consequent; that nothing
can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injust ice have there no place.
Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law no injustice. Force,
and fraud, are in war t he two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the fac-
ulties neither of the body, nor mi nd . If they were, they might be in a man that were alone
in t he world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men
in society, not in soli tude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be
no propriety, no domin ion, no mi ne and th ine d istinct; but on ly t hat to be every man’s,
that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill cond ition,
which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out
of it, consisting partly in the pass ions, partly in his reason.
The pass ions that incli ne men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things
as are necessary to commodious l ivi ng; and a hope by t heir ind ustry to obta in
them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be
drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called t he Laws
of Nature … .
CHAPTER 14. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND
NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus natura/e, is the li berty each
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own
nature; t hat is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any th ing, which in his
own judgment, and reason , he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereu nto.
By LIBERTY, is understood, accord in g to the proper sign ification of the word, the
absence of external impediments: which i mped iments, may oft take away part of a
man’s power to do what he wou ld; but cannot hinder him from using the power left
him, accord ing as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.
A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis), is a precept, or genera l ru le, found out by rea-
son, by which a man is forbidden to do t hat , wh ich is destructive of his life, or taketh

Social Contract Theories 369
away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he th inks it may be
best preserved . For t hough they t hat speak of this subject, use to confound jus , and lex,
right and law; yet they ought to be distingu ished; because RIGHT, consists in liberty
to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determines, and binds to one of them: so that law,
and right, differ as much, as obligation , and liberty; which in one and the same matter
are inconsistent.
And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chap-
ter) is a condition of war of every one aga inst every one; in which case every one is
governed by his own reason ; and there is nothing he can ma ke use of that may not be
a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it foll oweth , that in such a
cond ition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another’s body. And t here-
fore, as long as this natura l right of every man to every thing endu res, there can be no
security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out t he time, which
nature o rdinarily allows men to live. And consequen tly it is a precept, or genera l ru le of
reason, that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it;
and when he cannot obtain it, t hat he may seek, and use, all helps, and advan tages of
war. The first branch of which ru le, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature;
which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which
is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor
peace, is derived this second law; that a man be will ing, when others are so too, as
far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall t hink it necessa ry, to lay down
t his right to all things; and be contented with so much li berty agains t o ther men, as he
would allow other men aga inst himself. For as long as every man holds this right, of
doing any thing he likes; so long are all men in the cond ition of war. But if other men
will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest
himself of his : for that were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bo und to)
rather t ha n to d ispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; wha tsoever you
requi re that others shou ld do to you, t hat do ye to them . And that law of all men, [what
you would not have done to you , do not do to others) . . ..
CHAPTER 15. O F OTH ER LAWS OF NATURE
From t hat law of nature, by which we are ob liged to transfer to another, such rights,
as being retained, hinder the peace of man kind, t here followeth a third; which is this,
t hat men per form their covenan ts made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but
empty words; and the right of all men to all th ings rema ining, we are still in the cond i-
t ion of war.
And in this law of nature, consists the fountain and origina l of JU STICE. For where
no covenant hath proceeded , there hath no right been tra nsferred , and every man has
right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is
made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the
not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.
But because covenants of m utua l trust, where there is a fear of not performance
on either part (as hath been said in t he former chapter), are invalid; though the ori-
ginal of j ustice be the maki ng of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, ti ll
t he cause of such fear be taken away; which wh ile men are in the natural condition of
war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place,
t he re must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their
11 Is ceding a ll power
t o a leviathan the
on ly way for people t o
achieve peace, security,
and cooperation in a
society? Expla in.

370 Chapter 8 The Just Society
Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan
\Vhy has government been
instituted a t all? Because
the passions of m an will
no t conform to the die~
tares of reason and j ustice
w ithou t constraint.
-Alexander Hamilton
covenants, by the terror of some pun ishment, greater than the benefit they expect by
the breach of t heir covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual con-
tract men acquire, in recompense of the un iversal right t hey abandon: and such power
there is none before the erection of a commonwealth . And this is also to be gathered
out of the ordinary defi nition of justice in the Schools: for they say, t hat justice is the
constant will of giving to every man his own . And therefore where there is no own, that
is, no propriety, there is no inju stice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that
is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all
things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the
nature of ju stice, consists in keeping of valid covenants: but t he va lid ity of covenants
begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep
them: and then it is also that propriety begins.•
Locke
Locke’s social contract theory has some points in common \Vith Hobbes’s-but also
much that Hobbes would have rejected outright. Both Hobbes and Locke assert that
( I) reason enables people to see the w isdom of forming a state th rough a social con-
tract, (2) people must freely consent to be bound by the contract (not be coerce.cl into
accepting it), and (3) the state’s authority is justified by this consent of the governed.
Beyond these matters, Hobbes and Locke part company.
For one thing, they have very d ifferent ideas about the “state of nature,” the
\vorld in \vhich no civil society exisrs . For Hobbes, to be in the state of nature is to
be in a “war of all against all,” where morality is nonexistent, and the only la\vS are
commonsense rules fo r survival and self-interest. For Locke, on the other hand, the
state of nature is considerably less nasty and brutish, for even there, natu ral mora l
la\vS apply and help to regulate people’s behav ior. Those living in the state of nature
are free, sociable, equal, and (mostly) at peace.
Hobbes contends that, generally, justice and rights do not come into being until
the state is esta blished. People surrender thei r lives and liberties to the Leviathan in
exchange for security and peace, and he can do \vhat he wants \Vith his subjects. But
Locke a rgues that humans have inherent, God-given rights \vhether or not a govern-
ment is around to guarantee them. Ch ief among these is the right to property-not
just land but your own body and any object that you change th rough work (\vith
\vhich you “mix you r labor”). These rights are inalienable: They cannot be trans-
ferred to the government or any other entity. Humans create the government and
cede some power to it; in return it p rotects thei r righrs and liberties. The state serves
the people (not the other way round), di recting all its power “to no other end but the
peace, safety, and public good of the people.”
But \vhat exactly does the state do to p reserve liberties and p romote the com-
mon good? Locke identifies three functions that people need the state to perform.
First, citizens need the natural moral la\v to be set out in clearly expressed laws of
the land. Un\vritten natural laws are clear to humans, but people are apt to mis-
construe them in line with their biases. Second, there need to be impartial judges
\vho can settle disputes concerning the app lication of the laws. Third, there nee.ds

Social Contract Theories 371
to be po,ver in the st ate to enforce the laws. Otherw ise, people
will be able to t ake justice into their o,vn h ands.
Suppose, however, that the state abuses its power by repeat-
edly and arbitrarily trampling on the people’s rights and liberties.
Hobbes says that once you cede po,ver to the Leviathan, he is free
to treat you as he wil l. But Locke says if the government violates
the righrs of cit izens, it is no longer legitimate, obligations to it
are voided, and the people have a right to dissolve it-to initiate
rebellion. Locke’s ins istence on the right to rebel aga inst a govern-
ment t hat misuses its po,ver is echoed clearly in the Declaration of
Independence:
We hold t hese truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed ,- That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and
to institute a new Government. .. . s
TWO ‘
TREATISES
‘
OF
Government:
In ,he former,
17,efalfePrinciples a11d Foundation
OF
,
SirROBERT FILMER,
And hisFoLLOW £Rs,
ARE .
l!Dcttctrb and ©bcrtb:orun.
The latter is :m .
E s s A
CONCERNING
y
The True Original, Extent, a.nd End
O F
Civil – G overnment.
11!.:bt ~,,unb e ,’l,io:~ ; ;crctri:J. —-
WND0,’1, Printed to) A11’11;’li•• an4’ 1,t.. Chnr#18 ~
1bc a/,.,P $>P,,,., i.n Ptf•tr~~r,,,..11..,.,, 1&94,
The following passages are from Locke’s landmark Second Trea-
tise of Government:
Figure 8.8 Title page of Two Treatises of
Government by John Locke, second edition,
1694.
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government
CHAPT ER VIII
Of the Beginning of Political Societies
95. Men being, as has been said , by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one
can be put out of this estate, and subjected to t he political power of another, without
his own consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natura l liberty,
and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to jo in and unite
into a community, for their comfortable, safe , and peaceable living one amongst an-
other, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, a nd a greater security against any, that
are not ofit. This a ny number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of t he
rest; they are left as t hey were in t he liberty of the state of nature. When any number of
men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby pres-
ently incorporated , and make one body politic, wherein t he majority have a right to act
and conclude the rest.
96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every indi vidual, m ade a
community, t hey have thereby made t hat community one body, with a power to act as

372 Chapter 8 The Just Society
John Locke,
Second Treatise of
Government
12 Locke believes in
an objective mora l law.
Do you a lso believe in
it? Do you believe t hat
there a re objective
moral p rinciples that
are b inding on every-
one? Why or why not?
one body, wh ich is only by the will and determ ination of the majority. For that which
acts any community, being on ly the consent of the individuals of it, and it being neces-
sary to th at which grea ter force carries it, wh ich is the consent of the majority: or else it
is imposs ible it should act or con tinue one body, one community, which the consent of
every in dividual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by
that consen t to be concluded by t he majority. And therefore we see, that in assemb lies,
impowered to act by pos itive laws, where no nu mber is set by t hat pos itive law which
impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determ ines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
97. And thu s every man, by consenting with o thers to make one body politic under
one government, puts himself under an obliga tion, to every one of th at society, to su b-
mit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original
compact, whereby he with others incorporate into one society, wou ld signify nothing,
and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in
the state of nature. For what appearance would th ere be of any compact ? What new
engagemen t if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself
thought fit, and did actua lly consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he
himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may
su bmit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the
whole, and conclude every individua l; nothing but the consent of every individua l can
make any thing to be the act of the whole: But such a consen t is next to im possible ever
to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, wh ich in
a number, though much less th an that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep ma ny
away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions , and contrari-
ety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the com ing into so-
ciety upon such terms would be on ly like Cato’s com ing into the thea tre, only to go out
again. Such a constitution as thi s would make the m ighty leviathan of a shorter duration
than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in : which cannot
be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute so-
cieties only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they
cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
99. Whosoever therefore ou t of a sta te of natu re unite into a community, must be
understood to give up all the power, necessary to t he end s for which they unite into
society, to t he majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number
greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political
society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter
into, or make up a commonwealth. And t hus th at, which begins and actuall y constitutes
any political society, is nothing, but the consent of any number of freemen capab le of
a majority, to uni te and incorporate in to such a society. And th is is th at, and that only,
which d id , or cou ld give beginning to any lawful government in the world … .
CHAPTER IX
Of the Ends of Polit ical Society and Government
123. If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of
his own person and possessions, equa l to t he grea test, and subjec t to no body, why will
he par t with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the

Social Contract Theories 373
dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, t hat though
in the state of nat ure he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncerta in , and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he, every
man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoy-
men t of the prope rty he has in th is state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him
will ing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continua l dangers:
and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is will ing to join in society with
others, who are already un ited, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of
t heir lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
1 24 . The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themsel ves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in
t he state of nature there are ma ny t hings wanting.
First, There wants an establis hed, settled , known law, received and allowed by
common consent to be t he standard of right and wrong, and t he common measure
to decide all controversies between t he m. For though the law of nature be plain and
in tell igible to all ra tional creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as
ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to allow ofit as a law binding to them in the
application of it to t heir particular cases.
1 25. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with
authority to determine all d ifferences according to t he established law. For every one in
t hat state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to
t he mselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much
heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them
too remiss in other men’s.
1 26. Thirdly, In the state of nature, there often wan ts power to back and support
t he sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice of-
fended , will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injust ice; such
resistance many times makes the pun ishment dangerous, and frequently destructive,
to those who attempt it.
1 27. Thus man kind , notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being
but in an ill condition , while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. He nce it
comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men li ve any time together in this
state. The inconveniencies that they are t he rein exposed to, by the irregu lar and un-
certain exercise of the power every man has of pun ishing the transgressions of others,
make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and t he rein seek
the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willi ngly give up every one his
single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it
amongst them; and by such ru les as the commun ity, or those authorized by them to
t hat purpose, shall agree on. And i n this we have the original right and rise of both the leg-
islative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves ….
CHAPTER XIX
Of the Dissolution of Government
222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of t heir property, and
t he end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is , t hat there may be laws made,
and ru les set, as guards and fences to t he properties of all t he members of t he society:
to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of t he soci-
ety. For since it can neve r be supposed to be the will of t he society, that the legislative
13 Do you agree wit h
Locke that the main
reason for people to
establish a government
is to p rotect property?
Explain.

374 Chapter 8 The Just Society
John Locke,
Second Treatise of
Government
14 Do citizens of a
state ever have the
right to overthrow
their government?
How would a ut il itarian
answer this question?
How does Locke an-
swer it? Wh ich view is
closer to your beliefs?
Why?
Governme nt docs not
solve proble ms; it s ubsi ..
dizcs th e m .
-Ronald Reagan
L iberalism is the political
doctrine thar p u ts primary
emphasis on ,he libcny
and rights of individuals
against encroachment.~ by
the state.
shou ld have a power to destroy that, which every one designs to secure, by enteri ng
into soci ety, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of the ir own
making, whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the
people, o r to reduce the m to slavery under arbitrary power, they pu t themselves into a
state of wa r with the people, who a re thereupon absolved from any farther obedience,
and are left to the common refuge, which God ha th provided for a ll men, agains t force
and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative sha ll transgress this fundamen tal
ru le of society; and e ither by a mb ition, fear, folly or corruption , endeavour to grasp
themselves, or put into the hands of any other an absolute power over the lives, li berties,
and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power, the people had
put into their hands, for quite contrary ends , and it devolves to the people, who have
a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative
(such as they shall thin k fi t) provide for the ir own safety and security, which is the
end for which they are in society. What I have said he re, concern in g the legislative
in genera l, holds true also concerning the su preme executor, who having a double
trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of
the law, acts against both, when he goes a bout to set up his own arbitrary will, as the
law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he e ither employs the force,
treasure, and offices of the soci ety to corru pt the representatives, and gain them to his
purposes; or openly pre-engages the electors, and prescribes to the ir choice, such,
whom he has by solici tations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs:
and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand, what to vote,
and what to enact. Thus to regu late candidates and electors, and new mode l the ways
of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very
fountain of pub lic security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of
their representatives, as the fence to their properties, cou ld do it for no other end, but
that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, free ly act, and advise, as the
necessity of the commonwealth , and the publi c good should, upon exam ination and
mature debate, be judged to req uire. This, those who give their votes before they hea r
the de bate, and have weighed the reasons on a ll sides, are not capable of doing. To
prepare such an assem bly as this, and endeavour to set up the decl ared abettors of his
own will , fo r the true representatives of the people, and the law-make rs of the society,
is cer tainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert
the government, as is possib le to be met with. To which if one s hall add rewards and
punishmen ts visibly employed to the same end, and a ll the arts of perver ted Jaw made
use of, to take off and d estroy a ll tha t stand in the way of such a design, and will not
comp ly and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what
is doing. What power they ought to have in the soci ety, who thus emp loy it contrary
to the trust that went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one
cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any
longer be trusted.6
Liberalism is the political doctrine chat purs p ri mary emphas is on the liberty
and rights of individuals against encroachments by che scace. le is at the heart of po-
litical outlooks chat today are given the vague labels of liberalism and conservatism,
for both ideologies cake fo r granted chat bas ic ind ividual liber ties and rights should
be p rotected against unacceptable government intrusion. They d iffer in ho,v they de-
fine unacceptable involvement of the government. Locke’s theory of justice is a form

Social Contract Theories 375
of liberalism-classical liberalism, che view chat che scace should protect personal
freedoms as well as che r ig ht co pursue one’s O\vn social and econom ic \veil-being in
a free ma rket \vicho uc interfe re nce from ochers. I n cont empora ry polit ics, classical
liberalism most resembles what is known as (polit ical) libertarianism . Libertarians
insist chat government should be small and limited co night-watchma n funccions-
t he protectio n of society and free econom ic systems from coercion a nd fraud. All
ocher social or economic benefits a re che respo nsibil ity of individu als.
Rawls
Dav id H ume, \vhom \Ve met in earl ier chapters, \vas a severe critic of social con-
t ract t heory as offered up by H obbes a nd Locke. H e declared chat social contracts
a re h istorical fictions-no such concraccs have ex ist ed in realit y. Govern ments have
been established by conquest and force, not by agreements among equals in a state
of natu re. This criticism did no t matter m uch t o many lacer theorises because t hey
viewed che t heories of Locke, H obbes, a nd ochers not as historical faces, but moscly
PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK
John Locke
The philosopher John Locke (1632- 1704) is the
senior theorise among the British empiricists and per-
haps, as so,ne say, the grearesr English philosopher in
rhe early modern period (rhe firs t decades after Descartes) .
Classical liberalism is , he
view th ar , he srare should
pm,ec, personal freedo ms
as wdl as the right m
pursue o ne’s own social
and econo m ic wdJ.bci ng
in a free market w ithout
inte rfe re nce fro m o thers.
Libertarianism (political)
is the view that govern·
men, should be small a nd
limited to nig ht -watchman
functio ns.
Eventually he became the ,nose renowned inrellecrual Figure 8.9 John Locke (i 632-
in England and possibly throughout the Conrinenr. 1704), empiricist philoso pher and
H e ,vas born into a Puritan fam ily, stud ied political theorist.
moral phi losophy and logic ar Oxford, and rhen sec his sighrs on a career in med i-
cine. Like his fellow empiricist Thomas Hobbes, he rubbed elbo,vs with many of
rhe great ch inkers of rhe day. He knew rhe famous chemise Robert Boyle as well as
rhe physicist Isaac Newton and encountered ocher notables ar rhe Royal Society.
For a ,vh ile he was secretary ro rhe earl of Shaftesbury, ,vho beca,ne his patron .
Th is relationship involved hi,n in Protesranr policies and in ta lk of resistance ro
Charles II, rhe Catholic king. Conseq uenrly, Shaftesbury had ro Aee ro H olland,
and Locke followed him in 1683, returning ro E ngland in 1689.
Locke ,vas nor an academic who directed his ,vrirings ar ocher philosophers. He
preferred instead ro address imporcanr issues in conre,nporaty society, aim ing his
,vriring ar an ed ucated public. H is besr-kno,vn works include the Essay Concerning
Hu.man Understanding, Second Treatise of Government, and Leuer on Toleration, all
published in t 689.

