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Write an essay in response to the prompt given.

INSTRUCTIONS:

· Write an essay in response to the prompt given below.

· The essay should be around 1,500 words (please use 12-point font, 1-inch margins, and double spacing).

Your answer should rely primarily on the material covered in the lectures, supplemented by the assigned readings. Do not do outside research for this essay or bring in outside sources, but you may (and are encouraged to) consult and quote any of the sources (readings and/or lectures) we have used in the course so far.

Prompt:

While scholars of world politics have long emphasized its anarchic structure, there also exist clear elements of hierarchy in the international system, particularly between the rich, developed countries of the Global North and the poor, developing countries of the Global South. The difference between the Global North and South has been institutionalized in various ways in contemporary global governance, and these two groups of states often have widely divergent views on the purpose, justice and value of different governance arrangements, a fact which often complicates the creation and implementation of effective global policies.

Discuss how the economic and political inequalities between the North and South are manifested in three global governance regimes: the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the climate change regime, and the regime governing global development. Your answer should consist of three parts. In the first part, identify the different rights and responsibilities enjoyed by the North and South in all three regimes. Then, discuss the costs and benefits that these unequal rights and responsibilities generate for the management of these three global problems. What tensions exist between the Global North and South in these regimes and how do these tensions weaken the regime’s effectiveness? Finally, suggest some possible reforms to each regime that could better address the inequities in the relationship between the North and South in the practice of global governance. Be as specific as possible in offering your recommendations.

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?
Author(s): Robert O. Keohane
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 82-
96+194
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International

Institutions: Can

Interdependence
Work?
by Robert O.

Keohane

– o analyze world politics in the 1990s is to
discuss international institutions: the rules
that govern elements of world politics and

the organizations that help implement those rules.
Should NATO expand? How can the United Nations Security Council
assure UN inspectors access to sites where Iraq might be conducting
banned weapons activity? Under what conditions should China be
admitted to the World Trade Organization (wTo)? How many billions
of dollars does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) need at its dis-
posal to remain an effective “lender of last resort” for countries such as
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand that were threatened in 1997 with
financial collapse? Will the tentative Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change be renegotiated, ratified, and implemented effectively? Can
future United Nations peacekeeping practices-in contrast to the UN
fiascoes in Bosnia and Somalia-be made more effective?

These questions help illustrate the growing importance of internation-
al institutions for maintaining world order. Twelve years ago in these
pages, Joseph Nye and I gave “two cheers for multilateralism,” pointing

ROBE RT O. KEOHAN E is James B. Duke professor of political science at Duke University.

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Keohane

out that even the administration of President Ronald Reagan, which took
office ill-disposed toward international institutions, had grudgingly come
to accept their value in achieving American purposes. Superpowers need
general rules because they seek to influence events around the world.
Even an unchallenged superpower such as the United States would be
unable to achieve its goals through the bilateral exercise of influence: the
costs of such massive “arm-twisting” would be too great.

International institutions are increasingly important, but they are
not always successful. Ineffective institutions such as the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization or the Organization of
African Unity exist alongside effectual ones such as the Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the European
Union. In recent years, we have gained insight into what makes some
institutions more capable than others-how such institutions best pro-
mote cooperation among states and what mechanics of bargaining they
use. But our knowledge is incomplete, and as the world moves toward
new forms of global regulation and governance, the increasing impact
of international institutions has raised new questions about how these
institutions themselves are governed.

THEORY AND REALITY, 1919-89

Academic “scribblers” did not always have to pay much attention to
international institutions. The 1919 Versailles Treaty constituted an
attempt to construct an institution for multilateral diplomacy-the
League of Nations. But the rejection of the League Covenant by the
U.S. Senate ensured that until World War II the most important nego-
tiations in world politics-from the secret German-Russian deals of the
1920s to the 1938 Munich conference-took place on an ad hoc basis.
Only after the United Nations was founded in 1945, with strong sup-
port from the United States and a multiplicity of specialized agencies
performing different tasks, did international institutions begin to com-
mand substantial international attention.

Until the late 1960s, American students of international relations
equated international institutions with formal international organiza-
tions, especially the United Nations. International Organization, the
leading academic journal on the subject, carried long summaries of UN
meetings until 1971. However, most observers recognized long before
1972 that the United Nations did not play a central role in world poli-

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International Institutions

tics. Except for occasional peacekeeping missions-of which the First
UN Emergency Force in the Middle East between 1956 and 1967 was
the most successful-its ability to resolve hostilities was paralyzed by
conflicts of interest that resulted in frequent superpower vetoes in the
Security Council. Moreover, the influx of new postcolonial states
helped turn the General Assembly into an arena for North-South con-
flict after 1960 and ensured that the major Western powers, especially
the United States, would view many General Assembly resolutions as
hostile to their interests and values-for example, the New Interna-
tional Economic Order and the Zionism is Racism resolutions of the
1970s. Analysts and policymakers in Europe, North America, and
much of Asia concluded that international institutions were marginal
to a game of world politics still driven by the traditional exercise of state
power. The UN-called “a dangerous place” by former U.S. represen-
tative to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan-seemed more a forum for
scoring points in the Cold War or North-South conflicts than an instru-
ment for problem-solving cooperation.

In reality, however, even the most powerful states were relying increas-
ingly on international institutions-not so much on the UN as other
organizations and regimes that set rules and standards to govern specific
sets of activities. From the late 1960s onward, the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons was the chief vehicle for efforts to prevent
the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons. NATO was not only the most
successful multilateral alliance in history but also the most highly institu-
tionalized, with a secretary-general, a permanent staff, and elaborate rules
governing relations among members. From its founding in 1947 through
the Uruguay Round that concluded in 1993, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GArr) presided over a series of trade rounds that have
reduced import tariffs among industrialized countries by up to 90 percent,
boosting international trade. After a shaky start in the 1940s, the IMF
had-by the 1960s-become the centerpiece of efforts by the major cap-
italist democracies to regulate their monetary affairs. When that function
atrophied with the onset of flexible exchange rates in the 1970s, it
became their leading agent for financing and promoting economic devel-
opment in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The sheer number of inter-
governmental organizations also rose dramatically-from about 30 in
1910 to 70 in 1940 to more than 1,000 by 1981.

The exchange rate and oil crises of the early 1970s helped bring per-
ceptions in line with reality. Suddenly, both top policymakers and aca-

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Keohane

demic observers in the United States realized that global issues
required systematic policy coordination and that such coordination
required institutions. In 1974, then secretary of state Henry Kissinger,
who had paid little attention to international institutions, helped
establish the International Energy Agency to enable Western countries
to deal cooperatively with the threat of future oil embargoes like the
1973 OPEC embargo of the Netherlands and United States. And the
Ford administration sought to construct a new international monetary
regime based on flexible rather than pegged exchange rates. Confront-
ed with complex interdependence and the efforts of states to manage
it, political scientists began to redefine the study of international
institutions, broadening it to encompass what they called “intemrna-
tional regimes”-structures of
rules and norms that could be
more or less informal. The inter-
national trade regime, for exam-
ple, did not have strong formal
rules or integrated, centralized
management; rather, it provided a
set of interlocking institutions,
including regular meetings of the
GATT contracting parties, formal dispute settlement arrangements, and
delegation of technical tasks to a secretariat, which gradually devel-
oped a body of case law and practice. Some international lawyers grum-
bled that the political scientists were merely using other terms to
discuss international law. Nevertheless, political scientists were once
again discussing how international rules and norms affect state behav-
ior, even if they avoided the “L-word.”

In the 1980s, research on international regimes moved from attempts
to describe the phenomena of interdependence and international
regimes to closer analysis of the conditions under which countries coop-
erate. How does cooperation occur among sovereign states and how do
international institutions affect it? From the standpoint of political real-
ism, both the reliance placed by states on certain international
institutions and the explosion in their numbers were puzzling. Why
should international institutions exist at all in a world dominated by
sovereign states? This question seemed unanswerable if institutions
were seen as opposed to, or above, the state but not if they were viewed
as devices to help states accomplish their objectives.

Why should international
institutions exist at allin a

world dominated by
sovereign states?

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International Institutions

The new research on international institutions broke decisively
with legalism-the view that law can be effective regardless of politi-
cal conditions-as well as with the idealism associated with the field’s
origins. Instead, scholars adopted the assumptions of realism, accepting
that relative state power and competing interests were key factors in
world politics, but at the same time drawing new conclusions about the
influence of institutions on the process. Institutions create the capa-
bility for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing
the costs of making and enforcing agreements-what economists refer
to as “transaction costs.” They rarely engage in centralized enforce-
ment of agreements, but they do reinforce practices of reciprocity,
which provide incentives for governments to keep their own commit-
ments to ensure that others do so as well. Even powerful states have an
interest, most of the time, in following the rules of well-established
international institutions, since general conformity to rules makes the
behavior of other states more predictable.

This scholarship drew heavily on the twin concepts of uncertainty
and credibility. Theorists increasingly recognized that the preferences of
states amount to “private information”-that absent full transparency,

states are uncertain about what
their partners and rivals value at
any given time. They naturally
respond to uncertainty by being less
willing to enter into agreements,
since they are unsure how their
partners will later interpret the
terms of such agreements. Interna-
tional institutions can reduce this
uncertainty by promoting negotia-

tions in which transparency is encouraged; by dealing with a series of
issues over many years and under similar rules, thus encouraging hon-
esty in order to preserve future reputation; and by systematically moni-
toring the compliance of governments with their commitments.

Even if a government genuinely desires an international agree-
ment, it may be unable to persuade its partners that it will, in the
future, be willing and able to implement it. Successful international
negotiations may therefore require changes in domestic institutions.
For instance, without “fast-track” authority on trade, the United
States’ negotiating partners have no assurance that Congress will

By reducing the
uncertainty of enforcing
agreements, international
institutions help states
achieve collective gains.

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Keohane

refrain from adding new provisions to trade agreements as a condition
for their ratification. Hence, other states are reluctant to enter into
trade negotiations with the United States since they may be con-
fronted, at the end of tortuous negotiations, with a redesigned agree-
ment less favorable to them than the draft they initialed. By the same
token, without fast-track authority, no promise by the U.S. govern-
ment to abide by negotiated terms has much credibility, due to the
president’s lack of control over Congress.

In short, this new school of thought argued that, rather than impos-
ing themselves on states, intemrnational institutions should respond to
the demand by states for cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes.
By reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agree-
ments, intemrnational institutions help states achieve collective gains.

YESTERDAY’S CONTROVERSIES: 1989-95

This new institutionalism was not without its critics, who focused
their attacks on three perceived shortcomings: First, they claimed that
international institutions are fundamentally insignificant since states
wield the only real power in world politics. They emphasized the
weakness of efforts by the UN or League of Nations to achieve col-
lective security against aggression by great powers, and they pointed
to the dominant role of major contributors in international econom-
ic organizations. Hence, any effects of these international institutions
were attributed more to the efforts of their great power backers than
to the institutions themselves.

This argument was overstated. Of course, great powers such as the
United States exercise enormous influence within international
institutions. But the policies that emerge from these institutions are dif-
ferent from those that the United States would have adopted unilater-
ally. Whether toward Iraq or recipients of IMF loans, policies for specific
situations cannot be entirely ad hoc but must conform to generally
applicable rules and principles to be endorsed by multilateral
institutions. Where agreement by many states is necessary for policy to
be effective, even the United States finds it useful to compromise on
substance to obtain the institutional seal of approval. Therefore, the
decision-making procedures and general rules of international
institutions matter. They affect both the substance of policy and the
degree to which other states accept it.

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International Institutions

The second counterargument focused on “anarchy”: the absence of a
world government or effective international legal system to which vic-
tims of injustice can appeal. As a result of anarchy, critics argued, states
prefer relative gains (i.e., doing better than other states) to absolute
gains. They seek to protect their power and status and will resist even
mutually beneficial cooperation if their partners are likely to benefit
more than they are. For instance, throughout the American-Soviet
arms race, both sides focused on their relative positions-who was
ahead or threatening to gain a decisive advantage-rather than on their
own levels of armaments. Similar dynamics appear on certain econom-
ic issues, such as the fierce Euro-American competition (i.e., Airbus
Industrie versus Boeing) in the production of large passenger jets.

Scholarly disputes about the “relative gains question” were intense
but short-lived. It turned out that the question needed to be reframed:
not, “do states seek relative or absolute gains?” but “under what condi-
tions do they forego even mutually beneficial cooperation to preserve
their relative power and status?” When there are only two major players,
and one side’s gains may decisively change power relationships, relative
gains loom large: in arms races, for example, or monopolistic competi-
tion (as between Airbus and Boeing). Most issues of potential coopera-
tion, however, from trade liberalization to climate change, involve
multilateral negotiations that make relative gains hard to calculate and
entail little risk of decisive power shifts for one side over another. There-
fore, states can be expected most of the time to seek to enhance their
own welfare without being worried that others will also make advances.
So the relative gains argument merely highlights the difficulties of coop-
eration where there is tough bilateral competition; it does not by any
means undermine prospects for cooperation in general.

The third objection to theories of cooperation was less radical but
more enduring. Theorists of cooperation had recognized that coopera-
tion is not harmonious: it emerges out of discord and takes place
through tough bargaining. Nevertheless, they claimed that the poten-
tial joint gains from such cooperation explained the dramatic increases
in the number and scope of cooperative multilateral institutions. Crit-
ics pointed out, however, that bargaining problems could produce obsta-
cles to achieving joint gains. For instance, whether the Kyoto Protocol
will lead to a global agreement is questionable in part because develop-
ing countries refused to accept binding limits on their emissions and the
U.S. Senate declared its unwillingness to ratify any agreement not con-

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Keohane

taining such commitments by developing countries. Both sides staked
out tough bargaining positions, hindering efforts at credible compro-
mise. As a result of these bargaining problems, the fact that possible
deals could produce joint gains does not assure that cooperative solu-
tions will be reached. The tactics of political actors and the information
they have available about one another are both key aspects of a process
that does not necessarily lead to cooperation. Institutions may help pro-
vide “focal points,” on which competing actors may agree, but new
issues often lack such institutions. In this case, both the pace and the
extent of cooperation become more problematic.

TODAY’S DEBATES

The general problem of bargaining raises specific issues about how
institutions affect international negotiations, which always involve a
mixture of discord and potential cooperation. Thinking about bargain-
ing leads to concerns about subjectivity, since bargaining depends so
heavily on the beliefs of the parties involved. And the most fundamen-
tal question scholars wish to answer concerns effectiveness: What struc-
tures, processes, and practices make international institutions more or
less capable of affecting policies-and outcomes-in desired ways?

The impact of institutional arrangements on bargaining remains puz-
zling. We understand from observation, from game theory, and from
explorations of bargaining in a variety of contexts that outcomes
depend on more than the resources available to the actors or the pay-
offs they receive. Institutions affect bargaining patterns in complex and
nuanced ways. Who, for example, has authority over the agenda? In the
1980s, Jacques Delors used his authority as head of the European Com-
mission to structure the agenda of the European Community, thus lead-
ing to the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. What voting
or consensus arrangements are used and who interprets ambiguities? At
the Kyoto Conference, agreement on a rule of “consensus” did not pre-
vent the conference chair from ignoring objections as he gaveled
through provision after provision in the final session. Can disgruntled
participants block implementation of formally ratified agreements? In
the GATT, until 1993, losers could prevent the findings of dispute reso-
lution panels from being implemented; but in the WTO, panel recom-
mendations take effect unless there is a consensus not to implement
them. Asking such questions systematically about international

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International Institutions

institutions may well yield significant new insights in future years.
Institutional maneuvers take place within a larger ideological context

that helps define which purposes such institutions pursue and which
practices they find acceptable. The Mandates System of the League of
Nations depended in part on specific institutional arrangements, but
more fundamental was the shared understanding that continued Euro-
pean rule over non-European peoples was acceptable. No system of rule
by Europeans over non-Europeans could remain legitimate after the col-
lapse of that consensus during the 15 years following World War II.

The end of the Cold War shattered a whole set of beliefs about world
politics. Theories of international politics during the Cold War were
overwhelmingly materialistic, reflecting a view of the world in which
states pursued “national interests” shaped by geopolitical and economic
realities. As Stalin once famously quipped about the pope: “How many
divisions does he have?” Not only did an unarmed Pope John Paul II
prevail in the contest for the allegiance of the Polish people, but after
the failed 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the Soviet Union broke into
its constituent parts on the basis of the norm of “self-determination,”
rather than along lines of military power or economic resources. State
interests now depend in part on how people define their identities-as
Serbs or Croats, Russians or Chechens. They also depend on the polit-
ical and religious values to which their publics are committed.

Hence, the end of the Cold War made scholars increasingly aware
of the importance of ideas, norms, and information-topics that some
of them had already begun to explore. Some years earlier, such a reori-
entation might have faced fierce criticism from adherents of game the-
ory and other economics-based approaches, which had traditionally
focused on material interests. However, since the mid-1980s, bargain-
ing theory has shown more and more that the beliefs of actors are cru-
cially important for outcomes. To adapt economist Thomas Schelling’s
famous example, suppose that you and I want to meet for lunch in New
York City, but you work on Wall Street and I work on the Upper West
Side. Where will we get together? We have a mutual interest in meet-
ing, but each of us would prefer not to waste time traveling. If you leave
a message on my answering machine suggesting a restaurant on Wall
Street and are then unreachable, I have to choose between skipping
lunch with you or showing up at your preferred location. Asymmetri-
cal information and our mutual belief that I know where you will be
waiting for me have structured the situation.

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Keohane

The procedures and rules of international institutions create infor-
mational structures. They determine what principles are acceptable as
the basis for reducing conflicts and whether governmental actions are
legitimate or illegitimate. Consequently, they help shape actors’ expec-
tations. For instance, trade conflicts are increasingly ritualized in a
process of protesting in the WTO-promising tough action on behalf of
one’s own industries, engaging in quasi-judicial dispute resolution pro-
cedures, claiming victory if possible, or complaining about defeat when
necessary. There is much sound and fury, but regularly institutionalized
processes usually relegate conflict to the realm of dramatic expression.
Institutions thereby create differentiated information. “Insiders” can
interpret the language directed toward “outsiders” and use their own
understandings to interpret, or manipulate, others’ beliefs.

Finally, students of international institutions continue to try to under-
stand why some institutions are so much more effective than others. Vari-
ation in the coherence of institutional policy or members’ conformity
with institutional rules is partially accounted for by the degree of common
interests and the distribution of power among members. Institutions
whose members share social values and have similar political systems-
such as NATO or the European Union-are likely to be stronger than
those such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or
the Association of South East Asian Nations, whose more diverse mem-
bership does not necessarily have the same kind of deep common inter-
ests. Additionally, the character of domestic politics, discussed elsewhere
in this issue by Helen Milner, as well as by Margaret Hermann and Joe
Hagan, has a substantial impact on international institutions. The distri-
bution of power is also important. Institutions dominated by a small num-
ber of members-for example, the IMF, with its weighted voting
system-can typically take more decisive action than those where influ-
ence is more widely diffused, such as the UN General Assembly.

OVERCOMING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

Even as scholars pursue these areas of inquiry, they are in danger of
overlooking a major normative issue: the “democratic deficit” that
exists in many of the world’s most important international
institutions. As illustrated most recently by the far-reaching interven-
tions of the IMF in East Asia, the globalization of the world economy
and the expanding role of international institutions are creating a

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International Institutions

powerful form of global regulation. Major international institutions
are increasingly laying down rules and guidelines that governments, if
they wish to attract foreign investment and generate growth, must fol-
low. But these international institutions are managed by technocrats
and supervised by high governmental officials. That is, they are run by
6lites. Only in the most attenuated sense is democratic control exer-
cised over major international organizations. Key negotiations in the
WTO are made in closed sessions. The IMF negotiates in secret with
potential borrowers, and it has only begun in the last few months to
provide the conditions it imposes on recipients.

The EU provides another case in point. Its most important decision-
making body is its Council of Ministers, which is composed of govern-
ment representatives who perform more important legislative functions
than the members of the European Parliament. The council meets

behind closed doors and does not
publish its votes. It also appoints
members to the European Commis-
sion, which acts as the EU execu-
tive, whose ties to the public are
thus very indirect indeed. The
European Parliament has narrowly
defined powers and little status;

most national parliaments do not closely scrutinize European-level
actions. How much genuine influence do German or Italian voters
therefore have over the council’s decisions? Very little.

The issue here is not one of state sovereignty. Economic interde-
pendence and its regulation have altered notions of sovereignty: Few
states can still demand to be completely independent of external
authority over legal practices within their territories. The best most
states can hope for is to be able to use their sovereign authority as a bar-
gaining tool to assure that others also have to abide by common rules
and practices. Given these changes, the issue here is who has influence
over the sorts of bargains that are struck? Democratic theory gives pride
of place to the public role in deciding on the distributional and value
tradeoffs inherent in legislation and regulation. But the practices of
international institutions place that privilege in the hands of the 6lites
of national governments and of international organizations.

Admittedly, democracy does not always work well. American politi-
cians regularly engage in diatribes against international institutions,

Only in the most attenuated
sense is democratic control
exercised over major
international organizations.

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Keohane

playing on the dismay of a vocal segment of their electorates at the
excessive number of foreigners in the United Nations. More seriously,
an argument can be made that the IMF, like central banks, can only be
effective if it is insulated from direct democratic control. Ever since
1787, however, practitioners and theorists have explored how authori-
tative decision making can be combined with accountability to publics
and indirect democratic control. The U.S. Constitution is based on
such a theory-the idea that popular sovereignty, though essential, is
best exercised indirectly, through rather elaborate institutions. An issue
that scholars should now explore is how to devise international
institutions that are not only competent and effective but also account-
able, at least ultimately, to democratic publics.

One possible response is to say that all is well, since international
institutions are responsible to governments-which, in turn, are account-
able in democracies to their own people. International regulation simply
adds another link to the chain of delegation. But long chains of delegation,
in which the public affects action only at several removes, reduce actual
public authority. If the terms of multilateral cooperation are to reflect the
interests of broader democratic publics rather than just those of narrow
6lites, traditional patterns of delegation will have to be supplemented by
other means of ensuring greater accountability to public opinion.

One promising approach would be to seek to invigorate transnation-
al society in the form of networks among individuals and nongovern-
mental organizations. The growth of such networks—of scientists,
professionals in various fields, and human rights and environmental
activists-has been aided greatly by the fax machine and the Intemrnet
and by institutional arrangements that incorporate these networks into
decision making. For example, natural and social scientists developed
the scientific consensus underlying the Kyoto Protocol through the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) whose scientific
work was organized by scientists who did not have to answer to any gov-
ernments. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, but governments
opposed to effective action on climate change could not hope to rene-
gotiate the scientific guidelines set by the IPCC.

The dramatic fall in the cost of long-distance communication will
facilitate the development of many more such transnational networks.
As a result, wealthy hierarchical organizations-multinational corpora-
tions as well as states-are likely to have more difficulty dominating
transnational communications. Thirty years ago, engaging in prolonged

SPRING 1998 93

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International Institutions

intercontinental communication required considerable resources. Now
individuals do so on the Intemrnet, virtually free.

Therefore, the future accountability of international institutions to
their publics may rest only partly on delegation through formal demo-
cratic institutions. Its other pillar may be voluntary pluralism under
conditions of maximum transparency. International policies may
increasingly be monitored by loose groupings of scientists or other pro-
fessionals, or by issue advocacy networks such as Amnesty Interna-
tional and Greenpeace, whose members, scattered around the world,
will be linked even more closely by modem information technology.
Accountability will be enhanced not only by chains of official respon-
sibility, but by the requirement of transparency. Official actions, nego-
tiated among state representatives in international organizations, will
be subjected to scrutiny by transnational networks.

Such transparency, however, represents nongovernmental organiza-
tions and networks more than ordinary people, who may be as excluded
from e-lite networks as they are from government circles. That is,
transnational civil society may be a necessary but insufficient condition
for democratic accountability. Democracies should insist that, wherever
feasible, international organizations maintain sufficient transparency for
transnational networks of advocacy groups, domestic legislators, and
democratic publics to evaluate their actions. But proponents of democ-
ratic accountability should also seek counterparts to the mechanisms of
control embedded in national democratic institutions. Governors of the
Federal Reserve Board are, after all, nominated by the president and con-
firmed by the Senate, even if they exercise great authority during their
terms of office. If Madison, Hamilton, and Jay could invent indirect
mechanisms of popular control in the Federalist Papers two centuries ago,
it should not be beyond our competence to devise comparable mecha-
nisms at the global level in the twenty-first century.

As we continue to think about the normative implications of global-
ization, we should focus simultaneously on the maintenance of robust
democratic institutions at home, the establishment of formal structures of
international delegation, and the role of transnational networks. To be
effective in the twenty-first century, modem democracy requires interna-
tional institutions. And to be consistent with democratic values, these
institutions must be accountable to domestic civil society. Combining
global governance with effective democratic accountability will be a major
challenge for scholars and policymakers alike in the years ahead.

94 FOREIGN POLICY

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Keohane

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

The best single source for academic writings on international institutions
is the quarterly journal International Organization, published by MIT Press.
A forthcoming special issue, scheduled for Autumn 1998, will review the
last 30 years of scholarship in the field.

The sophisticated realism of the 1970s, which largely ignored inter-
national institutions, is best represented by Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of
World Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979). For data on
numbers of international organizations, see Cheryl Shanks, Harold
Jacobson, & Jeffrey Kaplan’s “Inertia and Change in the Constellation
of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992” (Interna-
tional Organization, Autumn 1996). For statements of institutionalist
theory, see Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Dis-
cord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1984) and Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). For a reflection on
this literature by an international lawyer, see Anne-Marie Slaughter
[Burley], “International Law and International Relations Theory: A
Dual Agenda” (American Journal of International Law, April 1993).

On the United Nations and multilateralism, see Daniel Patrick
Moynihan’s A Dangerous Place (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and
Company, 1978); Keohane & Joseph Nye, Jr.’s “Two Cheers for Mul-
tilateralism” (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1985); and John Ruggie’s Win-
ning the Peace (New York, NY: Columbia University Press for the
Twentieth Century Fund, 1996).

The “relative gains debate” is thoroughly reported in David Baldwin,
ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993).

On bargaining and distributional issues, see Stephen Krasner’s
“Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier” (World Politics, April 1991); James Morrow’s “Modeling the
Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Informa-
tion” (International Organization, Summer 1994); and James Fearon’s
“Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation” (Interna-
tional Organization, forthcoming).

Work on the legalization of international institutions is just begin-
ning; my comments in this article reflect an ongoing project on this

SPRING 1998 95

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International Institutions

subject that I am codirecting with Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, and
Anne-Marie Burley.

On the role of ideas, see Goldstein & Keohane, eds., Ideas and For-
eign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993) and Martha Finnemore’s National
Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996). Finally, on transnational issue networks, see Burley’s
“The Real New World Order” (Foreign Affairs, September/October
1997) and Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink’s Activists Beyond Bor-
ders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 1997).

For links to relevant Web sites, as well as a comprehensive index of
related articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.

96 FOREIGN POLICY

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Letters

CORRECTION

On page 96 of this issue, we incorrectly identified Anne-Marie
Slaughter as Anne-Marie Burley. We apologize to Dr. Slaughter and to
our readers.

CREDITS
Front Cover:
Day at the Races, 1923. A Man at the Derby, Epsom, Surrey, England, Hulton Getty
Back Cover:
Detail from illustration by Vint Lawrence, page 28
Young Zairean soldiers near Goma, Zaire; Ricardo Mazalan, AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS
UN General Assembly; Bert Hardy, Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis
Detail from chart, page 100
In Text:
p. 28, Illustration by Vint Lawrence
p. 50, Young Boy Plays with Troop of Toy Soldiers, Genevive Naylor, Corbis
p. 70, First Session of International Tribunal on War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia Opens in the
Hague, UN PHOTO 184689
p. 117, Ships reflagging in Persian Gulf, AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS
p. 127, Genghis Khan, James L. Stanfield, National Geographic Image Collection; Napoleon,
Jacques-Louis David, National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC, Samuel H. Kress Collection;
Stalin, UPI/Corbis-Bettman
p. 156, Volkswagen, compliments of Volkswagen of America, Inc.

