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Write an Executive Summary on the ” The Leadership Imperative Case Study” through the NCO C3 lens of Leadership.Answer the Question :  Within the NCO C3 of Leadership, what is the unit’s proficiency in mission command?

A CASE STUDY IN MISSION COMMAND

26 INFANTRY 26 INFANTRY January-March 2014January-March 2014

CPT THOMAS E. MEYER

THE LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVE:

As we transition from more than a decade of war to garrison training, we must identify and implement mission command (MC) into our fi ghting formations
and training management in order to respond to a complex
and evolving security threat. Through grounded experiences
at the tactical level and academic study of organizational
leadership theory, I seek to connect academic theory to Army
doctrine and show the successes of MC in practice through
a case study of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment,
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault). The following issues discussed are from the point
of view and perspective of an individual who has served
under multiple chains of command in the positions of platoon
leader, company executive offi cer, and company commander
between May 2010 and April 2013.

Hypothetical Vignette
Afghanistan, Regional Command-South — As the

battalion conducts air assault operations behind insurgent
improvised explosive device (IED) belts, leaders are faced
with an ambiguous and evolving operational environment
(OE). The commanders of two companies within the battalion
execute simultaneous operations, controlling their platoon
leaders and maneuvering their units at the order of the
battalion commander. A synchronized battalion operation
combining assets from air assault capabilities to air-to-ground
integration (AGI) is ongoing as companies push south of the
primary insurgent IED belts and defensive zones, all driven by
detailed command. The company conducting the battalion’s
decisive operation pushes south and clears through enemy

disruption zones, able to fi nd, fi x, and fi nish the enemy. These
two company commanders now face the exploitation phase
of their operation but are “off the page” — moving beyond the
initial contact and explicit direction provided by the battalion
operations order. Instead of understanding commander’s
intent, seizing the initiative, and exploiting the initiative
(which leads to assessment and dissemination of gathered
intelligence), these company commanders are hindered by the
micromanagement of the command and control philosophy
that results in detailed command.

The battalion ceases operations, and the companies strong-
point their locations so these two company commanders
can meet with the battalion commander and S3 operations
offi cer. While company leadership is unable to perceive and
execute the next step, platoon leaders are stifl ed and, as
micromanaged cogs in the wheel, move with their respective
company commanders back to the battalion command post
(CP) to receive further detailed guidance. At the battalion CP,
platoon leaders gather around imagery of the OE as the S3
and battalion commander brief the scheme of maneuver for
this unexpected phase of the operation. As the S3 describes
the scheme down to platoon movement techniques, company
commanders stand behind their platoon leaders observing
the concept of the operation in “receive mode” as they
conceptualize the directed concept.

Following the brief, company commanders and platoon
leaders move back to their individual locations and prepare
to exploit their gains. This process gave the enemy 12 hours
to consolidate and reorganize. Following the battalion-
directed scheme of maneuver, the platoon leaders depart

in the early morning hours
and face an enemy, previously
broken, in prepared defensive
positions protected by various
IEDs. Meanwhile, company
commanders act as radio
operators, relaying information
to battalion while awaiting further
guidance to maneuver their
elements. The lack of MC in this
situation created a unit devoid of
shared understanding. In failing
to know the expanded purpose of
the operation, the commanders’
ability to seize the initiative
was limited, which allowed the
insurgent force to consolidate
forces, plan a counteroffensive,
and emplace IEDs forward of
coalition forces.

“Leadership is […] infl uencing
Soldiers with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Airborne Division, execute a deliberate attack of an enemy objective during a training exercise.

Photos by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division Public Affairs Offi ce