376 Chapter 8 The Just Society
John Rawls,
A Theo,y of Justice
as exp lanations of how states could be fo rmed and just ified. Nevertheless, Hume’s
attack dampened interest in social contract theories of justice fo r two centuries-
until the \vork of John Ra\vls (1921-2002).
Ra\vls also thinks of social contracrs as fictions-but very useful fi ctions. H e
believes they give us a way to explore the requirements of distributive justice. He asks,
in effect, What kind of social contract would best ensure a fair distribution of rights,
duties, and the advantages of social cooperation? To ans\ver th is question, he proposes
an ingenious thought experiment. Imagi ne we are living in a state of nature and want
to devise a social contract that ensures that everyone is treated fa irly. What k ind of state
\vould we all agree to? Sp eci fically, by what principles should our just society structure
itself? His response is that the required principles are those that people \vould agree to
under hypothetical conditions that ensure fair and unbiased choices. H e holds that if
the starting point for the social contract is fa ir-if the initial conditions and bargain-
ing process fo r producing the p rinciples are fair-then the p rinciples themselves will
be just and will define the essential makeup of a just society. As Rawls says,
John Rawls, A Theory of justice
[The] gu iding idea is that the p rincip les of justice for the basic structure of society
are the object of the origina l agreem ent. They are the p rincip les that free and ratio nal
pe rso ns concerned to further their own interests wou ld accept in an initial position of
equa lity as defi ning the fu ndam ental terms of t heir association. These principles are to
regu late all further agreements; t hey specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be
entered into and the forms of government that can be establi shed .7
At the hypothetical starting point-what Rawls calls the “original position”-a
group of normal, self-interested, rational individuals come toget her to choose the
principles that will determine their basic rights and duties and their share of society’s
benefits and burdens. But to ensure that their decisions are as fa ir and impartial as
possible, they must meet behind a metaphorical “veil of ignorance.” Behind the vei l,
no one knows his or her own social or economic status, class, race, sex, abil ities,
talents, level of intelligence, o r psychological makeup. Rawls thinks that since the
pa rticipanrs are rational and sel f-interes ted but ig norant of their situation in societ y,
they \vi ll not agree to principles that w ill put any particular group at a disadvantage,
because they might very \veil be members of that group. They wi ll choose principles
that are unbiased and nondiscriminatory. The assumption is that since the negotiat-
ing cond itions in the o riginal position are fai r, the agreements reached will a lso be
fa ir-the principles wi ll be just.
Rawls contends that given the original positio n, the participants would agree to
arra nge thei r social relatio nships according to these fundamenta l principles:
FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Social Contract Theories 377
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Socia l and economic inequa lities are to be arranged so that they are both :
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, … and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under cond itions of fair equa lity
of opportuni ty.a
The first principle-the equal liberty principle-says that ever yone is entitle.cl to
the most political freedom possible in exercising basic rights and duties (for example,
the right to vote and hold office and freedom of speech, assembly, and thought).
Each person should get a maximum degree of basic liberties, but no more than
anyone else. This p rincip le takes precedence over all other considerations (including
the second principle), so that basic political liberties cannot be reduced or ca ncelled
just to improve economic well-being. This stipulation, of course, di rectly contradicts
utilitarian views of the matter.
The second principle concerns social and economic goods such as income,
wealth, opportun ities, and positions of authority. Ra,vls recogn izes t hat some social
and econom ic inequalities in society are unavoidable as well as beneficial. Those
who ,vork harder or devise a better mousetrap deserve to reap greater benefirs fo r
their efforts. Such inequality p rovides incentives
fo r extraordinary p roductivity, ,vhich in turn w ill
be to the good of society as a whole. (Th is k ind of
unequal social arrangement contrasrs ,vith systems
that aim at a much greater d egree of equality, as in
socialist societies.) So Rawls asserrs in part (a) that
social and economic inequalities are not unjust if
they work to everyone’s benefit, especially to the
benefit of the least well-off in society. “[There) is no
injustice,” he says, ” in the greater benefirs ea rne.d
by a few provided that the situation of persons not
so fortunate is thereby improved.” 9 For Rawls, such
a policy is far more just t han one in which some
people a re made to suffer fo r the greater good of
others: ” It is not just that some should have less in
order that others may prosper.”
But Ra,vls also maintains that although eco-
nomic inequalities are allowed, and not everyone
wi ll obtain the greater rewards, ever yone should
at least have an equal opportunity to acqu ire them.
Th is is the message of part (b). Every person is en-
t itled to an equal chance to t ry to acquire basic
goods. No one is guaranteed an equal share of
them, but opportunities to obtain these benefits
must be open to a ll, regardless of social standing.
Givi ng mo ney a n d power
to governme nt is like
giving whiskey and car
keys to teenage boys.
-P. J. 0 . Rourke
15 A re you more
sympathetic to liber-
t arian ism or welfare
liberalism? Why?
In Rawls’s program, the demands of the first
principle must be satisfied before satisfying the Figure 8.10 John Raw ls (1921-2002).

378 Chapter 8 The Just Society
Wdfare liberalism is a
form ofliberalism, ,h e
aim of which is m preserve
ind ivid ual libcnies w hile
e nsuring the gene ral wel-
fare of ,he ci,iu:nry.
second, and the requi rements of part (b) must be met before those of part (a). In any just
d istribution of benefits and burdens, then, the first priority is to ensure equal basic politi·
cal liberties fo r all concerned, then equality of social and econom ic opportu nity, then the
ar rangement of any inequalities to the benefit of the least advantaged.
Rawls’s t heory of justice has significant implications fo r the allocatio n of society’s
resources. C,onsider, fo r example, t he hotly debated resou rce of health ca re. O ne
prom inent line of argu ment goes li ke this: As Rawls cla ims, ever yone is entitled to
fa ir equality of opportunit y, and adequate (bas ic) health ca re enables fair equality
of opportunity (by ensu ri ng “normal species f unctioning”). Therefore, everyone is
ent itled to adequate health care, \vh ich includes a ll appropriate measures fo r elim·
inating or compensating fo r the disadvantages of disease and impairmen t. 10 In such
a system, t here would be universal access to a basic level of health care, wh ile more
elaborate or elective ser vices wou ld be available to a nyone who cou ld afford t hem.
Rawls’s proposal is a fo rm of liberalism, \vhat h as been called welfare liberalis m .
Its a im is to p reserve individual liberties wh ile e nsuring the general welfare of t he
citizenry. It requires the redistribution of resources (for example, taxing the better
off to p rovide benefits to the less well-off)-a scheme that liberta rians \vould never
countenance. The libertarian says t hat government shou ld not be in t he business of
helping t he socially or economically d isadvantaged, for t hat wou ld require violating
people’s liberty by taking resources from t he haves to give to t he have-noes.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.3
1. H obbes says t h at once people cede power to a strong governmental
authority, the aut ho rity w ields total authority over t hem; t he govern·
ment’s power is unalte rable and absolute. Do you t h in k such a govern·
ment is necessary for people to live in peace? W hy or why not? What
states in t he world today fi t H obbes’s description of the Lev iath an?
2. H obbes believes that t here is no such t hing as justice until the Lev ia-
t ha n is established . Th is means that justice does not exist independ-
ently of an aut ho rity to d efine a nd enforce it. Explain \vhy you agree
o r disagree \vit h t his vie\v.
3 . Locke thinks that people have a r ig ht to rebel against a government
t hat abuses ics po\ver. D o you agree? If so, u nder what conditions
would you thin k rebellion is justified ?
4. Was t he United States fou nded according to the p rinciples of classi-
cal liberalism, \velfare liberalism, or something else? Has t he country
stayed true to its origins? Explain.
5. Is classical libera lism a better theor y of justice tha n welfare libera lism?
Support your a nswer with reasons.

8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES
The prevailing theories of justice throughout the ,vorld are liberalism and social-
ism. Socialism is the political and economic doctrine that the means of production
(property, factor ies, bus inesses) should be owned or controlled by the people, either
communally or through the state. Socialism can accommodate liberal democratic
forms of government and can even retain some elements of market cap italism.
C ommunism usually implies socialism within a totalitarian system.
The gu iding p rinciple of the socialist vie,v is equality: The ,vealth of society should
be shared by all. The ideal distribution of goods usually follows the classic formu la
laid do,vn by Karl Marx (1818-1883), the father of modern socialism: “From each ac-
cording to h is ability, to each according to his needs.” People should do work that fits
their abilities, and they should reap rewards that match their nee.ds. Generally, liberal
societies let t he means of p roduction accru e to fewe r people through th e ,vork ings of
a free market-that is, t hrough capitalism . In such a system, wealth goes to anyone
who can acqui re it in the marketplace, but in a socialist system, ,vealth is controlled by
the state, ,vhich allocates it for the good of the people generally.
Few philosophers have had as much influence on the world as Marx has-,vho,
ironically, did not consider hi mself a philosopher and d id not believe t hat ideas a lone
could have much of an impact on history. He thinks that ,vhat d rives philosophy,
history, society, law, government, and morality is econom ics. It is the dominant
system of econom ics in every age, he says, that determines how society is structured
and ho,v history w ill go. A society’s system of economics is defined by its means of
p roduction-by irs economic and technological ways of meeting people’s physical
and social needs. The means of production, Marx says, shape social relationships,
class structure, technological tools, and political and philosophical ideas. Those ,vho
o,vn and control t he means of production make up t he dominant class, possess most
of t he ,vealt h, wield most of t he political power, and exploit t he lower
class. Their ideas-political, philosophical, o r social-are the ruling
ideas. The rest of the people own no property and occupy the lowest
ru ngs of society, selling their labor to the ru ling class, the property
o,vners. The nvo camps, t hen, are fo rever at odds.
Marx maintains that this pattern of opposition-this class
struggle-repeats irself th roughout history. It is inevitable and unalter-
able. In it he sees a dialectic process unfold again and again in society:
Socialist Theories 379
I am convinced that the
path to a new, better
and pos.

434 Appendix A: The Truth about Phi losophy Ma jors
Photo 13: Marti n Luther
King Jr., civil r ig hts
leader
Photo 14: John Lewis,
civil rights act ivist,
cong ressman
Photo 15: Terrence Malick,
f ilmmaker, di rector
Photo 16: Yann Mart el,
aut hor (Life of P11
Photo 17: Deepa Mehta,
d irect or, screenwriter
(Fire)
Photo 18: Susan Sont ag,
aut hor, MacArth ur
Fellow
Deepa Mehta, directo r, screenwriter (Fire, Water)
I ris Murdoch, aut hor (Under the Net)
Robert Pa rris Moses, e.ducacor, civil righcs leader
Scone Phi llips, broadcaster
Susan Sara ndon, acto r
Susan Sontag, autho r (Against Interpretation), MacA rt hur Fello\v
David Souter, Supreme Court justice
Alex T rebek, hose of jeopardy!
George F. W ill, journalise, aut hor (Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball)
Jua n Will iams, journalise
Philosophy Majors and the GRE
Ph ilosophy majors score higher than all other majors o n the Verbal Rea-
soni ng and Analytical Writi ng sections of che G RE (G raduate Record
Examinations).
Verbal Quan titative Analytic
R easoning Reasoning Writing
Phi lo so phy 160 154 4 .3
Ave rag e 149.97 152 .57 3.48
Educational Testing Service, 2017 GRE Scores, between July 1, 2013 and June 30. 2016.
SALARIES
According co recent surveys by PayScale, a major sou rce of college salary informa-
tion, p hilosophy majors can expect co earn a media n starting sala ry of $44,800 a nd
a med ian mid-career sala ry of $85, I 00. As you might expect, most of che higher sala-
r ies go co STEM graduates (those with degrees in science, technology, engineering,
or mathematics). Bue in a surprising number of cases, salaries for ph ilosophy majors
are comparable co chose of STEM graduates. For example, wh ile che ph ilosophy
gradu ate earns $85, 100 at mid-career, che mid-career salary fo r b iotechnology is
$82,500; for civil engineering, $83,700; fo r chem istry, $88,000; for industrial tech-
nology, $86,600; and fo r applied computer science, $88,800. Media n end-of-ca reer
salaries for ph ilosophy majors (ten co nineteen years’ exper ien ce) is $92,665-noc
che highest pay among college gradu ates, but far h igher t ha n many ph ilosophy-is-
useless critics \vou ld expecc.8
Another facto r co consider is t he increase in salaries over time. O n t h is score,
philosophy majors rank in the cop ten of all majors with che h ighest salary increase
from scare co mid-career, at JOI percent. The major with che highest increase: gov-
ern ment, at 118 percen t. Molecu lar biology is che fift h hig hest, at 105 percenc.9

Appendix A: The Truth about Philosophy Majors 435
Salary Potential for Bachelor’s Degrees
Median Median
Major Early Pay Mid-Career Pay
{0-5 yrs. (10+ yrs.
work experience) work experience)
Mechan ical Engineering $58,000 $90,000
Applied Computer Science $53,100 $88,800
Information Technology $52,300 $86,300
Civil Engineering $51,300 $83,700
Business and Finance $48,800 $91, 100
Biotechnology $46,100 $82,500
Business Marketing $45,700 $78,700
Philosophy $44,800 $85, 100
History $42,200 $75,700
Advertising $41,800 $84,200
General Science $41,600 $75,200
Telecommunications $41,500 $83,700
Eng lish Literature $41,400 $76,300
Marine Biology $37,200 $76,000
PayScale. “H ighest Paying Bachelor Degree, by Salary Potential,” 2017-2018 CollrgrSala7 Report,
h ct ps://w ww. pay sc.a le .com/ col lege-sa la ry-report/majors-that-pay-you-ba:c k/bache lo rs.
And among liberal arrs majors, philosophy salaries are near the cop of the list. All
liberal arcs majors except economics earn lower starting and mid-career pay than
philosophy does .
Salar y Pot ential for Liberal Art s Bachelor
Degr ees
Major
Economics
Philosophy
Political Science
Modern Languages
Median
Early Pay
{0-5 yrs.
work experience)
$54, 100
$44,800
$44,600
$43,900
Median
Mid-Career Pay
(10+ yrs.
work experience)
$103,200
$85,100
$82,000
$77,400

436 Appendix A: The Truth about Ph il osophy Majors
Salar y Poten tial for Liberal Arts Bachelor
Degrees (continued)
(0-5 yrs. (IO+ yrs.
work experience) work experience)
Geography $43,600 $72,700
History $42,200 $75,700
Eng li sh literature $41,400 $76,300
Anthropology $40,500 $63,200
Creative Writ ing $40,200 $68,500
Theatre $39,700 $63,500
Psychology $38,700 $65,300
Fine Art $38,200 $62,200
PayScale, “Highest Paying Bachelor Degree, by Salary Potential.” 2017-2018 Coll,g, Sala,, &port,
ht t ps:// www. pa ysc.a le .com/ college-sa I a ry-repo r t1 majors-that-pay-you-back/bachelors.
MEANING
In all this talk about careers, salaries, and superior test scores, we should not forget
that for many students, the most impor tant reason for majoring in philosophy is the
mean ing it can add to thei r lives. They know that philosophy, after two-and-one-half
mi llennia, is still alive and relevant and influential. It is not only for studying but
also for living-for gu iding our lives toward what’s true and real and valuable. They
,vould ins ist that philosophy, even with irs ancient lineage and seemingly remote
concerns, applies to your life and your times and you r world. The ,vorld is fu ll of
students and teachers ,vho can attest to these claims. Perhaps you wi ll eventually
decide to join them.
RESOURCES
American Philosophic.al Association, “Who Studies Philosophy?” http://www.apaonline.org/?whostudies
philosophy.
BestColleges.com. “‘Best Careers for Philosophy Majors,” 2017, http://www.besccolleges.com/careers/
ph ilosophy-majo,s/.
George Anders, “That ‘Useless’ liberal Arts Degree Has Become Tech’s Hotcest T icket,” ForbN, July 29, 2015,
h ttps:// w ww. fo rbes. co mis i tes/ georgea nders/2 0 I 5/07 /2 91 Ii be ral-arts-degree-tee h/ #5 fb6d7 4 07 4 5d.
Laura Tucker. ‘” \’7hac Can I Do with a Philosophy Degree?” TopUni\fersities.com. March 2, 2015.
h ttps:// w ww. copu n i ve rsi c ies. com /st uden t-i n fo/ ca reers-ad vice! wha L- ca n-you-do-ph i losoph y-degree.
University of Cali forn ia, Sal\ Diego. Department of Philosophy. “What Can I Do with a Philosophy Degree?”
h tcps:// philosophy. ucsd .edu/ undergrad ua ce/caree rs. hem I.
University of Maryland, Department of Philosophy. ‘”Careers for Philosophy Majors,”
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/undergraduate/careers.
Universicy ofNonh Carolina ac Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, · why Major in Philosophy?” http://
ph i Josoph y .u nc .ed u1 u nde rg rad ua tel the-major/ wh y-major-i n-ph i Josoph y/.

APPENDIX B: ANSWERS TO EXERCISES
…………………………… –……….. ._ …………………………. ._ ……… . ………….. . ………………….. __. …………………….. __. ……… __.__. …….. __.__. ……… __. ……………. __. ………. __._ …….. __._ …….. ·—–· … __._. …. __. . .._ …… ……… .
EXERC ISE 1.1
1. Argument.
Conclusion: Faster-tha n-light t ravel is not possible.
Prem ise: Faster-than-light travel ,vould violate a law of nature.
2. Argument.
Conclusion: Therefore, you are not fit to ser ve in you r current capacit y.
Prem ise: You have neglected your du ty on several occasions.
Prem ise: You have been absent from work too many times.
3. No argu ment.
4 . Argument.
Conclusion: The Au epidem ic o n t he East Coast is real.
Prem ise: Government health officials say so.
Prem ise: And I personally have read at least a dozen ne,vs stories t hat ch arac-
terize the situatio n as a “Au epidemic.”
5. No argu ment.
6. Argument.
Conclusion: Current-day Christia ns use violence to spread t heir right-to-life
message.
Prem ise: These Christians, often referred to as the religious r ight, a re well
know n fo r violent demonstrations against Plan ned Parenthood and other
abortion cli nics.
Prem ise: Doctors and other person nel are threat ened w it h death.
Prem ise: Clinics have been bombed .
Prem ise: There have even been cases of doctors being m urdered.
7. No argu ment.
8. No argu ment.
9. Argument.
Conclusion: Witches are real.
Prem ise: They are ment ioned in the Bible.
Prem ise: There are many people today w ho claim t o be witches.
Prem ise: Histo rical records reveal that t here were w itches in Salem.
10. No argument.
437

438 Appendix B: Answers to Exercises
EXE RC I SE 1.2
1. C,onclusion: The idea that God is required to be the en fo rcer of the mora l law
is not p lausible.
Premises: (4) In the fi rst p lace, as an empirical hypothesis about t he psychol-
ogy of human beings, it is questionable. (5) There is no unambig uous
evidence that t heists a re more moral than nontheists. (6) Not o nly have
psychological studies fa iled to find a significant correlat ion between fre-
quency of religious worship and m o ral conduct, but convicted criminals
are much more likely to be theists than atheists. (7) Second, the threat of
divine punishment ca nnot impose a mora l obligation. (8) Might does not
make right .
2. Conclusion : (I) When [G illespie) refers to [President Bush) as “the mi ll ion-
aire president who wa ited out the Vietnam War in the Texas Air National
G uard,” it rem inds me of the garbage rhetoric that I might see if I ,vere
reading Ted Rall, or Susan Sontag, or one of the other hate-monger ing,
America-bashing, leftist whiners. [Paraphrase: Gillespie’s rhet oric is
inappropriate.]
Premises: (2) That k ind of ad hom inem attack [is) dis resp ectful t o a m an ,vho
is doing a d amned good job as commander-in-ch ief. (3) [The rhetoric)
detracts fro m the whole point of the article.
3. C,onclusion: (I) Therefore some intelligent being exists by ,vhom all natu ra l
things are di rect ed to thei r end; and t h is being we call God.
Premises: (2) We see that things wh ich lack knowledge, such as natu ral bod ies,
act fo r an end, and this is evident from thei r acting ahvays, o r nearly
always, in the sam e way, so as to obt ain the best result. (3) H ence it is plain
that they ach ieve thei r end, not fo rtu itously, but designedly. (4) Now ,vhat-
ever lacks kno,vledge cannot move to,vards an end , unless it be directed
by some being e ndowed ,vith knowledge and intell igence; as the a rrow is
directed by the archer.
4 . Conclusion : (I) [The) position is certainly untenable.
Premises: (2) The first thing t hat must occu r to anyone studying moral sub-
jectivism [the view that the r ig htness or wrongness of an action depends
on the beliefs of an individual or group) seriously is that the view allows
the poss ibil ity that an action can be both right and not r ig ht, o r ,vrong
and not wrong, etc. (3) This poss ibil ity ex ists because, as we have seen,
the subjectivist cla ims that the mora l character of an action is d etermined
by individual subjective states; and these st ates can vary from person to
person, even when directed to,vard the same action on the same occasion.
(4) H ence one and the same action can evidently be determined to
have-s imultaneously-radically different mo ra l characters . …