194 FOREIGN POLICY

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Article Contents

p.82
p.83
p.84
p.85
p.86
p.87
p.88
p.89
p.90
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p.194

Issue Table of Contents

Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 1-96+1-48+97-194
Front Matter [pp.1-48]
Editor’s Note [pp.9-11]
Think Again
China [pp.13-27]
The Frontiers of Knowledge
International Relations: One World, Many Theories [pp.29-46]
International Security: Changing Targets [pp.48-63]
International Law: The Trials of Global Norms [pp.65-80]
International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? [pp.82-194]
International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization [pp.97-111]
International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability [pp.112-123]
International Decision Making: Leadership Matters [pp.124-137]
International Development: Is It Possible? [pp.138-151]
International Business: The New Bottom Line [pp.152-165]
Books
untitled [pp.166-169]
untitled [pp.169-172]
untitled [pp.172-174]
untitled [pp.175-177]
untitled [pp.177-179]
untitled [pp.179-181]
Global Newsstand
Contribuciones: July/September 1997, Buenos Aires [pp.182-183]
Middle East Journal: Winter 1998, Washington, DC [pp.183-184]
Management Science: December 1997, Providence, Rl [pp.184-185]
Le Monde Diplomatique: January 1998, Paris [pp.186-187]
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: December 12, 1997, Bonn [pp.187-188]
South African Yearbook of International Affairs: 1997, Pretoria [pp.188-189]
State, Government, and International Relations: Summer 1997, Tel Aviv [pp.189-190]
Letters
Mexican Standoff [pp.191-193]
Back Matter

ROUNDTABLE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global Governance and Power
Politics:

Back to Basics

Roland Paris

F
or many students of global governance who explore the myriad institu-

tions, rules, norms, and coordinating arrangements that transcend indi-

vidual states and societies, what really marks the contemporary era is

not the absence of such governance but its “astonishing diversity.” In addition

to “long-standing universal-membership bodies,” such as the United Nations, writes

Stewart Patrick, “there are various regional institutions, multilateral alliances

and security groups, standing consultative mechanisms, self-selecting clubs, ad

hoc coalitions, issue-specific arrangements, transnational professional networks,

technical standard-setting bodies, global action networks, and more.” The prolif-

eration and diversification of governance mechanisms—yielding a jumble of for-

mal and informal arrangements—has supplanted the simpler image of state

representatives gathering at official assemblies. Many scholars believe this plural-

ism opens important new avenues for tackling a growing array of complex trans-

national problems, particularly at a time when the responsiveness of traditional

multilateral institutions is being called into question.

Global governance has indeed become more diversified in recent decades, and

informal arrangements do sometimes provide opportunities for action when tra-

ditional multilateral bodies are stymied. But there is something important missing

from this picture. The fundamental challenge of global governance today is not a

shortage of cooperative mechanisms but the rapid shift in power away from the

United States and the West toward emerging countries in the erstwhile periphery

of the international system—countries that do not necessarily share Western as-

sumptions about the purposes and methods of global governance. No amount

of institutional proliferation or innovation can ultimately substitute for a lack of

consensus among incumbent or rising powers on the fundamental “rules of the

Ethics & International Affairs, , no.  (), pp. –.
©  Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
doi:./S

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game” in world affairs, including basic norms of political legitimacy, war and

peace, and commerce. These are the foundations upon which any workable global

governance system must be built.

It was easier to disregard these foundations when they seemed more secure. The

global governance literature emerged in a particular historical context—the imme-

diate post–cold war period—when America’s predominance was largely unchal-

lenged, and when the willingness of the United States to continue underwriting

the institutional arrangements of international security and commerce was widely

taken for granted. Early contributors to this literature focused on emerging forms

of governance beyond the nation-state, or “governance without government.” The

overriding image emerging from this scholarship was that of a world inhabited by

“countless actors of many different types” that combined in diverse arrangements

to address transnational problems, regulate international activity, and provide

public goods. Global governance, according to this view, was “less state-centric

and more the sum of crazy-quilt patterns among unalike, dispersed, overlapping,

and contradictory” political actors. Material power—and state power, in particu-

lar—seemed to fade into the background.

Today, the conditions that defined the post–cold war period are fading into the

past, yet the global governance literature continues to reflect the circumstances of

its birth: too often, it takes the foundations of global governance for granted. In

this essay I argue that the study of global governance needs to bring material

power—and power politics—back into focus. Otherwise, it will have little to say

about the most important governance challenge of our time: how to adapt and

strengthen the rules-based international order, and thus preserve cooperation,

in the midst of a historic global power transition.

The remainder of this essay is divided into three parts. First, I make the case

that the study of global governance has enhanced our understanding of world af-

fairs by drawing attention to the pluralization of global governance actors and

mechanisms, a trend that is likely to continue in the coming years. Second, I con-

tend that the literature has nevertheless tended to neglect the material foundations

of global governance, as well as the imperative of consensus among the world’s

most powerful states on core norms as a basis for global stability and cooperation.

Third, I argue that remedying this shortcoming does not mean abandoning

research on informal and innovative forms of cooperation or regulation. On

the contrary, it is a combination of both perspectives—the enduring importance

of major-power consensus, and the growing pluralization of governance

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arrangements—that offers the strongest basis for analyzing today’s most pressing

global governance challenges.

The Rise of Plurilateralism

With the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the decline of

great-power rivalry, many policymakers and scholars turned their attention to

other aspects of international affairs, including the globalization of capital, pro-

duction, information, ideas, crime, pathogens, and environmental damage. The

intensification of linkages across states and societies also highlighted the need

for improved methods of managing problems that transcended state borders,

which in turn fueled the growth of the academic literature examining new

forms of global cooperation and regulation. The study of global governance,

which gained prominence during this time, reflected these preoccupations.

Philip Cerny was one of the scholars writing on this subject in the early s,

and his work encapsulated many of the themes of this emerging scholarship. He

described the rise of a variegated patchwork of governance arrangements, which,

he believed, would ultimately coexist with, cut across, and rival the post–World

War II architecture of formal multilateral organizations. Cerny called this complex

system “plurilateralism” to reflect its diversity and fluidity. Although he acknowl-

edged that a plurilateral world would “not be an easy world to live in, much less to

manage,” he was optimistic about its potential to produce a stable, resilient, and

adaptable international system—partly because he expected it to be more flexible

and responsive than traditional multilateralism, and partly because shifting coali-

tions of “individuals, groups, states, firms, and other agents” working on different

issues would create new, overlapping ties of interdependence. Stability, he posited,

would not necessarily depend on a broad agreement about “the rules of the game,”

or a consensus on the fundamental norms of international affairs, but instead

could arise from “the very cross-cutting nature” of these new forms of coopera-

tion. Put differently, the apparent disorder of plurilateralism might, paradoxically,

produce order.

Interest in plurilateral global governance was not limited to the academy. The

concept gained traction in policy discussions, too, including in the  report

of the Commission on Global Governance, a blue-ribbon panel created after the

cold war to map out an agenda for international cooperation. Previously, the re-

port explained, governance had been “viewed primarily as intergovernmental

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relationships,” but now “a multitude of new actors . . . are increasingly active in

advancing various political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental objec-

tives that have considerable global impact.” As a result, global governance had be-

come “a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is

constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances.” Like Cerny, the

report’s authors highlighted the diversity of actors and mechanisms involved in

global governance and the fluidity and adaptability of the resulting system, as

well as its problem-solving orientation. They set out what some observers have

called a “post-internationalist” orientation, focusing on governance arrangements

and actors other than states and traditional intergovernmental organizations.

In the ensuing two decades the study of global governance burgeoned, as figure 

indicates. A total of  academic publications referred to “global governance” be-

tween  and , but by – that number had jumped to ,.

Figure  places this growth in perspective, by scaling these numbers and comparing

them to two other key terms: “international organizations” and “international rela-

tions.” While scholarly references to “global governance” increased more than

forty-two-fold from the early s to the early s, mentions of “international

organizations” and “international relations” grew by factors of only . and ., re-

spectively. These figures may help to explain why by  scholars were already ob-

serving that global governance had attained “near-celebrity status” in the political

science discipline. But this was just a start. We now know that academic interest

in the subject would continue to grow rapidly for another decade, both in absolute

terms and relative to other key concepts. By all appearances, it is growing still.

One of the drivers of this increased attention was almost certainly the propaga-

tion of new governance mechanisms themselves, along with a belief that “the

Figure . Number of Academic Publications Referring to “Global Governance”

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hierarchical old governance model” of formal treaties and universal-membership

bodies has only “limited utility in dealing with many of today’s most significant

global challenges.” Echoing Cerny’s description of plurilateralism, many more

recent analyses have traced the growth of nonstate, private, semiprivate, transna-

tional, and subnational entities in global governance, as well as the diversification

of regulatory and cooperative arrangements addressing an array of issues. On

climate change, for example, Matthew Hoffmann provides a fascinating descrip-

tion of fifty-eight “innovative initiatives” that have been pursued by “cities, coun-

ties, provinces, regions, civil society, and corporations” working outside the formal

treaty process, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC). Some of these initiatives catalogue greenhouse gas emissions; others

set certification standards or supervise emissions trading schemes, or perform

other functions. The result, he notes, is “something less familiar, messier, more

diffuse and dynamic” than the top-down UNFCCC process, which has been all

but paralyzed by interstate disagreements. Hoffmann suggests that this “experi-

mental system” of patchwork governance may be able “to provide the impetus

for the global response” to climate change “in a way that multilateral treaty-

making simply cannot.” Similar analyses have been performed in other “global

policy spaces,” including trade, finance, health, labor, security, migration, and

development.

Issue-specific investigations have also spawned more theoretical studies of “re-

gime complexity,” defined as the “presence of nested, partially overlapping, and

parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically organized.” In contrast

Figure . Number of Academic Publications Referring to “Global Governance”

vs. Other Terms (Normalized)

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to prior research on regimes, which tended to view international governance and

regulatory systems as relatively centralized and integrated, the newer scholarship

emphasizes both the fragmentation of these systems and the absence of top-down

direction. Some observers argue that international organizations play important

and constructive roles within these regime complexes, including that of mobilizing

and working with private actors and institutions to achieve regulatory goals.

Others, however, point to apparent disadvantages: Julia Morse and Robert

Keohane, forexample,believethat regime complexityallows multilateral institutions

to be used to undermine other institutions and to weaken existing international rules

and cooperation—a practice they describe as “contested multilateralism.”

All told, such debates and investigations have shed new light on an important

phenomenon: the growth of complex networks of diverse governance mechanisms

in world politics, which now overlap with, and sometimes rival, the traditional

multilateral structures of the post–World War II era. Plurilateralism has become

a reality. Further, these trends are likely to continue, particularly as the digital rev-

olution and other “disruptive” technologies enable more nonstate groups and in-

dividuals to become transnational actors in their own right. By detailing the rise

of this plurilateral system, and showing how informal mechanisms can sometimes

facilitate cooperation when more formal multilateral organizations are unable or

unwilling to act, the global governance literature has made an important contri-

bution to our understanding of international affairs.

But the World Was Changing in Other Ways, Too

During the same period, however, other changes were taking place in the world—

changes that have revealed something of a blind spot in the study of global gov-

ernance. Whereas during the immediate post–cold war years the predominance of

the United States was largely unchallenged, by the s few doubted the diffusion

of power away from the Western core of the international system and toward

emerging countries elsewhere, particularly in Asia. China’s economic output,

for instance, was just a tenth of the U.S. figure in , but it is reportedly on

track to be  percent larger by . Meanwhile, the fatigue and expense of

long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the effects of the – finan-

cial crisis and subsequent economic recession, seemed to have diminished the ap-

petite of the U.S. leadership and public for expensive foreign engagements. As U.S.

ambitions have contracted, China, Russia, and smaller regional powers in the

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Persian Gulf and elsewhere have grown more assertive, leading observers to pro-

claim the “return of geopolitics,” or a period of more aggressive competition

among powerful states. For all these reasons, a quarter century after the end

of the cold war many question whether the United States still has the material

power, or the political will, to continue underwriting and upholding the institu-

tional foundations of international security and the global economy.

These developments have placed the study of global governance in an awkward

position. The rise of plurilateralism has been real and important, but so is the need

for consensus among the world’s most powerful states on the core norms of inter-

national relations. Such a consensus can no longer be taken for granted. Not only

is power shifting toward emerging states, thus complicating the task of reaching

consensus because it multiplies the number of influential actors who must

agree. More fundamentally, there is no guarantee that new powers will subscribe

to Western ideas about how, and to what ends, global governance should be or-

ganized. Some scholars argue that such rising states as China, India, Turkey,

and Brazil already hold different views than that of industrialized Western nations

about “the foundations of political legitimacy, the rules of international trade, and

the relationship between the state and society.” Others are more sanguine, argu-

ing that “the overarching trend in the preference of China, India, and Brazil on

existing global governance regimes has been one of convergence on the status

quo.” This debate will be resolved in time: we will eventually learn whether

emerging powers accept, seek to revise, or attempt to overthrow existing gover-

nance arrangements. At present, however, greater ideological pluralization and in-

creased geopolitical competition seem all but inevitable, which in turn raises

questions about the future of global governance.

These questions are of particular concern to policy practitioners, who face the

daunting but vital task of adapting the rules-based international order and main-

taining cooperation in the midst of a global power transition. But these develop-

ments also pose an analytical challenge to students of global governance. As noted

above, no amount of institutional proliferation or innovation in global governance

can ultimately substitute for the absence of a consensus among the world’s most

powerful states on the rules of the game in international affairs. Yet much of the

global governance literature continues to reflect the preoccupations of the imme-

diate post–cold war era, when managing the effects of globalization—rather than

ensuring the foundations of world order—was top-of-mind. Although contribu-

tors to this literature have regularly acknowledged the continued importance of

global governance and power politics 413

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states and of material power in world affairs, many have in practice relegated

power—and state power, in particular—to the background, focusing instead on

post-internationalist forms of global cooperation and regulation. Indeed, the liter-

ature as a whole has tended to define itself in contradistinction to traditional con-

ceptions of interstate diplomacy and multilateral organizations. At a time when

the material and ideological foundations of world order seem to be shifting, stud-

ies of global governance that have little to say about power and geopolitics are at

risk of missing the forest for the trees—or worse, of being rendered obsolete.

Back to Basics

For all these reasons, the study of global governance needs to rediscover power. I

say “rediscover” because many international relations scholars have explored the

relationship between power politics and institutionalized cooperation in depth,

and their work might provide some guidance for students of global governance

today. One notable example is Robert Gilpin, whose eclectic brand of realist anal-

ysis came quickly to be overshadowed by Kenneth Waltz’s “neorealism,” which

has dominated the discipline for decades. In contrast to Waltz’s static and un-

remittingly materialist view of world politics, Gilpin examined the dynamics of

change and the interconnections among material power, norms, and institutions.

He conceived of the international system as a set of “social arrangements,” which

include “rights and rules that govern or at least influence the interactions among

states.” These arrangements, he argued, “tend to reflect the relative powers of the

actors involved,” but they are not simply reducible to the distribution of material

power. Ideas and institutions, in other words, have an independent causal role in

world affairs, serving as a “form of control” that “regulates behavior and may

range from informal rules of the system to formal institutions.” They are not

mere artifacts of power politics.

However, Gilpin maintained that these social arrangements cannot be disso-

ciated from material power. Global governance structures may, for example, per-

sist after the disappearance of the power conditions that gave rise to them, but not

indefinitely. At some point, a “disjuncture” emerges between these structures “and

the capacity of the dominant state, or states, to maintain the system.” If rising

powers—those gaining the capacity to maintain, or to topple, the system—view

the current governance arrangements as reflecting their own interests, needs,

and values, they may opt to replace the declining powers as guarantors of these

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arrangements. According to Gilpin, such states have historically sought to change

existing governance structures, either through incremental adjustment or, more

often, by undermining or overthrowing them.

Contemporary scholars and policy experts, including many in the United States,

are aware of this risk. Charles Kupchan, for instance, an academic who has held staff

positions at the National Security Council, warns that if the West and the “rising

rest” fail to “forge a consensus on the ordering rules that define legitimacy and gov-

ern matters of commerce, war, and peace,” we may be entering a period of “consid-

erable potential for geopolitical peril.” John Ikenberry similarly argues that the

United States “will need to renegotiate its relationship with the rest of the world,

and this will inevitably mean giving up some of the rights and privileges that it

has had in the earlier hegemonic era.” Stephen Brooks and William Wolhforth,

for their part, contend that the decline in American power should not be overesti-

mated, but also note that the existing architecture of international institutions is “a

relic of the preoccupations and power relationships of the middle of the last centu-

ry,” and maintain that there are good reasons for the United States “to spearhead

the foundation of a new institutional order.” Former U.S. National Security

Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts that any new institutional order must be

based on a new understanding between the United States and China. Such a com-

pact, he argues, is a necessary condition for the development of new global gover-

nance arrangements, because if the U.S.-China relationship “is not stable and is not

guided by a genuine recognition by both sides of our respective interests in working

together, then no multilateral institution created in that context is going to work.”

The challenge for students of global governance is to blend such insights with

the concurrent reality of institutional proliferation and diversification in global

governance. Returning to the example of climate change provides a small but tell-

ing illustration of why this is important. In spite of the plethora of governance in-

struments and experiments aimed at reducing emissions, the net results have been

less than satisfactory. The authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change has reported that global emissions of greenhouse gases grew more quickly

between  and  than in each of the three previous decades—arguably the

clearest measure of governance effectiveness on this issue. If anything, the most

hopeful recent development in this field was not the appearance of a variety of

new governance mechanisms, but rather the November  agreement between

the United States and China that set “new targets for carbon emissions reductions

by the United States and a first-ever commitment by China to stop its emissions

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from growing by .” Perhaps this agreement, or another like it, will serve as a

basis for a renegotiated approach to climate change that could be broadened to

include more countries and eventually institutionalized in new governance struc-

tures. Indeed, beyond the issue of climate change, achieving a new modus vivendi

between these two countries—the preeminent incumbent and rising powers, re-

spectively—on critical and contentious matters of international economics, secur-

ity, and environmental sustainability may be the single most important

requirement to adapt the system of global governance to new power realities.

Brzezinski probably gets this right.

At the same time, the sheer complexity of today’s transnational problems may

defy the capacity of even the strongest states, acting in concert, to manage. This is

why research on the growing role of nonstate actors in global governance and the

emergence of informal cooperative and regulatory mechanisms will remain rele-

vant and important. Too often, however, these two perspectives—one emphasiz-

ing the enduring importance of major-power consensus as a basis for world order,

the other highlighting the remarkable proliferation of global governance actors

and arrangements—have been treated as rival approaches to the study of interna-

tional affairs. In fact, each is incomplete without the other. A synthesis of both

perspectives would offer the strongest basis for analyzing the most pressing prob-

lems of order and governance facing the world today.

Taking the study of global governance “back to basics,” in other words, does not

mean returning to the past. Power is diffusing not only toward the emerging econ-

omies but also toward transnational and nonstate actors. Realists who fail to ac-

knowledge this trend, or who paint a picture of international relations that

depicts little more than interstate politics, will almost certainly face greater diffi-

culty explaining world affairs. Similarly, as the number and variety of participants

in global politics multiplies, the most strategically minded international actors, be

they governmental or nongovernmental, will be those that comprehend that get-

ting things done on a more crowded world stage requires mobilizing diverse co-

alitions of like-minded actors. The global governance literature, with its insights

into the pluralization of cooperative mechanisms, is already well-positioned to un-

derstand and to explain this tactic.

Yet, for all this transformation, states remain the most influential actors in

world affairs, and material power continues to be the primary source of influence.

It is one thing to acknowledge these facts in words, but another to build them into

analyses of international relations. The study of global governance should start

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from the recognition that complex new patterns of cooperation ultimately depend

on whether or not the foundations of global cooperation are maintained. Those

foundations, as Gilpin observed, are made up of mutual understandings among

the world’s most powerful actors. What is most needed today, therefore, is

more research and analysis not only about the actual or potential renegotiation

of these foundations but also, and more specifically, about the ways in which

the proliferation and diversification of global governance actors and mechanisms

might advance this most fundamental goal. In this sense, going “back to basics” is

about moving the field forward.

Conclusion

In their essay for this forum, Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson call on glob-

al governance scholars to consider “bigger questions that deal with where we have

come from and where we are going.” I agree. Navigating the current period of glob-

al power transition is a generational challenge that will require enlightened political

leadership informed by an understanding of how power, norms, and institutions

can interact to produce systemic stability. The contributions of global governance

scholars will be essential, but answering such “bigger questions” will require a

broader view of governance, one that blends the literature’s new insights about

the rise of plurilateralism with older truths about the foundational importance

of consensus among the world’s most powerful states on “the rules of the game.”

NOTES

 Stewart Patrick, “The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance,” Foreign Affairs
, no.  (), p. .

 Ibid., p. .
 James N. Rosenau and Ernst O. Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).

 Rainer Baumann and Klaus Dingwerth, “Global Governance vs Empire: Why World Order Moves
Toward Heterarchy and Hierarchy,” Journal of International Relations and Development , no. 
(), p. .

 James N. Rosenau, “Information Technologies and the Skills, Networks, and Structures that Sustain
World Affairs,” in James N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh, eds., Information Technologies and Global
Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York
Press, ), p. .

 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” in Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall, eds., Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ),
p. .

 Notable exceptions include Jamie Gaskarth, ed., Rising Powers, Global Governance and Global Ethics
(Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, ); Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the
Constitution of International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, ); and Barnett and
Duvall, eds., Power in Global Governance.

 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),”
Foreign Policy, no.  (), pp. –.

global governance and power politics 417

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 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority,
Power, Change,” International Studies Quarterly , no.  (), pp. –.

 Philip G. Cerny, “Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post–Cold
War World Order,” Millennium , no.  (), pp. –.

 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on
Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, ).

 Baumann and Dingwerth, “Global Governance vs Empire,” p. .
 Barnett and Duvall, eds., “Power in Global Governance,” p. .
 John Gerard Ruggie, “Global Governance and ‘New Governance Theory’: Lessons from Business and

Human Rights,” Global Governance , no.  (), p. .
 For example, Mark Raymond and Laura DeNardis, “Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an Inchoate

Global Institution,” International Theory, , no.  (), pp. –; Michael Zürn, “Global
Governance as Multi-Level Governance,” in David Levi-Faur, ed., Oxford Handbook of Governance
(New York: Oxford University Press, ), pp. –; and Luk Van Langenhove, “The
Transformation of Multilateralism: Mode . to Mode .,” Global Policy , no.  (), pp. –.

 Matthew J. Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response
after Kyoto (New York: Oxford University Press, ), p. .

 See, for example, Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds., International Organization and Global
Governance (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, ); and Sophie Harman and David Williams, eds.,
Governing the World? Cases in Global Governance (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, ). On “global policy
spaces,” see William D. Coleman, “Governance and Global Public Policy,” in Levi-Faur, ed., Oxford
Handbook of Governance, pp. –.

 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on
Politics , no.  (), p. . See also Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for
Plant Genetic Resources,” International Organization , no.  (), pp. –.

 Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt and Fariborz Zelli, “The Fragmentation of Global
Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis,” Global Environmental Politics , no.  (),
pp. –.

 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “International Regulations Without International Government:
Improving IO Performance through Orchestration,” Review of International Organizations , no. 
(), pp. –.

 Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism,” Review of International
Organizations , no.  (), pp. –.

 Moisés Naím, The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being In
Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be (New York: Basic Books, ); and Taylor Owen, Disruptive Power:
The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age (New York: Oxford University Press, ).

 Keith Fray, “China’s Leap Forward: Overtaking the US as World’s Biggest Economy,” Financial Times,
FT Data Blog, October , .

 Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs , no.  (), pp. –.
 Charles Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn (New York:

Oxford University Press, ), p. .
 Miles Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo,”

International Affairs , no.  (), p. .
 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ); and

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, ).
 Kupchan, No One’s World, pp. x and .
 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World

Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, ), p. .
 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order,” Foreign Affairs , no. 

(), p. .
 David Rothkopf, “A Time of Unprecedented Instability?” Foreign Policy website, July , , foreign-

policy.com////a-time-of-unprecedented-instability.
 International Panel on Climate Change, Mitigation of Climate Change: Working Group III Contribution

to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (New York:
Cambridge University Press, ), pp. –.

 Mark Landler, “U.S. and China Reach Climate Accord after Months of Talks,” New York Times,
November , .

 See Rothkopf, “A Time of Unprecedented Instability?”

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Global Governance and Power Politics: Back to Basics

The Rise of Plurilateralism
But the World Was Changing in Other Ways, Too
Back to Basics
Conclusion

THE GLOBAL FORUM

The Last Two Centuries
of Global Governance

�
Craig N. Murphy

IN RECENT ESSAYS, THOMAS WEISS AND RORDEN WILKINSON ARGUE THAT
analysis of systems of global governance going back to the beginnings of
the earliest state systems could provide fundamental insight into the prob-
lems that trouble the scholarly field of international relations today.1 While
no social scientist or historian is yet able to give a credible account of
global governance over those many millennia, it is possible to begin to
recount the history of global governance far back beyond the events with
which scholars of international relations begin, 1945, the end of World War
II and the founding of the postwar UN system—as Thomas Weiss and Dan
Plesch do in their essay in this issue of Global Governance—to provide
valuable insights for contemporary global governance.

An even more reasonable date for the beginning of the contemporary
system of global governance would be 1815. The associated events were the
end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna and the beginning
of a system of governance of Europe and its empires that eventually led to
the global system that we now have. The conservative governments that held
the congress created many of the institutions that still characterize global
governance and gave new life to older institutions and practices whose
sources and consequences were central to the nineteenth-century interimpe-
rial organizations out of which the United Nations grew. Many of the goals
of the interimperial system—the economic goals as well as the goal of uni-
versalizing and perfecting the state system—also are still with us. Moreover,
the constitutional dynamics of the nineteenth-century system—the forces
that led to change within international governance—remain the same. Atten-
tion to those dynamics can, as Weiss and Wilkinson would suggest, help us
understand the prospects for ameliorating current global problems, including
problems that could not have been anticipated two centuries ago.

New Institutions
The Congress of Vienna imposed a peace on France and Napoleon’s allies
by doing much more than reestablishing something like the eighteenth-

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century European balance of power. The victors sought to create a system
that would assure continent-wide and interimperial rule by conservative
social forces far into the future. The congress itself was the first of a series
of nineteenth-century multilateral conferences of the great powers called to
deal with European and interimperial conflicts. The Hague international
peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 (and a third, planned for 1915, aborted
after the outbreak of war) also built on the earlier conferences by attempt-
ing to institutionalize general processes for resolving conflicts among all
national governments. The goal remained the same with the 1919 Paris
Peace Conference that established the League of Nations and the 1945 San
Francisco conference that agreed on the UN Charter.

The congress or conference system not only made multilateral treaty
making a common practice, it quickly led to the simultaneous or sometimes
separate meetings of periodic congresses or conferences of representatives
of ministries involved with transportation, communication, commerce,
health, currency, finance, and almost every other aspect of government.
This was the beginning of the “legislative branch” of today’s global gover-
nance, the system of global multilateral conferences.

At the same time, and often in the same cities where nineteenth-century
public officials met, private associations of transnationally oriented com-
munities of professionals and social activists also met to agree on voluntary
international standards affecting almost every aspect of economic and
social life throughout Europe and its empires. Moreover, long before the
congresses of the great powers became truly global, the private interna-
tional governance system welcomed professionals and activists from every
part of the world.

By the mid-nineteenth century, many of the periodic conferences, both
public and private, had created permanent administrations (secretariats) to
carry out tasks between the meetings of national representatives. The secre-
tariats prepared conferences; helped set agendas; proposed new agreements;
helped monitor compliance with previous agreements; and, in some cases,
provided specific services to governments, national associations, or even to
citizens in many parts of the world. The nineteenth-century secretariats
became the “executive branch” of contemporary global governance; the
administrative history of the UN system and other global international organ-
izations begins there, as a visit to the archives of almost any agency of the
UN system readily confirms. Some were originally part of the nineteenth-
century system of “public international unions” (e.g., the International
Telecommunications Union [ITU] and the Universal Postal Union). Others
grew out of or incorporated nineteenth-century predecessors (e.g., the Inter-
national Labour Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization).
And the rest were modeled on nineteenth-century antecedents in different
older fields (e.g., the International Civil Aviation Organization on the early
ITU and railway unions).

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A final new, and continuing, institution initiated at the end of the
Napoleonic Wars is the practice of giving systemwide sanction to some, but
not all, successful nationalist movements. For example, the victors over
Napoleon approved the freedom that the Norwegians won from Napoleon’s
ally, Denmark (albeit, allowing only a limited freedom under a personal
union of Norway and Sweden under the Swedish king), but the revolution-
aries who had defeated Napoleon in Haiti did not gain similar recognition.
As the nineteenth century went on, the creole-ruled American states,
Greece, Belgium, Romania, and others gained interimperial recognition, but
not Liberia, Ethiopia, or other nonwhite-ruled states that were distant from
Europe.