Appendix B: Answers to Exercises 439
5. Conclusion: (1) I submit that the dism issal was proper and ethical cons ideri ng
the community stature and function of priesrs and the benefits that accrue
to society in the aftermath of the decision.
Prem ises: Let’s consider community stature fi rst. The community st ature of
p riests must always be taken into account in these abuse cases. (2) A priest
is not just anybody; he performs a special role in society-namely, to
p rov ide spiritual guidance and to remind people that there is both a mora l
order and a divine order in the world. The priest’s role is special because it
helps to underpin and secure society itself. (3) Anyth ing that could under-
mine this role must be neutralized as soon as possible. (4) Among those
things t hat can weaken the p riestly role a re publicity, public debate, and
legal actions. Abuse cases are better handled in p rivate by those w ho are
keen ly a,vare of the importance of a positive public image of p riests. And
what of the benefits of curta iling the legal proceedings? (5) The benefirs to
society of dismissing the legal case ounveigh all the alleged disadvantages
of continuing with public hea ri ngs. (6) The primary benefit is the contin-
ued nurturing of the commun ity’s fa ith, ,vithout ,vhich the commun ity
would cease to function effectively.
EXERC ISE 1.3
1. Genetic fallacy
2. Stra,v man
3. Division
4. Appeal to the person
5. Genetic fallacy
6. Equ ivocation
7. Appeal to ignorance
8. Appeal to the person
9. Appeal to ignorance
10. Equivocation

APPENDIX C: HOW TO WRITE A PH I LOSO PHY PAPER
…………………………… –……….. ._ …………………………. ._ ……… . ………….. . ………………….. __. …………………….. __. ……… __.__. …….. __.__. ……… __. ……………. __. ………. __._ …….. __._ …….. ·—–· … __._. …. __. . .._ …… ……… .
In conversations, letters to the ed itor, or on line d iscuss ions, have you ever taken a
position on an issue and offered reasons why you r view is correct? If so, then you
have defended a thesis. You have p resented an argument, giving reasons for accept-
ing a particular thesis, or conclusion. If you elaborate on you r argument in a \vritten
paper, you create something even more valuable-a thesis defense (or argumentative)
essay. In a thes is defense essay, you t ry to sho\v the reader that your view is worthy of
acceptance by offering reasons that support it. You r thes is may assert your pos ition
on a philosophical, social, o r political issue; on the arguments or claims of other
writers (including some famous o r not-so-famous philosophers); or on the interpret-
ation of a single work o r several \vorks. In every case, you affirm a thesis and g ive
reasons for you r affirmation.
This type of essay is not merely an analysis of claims, a summary of poinrs made
by someone else, o r a reiteration of \vhat other people believe or say-though a good
thesis defense essay may contain some of these elements. A thesis defense essay is
supposed to be a demonstration of what you believe and why you believe it. What
other people think is, u ltimately, beside the point.
BAS IC ESSAY STRUCTURE
Thesis defense essays usually contain the fo llowing elements, though not necessarily
in th is o rder:
I. Introduction (or open ing)
A. Thesis statement (the claim to be supported)
B. Plan for the paper
C. Background for the thesis
II. A rgument supporting the thesis
III. Assessment of objections
IV. Conclusion
Introduction
The introduction often consists of the paper’s fi rst pa ragraph, sometimes just a sen-
tence or nvo. Occasionally it is longer, perhaps several pa ragraphs. The length de-
pends on how much g round you must cover to introduce the a rgument. Whatever
441

442 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper
the length, the introduction shou ld be no lo nger tha n necessary. In most cases the
best introductions are short.
If there is a ru le of thumb for what the introduction must conta in, it is this: The
introduction should set forth the thesis statement. The thesis statement usually appears
in the first pa ragraph. It is the claim that you hope to support o r prove in your essay,
the conclusion of the argumen t that you intend to present. You may want to pose
the thes is statemen t as the answer to a question that you raise, o r as the solution to
a p roblem that you wish to discuss. H o,vever p resented, your thesis statement is the
assertion you must s upport with reasons. It is like a compass to your readers, g uiding
them from paragraph to paragraph, premise to p rem ise, sho,ving them a clear pat h
from introduction to conclusion. It also helps you stay on cou rse. It reminds you to
relate ever y sentence an d paragraph to your one controlling idea.
You r thesis statement shou ld be restricted to a claim that you can defend in the
space allowed. You wa nt to state it in a single sentence and do so as ea rly as possible.
You may need to add a few ,vords to explai n or elaborate o n the statement if you
think irs mea ning or implications unclear.
The other two parts of a n introduction-the p la n for the paper (B) a nd back-
ground information for the thesis (C)-may or may not be necessary, depending
on you r thesis and your intent. I n more forma l essays, you ,viii nee.cl not only to
state your thes is, but a lso to spell out ho,v you intend to a rg ue for it. You wi ll have
to summarize your whole argument-each of your premises a nd conclusion-or,
if your argu ment is lo ng or complex, at least the most importa nt points. Provid ing
background information for you r thesis is a matter of explai ning ,vhat your thes is
means (wh ich includes defini ng terms a nd clarifying conceprs), what its implications
are, why the issue is so important or p ressing, or ,vhy you have decided to address
it. Sometimes the nee.ded background information is so extens ive that you must
supply much of it after the introduction. At any rate, by addi ng the right k ind of
background information, you g ive your readers good reason to care about what you
are saying and to continue reading.
In ma ny ph ilosophy papers, the background information includes a summa ry
or sketch of the views of other philosophers-what they have said that is releva nt to
the issue or to your thesis. Providing this kind of material ca n help the reader u nder-
stand ,vhy your topic is ,vorth exploring and why your a rgument is relevant.
Argument Supporting the Thesis
Benveen your paper’s introduction and conclusion is the body of the essay. The basic
componenrs of the body a re (1) the premises of your argu ment plus the material
that supporrs or expla ins them and (2) an evaluation of objections to your thesis.
Each premise must be clea rly stated, carefully explained and illustrated, and prop-
erly backed up by examples, statistics, expert opinion, argu ment, or other reasons
or evidence. You may be able to adequately develop the essay by devoting a s ingle
pa ragraph to each premise, or you may have to use several paragraphs per premise.
Whatever tack you take, you must stick to the central ru le of paragraph de-
velopment: Develop just one main point in each pa ragraph, embodying that point

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 443
in a topic sentence. Make sure chat each paragraph in turn relates co you r thesis
statement.
If your essay is a critique of someone else’s arguments, you shou ld examine chem
in che body, explaining ho\v they work and laying out the author’s response co any
major criticisms of chem. Your account of the a rgumencs should be accurate and
complete, putting forth che author’s best case and providing enough detail for you r
readers co understand che import of your own argument. After the presentation of
che author’s side of th ings, you can then bring in your critique, asserting and ex-
p laining each premise.
Some premises, of cou rse, may be so obvious that they do not require support.
The determining factor is \vhecher your readers \vould be likely co question chem. If
your readers are likely co accept a premise as it is, no backup is requ ired. If they are
not, you need co support che premise. A common mistake is co assume chat a p rem ise
would be accepted by ever yone when in face it is controvers ial.
Recall chat in a good argument che conclusion logically follows from che prem-
ises, and che premises a re true. You r cask in che body of your essay is co put forth
such an argument and co do so plainly-co demonstrate clearly co your readers chat
your p remises a re properly related co your conclusion and that they are true. You
should leave no doubt about \vhac you are crying co prove and how you a re crying co
prove it. In longer papers, you may \vane co back up your thesis \vich more than one
a rgument. This is an acceptable way co proceed, provide.cl you make che relationships
between the separate a rgumencs and your thesis clear.
Assessment of Objections
Very often an argumentative essay includes an assessment of objections-a sincere
effort co cake into account any objections or doubts chat readers are likely co have
about poincs in your essay. (In some cases, however, there may be no significant ob-
jections co assess.) You muse show you r readers chat the objections a re unfounded,
chat your argument is not fatally wounded by likely criticisms. Contrary co what
some may chink, when you deal effectively \vich objections in your essay, you do not
weaken it-you strengthen it. You lend credibility co it by making an attempt co be
fair and thorough. You make your position stronger by remov ing doubts from you r
readers’ minds. If you don’t confront likely objections, your readers may conclude
chat either you are ignorant of che objections o r you don’t have a good reply co chem.
An extra benefit is chat in dealing with objections, you may see \vays co make you r
a rgument stronger.
On the ocher hand, you may discover chat you do not have an adequate ans\ver co
the objections. Then what? Then you look for \vays co change your arguments or thesis
co overcome che criticisms. You can weaken your thesis by making it less S\veeping
or less probable. Or you may need co abandon your thesis alcogether in favor of one
that is stronger. Discovering chat your beloved thesis is full of holes is not necessarily
a setback. You have increased your understand ing by find ing out \vhich boats will
float and \vhich will not.

444 Appendix C: How to Write a Ph ilosophy Paper
Conclusion
U nless you r essay is very short, it should have a conclusion. The conclusio n usually
appea rs in the last paragraph. Ma ny conclusio ns simply reiterate the thesis state-
ment and then go on to emphasize ho,v important it is. Others iss ue a call to action,
present a compell ing perspective o n the issue, or d iscuss further implications of the
thesis statement. Some conclusions contain a summary of the essay’s argument.
A summary is ahvays a good idea if the argument is complex, long, or formal.
WRITING THE ESSAY: STEP BY STEP
No,v we examine the steps involved in crafting a good thesis defense essay. You have
the best chance of ,vriting a good essay if you try to follow these steps. J ust remember
that the p rocess is not linear. You may not be able to fo llow the steps in the sequence
suggested. You may have to backtrack or rearrange the order of the steps. This k ind
of improvis ing on the Hy is no rmal-and often necessary. At any stage in the pro-
cess, you may discover that your argu ment is not as good as you thought, or that you
did not take a n important fact into account, or that there is a way that you can alter
the essay to make it stronger. You may then ,vant to go back and rework your outl ine
or ti nker with the draft you are working on-and your essay wi ll be better for it.
Rethinking and revis ing a re no rmal p rocedu res for even the best writers.
H ere are the steps:
I. Select a topic and narrow it to a specific issue.
2. Research the issue.
3. Write a thesis statemen t.
4. Create an outline.
5. Write a first draft.
6. Study and revise you r first draft.
7. Produce a final d raft.
Step 1 . Select a topic and narrow it to a specific issue.
This step is fi rst for a reason . It is here to help inexperience.cl w riters avoid a tempt-
ing but nasty trap: picking a thesis out of the a ir and ,vriting their paper on it.
Caution: Any thesis that you dream up ivithout knowing anything about it is likely to be
unusable-a nd a waste of time. It is better to begin by selecti ng a topic or issue a nd
narrowing it through research a nd ha rd thinking to a manageable thesis.
A topic is s imply a broad category of s ubject matter, such as human cloning, the
mind, capital punishment, and God. Within topics there lurk a n infinite number of
issues-that is, questions that a re in dispute. From the topic of capital punish ment,

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 445
for example, countless issues arise: whether executing criminals deters crime, whether
executing a human being is ever mora lly permissible, whether it is ethical to execute
people who are insane o r mentally impaired, \vhether the system of capital pun ish-
ment in the United States is unfair, \vhether the death penalty should be mandatory
for serial killers, \vhether executing juven iles is immoral … the list could go on and
on. The basic idea is to select from the roster of possibilities an issue that (1) you a re
interested in and (2) you can adequately address in the space allowed.
Step 2. Research the issue.
The main reason fo r researching an issue is to find out \vhat viewpoints and argu-
menrs are involved. Often you r instructor will suggest good sources to resea rch fo r
a pa rticular \vriting assignment. Your assigned reading may be the on ly source you
need to check. Otherwise, you can read a rticles and books, talk to people who have
studied the issue or at least thought about it carefu lly, or go online to revie\v topical
or philosoph ical sites.
Step 3. Write a thesis statement.
The conclus ion of your selected argument will serve as the basis for your thesis state-
ment. Often the conclusion is your thesis statement. W riting a good thesis statement
is an essential step, because the entire essay is built on it. An imprecise o r clumsy
thesis statement can lead to an imprecise or clumsy argument, which can wreck any
a rgumentative essay.
At this stage, you should try to get the wording of your statement just right, even
though you may revise it later on. !rs scope should be restricted to \vhat you can
handle in the space you have. It should also be focused on just one idea, not several.
A good thes is statement must be clear. No one should have to guess about the mean-
ing of your thesis. The thesis “Same-sex marriages are intolerable,” for example, is
intolerably vague, since there are many ways that someth ing can be intolerable. It
gives us very little information about \vhat \vill be discussed in the essay.
It is possible to devise a thesis statement that is restricted, focused, clear-and
trivial. A t rivial thesis statement is one that either concerns an insignificant issue o r
makes an insign ificant cla im. People generally don’t care about insign ificant issues,
and few would bother to disagree \Vith an insignificant claim. Who cares whether
pens a re better than pencils, or whether gambling is more fun than beachcombing?
And who would care to contest the claim that pleasure is better than pain? An essay
built on a trivial thesis statement wastes your readers’ time (if they bother to read it
at all), and you learn noth ing and change noth ing by writing it. Thesis statemenrs
should be worthy.
Here are some thesis statements that meet the preceding criteria:
• Jeremy Bentham’s moral theory known as act-utilitarianism conflicts with
our commonsense ideas about human rights.
• The U.S. government should be al lowed to arrest and indefinitely imprison
without trial any American citizen who is suspected of terrorism .

446 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper
• Subjective relativism-the view that truth depends on what someone
believes-is self-refuting.
• Racial p rofiling should not be used to do security screening of airl ine pas-
sengers.
Step 4. Create an outline of the whole essay.
If you can write out your thesis statement and outline the argument used to defend
it, you have already come far. Your argument and thesis statement w ill const itute the
skeleton of your essay. The next step is to Resh out the bones \vith introductory or
explanatory material, responses to objections, and support for the premises (\vhich
may consist of subordinate a rgumencs, examples, explanations, analogies, statistics,
scientific research, expert opinion, or other evidence). Producing a detailed, coherent
outline of the \vhole essay is the best way to manage this task, and if you a lready have
an outline of your argument, creating an outline fo r the whole essay will be easy. An
outline helps you fill out your a rgument in an orderly fashion, showing you how the
pieces fit together, and whether any parts are m issing or m isaligned. Th is fi lling-out
process wi ll probably require you to research your thesis further-to check the truth
of premises, exam ine a lternative arguments, look for additional evidence, or assess
the strength of objections to your a rgument.
Do not be afraid to alter your outline at any stage. As you write, you may realize
that your thesis is weak, your argument Hawed, or your p rem ises vague. If so, you
should go back and adjust the outline before writing any further. Writing is an act
of exploration, and good writers a re not afraid to revise when they find someth ing
amiss.
When you outline your essay, include your full thesis statement in the introduc-
tion. Then, as you work on the outline, you ca n refer to the statement for gu idance.
The major points of your outl ine wi ll include the premises, conclusion, objections,
and responses to objections.
You \vill find that as you nveak the outline, you may need to adjust the thesis
statement. And as you perfect the thesis statement, you may need to adjust the out-
line. In the end, you \Vant to satisfy yourself that the outl ine is complete, accu rate,
and struc turally sound, tracing a clear and logical p rogression of points.
Step 5. W rite a fi rst draft.
Good \vriters revise … and revise and revise. They either write multiple d rafcs, revis-
ing in successive passes, or revise continuously as they write. They know that their
first tries \vi ll always be in need of improvement. Inexperienced \vriters, on the other
hand, too often dash off a first draft without a second look-then turn it in! A much
more reasonable approach (a nd the best one for most studencs) is to at least write a
first draft and a fina l d raft or-better-several drafts and a final one.
In argumentative essays, because of the importance of articulating an a rgument
carefu lly, and the difficulty of writing later drafts of the essay unless the first one is
in reasonable shape, the first draft should be fairly solid. That is, in your first draft,

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 447
you shou ld write a tentative version of each paragraph a nd the wording of you r thesis
statement, and all p remises should be at least close to final fo rm.
Give you r d raft a good introduction that lays out your thesis statement, p rovid es
backg round info rmatio n on the issue, and d raws your readers into the essay. Make it
interesting, informative, and pertinen t to the question at hand. Do not assume that
you r readers will automatically see that you r paper is \VOrth reading.
Ever y paragraph in you r paper shou ld relate to the thes is; ever y sentence in each
paragraph should relate to a topic senten ce. Delete any sentence that does not serve
the essay’s purpose. Ensure that paragraphs appear in a logical sequence and are
clearly linked by transitional \vords and ph rases or references to material in preced-
ing paragraphs. Your readers should never h ave to wonder what the connection is
between pa rts of you r paper.
Step 6. Study and revise your first draft.
Your first draft is li kely to have problems, both big and small. At this stage, though,
you should scrutin ize mostly the big ones. Th is is no time for p roofreading (correct-
ing spelling, fi xing pu nctuation, repairing typos, and the like). This is the time to
make substantive cha nges.
Step 7. Produce a final draft.
After completing all substantive changes, you should generate a final d raft, the one
you \viii turn in . The fin al d raft shou ld reflect not on ly the b ig changes, but the cor-
rections of all minor errors as well-misspellings, typos, grammatical errors, mis-
placed words, fau lty punctuatio n, and documen tation mis takes. This task should be
primarily a p roofreading job. At this stage, you sho uld also fo rmat the manuscript
according to you r instructor’s requirements.
The key to p roducing a clean fi nal draft is down time-an interim in which you
leave the last draft alo ne a nd focus o n something else. C,oming back to your paper
after a day or so away from it can help you see errors that passed right by you before.
You may be surprised how ma ny m istakes this fresh look can reveal. If you cannot
set the essay aside, ask a frie nd to read it and give you some constructive criticism .

448 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper
Further explains
the divine
command
theory.
A SAMP LE PH IWSOPHY PAPE R
The Dile m ma of the Divine Comma nd Theory
by Jane D oc
Phi losop hy I O I
What is the connection between God a nd morality? In the p ast , many people would
take this q uestion to b e a bo ut w hethe r someone can be have morally even if they a rc
atheists. Bu t nowadays m ost people in the \Vest would p robab ly answer yes to this
question. If the re arc moral standards o f be havio r, then it seems that anyone can
live by them. A more important question (for bo th the religious and nonreligious)
is no t whether someone can be mo ral without belief in God, but whether m orality
itseJ/ is p ossible without God. The answer that many give to this question is the divine
command theory, the view that m orality absolu tely requires God.
Ir says that an actio n is right if God commands o r wills it. In other words, certain
actio ns arc right o r wro ng o nly because God says they a rc, fo r he is the autho r o f the
moral law. God’s commanding an actio n is wh at makes it right; God ‘s forbiddi ng it is
wha t makes it fo rbidde n.
Those w ho accep t the d ivine command t heory could consistently t h ink that t hey
sho uld perform actio ns that pro mo te the common gooct as an act-utilitarian would.
O r they could believe that they s ho uld always ac t to serve their own interests} as an
eth ical egoist d ocs. O r they cou ld assume t hat their d u ty is ro ac t accord ing to a set
of dcontological p rinciples. Bu t no matter w hat approac h they ta ke, they would still
maintain that ultimately an actio n is right because God commands it.
Introduces
topic.
Defines key
term.