Incorporating Older Institutions
The differential practice of nineteenth-century multilateral recognition
reflected a European institution that only slightly predated the Congress of
Vienna, the idea that legitimate sovereignty depended on governments
adhering to “the standard of civilization,” or, perhaps it is better to call that
standard “white hegemony.” As W. E. B. Du Bois describes it in “The Souls
of White Folk,”

The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very
modern thing, a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed. . . . [E]ven
up into the eighteenth century we were hammering our national manikins
into one, great, Universal Man, with fine frenzy which ignored color and race
even more than birth. Today we have changed all that, and the world in a sud-
den, emotional conversion has discovered that it is white and by that token,
wonderful!2

The discovery of whiteness and of the standard of civilization were reac-
tions to the resistance to European colonization of much of the world,
worldwide colonization that was made possible by the fortuitous European
discovery of America and its exclusive exploitation by Europeans through-
out the three centuries before the Congress of Vienna.

Access to the wealth of the Americas and the exploitation of African
labor gave Europe and the United States their head start into the Industrial
Revolution. It also gave the world what Ian Morris describes as the West’s
(temporary) global “rule,” something that only began in the 1770s, when
Napoleon was a boy.3 Looked at through the historical lenses of Morris or
Du Bois, contemporary global governance started as a set of institutions
designed to help secure the global dominance of white folks by managing
some of the conflicts among Europe’s imperial powers. The early system
seems to have done the job of helping secure European dominance quite
well; after all, when Du Bois was writing the “The Soul of White Folks” in
1910, the number of nonwhite-ruled states whose sovereignty remained

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uncompromised by any of the European empires could have been counted
on one hand. Nevertheless, contradictions within the nineteenth-century
system of global governance assured that it would eventually help under-
mine the white hegemony that it originally served.

Despite the focus of the nineteenth-century great-power conferences on
the high politics of potential armed conflict, most of the staff and the
resources of the public international unions were dedicated to supporting
what we would now call “economic globalization.” The unions eased trade
and international communication among industrial firms while mollifying
powerful business and labor groups that might be harmed by ever greater
economic integration; the League and the UN systems continued to do the
same. Ultimately, though, economic globalization undermined white privi-
lege and power, acting as an often unexpected ally of the forces of nation-
alist resistance to European imperialism that gave rise to the defensive ide-
ology of the standard of civilization.

Similarly, the secretariats of the public international unions, the
League, and the UN attracted idealistic internationalists who often believed,
in the words of John A. Hobson, that

nationalism is a plain highway to internationalism, and if it manifests diver-
gence we may well suspect a perversion of its nature and its purpose. Such a
perversion is Imperialism, in which nations trespassing beyond the limits of
facile assimilation transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied na-
tional types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires.4

Moreover, from the beginning, Hobson and other activists who supported
the emerging system of global governance considered the training of native
administrators and eventual decolonization something that anyone who
believed in good government and internationalism should support. For that
reason, international institutions designed to improve the state and the state
system should, as a matter of course, be anti-imperialist.

The Dynamics: Why and How the System Changed
In 2015, global governance may still promote economic globalization, but
it is hardly still the champion of formal imperialism. This is, in large part,
due to the forces that have influenced the global governance system over
the past two centuries: the system has responded to the will of the govern-
ments of the great powers, particularly that of the hegemonic powers,
changing in response to changes in the ideology of the hegemon and with
the change of the hegemon. The system has also responded to civil society
and political forces from below, forces that have been strong enough to
maintain global agendas even after they have been dropped by the hege-

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mon. And perhaps most significantly, global governance has both
responded to—and helped shape—the phases in the increasingly global
industrial economy, the periodic creative destruction that took the world
from the early Industrial Revolution to the Information Age.

Great Britain led the victors over Napoleon and it remained the Euro-
pean hegemon. Therefore, when the balance of social forces within Britain
shifted in the mid-nineteenth century and all of its governments began to
give active support to a liberal international order, Britain became a leader
in the campaign to create the governance that made the first era of eco-
nomic globalization possible. Britain’s nineteenth-century humanitarian
sympathies also received special attention in nineteenth-century global gov-
ernance; for example, the Congress of Vienna took the time to condemn the
slave trade even though most of the conservative governments in atten-
dance thought the issue a bit off-topic or even outré. Of course, not all of
the nineteenth-century hegemons’ hobbyhorses appeared this progressive.
In the quarter-century before World War I, an official British skepticism
about the “germ theory of disease” led to its implacable (and effective)
opposition to an international regime to require quarantine of ships infected
with cholera, influenza, and the like (a regime opposed by British shipping
interests). After World War I, the end of British hegemony, and the 1918 flu
pandemic, such a global regime became possible. Arguably, the end of
British hegemony also meant the beginning of the real possibility of a
global governance system indifferent to, or even opposed to the chummy
global condominium of the world by the European empires.

The relative dominance of the United States after World War II assured
that global governance would learn to ride American hobbyhorses, one of
which (although it is now often forgotten) was economic development.
From 1946 through Richard Nixon’s first administration, the United States
provided more than half of the finance of the UN development system of
technical assistance (coordinated by the UN Development Programme
[UNDP] and its predecessors and initially carried out by the specialized
agencies), development finance (primarily the task of the World Bank), and
humanitarian relief. Americans were at the helm of all of the main devel-
opment agencies and Americans designed and helped establish most of the
lasting institutional innovations within the development system.

All that changed in the mid-1970s. A good marker and explanation of
the change is “The United States in Opposition” written by Gerald Ford’s
UN ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, which laments the waning influ-
ence of the great powers in favor of the states newly liberated from colo-
nialism.5 Despite this rebalancing of power, the UN development system
continues to dominate the entire UN system forty years later in terms of
staffing and expenditure, demonstrating that the identity and will of the
hegemon is only one part of the dynamics of global governance. Certainly

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hegemons remain important; after all, when US governments began to push
economic deregulation, with Jimmy Carter, and neoliberalism, with Ronald
Reagan, most of the UN agencies began acting as transmission belts of the
same policies to the developing world. Nevertheless, the UN system also
remained a well-endowed site of alternatives to the economic vision pre-
ferred by the hegemon and this was not just a consequence of the feckless
third world majority that Moynihan blamed. It had to do with the policy
preferences of many UN members in all parts of the world, the advocacy of
groups within international civil society, and with the independent judg-
ment of professionals on the UN staff. Many, like the founder of the UN
Development Office, Mahbub ul Haq, were actually brought into the system
due to their expertise by Americans with close connections to its new
neoliberal leaders (in this case, to Reagan who nominated UNDP’s admin-
istrator, Bill Draper, a venture capitalist who recruited Haq simply because
he had the widest reputation as the wisest and most creative person in the
development business).

A final aspect of the dynamics of global governance—and one often
overlooked by scholars who focus on the formal intergovernmental organi-
zations (the public international unions, the League, and the UN system)—
is the role of changes in the global industrial economy. Global governance
not only encourages and shapes globalization, it is affected by it, particu-
larly by the new sectors that emerge in the processes of creative destruction
that have marked industrial capitalism from its beginning. If that creative
destruction is the stuff of industrial entrepreneurs—of the Thomas Edisons,
Henry Fords, and Bill Gateses who create whole new lead industries—there
is equally a lesser known pantheon of institutional entrepreneurs who have
created the new forms of global governance necessary to sustain each suc-
cessive industrial age.

In the most recent era the name of one of them, Sir Timothy John “Tim”
Berners-Lee, the “inventor of the World Wide Web,” is widely known. He
is not widely known as the inventor of one of the most powerful institutions
of contemporary global governance, the voluntary consensus standard-set-
ting organization called the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), formed in
1994. Often much to the irritation of the world’s most powerful govern-
ments, W3C along with other relatively new groups (the Internet Society,
Internet Engineering Task Force [IETF], and Internet Architecture Board
[IAB]) and much older organizations such as the IEEE Standards Associa-
tion (originally the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, founded
in 1884) govern the Internet, the essential infrastructure of the Information
Age global economy, through a set of committees that include representa-
tives of major infrastructure producers and consumers (and many others)
that operate on the basis of consensus rules, meet continuously, and have lit-
tle or no relationship to national governments or the UN system.

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The Internet governance structure is not the only system critical to the
current global economy that operates this way. Containerized shipping, an
infrastructure essential to global manufacturing (and, in that way, to the
economic rise of China) both began with and is largely governed through
technical committees of the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) an ostensibly private network set up after World War II but growing
out of the wartime “United Nations” (the official name of the anti-fascist
alliance) standard-setting organization. Global financial transactions are
facilitated by a similarly organized voluntary consensus body, the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), and even
many of the environmental and social externalities associated with contem-
porary global industrial capitalism are dealt with (to the extent that they are
dealt with at all) through a similar set of standards-creating and -monitoring
organizations that are part of the ISEAL Alliance, “the global membership
association for sustainability standards,” whose members most of us know
only through various fair trade, organic, or other seals on the packages of
some the products we buy.

Many, perhaps most, of the hundreds of thousands of people involved
in these global standard-setting and -monitoring organizations who have
reflected on their history think of them as something fundamentally new,
something required by the rapid rate of technological innovation that has
taken place since the early 1980s and by the lack of interest—and often the
incompetence—of governments to establish the regulatory frameworks nec-
essary to gain the greatest public benefit from the new technologies, and to
avoid the greatest risks of harm from their exploitation. In fact, as the date
of the founding of IEEE might suggest, this belief is fundamentally incor-
rect. At least since the second half of the nineteenth century—that is, since
that first era of economic globalization before World War I—governments
have been reluctant (and often unable) to regulate new globalizing tech-
nologies in the public interest and private transnational associations of
engineering professionals and social activists have stepped in to fill some of
the gaps.

The Next Half-century of Global Governance
It is probably more difficult for us to imagine the world of 2215 than it was
for the people of 1815 to image the world today, but fifty years forward,
2065, is much less difficult. If the dynamics operating since the Congress of
Vienna remain the same—and, barring the revolutionary transformation of
capitalism or disasters triggered by unregulated climate change—global
governance in 2065 will still involve a thin layer of global institutions sup-
porting the global economy and helping to mitigate its harms. The eco-
nomic rise of China and of other large industrializing countries will mean

Craig N. Murphy 195

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that the agenda of the global institutions will be shaped as much by their
governments as it is now by the preferences of the United States and of the
first countries to industrialize. Those governmental preferences will be
shaped by the domestic and transnational social conflicts that emerge
throughout the century. And even though many of the social scientists of
2065 may be oblivious to it, institutional entrepreneurs, among the engi-
neers who have created the newest industries of the day, will be doing much
of the work of world government alongside, and sometimes competing
with, transnational activists and socially responsible companies. �

Notes
Craig N. Murphy teaches at Wellesley College and the University of Massachusetts
Boston’s McCormack Graduate School for Global and Policy Studies. He received
the 2013 International Studies Association (ISA) Distinguished Senior Scholar
Award in International Political Economy for his work on global governance and
economic development. He is past president of the ISA, past chair of the Academic
Council on the UN System, and a founding editor of Global Governance. His recent
publications include a Japanese translation of his history of the UN Development
Programme, UNDP: A Better Way? (2014), and a Portuguese translation of his study
of global governance, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global
Governance Since 1850 (2014).

1. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Global Governance to the Res-
cue: Saving International Relations?” Global Governance 20, no. 1 (2014): 19–36;
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Rethinking Global Governance? Com-
plexity, Authority, Power, Change,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1
(2014): 207–215.

2. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk,” The Independent 69, no. 3220
(18 August 1910): 339.

3. Ian Morris writes that, if he were forced to specify a year for the beginning
of the West’s lead, it would be 1773. See Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For
Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York:
Random House, 2011), p. 167.

4. John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: James Pott, 1902), p. 9.
5. Daniel P. Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition,” Commentary 59,

no. 3 (March 1975): 31–44.

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The Agency and Authority of International
NGOs
Sarah S. Stroup and Wendy H. Wong

“Lost” Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security. By Charli Carpenter.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. 256p. $82.50 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance. By Jessica Green.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. 232p. $75.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs. By Amanda Murdie. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2014. 320p. $60.00.

T
he study of global politics today encompasses an
enormous array of actors, relationships, and processes
beyond the state. The growth in the study of one

nonstate actor, international nongovernmental organizations
(INGOs), is particularly noteworthy.1 We frequently hear
about INGOs because they claim to challenge the existing
social and political order on issues such as human rights
abuses, poverty, and environmental degradation, and they
appear to have had substantial victories in championing new
ideas and changing state policy.

Are INGOs powerful actors that are able to transform
global politics, noisy interest groups whose influence is
severely constrained by increasingly complex global
structures, or epiphenomenal representations of an
increasingly liberal world order? To answer this question
requires more research into the incredible variation
among the tens of thousands of INGOs active around
the world. Politics happens within and among INGOs,
and those processes directly affect both the way that
INGOs engage with their environment and their ability
to influence international policies and social practices.

A quarter century of serious scholarship on INGOs has
demonstrated the utility of a more expansive conception
of power in global politics.2 Research on INGOs brings
together foreign policy analysis, scholarship on interest
groups, a constructivist concern for social norms, and
network analysis, all in an attempt to explain politics
beyond the state. In showing how INGOs change policies,

create global rules, and advance new normative frame-
works, scholars have drawn upon a vast array of concepts
and methodological tools from political science and
beyond. The three recent books by Charli Carpenter,
Jessica Green, and Amanda Murdie are exemplary in the
creativity and care that they bring to the question of the
ways in which INGOs set policy agendas, improve human
security, and participate in global governance. All three
books treat INGOs as agents that have capabilities and
weaknesses that affect how they achieve their goals.
We suggest that a stronger focus on INGOs as agents

can help explain which INGOs are able to exercise
influence and under what conditions. Armed with greater
knowledge about individual INGOs and their practices,
we can then understand how these traits shape
their relationships with those they seek to influence.
Authority—by its nature a relational concept—exists for
certain INGOs in their relationships with particular audiences.
INGO authority is real, but it is also uneven and contested.
We are not the first to engage the question of INGO

power and authority, but the debate too often treats
INGOs as abstractions rather than as real-life, differen-
tiated actors. Just as the answer to the question of “how
powerful is the state” will vary depending on whether the
state in question is Japan or Jamaica, an understanding of
INGO power requires disaggregation of the category of
INGO. Groups like Oxfam, Human Rights First, and the
Environmental Defense Fund are wildly different, and
these differences shape their reception by the many and
varied audiences that they seek to reach. The agential study
of INGOs should complement, not replace, the more
structural and constructivist perspectives in international
relations, while offering insight into bigger questions
about power and authority.

Sarah S. Stroup (sstroup@middlebury.edu) is Associate
Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College.
Wendy H. Wong (wendyh.wong@utoronto.ca) is Associate
Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto.

138 Perspectives on Politics
doi:10.1017/S153759271500328X

Review Essay

The State of the Nonstate?
Private transnational groups are not new, but a new and
intense focus on them emerged in the 1990s as part of the
growing attention to nonstate actors. The United Nations
defines an “NGO” as “a not-for-profit group, principally
independent from government, which is organized on
a local, national, or international level to address issues in
support of the public good.”3 International NGOs
(INGOs) work in more than three or more countries,
according to the Union of International Associations, and
over the past 20 years the number of INGOs has almost
tripled, reaching more than 55,000 in 2010.4

These definitions of INGOs are widely cited but also
problematic. First, they are overly inclusive. The afore-
mentioned definitions include such groups as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
private actors that may be very influential but have
a different form of power than groups such as Doctors
without Borders and the World Conservation Union.5

Second, the definition emphasizes formal legal status,
when in fact many NGOs are not registered as nonprofits.
In fact, social recognition rather than legal status may be
much more important for an INGO’s authority: Amnesty
International, for example, is registered in Britain as
a company and a charity. The public benefit orientation
that supposedly distinguishes INGOs is a third area of
confusion. Many INGOs respond to a perceived need for
which there is often no direct demand; these groups decide
what to work on in accordance with their own agendas.
Finally, the definition places INGOs in opposition to
states; in fact, many INGOs work closely with or through
states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). These
conceptual ambiguities are not merely academic. Scholars
who make claims about what INGOs really are often have
very different sorts of groups in mind.
Generally, we can organize INGO scholarship into

several waves. At the end of the Cold War, a first wave of
scholars focused on demonstrating that INGOs were
powerful actors in global politics, worthy of serious study.
Often depicted as nodes in transnational advocacy net-
works, INGOs could create external pressure to change
state policies, bring new issues like torture to the global
agenda, or change social practices around environmental
protection and sustainability.6 This early work was
sympathetic to, or explicitly part of, a constructivist re-
search program that sought to unpack the importance of
ideational forces and processes. As such, INGOs were
often portrayed as transmission belts for emergent norms,
and the emphasis was on the ideational structures that
INGOs create and recreate.7 The focus was on showing
that INGOs influenced political outcomes, but not in
a way that systematically evaluated differences in the
identities, tactics, or issue areas.

Since the late 1990s, two questions have dominated
a second wave of INGO research. First, what do INGOs
do and why? Challenging the idea that INGOs are
distinctive because of their principled orientation, a num-
ber of scholars have suggested that the demands of
organizational maintenance, rather than commitment to
lofty goals, best explains how INGOs choose to engage in
advocacy and service delivery. Second, what is the nature
of the relationship between INGOs and the states that
have been traditionally the focus of IR scholarship? In
fact, states and INGOs can collaborate, compete, or
complement one another; INGOs can be instruments of
state power at one point while later directly challenging
state authority. Outside of a narrow cohort of state-
centric realists, IR scholars seem open to the potential
power of INGOs in governance while demanding greater
specificity around the scope conditions enabling INGO
influence and how those opportunities have changed
over time.

Within this second wave, a strong structuralist
critique offers a challenge to the idea of examining
individual INGOs by locating the source of their power
in global social processes. In this perspective, the ability
of INGOs to make specific principled claims rests on
a broader liberal normative framework that legitimates
the right of individuals to speak for themselves. Only
those INGOs that conform to certain standards—
liberal, rationalist, acceptant of the basic legitimacy of
markets and states—are recognized as legitimate gover-
nors.8 In this Foucaultian view, INGOs lack agency within
a liberal governmental rationality. Real resistance is very
difficult.9 While we accept the point that liberal norms
facilitate the participation of civil society groups in global
political processes, this determinism ignores the fragmenta-
tion of the global social structure and the diversity of INGOs
within it. INGOs actively advance or resist this liberal
rationality: Some INGOs like Amnesty have been at the
forefront of the expansion of universal human rights and the
responsibility to protect, but others like Focus on the Global
South resist this liberalism as imperialistic. Proponents of
global civil society, in particular, see much more possibility
for change, as the issues promoted by INGOs directly address
problems of injustice that are created by sovereign states and
liberal free markets.10 At the more micro level, there is also
substantial variation in the way that INGOs respond to the
structural conditions that they face, as the works under review
here demonstrate.

Across these several strands of INGO research, one
unifying thread is the privileged attention that the
INGO—state relationship receives. This relationship is
doubtless a critical one, as states enable, constrain, and
respond to them.11 But INGOs engage all kinds of
political actors—IGOs, local communities, multinational
corporations, and other INGOs. As Green explains,
“governance is expanding: there are multiple loci of

March 2016 | Vol. 14/No. 1 139

authority rather than a single locus that rests with the state”
(Rethinking Private Authority, p. 164). Theoretically,
therefore, we need greater attention to the diversity of
INGOs and the choices that they make. How INGOs
define their missions, how they choose different audiences
to target, and which strategies they choose to employ help
define INGO agency. In turn, these agential qualities
shape the INGOs that are able to exercise influence.

INGOs as Agents
INGOs are often portrayed as an increasingly important
type of global actor: What type of actions, then, do
INGOs take? Both scholars and practitioners separate the
work of INGOs into advocacy and service delivery. In
actual practice, the divide between advocacy and service
delivery is blurred, and many organizations do both or
have changed the balance of their activities over time.12

Whether pushing for policy changes from states and IGOs,
providing ideas and goods to target populations, or some
mix of the two, INGOs see advocacy and service delivery
as tactics for advancing social change.

One central debate among INGO analysts is over
whether and how these practices are shaped by the moral
commitments of INGOs. While usually presented as
mutually exclusive, NGOs may be motivated by both
principles and self -interest.13 As Murdie argues, the fact
that some INGOs are not principled does not mean that
all INGOs are not principled (Help or Harm, p. 239). We
ultimately agree with Thomas Risse that INGOs that
neglect their principled orientation risk the attribute that
makes them distinctive and potentially powerful.14

INGOs must maintain their organizational capacity, but
their claims to serve others underpin their legitimacy in the
eyes of global audiences.

The three books under review offer valuable insight
into the various audiences affected by INGO work.
Carpenter’s “Lost” Causes concentrates on relationships
among INGOs and other members of issue advocacy
networks. Murdie’s Help or Harm focuses on the impact of
INGOs on populations in developing countries. Finally,
in Rethinking Private Authority, Green explores how
private actors create or enforce rules that shape the
environmental practices of firms and states.

The politics among INGOs were initially neglected, but
have been drawn into the spotlight through the works of
Carpenter and Clifford Bob.15 INGOs often work together
in advocacy coalitions to push for policy change, in more or
less formal versions of the many networks that connect
INGOs. These campaigns—perhaps most famously the
International Coalition to Ban Landmines—can be very
effective but are not always so.16 Precisely how do INGOs
interact with one another in these networks? Carpenter has
written the statement book on gatekeeping by advocacy
INGOs and their effects in “agenda vetting” within the
human security and human rights networks. Some INGOs

are able to decide the merit of certain issues for global
campaigns and eliminate others. These network hubs have
kept issues such as male circumcision, compensation for
victims of war, and autonomous weapons on the sidelines of
global INGO advocacy. The structure of networks directs
the way that ideas travel to achieve international support.
Perhaps most cogently, Carpenter’s focus groups and
network analysis demonstrate how INGOs work with other
INGOs: Smaller, less well-known actors can be stifled, and,
similarly, larger actors are courted by other INGOs and
policymakers. We can clearly observe how, as separate
agents interacting in issue-specific networks, some INGOs
exercise power over others, but Carpenter also shows how
INGOs serve different purposes and therefore bring value to
a coalition in distinct ways.17

Complementing Carpenter’s focus on advocacy
INGOs working on human security, Murdie explores
how both service delivery and advocacy INGOs can “help
or harm” populations in need. In her methodologically
sophisticated but accessible book, Murdie uses game
theory, regression analysis, and illustrative case studies to
show that INGOs can improve access to potable water and
increase the protection of physical integrity rights. Her
general finding is based on careful delineation among
different INGOs, both in terms of their varied motivations
and their practices. Murdie argues that INGO motivations
condition their ability to improve human security. Service
INGOs can signal their good intentions by joining
voluntary accountability programs, which then increase
the support they receive from donors and improve their
capacity to provide services. In a chapter on advocacy
INGOs, she also argues that they can be effective
promoters of some human rights, but finds that INGOs
are less likely to succeed when global and local norms are
at odds and INGO agendas are biased toward their
international donors (Help or Harm, p. 196). Her analysis
of the human impact of INGOs ably incorporates
structural factors and individual agency. Structural con-
ditions do matter—for example, in countries with high
levels of corruption, rent-seeking INGOs are more likely
to flourish (ibid., p. 163)—but INGOs also make choices
about whether to send costly signals about their motiva-
tions, as when they choose to go through the onerous
process of applying for consultative status at the United
Nations. They come to difficult situations armed with
their own interests, and “good” and “bad” INGOs will
respond to social and political conditions quite differently.
Beyond political activism and service delivery, INGOs

also attempt to create and enforce new rules for global
governance. Green’s book examines when and how private
actors have authority in the environmental sector. State
preferences are important determinants of environmental
governance, Green explains, but there can be structural
openings that allow INGOs to govern using private
authority. Where private actors wield delegated authority,

140 Perspectives on Politics

Review Essay | The Agency and Authority of International NGOs

she argues, states must have collectively agreed to delegate
authority and agreed upon a specific agent; by contrast,
entrepreneurial authority is most likely to emerge when
state preferences are heterogeneous, leaving a regulatory
vacuum. Examining 152 multilateral environmental trea-
ties over a 150-year period, Green finds that states rarely
delegate to private actors. But entrepreneurial authority by
private actors has grown substantially; of the 119 envi-
ronmental civil regulations created between 1950 and
2009, almost 60% (69) were created in 2000 or later
(Rethinking Private Authority, p. 92). While Green does
not differentiate between firms and NGOs engaged in
environmental governance, she suggests that all private actors
bring particular strengths to the design of new rules. Private
actors, perhaps because of their small size, can promote
experimentation; they can build political support for new
regulatory models; they can use their expertise to inform
better rule-making; and competition among these different
rules may ratchet up regulations (ibid., pp. 174–76).
Whether private authority is in fact beneficial for environ-
mental protection depends on coordination among “rule
makers of all kinds” (ibid., p. 178)— INGOs and beyond.

The Authority of INGOs
Even though the books reviewed here show that the
ability of INGOs to draw attention to and command
policy space for their concerns attests to their power and
authority, we still lack a unified way to conceptualize why
and how they do. One promising move is to disaggregate
the different bases of authority for INGOs by explicitly
evaluating their audiences. Deborah Avant, Martha
Finnemore, and Susan Sell offer a useful typology of
forms of authority.18 Global governors, they argue, may
have five types of authority, and for each, some audience
has deferred to that governor. This authority allows these
actors to set agendas; make, implement, and enforce rules;
and then evaluate, monitor, and adjudicate outcomes.19

Using this typology, and drawing on the books under
review, we argue that INGOs enjoy three types of
authority—delegated, expert, and principled. First,
INGOs may act as delegated authorities when states or
intergovernmental organizations task them with monitor-
ing the implementation of treaties or delivering foreign
aid.20 Such delegation appears growing in the humanitar-
ian sector but rare in the environmental sector.21

Second, INGOs’ research and experiences in the field
translate into expert authority. INGOs make defensible
policy prescriptions using their specialized knowledge. For
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) claims expert knowledge on the treatment of
prisoners of war, and the access they have enjoyed as
a result has reinforced their authoritative status.22 Some-
times, working with epistemic communities, INGOs may
help define an issue and recommend solutions, as many
environmental INGOs do in their work alongside the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.23 Expert
authority allows INGOs to access media outlets and
policymakers, creating political salience and political
opportunities.24

Finally, principled authority is critical for INGOs.
Perhaps more so than others, this brand of authority is
both contested and more difficult to pinpoint precisely
because so many audiences might confer it on the basis of
various principles.25 As the discussion of organizational
motivations makes clear, INGOs may not in fact serve
others, but INGOs that appear to serve only private
interests lose their principled authority. The principled
authority of INGOs thus depends on the perceived
legitimacy of their claims, in which signaling (a la Murdie)
is critical to how organizations are viewed. Organizations
are legitimate in the eyes of a particular audience if that
audience agrees with the social purpose and practices of the
organization.26 Importantly, INGOs face many audiences.
As Bob illustrates in the case of gay rights proponents, an
INGO may be legitimate in the eyes of one audience but
wholly rejected by another.27

Setting aside broad structural processes, the authority
of INGOs rests on two important factors: their internal
capacities and their relations with external audiences. We
see three important tasks for future INGO research, all of
which are premised on the primacy of INGO agency.
First, at the risk of stating the obvious, INGOs are not all
the same; they share certain attributes but are not
interchangeable, and these differences shape the type
and level of authority that they enjoy.28 Second, in order
to better understand the effects of INGOs, we need a more
rigorous way to study and measure the relationships
between INGOs and multiple, distinct audiences. INGO
activity affects more than just states, including the
beneficiaries of INGO service-delivery activities.29 Third,
an agent-centered perspective on INGO authority neces-
sarily raises questions about whether INGOs are most
powerful individually or collectively. The INGO literature
has been an important focal point for discussions of the
power of networks (see “Lost” Causes, for example). Future
research on INGO networks must move more easily
between the study of network structures and the organi-
zational nodes. Our ability to address these questions turns
on the quality of organization- and network-level data on
INGOs—data that are inconsistent or nonexistent.

A focus on the differences in the level and scope
of INGO authority suggests new research questions.
Perhaps most importantly, the politics of interactions
among INGOs requires much more attention. Beyond
gatekeeping, we expect that powerful INGOs influence
other practices within the INGO sector as well, including
fund-raising strategies, program design, patterns of pro-
fessionalization, and networking practices. Just as firms
may imitate the new strategies of leaders in their fields,30

smaller or less competitive INGOs operating in highly

March 2016 | Vol. 14/No. 1 141

uncertain environments may follow their seemingly suc-
cessful peers.

A particularly pressing problem for INGO scholars is
the lack of rigorous and comparable data at the organi-
zation level across the global population of INGOs.
Murdie uses the Union of International Associations
Yearbook, which offers membership data over time at the
global level. Still, as she and others have explained, the
Yearbook indicators at the organizational level are self-
reported and unstandardized, with inconsistent categori-
zation of INGOs by subject matter and organizational
type. Generally, the most extensive data on individual
organizations are collected at the national level, but each
country has its own reporting requirements for charities.
Future INGO research depends on developing better
descriptive statistics of the global population under
examination.31

Conclusion
INGO research has come a long way from its origins. We
know a lot about how INGOs interact with states, and
the zero-sum conception of the ways in which states and
INGOs interact has been debunked, even if the reality of
the state—INGO relationship is not easily summarized.
The field remains split between those who see INGOs as
creative agents and those who understand them as role
players in larger dynamics. We see this tension as healthy,
but our sympathies lie with the former conception of
INGOs.

Future research needs to treat INGOs as diverse actors
worthy of study in themselves, as the three books
reviewed here do. This means taking into account their
internal organizational dynamics and external relation-
ships with their audiences. Without an understanding of
differences among INGOs, structural perspectives miss
the additional internal constraints that they face, as well
as the prospect that INGOs create structural change.
Without attention to the ideational and material environ-
ments in which INGOs operate, researchers risk advanc-
ing a triumphalist perspective that is increasingly distant
from the frustrating reality faced by INGOs on a global,
and increasingly crowded, stage. Indeed, we view this as
a natural progression of research that has strayed too far
into the stylized view of INGOs, or for that matter “civil
society actors,” treating such actors as interchangeable and
monolithic, rather than colorful and unique as their
Websites and branding materials suggest. In essence, we
are bringing the organization (the “O”) back in to the study
of INGOs, a turn that allows us to reach more deeply into
the real world of INGOs and offers the promise of
advancing theory and practice. IR has a long history of
stylization and specificity, as we see with studies of states,
where neorealists and neoliberals alike theorized generalized
state “interests” before bringing domestic politics into more
nuanced and contemporary theories of interstate politics.

Although we prioritize the agent-centric view of
INGOs, we understand that isolating the independent
effects of INGO advocacy on state policy is difficult. As
a practical matter, informants can be reluctant to assign
credit or blame to interest groups. In addition, we should
not mistake high volume of advocacy for policy influence.
As one view claims, the loudest INGOs are actually least
influential since they have “gone public” without chang-
ing policymakers’ attitudes.32 However, the latest research
reviewed here suggests that INGOs’ voices can be heard,
albeit not always by the same audiences and not always by
states. Carpenter’s work shows that other INGOs and
individual state officials are affected by the decisions of
gatekeepers in very direct ways. Green’s idea of entrepre-
neurial authority shows that vocal INGOs may be pushing
for new regulations rather than quietly implementing laws
as state delegates, thereby taking on new roles that affect
both governments and corporations. Murdie shows how
substate actors can be adversely affected by varying
intentions. Her research definitively demonstrates that
once we disaggregate the idea of “the state,” we can see
how INGOs affect the decision matrix and, at times, the
welfare of governments. These three works, and we hope
future projects, will show how audiences vary for different
INGOs, and furthermore, how these audiences differen-
tially affect and are affected by INGOs.
Several decades of scholarship have yielded an

incredibly rich depiction of INGO participation in global
politics. INGOs deliver billions of dollars’ worth of social
services around the world, pressure other “global gover-
nors” to live up to their commitments, and attempt to
reframe the basic values around which global politics
might be organized. This work involves constant contact
with sovereign states, a relationship that can be compet-
itive, collaborative, deferential, or disjointed. For individ-
ual INGOs, the capacity to govern and their ultimate
influence are shaped by their choices and their environ-
ment. A closer look at the relationship between INGOs’
strategic choices and the audiences that they seek to
influence can be practically useful while revealing the
complex nature of power and authority in global politics.

Notes
1 A fairly restrictive search on JSTOR (Journal Storage)
for “nongovernmental organization” yields 1,755
articles from 1922 to 2013. Seventy-seven percent of
the articles date from 1990 to the present. The exact
results are as follows: 117 (before 1970), 119
(1970–79), 160 (1980–89), 332 (1990–99), 793
(2000–2009), 234 (2010–13).

2 Barnett and Duvall 2005.
3 http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id523
(accessed April 29, 2014).

4 UIA, various years.
5 Büthe and Mattli 2011.

142 Perspectives on Politics

Review Essay | The Agency and Authority of International NGOs

6 Clark 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker,
and Sikkink 2002; Wapner 1995. For excellent
reviews, see Wapner 1995 and Price 2003.

7 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Lynch 2008.
8 Neumann and Sending 2010, 129.
9 Lipshutz 2005.
10 Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Dryzek 2012.
11 Busby 2010; Neumann and Sending 2010.
12 Barnett 2011; Nelson and Dorsey 2008; Wong 2012.
13 Clark 2001; Hopgood 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998;

Lynch 2008; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Wapner
1995. For self-interested conceptions, see Bob 2005;
Bloodgood 2011; Cooley and Ron 2002; Prakash and
Gugerty 2010; Sell and Prakash 2004.

14 Risse 2010, 288–89.
15 Bob 2005.
16 Including, and not limited to, the networks in support

of the International Criminal Court, against cluster
munitions, and in favor of the Arms Trade Treaty. For
a more comprehensive list, see Moyes and Nash 2011.

17 For the practitioner view, see Moyes and Nash 2011.
18 Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010.
19 Ibid., pp. 14–16.
20 In addition to Rethinking Private Authority, see Cooley

and Ron 2002.
21 Contrast Barnett 2011 to Rethinking Private Authority.
22 Finnemore 1996; Forsythe 2005.
23 Haas 2004.
24 Gourevitch, Lake, and Gross Stein 2012; Ron, Ramos,

and Rogers 2005; Wong 2012.
25 Hopgood 2009.
26 Thaut, Gross Stein, and Barnett 2012.
27 Bob 2012.
28 Stroup 2012; Wong 2012.
29 Barnett 2011.
30 Lieberman and Asaba 2006.
31 Bloodgood and Schmitz 2013.
32 Drezner 2008, 86.

References
Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor.
2001. “Introducing Global Civil Society.” In Global
Civil Society Yearbook 2001. London: Sage, 3–22.

Avant, Deborah D., Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.
Sell, eds. 2010. Who Governs the Globe? New York:
Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, Michael. 2011. Empire of Humanity: A History of
Humanitarianism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power
in International Politics.” International Organization
59 (1): 39–75.

Bloodgood, Elizabeth. 2011. “The Interest Group
Analogy.” Review of International Studies 37(1): 1–28.

Bloodgood, Elizabeth and Hans Peter Schmitz. 2013.
“The INGO Research Agenda.” In The Routledge
Handbook of International Organization, ed. Bob Reinalda.
London: Routledge.

Bob, Clifford. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion:
Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. New
York: Cambridge University Press.

. 2012. The Global Right Wing and the Clash of
World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Busby, Joshua. 2010. Moral Movements and Foreign Policy.
New York: Cambridge University Press.

Büthe, Tim and Walter Mattli. 2011. The New Global
Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Clark, Ann Marie. 2001. Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty
International and Changing Human Rights Norms.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cooley, Alexander and James Ron. 2002. “The NGO
Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political
Economy of Transnational Action.” International
Security 27(1): 5–39.

Drezner, Daniel. 2008. All Politics Is Global: Explaining
International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Dryzek, John. 2012. “Global Civil Society: The Progress
of Post-Westphalian Politics.” Annual Review of
Political Science 15: 101–19.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in
International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998.
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”
International Organization 52(4): 887–917.

Forsythe, David. 2005. “Naming and Shaming: The
Ethics of ICRC Discretion.” Millennium—Journal of
International Studies 34(1): 461–74.

Gourevitch, Peter, David Lake, and Janice Gross Stein,
eds. 2012. The Credibility of Transnational NGOs. New
York: Cambridge University Press.

Haas, Peter M. 2004. “Addressing the Global Governance
Deficit.” Global Environmental Politics 4(4): 1–15.

Hopgood, Stephen. 2006. Keepers of the Flame:
Understanding Amnesty International. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.

. 2009. “Moral Authority, Modernity, and the
Politics of the Sacred.” European Journal of International
Relations 15(2): 229–55.

Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists
Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Khagram, Sanjeev James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink,
eds. 2002. Restructuring World Politics. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.

Lieberman, Marvin and Shigeru Asaba. 2006. “Why Do
Firms Imitate Each Other?” Academy of Management
Review 31(2): 366–85.

March 2016 | Vol. 14/No. 1 143

Lipschutz, Ronnie. 2005. “Global Civil Society and
Global Governmentality.” In Power in Global
Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall.
New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lynch, Cecelia. 2008. “Reflexivity in Research on Civil
Society: Constructivist Perspectives.” International
Studies Review 10(4): 708–21.

Moyes, Richard and Thomas Nash. 2011. Global
Coalitions: An introduction to working in international
civil society partnerships. Article 36/ Action on Armed
Violence (AOAV). http://www.globalcoalitions.org
(accessed January 8, 2016).

Nelson, Paul J. and Ellen Dorsey. 2008. New Rights Advocacy.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Neumann, Iver and Ole Jacob Sending. 2010. Governing
the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Prakash, Aseem and Mary Kay Gugerty, eds. 2010.
Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action. New
York: Cambridge University Press.

Price, Richard. 2003. “Transnational Civil Society and Advo-
cacy in World Politics.” World Politics 55(4): 579–606.

Risse, Thomas. 2010. “Rethinking Advocacy Orgnizations?
A Critical Comment.” In Advocacy Organizations and
Collective Action, ed. Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay
Gugerty. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds.
1999. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and
Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ron, James, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rogers. 2005.
“Transnational Information Politics.” International
Studies Quarterly 49(3): 557–88.

Sell, Susan and Aseem Prakash. 2004. “Using Ideas
Strategically: The Contest Between Business
and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property
Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 48(1):
143–75.

Stroup, Sarah S. 2012. Borders Among Activists. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.

Thaut, Laura, Janice Gross Stein, and Michael Barnett.
2012. “In Defense of Virtue.” In The Credibility
of Transnational NGOs: When Virtue Is Not
Enough, ed. Peter Gourevitch, David A. Lake, and Janice
Gross Stein. New York: Cambridge University Press.

UIA (Union of International Associations). Various years.
Yearbook of International Associations. Brill.

Wapner, Paul. 1995. “Politics Beyond the State: Envi-
ronmental Activism and World Civic Politics.” World
Politics 47(3): 311–40.

Wong, Wendy H. 2012. Internal Affairs: How the
Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.

144 Perspectives on Politics

Review Essay | The Agency and Authority of International NGOs

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.

S
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A
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C
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IN
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F
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G
Y This Time Is

Different
W h y U.S. Foreign Policy
W ill Never Recover

Daniel W. Drezner

I
t is a truth universally acknowledged
that a foreign policy community
in possession of great power must

be in want of peace of mind. Climate
change, the Middle East, terrorism,
trade, nonproliferation—there is never
a shortage of issues and areas for those
who work in international relations
to fret about. If you were to flip through
the back issues of Foreign Affairs, you
would find very few essays proclaiming
that policymakers had permanently
sorted out a problem. Even after the Cold
War ended peacefully, these pages
were full of heated debate about civili
zations clashing.

It is therefore all too easy to dismiss
the current angst over U.S. President
Donald Trump as the latest hymn from
the Church of Perpetual Worry. This is
hardly the first time observers have
questioned the viability of a U.S.-led
global order. The peril to the West was
never greater than when the Soviet Union
launched Sputnik—until U.S. President
Richard Nixon ended the Bretton
Woods system. The oil shocks of the
1970s posed a grave threat to the liberal
international order—but then came the

DANIEL W. DREZNER is Professor o f In te rn a
tio n a l P o litics a t th e F le tch e r School o f Law and
D ip lo m a cy and a re g u la r c o n trib u to r to The
W ashington Post.

explosion of the U.S. budget and trade
deficits in the 1980s. The perpetrators of
the 9/11 attacks seemed like an existential
threat to the system—until the 2008
financial crisis. Now there is Trump. It is
worth asking, then, whether the current
fretting is anything new. For decades, the
sky has refused to fall.

But this time really is different. Just
when many of the sources of American
power are ebbing, many of the guardrails
that have kept U.S. foreign policy on
track have been worn down. It is tempt
ing to pin this degradation on Trump
and his retrograde foreign policy views,
but the erosion predated him by a good
long while. Shifts in the way Americans
debate and conduct foreign policy will
make it much more difficult to right the
ship in the near future. Foreign policy
discourse was the last preserve of
bipartisanship, but political polarization
has irradiated that marketplace of
ideas. Although future presidents will
try to restore the classical version of
U.S. foreign policy, in all likelihood, it
cannot be revived.

The American foundations undergird
ing the liberal international order
are in grave danger, and it is no longer
possible to take the pillars of that order
for granted. Think of the current
moment as a game of Jenga in which
multiple pieces have been removed but
the tower still stands. As a result, some
observers have concluded that the
structure remains sturdy. But in fact, it
is lacking many important parts and,
on closer inspection, is teetering ever so
slightly. Like a Jenga tower, the order
will continue to stand upright—right
until the moment it collapses. Every effort
should be made to preserve the liberal
international order, but it is also time to

1 0 F O R E I G N A F F A I R S

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/ T

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W
Y

O
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K
T

IM
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/
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E
D

U
X

This Time Is Different

Confidence man: Trump aboard A ir Force One in Maryland, October 2018

start thinking about what might come
after its end.

The gravity of the problem is dawning
on some members of the foreign policy
community. Progressives are debating
among themselves whether and how they
should promote liberal values abroad if
they should return to power. Conserva
tives are agonizing over whether the
populist moment represents a permanent
shift in the way they should think about
U.S. foreign policy. N either camp is
really grappling with the end of equilib
rium, howrever. The question is not what
U.S. foreign policy can do after Trump.
The question is whether there is any viable
grand strategy that can endure past an
election cycle.

THE GOOD OLD DAYS
In foreign policy failures garner more
attention than successes. D uring the
Cold War, the “loss of China,” the rise of

the Berlin Wall, the Vietnam War, the
energy crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis
all overshadowed the persistently effec
tive grand strategy of containment.
Only once the Soviet Union broke up
peacefully was the U nited States’ Cold
War foreign policy viewed as an over
arching success. Since then, the wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria,
along with the 2008 financial crisis and
the rise of populism, have dominated the
discussion. It is all too easy to conclude
that the United States’ recent foreign
policy has been an unmitigated disaster.

At the same time that all these
negative developments were taking place,
however, underlying trends were
moving in a more U.S.-friendly direction.
T he number of interstate wars and
civil wars was falling dramatically, as
was every other metric of international
violence. Democracy was spreading,
liberating masses of people from

May/June 2019 11

D a n ie l W. D re zn e r

tyranny. Globalization was accelerating,
slashing extreme poverty. The United
States could take a great deal of credit
for these gains, because the liberal order
it nurtured and expanded had laid
the foundations for decades of relative
peace and prosperity.

Washington made mistakes, of course,
such as invading Iraq and forcing
countries to remove restrictions on the
flow of capital across their borders.
As misguided as these errors were, and
as much as they alienated allies in the
moment, they did not permanently
weaken the United States’ position in
the world. U.S. soft power suffered in
the short term but recovered quickly
under the Obama administration. The
United States still managed to attract
allies, and in the case of the 2011
intervention in Libya, it was natq allies
begging Washington to use force, not
vice versa. Today, the United States has
more treaty allies than any other
country in the world—more, in fact,
than any country ever.

The United States was able to
weather the occasional misstep in large
part because its dominance rested on
such sturdy foundations. Its geographic
blessings are ample: bountiful natural
resources, two large oceans to the east
and the west, and two valued partners
to the north and the south. The country
has been so powerful for so long that
many of its capabilities seem to be
fundamental constants of the universe
rather than happenstance. The United
States has had the most powerful
military in the world since 1945, and its
economy, as measured by purchasing
power parity, became the biggest around
1870. Few people writing today about
international afFairs can remember a

time when the United States was not the
richest and most powerful country.

Long-term hegemony only further
embedded the United States’ advantage.
In constructing the liberal interna
tional order, Washington created an array
of multilateral institutions, from the
un Security Council to the World Bank,
that privileged it and key allies. Having
global rules of the game benefits
everyone, but the content of those rules
benefited the United States in particu
lar. The Internet began as an outgrowth
of a U.S. Department of Defense
initiative, providing to the United
States an outsize role in its governance.
American higher education attracts the
best of the best from across the world, as
do Silicon Valley and Hollywood, adding
billions of dollars to the U.S. economy.
An immigrant culture has constantly
replenished the country’s demographic
strength, helping the United States avoid
the aging problems that plague parts of
Europe and the Pacific Rim.

The United States has also benefited
greatly from its financial dominance.
The U.S. dollar replaced the British pound
sterling as the world’s reserve currency
75 years ago, giving the United States the
deepest and most liquid capital markets
on the globe and enhancing the reach
and efficacy of its economic statecraft.
In recent decades, Washington’s financial
might has only grown. Even though the
2008 financial crisis began in the Ameri
can housing market, the end result was
that the United States became more,
rather than less, central to global capital
markets. U.S. capital markets proved
to be deeper, more liquid, and better
regulated than anyone else’s. And even
though many economists once lost
sleep over the country’s growing budget

12 F O R E I G N A F F A I R S

This Time Is Different

deficits, that has turned out to be a non
crisis. Many now argue that the U.S.
economy has a higher tolerance for public
debt than previously thought.

Diplomatically, all these endowments
ensured that regardless of the issue at
hand, the United States was always
viewed as a reliable leader. Its dense and
enduring network of alliances and
partnerships signaled that the commit
ments Washington made were seen as
credible. American hegemony bred
resentment in some parts of the globe,
but even great-power rivals trusted
what the United States said in interna
tional negotiations.

At the same time as the international
system cemented the United States’
structural power, the country’s domestic
politics helped preserve a stable foreign
policy. A key dynamic was the push
and pull between different schools of
thought. An equilibrium was main
tained—between those who wanted the
country to adopt a more interventionist
posture and those who wanted to
husband national power, between those
who preferred multilateral approaches
and those who preferred unilateral ones.
When one camp overreached, others
would seize on the mistake to call for a
course correction. Advocates of restraint
invoked the excesses of Iraq to push
for retrenchment. Supporters of inter
vention pointed to the implosion of
Syria to argue for a more robust posture.

Thanks to the separation of powers
within the U.S. government, no one
foreign policy camp could accrue too
much influence. When the Nixon White
House pursued a strictly realpolitik
approach toward the Soviet Union,
Congress forced human rights concerns
onto the agenda. When the Obama

administration was leery of sanctioning
Iran’s central bank, congressional hawks
forced it to take more aggressive action.
Time and time again, U.S. foreign policy
reverted to the mean. Overreaching was
eventually followed by restraint.
Buck-passing led to leading. The results
of these crosscutting pressures were far
from perfect, but they ensured that U.S.
foreign policy did not deviate too far
from the status quo. Past commitments
remained credible into the future.

For decades, these dynamics, global
and domestic, kept crises from becoming
cataclysmic. U.S. foreign policy kept
swinging back into equilibrium. So what
has changed? Today, there is no more
equilibrium, and the structural pillars of
American power are starting to buckle.

THE NEW NORMAL
Despite the remarkable consistency
of U.S. foreign policy, behind the scenes,
some elements of American power
were starting to decline. As measured
by purchasing power parity, the United
States stopped being the largest econ
omy in the world a few years ago.
Its command of the global commons has
weakened as China’s and Russia’s asym
metric capabilities have improved.
The accumulation of “forever wars” and
low-intensity conflicts has taxed the
United States’ armed forces.

Outward consistency also masked the
dysfunction that was afflicting the
domestic checks on U.S. foreign policy.
For starters, public opinion has ceased
to act as a real constraint on decision
makers. Paradoxically, the very things that
have ensured U.S. national security—
geographic isolation and overwhelming
power—have also led most Americans
to not think about foreign policy, and

M a y/J u n e 2019 13

Daniel W. Drezner

rationally so. The trend began with the
switch to an all-volunteer military, in
1973, which allowed most of the public to
stop caring about vital questions of war
and peace. The apathy has only grown
since the end of the Cold War, and today,
poll after poll reveals that Americans
rarely, if ever, base their vote on foreign
policy considerations.

The marketplace of ideas has broken
down, too. The barriers to entry for
harebrained foreign policy schemes have
fallen away as Americans’ trust in
experts has eroded. Today, the United
States is in the midst of a debate about
whether a wall along its southern border
should be made of concrete, have see-
through slats, or be solar-powered.
The ability of experts to kill bad ideas
isn’t what it used to be. The cognoscenti
might believe that their informed opin
ions can steady the hands of successive
administrations, but they are operating
in hostile territory.

To be fair, the hostility to foreign
policy experts is not without cause. The
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya were massive screwups. Despite
what the experts predicted, globalization
has not transformed China into a
Jeffersonian democracy. The supposedly
infallible advice enshrined in the Wash
ington consensus ended up triggering
multiple financial crises. Economists and
foreign affairs advisers advocated
austerity, despite the pain it caused the
poor and the middle class, and consis
tently cried wolf about an increase
in interest rates that has yet to come.
No wonder both Barack Obama and
Trump have taken such pleasure in
bashing the Washington establishment.

Institutional checks on the presi
dent’s foreign policy prerogatives have

also deteriorated—primarily because
the other branches of government have
voluntarily surrendered them. The
passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930, which exacerbated the Great
Depression, showed that Congress
could not responsibly execute its consti
tutional responsibilities on trade. With
the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act, it delegated many of those powers
to the president, marking the beginning
of a sustained decline in congressional
oversight. More recently, political
polarization has rendered Congress a
dysfunctional, petulant mess, encour
aging successive administrations to
enhance the powers of the executive
branch. Nor has the judicial branch acted
as much of an impediment. The Su
preme Court has persistently deferred to
the president on matters of national
security, as it did in 2018 when it ruled
in favor of the Trump administration’s
travel ban.

Foreign policy analysts largely
celebrated this concentration of power
in the executive branch, and prior to
Trump, their logic seemed solid. They
pointed to the public’s ignorance of and
Congress’ lack of interest in interna
tional relations. As political gridlock and
polarization took hold, elected Demo
crats and Republicans viewed foreign
policy as merely a plaything for the next
election. And so most foreign policy
elites viewed the president as the last
adult in the room.

What they failed to plan for was the
election of a president who displays the
emotional and intellectual maturity of
a toddler. As a candidate, Trump gloried
in beating up on foreign policy experts,
asserting that he could get better results
by relying on his gut. As president, he

14 F O R E I G N A F F A I R S

has governed mostly by tantrum. He has
insulted and bullied U.S. allies. He
has launched trade wars that have accom
plished little beyond hurting the U.S.
economy. He has said that he trusts
Russian President Vladimir Putin more
than his own intelligence briefers. His
administration has withdrawn from an
array of multilateral agreements and bad-
mouthed the institutions that remain.
The repeated attacks on the eu and nato
represent a bigger strategic mistake
than the invasion of Iraq. In multiple
instances, his handpicked foreign policy
advisers have attempted to lock in
decisions before the president can sabo
tage them with an impulsive tweet. Even
when his administration has had the
germ of a valid idea, Trump has executed
the resulting policy shifts in the most
ham-handed manner imaginable.

Most of these foreign policy moves
have been controversial, counterproduc
tive, and perfectly legal. The same
steps that empowered the president to
create foreign policy have permitted
Trump to destroy what his predecessors
spent decades preserving. The other
branches of government endowed the
White House with the foreign policy
equivalent of a Ferrari; the current
occupant has acted like a child playing
with a toy car, convinced that he is
operating in a land of make-believe.

After Trump, a new president will no
doubt try to restore sanity to U.S. foreign
policy. Surely, he or she will reverse
the travel ban, halt the hostile rhetoric
toward long-standing allies, and end
the attacks on the world trading system.
These patches will miss the deeper
problem, however. Political polarization
has eroded the notion that presidents
need to govern from the center. Trump

K e n n e t h Y a m j g u c h i , P h . D .

Professor, C hem istry

J o in o u r g lo b a l c o m m u n i t y :

1 0 0 + c o u n t r ie s . 6 0 + la n g u a g e s .

NEW JERSEY
CITY U N IV E R S ITY

Daniel W. Drezner

has eviscerated that idea. The odds are
decent that a left-wing populist will
replace the current president, and then
an archconservative will replace that
president. The weak constraints on the
executive branch will only make things
worse. Congress has evinced little
interest in playing a constructive role
when it comes to foreign policy.
The public is still checked out on world
politics. The combination of worn-down
guardrails and presidents emerging
from the ends of the political spectrum
may well whipsaw U.S. foreign policy
between “America first” and a new
Second International. The very concept
of a consistent, durable grand strategy
will not be sustainable.

In that event, only the credulous will
consider U.S. commitments credible.
Alliances will fray, and other countries
will find it easier to flout global norms.
All the while, the scars of the Trump
administration will linger. The vagaries
of the current administration have
already forced a mass exodus of senior
diplomats from the State Department.
T hat human capital will be difficult to
replace. For the past two years, the
number of international students who
have enrolled in U.S. university degree
programs has fallen as nativism
has grown louder. It will take a while to
convince foreigners that this was a
tem porary spasm. After the Trum p
adm inistration withdrew from the Iran
nuclear deal, it forced s w i f t , the private-
sector network that facilitates interna
tional financial transactions, to comply
with unilateral U.S. sanctions against
Iran, spurring China, France, Germany,
Russia, and the U nited Kingdom to
create an alternative payment system.
T hat means little right now, but in the

long run, both U.S. allies and U.S. rivals
will learn to avoid relying on the dollar.

Perhaps most im portant, the Trum p
administration has unilaterally surren
dered the set of ideals that guided U.S.
policymakers for decades. It is entirely
proper to debate how much the U nited
States should prioritize the promotion
of human rights, democracy, and the rule
of law across the world. W hat should
be beyond debate, however, is that it is
worthwhile to promote those values
overseas and enshrine them at home.
Trum p’s ugly rhetoric makes a mockery
of those values. Although a future presi
dent might sound better on these issues,
both allies and rivals will remember the
current moment. The seeds of doubt
have been planted, and they will one
day sprout.

T he factors that give the United
States an advantage in the international
system—deep capital markets, liberal
ideas, world-class higher education—have
winner-take-all dynamics. O ther actors
will be reluctant to switch away from
the dollar, Wall Street, democracy, and
the Ivy League. These sectors can
w ithstand a few hits. Excessive use of
financial statecraft, alliances with overseas
populists, or prolonged bouts of anti
immigrant hysteria, however, will force
even close allies to start thinking about
alternatives. T he American advantage
in these areas will go bankrupt much like
Mike Campbell in The Sun Also Rises
did: “gradually and then suddenly.” Right
now, the United States’ Jenga tower is
still standing. Remove a few more
blocks, however, and the wobbling will
become noticeable to the unaided eye.

W hat would collapse look like? The
United States would remain a great
power, of course, but it would be an

16 F O R E I G N A F F A I R S

This Time Is Different

ordinary and less rich one. On an increas
ing number of issues, U.S. preferences
would carry minimal weight, as China
and Europe coordinated on a different
set of rules. Persistent domestic political
polarization would encourage Middle
Eastern allies, such as Israel and Saudi
Arabia, to line up with Republicans
and European allies, such as Germany and
the United Kingdom, to back Democrats.
The continued absence of any coherent
grand strategy would leave Latin America
vulnerable to a new Great Game as
other great powers vied for influence
there. Demographic pressures would tax
the United States, and the productivity
slowdown would make those pressures
even worse. Trade blocs would sap global
economic growth; reduced interdepen
dence would increase the likelihood
of a great-power war. Climate change
would be mitigated nationally rather than
internationally, leaving almost everyone
worse off.

WHAT, ME WORRY?
It would be delightful if, ten years from
now, critics mocked this essay’s mis
placed doom and gloom. The state
of U.S. foreign policy seemed dire a
decade ago, during the depths of the
financial crisis and the war in Iraq. That
turned out to be more of a blip than a
trend. It remains quite possible now
that Trump’s successor can repair the
damage he has wreaked. And it is worth
remembering that for all the flaws in
the U.S. foreign policy machine, other
great powers are hardly omnipotent.
China’s and Russia’s foreign policy
successes have been accompanied by
blowback, from pushback against infra
structure projects in Asia to a hostile
Ukraine, that will make it harder for

those great powers to achieve their
revisionist aims.