Provides
background
for the
issue.
Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 449
But is the d ivine command theory p lausible? D ocs God make rig ht? I inte nd to
a rgue tha t the theory is u ntenable-and fo r reasons that both theists and nonthcisL< can app reciate. I w ill show that there is a c rucial difficul ty for the theory that would come to fo re even if God's exis ten ce and our knowledge of h is wiJI arc assured. The source of the problem is that the divi ne command theory forces a dilemma o n us that can be satisfactorily resolved o nly by aband o n ing the theory. Plato lays ou t the dilemma in his d ialogue Eurhyphro. In it Socrates asks, in effect} Arc actio ns right because God comm ands them, o r docs God command the m because they arc right> The fi rst optio n says that God c reates mo rality, and t he divine
comm and theory is true. The second option says that the divin e command theory is
false : morality exists independen tly of God’s w ill, and even he must o bey it.
If one acccp L< the theory, u n palatable implicat io ns arise. If an action is morally right o nly because God says so, the n any action a t all could be morally right. If God so ,villcd , the torture of c hildren or the murder o f innocen ts would be morally right. A, the divine command t heory would have it, there could be n o reasons for God's willing o ne "'"'Y o r t he o ther. H e just commands, a nd that makes a n ac tion rig ht (or wrong). But if God has no reasons for h is command s, no standard s o ther than his say~so, his commands arc arbitrary. If the theory is correct, then God d oesn't have reasons-and d oesn't need reasons - to make the moral rules. Bu t in chat case, God's d ccL'iions would amo unt to no mo re than a throw of the dice. If rape and mu rder arc morally wro ng (or morally rig ht), they a rc arbitrarily so. This result is implausible, a nd bo th theists a nd no nthcists agree. In fact, most C hristian p h ilosophers reject the divine command theory. To reject the theory is t o give up the idea that God is t he ma ke r of the mo ral law a nd to ack nowled ge that morality is independent o f God's w ill. Actions a rc right or w ro ng fo r reasons that d o no t depe nd o n God. We try to d o right because it's right, not because a divine power has made an arbitrary decis io n. Theist~ w ho reject the divine command theory believe that God commands humans t o obey moral standards tha t exist regardless of w hat God commands. God is pe rfect . H e o beys the moral law a nd expects his childre n to obey it also. Thesis statement. The main argument for the thesis. 450 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper Writer explains and rebuts the chief argument against the thesis. The chief argumcnr againsr the charge of a rbitrariness is this: God would n ever command the m urder of one's neighbors, the to rture of children} o r any o ther evil acL< because God is all-good. An d because God is all-good, h is comma nds would not be arbitrary- they would be good. Bu t to say this is to argue in a circle and undermine-not strengthen- the d ivine command theory. The theory is supposed to tell us what moraliry is, o r what makes something good. Bu t if goodness is a defining propcrry of God, then God cannot be used to define goodncs.s. Su ch a tack would rc.sult in an empry defin ition of the divi ne command theory: Good actions arc those commanded by an all-good God. When theists say that God is good , they surely mean mo re than thL'i. In conclusio n, the d ivin e comman d theory is unfounded. To avoid the arbitrariness problem, and to preserve a c redi ble idea of goodm:s..'it the theory must be rejected. The much mo re p lausible view is located o n the o ther side of Socrates' dilemma: The moral law is independe n t of God and applies to both God a nd man. Conclusion and brief re- iteration of the argument in its favor. NOTES ............................................ · ----· -------- .. .._ ....................................... ._ .................... --... ·-------· ................. __. ......... __. .......... __. ..... __. ............ _. ...... __. ....................... ........... __._ ..... __.____. ..................... _. ........ . CHAPTER 1 1. Plato, lhe Republic, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 2, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Hea rst's Inter· national Library, 1914), 18- 20. CHAPTER 2 1. Thomas Aquinas, Stunma 17uoiogica, Questio n 2, ''Whe the r God Ex isrst in Basic \Y/rirings of St. Thomas Aquinas, tra ns. Anton C . Pegis (New York: Random House, 1944), 22. 2. Will iam Lane Cra ig, Reasonable Faith: Christia11 Tntth and Apologetics (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994), 92. 3. Will iam Lane Cra ig, God? A Debate Benueen a Christian and a11 Atheist (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4. 4. Craig, God> A Debate Betwee11 a Christian and an Atheist, 7.
5. Will iam Paley, Natural 77,eology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity
Collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802).
6. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779).
7. Hume, Dialogues.
8. Richard Swinburne, Is lhere a God> (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1996), 2 .
9. Swinburne, ls 77,erea God>4 1- 42.
10. Anselm, Proslogium, ch. 11- 11 1 (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1962), 53- 55.
11. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan & Compa ny and St. Martin’s
Press, 1929), 504- 505.
12. Will iam L. Rowe, Philosophy ofReligio11: A11 !11troductio11 (Bel mont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993),
80- 82.
13. Will iam L. Rowe, “The Empirical Argument fro m Evil,” i n Rationality, Religious Belief,
and Moral Commitme11t, ed . Robert Aud i and Wi lliam). Wai nwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1986), 227- 247.
14. J. L. Mackie, 17,e Miracle of17,eism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 156.
15. Swinburne, Is 77,ere a God> 98.
16. Mackie, Miracle of171eis111, 164.
17. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: HarpcrCollins, 1966, 1977), 253- 259.
18. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion, 85 – 86.
19. St. Teresa, 77,e Lift of Teresa of Jesus, trans. a nd ed. E. Allison Peers (Garden C ity, NY:
Image Books, 1960), 249. Q uoted in M ichael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical justification
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 156.
20. Q uoted in \Villiam James, 77,e Varieties of Religious Experie11ce (New York: New American
Library, 1958), 68- 69.
21. Mackie, Miracle of171eis111, 179- 181.
22. Richard Swinburne, 77,e Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 204), 304.
23. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion, 60- 61.
24. Swinburne, Existence of God, 316- 317.
25. W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan, 1886).
451

452 Notes
26. \”1illiam James, “The \”1ill to Believe,” in 71,e \Vil! to Believe and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896), 11.
27. James, “W ill to Believe,” 26.
28. James, “W ill to Believe,” 2- 30.
29. M ichael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical justification ( Ph iladelphia: Temple University Press,
1990), 246.
30. Blaise Pasca l, Pensees and Other W’ritings, trans. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
31. Pascal, Pensees and Other W’ritings.
32. Buddhist Surtas, trans. T. \”1. Rhys Davids ( New York: Dover, 1976), 148.
33. Ajahn Sumedho, cited in Satnacirro Bhikku, ed., Buddha-Nature (London: World Wide Fund
for Nature, 1989).
34. \”1alpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974), 43.
35. Chuang Tzu, trans. Richard Welhelm and Dschuang Dsi (Jena, Germany: Diederichs, 1912),
158, 7.18b.
36. Tao-te chingby Lao Tzu, translated with an introduction by D. C . Lau ( Penguin C lassics, 1963).
Copyright © D. C. Lau, 1963, 1, 25.
37. Tao-de ching, trans. D. C. Lau, 19.
38. Tao-de ching, trans. D. C. Lau, 57.
CHAPTER 3
1. Russ Shafer-Landau, \'(lhatever Happened to Good and EuiJ> (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 8 1- 82.
2. John Stuart M ill, “\”1hat Utilitarianism Is,” in Utilitarianism (1861).
3. M ill, “What Utilitarianism Is.”
4. M ill, “What Utilitarianism Is.”
5. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. T. K. Abbott (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909, 1873), 3- 4, 9- 10.
6. Kant, Groundwork, 18.
7. Kant, Groundwork, 47.
8. Kant, Groundwork, 46- 47.
9. Aristorle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1980), bk.
I, chs. 1, 2, 7; bk. 2, chs. 6 -7.
10. Rosal ind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” in 71,e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2003
edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, hrrp://plato.Stanford.edu/archives/fu ll2003/entries/ethics-virtue/.
11. Russ Shafer-Landau, 71,e Fundamentals of Ethics ( New York: Oxford University Press,
2010), 257.
12. Alison Jaggar, “Feminist Ethics,” in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence Becker and C harlotte
Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), 364.
13. Jan Crosthwaite, “Gender and Bioethics,” in A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and
Peter Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 200 1), 32- 40.
14. Crosthwaite, “Gender and Bioeth ics,” 37.
15. Carol G illigan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 7beory and \\7omen’.r Development
(Cambridge: Harva rd University Press, 1982).
16. Virginia Held, 71,e Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10- 13.
17. Annette C. Baier, “The Need for More Than Justice,” Canadian journal of Philosophy, suppl. 13
(1988): 56.
18. “The Myth of Sisyphus” from 71,e Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus, translated byJustin
O ‘ Brien, translation copyright © 1955, copyright renewed 1983 by Penguin Random House
LLC. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

19. Analects, trans. Arthur Waley, 2:13- 14, 14:30, 14:45.
20. Analects, trans. Arthur Waley, 2:5, 7.
21. John B. Noss, A History of the Worlds Religions (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 323.
CHAPTER 4
I. Rene: Descartes, Discourse 011 the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, in Philosophical
\fforks of Descartes, ed. Elizaberh Haldane and G . R. T . Ross (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
Universiry Press, 191 1), 101.
2 . Theodore Schick, Jr., and Lewis Vaughn, Doing Philosophy: A11 !11trodttctio11 Through Thought
Experiments (New York: McG raw-H ill, 20 10), 88.
3. Rene: Descarres, Meditations 011 First Philosophy, Med itation V I, in Philosophical \fforks of
Descartes, ed . Elizabeth Ha ldane and G. R. T. Ross (Ca mbridge, England: Cambridge
Universiry Press, 191 1), 196.
4. John R. Searle, Mind· A Brief !11troductio11 ( New York: O xford University Press, 2004), 29- 30.
5. Searle, Mind, 21.
6. J. J.C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 144- 145.
7. David J. Cha lmers, 17,e Conscious Mind: !11 Search ofa Fundamental 7heory ( New York: O xford
Universiry Press, 1996), 94- 95.
8. David J. Cha lmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings ( New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 249.
9. Thomas Nagel, “W hat Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435- 500.
10. Jerry A. Fodor, “The Mind- Body Problem,” Scientific American 244 Qanuary 198 1). Reproduced
wirh perm ission. All Rights Reserved.
11. Ned Block, “T roubles with Functionalism,” i n Readings i11 the Philosophy of Psychology, ed. Ned
Block (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 276, 278.
12 . Searle, Mind, 45.
13. Searle, Mind, 46.
14 . Searle, Mind, 48- 49.
15. Searle, Mind, 62- 63.
16. John Searle, ” Is t he Brain’s M ind a Computer Progra m?” Scientific American 262 (January 1990).
17. From Forbes.com, June 29, 2009 © 2009 Forbes LLC . All rights reserved. Used by permission
and protected by the Copyright Laws of t he United Srates. The printing, copying. redistribution,
or re transmissio n of rhis Content witho ut express w ritten pe rmissio n is prohibited.
18 . Chalmers, Conscious Mind, 125.
CHAPTERS
I. Baron d ‘ Holbach, “Of t he System of Man’s Free Agency,” in 7he System of Nature, trans. H . D.
Robinson (1770), chap. 11.
2 . Wi lliam James, “The D ilemma of Determinism,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays i11
Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 145- 183.
3. John Locke, A11 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed . Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford:
C larendon Press, 1975), bk. II, sec. 33.
4. W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind (New York: Ha rperCollins, 1952), 254- 255.
Copyright 1952 by W.T. Stace, renewed © 1980 by Blanche Stace. Reprinted by Permi ssion of
HarperCollins P ublishers
5. Wi ll iam L. Rowe, ..:Two Concepts of Frccdomt in Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays 011
Indeterminism and Free \'(!jl/, ed. Timorhy O ‘Connor (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995), 154- 155.
Notes 453

454 Notes
6. Peter van lnwagen, AJ1 &say on Free \'(!j/1 (Oxford: C larendon Press, 1983), 16.
7. Richard Taylor, Metaphysic, (Englewood C liffs, NJ: Prentice HaJI, 1992), 51 – 53.
8 . Jca n~Paul Sartre, (‘Existe ntialism Is a H um an ism,” in E.xisre11tiaiism, trans. Bernard Frcchtman
(New York: Ph ilosophica l Library, 1947) 524- 533.
CHAPTER 6
I. Plato, Meno, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Hearst’s International
Library, 19 14), 24- 36.
2 . RcnC Descartes, ”Med itation Onct in Meditations on First Philosophy, volume 1, 7he Philosoph ~
ical \Vorks of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Halda ne a nd G . R. T. Ross (Cambridge, Engla nd:
Cambridge University Press, 1911), 144- 145.
3. Rene Descartes, “Med itation O ne,” in MeditarioJ1s on First Philosophy, 146.
4. Descartes, “Meditation One,” in Meditatiom OJI First Philosophy, 145- 146.
5. Descartes, “Meditation One,” in Meditatiom OJI First Philosophy, 147.
6. Descartes, “Meditation Two,” in Meditatiom 011 First Philosophy, 149- 150.
7. Descartes, “Meditation Two,” in Meditatiom 011 First Philosophy, 158.
8. Descartes, “Meditation Five,” in MeditatioJ1s 011 First Philosophy, 184- 185.
9. Descartes, “Meditation Two,” in Meditation, 011 First Philosophy, 154- 155.
10. John Locke, An Essay Concerning HumaJI Understanding, ed. Peter H . Nidd itch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), bk. I, ch. 2, and bk. IV, ch. 11, parts 1- 9.
11. Locke, Essay ConcerJ1i11g Human Understanding.
12. Locke, Essay ConcerJ1i11g Human Understanding
13. George Berkeley, Of the Principles of H11man KJ1owledge in Principles of Huma11 Knowledge and
Three Dialogues, Part I, sec. 1- 4, 6, 8 (Oxford: O xford University Press, 1999).
14. Berkeley, Part I, sec. 9- 10, 14- 15.
15. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912 , 1959), 24.
16 . David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understandi11g, sec. 2 and 4, parts 1- 11, ed. Peter
M illica n (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2008).
17. Hume, Enquiry Concerning HumaJI Understanding.
18. Hume, Enquiry Concerning HumaJI U11dersta11ding.
19. Hume, Enquiry Concerning HumaJI U11dersta11ding.
20. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Carus (New York: Open
Court Publishing, 1912).
2 1. Imma nuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: H uma nities
Press, 1929), 44.
22 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso11, 4 1- 42, 46- 47.
23. Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso11, 22.
24. Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso11, 92- 93.
25. Alison Ainley, “Femin ist Philosophy,” in The Oxford Compa11io11 to Philosophy, ed. Ted
Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 273.
26. Louise M. Antony, “Embodiment and Epistemology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 465.
27. Elizabeth Anderson, “Feminist Epistemology and Ph ilosophy of Science,” in The St01,fard
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2011 edition, ed. Edward N. Zalra, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr201 1/entries/fcminism-epistemology.
28. Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism (New York: Paragon House, 1993), 83- 84.
29. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 84 – 85.
30. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 88- 90.
31. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 94- 95.
32. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 95- 96.

CHAPTER 7
I . Leo To lstoy, \'((hat Is Art? ( Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960).
2 . Cl ive Bell, A rt (Lo ndon: C hatto a nd W ind us, 1914).
3. Ma rtin Ga rd ner, lhe \'(fhys of a Philosophical Scrivener (New Yo rk: St. Martin’s G riffin, 1983),
77-78.
4. Curt J. Ducasse, 7be Philosophy of Art (New York: Dover Pu blicatio ns, 1929).
5. Aristotle, Poerio, t rans. M . E. Hubbard, in Classical Literary Cri ticism, ed. D. A. Russell and
M . \”1interborrom (Oxford: C larendon, 1972, 2008) 60- 66.
6 . David Hume, “Of the Stand ard o f Taste,” fro m Fot1r Dissertations ( Lo ndo n: A. M iller, 1777),
david hume.o rg.
CHAPTER 8
I. Plato , lhe Republic, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Hearst’s Inte rnat io nal Library, 19 14), I 53-155.
2 . Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651.
3. H obbes, Leviathan.
4. H obbes, Leviathan.
5. Declara rion o f Ind e pe ndence, July 4, 1776.
6 . Joh n Locke, Second Treatise of Government, cha ps. 8, 9, 19 (1690) .
7. Joh n Rawls, A 7heory of justice, rev. ed . (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press,
1999), I 0, 266.
8. Rawls, 7beory of justice, 266.
9. Rawls, 7beory of justice, 13.
JO. No rman D a n iels, ” Health Ca re Needs a nd D istributive Justice,” in justice and justification
(Camb ridge: C amb rid ge U niversiry Press, 1996).
11. Ka rl Ma rx and Fried ric h Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, t ra ns. Samuel Moore (1888).
12. Susan Moller O kin,justice, Gender, and the Family (New Yo rk: Basic Books, 1989), 3- 5,
124- 127.
13. David M iller, Political Philosophy: A Very Short l ntroducrion (Ox ford: O x ford U n iversit y Press,
2003), 93, 97 © Dav id M ille r 2003 “By Permissio n of O xfo rd U niversity Press.
CHAPTER 9
I . Albe rt Ca mus, 7he Myth of Sisyphus, t rans. J. O ‘ Brien (New York: Alfred A. Kno p f, 1955), i.
2 . Leo To lstoy, My Confession, rra ns. Leo W ie m e r (New York: J. M. Dent a nd Sons, 1905).
3. Arthur Schopen hauer, “On the Sufferi ngs of the World,” in Parerga and Paralipomena, trans.
T . Bailey Saunders (1851).
4. C larence D arrow, “Is Life Worth Livi ng?” (debate), Ma rc h 28, 1920.
5. Julian Baggini, Whats It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Oxford: O x ford
University Press, 2005), 160- 161.
6 . Tolstoy, My Confession.
7. Baggini, Whats !tAl!About? 17, 19- 20.
8 . Paul Ed wards, 7he Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. Paul Ed wards (New York:
Macm illan, 1967).
9. Edwards, 17,e Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
JO. E. D. Klemke, ” Living W ith o ut Appeal: An Affirmative Ph ilosophy o f Life,” in lhe Meaning
of Life: A Render, ed. E. D. Klemke and St even M . Cahn (New Yo rk: O xfo rd University Press,
2008), I 90.
Notes 455

456 Notes
11. Klemke, “Living Withou, Appeal,” 191.
12. Klemke, “Living Withou, Appeal,” 193.
13. Susa n Wolf, ” Meaning in Life,” in 71,e Meaning of Lift: A Reader, ed. E. D. Klemke a nd Steven
M. Cahn (New Yo,k: Oxford University Press, 2008), 232.
14. \Vol f, “Mean ing in Life,” 233.
15. \Vol f, “Mean ing in Life,” 234.
16. Christophe, Belshaw, JO Good Questio11s about Lift and Death (Oxford: Blackwel l, 2005), 113.
17. Belshaw, JO Good Quesrio11s, 115.
18. Belshaw, JO Good Quesrio11s, 116.
APPE NDIX A
I. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Labor Market for Rcccn, College Graduates,”
January 11, 2017, https:/lwww.ncwyorkfed.org/rcscarch lcollcgc-labor-markc,/collcgc-labor-
markct_ comparc .. majors. htm I.
2. T. Recs Shapiro, ” For Ph ilosophy Majors, the Q ucsrion after Graduation Is: W har Next?”
Washington Post, June 20, 2017.
3. Carolyn G regoire, “The Unexpected Way Philosophy Majors Arc Cha nging the \Vorld of
Business,” Huffingto11 Post, March 5, 2014, https:/lwww.huffingtonposr.com/2014103105/why
-phi losophy-majors-ru lc_n_ 4891404. h tm I.
4. Shapiro, ” For Ph ilosophy Majors.”
5. David Silbcrswcig, “A Harvard Medical School Professor Makes a Case for , he Liberal Arts
and Ph ilosophy,” \'(fashington Post, December 24, 2015.
6. Shapiro, ” For Ph ilosophy Majors.”
7. American Philosophical Association, “Who S,udics Philosophy>” http:/lwww.apaon linc.org/>
whosmd icsphilosophy.
8. PayScalc, ” H ighest Paying Bachelor Degrees by Sa lary Po,cntial,” 2017-2018 College Salary
Report, htrps:/lwww.payscalc.com/collcgc·salary· rcport/majors-that· pay-you-back/bachclors.
9. PayScalc; reported by Rachel G illert and Jacquelyn Sm ith, “People with These College Majors
Get the Biggest Raises,” Business Insider, January 6 , 2016, http://www.busincssinsidcr.com/
college-majors-that· lcad-ro-, hc-bi ggcst-pay-ra iscs-20 J 6 -J /#20-physics- 1.