The trouble with “after Trump”
narratives, however, is that the 45th
president is as much a symptom of the ills
plaguing U.S. foreign policy as he is a
cause. Yes, Trump has made things much,
much worse. But he also inherited a
system stripped of the formal and infor
mal checks on presidential power. T hat’s
why the next president will need to
do much more than superficial repairs.
He or she will need to take the politically
inconvenient step of encouraging greater
congressional participation in foreign
policy, even if the opposing party is in
charge. Not every foreign policy initia
tive needs to be run through the De
fense Department. The next president
could use the bully pulpit to encourage
and embrace more public debate about
the United States’ role in the world.
Restoring the norm of valuing expertise,
while still paying tribute to the wisdom
of crowds, would not hurt either. Nor
would respecting democracy at home
while promoting the rule of law abroad.

All these steps will make the political
life of the next president more difficult.
In most Foreign Affairs articles, this is
the moment when the writer calls for
a leader to exercise the necessary
political will to do the right thing. That
exhortation always sounded implausible,
but now it sounds laughable. One hopes
that the Church of Perpetual Worry
does not turn into an apocalyptic cult.
This time, however, the sky may really
be falling.®

M a y / J u n e 2019 17

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Relations, Inc., all rights reserved. To request permission to reproduce additional copies of the
article(s) you will retrieve, please contact the Permissions and Licensing office of Foreign
Affairs.

Constructing International Politics
Author(s): Alexander Wendt
Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 71-81
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Constructing Alexander Wendt
biternational Politics

John J. Mearsheimer’s
“The False Promise of International Institutions”1 is welcome particularly in
two respects. First, it is the most systematic attempt to date by a neorealist to
address critical international relations (IR) theory.2 Second, it reminds neo-
liberals and critical theorists, normally locked in their own tug-of-war, that they
have a common, non-realist interest in the institutional bases of international
life.3 “False Promise” is likely, therefore, to spur productive discussions on all
sides.

Unfortunately, it will be hard for most critical theorists to take seriously a
discussion of their research program so full of conflations, half-truths, and
misunderstandings. However, to some extent misunderstanding is inevitable
when anthropologists from one culture first explore another. A dialogue be-
tween these two cultures is overdue, and “False Promise” is a good beginning.

Critical IR “theory,” however, is not a single theory It is a family of theo-
ries that includes postmodernists (Ashley, Walker), constructivists (Adler,
Kratochwil, Ruggie, and now Katzenstein), neo-Marxists (Cox, Gill), feminists
(Peterson, Sylvester), and others. What unites them is a concern with how
world politics is “socially constructed,”4 which involves two basic claims: that
the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than
strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures

Alexander Wendt is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University.

For their exceptionally detailed and helpful comments I am grateful to Mike Barnett, Mlada
Bukovansky, Bud Duvall, Peter Katzenstein, Mark Laffey, David Lumsdaine, Sylvia Maxfield, Nina
Tannenwald, Jutta Weldes, and the members of the Yale IR Reading Group.

1. John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.
19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95). Subsequent references appear in parentheses in the text.
2. Other efforts include Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,”
International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 287-304, and Markus Fischer, “Feudal
Europe, 800-1300,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-466.
3. On neoliberalism and critical theory, see Robert Keohane, “International institutions: Two ap-
proaches,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 379-396, and Wendt,
“Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, Vol.
88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396. Mearsheimer treats collective security as a third form of
institutionalism, but this is unwarranted. Collective security is an approach to international order,
arguable on either neoliberal or critical grounds, not a form of institutional analysis.
4. This makes them all “constructivist” in a broad sense, but as the critical literature has evolved,
this term has become applied to one particular school.

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81
( 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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International Security 20:1 | 72

shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim
that opposes rationalism). However, having these two claims in common no
more makes critical theory a single theory than does the fact that neorealism
and neoliberalism both use game theory makes them a single theory. Some
critical theorists are statists and some are not; some believe in science and some
do not; some are optimists and some pessimists; some stress process and some
structure.5 Thus, in my reply I speak only for myself as a “constructivist,”
hoping that other critical theorists may agree with much of what I say I address
four issues: assumptions, objective knowledge, explaining war and peace, and
policymakers’ responsibilities.

Assumptions

I share all five of Mearsheimer’s “realist” assumptions (p. 10): that interna-
tional politics is anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, cannot be
100 percent certain about others’ intentions, wish to survive, and are rational.
We even share two more: a commitment to states as units of analysis, and to
the importance of systemic or “third image” theorizing.

The last bears emphasis, for in juxtaposing “structure” to “discourse” and in
emphasizing the role of individuals in “critical theory” (p. 40), Mearsheimer
obscures the fact that constructivists are structuralists. Indeed, one of our main
objections to neorealism is that it is not structural enough: that adopting the
individualistic metaphors of micro-economics restricts the effects of structures
to state behavior, ignoring how they might also constitute state identities and
interests.6 Constructivists think that state interests are in important part con-

5. These are far more than differences of “emphasis,” as suggested by Mearsheimer’s disclaimer,
note 127.
6. “Constitute” is an important term in critical theory, with a special meaning that is not captured
by related terms like “comprise,” “consist of,” or “cause.” To say that “X [for example, a social
structure] constitutes Y [for example, an agent],” is to say that the properties of those agents are
made possible by, and would not exist in the absence of, the structure by which they are “consti-
tuted.” A constitutive relationship establishes a conceptually necessary or logical connection be-
tween X and Y, in contrast to the contingent connection between independently existing entities
that is established by causal relationships.
The identity-behavior distinction is partly captured by Robert Powell’s distinction between

preferences over outcomes and preferences over strategies; Robert Powell, “Anarchy in Interna-
tional Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344. The
main exception to the mainstream neglect of structural effects on state identity is Kenneth Waltz’s
argument that anarchy produces “like units”; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Read-
ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 74-77. Constructivists think there are more possibilities than
this; see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

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Constructing International Politics | 73

structed by systemic structures, not exogenous to them; this leads to a socio-
logical rather than micro-economic structuralism.

Where neorealist and constructivist structuralisms really differ, however, is
in their assumptions about what structure is made of. Neorealists think it is
made only of a distribution of material capabilities, whereas constructivists
think it is also made of social relationships. Social structures have three ele-
ments: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices.7

First, social structures are defined, in part, by shared understandings, expec-
tations, or knowledge. These constitute the actors in a situation and the nature
of their relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual. A security dilemma, for
example, is a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in
which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about
each others’ intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms.
A security community is a different social structure, one composed of shared
knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war.8
This dependence of social structure on ideas is the sense in which constructiv-
ism has an idealist (or “idea-ist”) view of structure. What makes these ideas
(and thus structure) “social,” however, is their intersubjective quality In other
words, sociality (in contrast to “materiality,” in the sense of brute physical
capabilities), is about shared knowledge.

Second, social structures include material resources like gold and tanks. In
contrast to neorealists’ desocialized view of such capabilities, constructivists
argue that material resources only acquire meaning for human action through
the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.9 For example,
500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5
North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United
States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of
shared understandings. As students of world politics, neorealists would prob-
ably not disagree, but as theorists the example poses a big problem, since it
completely eludes their materialist definition of structure. Material capabilities
as such explain nothing; their effects presuppose structures of shared knowl-
edge, which vary and which are not reducible to capabilities. Constructivism
is therefore compatible with changes in material power affecting social relations

7. What follows could also serve as a rough definition of “discourse.”
8. See Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957).
9. For a good general discussion of this point, see Douglas Porpora, “Cultural Rules and Material
Relations,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, No. 2 (July 1993), pp. 212-229.

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International Security 20:1 | 74

(cf. Mearsheimer, p. 43), as long as those effects can be shown to presuppose
still deeper social relations.

Third, social structures exist, not in actors’ heads nor in material capabilities,
but in practices. Social structure exists only in process. The Cold War was a
structure of shared knowledge that governed great power relations for forty
years, but once they stopped acting on this basis, it was “over.”

In sum, social structures are real and objective, not “just talk.” But this
objectivity depends on shared knowledge, and in that sense social life is “ideas
all the way down” (until you get to biology and natural resources). Thus, to
ask “when do ideas, as opposed to power and interest, matter?” is to ask the
wrong question. Ideas always matter, since power and interest do not have
effects apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such.10 The
real question, as Mearsheimer notes (p. 42), is why does one social structure
exist, like self-help (in which power and self-interest determine behavior),
rather than another, like collective security (in which they do not).

The explanatory as opposed to normative character of this question bears
emphasis. Constructivists have a normative interest in promoting social
change, but they pursue this by trying to explain how seemingly natural social
structures, like self-help or the Cold War, are effects of practice (this is the
“critical” side of critical theory). This makes me wonder about Mearsheimer’s
repeated references (I count fourteen) to critical theorists’ “goals,” “aims,” and
“hopes” to make peace and love prevail on Earth. Even if we all had such
hopes (which I doubt), and even if these were ethically wrong (though Mear-
sheimer seems to endorse them; p. 40), they are beside the point in evaluating
critical theories of world politics. If critical theories fail, this will be because
they do not explain how the world works, not because of their values. Empha-
sizing the latter recalls the old realist tactic of portraying opponents as utopians
more concerned with how the world ought to be than how it is. Critical
theorists have normative commitments, just as neorealists do, but we are also
simply trying to explain the world.

Objectivity

Mearsheimer suggests that critical theorists do not believe that there is an
objective world out there about which we can have knowledge (pp. 41ff). This
is not the case. There are two issues here, ontological and epistemological.

10. On the social content of interests, see Roy D’Andrade and Claudia Strauss, eds., Human Motives
and Cultural Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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Constructing International Politics | 75

The ontological issue is whether social structures have an objective existence,
which I addressed above. Social structures are collective phenomena that con-
front individuals as externally existing social facts. The Cold War was just as
real for me as it was for Mearsheimer.

The epistemological issue is whether we can have objective knowledge of
these structures. Here Mearsheimer ignores a key distinction between modern
and postmodern critical theorists. The latter are indeed skeptical about the
possibility of objective knowledge, although in their empirical work even they
attend to evidence and inference. Constructivists, however, are modernists who
fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence. In an
article cited by Mearsheimer, I advocated a scientific-realist approach to social
inquiry, which takes a very pro-science line.1″ And despite his claims, there is
now a substantial body of constructivist empirical work that embodies a
wholly conventional epistemology.12

Mearsheimer is right, however, that critical theorists do not think we can
make a clean distinction between subject and object. Then again, almost all
philosophers of science today reject such a naive epistemology All observation
is theory-laden in the sense that what we see is mediated by our existing
theories, and to that extent knowledge is inherently problematic. But this does
not mean that observation, let alone reality, is theory-determined. The world is
still out there constraining our beliefs, and may punish us for incorrect ones.
Montezuma had a theory that the Spanish were gods, but it was wrong, with
disastrous consequences. We do not have unmediated access to the world, but
this does not preclude understanding how it works.

Explaining War and Peace

Mearsheimer frames the debate between realists and critical theorists as one
between a theory of war and a theory of peace. This is a fundamental mistake.

11. See Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; and, for fuller discussion, Ian
Shapiro and Alexander Wendt, “The Difference that Realism Makes,” Politics and Society, Vol. 20,
No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 197-223.
12. See, among others, Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 271-296; David Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in Interna-
tional Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The
State and the Nation,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 107-130; Rey
Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwilj, “Understanding Change in International Politics,” Interna-
tional Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-248; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber,
eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming);
and Peter Katzenstein, ed., Constructing National Security (working title), forthcoming.

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International Security 20:1 | 76

Social construction talk is like game theory talk: analytically neutral between
conflict and cooperation.”3 Critical theory does not predict peace.14 War no
more disproves critical theory than peace disproves realism. The confusion
stems from conflating description and explanation.

The descriptive issue is the extent to which states engage in practices of
realpolitik (warfare, balancing, relative-gains seeking) versus accepting the rule
of law and institutional constraints on their autonomy States sometimes do
engage in power politics, but this hardly describes all of the past 1300 years,
and even less today, when most states follow most international law most of
the time,15 and when war and security dilemmas are the exception rather than
the rule, Great Powers no longer tend to conquer small ones, and free trade is
expanding rather than contracting.16 The relative frequency of realpolitik, how-
ever, has nothing to do with “realism.” Realism should be seen as an explana-
tion of realpolitik, not a description of it. Conflating the two makes it impossible
to tell how well the one explains the other, and leads to the tautology that war
makes realism true. Realism does not have a monopoly on the ugly and brutal
side of international life. Even if we agree on a realpolitik description, we can
reject a realist explanation.

The explanatory issue is why states engage in war or peace. Mearsheimer’s
portrayal of constructivist “causal logic” on this issue is about 30 percent right.
The logic has two elements, structure and agency. On the one hand, construc-
tivist theorizing tries to show how the social structure of a system makes
actions possible by constituting actors with certain identities and interests, and
material capabilities with certain meanings. Missing from Mearsheimer’s ac-
count is the constructivist emphasis on how agency and interaction produce
and reproduce structures of shared knowledge over time. Since it is not possi-
ble here to discuss the various dynamics through which this process takes
place,17 let me illustrate instead. And since Mearsheimer does not offer a

13. On the social basis of conflict, see Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955). This is also why I prefer to avoid the term “institutionalism,” since
it associates sociality with peace and cooperation.
14. Fischer’s suggestion that critical theory predicts cooperation in feudal Europe is based on a
failure to understand the full implications of this point; see Fischer, “Feudal Europe, 800-1300.”
15. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1979), p. 47.
16. On the inadequacy of “realist” descriptions of international politics, see Paul Schroeder, “His-
torical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp.
108-148.
17. For a start, see Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation,” and Emanuel Adler, “Cog-
nitive Evolution,” in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 43-88. The best introduction to proc-
esses of social construction remains Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).

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Constructing International Politics | 77

neorealist explanation for inter-state cooperation, conceding that terrain to
institutionalists, let me focus on the “hard case” of why states sometimes get
into security dilemmas and war, that is, why they sometimes engage in real-
politik behavior.

In “Anarchy is What States Make of It” I argued that such behavior is a
self-fulfilling prophecy,18 and that this is due to both agency and social struc-
ture. Thus, on the agency side, what states do to each other affects the social
structure in which they are embedded, by a logic of reciprocity If they milita-
rize, others will be threatened and arm themselves, creating security dilemmas
in terms of which they will define egoistic identities and interests. But if they
engage in policies of reassurance, as the Soviets did in the late 1980s, this will
have a different effect on the structure of shared knowledge, moving it toward
a security community. The depth of interdependence is a factor here, as is the
role of revisionist states, whose actions are likely to be especially threatening.
However, on the structural side, the ability of revisionist states to create a war
of all against all depends on the structure of shared knowledge into which they
enter. If past interactions have created a structure in which status quo states
are divided or naive, revisionists will prosper and the system will tend toward
a Hobbesian world in which power and self-interest rule. In contrast, if past
interactions have created a structure in which status quo states trust and
identify with each other, predators are more likely to face collective security
responses like the Gulf War.19 History matters. Security dilemmas are not acts
of God: they are effects of practice. This does not mean that once created they
can necessarily be escaped (they are, after all, “dilemmas”), but it puts the
causal locus in the right place.

Contrast this explanation of power politics with the “poverty of neoreal-
ism.”20 Mearsheimer thinks it significant that in anarchy, states cannot be 100
percent certain that others will not attack. Yet even in domestic society, I can-
not be certain that I will be safe walking to class. There are no guarantees in
life, domestic or international, but the fact that in anarchy war is possible does
not mean “it may at any moment occur.'”21 Indeed, it may be quite unlikely, as
it is in most interactions today Possibility is not probability Anarchy as such

18. A similar argument is developed in John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
19. On the role of collective identity in facilitating collective security, see Wendt, “Collective
Identity Formation.”
20. Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring
1984), pp. 225-286.
21. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 232.

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International Security 20:1 | 78

is not a structural cause of anything. What matters is its social structure, which
varies across anarchies. An anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies, one
of self-help from one of collective security, and these are all constituted by
structures of shared knowledge. Mearsheimer does not provide an argument
for why this is wrong; he simply asserts that it is.

Other realist explanations for power politics fare somewhat better. Although
neorealists want to eschew arguments from human nature, even they would
agree that to the extent human-beings-in-groups are prone to fear and compe-
tition, it may predispose them to war.22 However, this factor faces countervail-
ing dynamics of interdependence and collective identity formation, which
sometimes overcome it. The distribution of material capabilities also matters,
especially if offense is dominant, and military build-ups will of course concern
other states. Again, however, the meaning of power depends on the underlying
structure of shared knowledge. A British build-up will be less threatening to
the United States than a North Korean one, and build-ups are less likely to
occur in a security community than in a security dilemma.

In order to get from anarchy and material forces to power politics and war,
therefore, neorealists have been forced to make additional, ad hoc assumptions
about the social structure of the international system. We see this in Mear-
sheimer’s interest in “hyper-nationalism,” Stephen Walt’s emphasis on ideol-
ogy in the “balance of threat,” Randall Schweller’s focus on the status
quo-revisionist distinction and, as I argued in my “Anarchy” piece, in Waltz’s
assumption that anarchies are self-help systems.23 Incorporating these assump-
tions generates more explanatory power, but how? In these cases the crucial
causal work is done by social, not material, factors. This is the core of a
constructivist view of structure, not a neorealist one.

The problem becomes even more acute when neorealists try to explain the
relative absence of inter-state war in today’s world. If anarchy is so determin-
ing, why are there not more Bosnias? Why are weak states not getting killed
off left and right? It stretches credulity to think that the peace between Norway
and Sweden, or the United States and Canada, or Nigeria and Benin are all
due to material balancing. Mearsheimer says cooperation is possible when core
interests are not threatened (p. 25), and that “some states are especially friendly

22. For a good argument to this effect, see Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International
Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995).
23. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990),
pp. 5-56; Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Randall
Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1
(March 1993), pp. 73-103; and Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It.”

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Constructing International Politics | 79

for historical or ideological reasons” (p. 31). But this totally begs the question
of why in an ostensibly “realist” world states do not find their interests
continually threatened by others, and the question of how they might become
friends. Perhaps Mearsheimer would say that most states today are status quo
and sovereign.24 But again this begs the question. What is sovereignty if not
an institution of mutual recognition and non-intervention? And is not being
“status quo” related to the internalization of this institution in state interests?
David Strang has argued that those states recognized as sovereign have better
survival prospects in anarchy than those that are not.25 Far from challenging
this argument, Mearsheimer presupposes it.

Neorealists’ growing reliance on social factors to do their explanatory work
suggests that if ever there were a candidate for a degenerating research pro-
gram in IR theory, this is it.26 The progressive response (in the Lakatosian sense)
would be to return to realism’s materialist roots by showing that the back-
ground understandings that give capabilities meaning are caused by still
deeper material conditions, or that capabilities have intrinsic meaning that
cannot be ignored. To show that the material base determines international
superstructure, in other words, realists should be purging their theory of social
content, not adding it as they are doing.27 And anti-realists, in turn, should be
trying to show how the causal powers of material facts presuppose social
content, not trying to show that institutions explain additional variance beyond
that explained by the distribution of power and interest, as if the latter were a
privileged pre-social baseline.

Responsibility

An important virtue of “False Promise” is that it links neorealism and its rivals
to the ethical responsibilities of foreign policymakers. These responsibilities

24. Mearsheimer and Waltz both assume sovereignty, without acknowledging its institutional
character; see Mearsheimer, “False Promise,” p. 11, and Waltz, Theory of International Politics,
pp. 95-96.
25. David Strang, “Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion,” International
Organization, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 143-162.
26. “Degenerating” problem shifts are adjustments to a theory that are ad hoc, while “progressive”
shifts are those that have a principled basis in its hard core assumptions. See Imre Lakatos,
“Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Lakatos and Alan
Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), pp. 91-196.
27. The significance of Dan Deudney’s work lies partly in his appreciation of this point; see Dan
Deudney, “Dividing Realism: Structural Realism versus Security Materialism on Nuclear Security
and Proliferation,” Security Studies, Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3 (1993), pp. 7-37.

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International Security 20:1 | 80

depend in part on how much it is possible to change the structure of shared
knowledge within anarchy If such change is impossible, then Mearsheimer is
right that it would be irresponsible for those charged with national security to
pursue it. On the other hand, if it is possible, then it would be irresponsible to
pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders, especially if we care
about the well-being of future generations.

To say that structures are socially constructed is no guarantee that they can
be changed.28 Sometimes social structures so constrain action that transforma-
tive strategies are impossible. This goes back to the collective nature of social
structures; structural change depends on changing a system of expectations
that may be mutually reinforcing. A key issue in determining policymakers’
responsibilities, therefore, is how much “slack” a social structure contains.
Neorealists think there is little slack in the system, and thus states that deviate
from power politics will get punished or killed by the “logic” of anarchy
Institutionalists think such dangers have been greatly reduced by institutions
such as sovereignty and the democratic peace, and that there is therefore more
possibility for peaceful change.

The example of Gorbachev is instructive in this respect, since the Cold War
was a highly conflictual social structure. I agree with Mearsheimer (p. 46) that
Soviet nuclear forces gave Gorbachev a margin of safety for his policies. Yet
someone else in his place might have found a more aggressive solution to a
decline in power. What is so important about the Gorbachev regime is that it
had the courage to see how the Soviets’ own practices sustained the Cold War,
and to undertake a reassessment of Western intentions. This is exactly what a
constructivist would do, but not a neorealist, who would eschew attention to
such social factors as naive and as mere superstructure. Indeed, what is so
striking about neorealism is its total neglect of the explanatory role of state
practice.29 It does not seem to matter what states do: Brezhnev, Gorbachev,
Zhirinovsky, what difference does it make? The logic of anarchy will always
bring us back to square one. This is a disturbing attitude if realpolitik causes
the very conditions to which it is a response; to the extent that realism counsels
realpolitik, therefore, it is part of the problem. Mearsheimer says critical theorists

28. Hence, contra Mearsheimer, there is nothing problematic about the fact that critical theorists
do not make predictions about the future. What happens in the future depends on what actors do
with the structures they have made in the past.
29. This is not true of classical realists; for a sympathetic discussion of the latter from a critical
standpoint, see Richard Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (June 1981), pp. 204-237.

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Constructing International Politics | 81

are “intolerant” of realists for this reason (p. 42). The ironies of this suggestion
aside, what matters is getting policymakers to accept responsibility for solving
conflicts rather than simply managing or exploiting them. If neorealism can
move us in that direction, then it should, but as I see it, neorealist ethics come
down to “sauve qui peut.”

To analyze the social construction of international politics is to analyze how
processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures-coopera-
tive or conflictual-that shape actors’ identities and interests and the sig-
nificance of their material contexts. It is opposed to two rivals: the materialist
view, of which neorealism is one expression, that material forces per se deter-
mine international life, and the rational choice-theoretic view that interaction
does not change identities and interests. Mearsheimer’s essay is an important
opening to the comparative evaluation of these hypotheses. But neorealists will
contribute nothing further to the debate so long as they think that construc-
tivists are subversive utopians who do not believe in a real world and who
expect peace in our time.

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Article Contents

p. 71
p. 72
p. 73
p. 74
p. 75
p. 76
p. 77
p. 78
p. 79
p. 80
p. 81

Issue Table of Contents

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 1-195
Front Matter [pp. ]
Editors’ Note [pp. 3-4]
Democratization and the Danger of War [pp. 5-38]
Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory [pp. 39-51]
The Promise of Collective Security [pp. 52-61]
The False Premise of Realism [pp. 62-70]
Constructing International Politics [pp. 71-81]
A Realist Reply [pp. 82-93]
Guidance from Above
New Satellite Images for Sale [pp. 94-125]
The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits [pp. 126-148]
In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia [pp. 149-181]
Correspondence
History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look [pp. 182-195]
Correction: Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia [pp. 195]
Back Matter [pp. ]

Escobar 1
Escobar 2
Escobar 3

The “Third” United Nations

Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis,

and Richard Jolly

Analysts usually identify two United Nations, one composed of member
states and a second composed of the secretariats. A third UN should also
be recognized, composed of actors that are closely associated with the
world organization but not formally part of it. This “outside-insider” UN
includes nongovernmental organizations, academics, consultants, experts,
independent commissions, and other groups of individuals. These informal
networks often help to effect shifts in ideas, policies, priorities, and prac-
tices that are initially seen as undesirable or problematic by governments
and international secretariats. KEYWORDS: United Nations, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, intellectual history, networks, international secretariats.

R
esearch and oral histories from the United Nations Intellectual History
Project (UNIHP) demonstrate that ideas, one of the UN’s most im-
portant legacies, have made a substantial contribution to international

society.1 This work also suggests that the concept of a “third UN” should be
added to our analytical toolkit in order to move beyond Inis Claude’s clas-
sic twofold distinction between the world organization as an intergovern-
mental arena and as a secretariat.2

This “additional” UN consists of certain nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), external experts, scholars, consultants, and committed citizens who
work closely with the UN’s intergovernmental machinery and secretariats.
The third UN’s roles include advocacy, research, policy analysis, and idea
mongering. Its elements often combine forces to put forward new informa-
tion and ideas, push for new policies, and mobilize public opinion around
UN deliberations and operations. Critics might disagree and regard our per-
spective as quite orthodox.3 However, in our view, informed scholars, prac-
titioners, and activists have a value-added and comparative advantage within
intergovernmental contexts to push intellectual and policy envelopes. These
circles—a third UN—are independent of and provide essential inputs into
the other two UNs. Such “outside-insiders” are an integral part of today’s
United Nations. What once seemed marginal for international relations now
is central to multilateralism.

We begin by situating the notion of a third UN among broader schol-
arly efforts to reconceptualize multilateralism before briefly examining
Claude’s two traditional components. We then consider the contributions of
the third UN concept by exploring key definitional questions and parsing its

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membership and interactive dynamics in the world organization. Finally, we
spell out why the idea of a third UN is significant for the theory and prac-
tice of international organization and propose an agenda for future research.

New Multilateralisms and Public Policy Networks
The notion of a three-faceted UN is a contribution to the challenge of the-
orizing contemporary global governance. It builds on a growing body of
work that calls for a conception of “multiple multilateralisms.”4

Why bring forward this idea now? After all, networks of diplomats and
professionals are hardly new. Although major governments have resisted
the influence of nonstate actors and, particularly, civil society organiza-
tions, parts of the UN system have long engaged them and drawn on aca-
demic expertise located outside the system. The International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO) has incorporated representatives of trade unions and the
business sector into its tripartite structure since 1919. NGOs have been sig-
nificant for advances in ideas, norms, and policies at the UN beginning
with advocacy for the inclusion of human rights in the UN Charter in 1945
and for the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three
years later. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has long had
close interactions with civil society groups for a wide range of children’s is-
sues and for fund-raising and advocacy. The United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations De-
velopment Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have interacted with national com-
mittees consisting of academics and NGOs. Indeed, most parts of the UN
have drawn on academic or professional expertise located outside the system.

A growing number of authors have attempted to conceptualize the phe-
nomenon of nonstate actors, especially NGOs, as they intersect with the
United Nations.5 The number of nonofficial groups involved has grown dra-
matically, while the density of globalization has meant that communications
and technological developments have increased the reach of their voices as
well as their decibel levels.

Adopting the notion of the third UN is a sharper way to depict inter-
actions in and around the world organization than employing the usual three-
fold vocabulary of state, market, and civil society. This terminology res-
onates for students of international organization who were raised on Claude’s
framework, including much of the Global Governance readership. More-
over, beyond the United Nations there could also be a third European Union
(EU), a third Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and so on. However, the data and argument presented here relate
more specifically to the UN.

Why have analysts relatively neglected—or often resisted address-
ing—something that seems so obvious? Part of the answer lies in difficult

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definitional questions about an amorphous, fluid, and ill-defined group of
actors who engage with the United Nations at various levels, at various
times, and on various issues. Patterns are hard to grasp, and many of the in-
teractions are ad hoc. Which groups should be included? Should one exam-
ine all NGOs and all academics? Where does one draw the line? Would it
make more sense to focus on policy orientations rather than on sectors of
actors? Once in, are actors forever part of the third UN, or do they move in
and out depending on the issue, their influence, or the calendar? This arti-
cle is another step in conceptualizing global governance in terms of free-
flowing networks rather than rigid formal structures.6

Most social scientists—development economists, students of compara-
tive politics, sociologists, and anthropologists—have long recognized the
empirical and theoretical importance of nonstate actors. However, this in-
sight largely eluded international relations (IR) specialists who, with their
preoccupation with issues of sovereignty and with the UN’s being com-
posed of member states, tended to minimize or even ignore interactions
with nonstate actors and their influence on decisionmaking. Beginning in
the 1970s with Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,7 the growing presence and
activities of actors other than states have gradually forced many main-
stream IR theorists to pry open the lid on the black box of state-centric
theories of international organization. Realists remain unreconstructed in
this regard. But with issues as varied as gender and climate change mov-
ing into the limelight on the international agenda, largely as a result of
efforts by nonstate actors, and despite the recalcitrance of many states and
international civil servants, it is imperative to better understand the impact
of the third UN.

The First and the Second UN
Unsurprisingly, the first UN and the second UN have long provided the prin-
cipal grist for analytical mills about the world organization. After all, mem-
ber states—51 in June 1945 and 192 today—establish the priorities and pay
the bills, more or less, thus determining what the world body does. Inter-
national civil servants would not exist without member states, nor could a
permanent institution of member states operate without a secretariat.

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore distinguish five roles for the
first UN: “as an agent of great powers doing their bidding; as a mechanism
for interstate cooperation; as a governor of international society of states; as
a constructor of the social world; and as a legitimation forum.”8 States pur-
sue national interests in this arena, which varies from “high politics” in the
Security Council to “low politics” in the boards and governing councils of
UN funds and specialized agencies. States caucus in regional groups for the
General Assembly and in smaller groups for numerous issues. Notions of

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the first UN find a home in virtually all IR theory: for a realist emphasizing
self-interested states within an anarchical system; for a liberal institutional-
ist looking for a stage where states pursue mutual interests and reduce
transaction costs; for a proponent of the English School seeking to foster
shared norms and values in an international society; for a constructivist
looking for a creative agent for ideational change and identity shaping; and
for a pragmatist seeking a place to legitimate specific values and actions.

The second UN is also a distinct sphere, consisting of career and long-
serving staff members who are paid through assessed and voluntary con-
tributions. This international civil service is a legacy of the League of
Nations. Article 101 of the UN Charter calls for a core of officials to tackle
international problems. A leading advocate for the second UN was Dag
Hammarskjöld. His May 1961 speech at Oxford does not ignore the reality
that the international civil service exists to carry out decisions made by
states; but it emphasizes that a UN official could and should pledge alle-
giance to striving for a larger collective good, rather than defending the
interests of the country that issues his or her passport.9 The practice of
reserving senior UN positions for former high-level officials approved by
their home governments undermines the integrity of secretariats. Moreover,
a shadow today hangs over the UN Secretariat as a result of corruption in the
Oil-for-Food Programme, sexual exploitation by peacekeepers, and the Staff
Council’s vote of no-confidence in the secretary-general in May 2006.

Nonetheless, a basic idealism continues to animate the second UN. The
likes of Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart indicate that autonomy and in-
tegrity are realistic expectations of international civil servants.10 Today’s pro-
fessional and support staff number approximately 55,000 in the UN proper
and another 20,000 in the specialized agencies. This number excludes tem-
porary staff in peace operations (about 100,000 in 2007) and the staff of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group (another 15,000).
These figures represent substantial growth from the 500 employees in the
UN’s first year at Lake Success and the peak total of 700 staff employed by
the League of Nations.11

The second UN does more than simply carry out marching orders from
governments. UN officials also present ideas to tackle problems, debate
them formally and informally with governments, take initiatives, advocate
for change, turn general decisions into specific programs of action, and work
for implementation. None of this should surprise. It would be a strange and
impotent national civil service whose staff took no initiatives or showed no
leadership, simply awaiting instructions from the government in power. The
second UN is no different, except that the formal decisionmakers are gov-
ernment representatives on boards meeting quarterly, annually, or even bi-
ennially. With the exception of the Security Council, decisionmaking and re-
sponsibility for implementation in most parts of the UN system, especially

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the development funds and specialized agencies, depend in large part on the
executive head or a staff member of the second UN.

What Is the Third UN?
From the outset, nonstate actors have been active in UN corridors and field
projects. The Charter’s 1945 Preamble opened with a clarion call from “We
the Peoples of the United Nations,” when one might have expected “We the
Representatives of Sovereign Member States.” Article 71 explicitly made
room for NGOs in UN debates. Nonetheless, the extent to which nonstate
actors are now routinely part of what passes for “international” relations by
“intergovernmental” organizations is striking.

Involvement of NGOs has been a routine part of all UN-sponsored
global conferences since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, when the conference secretary-general, Maurice Strong, in-
sisted on their presence. NGO parallel meetings, usually called “forums,”
have become a prominent fixture of deliberations and have been an impor-
tant force in pressing for more forward-looking policies. For the Millennium
Summit and the 2005 World Summit, special hearings involving NGOs were
organized in advance.

Although the terminology may sound odd, it is appropriate to refer to
such networks as a “third United Nations.” Many individuals who have
played an essential role in the world organization’s intellectual and norm-
building activities were neither government officials nor international civil
servants. Moreover, many key contributors to ideas as members of the first
and the second UN had significant prior associations with a university, a
policy think tank, or an NGO—or joined one after leaving government or
UN service. Many individuals have served as members or chairs of inde-
pendent panels and commissions that examined emerging problems not yet
on the international radar screen. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change is a prominent example. Many also served as staff or board mem-
bers of NGOs, and most have attended ad hoc global conferences that pull
together a range of actors on the international stage.

We define the third UN as comprising NGOs, academics, consultants,
experts, independent commissions, and other groups of individuals that rou-
tinely engage with the first and the second UN and thereby influence UN
thinking, policies, priorities, and actions. The key characteristic for this third
sphere is its independence from governments and UN secretariats. Thus, leg-
islators in Parliamentarians for Global Action as well as local governmental
officials in United Cities and Local Governments would be part of the third
UN by virtue of their position outside the executive branch of government.

Deciding who is in or out of the third UN depends on the issue and the
period in question. But the third UN consists of “outsiders”—that is, persons

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who are not on the regular payroll of a government or a secretariat—who
complement the “insiders” of the other two United Nations in collective
efforts to generate, debate, implement, and disseminate ideas and programs.
That said, the distinction between outsiders and insiders can blur in the case
of many prominent individuals who move in and out of institutions through
a “revolving door.”

At the same time, it is essential to distinguish persons who are neither
government representatives nor international civil servants when they make
certain contributions to the UN. Outsiders are often better placed to be more
adventuresome and critical. Anyone who has attended a UN-sponsored
global conference is quite aware that Secretariat staffers who organize these
meetings are joined not only by representatives of governments who make
decisions, but also by a legion of NGOs, think tanks, and academics. The
Beijing conference on women in 1995 perhaps illustrated this interaction
most visibly.12 The same is true of the board meetings of many UN funds,
programs, and specialized agencies.

In spite of the Global Compact and other schemes for “corporate social
responsibility,” we do not include the for-profit sector in the third UN. The
primary focus of business is not on any larger community of interests, but
on financial bottom lines. Companies also have relatively little direct in-
teraction with the first and the second UN in the context of the organiza-
tion’s policy formulation and project execution.13 Business groups that pro-
mote fair trade or microcredit, for instance, are better considered as NGOs.
The same holds for corporate-centered NGOs such as the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development and the World Economic Forum.

The mass media that follow UN activities often have an impact on in-
ternational thinking and action. However, their primary role as a category
of actors in global governance is to report on and not to alter policy. For
this reason we do not include media organizations within the third UN. On
the other hand, investigative journalists and columnists who are in the opin-
ion business can be aptly considered part of the third UN as influential in-
dividuals, like scholars and policy analysts.

In brief, then, three main groups of nonofficial actors compose the third
UN: nongovernmental organizations; academics and expert consultants; and
independent commissions of eminent persons. None of these subgroupings
is monolithic. The importance of particular individuals and organizations in
multiactor policymaking or project execution varies by issue and over time.
Thus “membership” in the third UN is temporary and contingent.

Eight roles played collectively by the first, second, and third UNs can
be summarized as: providing a forum for debate; generating ideas and poli-
cies; legitimating ideas and policies; advocating for ideas and policies; im-
plementing or testing ideas and policies in the field; generating resources to

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pursue ideas and policies; monitoring progress in the march of ideas and
the implementation of policies; and occasionally burying ideas and policies.
As is elaborated in subsequent sections, the importance of each role and the
importance of each of the three UNs in those roles varies depending on how
new a particular policy approach is at a given moment, and how much it
flies in the face of strong national or regional interests and received wisdom.

Intellectual energies among the three UNs blend. Indeed, there is often
synergy. A revolving door turns as academics and national political actors
move inside to take staff positions in UN secretariats, or UN staff members
leave to join NGOs, universities, or national office and subsequently en-
gage from outside, but are informed by experience inside. Primary loyalties
to, or location in, one of the three UNs provide strategic and tactical ad-
vantages and disadvantages, which give these analytical distinctions their
importance.

Nongovernmental Organizations
In the last six decades, there has been a dramatic growth in the role and in-
fluence of NGOs in UN corridors as elsewhere. The result is a qualitatively
different debate than would take place without their inputs. “I think life
would be duller without the NGOs, and there would probably be much less
point to it also,” said Viru Dayal, the former chef de cabinet of two UN sec-
retaries-general. “Besides, civil society knows where the shoe pinches.
They know when to laugh and they know when to cry.”14

Most UN global meetings attract NGO participants, and in large num-
bers. Usually the scenario does not resemble the Seattle Ministerial Con-
ference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 1999, when tens of
thousands of protesters filled the streets. In fact, most involvements by the
third UN are more peaceful and more supportive of the other two UNs.
While estimates vary because of different ways that delegates are counted,
the orders of magnitude are striking. The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 had
some 17,000 nongovernmental participants, the Fourth World Conference
on Women in Beijing in 1995 drew some 32,000 (including 5,000 Chinese),
and UNICEF’s World Summit for Children in New York in 1990 stirred
over a million people worldwide to join in candlelight vigils.15

Commentators rightly emphasize the last few decades of NGO growth,
but the phenomenon has been gaining momentum over two centuries, begin-
ning with the antislavery movement late in the eighteenth century.16 Before
and during the San Francisco conference in 1945, US-based private actors
of the third UN were especially visible, including forty-two consultants
officially recognized by Washington, plus some 160 other observers from
diverse NGOs, including religious groups.17

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The Cold War slowed the growth of nonstate actor participation in the
UN. The communist bloc and many totalitarian developing countries resisted
independent and dissident voices. NGOs in such places were essentially an
extension of the state and its views, which prompted the ugly acronym
GONGO (government-organized NGO). Indeed, there are still so-called
NGOs in repressive countries that are anything but nongovernmental. Purists
would also point to problems when democratic governments provide sub-
stantial funding to NGOs, even if few visible strings are attached. Moisés
Naím’s proposal for a credible rating agency to evaluate the backers, inde-
pendence, goals, and track records of NGOs is intriguing,18 as is the signa-
ture in 2006 of an Accountability Charter by eleven of the world’s leading
international NGOs in the fields of human rights, environment, and social
development.19 Since the thaw in East-West relations and the changing bal-
ance between markets and states, human rights advocates, gender activists,
development specialists, and groups of indigenous peoples have become
more vocal, operational, and important in contexts that were once thought to
be the exclusive prerogatives of states or international secretariats.

Since the 1990s, the sheer growth in NGO numbers has prompted Lester
Salamon to discern an “associational revolution” that has been largely driven
by communications technology and funding availability.20 The Union of In-
ternational Associations currently estimates international NGOs (those operat-
ing in more than two countries) to number 25,000.21 Not all of these organi-
zations are active in UN matters, but the size of the phenomenon is clear.
Much NGO engagement with the first and second UNs occurs at headquar-
ters, where some 2,870 NGOs now have “consultative status” and are rou-
tinely joined by others without such status. In the field, meanwhile, out-
sourcing and subcontracting to members of the third UN also reflect the
changing balance between markets and states in global governance. Execut-
ing predetermined activities as subcontractors is not the same as shaping
policy, but many dual-purpose NGOs use field experience in advocacy and
vice versa. In fact, NGOs had already become substantial executors of projects
funded by the second UN by the time that the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) agreed to more flexible NGO accreditation standards in 1996.

NGOs in the third UN are not always appealing bodies. Much has been
made of the ugly elements of local civil society in the genocides in Rwanda
and Sudan. NGOs with direct links to the UN also include “nasty” social
movements,22 or what Cyril Ritchie has called “criminals, charlatans and
narcissists.”23 For instance, the National Rifle Association hardly pursues
a human security agenda that most NGOs with consultative status at the UN
would support. In humanitarian emergencies, a number of mom-and-pop
organizations as well as larger operations proselytize and/or have agendas
that reflect the biases of government funders—especially evident in Afghan-
istan and Iraq—that are anathema to most NGOs in the third UN. But despite

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such shortcomings in some cases, NGOs have become integral to UN pro-
cesses and to global governance more generally.

Academics, Consultants, and Think Tanks
The bulk of scholarship about the United Nations and the main substantive
issues on the world organization’s agenda emanates from universities, spe-
cialist research institutes, and learned societies in North America and West-
ern Europe.24 During World War II, the notion that the UN would be a
major instrument of Washington’s foreign policy attracted support from US
foundations. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
actively followed and promoted research on the new organization by schol-
ars and by officials from the League of Nations. Such support has contin-
ued in fits and starts since then, including the $1 billion gift from the busi-
ness leader Ted Turner in 1997 to create the UN Foundation and Better
World Fund. Other external policy research organizations with intimate
links to UN affairs include the Stanley Foundation, the International Peace
Institute, the Center for International Cooperation, and the Center for Hu-
manitarian Dialogue. Two professional associations, the Society for Inter-
national Development (founded in 1967) and the Academic Council on the
United Nations System (founded in 1987), emerged as part of policy re-
search networks focused on the UN and the international system.

“Knowledge networks”25 have become an analytical concern for stu-
dents of global governance because they create and transfer knowledge and
influence policymakers irrespective of location. These networks often frame
debate on a particular issue, provide justifications for alternatives, and cat-
alyze national or international coalitions to support chosen policies and ad-
vocate change. What Peter Haas called “epistemic communities” influence
policy, especially during times of uncertainty and change when the demand
for expertise increases.26 Much literature relates to scientific elites with par-
ticular expertise in areas such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the environ-
ment.27 A related approach to knowledge networks is Peter Hall’s earlier
study of the cross-national dissemination of ideas among experts in the
postwar period, when Keynesianism spread largely because it “acquired in-
fluence over the economic policies of a major power and was exported as
that nation acquired increasing hegemony around the world.”28

Three panels of experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s—not then
called “knowledge networks”—produced pioneering reports for the United
Nations that launched the world organization’s use of external expertise:
National and International Measures for Full Employment; Measures for
the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries; and Measures
for International Economic Stability.29 These groups permitted the entry of
outside expertise—including prescient thinking by such later Nobel laureates

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as W. Arthur Lewis and Theodore W. Schultz—as parts of teams of promi-
nent economists from different parts of the world, supported by professionals
within the UN Secretariat.

In the 1960s, the Committee for Development Planning (since 1999,
“Policy” has replaced “Planning” in the acronym, CDP) was created and
initially chaired by Jan Tinbergen, who later won the first Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences. The CDP usually comprised twenty-four economists,
all unpaid and appointed in their personal capacities by the UN secretary-
general, without nomination by governments. The CDP met a few times a
year to bring external expertise into the UN regarding development and in-
ternational economic policy.

A strong ethical dimension was present among such teams—pursuing a
world of greater economic and social justice with less poverty and a more
equitable income distribution. Nobel economics laureate Lawrence Klein,
an eloquent member of the third UN on disarmament and development, ob-
served, “I believe that it would be quite valuable if the UN had a better
academic world contact.”30 Indeed, the import of new thinking, approaches,
and policies from scholars in the third UN remains vital to the world or-
ganization, as suggested by recent reports from Jeffrey Sachs and the UN
Millennium Project.31

The UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) was the
first of a handful of United Nations think tanks, and the core fourteen re-
search entities of the UN University (UNU) are now collectively the largest.
While the staffs of these units have somewhat more autonomy than most in-
ternational civil servants, UNRISD and UNU remain part of the second UN
because their research agendas are subject to subtle and not-so-subtle fi-
nancial pressure from governments. However, they often provide a back-
door channel for external academic and analytical expertise.

Independent Commissions
In addition to NGOs and experts, some of the loudest and most challeng-
ing voices in the third UN come from “eminent persons.” For example, as
part of the lead-up to the UN’s sixtieth anniversary, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan convened the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
As part of the follow-up to the September 2005 World Summit, Annan
pulled together the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the areas
of development, humanitarian aid, and the environment.

This tradition goes back to the late 1960s and the panel, headed by for-
mer Canadian prime minister Lester B. Pearson, that produced Partners in
Development (1969). The so-called Pearson Commission was followed by a
host of others, including commissions on development issues chaired by for-
mer German chancellor Willy Brandt (1980 and 1983); on common security

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by former Swedish prime minister Olof Palme (1982); on environment and
development by serving Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundt-
land (1987); on humanitarian problems by Iranian and Jordanian princes
Sadruddin Aga Khan and Hassan bin Talal (1988); on South-South coop-
eration by serving Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere (1990); on global
governance by former Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson and the
Commonwealth secretary-general Shridath Ramphal (1995); on humani-
tarian intervention and state sovereignty by former Australian minister of
external affairs Gareth Evans and former Algerian ambassador to the UN
Mohamed Sahnoun (2001); on human security by Sadako Ogata and
Amartya Sen (2003); and on civil society by former Brazilian president
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (2004). There are also commissions that are
recalled more by their sponsors’ names rather than those of their chairs—
for example, the Club of Rome (1972) and the Carnegie Commission on
Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997).

This type of expertise—combining knowledge with political punch and
access to decisionmakers—has been influential in nourishing ideas. Com-
missioners speak in their individual capacities and can move beyond what
passes for received wisdom in governments and secretariats. The reports are
normally presented to the secretary-general, who can point to multinational
composition and a variety of perspectives behind a consensus and thus use
the findings and recommendations more easily than ideas emanating from
inside the Secretariat, which many governments believe should not go be-
yond established intergovernmental positions. Research teams are often led
by academics and usually located “outside” the UN but sometimes tem-
porarily in the employ of the second UN. The researchers play an important
role not only by supporting the commissioners’ deliberations with necessary
documentation, but also by providing an entry point for ideas that eventually
get carried forward by the commissioners and the published panel reports.

These examples indicate the utility for international deliberations of a
mechanism that takes visible individuals who made careers as senior gov-
ernmental or intergovernmental officials, or both, but who subsequently—as
independent and usually prominent elders—are willing to voice criticisms at
higher decibel levels and make more controversial recommendations than
when they occupied official positions. These commissions are a key part of
the third UN even if they are established and bankrolled by the first or the
second UN. They can formulate ideas beyond what passes for political cor-
rectness in governments and secretariats.

Interactions Among the Three UNs
Understanding the interactions among the three United Nations is crucial in
the analysis of global policy processes. It is a difficult task in view of the

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increasing ease of movement by talented people who contribute to UN de-
liberations and actions from several vantage points during their careers. In
the contemporary world, it is common for leading policy figures to have
significant exposure to all three United Nations. For instance, Adebayo
Adedeji was a junior academic working on UN issues before becoming a
government minister, before taking over as the head of the Economic Com-
mission for Africa (ECA), and before setting up his own UN-related NGO
in Nigeria after his retirement from the ECA secretariat in Addis Ababa.
Bernard Chidzero was about to start as an academic, then became a UN of-
ficial, and finally, after Zimbabwe’s independence, became a member of
parliament, minister of economic planning and development, and then sen-
ior minister of finance. Julia Taft ran the emergency program of the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), after having been the CEO of
InterAction—a consortium of some 165 US development and humanitar-
ian NGOs—while being a member of a UN committee coordinating emer-
gency operations, and after having headed the US State Department’s Bu-
reau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Boutros Boutros-Ghali earned
a reputation as a professor of international law and a government minister
in Egypt before spending five years at the helm of the United Nations. He
subsequently headed two NGOs in Europe after his failed bid for reelection
as the UN’s top civil servant.

Figure 1 depicts the three United Nations as separate circles whose
overlaps convey interactive space. This article focuses on where the three
come together (D), but also addresses where the third and the second inter-
act (C), because these networked spaces have been underexplored in the lit-
erature and help explain shifts in ideas, policies, priorities, and practices.
The universe of UN activities is illustrated by these interplays in combina-
tion with the interactions between the first and the second United Nations
(A) as well as between the first and the third (B), spaces that have received
more significant scholarly scrutiny. The interactions between governments
and secretariats have constituted the bulk of UN studies over the past six
decades, while those between governments and nonstate actors have be-
come prevalent as an explanation for influencing many international policy
outcomes.

In terms of advancing ideas, the most obvious target is the first UN,
since member states make policies, sign treaties, deploy soldiers to halt mass
murder or keep the peace, and establish priorities and budgets. Ideas can
also emanate from visionary individuals within the first UN. Examples in-
clude Canadian foreign minister Lester B. Pearson’s call for the first peace-
keeping effort in 1956 and the Swedish government’s decision to organize
the first ad hoc global conference on the human environment in 1972.

In addition, influential ideas sometimes gravitate from the second UN
to the first UN. An intriguing example is the notion of declining terms of

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trade, a thesis formulated by Hans Singer in 1949 at UN headquarters in the
Department of Economic Affairs and rapidly further developed and applied
by Raúl Prebisch at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA).32 The two intellectual stalwarts were highly influential members
of the second UN who pulled together the initial data and argument. They
then publicized the problems created by the tendency of the terms of trade
to move against primary commodities, thus creating persistent balance-of-
payments problems for poor countries and slowing their economic growth.
This argument, radical at the time, framed debates on economic develop-
ment for the 1960s and 1970s and led to the establishment in 1964 of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

However, this article focuses on the third UN, whose members often
launch or doggedly pursue notions about which important players in the
first or the second UN are less than enthusiastic. “Sovereignty as responsi-
bility,” which Francis M. Deng and Roberta Cohen deftly designed in the
late 1980s and early 1990s to help foster international assistance and pro-
tection for internally displaced persons (IDPs),33 in turn was made more
visible and palatable in 2001 by the report of the International Commission

Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly 135

Figure 1 Interactions Among the Three United Nations

First
UN

Second
UN

Third
UN

A B

A International and national civil servants’ interactions
B State–civil society interactions
C Secretariat–civil society interactions
D The networked space within which individuals and private

organizations interact with the first UN and the second
UN to influence or advance UN thinking, policies,
priorities, or actions

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on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect.34 For
decades, few members of the first or the second UN embraced the notion of
international responsibility to enforce basic human rights standards because
of sacrosanct Article 2 (7) of the Charter. When Secretary-General Kofi
Annan dared to speak out in 1998–1999,35 many member states were livid
and many staff members were baffled. Nonetheless, this emerging norm
figured in the consensus of the 2005 World Summit, where it was one of the
few issues on which progress was made.36

In many instances, various constellations of the first, the second, and
the third UN constitute a like-minded partnership to move ahead on issues,
with or without some member states, including major powers. One promi-
nent case was the coming together of like-minded governments, UN offi-
cials, analysts, and NGOs in the Ottawa Process, which in 1997 produced
the convention banning antipersonnel landmines.37 A similarly diverse co-
alition led to the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute, which established the
International Criminal Court.38

In another variation, members of the second UN may sometimes turn
to the third UN to formulate ideas that are controversial but propitious to
place on the agenda and pursue when they come from nonstate actors. One
of the clearest examples is the idea of “human development,” which UNDP
administrator William Draper imported through the work of Mahbub ul Haq
and Amartya Sen. The concept has seen continual refinements since the
publication of the first Human Development Report in 1990.39 Certainly,
some UNDP staff members were keen on the notion, but the technical de-
tails were the work of minds outside the Secretariat. These outside-insiders
also took the political flack from governments that were irritated with the
publicity given to their embarrassing positions in the rankings. Indeed,
many governments at first disputed the appropriateness of paying the bill
for such research, a complaint arising from disgruntled governments as
viewed in the research about international commissions as well.40

A Research Agenda
Too little is known about the precise roles and impact of the third UN. In
particular, future research should aim to fill three lacunae: mapping net-
works; tracing movements of individuals; and measuring relative influence
in specific settings.

Mapping Networks
The first pressing task is the rather unexciting, though necessary, exercise
of systematic data gathering in order to acquire thick descriptions of the
loose networks of individuals and groups across the three UNs. Lacking
such data, we cannot move beyond black boxes and sweeping generaliza-

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tions as explanations for action or inaction. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for in-
stance, has done ground-breaking work in tracking transgovernmental net-
works, for which the building blocks are not “states but parts of states:
courts, regulator agencies, ministries, legislatures.”41 Other scholars have
dissected networks of transnational activists organized to “multiply chan-
nels of access to the international system,”42 transnational movements to
end the Cold War,43 and knowledge-based networks.44

Multiactor policymaking networks for the United Nations are less pre-
cisely defined, which poses a substantial analytical challenge. However, the
basic notion that transnational actors contribute to changes in thinking and
policy is similar to that put forward by Slaughter. As such, social network
analysis holds the promise of better being able to capture complex relation-
ships among the three UNs.45 This research method focuses on the patterns
of interactions among actors rather than on the attributes of individual units.
Some networks have informal, decentralized, and horizontal relationships,
while others have a more hierarchical organization. There is little defini-
tional consensus about networks, given wide variations in structures. How-
ever, network analysts do agree that, regardless of the type of structure, the
nodes (or actors) in these networks are interdependent. They are therefore
“not seen as acting in isolation, but within complex linkages with other ac-
tors that influence decision making.”46

Social network analysis potentially can help explain which portions of
which networks are more important than others under specified circum-
stances. Key individuals are so embedded in diplomatic, policy, research,
and other social networks that separating them for analytical purposes is ex-
tremely challenging, but nonetheless it is a critical part of the contemporary
puzzle of international cooperation and global governance. The next step is
to move the discussion beyond which nonstate actors matter toward deter-
mining more precisely how each matters in the UN’s policy-shaping process.

Tracing Individuals’ Trajectories
The second research area involves mapping the movements of key individ-
uals who are active in UN policymaking. In view of the increasing ease of
movement by policy professionals, a proposition to be tested is that promi-
nent individuals may be more influential, internationally or nationally, be-
cause of their firsthand exposure to a wide variety of institutions. Many in-
dividuals are, in effect, “cross-dressers” whose membership at any moment
in one of the three UNs reflects the extent to which they are embedded in
larger social networks.

As Barnett and Finnemore observe, “Many UN staff and field personnel
have varied careers and move back and forth between UN appointments, jobs
within their own governments at home, and positions in the private sector,
universities, and NGOs.” They go on to note that work by sociologists,

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anthropologists, and scholars of organizational behavior indicates that such
backgrounds are important in explaining flows of information and individ-
ual behavior. “Good network analysis and good ethnographic work on the
UN would contribute greatly to our understanding of its behavior.”47 While
privacy legislation applying to personnel files may be an obstacle to ob-
taining relevant data, a pertinent research task is to track career movements
and to explore whether exposure to the culture of an international secre-
tariat, for instance, is an asset in career development in government or
NGO service, and vice versa.

Weighing Influence
Distinguishing forums for state decisionmaking, international secretariats,
and the outside-insiders are essential to determine which UN is behind
which policy or action, and to what extent they are responsible for desirable
outcomes to be emulated or for undesirable results to be avoided. Analysts
of global governance are obliged to design better empirical indicators to
move beyond the adage that success has numerous parents, but failure is an
orphan.

States rarely are willing to blame themselves for breakdowns in inter-
national order and society; and UN secretariats often indiscriminately fault
governments for their lack of political will. The first UN has a convenient
scapegoat in the second UN, and vice versa. Sometimes the third UN adds
to this confusion, blaming or praising the world organization in general.
But in other cases—say, the influence of the Bretton Woods institutions on
structural adjustment policy or the slowness of developed country govern-
ments to finance debt relief—members of the third UN have pointed fingers
with more precision and effect.

Agency is crucial, but students of global governance know too little
about the relative influences of the actors in what Conor Cruise O’Brien
aptly called the “sacred drama” of the United Nations.48 The stage with
Claude’s two United Nations has, over the last six decades, become in-
creasingly crowded with other actors who play more than bit parts. States
are still on the marquee, and national interests have not receded as the basis
for decisionmaking; and international secretariats still largely serve these
state masters but with margins for independence and maneuver. And there
is substantial evidence that the third UN is increasingly salient—sometimes
in the wings or dressing room, sometimes in the limelight. Hence, numer-
ous individuals and institutions that are neither states nor their creation in
the form of intergovernmental bureaucracies contribute to and circumscribe
virtually every deliberation, decision, and operation by either of the other
two UNs.

Deciphering what Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson long ago called “the
anatomy of influence”49 requires identifying the strengths and weaknesses

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of a seemingly ever growing number of actors. A third research task in-
volves identifying better criteria to measure which actors have contributed
to “success” and which to “failure” within the United Nations. And a com-
parable research task for global governance would apply to other intergov-
ernmental arenas—for example the “third EU” and the “third OECD.”