GLOSSARY
…………………………………….. · —-·——– .. .._ ………………………………… ._ ……………….. –… ·——-· …………….. __. ……… __. ………. __. ….. __. ………… _. …… __. ………………….. ……….. __._ ….. __.____. ………………… _. …….. .
aesthetics 1he study of the fee lings and jud g-
ments involved in experiencing the arts or
other object.~ d eemed beautiful.
a posteriori k n owledge Knowledge that de-
pends entirely on sense experience
a priori k n owled ge Knowledge ga ined inde-
pend ently of or prior to sense experience.
act-utilitarianism The idea t hat t he rightness
of actions d epends solely on t he overall well-
being produced by individual actions.
agen t causation The v iew t hat a free action is
caused by an agent (person) and is not whol-
ly d eterm ined by previous events.
agn ostic Someone who neither accepts nor de-
nies God ‘s existence.
analy tic statemen t A logical truth wh ose de-
nial results in a contrad iction.
appeal to ignoran ce The fallacy of argui ng
chat either (I) a claim is true because it
hasn’t been proven false or (2) a claim is fa lse
because it hasn’t been proven true.
appeal to popularity 1he fallacy of argui ng
chat a claim must be true not because it is
backed by good reasons, but simply because
many people believe it.
appeal to the person The fa llacy of rejecting a
statement on the grounds t hat it comes from
a particular person, not because t he state-
men t, or claim, itself is fa lse or dubious.
argument A statement coupled with other state-
ments that are meant to support that statement.
a rgumen t fro m evil An argument purporting
to sho,v t hat since t here is unnecessary evi l,
an all-powerful, a ll-knowing, and all-good
God must not exist.
a rgumen t from religious experience An
argument of this form: A person seems to
have experienced God ; the experience must
have actually been a genui ne encounter with
God; t herefore, God probably exists.
aristocracy A society ruled by t he best citizens.
ath eism The denial of the existence of God .
ath eist Someone who den ies God ‘s existence.
lltmau One’s soul or self.
axiology 1 he study of value, includ ing both
aesthetic va lue a nd moral value.
beggin g the q uestion The fallacy of trying to
prove a conclusion by using t hat very same
conclusion as s upport.
Bhagavad-Gita 1he most highly venerated and
influential scriptures in Hinduism.
Brahman 1he impersonal, all-pervading Spirit
t hat is t he universe yet transcends all space
and time.
brahmin A priest or teacher; a man of the
priestly caste.
capita lism A political economic system that
lets the means of production accrue to fewer
people through t he workings of a free mar-
ket. In such a system, wealth goes to anyone
who can acquire it in t he marketplace.
Cartesian dualism 1he view that mind {or
soul} and body are completely independent
of on e another and in teract causally.
categorical imperative Kant’s fu ndamental
moral principle, which he form u lates as
(I) “I am never to act otherwise than so that
I could also will that my maxim should become
a univmal law”; and (2) “So act as to treat
humanity, whether in thin e own person or
in chat of any other, in every case as an en d
withal, never as a means only.”
catharsis 1 he purgin g of t he emotions of pity
and fear by experiencing t hem vicariously in
a theatrical context.
causal closure of the p hysical 1he principle
t hat t he world is a closed system of physical
causes and effects.
classical liberalism The v iew that the state
s ho uld protect personal freedoms ~~ ,veil as
457

458 Glossary
the right ro pursue one’s own social and eco-
nomic well-being in a free market w ithout
interference from ochers.
cognitive relativism The doctrine char the
truth about something d epends on what
persons or c ultures believe.
communism Common ly, socialism within a
roralicarian system.
compatibilism 1he v iew char although deter-
min ism is true, our actions can s till be free.
composition 1he fallacy of a rguing errone-
ously char what can be said of the parts can
also be said of the whole.
conclusion In an argument, t he statement be-
in g s upported.
consequentialisr theory A moral theory in
which the rig htness of actions depends sole-
ly on their consequences or results.
cosmological arguments Arguments rhar try
co s how rhar from the fact rhar rhe un iverse
exists, God exists.
cultural relativism 1he view char rig ht actions
are chose endorsed by one’s culture.
deductive argument An argument intended ro
g ive logically conclusive support ro irs con-
clusion.
deism Belief in one God who created rhe world
bur left it unattended co run on its own.
democracy Rule by t he people as a who le.
deon tological (or n on consequen tialist) the-
ory A moral theory in which the rightness
of actions is determined nor solely by t heir
consequences, but partly or e,uirely by t heir
intrinsic nature.
determin ism The doctrine char every event
is d eterm ined by preceding events and the
laws of nature.
dharma The Buddha’s system of teachings
about the true nature of reality and how co
live correctly to transcend it.
d istr ibutive justice (or social justice) 1he fa ir
dL~rribucion ofsociery’s benefirsand burdens-
such th ings as jobs, income, property, liberties,
rig hts, ,velfare a id, taxes, and public service.
d ivine command theory The doctrine char
God is the creator of morality.
division The fa llacy of arguing erroneously
char what can be said of the who le can be
said of che pares.
empiricism 1he view char our knowledge of
the empirical world comes solely from sense
experience.
epiphenomen alism 1he notion char mental
properties do nor cause anything, bur mere-
ly accompany physical processes.
epistemology 1he study of knowledge.
equivocation 1he fallacy of as.~igni ng c,vo
different meanings co the same sign ificant
word in an argument.
ethical egoism 1he view chat right actions are
chose char further one’s own best interests.
ethics (moral philosophy) The study of mor-
a lity using rhe methods of ph ilosophy.
ethics of care A moral perspective chat empha-
sizes the unique d emand~ of specific situa-
tions a nd t he v irtues and fee lings chat are
ce,ural co close personal relationsh ips.
evid en tialis m 1he view chat we are justified in
believing someth ing on ly if it is s upported
by sufficient evid en ce.
fallacy A common bur bad argument.
false d ilemma The fallacy of arguing errone-
o usly chat sin ce t here are only two a ltern a-
tives co c hoose from , and one of chem is un-
acceptable, t he ocher one must be true.
fem in ist ethics An approach co 1nora licy a imed
at advancing women’s interests, underscor-
ing their d istin ctive experiences and char-
acteristics, and advancing the obvio us truth
chat ,vomen and men are morally equal.
formalism 1he view char arc is d efined by its
form, rhe structure or organization of its
pares.
function alism The v iew rhar the mind is the
functions chat the brain performs.
genetic fal lacy The fallacy of arguing char a
statement can be judged true or false based
on its source.
hard determin ism The view char free will does
nor exist, rhac no one acrs free ly.
id en tity theory 1he view char mental states are
identical co physical brain states.

incompatib ilis m The view that if determin ism
is true, no one can act freely.
ind ete rminis m The view t hat nor every even t
is determin ed by preceding events and t he
laws of nature.
ind u ctiv e a rg umen t An argument intend ed to
give probable s upport to its conclusion .
justice The idea t hat people should get what is
fa ir or what is t heir due.
Kant’s th eory 1 he t heory that right actions are
tho.,;e chat accord with rhe categorical imperative.
k a rma The un iversal principle chat o ur actions
result in deserved pleasure or pain in this
life or the next.
Ii In early Con fucia n ism, ritual, etiquette, prin-
ciple, an d propriety; conscientio us behavior
and right action .
liberalism The po litical theory that puts primary
emphasis on the liberry and rights of individ-
ua ls against encroach ments by t he scare.
liberta rianis m (metaphysica l) 1 he view chat
some actions are free, for they are caused, or
controlled , by t he person, or agent.
liberta rianis m (political) The d octrine chat
emphasizes person al freedoms and the right
to pursue one’s own social an d economic
well-being in a free marker without interfe r-
ence from others.
logic The study of correct reasoning.
logical b eh aviorism The idea chat menta l
stares are d ispositions to be have in a particu-
lar ,vay in certain circumstances.
materia lism (or physicalism) 1 he doctrine
th at every object and event in the ,vorld is
physical.
me rit ocracy A system of ru le by t hose most
qualified co govern.
me taphysics 1 he study of reality, an inquiry
into rhe fund amen tal n ature of the un iverse
and che t h ings in it.
mind-body problem The issue of what menta l
phen omena are an d how th ey rela te to t he
physical world.
mon oth e is m Bel ief in one God.
moral absolutis m The belief chat objective
moral principles a llow no exceptions or
must be applied t he same way in all cases
and c ultures.
mora l evil Evil chat comes fro m human choic-
es and actions a nd the bad things char arise
from chem.
moral objectivis m The view ch at t here are moral
standards char are true or correct fo r everyone.
moral relativism The view chat moral stand ards
do not have independent status bur are relative
co what ind ividua ls or cultures believe.
mora l th e ory A t heory char explains why an
action is right or wrong or why a person or a
person’s c haracter is good or bad.
mo rality Bel iefs about right and ,vrong ac-
tions and good and bad persons or char-
acter.
multiple realiza bility 1 he capacity to be real-
ized or insra,uiared in a variety of forms an d
materials.
natura l evil Evil that results from the workings
of nature.
n irva n a En lightenment: t he u lt imate aim of all
Buddhist practice an d the fina l liberation co
which all the Bud d ha’s teach ings point.
objectivis m (in arr) 1 he vie,v char works of arr
have objective properties by which we can
judge their aesthetic good ness o r badnes.~.
ontolog ical a rg umen t An argument chat cries
co demonstrate God’s existence by logical
an alysis of the concept of God.
pa n en th eis m The view chat God is in t he un i-
verse and the universe is in God .
pa n th eism The view t hat God and t he un iverse
a re on e and t he same th ing, a d ivine W hole.
political philosophy 1 he s tudy of political so-
cieties using t he methods of ph ilosophy.
poly t h eis m Belief in many gods.
premise In an argument, a statement support-
ing the conclusion.
prin ciple of in duc tion The presumption chat
even ts char fo llowed one another in t he past
will do t he same in t he future, that the fu-
ture wi ll be li ke the past.
problem of fre e w ill The challenge of reconcil-
ing determin ism with our intuitions or ideas
about persona l freedom.
Glossary 459

460 Glossary
proper ty dualism The view that mental proper-
ties are nonphysical properties arising from,
but not reducible to, physical properties.
prop osition al k n owled ge Knowledge of a
proposition.
psycholog ical egois m 1 he t heory that people
always act o ut of self-in terest.
rationalism The view that through unaided reason
we can come to know what the world is like.
red uctio ad absurdum An argu,nent of t his
form: If you assume that a set of statemen ts
is true, and yet you can deduce a false or
absurd statement from it, t hen t he origin al
set of statements as a whole must be false.
re111he essential Confucian virtues, including be-
nevolence, sympathy, kindness, generosity,
respect for others, and human-heartedness.
r ule-utilitarianism 1 he doctrine that a right
action is on e t hat con forms to a rule t hat,
if followed consisten tly, ,vould create for ev-
eryon e involved the most beneficial balan ce
of well-being over suffering.
sa111sara O ne’s cycle of repeated deaths and
rebirths.
s k ep ticism 1 he view that we lack knowledge in
some fundamental way.
slippe ry slope The fallacy of argui ng errone-
ously that a particular action s hould not be
taken because it will lead inevitably to other
actions resulting in some di re oucco,ne.
social contra ct th eory The view t hat justice
is secured , and t he state is mad e legitimate,
through an agreement among citizens of the
state or between t he citizens a nd t he rulers
of the state.
socialism 1 he doctrine that the means of pro-
duction (property, factor ies, busines.~es)
should be owned or controlled by the people,
eit her communally or through the state.
Socrat ic method Question-and-answer d ia-
logue in which propositions are method i-
cally scrutinized to uncover t he truth.
statemen t (claim} An assertion that somethi ng
is or is not the case and is therefore t he k ind
of utterance chat is eit her true or fa lse.
straw m an 1 he fa llacy of misrepresen ting a
person’s views so they can be more easily at-
tacked or d ismissed .
subjective idealism The d octrine that a ll t hat
exist are minds and t heir ideas.
subjective relativis m The view that right ac-
tions are those endorsed by an in d ividual.
subjectivism (in arr) The view that aesthetic
criteria are purely subjective; the good ness
or bad nes.~ of a work of arr depends on how
the audience responds co it.
subs ta n ce d u alis m The notion that mind and
body consist of nvo fundamenta lly d ifferent
kinds of stuff, or substances.
sy nthetic statemen t A statement that is not
ana lytic.
t eleolog ical a rgumen ts Argu ments that try to
sho,v t hat God must exist because feat ures
of the universe show signs of purpose or
d esign.
theism Belief in the existence of God.
theist Someone who believes in God.
theodicy A d efense of the tradit ional concep –
tion of God in light of the existence of evil.
Upa11ishad s Ved ic literature concerning the
self, Brahman, samsara, and liberation.
utilitarianism 1 he view that right actions
are t hose chat result in the most beneficial
balance of good over bad consequences for
everyone involved.
Ved a.s Early Hindu scriptures, d eveloped be-
c,veen 1500 and 600 BCE.
virtue ethics A moral t heory that foc uses on
the development of v irtuous character.
welfa re libe ralism A form of liberalism, the
a im of which is to preserve individual liber-
ties whi le ensuring the general welfare of the
citizenry.

CREDITS
…………………………………….. · —-·——– .. .._ ………………………………… ._ ……………….. –… ·——-· …………….. __. ……… __. ………. __. ….. __. ………… _. …… __. ………………….. ……….. __._ ….. __.____. ………………… _. …….. .
Chapter 1
Chapier opening photo© iStock
photo.com/Chris Schmidt
1. 1 Uni\fersa.1
1. 2 Uni\fersa.l
1.3 SuperStock/Sup
1.4 Gianni Dagli
1.5 Corbi,
1.6 Thale, of M iletus: Courtesy of
the Yale University Arr Gallery
1.7 Empedocles: Universal Images
Group/Getty I mages
1.8 Parmenides: DeAgostini/Ge«y
Images
1.9 The Print Collector/Alamy
1. 10 © Gary Jochim/SuperStock
1. 11 Clarence Darrow at H is Desk©
Beumann/CORBIS
1. 12 Profile of Greek Ma 1..he.matician
Hypatia © Be«mann/CORBIS
1. 13 © Photri lmages/SuperStock
Chapter 2
Chapier opening photo© iStock
photo.com/Phoco_HamsterMan
2. 1 Distinctive
2. 2 O llyy/Shutterstock
2.3 Michael D Brown/Shutterstock
2.4 © I NTERFITTO/Alamy
2.5 Uias 51.rachinis/Shutterstock
2.6 © BH C’.eneric Scock lmages!Alamy
2.7 © Suraj Dongol/Alamy
2.8 © Mary Evans Picture Ubrary/
Alamy
2.9 Tatfana Makocra/Shutterstock
2. 10 © sam l 00/Shutterstock
2. 11 nea randfar/iStockphoto
2. 12 ©Timewatch lmages/Alamy
2. 13 © Agencja Fotograficzna Caro/
Alamy
2. 14 Manin No\-a.k/Shutcerscock
2. 15 © The Art Gallery Collection/
Alamy
2. 16 © J Marshall – Tribaleye Images/
Alamy
2. 17 © Peter H orree/Alamy
2. 18 Phoco of Buddhist monk
praying: ASSOCIATED P RESS
2. 19 © Gavriel Jeean/Corbi,
2.20 © Mitchell Kanashkevich/
Corbis
2.2 1 © Luca TettonilRoberr H a rding
Wo rld lmagery/Co rbis
Chapter 3
Chapter opening phoco Siegfried
Layda/Geuy l mageS
3. 1 Allen G raham – P Dlmage,/
Shutrerstock
3.2 Kheng Guan TohJShuiterstock
3.3 Christian Darkin/Shutterstock
3.4 © PjrTravel/Alamy
3.5 © Lord price Collection/Alamy
3.6 © narvikkilStockphoro
3.7 © LondonPhocos – Homer
Sykes/Alamy
3.8 © Simon Belcher/Alamy
3.9 © SCPhotos/ Alamy
3. 10 © Pictorial Press ltd/Ala my
3. 11 Ft.d.i1/Shutterscock
3.12 © iStockphoto.com/Jaap2
3. 13 Scala/Art Resource. NY
3.14 Virginia Held
3. 15 Mary W’ollstonecraft: G l
Archive/Alamy Stock Photo
3. 16 H ung Chung Chih/
Shutterstock
Chapter 4
C hapter opening photo
© Blu1gru ppe/Corbis
4.1 lukiyano,,. Naralia/frenta/
Shuuerscock
4.2 shiva3d/Shutterstock
4.3 © Louie Psihoyos/CORBIS
4.4 © Mary fa-ans Picture LlbrJ.ry/
Alamy
4.5 © Univel’$3) Images Group
limi1ed/Alamy
4.6 © CC BY 3.0
4.7 © Ian McDonnell/iStockphoto
4.8 © GlobalP/iScockphoco
4.9 The incelligent human-like
machine Sonny from the movie I.
Robot: fair use
4.10 © Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy
4.11 Robert H ol mgren
4. J 2 Science FaccionlSuperScock
Chapter 5
Chapter opening photo David
Greenwood/Getty Images
5.1 De,ign Pies lmageS/Fotosearch
5.2 Science Faction/SuperStock
5.3 solarseve.n/Shutterstock
5.4 © Mary E,,.ns Picture Library/
Alamy
5.5 © Mary E,,.ns Picture Library/
Alamy
5.6 © Milk Phorogr,phie/Corbis
5.7 © AF archive/ Alamy
Chapter 6
C hapter opening photo Horesco
Productions/Getty Images
6.1 © C .J. Burron!Corbis
6.3 © Alfredo Dagli Orti/The Ar,
Archive/Corbis
461