Conclusion
A special section of the journal Foreign Policy in fall 2002 was titled, “What
Is the International Community?”50 The lead-in quipped, “Invoking the in-
ternational community is a lot easier than defining it.” It no longer makes
sense to use the term restrictively to states alone, because nonstate charac-
ters are playing essential roles with respect to virtually every global chal-
lenge to human survival and dignity. International lawyers conceive of the
international community narrowly in terms of “peace-loving states”—that is,
euphemistically, the first UN. Other observers employ the concept more ex-
pansively and also include the creations of states in the form of intergovern-
mental secretariats—that is, the second UN. Still other commentators also
embrace nonstate actors operating internationally—that is, the third UN.

We hazard a step in this wider direction by beginning to parse the con-
temporary international community in terms of interactions among three
United Nations. Filling the glaring gaps in global governance51 leads us to
urge that “the UN”—first, second, and third—continue to pool energies and
make maximum use of its comparative advantages.

The value of the third UN, in practice as well as in theory, is clear.
States and intergovernmental organizations cannot adequately address threats
to human security. Whether the UN is seen as a convener, a norm entrepre-
neur, or an operator, we the peoples require all the helping hands we can
get—and many of those are toiling in the third United Nations. c

Notes
Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science and director of the
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at The City University of New York
(CUNY) Graduate Center, and codirector of the UN Intellectual History Project
(UNIHP). Tatiana Carayannis is associate director at the Social Science Research
Council and, until recently, UNIHP’s research manager. Richard Jolly is honorary
professor at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and
codirector of UNIHP.

1. Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, The Power of UN
Ideas: Lessons from the First Sixty Years, available along with other information at
www.unhistory.org. See also Robert J. Berg, “The UN Intellectual History Project,”
Global Governance 12, no. 4 (2006): 325–341. For the capstone book in the series,
see Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas That Changed
the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming 2009).

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2. Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Prospects of
International Organization (New York: Random House, 1956); Inis L. Claude Jr.,
“Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations,” Global Gov-
ernance 2, no. 3 (1996): 289–298.

3. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert C. Cox, The New
Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1997).

4. Barry Carin, Richard Higgott, Jan Aart Scholte, Gordon Smith, and Diane
Stone, “Global Governance: Looking Ahead,” Global Governance 12, no. 1 (2006):
1–6. Other authors have begun to speak of “new multilateralism”: Michael G.
Schechter, ed., Innovation in Multilateralism (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
1999); “complex multilateralism”: Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart
Scholte, and Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic
Institutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000); “polylateralism”: Geoffrey Wiseman, “‘Polylateralism’ and New Modes of
Global Dialogue,” Discussion Paper No. 59 (Leicester: Leicester Diplomatic Stud-
ies Programme, 1999); and “plurilateralism”: Philip G. Cerny, “Plurilateralism:
Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post–Cold War World
Order,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22, no. 1 (1993): 27–51.

5. Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global
Governance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Peter Willetts, ed., The “Conscience”
of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Bob Deacon, Global Social
Policy and Governance (London: Sage, 2007); Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society
Voices and the International Monetary Fund (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 2002).

6. Wolfgang R. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Govern-
ment? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); Wolfgang R. Reinicke, Fran-
cis Deng, Thorsten Benner, and Jan Martin Witte, Critical Choices: The United Na-
tions, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance (Ottawa: IDRC Publishers,
2000). Jan Aart Scholte has suggested that it may be more useful to distinguish be-
tween “conformist,” “rejectionist,” “reformist,” and “transformist” orientations rather
than focus on sectors, in Democratizing the Global Economy: The Role of Civil So-
ciety (Coventry: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, 2004).

7. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

8. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “Political Approaches,” in Thomas
G. Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 42.

9. Dag Hammarskjöld, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,”
reprinted by permission of Clarendon Press, Oxford, quotes at pp. 329 and 349.

10. Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly,
UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2005). See also The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN
Voices, CD-ROM (New York: United Nations Intellectual History Project, 2007).

11. Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945–
2006) (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), pp. 126–128.

12. Devaki Jain, Women, Development, and the UN: A Sixty-Year Quest for
Equality and Justice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

13. John G. Ruggie, “global_governance.net: The Global Compact as Learning
Network,” Global Governance 7, no. 4 (2001): 371–378. See also Tagi Sagafi-nejad,

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in collaboration with John Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From
Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

14. Weiss et al., UN Voices, p. 387.
15. UNRISD, UN World Summits and Civil Society Engagement, UNRISD

Research and Policy Brief 6 (Geneva: UNRISD, 2007), p. 2. See also Michael G.
Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences (London: Routledge, 2005).

16. Steve Charnowitz, “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance,” Michigan Journal of International Law 18, no. 2 (1997): 183–286.

17. Stephen Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations
(Boulder: Westview, 2003), p. 122.

18. Moisés Naím, “Democracy’s Dangerous Impostors,” Wall Street Journal, 21
April 2007.

19. “INGO Accountability Charter,” available at www.ingoaccountabilitycharter
.org.

20. Lester M. Salamon et al., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit
Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999).

21. Union of International Associations, “International Organizations by Type
(Table 1),” in Yearbook of International Organizations, available at www.uia.org//
uiastats/stbv196.htm.

22. Peter Waterman, “Global Civil Society: A Concept Worth Defining; A Ter-
rain Worth Disputing,” available at www.nigd.org/docs/GlobalCivilSocietyPeter
WatermanNovember2005.

23. “Overview by Cyril Ritchie, Secretary of CONGO,” available at www.ngo
congo.org/index.php?what=doc&id=1121.

24. W. Andy Knight, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Thomas G. Weiss, “Swan Song,”
Global Governance 11, no. 4 (2005): 527–535; Leon Gordenker and Christer Jöns-
son, “Knowledge,” in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, pp. 82–94.

25. Diane Stone, Global Knowledge Networks and International Development
(London: Routledge, 2005); Janice Gross Stein, Richard Stren, Joy Fitzgibbon, and
Melissa MacLean, Networks of Knowledge: Collaborative Innovation in Inter-
national Learning (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

26. Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities, World Order,
and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” International Organization 46,
no. 1 (1992): 367–390.

27. For example, Leon Gordenker, Roger A. Coate, Christer Jönsson, and Peter
Söderholm, International Cooperation in Response to AIDS (London: Pinter, 1995); Peter
M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources
of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).

28. Peter A. Hall, “Introduction,” in Peter A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of
Economic Ideas: Keynsianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989), p. 26.

29. Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and Thomas G. Weiss, Ahead of the Curve?
UN Ideas and Global Challenges (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001),
pp. 26–42.

30. Weiss et al., UN Voices, p. 373.
31. Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium De-

velopment Goals, and ten reports from thematic task forces, available at www.un
millenniumproject.org.

32. John Toye and Richard Toye, The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade,
Finance, and Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp.
110–136.

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33. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of
Internal Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); Roberta
Cohen and Francis M. Deng, eds., The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Inter-
nally Displaced (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).

34. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Re-
sponsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

35. Kofi A. Annan, The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (New York: United Nations, 2000).

36. Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge:
Polity, 2007).

37. Don Hubert, The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy
(Providence, RI: Watson Institute, 2000), Occasional Paper No. 42; Richard Price,
“Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines,” Inter-
national Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 613–644; Motoko Mekata, “Building Part-
nerships Toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines,” in Ann M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transna-
tional Civil Society (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2000), pp. 143–176.

38. Fanny Benedetti and John L. Washburn, “Drafting the International Crimi-
nal Court Treaty,” Global Governance 5, no. 1 (1999): 1–38.

39. Craig N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme: A Better
Way? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 232–262.

40. Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper, and John English, International Com-
missions and the Power of Ideas (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2005).

41. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2004), p. 5.

42. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Without Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 1.

43. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to
End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

44. Stein et al., Networks of Knowledge, p. 2.
45. Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods

and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
46. Tatiana Carayannis, “The Complex Wars of the Congo: Towards a New An-

alytic Approach,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 38, no. 2–3 (2003): 236.
47. Barnett and Finnemore, “Political Approaches,” p. 54.
48. Conor Cruise O’Brien, United Nations: Sacred Drama (London: Hutchinson

& Company, 1968).
49. Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., The Anatomy of Influence: De-

cision Making in International Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1973).

50. Foreign Policy, no. 132 (September–October 2002): 28–46.
51. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, The UN and Global Governance: An

Unfinished Journey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

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Assessing the UN Security Council:
A Concert Perspective

�
David Bosco

This article distinguishes between the UN Security Council’s “governance”
and “concert” functions and argues that the latter is important in assessing
the body’s diplomatic value. It presents data suggesting that serving to-
gether on the Council deepens diplomatic linkages between permanent
members. It also argues that Council membership may offer several bene-
fits for managing relations between the permanent members. Specifically,
the Council provides a mechanism through which permanent members
have slowed the pace of crises that might threaten their relations, used am-
biguity to produce exits from potentially dangerous situations, and miti-
gated diplomatic humiliation. The article contends that many proposals for
Council reform pay little attention to this concert function and, if adopted,
may unwittingly diminish a key benefit of the institution. KEYWORDS: United
Nations, diplomacy, Security Council.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN MORE ACTIVE IN THE PAST TWENTY
years than during any other phase of its existence. The Council has met more
frequently, authorized more peacekeeping and observation missions, and
enacted more sanctions regimes and arms embargos than in its first four
decades. The Council’s move toward the center of international politics has
intensified efforts to assess its role. Yet the metrics for doing so are not
always clear, and a central challenge in analyzing the performance of inter-
national organizations is clarity about what is being evaluated.1

Most scholarly attempts to assess the Council have focused on its broad
external impact or judged the effectiveness of certain Council “products,”
including peacekeeping operations and sanctions regimes.2 In this article, I
seek to shift the focus to intra-Council dynamics and, in particular, to comity
between the Council’s Permanent Five (P5) members. Specifically, I distin-
guish between two methods of assessing the Council. I briefly define gover-
nance and concert approaches, with the former focused on the maintenance
of international peace and security and the latter on fostering major-power
comity. I argue that the P5 in key respects represents a concert of major pow-
ers and that assessing its impact accordingly is appropriate. I then present
data suggesting that serving together on the Council deepens high-level
diplomatic contacts between P5 members. Through illustrative historical
examples, I outline some benefits that the Council structure offers to its per-

545

Global Governance 20 (2014), 545–561

manent members in managing their own relations. By providing an alterna-
tive approach to assessing the impact of the Security Council, this article
offers a new perspective on how the Council should be used and reformed.

The Governance Vision
The UN Charter provides a straightforward metric for measuring the Coun-
cil’s effectiveness: the “maintenance of international peace and security.”3

The Charter outlines a collective security structure in which the Council
should respond promptly to threats or breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression anywhere in the world. In so doing, the Council can meet imme-
diately and draw on the resources of all UN members, with the permanent
members coordinating any UN military operations. The Charter makes no
geographic or qualitative distinction between potential disruptions to the
peace and makes clear that the Council can investigate any dispute it deems
dangerous to peace and security. As Inis Claude argues, collective security in
its ideal form “purports to provide security for all states, by the action of all
states, against all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbi-
trary unleashing of their power.”4 The Charter therefore tasks the Council
with a critical, if rudimentary, governance function: providing the interna-
tional community with security and order.

The content of this governance role has varied considerably over time.
The UN’s founders and many early commentators focused almost exclusively
on the threat of renewed interstate aggression.5 For this reason, the Council’s
response to North Korea’s aggression in 1950 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
forty years later are often cited as notable successes. Yet repelling cross-
border aggression is only one possible element in maintaining international
peace and security. Particularly in the post−Cold War era, the Council has
sought to address a broader array of challenges, including intrastate conflict,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mass atrocities and geno-
cide, and democratization. Health and environmental issues, including
HIV/AIDS and climate change, have also appeared on the Council’s agenda.
Whatever the precise contours of the Council’s mission, a governance per-
spective essentially judges the Council by its success in confronting external
challenges. (See Figure 1.)

An alternative approach to assessing Security Council effectiveness pres-
ents itself if the body is thought of less as an instrument for providing global
security and more as a grouping of the major powers with the purpose of
facilitating harmony within that elite group, or concert of nations.6 Without
denying the Council’s formal governance function, a concert perspective
shifts the focus from the body’s ability to resolve external challenges to its
impact on relations between permanent members.

The utility of a concert perspective rests largely on the distinction
between great-power comity and international security more broadly. It is not

546 Assessing the UN Security Council

obvious that these should be considered distinct. As was evident during the
Cold War, great-power tension often fosters conflict around the world. Con-
versely, insecurity outside the great-power community can lead to tension,
and perhaps even conflict, within this group.7 Yet various local conflicts have
begun and ended without major powers being drawn into the conflict directly.
Moreover, relative comity between the major powers, as has existed for most
of the post−Cold War period, has not led ineluctably to stability elsewhere.
The end of bipolar tension helped reduce the occurrence of some types of
civil conflict, but may have also increased the vulnerability of certain states
to internal challenge.8 It is possible to make a meaningful, if not airtight, dis-
tinction between global security and great-power comity. (See Figure 2.)

While several scholars have discussed the conflict mitigation effects of
concert-style diplomacy, that insight has not been deployed to explore the
Council’s impact.9 The major-power peace that has prevailed since the end of
World War II between permanent Council members suggests that it may be
illuminating; in the more than sixty years that the Council has been operating,
there has never been a sustained military clash between permanent mem-
bers.10 There are multiple possible explanations for this, not least the fact that
all of the P5 are nuclear powers. Yet the possibility that the Council structure

David Bosco 547

Interstate conflict

Human rights violations

Civil conflict

Security Council
Piracy

WMD proliferation

Terrorist financing

Figure 1 Governance Perspective

Russia

United States

France
Security Council

China
United Kingdom

Figure 2 A Concert Perspective

has helped to maintain peace between its permanent members merits exami-
nation. Before considering the evidence, however, it is essential to expand on
the notion of a concert and to demonstrate that the Council’s permanent
membership should be evaluated as such.

Characteristics of a Concert
The concept of a great-power concert is familiar in diplomatic history, with
the Concert of Europe as the paradigmatic example. That loose arrangement
of the major European powers has often been credited with stabilizing great-
power relations in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars and avoiding major con-
flict for at least several decades.11 The notion of a great-power concert has
received less systematic attention in the international relations literature, but
several scholars have identified key attributes of a concert structure. I argue
below that Council’s permanent membership can be considered a great-power
concert nested within the broader framework of the Council.

The first attribute of a concert is that its membership is limited to the
major powers. Richard Elrod argues that an underlying feature of concert
diplomacy during the nineteenth century was the creation of a privileged
place for great powers that limited lesser powers to a peripheral role: “Lesser
states were occasionally consulted when their interests were involved, but
they possessed few rights and certainly not that of equality.”12 The UN Char-
ter offers a similar privileged status to key powers. As the dominant Allied
powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom
secured permanent seats for themselves. They in turn offered seats to France
and China in the expectation that these countries would assume, or reassume,
great-power status. There was significant debate between the three Allied
powers about whether this expectation was reasonable, but almost none about
whether it was appropriate to give great powers, however defined, a unique
place and special privileges.13 In practice, the Council’s permanent members
have usually operated as a distinct community within the Council. Particu-
larly in recent years, they have often met separately from the rest of the
Council and negotiated many draft resolutions among themselves before pre-
senting them to the rest of the membership. Permanence and possession of
the veto power create a critical status difference with the elected members,
even those (e.g., Germany, India, and Japan) who are major powers in their
own right.14

Second, a concert operates by consensus rather than by majority or
supermajority voting. No major decision can be made without the agreement
of all concert members. In the Concert of Europe, according to Elrod, “una-
nimity rather than majority rule prevailed.”15 Charles A. Kupchan and Clif-
ford A. Kupchan argue that decisions in a concert “are taken through informal
negotiations, through the emergence of a consensus.”16 As a whole, the Coun-
cil operates by supermajority; nine of fifteen votes are necessary to pass a

548 Assessing the UN Security Council

resolution. But among the permanent members, the veto ensures that the
Council is consensus based. The Charter allows for permanent members to be
outvoted only on procedural issues, and the Council cannot make substantive
decisions without P5 acquiescence. In analyzing the Council as an “elite
pact”—a concept similar to a concert—Erik Voeten emphasizes this nonma-
joritarian quality of the Council’s operations.17

Third, a concert is political rather than legal in nature and “entails no
binding or codified commitments to collective action.”18 The issues that a
concert considers are resolved by political negotiation rather than legal obli-
gation. If, in the face of some external crisis, the concert members decide not
to act, they are not necessarily violating the purpose of the arrangement. In
this respect too, the Council’s permanent membership fits the criteria for a
concert. For all its admonitions about the necessity of preserving the peace,
the UN Charter creates no commitments for Council members to act. While
the Council is tasked with maintaining peace and security, it alone has the
power to determine whether a crisis constitutes a “threat to international
peace.”19 Even when the Council decides that this threshold has been
reached, the Charter gives its members complete discretion as to the appro-
priate course of action. Moreover, the existence of the veto power implicitly
acknowledges that the Council should not act when the permanent members
are unable to reach consensus. While the Charter’s drafters hoped that the
Council would respond in the face of a security crisis, they did nothing to
compel the body to act.

Finally, a leading goal of a concert is preservation of the group’s internal
harmony. Members of the Concert of Europe “focused on regulating relations
among each other” and had limited ambitions to preserve peace more com-
prehensively.20 A concert does not seek to eliminate competition among the
powers included in the group, but it does aim to manage the competition and
prevent it from reaching outright conflict. This internal focus is the one respect
in which the Council’s permanent membership does not clearly match the cri-
teria for a concert. The UN Charter gives the P5 the same global security
responsibilities that the Council as a whole has, and nothing in the Charter
suggests that the body should serve an intra-P5 conflict resolution function.
The historical record is not clear on whether key diplomats expected the
shared Council membership to serve that purpose. Inis L. Claude concludes
that “it was assumed that the harnessing of the Big Five into a team responsi-
ble for the successful operation of the new organization might help to promote
the maintenance of their indispensable unity.”21 Yet that assumption was rarely
made explicit. More often, the Charter’s drafters suggested that comity
between the permanent members would be a prerequisite to—rather than a
product of—the Council’s operations. “The only hope for the world is the
agreement of the Great Powers,” said Winston Churchill, and that sentiment
was widespread among observers of the new organization.22 Because I seek to

David Bosco 549

demonstrate that the Council has in practice had an internal impact, however,
I do not consider the absence of an explicit internal focus as disqualifying.

Conceiving of the Council’s permanent membership as a political con-
cert rather than as part of a governance body generates a different set of
potential tests for effectiveness. Instead of asking whether the Council has
maintained peace and security by resolving external conflicts and challenges,
one might focus on whether it has deepened diplomatic relations between the
permanent members, increased harmony between them, and provided these
states with exits from crises that threaten relations with other P5 members. I
now turn to quantitative and historical evidence suggesting that serving
together on the Council has in fact deepened diplomatic relations between P5
members and, in several important cases at least, helped to manage tensions
between them.

Denser Diplomatic Relations
As a forum for regular meetings, the Council by its very nature increases
diplomatic density between the permanent members. During the Cold War
the Council normally met several times a month, and during certain crises
much more frequently. In the past two decades, the intensity of contact has
increased dramatically. The Council now consults informally on a nearly
daily basis and produces a steady stream of resolutions, presidential state-
ments, and press releases. While it has declined somewhat recently, the Coun-
cil’s activity level has been high since the end of the Cold War. Every year
since 1992, the Council has met formally or consulted informally more than
200 times. The P5 also consult periodically separate from the other Council
members, usually in one of the P5 missions, although data on how often these
meetings occur is not available.23 (See Figure 3.)

Yet how far beyond the UN diplomatic community does this increased
contact extend? Frequent contact between the UN diplomats of P5 members
may be of little relevance if it does not produce greater contact at higher lev-
els. There is anecdotal evidence that the practice of Council consultations
produces contact at different levels of P5 governments. Issues considered by
the Council often draw in officials and experts outside of UN missions and
create diplomatic contacts and linkages that might not otherwise exist. One
longtime French ambassador recalled that “we often discuss from capital to
capital issues on the council agenda, trying to reach agreement or at least nar-
row the gap.”24 Non-P5 ambassadors have noted that the P5 interact dis-
tinctly. According to a former German ambassador, the P5 “have to make
constant deals, whether it’s the election of the new Secretary-General or a
Chapter VII Resolution. [They] need each other all the time and I think it
affects also the way [they] behave in bilateral relations.”25 Council matters
also sometimes produce increased contact at the highest levels of govern-
ment. In certain cases, P5 foreign ministers have met directly to discuss

550 Assessing the UN Security Council

Council strategy and vote on resolutions. During the deliberations that pre-
ceded the Iraq War, for example, the Council met at the foreign-minister level
multiple times in the space of a few months.

A more systematic test for whether the Council increases high-level
diplomatic contacts between permanent members is to assess whether P5 for-
eign ministers interact with each other bilaterally more than they do with the
foreign ministers of other major powers. Visits at the foreign-minister level
require substantial investments of time and diplomatic resources and can
plausibly be seen as a signal of the importance of the relationship between
the countries in question. My examination of travel patterns by US secretaries
of state over the past two decades suggests that there is in fact a “P5 prefer-
ence.” For the purposes of this analysis, I excluded personal travel and offi-
cial travel primarily for multilateral conferences, as neither of these cate-
gories would necessarily speak to the bilateral relationship. I included a
control group of major powers without permanent Council seats for compar-
ison purposes. (See Table 1.)

I also conducted a probability probe that compiled the travels of the
British foreign minister from January 1990 through September 2013. Consis-
tent with the findings for the United States, British foreign ministers also
made approximately twice the number of bilateral visits to P5 countries than
they did to the non-P5 major powers.26

These patterns suggest that there is a significant diplomatic premium
accorded to other permanent Council members. It is notable that both Britain

David Bosco 551

Figure 3 Council Meetings and Consultations, 1970–2013

Source: Author’s correspondence with the United Nations Security Council Affairs Division.

and France received more US visits than the much larger and more econom-
ically powerful Germany. That China led Japan is also striking, given the
closeness of the US-Japan strategic relationship. China received more visits
even between 1990 and 2000, before the country’s economic rise became as
obvious and as urgent a priority for the United States. The P5 preference
endured—and sometimes became more pronounced—when economic
strength (as measured by share of world gross domestic product [GDP]) and
military spending (as measured by share of world military spending) were
included in the analysis. France and Britain retained their edge over simi-
larly situated Germany when GDP and military spending were taken into
account. China’s advantage over Japan also endured. (See Table 2.)

Evidence that the P5 members interact more intensively with each other
at high levels than with other major powers is notable. In other areas, schol-
ars have suggested a relationship between high-level contacts and peaceful
outcomes. In the context of regional organizations, for example, Yoram Haf-
tel has found evidence that “regular meetings among top-level policymakers
. . . appear to promote a peaceful resolution of political tensions.”27 Jennifer
Mitzen argues that face-to-face conference diplomacy produces what she
terms “forum effects” that in turn help avoid violence.28 These lines of
research suggest that Council encouragement of more frequent high-level
meetings may itself be an important contribution to P5 comity.

The diplomatic history of the Council suggests that the institution’s work
has had other more specific benefits to P5 relations. At several important
moments, the P5 have employed Council procedures and mechanisms to help

552 Assessing the UN Security Council

Table 1 Bilateral Visits by US Secretaries of State, 1990–2013

Number of Visits

Other P5 members
China 27.0
Russia 42.0
France 30.0
United Kingdom 26.0
Average 31.5

Non-P5 major powers
Brazil 12.0
Japan 19.0
Germany 22.0
India 14.0
Average 16.75

Source: Records of the travels by the US secretary of state are recorded by the US Depart-
ment of State, Office of the Historian. The current secretary’s travels can be accessed at
www.state.gov/secretary/travel while the travels of former secretaries are archived at http://history
.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/secretary.

manage their relations. Methods have included using the Council to facilitate
quiet deliberations, to slow the pace of crises, as a vehicle for “constructive
ambiguity,” and to avoid the humiliation of a P5 member. None of these diplo-
matic methods is uniquely a product of the Council, and it is conceivable in
each case discussed below that the key players could have achieved similar
results through other means. That is far from certain, however, and the Coun-
cil’s processes appear at least to have facilitated major-power accommodation.

It is important to acknowledge several important limitations to this his-
torical evidence of Council’s internal conflict mitigation benefits. At a
methodological level, isolating the Council’s impact on the course of
events—and on P5 relations in particular—is difficult and ultimately relies on
counterfactual analysis. Moreover, the examples outlined below must be set
against broader patterns of Council activity on issues important to relations
among P5 members. Many of these issues never reach the Council because
no P5 member sees value in employing the body. Even when the Council is
engaged, it has in many cases (particularly during the Cold War) done little
beyond providing an opportunity for P5 members to exchange well-rehearsed
rhetoric. Recent Council diplomacy on Syria and Ukraine has provided a
reminder of that tendency. I do not claim here that the P5 routinely use the

David Bosco 553

Table 2 US Secretary of State Visits, Controlling for Share of World
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Share of World Military Spending

Average Visits
Average Share of Visits Divided by
Share of World Military Divided by Share of

Number of World GDP, Expenditure, Share of World Military
Visits 1990–2013 1990–2013 World GDP Expenditure

Other P5 members
China 27.0 4.98% 4.71% 5.42 5.73
Russia 42.0 1.72% 4.24% 24.42 9.91
France 30.0 4.59% 4.98% 6.54 6.02
United Kingdom 26.0 4.34% 4.14% 5.99 6.28
Average 31.25 3.91% 4.52% 10.59 6.99

Non-P5 major powers
Brazil 12.0 2.28% 2.06% 5.26 5.83
Japan 19.0 11.99% 4.47% 1.58 4.25
Germany 22.0 6.46% 3.96% 3.41 5.56
India 14.0 1.71% 2.3% 8.19 6.09
Average 16.75 5.61% 3.20% 4.61 5.43

Sources: Records of the travels by the US secretary of state are recorded by the US Department of State, Office
of the Historian, http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/secretary. GDP data for this analysis was drawn
from the World Bank World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development
-indicators, in current US dollars. Military expenditure figures were calculated using the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Dataset, www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex
_database.

Council to manage their own differences or that the body can only have that
effect; I do seek to identify several ways in which it has served that function
and to highlight this mostly ignored facet of the Council’s performance.

The Value of Proximity: The Berlin Blockade
One of the Council’s key attributes is that it places senior major-power diplo-
mats in close proximity to each other. In some cases, that proximity has gen-
erated diplomatic breakthroughs on issues that threatened relations between
the permanent members. Perhaps the clearest example of that dynamic
occurred early in the Council’s history. In 1948, as the crisis over the status of
Berlin threatened conflict between the superpowers, diplomacy between them
appeared to be nonexistent. After considerable debate, the Western powers
chose to hold formal Council debates on the crisis. Over strenuous Soviet
objections, they placed the Berlin blockade on the body’s agenda. The formal
sessions that followed produced vituperative speeches, but little diplomatic
headway. A Western-backed resolution met a predictable Soviet veto.29

Several months later, however, the mechanism of the Council did provide
valuable diplomatic space. After a quiet opening from the Soviets, US and
Soviet diplomats met on the margins of a Council meeting to explore a solu-
tion. Deputy US ambassador Philip Jessup and Soviet ambassador Yakov
Malik emerged as key interlocutors on the crisis. US secretary of state Dean
Acheson (no fan of the UN overall) saw the informal contact that the Council
meetings allowed as particularly valuable. “We concluded that a highly secret,
casual approach to the Russians could better be made by Jessup at the United
Nations than through the embassy in Moscow or by the [State] Department to
the Russian Embassy.”30 During the ensuing months, that diplomacy contin-
ued in New York and was critical to a resolution of the crisis.

The Soviet Union and the United States each had reasons to seek an exit
from the Berlin crisis and they might well have found another mechanism for
achieving it. However, there were formidable obstacles to arranging a high-
level meeting. One attempt by President Harry Truman to do so foundered
when Secretary of State George Marshall and several other senior officials
objected.31 As Acheson acknowledged, the easy proximity of senior diplo-
mats at the Council facilitated quiet bilateral deliberations. As UN Secretary-
General Trygve Lie wrote later, “The electric tension that the Berlin Blockade
generated between two non-negotiating worlds was very great. Had there
been no United Nations, it might have been so great that the electricity would
have shot across the gap, setting both sides afire.”32

The Value of Delay: The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Council’s inability to respond quickly and unambiguously in the face of
developing crises is often cited as an institutional defect. From a governance
perspective, these attributes of Council diplomacy may be pernicious. But in
the context of an evolving crisis in which the permanent members desire to

554 Assessing the UN Security Council

limit their own involvement, delay and ambiguity can become virtues. Pro-
longed deliberations allow the body to give the appearance of action. This
appearance can be helpful to the permanent members when one or more of
them is being pressured by non-Council members, activist groups, or domes-
tic actors to take more assertive steps. The Council has served the interests of
great-power comity on several occasions by simply filling time and slowing
the diplomatic pace of international crises.