462 Credits
6.4 © Pictorial Press Lrd/Alamy
6.5 © North Wind Picture Archives/
Alamy
6.6 © Larry Lilac/Alamy
6.7 © North Wind Picture Archives/
Alamy
6.8 © 19th era/Alamy
6.9 © Lebrecht Music and Arts
Pho,o Library/Alamy
6.10 © KevinTaylor/Alamy
6.1 1 © The Art Gallery Collection/
Alamy
6.12 © \’qorld His1ory Archive/
Alamy
6.13 BrainDen.oom
6.J4 BrainDen.com
6.15 J 230plicallllusions.com
6.16 © Lebrecht Music and Arts
Photo Library/Alamy
Chapter 7
Chapter opening pho,o © seraficus/
iStockphoto
7 .J lnstagram: lnstagram
7 .2 © Damien Hirst and Science
Ltd. All righ,s reserved. DACS
20 15. Photo : Prudence Cuming
Associates Ltd
7 . 3 Fearless girl statue:
© vivalapenler/iStockphoco
7.4 Homeless Jesus statue:
ASSOCIATED PRESS
7.5 Davis Museum at Wellesley
College/Art Resource, NY.
© 2015 11,e Andy Warhol
Fow,dation for the Visual Ans.
lnc./Anisrs Rights Society
7.6111e Dinner Parcy:
ASSOCIATED PRESS
7.7 Tri.:cie on tl,e Coe: The Solomon
R. Guggenheim Foundation/Art
Resource, NY
7 .811,e Rag Is Bleedi ng: © 20 18
Faith Ringgold. member Artist.s
Rights Society (ARS), New York
Chapter 8
Chapter opening photo©
\’qashington Srock Photo/Alamy
8 .1 © GraphicaArtis/Corb is
8 .2 Chuck Rausin/Shutterstock
8.3 BananaStock/Punchscock
8.4 Universal Images Group/
SuperStock
8.5 OJO lmages/Supe rStock
8 .61homas Hobbes (oil on canvas),
Fuller, Isaac (1606-7 2) (circle
of)/Burghley H ouse Colleclion.
Lincolnshire, UK/Bridgeman
Images
8.7 Frontispiece to ‘l…eviahan or the
Matter, Forme and Power of a.
Comon \XleaJLh Ec:desiasticall and
Civil’, 165 1, by Thomas Hobbes
(1588- 16 7 9) ofMalmesbury
(engraving) (b&w photo) , English
School, (17th century)/Priv>re
Collection/Bridgeman Images
8 .8 Image Asset Management Ltd./
SuperStock
8.9 © North \Vind Picture Archi\fes/
Alamy
8 .10 Copyright© President and
Fellows of H arvard College and
are proteCLed by Harvard rublic
Affairs&. Communications
8 .1 1 © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/
CORBIS
8. 12 Linda A. Cicero/Stanford News
Service
8 .13 Gold en Pixels/SuperSrock
Chapter 9
Chap1er opening photo RubberBall
Produclions/Getty Images
9 .1 © marekuliw./iStockphoto
9 .2 © Peter Barritt/Alamy
9 .3 l’antheon/SuperStock
9.4 © lmagineGoll’llStockphoto
9.5 © HultonArchive/iStockp ho10
9 .6 Nicku/Shu1terstock
9.7 Silvio Fiore/SuperStock
9 .8 Exactostock/SuperSrock
9.9 © AlexMotrenko/iStockphoto
9 . 10 Philip and Karen Smith/Getty
Images
Appendix A
Photo 1, Carly Fiorina: Commons
Wikimedia/Michael Yadon
Photo 2, Stewart Butterfield:
Commons Wikimedfa/nmafa
Photo 3, Sheila Bair: Commons
\Xlikimedia/1llatcher Cook for
Pop Tech
Photo 4, Katy Tur: Commons
Wikimedia/ nrkbeta
Photo 5, Damon Horowitt:
Commons Wikimedia./Rcsiren
Photo 6, l.a.rry Sanger: Commons
Wikimedia/Larry Sanger
Photo 7, Stephen Breyer: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Sceve retteway
Photo 8, Srephen Colbert: Commons
Wikimedia/Montclair Film Festival
Photo 9, Angela Davis: Commons
Wikimedia/Columb ia GSAPP
Photo 10, Lana Del Rey: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Harmony Gerber
Photo 11 , Chris Hayes: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Joann Jovinelly
Photo 12, Rashina Jones: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Stephanie Moreno
Photo 13 , Marrin Luther Kin g. Jr.:
Commons \’7ikimedia/\Xlalter
Albertin
Photo 14, John Lewis: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Online Guide co
House Members and Sena.cors
Photo I 5. Terrence Ma.lick: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Hadean-mind
Photo 16, Yann Martel: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Shane Lin
Photo 17. Deepa Mehta.: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Ca.na.dian Film Cencre
Photo 18, Susan Sontag: Commons
\Xlikimedia/Lynn Gilbert

INDEX OF MARGINAL QUOTATIONS
…………………………………………………… .._ ……….. .._ ………………………………………… __ ……… __ …………………………….. __. ………. __. …… __.__. …….. __.__. ……………….. __. ………………. …….. ……….. ……. ……….. _. ………. … … .
Th is index helps you locate pa rticular q uotations in the text’s margins a nd find all the marginal quotations by
a specific autho r.
A
Adams, Scott, 259
Ainley, Alison, 320
Allen, Woody, 73
Amyl, Henri Frederic, 168
Anderson, Elizabeth, 321
Anselm, 79-8 1
Antony, Louise M., 320-21
Aquinas, Thomas, 45, 66-67
Aristotle, 3, 176-77, 181, 247, 282,
334, 340-43, 357
Augusti ne, 58, 356
Ayer, Alfred Jules, 147
B
Bacon, Fra ncis, 18, 30
Baggini, J ulia n, 414-16, 420-2 1
Baier, A nnette C., 188
Bair, Sheila, 4 32
Bell, C live, 335
Belshaw, C hristopher, 425
Berkeley, George, 300-302
Bierce, Ambrose, 208
Bisson, Terry, 237-38
Block, Ned, 223
Blum, Lawrence, 20-2 1
Bombeck, Erma, 223
Brau lt, Robert, 97
Broughton, James, 207
Brown, Les, 410
Butterfield, Stewart, 432
c
Cabanis, Pierre-Jean Georges, 213
Campbe ll, Joseph, 411
Camus, Albert, 190-91, 408, 422
Capp, A l, 340
Carroll, Lewis, 330
C halmers, David J., 218-19, 232
C havez, Hugo, 379
C hesterton, G. K., 139
C hinese Proverb, 175
C huang Tzu, 123
Clarke, Arthur C., 131-33
Clifford, W. K., 99
Cole, Eve Browning, 321-25
Collins, Francis, 78
Confucius, 193-95, 276
Cortazar, Julio, 165
Craig, William Lane, 70-7 1
Crosthwaite, Jan, 182
Cuppy, \Viii, 220
D
Darrow, Clarence, 75, 414
Darwin, C harles, 77
Davis, Thomas D., 270-72
Dershowitz, Alan, 109, 167
Descartes, Rene, 212, 285-86,
288-92
d’Holbach, Baron, 246-47
Dickens, C harles, 179, 365
Disraeli, Benjamin, 279
Dockri ll, Peter, 224-25
Douglass, Frederick, 359
Ducasse, Curt J ., 339
Durant, \Vi ii, 2
E
E. D. K lem ke, 423
Edison, Thomas A., 2 13
Edwards, Paul, 421-22
Ehrenreich, Barbara, 387
Ei nstein, A lbert, 69, 82, 144, 184, 284,
287, 292
Eliot, T. S., 314
Emerson, Ralph \Valdo, 121
Engels, Friedrich, 381-86
Epictetus, 22, 265
F
Fiorina, Carly, 432-33
Fodor, Jerry A., 222-23
Forude, James A., 173
Frankl, Viktor E., 407, 418
Franklin, Benjami n, 99
G
Galileo Galilei, 59
Gandhi, Mahatma, 118
Gardner, Marti n, 338-39
Glaspell, Susan, 39
Golding, Wi lliam, 397-404
Grau, Christopher, 287
H
Ham ilton, Alexa nder, 370
Hawki ng, Stephen, 72, 78
Held, V irginia, 184-85
Hesse, Hermann, 414
Hick, John, 88-91
Hobbes, Thomas, 366-70
Hodge, C harles, 148
H ubbard, Elbert, 154, 278
H ume, David, 8, 74-76, 305-10,
346-48
H untington, Ellsworth, 2 10
H ursthouse, Rosalind, 179
H uxley, Thomas H., 281
Inge, Dean, 25
Ingersol, Robert, 157
Isaiah 5:20, KJV, 91
J
Jagger, A lison, 182
James, W ill iam, 38, 92, 99-105, 249
Jefferson, Thomas, 146
463

464 Index of Margi nal Quotations
Jewish Proverb, 66
Johnson, B. C., 87
K
Kant, Immanuel, 83, 137, 169-73, 309,
3 12-15, 3 18
Ken nedy, Joh n F., 335
Kierkegaard, S0ren, 115
King, Ma rtin Luther, Jr., 355
Kitcher, Philip, 8 1
Klemm, W. R., 256
L
Lacy, Suzanne, 344
Lao Tzu, 123-25
Le G uin, Ursu la K., 200-203
Leonardo da V inci, 296
Lewes, George H enry, 26
Lewis, C . S., 62, 65, 2 11
Lichtenstein, Roy, 338
L iebknecht, Karl, 380
L in, Patrick, 230-31
L incoln, Abraham, 178
Locke, Joh n,251, 293-99,371-74, 391
L ucretius, 424
L uther, Martin, 262
L uyah, Ha l Lee, 257
M
Mackie, J. L., 87, 93
Martin, Michael, I 06
Marx, Karl, 381-86
Maug ham, \Y/. Somerset, 66, 87
McCarthy, Cormac, 255
McGi ll, Bryant H., 366
Michelangelo, 333
Mi ll, John Stuart, 46, 157-64, 216
Mi ller, David, 392
Mi nsky, Marvin, 2 10
Mizner, \Y/i lson, 103
Montague, Ph illip, 45
Montesquieu, Cha rles de, 83
Morris, R ichard, 69
N
Nagel, Thomas, 208, 220-21
Namazie, Ma ryam, 153
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 244
Nietzsche, Friedrich, JOI, 163
N in, Anais, 303
Noddings, N el, 185
Noss, John B., 195
Novalis, 34 2
N ussbaum, Martha, 2
0
O kin, Susan Moller, 388-91
O’Rourke, P. J., 244, 377
Orwell, George, 382
p
Pa ley, \Y/i lliam, 72-73
Pasca l, Blaise, I 06-8
Picasso, Pablo, 333
Pigliucci, Massimo, 108
Pike, Al bert, 28
Plato, 3, 5, I O-I I , 47-55, 283-84, 316,
322, 361-62
Poe, Edgar Allan, 351-52
Pope, Alexander, 206
Pugh, Emerson, 219
R
R achels, James, 183
R ahula, Wa lpola, 112-13
Rand, Ayn, 254
Rawls, John, 376-77
Reagan, Ronald , 374
Roosevelt, E leanor, 17
Rowe, Wi lliam L., 84-87, 9 1, 95,
254-55
Russell, Bertrand, 4 , 8 , 33, 7 1, 150,
280,289, 303
s
Sagan, Ca rl, 77, 78
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 262-65, 360,
408, 422-23
Schick, Theodore, Jr., 212, 277
Schopen hauer, Arthur, 222,
248, 4 13-14
Schrodinger, Erwin, 78
Schulz, C harles M., 7, 114, 409
Searle, Joh n R., 216, 226-29, 23 1
Shafer-Landau, Russ, 147, 180
Shakespea re, \Y/i lliam, 36, 149, 311
Shaw, George Bernard, 119, 171
Silbersweig, David, 432
Singer, Isaac Bashevis, 242
Sin nott-A rmstrong, Walter, 6 1
S mart,]. J. C., 2 17-18
S now, C. P., 168
Socrates, 3, 8-11, 42, 47-55, 140,
275,278
Spinoza, Ba ruch, 148, 24 2
Spong, John, 64
Stace, W. T., 25 1-52
S umed ho, Ajah n, 112
Swam i Vivekananda, 117
Swi nbur ne, Richard, 87, 97
T
Taylor, R icha rd , 258-60
Tennyson, Alfred Lord, 307
Teresa of Avila, 92
Tertullian, 168
The Budd ha, 68, 111-12
Thoreau, Henry David, 117, 173
T illich, Paul, 11 , 416, 421
Tocquevi lle, A lexis de, 382
Tolstoy, Leo, 250, 335, 4 11-13,
416-18
T ru mbull, H . C., 171
T ryon, Edward, 69
Tur, Katy, 433
Twa in, Mark, 122
u
U nknown, 299
U rlaub, Ivan, 304
v
Vanbrugh, Joh n, 151
van l nwagen, Peter, 257
Vaughn, Lewis, I 41, 277
Voltaire, 82, 143, 319, 429-30
von Brau n, Wernher, 78
w
\Y/aithe, Mary E llen, 31
\Vest, Rebecca, 323
\Y/hitehead, A lfred North,
16, 149
\Y/ittgenstein, Ludwig, 19
\Y/olf, Susa n, 4 25
\Y/olls tonecraft, Mary, 187, 321
\Y/right, Frank Lloyd, 347

GENERAL INDEX
………………………………. __.__. ……………………………………… ……. …. …._.__._ .. ——· ………….. ………. __.__. … …… .. …… ………. ………………………………………. .
A
Abolitionists, of capital punishment,
160-61
Abortion rights, 39 1
Above, mea ning from, 416-2 1,
419j 420/
Abse,uqualia objections, 2 10, 223
Absolute d uty, 173
Absu rdity, of existence, 188-91
Active read ing, 30, 32
Act-utilitarian ism
consequences in, 156-58
defined, 156, 198, 457
Addison, Joseph, 347
Ad ht>minem fallacy. See Appeal to the
person
Aegisthus, 343
Aesthetics
Aristotle inAuenci ng, 340-43
defined ,333, 350, 457
Hume inAuencing, 346-48
philosophy of beauty and, 333
Plato inAuencing, 340
va lue, 338-40, 339/
See also Art
Affirmi ng t he a ntecedent. See Modus
pt>nens
Affirmi ng t he consequent, 22
Agent causation
defined ,258, 268,457
libertaria nism (metaphysic,,l)
a nd,258-60
Agnostic, 64-65, 129, 457
Ahimsa {non harm), 116
Al. See Artificial intelligence
Ai nley, Alison, 320
Alienation, 380
Aliens, 209
Ana logical induction, 24-25
Ana lytic statement, 3 11-12, 329, 457
Anatta (impermanence of the self),
l l l-12
Anderson, Elizabeth, 32 1
Anguish, 264
Anicca (impermanence), 111
Anselm (sai nt)
criticism of, 82-83
ontological a rgument of, 62, 79-83
Prt>slt>gium by, 79-82
Antecedent, 19
Antisocial be havior, belief in free w ill
inAuencing, 252-53
Antithesis, 379
Antony, Louise M., 320-21
The Apt>logy ( Plato), 47-55
A pt>sterit>ri a rguments, 66
A posteriori knowledge, 278, 3 12,
329,457
Appeal to ignorance, 37, 42, 457
Appeal to popularity, 35-36, 42, 457
Appeal to t he person, 33-35, 42, 457
A prit>ri arguments, 66
A priori knowledge, 278, 312, 313-19,
327, 329, 457
Aqu inas, Thomas
argu ment from motion of, 67-68
biography of, 68
criticism of, 69-71
firs t-cause argument of, 68-7 1
God and, 44-45, 61, 66-70, 126
meaning from below and, 42 1
Summa 7het>lt>gica by, 44-45, 66-70
Arbitrariness problem, of divine
command t heory, 147-48, 448-50
Argument from evil
defi ned,63-64, 129,457
God and, 63-64, 84-87, 126-27,
129,457
ignorance and, 86-87
Rowe’s, 84-87
Argument from motion, 67-68
Argument from religious experience,
62-63,92-98, 12~ 129,419,457
Arguments
a pmteriori, 66
a priori, 66
claims in, 15-18
conclusion in, 15-19, 28-32
defi ned, 15,42, 458
eva luation of, 32
exercises, 43-46, 437-39
invalid , 22, 23
knowledge, 219-2 1
premise in, 15-19, 28-32
sound, 19
statements in, 15-18, 28-29
strong, 18-19
symbolization of, 19-26
theodicies, 64
thesis s upported by, 379-80
in thi nki ng ph ilosophica lly,
14-40, 4 1
valid, 18-21, 23
weak, 18
See also Teleological a rg uments;
specific arguments
Arignote, 3 1
Aristocracy, 361, 395, 457
Aristonexus, 3 1
Aristotle, 3, 4j 7j 115, 349
aesthetics inAuenced by, 340-43
happiness and, 176-78
Hypatia and, 29
Nict>machean Ethics by, 176-77
objectivism of, 340-43
The Poetics by, 340-43
in The Schot>l t>f Athens {Raphael), 178/
soul and, 2 14
virtue ethics a nd, 176-78
women and, 320, 322
Art
aesthetic va lue of, 338-40, 339/
c haracterization of, 333-35,
336/-337/
as controversial, 336-37, 336/-337/
defi ned, 333-35
465

466 General Index
Art (contintted)
as expression, 335
fe minist, 344-46, 344/-346/
form of, 335
museum, 341
objectivism in, 338-43, 350, 459
as representation, 334-35
subjectivism in, 338, 346-48,
350, 460
Art (Bell), 335
Arti fi cial intelligence (AI)
autonomous, 230-3 l
a nd human rights, 224-25
strong, 208-10, 226-29, 230-31
Artworld, 339
Aryans, 117
Assessment of objections, in essay
structure, 443
Atheism
defined,64-65, 129,457
problem o f evil and, 84-87
in U.S., 60
Atheism: A Philosophical fustifict1tion
(Marti n), 106
Atheistic existentia lism, 263
Atheists, 64, 419
Atmt1r1, 118
Atomist ph ilosophers, 249
Authoritaria nism, 361
Autonomous Al, 230-31
Auxiliaries, 360
Ax iology, 6-7, 42, 457
B
Baggini, Ju lian
mea ning o fl ife and, 414-16,
420-21, 420/
What’.r It All About? by, 414-16,
420-2 1, 420/
Baier, Annette, 188
Bai r, Sheila, 432
Bats, 219-21
Bats, materialism and, 221/
Baumeister, Roy F., 253
Beauty
aesthetics and, 333
Form of, 340
Hume on, 346-48
philosophy of, 333, 349
Begging the question, 38-39, 42, 457
Behavior
a ntisocial, belief in free wi ll
in flu encing, 252-53
fait h a nd, 107-8
Behaviorism. See Logica l behaviorism
Belief
in free will, 252-53
in God, 58-109
ha rd-wired, 63
insu fficient evidence fo r, 99, 102-3
in intercessory prayer, 96
justi fication of, 276
ph ilosophical, survey of, 5
without reason, 98-109, 127
Bell, C live, 335
Below, mea ning fro m, 421-25
Belshaw, C hristopher, 425
Bentham, Jeremy, 157-58, 165
Berkeley, George, 299/
criticism of, 303
empiricism o f, 279, 280, 299-303
God and, 303
Lockeand,299,30 1-2
“Of the Principles of H uma n
K nowledge” by, 300-303
sensations and , 299-303
subjective idealism and, 280
Bhagt1ut1d-Gitt1, 120-22, 457
bhaltti, 122
Bible, soul in, 214
Big Bang, 70-71, 70/
Bigfoot, 233
Bios (biological life of man), 90
Bisson, Terry, 237-38
Block, Ned, 223, 226
Blum, Lawrence, 20-2 1
Body. See M ind-body problem
Body, in essay structure, 442-43
Bourgeoisie, 379-86
Brahman, 119, 457
Brahm in, 457
Brai n
consciousness and, 212-13, 215,
2 17-23
m ind a nd, 207- 10, 223-29, 231-33
pi neal gla nd in, 215/
Braue New \Vorl.d (Hux ley), 242
Brillo Box, 339, 339/
The Buddha, 109-16, 110/, 127-28
Buddht1-Nt1ture (Sumedho), 112
Buddhism
Buddha and, 109- 16, 127-28
complex ity of, 110
d harma in, 111- 16, 128, 130, 458
dultltht1 in, 111-16
Five Precepts of, 116
Four Noble Truths of, 111-16
God, ph ilosophy and , 109-10, 11 l,
114-16
history of, I 09-16
in India, 110-l l
karma in, 110, 113-14, 130, 459
n irvana in, 112-16, 114-16, 128,
130, 459
Noble Eightfold Path of, 114-16
overview of, 109-16
and science, 114, 115
Temple of the Dawn and , 113/
Bunyan, Joh n, 347
Butterfi eld, Stewart, 432
Byrd, Randolph, 96
c
Cam us, Albert
existentialism of, 189-92, 197, 408
meani ng of life a nd, 408, 414
morality a nd, 189-92, 197
“The My th of Sisyphus” by, 189-91
Capita lism
defi ned,379,395,457
socia list t heory and, 379, 380
Caring, 142, 181-88, 197
Carro ll, Lewis, 330
Cartesia n d ualism
c riticism of, 212-13, 215-16
defi ned,20~236, 457
identity theory and, 207-8, 218
Caste system, 117, 120, 121
Categorical imperative
defi ned, 171, 198-99, 457
in Kant’s theory, 171-75
Catharsis, 340-43, 350, 457
Causa l closure of the physical, 215-15,
236,457
Causa lity, 307-8, 307/
Cerebra l commissurotomy, 213, 215
Certai nty
o f Descartes, 288-92, 292/, 326
o f Locke, 293-99
Cha lmers, David J., 218-20, 219/
Character
morality based on, 175-81, 197
in virtue ethics, 175-80
Ch ild ca re, 388-91
Ch ild hood, religion acquired in, 59, 61/
Ch ina, 192-95, 197-98, 223, 226
Ch inese Room thought experiment,
226-29
Ch isholm, Roderick, 258
Chuang Tztt, 123-24
Clai m. See Statement
Clarke, Arthur C., 131-33
Clarke, Randolph, 258
Classical liberalism, 374-75, 395,
457-58

C lassic utilitaria nism, 157-58
C lass struggle, 379-87
C leanthes, 73-76
C lifford, W. K.
insufficien t evidence for belief a nd,
99, 102-3
Ja mes a nd, 101-2, 102-4
C lon ing, human, 144-45, l44-45f
Cogn itive relativism
criticism of, 277
defi ned, 277,329, 458
problem of knowledge and , 277-78
Cole, Eve Brown ing, 321-25
Comedy, 343
Commun ism
defi ned, 379,395,458
Manifesto of tht Comm,mist Party
and, 381-86
socialist theory a nd, 379-87
Commun ity, 360, 371-72, 393
Compatibilism
Consequence Argument rejected
by, 257
criticism of, 244, 255
defi ned, 243-44,268, 458
free wi ll, determ inism and, 250-55,
268, 458
Hobbes and, 250
H ume and, 250-51
libertarianism (metaphysical) a nd,
255,257-58
Locke and, 250-51, 254-55
overview of, 267
Stace a nd, 251-54
trad itional, 243-44, 250-55
Competition, 367
Composition, fallacy o f, 39, 42, 458
Computers, strong Al and, 208-10,
226-29, 228f
Conceivability a rg uments
of Descartes, 212-13
aga inst identity t heory, 2 18-20
Conceptualized experience, 314-19,
315/, 316/, 317f
Conclus ion
in arguments, 15-19, 28-32
defi ned, 15,42,458
in essay structure, 444
identi fi ed, 29-32, 44-45, 437-39
indic,itor words, 17
Cond itional premise, 19
Confucius, 123, 192-95, 192/, 197-98
Conscience, 138-39
Tiu Conscious Mind (Chalmers),
218-19, 232
Conscious ness
brai n a nd, 212-13, 215, 217-23
d ivided, 213, 215
Consent, in socia l contract theory, 356,
364, 37 1-74
Consequence Argu ment, 257, 267
Consequences
in ethica l egoism, 140, 143, 165-69
Kant’s theory and, 141, 169-70
mora lity based on, 155-69
in utilitarian ism, 140, 143, 155-64
Consequent, 19
Consequentialist theory, 140, 143, 155,
199, 458
Conservatism, 26, 143
Considered moral judgments, 143-46,
168, 173
Controversial art, 336-37, 336f-337f
Copernicus, 314, 315f
Cosmological arguments
Cra ig’s, 70-7 1
defi ned, 61, 129, 458
for God ‘s existence, 61, 66-71,
126,458
Kalam, 70-71
Cra ig, \Vi lliam La ne, 70-7 1
Credulity, pri nciple of, 93, 94-95
Criteria of adequacy
defi ned, 26
mora l, 143-46, 149-50, 196
Swi nburne and, 77
types of, 26
Critical read ing, 30, 32
Critique of Purt Reason (Kant), 83,
312-15, 318
Crosthwaite, Ja n, 182
Cultura l relativism
argument for, 153-54
defi ned, 149, 199,277-78,329, 458
infa llibi lity problem o f, 151-52, 278
mora l progress and, 151-53
mora l relativism a nd, 149, 151-55
problem of knowledge and, 277-78
social reformers and, 152-53
women’s rights and, 152-53, 152-53f
Curie, Marie, 421
D
Da la i Lama, 114
Da nto, Arthur C., 339
Dao, 123-24
Daoism, 123-26
Da rrow, C la rence, 28/, 75f
determinism of, 27-28
as pes.~imist, 414
General Index 467
Darwin, C harles, 13
Data, theory a nd, 143-46
David, 335
David, Jacques-Louis, !Of
Da Vi nci, Leonardo, 335, 338, 343
Davis, Thomas D., 270-72
Dawkins, Richard, 63
Dead hypothesis, 100
Death
euthanasia, 156-57, 157f
penalty, 160-61, !60-6 lf
rebi rth and , 11 3-14
of Socrates, 9, !Of, 47-55
Declaration o f Independence, 356,
356/, 371
Deductive a rg ument, 42, 458
defined , 17
examples of, 17-19
Deep Blue, 209-10, 209f
Defi lements, 113
Deism, 65, 129, 458
Demea, 73
Democracy
defined ,360,395,458
Plato opposing, 360, 364
Denying the antecedent, 22, 23
Denying the consequent.
See Modus tollens
Deontologica l t heory, 140, 141, 155,
199, 458
Dependent premise, 28
Descartes, Rene
biography of, 290-91, 290f
certa inty of, 288-92, 292/, 326
conceivability argument
of, 212-13
despair and, 265
Discour.re 011 the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason by, 212
divisibility argument of, 213-15
doubt of, 284-87
dream argument of, 285-86
God a nd, 289-90, 292
innate knowledge and, 285
Meditations on First Philosophy by,
213,285-86,288-92
principle o f clarity and d istinctness
of, 289-90
rationalism of, 279, 281, 284-92,
292/, 295
skepticism of, 285-87
substa nce dua lism of, 206-7,
211-13, 215-16, 230, 234-35
Ste also Cartesian dua lism
Desert, 357, 359

468 General Index
Design a rguments
evolution and, 80-81
for God’s existence, 61-63, 62/,
72-77, 80-81, 127
Hume critiqui ng, 73-77
Kant a nd, 83
Desire, 112
Despair, 264-65
Determinism
compatibi lism and, 250-55, 268, 458
Darrow’s, 27-28
defined,241,268,458
d’Holbach and, 246-47
fata lism compa red with, 245
free will problem and, 27-28, 241-45
indetermi nism and, 242-43,
246-50,266-67
James and, 249
libertaria nism (metaphysical) and,
244-46, 249-50,255-60
“A Little Omniscience Goes a Long
Way” and, 270-72
science a nd, 243, 247-48, 250
See also Hard determi nism
Dewey, John, 320
Dharma, 111 , 120-21, 458
d’Holbach, Baron, 246-47, 247/
Dialectic process, 379-80
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
(H ume), 73-77
Diffidence, 367
“The Dilemma of Determin ism”
(James), 249
“The Dilemma of the Divine Command
Theory” sample essay, 448-50
Disbelief, 64-66
Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason
(Descartes), 212
Disembodied existence, 212-13
Distributive justice, 357, 395, 458
Divi ne comma nd theory
a rbitrari ness problem of, 147-48,
448-50
defined, 146-47, 199, 458
God in, 139, 146-48, 199, 458
as moral theory, 139, 146-48, 180,
196, 199,448-49,458
in sample essay, 448-50
virtue ethics and, 180
Divi ne right, 364
Divisib ility argument, 213-15
Division, fallacy of, 39, 42, 458
Doing Philosophy (Schick), 212-13
Doubt, of Descartes, 284-87
Downward causation, 232
Dreams, 93, 276, 276/
Dttkkha (suffering), 111-16
Duty
E
absolute, 173
Ka nt and, 183
morality based on, 169-75, 197
to opi nion, 102-3
virtue ethics and, 175-76, 178-80
Eagleton, Terry, 424
Eastern religious traditions, 109-22,
127-29. See also Buddhism
Edwa rds, Paul, 421-22
Efficient cause, 67
Einstein, Albert, 65, 145, 284, 287, 292
“Embodiment a nd Epistemology”
(Antony), 320-21
Emotions
ethics and, 137-38, 182-85
tragedy invoking, 340-43
Empedodes, 13, 13/
Empiricism
of Berkeley, 279, 280, 299-303
defi ned,278,329,458
feminist, 322
of Hume, 279, 280, 303-10, 307/
Kant and, 311-19, 315/, 316-17/
of Locke, 279-80, 293-99
morality and, 170
problem of knowledge and, 278-80,
293-3 10, 307/, 326-27
skepticism in, 280
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Edwards), 421-22
Engels, Friedrich, 381-86
En lightenment, 246-47, 304
An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (Hume), 305-10
Entitlement, 359
Enumerative induction, 22-23
Epicureans, 41, 159, 417
Epicurus, 3, 159, 178/
Epiphenomenalism
criticism of, 216, 232
defi ned,2 10, 236,458
mind-body problem and, 210-11
property d ualism and, 232-33
Epistemic justi fi cation, 98
Epistemology
defi ned,6,42,275,329,458
feminist, 321-22
Ka nt’s revolution in, 314-15,
315/, 318-19
q uestions, 6, 276
traditiona l, 321-22
Equality
genderand,388-92
Hobbes a nd, 366-67
justice as, 357, 359, 363, 363/
of opportunity, 377-78
o rgan transplants and, 363, 363/
in political ph ilosophy, 357, 359
Rawls and, 357
Equal liberty principle, 376-78
Equivocation, 36-37, 42, 458
An Essay Concerning Httman
Understanding (Locke),
25 1, 293-99
An Essay on Free Will (van Inwagen), 257
Essay structure, 441-44. See also
Philosophy papers
Essence, ex istence preceding, 189-9 1,
262-65
Ethical egoism
arguments agai nst, 167-69
consequences in, 140, 143, 165-69
defi ned, 140, 143, 199,458
as moral t heory, 140, 143,
165-69, 458
psychological egoism and, 166-69,
460
utilitarianism and, 165-66
Ethics
defi ned, 6, 43, 136, 199, 458
emotions a nd, 137-38, 182-85
fem in ist, 181-88, 197, 199, 458
morality distinguished from, 137-38
in Nicon1achea11 Ethic,, 176-77
overview of, 136-48, 196
of strong AI, 230-31
See also Virtue ethics
Ethics of care
c riticism of, 185, 188
defi ned, 142, 182, 199, 458
femin ist ethics and, 181-88, 197
as moral t heory, 142-43, 181-88,
197, 199, 458
The Ethics of Care (Held), 184-85
Eudaimonia (h appi ness), 176
Euripides, 34 3
Europe, belief in God in, 60
Euthanasia, 156-57, 157/
Euthyphro (Plato), 147, 449
Evidence, insufficient for belief, 99,
102-3
Evidentialism
defi ned, 99, 130, 458
James repudiati ng, 99-106

Evil
argument from, 63-64, 84-87,
127, 129, 457
atheism and, 84-87
free wi ll defense and, 64, 87-88
God and, 63-66, 84-91, 127,
129, 133
moral, 84, 130, 459
natural, 84, 130, 459
necessar)’, 64
problem of, 84-9 1, 127
soul-maki ng defense a nd, 88-9 1
suffe ring from, 84-87
un necessar)’, 64, 66
Evil and the God of Love (Hick), 88-9 1
Evolution, design arguments and,
80-81
Examined life, Socrates and, 3, 8-11,
14, 40-4 1
Existence
absurdit)’ of, 188-91
d isembodied, 212-13
essence preceded b)’, 189-91, 262-65
God’s, arguments fo r, 61-63, 62/,
66-83, 126-2~ 129-30,457
persona l, recognition of, 291
Tiu Existence of God (Swinburne), 97
Existentia lism
atheistic, 263
of Camus, 189-92, 197, 408
defi ned, 188-89
of Sartre, 189, 262-66
“Ex istentialism Is a Humanism”
(Sartre), 262-65
Explanation
defi ned, 25
in inductive a rguments, 25-26
Explosive O rdna nce Disposa l Robot,
230-31, 230-31/
Expres.~ion, art as, 335
Extension, of physical th ings, 211
External mean ing, 410-11
F
Fact, fa ith creating, 104
Faith
beh avior a nd, 107-8
fac t created by, 104
living b)’, 107
pragmatic, 99- 108
reason and, 65-66
Tolstoy’s, 4 17-18
Fallac)’
appea l to ignora nce, 37, 43, 457
appea l to popularity, 35-36, 43, 457
appeal to the person, 33-35, 43, 457
begging t he q uestion, 38-39, 43, 457
composition, 39, 43, 458
defi ned,33, 43,458
d ivision, 39, 43, 458
equivocation, 36-37, 43, 458
exercise, 439
fa lse d ilemma, 37-38, 43, 458
genetic, 36, 43, 458
identified, 45-46
slippery slope, 39, 43, 460
straw man, 33, 43, 460
Fa lse d ilemma, 37-38, 43, 458
Fam ii)’
power relationships in, 388-89, 390/
responsibilities, 388-91
si ng le-parent, 388-89
Fatalist, 245
Fate, 245
Father, God as, 90
Fear, 340-43
Fem in ism
concerns of, 319
criticism of, 391-92
jus tice, political ph ilosoph)’ and,
387-92,394-95
Miller a nd, 391-92
O kin and, 388-91, 389/
Fem in ist art, 344-46, 344/-346/
Fem in ist empiricism, 322
Fem in ist epistemology, 321-22
“Fem inist Epistemology and Philosoph)’
of Science” (Anderson), 321
Fem in ist ethics
defi ned, 181, 199, 458
ethics of care and, 181-88, 197
“Feminist Ethics” Qaggar), 182
Fem in ist perspective, on k nowledge
Ain ley’s, 320
Anderson’s, 321
Antony’s, 320-21
Cole’s, 321-23
criticism of, 323, 324
problem of kn owledge and, 3 19-25,
327-28
“Feminist Philosophy” (Ai nle)’), 320
Fem in ist postmodern ism, 322-25
Fem in ist standpoint t heor)’, 322-24
Fiction
“The Good Bra hmin,” 429-30
“A Little Omniscience Goes a Long
Way,” 270-72
Lord of the Flies, 397-404
“The O nes Who \Val k Awa)’ From
Ornelas” (Le Guin), 200-203
General Index 469
“The Ova l Portrait,” 351-52
“The Star,” 131-33
“They’re Made O ut of Meat”
(Bis.~on), 237-38
Through the Looking Glass, 330
See also Narrative
Final draft, of philosophy paper, 447
Fiori na, Carly, 431-32
First-cause a rgument, 68-7 1
First draft, of philosophy paper,
446-47
First Mover, 68, 69-70
First Noble Truth, 111-12
Five Precepts, 116
Fodor, Jerry A., 222-23
Forlorn ness, 264
Formalism, 45, 335, 350
Forms, 282
of art, 335
of Beauty, 340
Four Noble T ruths, 111-16
Fourth Noble T ruth, 114-16
Frank, Anne, 174/
Frankl, Viktor, 424
Free acts, 251-54
Freedom
Sartre’s, 261-65, 268
va lue of, 24 1
Free will
bel ief in, 252-53
compatibi lism and, 250-55, 268, 458
defense, evil and , 64, 87-88
incompatibilism a nd, 243, 244-45,
254-55
libertaria nism (metaphysical) and,
244-46,249-50,255-60
“A Little Om niscience Goes a Long
\Va)'” and, 270-72
science and, 243, 247-48, 250, 256
See also Problem of free wi II
Fruitfulness, 142
Functiona lism
criticism of, 223, 23 1, 235
defined ,209,236,458
identity theory and, 222-23
logical behaviorism a nd, 222-23
m ind-body problem in, 209-10,
222-23,235
Fundamental ideas, 2
7he Fundamentals of Ethier
(Sha fer-Landau), 180
G
Gand hi, Mahatma, 417/, 421
Gardner, Martin, 338

470 General Index
Gaunilo, 82
Gender, equality and, 388-92. See also
Femi nism
“Gender and Bioethics”
(Crosthwa ite), 182
Gender-structured marriage, 388-90
General assent, 294
Genetic fu llacy, 36, 43, 458
Genuine option, 99-100, 102
“G host in t he machine,” 211
G illigan, Carol, 183
Girl with a Pearl Earring, 335
G lory, 367
God
Aquinas a nd, 44-45, 61, 66-70, 126
a rgument from evil a nd, 63-64,
84-97, 127, 129, 457
a rgument from rel igious experience
a nd,62-63, 12~ 129,457
belief in, 58-109
Berkeley and , 303
cosmological a rg uments for, 61,
66-71, 126, 458
Descartes a nd, 289-90, 292
design argu ments for, 61-63, 62j
72-77, 80-81, 126
d ifficulty recognizing, 97-98
in d ivine com mand theory, 139,
146-48, 199, 458
d ivi ne right and, 364
evil a nd, 63-66, 84-91, 127,
129, 133
experience of, 92-98, 127
as fathe r, 90
in “A Little Omn iscience Goes a
Long \Vay,” 270-72
mea ning o fl ife from, 409-10, 409j
4 16-21, 417j 419-20/
morality of, 87
nature of, 108
ontologic”I argu ments for, 62, 66,
79-83, 127, 130
Pascal betting on, 106-9
Paul’s experience of, 93/
purpose of, 89-90
theodicies a nd, 64
See also Rel igion; Religious
experience
God, philosophy a nd
a rguments for existence, 61-63, 62j
66-83, 126-2~ 129-30,457
belief without re,tson in, 98-109, 127
Buddhism and, 109-10, 111, 114-16
overview of, 58-66, 126-27
in ph ilosopher’s quest, 59-64
problem of evil in, 84-91, 127
“The Star” and , 131-33
t heism a nd religious experience in,
92-98, 93j 127
Goldi ng, W illiam, 397-404
“The Good Brah m in” (Volta ire), 429-30
Good will, 170-71
Govern ment
begi nn ing of, 371-72
end of, 372-73
func tions needed from, 370-71
pervasiveness of, 355-56
rebellion against, 371, 375
The Grand Design (Hawki ng), 72/
Grau, Christopher, 287
Greatest Happiness Principle,
158-59, 162
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
(Kant), 170-71
Guard ians, 360
H
Hallucinations, 276
Happiness
Aristotle a nd, 176-78
eudainionia, 176
in Greatest H appiness Pri nciple,
158-59, 162
meaning of life d isti ng uished
from, 409
in uti lita rian ism, 157-64
Hard determi nism
defi ned, 243,268,458
of d ‘Holbach, 246-47
Sartre and, 265
Hare, R. M., 422
Hawking, Stephen, 72/
Hea lt h care, 378
Held, Virginia, 183-85, 183/
Herodotus, 341-42
Hick, John
Evil and the God of Love by, 88-91
Hume and, 89, 90
and Rowe’s criticism of, 91
suffering a nd, 89, 91
Hi nduism, 116-23
Bhagavad-Gita, 120-22
origins, 117
schools of, 122-23
Upanishads, 118-19
Vedas, 117-18
Hitler, Adolf, 15j 149-50
Hobbes, Thomas
biography of, 365, 365/
compatibilism a nd, 250
equa lity and, 366-67
injustice and, 387
justice and , 366, 369-71, 375-76
socia l contract t heory of, 365-70
See also Leviathan
Homer, 343
Hood, Bruce, 63
H uma n cloning , morality of, 144-45,
144-45/
H uma n rights, Al and, 224-25
H uma ns, natural condition of, 366-70
H ume, David, 350
aesthetics influenced by, 346-48
o n beauty, 346-48
biography of, 304-5, 304/
causality and, 307-8, 307/
compatibi lism and , 250-5 1
c riticism of, 77, 375-76
design arguments critiqued by, 73-77
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion by, 73-77
empiricism of, 279, 280, 303-10, 307/
An Enquiry Concerning H11man
Understanding by, 305-10
Hick and, 89, 90
infi nite regress and , 69
Kant and, 311-12
o n perceptions, 304-6, 308, 310
pri nciple of induction a nd, 308-9,
329, 459-60
reasoning a rg ument of, 74
self and, 111
skepticism of, 304-5, 307, 310-12
socia l contract t heory criticized by,
375, 376
Of the Standard of Taste by, 346-48
subjectivism of, 346-48
women and, 320
H ursthouse, Rosali nd, 179
Huxley, Aldous, 242
Hypatia
biography of, 29, 29/
in Tiu School of Athens (Raphael),
178/
Hypothesis
dead, 100
live, 100, 106
rel igious, 99-106
Hypothetical imperative, 171
!, Robot, 225
Ideas
perceptions as, 295-99, 304-5
sensations and, 295-99

Identity theory
Cartesian dua lism a nd, 207-8, 218
conceivabi lity arguments agai nst,
218-20
criticism of, 218-2 1, 230-31
defi ned, 208, 236, 458
functionalism and, 222-23
See also Mind-body identity
Ignorance
appea l to, 37, 43, 457
argument from evil and, 86-87
veil of, 376
Imitation . See Representation
Tiu Imitation Game, 227
Immorta l soul, 214
Impartiality, 137, 158, 169, 183, 184-85
Impermanence, 111-12, 113
Impressions, 304-6
In ti Different Voice (G ill igan), 183
Incompatibi lism
defi ned, 243,269,459
free wi ll a nd, 243, 244-45, 254-55
libertarianism (metaphysical) a nd,
255,257
Independent premise, 28
Indetermi nism
defi ned, 243,269,459
determi nism and, 242-43,
246-50, 266-67
India, Buddhism originati ng in, 110-1 1
Indicator words, 17
Induction
analogical, 24-25
enumerative, 22-23
principle of, 308-9, 329, 459
problem of, 309
Inductive argu ment
analogical induction, 24-25
defi ned, 18, 43, 459
enumerative induction, 22-23
examples of, 18-19
inference to the best explanation,
25-26
Industry, modern, 384-85
Infallibility problem, 149-51, 278
In ference to the best
explanation, 25-26
In fi nite chain, o f Movers, 67-71
In fi nity, logica l contradictions of, 71
In herent va lue, of persons, 173-74
Injustice
laws of nature and, 369-70
in politica l philosophy, 387
In nate knowledge, 282-84, 283-95
Instagram, 334/
Intell igent design, 61-63, 62/, 80-8 1.
See also Design arguments
Intercessory prayer, 96
Internal mea ning, 410, 421-25
Introduction, in essay structure, 441-42
Invalid arguments, 22, 23
Irises, 335
Island, greatest possible, 82-83, 82f
J
Jaggar, Alison, 182
James, W ill iam
biography of, 248, 248f
Clifford a nd, 101-2, 102-4
criticism of, 106
determinism a nd, 249
“The Dilemma of Determinism”
by, 249
evidentialism repudiated by, 99-106
genuine option of, 99-100, 102
pragmatism of, 99-106, 248
on religious experience, 92
religious hypothesis of, 99-106
The Will to Believe by, I 00- 106
Judge, k nown and ind ifferent, 373
Justice
defi ned,357,396,459
d istrib utive, 395, 458
as equa lity, 357, 359, 363, 363f
femin ism a nd, 387-92, 394-95
Hobbesand,366, 369-71,375-76
laws of nature a nd, 369-70
Lord of the Flies and, 397-404
as merit, 357, 360-63
Plato a nd, 10-11, 357, 360-62,
360/, 393
political philosophy a nd, 355-59,
356/, 358-59] 393
in T/,e Republic, 10-11, 360-62
retributive, 357
social, 387-92, 394-95
social contract theory a nd, 364-78
utilitarian theory of, 357
]ttstice, Gender, and the Family (Okin),
388-91
K
Kalam cosmological a rg ument, 70-7 1
Kane, Robert, 258
Kant, Im manuel
biography, 313, 313f
criticism of, 318-19
Critique of Pure Reason by, 83,
312-15, 318
design a rg uments and, 83
General Index 471
d uty and, 183
empiricism and, 311-19, 315/,
316-I7f
epistemology revolution of, 314-15,
315/, 318-19
Grottndwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals by, 170-71
Hume and, 311-12
moral theory of, 141, 143, 170-75,
197, 199, 459
Plato and, 3 12-14
problem of knowledge a nd, 280,
31 1-19, 316-17/, 327
rationalism a nd, 312-14, 318
respect for persons a nd , 173-74
skepticism and, 280, 312, 318
on stamp, 17 If
utilitarian ism and, 173
women a nd, 321
Kant’s theory
categorical imperatives in, 171-75
consequences and, 141, 169-70
criticism of, 173-75
defined, 141, 199, 459
as moral theory, 14 1, 143, 170-75,
197, 199, 459
Karma, 110, 113-14, 121, 459
Kasparov, Garry, 209-10, 209f
Kaufma nn, Wa lter, 3
Ki ng, Martin Luther, Jr., 355, 421
Ki ngs, divi ne right of, 364
Kitcher, Philip, 8 1
Klemke, E. D., 423
Knowledge
a rg uments, 219-2 1
forms, 275-76, 303,304
innate, 282-84, 283-95
a posteriori, 278, 3 12, 329, 457
a priori, 278, 312, 313-19, 327,
329, 457
propositional, 276, 329, 460
situated, 321
See also Epistemology; Fem in ist
perspective, on k nowledge;
Problem of knowledge
Kushner, Haro ld, 66
L
Labor, sexua l division of, 390, 391
Lao-Tzu, 123-26
Law, mora lity a nd the, 141
Law of conservation of
mass-energy, 2 16
Laws of nature, 368-70
Lawyers, women as, 391

472 General Index
Legal moralism, 141
Le G uin, Ursu la, 200-203
Leibn iz, Gottfried, 269
Leviathan, 366, 371, 372
Leviathan (Hobbes)
fro ntispiece to, 367f
laws of nature in, 368-70
natura l condition of man kind in,
366-70
peace in, 368-70
political ph ilosophy in, 365-70
war in, 368-69
Li, 193, 459
Libera lism
classical, 374-75, 395, 457-58
defined ,374,396,459
welfa re, 378, 396, 460
Libertarianism (metaphysical)
agent causation and, 258-60
compatibilism and, 255, 257-58
Consequence Arg ument of, 257
criticism of, 257-60
defined ,244, 269,459
determin ism and, 244-46,
249-50, 255-60
free wi ll a nd, 244-46,
249-50, 255-60
incompatibilism a nd, 255, 257
Libet and, 256
overview of, 267-68
Libertarianism (political)
classical liberalism
resembling, 375
defined , 375, 396,459
paradise, in U.S., 380
Liberty, 368-69, 370-71
Libet, Benjamin, 256
Life
bios, 90
examined, 3, 8-11, 14, 40-41
length of, 412j 422
mea ninglessness of, 410-16, 412f
moral, consistency with facts of,
145-46
private a nd public, 387-92
purpose of, 419
zoe, 90
See also Meaning, of life
The Lift of Teresa of]enis (Teresa of
Avila), 92
Lin, Patrick, 230-31
“A Little Omniscience Goes a Long
Way” (Davis), 270-72
Live hypothesis, 100, 106
Living \Vith Darwin (K itcher), 81
Locke, John, 293f
Berkeley and, 299, 301-2
biography of, 375, 375f
certainty of, 293-99
compatibilism a nd, 250-51,
254-55
criticism of, 296-99
empiricism of, 279-80, 293-99
An Essay Concerning H11man
Understanding by, 25 1, 293-99
injustice and, 387
political philosophy and, 356
social contract theory of, 371-75
Two Treatises of Government
by, 371f
women and, 320
See also Second Treatise of Government
Logic
defi ned, 7, 43, 459
of ontological arguments, 79
questions, 6
Logical behaviorism
defi ned, 207-8, 236, 459
func tionalism and, 222-23
mind-body problem in, 207-8
Lord of the Flies (Goldi ng), 397-404
Love, parental, 90
Lucretius, 423-24
Lyi ng prom ise, 171-72
M
Mach ine-un iverse a nalogy, 74, 75
Mackie, J. L.
on God’s morality, 87
The Miracle of Theism by, 93
Mahabarata, 115-16
Majority, act of, 371-72
Man, natural condition of, 366-70
Manifesto of the Comm11nist Party
(Marx a nd Engels), 381-86
Marriage, gender-structured, 388-90
Martin, Michael, 106
Marx, Ka rl, 379f
infl uence of, 379
Manifesto of the Comm11nist Party by,
381-86
socialist theory of, 379-86
Materialism
bats and, 219-21, 22 1f
defi ned, 207, 236, 459
as false, 210
property dualism and, 232-33
zombies and, 2 18-19, 220f
The Matrix, 287, 287f
Matters of fac t, 303-4, 306, 312
Meani ng
from above, 4 16-21
from below, 421-25
external, 4 10-11
interna l, 410, 421-25
meani ng of, 409-10, 414, 4 16
Meani ng, of life
from above, 4 16-21
Baggi ni and, 414-16, 420-21, 420f
from below, 421-25
Camus and, 408, 414
defi ned,409-10,4 14, 4 16
God’s plan for, 409-10, 409j
416-2 1, 417j 419-20f
happiness d isti nguished from, 409
interna l, 410
length of life and, 4 l 2j 422
meani ng of meaning in, 409-10,
414,4 16
morality distinguished from, 409
optimist’s view of, 4 10, 416-25, 417j
419j 420j 426
overview of, 407-10, 407j 409j 426
as personal, 408-9
pessimist’s view of, 411-16,
412j 426
philosophy and, 407-10, 407j 409f
for potter, 407-8
q uiz, 427, 427f
from religion, 409- 10, 409j 416-21,
417j 4 19-20f
suffering and, 4 13-14
Meani nglessness, of life, 410-16, 412f
Means of production, 379-81, 384
Meditations on First Philosophy
(Descartes), 2 13, 285-86, 288-92
Meno (Plato), 283-84
Mental discipline, 114-16
Merit
justice and , 357, 360-63
o rgan transpla nts and, 363, 363f
Meritocracy, 360, 396, 459
Messerly, John G., 424
Metaphysics, 4-6, 43, 459
Metaphysics (Taylor, R.), 258-60
Metz, Thaddeus, 424
Michelangelo, 335
M iddle Way o r Path, 114-16
M ill, James, 165
M ill, John Stuart
biography of, 165, 165f
Greatest Happiness Pri nciple of,
158-59, 162
The Sttbjection of\Vome11 by, 165
uti lita rianism of, 157-63

“\Vhat Utilitarianism Is” by, 158-63
women and , 165, 320
Mi ller, David, 391-92
Milton, John, 347
Mimesis. See Representation
Mi nd
of bats, 219-21
bra in and, 207-10, 223-29, 231-33
conceptual processor of, 316-17,
316-17/
intu ition of, 291-92, 292/
objects conformi ng to, 3 15-18
as properties, 230-35
See also Software, mind as
Mind (Searle), 216, 226-29
Mi nd-body identity
conceivabi lity arguments and,
218-20
criticism of, 218-2 1, 230-31
theory of, 207-9, 217-21, 235
Mi nd-body problem
defi ned, 206, 236, 459
epiphenomenalism and, 210-11
in fu nctiona lism, 209- 10, 222-23,
226-27, 235
immortal sou l and, 214j 215
in logica l behaviorism, 207-8
mind as softwa re and, 209-10,
222-29, 235
overview of, 206-10, 234
in property dua lism, 210, 230-35
in substa nce d ualism, 206-7,
211- 16, 214-15] 234-35
“The Mind-Body Problem” (Fodor),
222-23
The Miracle of Theism (Mackie), 93
Mitys, 342
Modern industry, 384-85
Modus ponens (affirming the a ntecedent),
19, 23
Modus to/lens (denyi ng the
co nsequent), 20-21
Mommy track, 39 1
Mona Lisa, 335, 338, 343
Monotheism, 65, 130, 459
Moral absolutism, 148-49, 199, 459
Moral com mon sense, 143-46, 168,
173-74
Moral conduct, 114-16
Moral criteria of adequacy, 143-46,
149-50, 196
Moral disagreement, 149-5 1, 153-55
Moral evil, 84, 130, 459
Moral excellence, 178-79
Morality
based on rights, 169-75, 197
Camus and, 189-92, 197
character and, 175-81, 197
consequences and, 155-69
defined, 136, 199, 459
d ivine command t heory and,
139, 146-48, 180, 196, 199,
448-49, 458
duty and, 169-75, 197
empiric”) basis of, 170
ethics d isti ng uished from, 137-38
God’s, 87
of human cloning, 144-45, 144-45/
impartiality and, 137, 158, 169, 183,
184-85
and t he law, 141
mean ing of life distinguished
from, 409
as normative enterprise, 137
overview of, 136-48, 196
political philosophy a nd, 365
principle of respect for persons and,
173-74
properties o f, 137-38
reason-based, 137-38
religion and, 146-48
Socrates a nd, 147
Mora l judgments, considered, 143-46,
168, 173
Mora l life, consistency with fa cts of,
145-46
Mora l objectivism, 148-49, 154-55,
199, 459
Mora l obligations, 139
Mora l ph ilosophy. See ethics
Mora l problem-solving, resourcefulness
in, 145-46
Mora l progress, 150-52, 151-53
Mora l question, 103-4
Mora l relativism
cultural relativism and,
149, 151-55
defined, 149, 199, 459
infallibi lity problem of, 15 1-52
overview of, 196
subjective relativism and, 148-51
Mora l t heory
consequentialist, 140, 143, 155,
199, 458
considered mora l judgments in,
143-46, 168, 173
criteria of adequacy in, 143-46,
149-50, 196
data and, 143-46
defined, 139, 199, 459
General Index 473
deontological, 140, 141, 155, 199, 458
divine command t heory, 139, 146-48,
180, 196, 199, 448-49, 458
ethical egoism, 140, 143, 165-69, 458
ethics of care, 142-43, 181-88, 197,
199, 458
Kant’s theory, 141, 143, 170-75, 197,
199, 459
scientific theory ana logous to,
142-46
types, 140-46
utilitarian ism, 140, 141, 143,
155-64, 460
virtue ethics, 142, 175-80, 460
Moral values, 139
Morris, Richard, 69
Motion, a rgument from, 67-68
Motivation, right t hought a nd, 116
Movers, infin ite chai n of, 67-71
Mu lt iple persona lity disorder, 213
Mu ltiple realizability, 209, 236, 459
Museu m, 341
My Confession (Tolstoy), 411-13, 416-18
“The Myth of Sisyphus” (Camus),
189-92
N
Nagel, Thomas, 219-21
N amazie, Ma ryam, 153
Narrative, “The Tria l and Death of
Socrates” as, 47-55
N atura l condition, of ma n, 366-70
Natura l evil, 84, 130, 459
Natura listic theories, 77
Natura l selection, 80-8 1
Na tttral Theology (Paley), 72-73
Nature
of God, 108
imperfections in, 74-77, 75/
laws of, 368-70
state of, 366, 371, 372-76
Necessary evil, 64
“The Need for More Than Justice”
(Baier), 188
N eedy, assisting, 357, 359, 359/
N ews, philosophy in, 34
Niconiachean Ethics (A ristotle), 176-77
Nielsen, Kai, 422
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 415
N ihilists, 411
Nirvana, 112-16 , 130, 459
N oble Eightfold Path, 114-16
N on-art, 333-35
Nonconsequentialist theory.
See deontological theory

474 General Index
Norma l species f unctioning, 378
Normative, 137
Noumena, 317
Nozick, Robert, 359
0
Obama, Barack, 381
Objections, assessment of, 443
Objectivism, 338-43, 350, 459
Objects, confo rm ing to m ind, 3 15-18
Obligation
moral, 139
theories of, 141-42, 175-76, 178-79
Ockham’s razor, 77
O’Connor, Timoth)’, 258
Odys,ey (Homer), 343
Oedipus, 34 2
“Of t he Principles of Human
Knowledge” (Berkeley), 300-303
Of the Standard of Taste (Hume),
346-48
“Of t he System of Man’s Free Agency”
(d’ Holbach), 246-47
Ogilby, John, 347
Oki n, Susan Moller
femi nism and, 388-91, 389f
justice, Gender, and the Family by,
388-9 1
Omn iscience, 270-72
“The Ones \Vho Walk Away From
Ornelas” (Le Gui n), 200-203
“On the Sufferi ngs of the World”
(Schopen hauer), 4 13-14
Ontological arguments
Anselm’s, 62, 79-83
defined, 62, 130, 459
form of, 66
for God’s existence, 62, 66, 79-83,
127, 130
logic of, 79
Opi nion
d uty to, 102-3
psychology of, 103-4
Opportunity, equa lity of, 377-78
Optim ists
about mea ning o fl ife, 4 10, 416-25,
417/, 419/, 420/, 426
Edwards, 421-22
Tolstoy, 4 11, 416-18
Warren, 4 19
Orestes, 343
Organ transplants, 363, 363f
Original position, of Rawls, 376-77
Outline, of philosophy paper, 446
“The Ova l Portrait” (Poe), 351-52
Overridingness, 137
Ovid, 333
p
Pa in, 222-23, 297-98
Pa ley, \Vi lliam, 61-62, 72-73
Pa nentheism, 65, 130, 459
Pa ntheism, 65, 130, 459
Papers. See Philosophy papers
Pa rental love, 90
Parks, Rosa, 42 1
Parmenides, 13, l 3f
Pasca l, Blaise, 106f
criticism of, I 08
God and, 106-9
Pensees and Other Writings by, 107-9
wager of, 99, 102, 106-9
Paul (sai nt), 93f
Peace, in Leviathan, 368-70
Pensees and Other \flritings
(Pascal), 107-9
Perceptions
Hume o n, 304-6, 308, 310
as ideas, 295-99, 304-5
Persona l, as political, 390, 390j 392
Persona l existence, recognition of, 291
Persuasion, 15
Pessim ists
abo ut meaning of life, 4 11-16,
412j 426
Darrow, 414
Schopen hauer, 413-14, 414f
Tolstoy, 411-13, 416- 18
Phenomena, 317
Philo, 73-76
Philosophers, quest of, 2-7, 40, 59-64.
See also specific philosophers
Philosophic”l beliefs survey, 5
Philosophical method, 2
Philosophy
aesthetics a nd, 333
arguments in, 14-40, 4 1
of beauty, 333, 349
bias in, 320-23
careers in, 431-36
as college major, 43 1-36
good of, 2-4
immediacy of, 2
main d ivisions of, 4-7
meaning ofl ife and, 407-10,
407/, 409f
in news, 34
in politics, 35, 35f
as quest for u nderstanding, 2-7,
40, 59-64
reading, 27-32
reasons in, 15-27
th inking philosophically in,
14-40, 4 1
See also God , philosophy and;
Politica l philosophy
Philosophy and Feminist Criticism
(Cole), 321-23
ph ilosophy majors, 431-36
ca reers for, 431-34
salaries of, 4 34-36
Philosophy of Religion (Rowe),
84-87, 95
Philosophy papers
fi nal draft of, 447
first draft of, 446-47
o utline of, 446
resea rch fo r, 445
revision of, 447
sample, 448-50
steps of, 444-47
structure of, 441-44
thesis statement in, 442-43, 445-46
topic selection fo r, 444-45
writi ng instructions for, 444-50
Ph)’sica lism. See materialism
Ph)’sics, q uantum, 69, 71, 243, 247-48
Pinea l gland, 215f
Pity, 340-43
Plato, 7 f, 28 lj 349
Academy of, 360f
aesthetics influenced by, 340
The Apology by, 47-55
democracy opposed by, 360, 364
Ettthyphro by, 147
Forms of, 282, 340
H)’patia and, 29
inAuence of, 9
justice and, 10-11, 357, 360-62,
360/, 393
Kant and, 312-14
Meno by, 283-84
propositional knowledge and , 276
rationalism of, 279, 281-84,
281/, 312-14
The Repttblic b)’, 10-11, 360-62, 360f
in The School of Athens (Raphael), l 78f
Socrates a nd, 8-11, 47-55, 147,
283-84,326,361-62, 449
substa nce dualism of, 207
“The Trial a nd Death of Socrates”
by,47-55
women and, 320
Pleasure, sensi ng of, 287-88
Poe, Edgar Allan, 351-52