The Cuban missile crisis is a notable example of this function. The
Council debates on that crisis lasted for more than a week. They occurred
while President John F. Kennedy’s advisers were considering courses of
action, and when several influential voices inside and outside government
were urging immediate military strikes. At certain moments during these
debates, the president appeared to use the fact of the ongoing Council debate
to fend off calls for prompt military action. As he considered whether to order
the forcible boarding of a Soviet ship on 25 October, for example, President
Kennedy pointed explicitly to the Council process under way as a rationale
for delaying the decision to do so.33 The chances of substantive Council
action were vanishingly small throughout the crisis. Yet the process of
extended debate may have been important; key participants such as Secretary
of State Dean Rusk later argued that the Council served a critical delaying
function. “Although the Cuban Missile Crisis was directly resolved between
Washington and Moscow, it was very important that the Security Council
[took] it up,” Rusk wrote. “Prolonged discussion lessened the chance that one
side would lash out in a spasm and do something foolish. The UN earned its
pay for a long time to come just by being there for the missile crisis.”34 Rusk
was a strong backer of the UN throughout his career, and his views should be
judged accordingly. Still, the broader record of the crisis suggests that the
Council process served as one of several factors that helped prevent quick US
military action.

The Value of Ambiguity: The 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars
If delay can be a potent virtue from a concert perspective, so too can ambi-
guity. Council resolutions are intricately worded documents that are usually
the product of lengthy deliberation. The resulting documents are often diffi-
cult to interpret, and this lack of clarity is in some cases intentional. From a
governance perspective, this ambiguity can be devastating. Peacekeeping
commanders, for example, need clear guidance on how to pursue their man-
dates and often have been frustrated by confused Council instructions. At the
broader political level, however, the lack of clarity in Council resolutions can
have positive effects. As Michael Byers argues, ambiguity in Council reso-
lutions “is a legal safety valve that helps to buy time.”35

The Council’s most famous resolutions on the Israel-Palestine crisis,
Resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973, offer an important illustration of
how Council ambiguity can serve the interests of comity between the perma-

David Bosco 555

nent members. Both resolutions emerged in response to fighting that threat-
ened to draw in the superpowers and, in both cases, the superpowers were
deeply involved in the drafting process. Resolution 242’s key provision—that
Israel exchange occupied land for Arab recognition—included one central
ambiguity: the resolution was not clear about whether Israel should withdraw
from all the Occupied Territories. The English and French versions of the res-
olution led to different interpretations. The uncertainty was intentional, and it
allowed the United States to argue that it had defended the interests of Israel
while giving the Soviet Union room to interpret it as requiring a full Israeli
withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, which its Arab allies demanded.
As Henry Kissinger wrote of the Council’s phrasing, “What it lacked in pre-
cision, it made up for in flexibility. It was well suited for beginning a negoti-
ation in which reconnecting the different interpretations of the parties would
be one of the objectives.”36

US and Soviet diplomats drew on that fragile and ambiguous consensus
during the 1973 war, which was in some respects even more dangerous for
the superpowers. At one point during the crisis generated by that conflict, the
United States changed the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) level for
the first time since the Cuban missile crisis.37 As fighting continued, the
United States and the Soviet Union drafted a joint Council resolution reiter-
ating the formulation in Resolution 242 and insisting on a cease-fire. After
several anxious days, the Council’s demand had the desired effect. In both
cases, the superpowers effectively used Council ambiguity as a tool for man-
aging their bilateral relations. As subsequent events have demonstrated, the
Council’s formulation did little to resolve the underlying conflict, but it did
help limit the chances that the superpowers themselves would be drawn into
the fighting.

The Value of Face-saving:
Russia’s Decline and the Kosovo Conflict
In several situations, the Council has been used to smooth over diplomatic
tension arising when a member of the P5 has suffered a diplomatic or geopo-
litical reverse. Elrod argues that the Concert of Europe had the avoidance of
great-power humiliation as a central goal: “Excessive weakness as well as
superabundant strength of an essential member posed a serious menace to the
system.”38 A similar recognition has been evident in Council behavior at sev-
eral points, and particularly in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In late 1991, the Council members faced the question of how to respond insti-
tutionally to the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the emergence of the Russian
Federation. The UN Charter accords a permanent seat to the USSR, not to the
Russian Federation. That reality might have prompted a full debate on how to
adjust the Council’s membership to new realities. Instead, the other P5 mem-
bers endorsed simply transferring the Soviet permanent seat to the Russian

556 Assessing the UN Security Council

Federation. Several factors militated in favor of a substitution. The P5 had a
joint interest in avoiding a broader debate on Council reform that likely
would have brought scrutiny to their own privileges. Yet it is evident that
another motive for the quick substitution was softening Moscow’s geopoliti-
cal fall and boosting its new government. “Russia will remain a great power,”
said the Soviet foreign minister as it became clear that Russia would retain
the USSR’s permanent Council seat. “It may not be a superpower, but it will
still be a great military power and part of the global strategic balance.”39

Almost a decade later, the Council mechanism helped to mitigate some
of the consequences of Russia’s geopolitical decline. In 1999 Russia endured
a diplomatic defeat when the NATO alliance initiated military action to com-
pel Serbia, a Russian ally, to cede control of the restive province of Kosovo.
In so doing, the Western powers circumvented the Council and launched
strikes without its authorization. The bombing campaign, which lasted for
more than two months, produced a significant deterioration in relations
between the West and Russia. In the wake of the NATO campaign, however,
a divided Council managed to assemble a resolution authorizing a postcon-
flict stabilization force. Russia, publicly bruised by its inability to protect its
ally, was intent on returning the Council to the center of the diplomatic
process. During the process of drafting a new resolution, it managed to
extract several concessions from the Western powers. Russia’s Council veto
therefore had the effect of restoring a formal equality between the great pow-
ers that the NATO air campaign had demonstrated did not exist in military or
diplomatic terms. “Formulated as a resolution of the UN Security Council,”
Russian president Boris Yeltsin wrote later, “the [Serbian] surrender ceased to
be humiliating.”40 Even as Russia recovered from a diplomatic setback, the
Council process provided space for its diplomats to secure minor diplomatic
victories and to reassert, at least in a symbolic sense, its prerogatives as a
major power.

Implications of a Concert Vision
In this article, I have presented evidence that the Council may deepen high-
level diplomatic contacts between its permanent members and that Council
processes can help the P5 manage their own relations in several ways. I have
shown that a concert approach produces a different perspective on the body
and its utility. It encourages seeing the P5 itself as a distinct institution
embedded within the broader framework of the Council. With this perspec-
tive, it emphasizes the Council’s political rather than its legal role. It encour-
ages an understanding of the body as a politically driven consensus body, the
value of which extends beyond its ability (or inability) to consistently enforce
international law or even respond promptly to many security crises. A concert
view emphasizes that increased contact and comity among the permanent

David Bosco 557

members is itself a key product—perhaps the most important product—of the
Council’s work.

It may be asked whether these concert benefits could not be obtained
through a mechanism other than the Council, with all its formal responsibili-
ties and legal power for maintaining peace and security. The diplomatic land-
scape is littered with consultative groups that allow for informal consensus
building between different groups of states. The dilemma is that there appears
to be a symbiotic relationship between the Council’s governance and concert
functions. The council meets regularly and consults intensively because of its
responsibility to manage the dozens of active UN operations in the field,
supervise the work of subsidiary bodies it has authorized, and monitor sanc-
tions it has enacted. If those burdens were formally or informally shifted else-
where, its concert benefits would likely be diminished.

Barring some kind of catastrophic international event, the Council will
remain often at the center of international security efforts. Its conspicuous
failures notwithstanding, states and international public opinion will continue
to ask the Council to fulfill its mandate for preserving peace and security.
Discussion will continue about how to make this core institution more effec-
tive. In this environment, the governance view will dominate, but the Coun-
cil’s concert benefits should not be forgotten.

The Council’s working methods have come under intense scrutiny during
the past several decades. A number of voices have argued that the Council
needs to increase its transparency.41 The body’s informal consultations—
where most major decisions are made—have been a particular focus of criti-
cism. These meetings, which became standard practice in the late 1970s,
occur without any record of discussion and often without a formal agenda.
In response to persistent criticism, the Council has agreed to provide regular
updates on its informal meetings and to create certain avenues for civil soci-
ety input. From a governance perspective, this emphasis on transparency is
understandable. A legitimate governing body’s methods and procedures must
be clear to the public. Whether transparency is unambiguously beneficial
from a concert perspective is less clear. Some of the Council’s most effective
moments have resulted from off-the-record informal consultations, particu-
larly between permanent members. A relentless transparency drive that dis-
courages, for example, regular consultations among the permanent members
might sacrifice important Council benefits on the altar of good governance.
As Voeten argues, “Successful reforms to make the Security Council more
transparent may actually have adverse effects in that powerful states may flee
the forum.”42

Finally, a concert approach offers a different perspective on the perennial
question of Security Council reform and enlargement. Those who argue for
significant Council expansion often cast these arguments in terms of legiti-
macy and respect for the Council’s decisions. A more representative Coun-

558 Assessing the UN Security Council

cil, it is asserted, will command greater respect and ultimately be more effec-
tive. Arguments in favor of Council reform therefore lean heavily on a gov-
ernance conception of the Council’s role and usually pay little heed to its
concert utility. From a concert perspective, Council reform might be quite
beneficial if it extends the benefits outlined above to other major powers. Yet
membership reform might also pose a danger to the concert dynamic. Some
proposals would significantly expand the number of nonpermanent seats and
produce a total membership of up to thirty members. Reform of this type
might alter the diplomatic balance considerably and discourage major powers
from using the Council as often as they do now. If so, the push for a more
representative and effective Council could inadvertently undermine one of
the institution’s hidden values. �

Notes
David Bosco is assistant professor at American University’s School of International
Service, where he teaches international law and organizations. He is author of Five
to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World
(2009) and Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power
Politics (2014).

1. Tamar Gutner and Alexander Thompson, “The Politics of IO Performance: A
Framework,” Review of International Organizations 5, no. 3 (2010): 239.

2. For examples of the former, see Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council:
Practice and Promise (New York: Routledge, 2006); for notable examples of the lat-
ter, see Virginia Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices
After Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

3. Charter of the United Nations, Article 24.
4. Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random

House, 1962), p. 110 (emphasis in original).
5. Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Law and the Use of Force: Cases and

Materials, University Casebook Series (New York: Foundation Press; Thomson
West, 2005), p. 225; Anthony C. Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and
the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1993),
pp. 33–34, 37.

6. It is not clear that the diplomats who negotiated the United Nations con-
ceived of the Council itself as a tool for managing major-power relations. Instead,
comity between the permanent members was generally seen as the predicate for the
body’s broader role in maintaining the peace.

7. For an examination of the role of major-power involvement in local conflict,
see Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts:
Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post–Cold War
Era,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 51–85.

8. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technolo-
gies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” Ameri-
can Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010).

9. See, in particular, Jennifer Mitzen, “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multi-
lateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres,” American Political Science Review
99, no. 3 (2005): 401–417.

David Bosco 559

10. The direct clashes between China and the United States (in Korea) and
between China and the Soviet Union (border dispute) occurred before China assumed
the Council seat, which to that point was held by the government in Taiwan.

11. Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of
Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics 28, no. 2 (1976):
159–174 ; Georges-Henri Soutou, “Was There a European Order in the Twentieth
Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War,” Contemporary
European History 9, no. 3 (2000): 329; A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in
Europe, 1848–1918, Oxford History of Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1954).

12. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe,” p. 163.
13. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations

and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1990).

14. B. Urquhart, “International Peace and Security: Thoughts on the Twentieth
Anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld’s Death,” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 1 (1981): 14;
David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of
the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 137–139. For an
in-depth look at how permanent members of the Security Council worked infor-
mally outside of the Council to develop the resolution leading to the cease-fire in
the Iran-Iraq War, see Cameron R. Hume, The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How
Peacemaking Changed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 89–91,
94–97, 100–103.

15. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe,” p. 167.
16. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Secu-

rity, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 16, no. 1 (1991): 120.
17. Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to

Legitimize the Use of Force,” International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): 527–557.
18. Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of

Europe,” p. 120.
19. Charter of the United Nations, Article 39.
20. Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of

Europe,” p. 123.
21. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Process of

International Organization (New York: Random House), p. 76.
22. Prime Minister’s Personal Minute, quoted in Martin Gilbert, Road to Vic-

tory: Winston S. Churchill, 1941–1945 (London: Heinemann, 1986), p. 1170.
23. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, pp. 149–151.
24. Ibid., p. 251.
25. Ibid.
26. The data was compiled using major news sources. It excludes visits to Ger-

many and France because regularized European Union meetings make these diffi-
cult to track.

27. Yoram Z. Haftel, “Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements,
Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes,” International Organi-
zation 61, no. 1 (2007): 217–237.

28. Mitzen, “Reading Habermas in Anarchy,” p. 411.
29. For an account of Western diplomacy at the Council, see Philip Jessup, “The

Berlin Blockade and the Use of the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs 50, no. 1
(1971): 163–173.

560 Assessing the UN Security Council

30. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York: Norton, 1969), p. 269.

31. James Reston, “Truman Blocked in Move to Send Vinson to Stalin,” New
York Times, 9 October 1948, p. 1. See also Wilson D. Miscamble, “Harry S. Tru-
man, the Berlin Blockade and the 1948 Election,” Presidential Studies Quarterly
10, no. 3 (Summer 1980): footnote 50.

32. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years at the United Nations (New
York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 218.

33. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the
White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1997), pp. 404–405.

34. Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 1st ed. (New York: Norton,
1990), p. 236.

35. Michael Byers, “Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441
and International Ambiguity,” Global Governance 10, no. 2 (2004): 181.

36. Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 273.

37. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1992), pp. 529–531.

38. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe,” pp. 166–167.
39. David Remnick, “In New Commonwealth of ‘Equals,’ Russia Remains the

Dominant Force,” Washington Post, 21 December 1991, p. A39.
40. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries (New York: Public Affairs,

2000), p. 265.
41. See, for example, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, “A

More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” UN Doc. A/59/565 (December
2004), pars. 246–260.

42. Voeten, “Political Origins,” p. 552.

David Bosco 561

The Washington Post

Outlook Perspective

Five myths about peacekeeping

 Add to list

No, it isn’t the same as counterinsurgency.

By Lise Howard

United Nations Secretary General António Guterres warns that a “financial crisis” threatens peacekeeping

activities because U.N. member states have not paid 25 percent of the $6.7 billion peacekeeping budget. Those

dues are crucial because peacekeepers are protecting millions of civilians in more than a dozen war zones and

hot spots. The United Nations has nearly 90,000 uniformed personnel deployed, more than any other type of

uniformed troops in current conflicts around the globe. Peacekeeping is important, effective and inexpensive,

but it remains mired in myths.

MYTH NO. 1

Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia show peacekeeping often fails.

Peacekeeping failures tend to grab both popular and scholarly attention. Movies are not made about the

successes, but “Black Hawk Down” and “Hotel Rwanda” show what happens when things go wrong; Angelina

Jolie’s directorial debut depicted peacekeeping failures in Bosnia. One scholar-diplomat asserts that U.N.

peacekeeping “is destined to fail,” and a recent Foreign Affairs piece claims that “peacekeepers too often fail to

meet their most basic objectives.”

But the notion that failure is the norm is simply inaccurate.

Although the world experienced some devastating peacekeeping failures in the early-to-mid 1990s, few

remember — or even know about — the successful missions since then in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, El

Salvador, Croatia, Guatemala, East Timor, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Liberia. Since the end of the

Cold War, of the 16 completed, complex missions, the United Nations has implemented its mandates in 12,

helping rebuild the basic components of the state. And U.N. peacekeepers aren’t sent to the easy places.

MYTH NO. 2

Peacekeeping isn’t so different from counterinsurgency .

In some policy and scholarly circles, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency are increasingly viewed as

synonymous. One scholar suggests that they are “two of a kind.” A former U.N. force commander argued

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/outlook

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1039851

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate

https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pk_factsheet_01_19_eng

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_the_Land_of_Blood_and_Honey

https://www.afsa.org/why-peacekeeping-fails

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping?cid=otr-authors-january_february_2019-121118

https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8705.html

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533311003589199?journalCode=finp20

https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report

recently that when necessary, peacekeeping “troops should use overwhelming force and be proactive and

preemptive.” The African Union describes its mission in Somalia as “an active, regional peacekeeping mission,”

even though its main task is to fight al-Shabab insurgents.

But peacekeeping is not counterinsurgency. It differs from other forms of intervention because of its three

doctrinal rules: the consent of the warring parties, the promise of impartial treatment of the belligerents and

the limited use of force. Peacekeepers don’t take sides, and they don’t fight their way to peace.

Counterinsurgencies — such as U.S. efforts to help governments in Iraq and Afghanistan defeat internal

enemies — defy all three peacekeeping principles. Counterinsurgents, by definition, do not deploy with the

consent of the insurgents; they side with the government; and they use military force as their main instrument

of change. According to some top scholars, counterinsurgency success rates have been declining for the past

100 years. Peacekeeping success rates are far higher than those for counterinsurgency.

MYTH NO. 3

The world needs China to get more involved in peacekeeping.

A decade ago, the International Crisis Group gushed over China’s growing role in U.N. peacekeeping, calling it

“a development that will benefit the international community.” President Barack Obama pressed China to step

up its game in peacekeeping and take on more responsibilities at the United Nations.

China’s international pursuit of economic growth and political stability does mesh well with some strategic

goals of peacekeeping. But its burgeoning role is problematic. Peacekeepers seek to advance peace by

promoting human rights, and many civil wars today are fought precisely because authoritarian leaders

have quashed human rights. The increasingly authoritarian government of Xi Jinping, meanwhile, has stifled

the basic rights of political dissent, religious expression, free elections, a free press and privacy at home.

Abroad, the Chinese government stands accused of enabling the spread of authoritarianism. Human Rights

Watch warns of “China’s efforts to subvert the UN human rights system.”

As China has risen, it has removed human rights provisions from U.N. resolutions, eliminated the human

rights cell from the U.N. secretary general’s office, prevented U.N. Security Council discussion of human rights

abuses in conflict and disproportionately cut human rights observers from peacekeeping missions. Russia, and

sometimes the current U.S. administration, have joined China in removing human rights objectives from

https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report

http://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping

http://www.jasonlyall.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Rage_Final

https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-s-growing-role-un-peacekeeping

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/xi-jinping-visit/a-light-lunch-with-vice-president-biden

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-15/how-china-can-improve-un-peacekeeping

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/promoting-human-rights

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2018-02-27/why-civil-wars-are-lasting-longer

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5564f4n9

https://www.brookings.edu/research/democracy-and-civil-war/

China’s Complacent Generation

Big Brother Comes to Belgrade

https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights

https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/

At the U.N., China and Russia Score Win in War on Human Rights

peacekeeping. But given China’s increasing role on the world stage and in the United Nations, it is positioned

to undercut this important dimension of peacekeeping.

MYTH NO. 4

Republicans hate U.N. peacekeeping.

In 1994, Republicans in Congress proposed that the United States “withdraw from any significant role in

peacekeeping,” as one scholar recounts. George W. Bush campaigned on an anti-U.N. platform and appointed

John Bolton to serve as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations after Bolton famously declared: “The

secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If it lost 10 stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.” At the

time, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was housed on those top floors. There have been legislative

efforts, too, to hamstring peacekeeping, such as the Republican-sponsored American Sovereignty Restoration

Act, which calls for an end to U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.

Rhetoric is one thing. Budget numbers are another. During his two terms in office, Bush increased financial

support for U.N. peacekeeping more than any previous American president; the agency’s overall peacekeeping

budget and troop numbers tripled. His administration realized that peacekeeping was a great tool for sharing

burdens. Budget numbers have declined under President Trump, but even in this deeply divided era, bipartisan

support remains. For example, regarding the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, Reps. Vicente Gonzalez

(D-Tex.), Tom Graves (R-Ga.) and Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill). wrote in Roll Call that “the United Nations and its

peacekeeping force . . . play a vital and stabilizing role for the country.” The American Sovereignty Restoration

Act, meanwhile, hasn’t made its way out of committee.

MYTH NO. 5

Peacekeepers can solve all kinds of problems.

Some experts claim that peacekeepers provide security guarantees. Political actors and pundits have suggested

that U.N. peacekeepers could end wars in places like Syria and Ukraine. And the Security Council has a

tendency to issue peacekeeping mandates whenever it can come to an agreement .

But peacekeepers cannot provide military-based security guarantees, and they cannot end raging wars in places

like Syria or Ukraine without a negotiated peace deal. Moreover, many Security Council mandates do not align

with the problems they seek to solve. Three in particular stand out. First, as its civil war was ostensibly winding

down, Congo received approximately the same number of troops as Sierra Leone, even though it has about 15

times more people and a land mass more than 30 times the size. Probably no peacekeeping mission, no matter

https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=cilj

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18706-2005Mar8.html

https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/204/text

http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/United-Nations-Peacekeeping-Financial-Contributions-by-the-P5-_-nominal-USD

http://www.rollcall.com/news/opinion/u-s-aid-lebanon-armed-forces

https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/most-people-think-peacekeeping-doesn-t-work-they-re-wrong

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/01/would-a-u-n-peacekeeping-force-in-eastern-ukraine-make-sense/?utm_term=.2e26664a0cd0

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/use-of-force-in-un-peacekeeping/FEC0C6E0B4B6D4017D242171602A7E01

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-in-peacekeeping/power-in-peacekeeping/8E933B572A970BF932940B0ABE333A69

how big, could hope to stabilize a country as vast as Congo, but a standard-size peacekeeping mission certainly

would not fit the bill. Second, Haiti was never in a civil war; it had long needed development aid and

governance reform, but it got a standard civil war stabilization mandate and armed U.N. troops. In Mali,

peacekeepers have a mandate that does not match the counterterrorist environment there. As a result, U.N.

peacekeepers in Mali are dying in higher numbers than elsewhere.

Peacekeeping is a tool of conflict management, not conflict resolution.

Five myths is a weekly feature challenging everything you think you know. You can check out previous

myths, read more from Outlook or follow our updates on Facebook and Twitter.

Lise Howard
Lise Howard is an associate professor of government at Georgetown University and the author of “Power in Peacekeeping.”
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377

Reforming the United Nations
Security Council

Proposals, strategies and preferences

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the only global institution with the right
to legally adopt binding resolutions for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and to authorize the use of force to that end. Since the creation of the United Nations (UN)
in 1945, there have been debates about who should be represented in this institution. Adapting
the institutional structure and decision-making procedures of the UNSC appears to be one
of the most diffi cult challenges of the last decades. Several attempts have been unsuccessful,
in spite of a range of major and well-prepared proposals. A large majority of UN

members

prefers reform, but deciding on an option to carry this out is intricate, mainly due to concerns
about regional equality, effi ciency and representation by individual member-states.

This chapter aims to explain the diffi culties of UNSC reform, basing the analysis on path
dependency approaches and insights from veto player analysis. This empirically oriented anal-
ysis shows two aspects: 1) possible compositions of the UNSC if current power indicators
guided representation in this institution, and 2) preferences of UN member-states, as expressed
by their governments, on UNSC reform. The analysis shows reasons for ‘institutional sticki-
ness’ and highlights possible avenues for change. We fi rst review selected work on institutional
change and UNSC reform and provide an introduction to our theoretical framework. We
then apply this to the UNSC and assess the need for reform on the basis of power change
indicators between 1945 and the present. Finally, we analyse preferences of pivotal actors and
assess whether potentially, a winning coalition supporting one of the reform proposals exists.

The challenge of Security Council reform

United Nations reform constitutes a complex challenge and has sparked intensive academic
debate. Beigbeder (2011) shows how UN member-states perceived UN effectiveness over
time and provides an overview of UN reform proposals in recent decades. While these
proposals have prompted deliberation and some reform decisions, a lack of consensus has
inhibited substantial, generally acceptable change on issues such as adapting the UNSC insti-
tutional structure. International law scholars have discussed the legal basis of UNSC authority
and reform (Fassbender 2003; Blum 2005). Other authors focus on the UNSC reform process
from a historical perspective (Morris 2000; Franda 2006; Volger 2008; Kugel 2009),

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

378

highlighting important developments such as the 2005 World Summit (e.g. Zifcak 2009:
14–37). An alternative approach focuses on actor perspectives and preferences, especially for
those interested in gaining permanent representation (such as Japan, see Akiyama 2009),
members of the permanent fi ve (P-5) (Bourantonis 1998; on the Chinese perspective see
Malik 2005), or the Non-Aligned Movement and the South (Bourantonis 1998; Zifcak 2009:
163–87).

United Nations Security Council reform has especially stimulated work from a political
science perspective, such as on the legitimacy and legitimation of the UNSC in view of
possible changes in its composition (Hurd 2002, 2008). Similarly, Voeten (2008) focuses
on the role of the UNSC and implications of current arguments for its institutional
design. Alexopoulos and Bourantonis (2008) apply veto player analysis to assess
possible effects of changed UNSC compositions, suggesting that increased representation
does not necessarily imply decreased effi ciency. More empirically informed work on
UNSC reform focusing on feasibility encompasses work such as Weiss (2005) and Weiss
and Young (2005), who based their analysis on expert surveys of diplomats involved in the
reform process.

Explaining institutional inertia: path dependency and veto players

The concept of path dependency is often attributed to the economists Arthur (1994) and
David (1985), who challenged the proposition of neoclassical market effi ciency (Beyer 2006:
14–15), and to North (1990), who essentially introduced a path dependency argument into
the social sciences. Early discussions on path dependency mostly centred on the argument that
chosen equilibriums do not necessarily constitute the most effi cient solutions to a given
problem (North 1990). However, for political actors, effi ciency may be of secondary impor-
tance, due to the impact of power, norms, values, traditions and bounded rationality (Beyer
2006: 21). Pierson (2000a: 252–3; 2004: 54–78) further adapted the path dependency
approach to a social science framework by emphasizing the importance of ‘sequencing’:
events at the beginning of the sequence of institutional development are more important than
developments later in the chain. Different sequences produce different outcomes and the
history of events crucially matters.

Compared to economics, on the ‘market of political institutions’, corrective mechanisms
such as price are less effective (Pierson 2000b: 489–90). Even when actors identify an
ineffi cient political institution, adapting it requires overcoming several obstacles. Two such
obstacles are actors’ short time horizons and the status quo bias of institutions. Because of
re-election constraints, political actors may have short time horizons and are more interested
in short-term than long-term benefi ts. Actors thus stay on the same path, because changing
it is expensive in the short run and may only create pay-offs in the long run.

In addition, political institutions are generally hard to adapt or even resist change. Two
possible factors determine this status quo bias (Pierson 2000a: 261–2). First, to bind succes-
sors, designers aim to establish stable institutions. In the political world, actors are uncertain
about future developments and must reasonably assume that political opponents may gain
control over governmental responsibility in the future. As a safeguard, actors equip institu-
tional arrangements with high thresholds for change to prevent the institution from being
used against the preferences of its creators. In barring political opponents from the power to
change the institution, however, they also forgo this option for themselves (Moe 1990: 125).
Second, political actors are often required to bind themselves. A key fi nding of the literature
on credible commitments is that actors have an interest in removing given options from their

379

Reforming the UN Security Council

menu (Pierson 2000b). Once excluded from political choice, they are unlikely to be part of
the menu of options in the future.

Designers purposely agree on these high thresholds for change to create stable institutions.
Many constitutions forgo certain adaptations completely as they grant veto rights to actors in
need of special protection or privileges. This ‘institutional stickiness’ has profound
implications for institutional change. ‘Confronting the twin problems of time inconsistency
and political uncertainty, designers may reasonably decide to make political institutions
change-resistant’ (Pierson 2000b: 491). If there is a need for institutional change, the threshold
might be too high to implement it. Conversely, an institution may be less functional than
intended due to underlying path dependency (Mahoney 2000: 519).

In terms of a concrete ‘stability mechanism’ (Beyer 2006), however, Pierson does not specif-
ically establish a link between status quo biases and the prospect for institutional change, besides
advising to focus on the decision-making threshold. Accordingly, insights from veto player
analysis offer a way to extend Pierson’s concept. According to Tsebelis (2002: 2), decision-
making procedures empower certain actors to become ‘veto players’, namely those required to
alter the status quo. Without their consent, institutional change is not possible. The constitu-
tional provisions determining an institution’s structure defi ne the confi guration of veto players.
The prospect of successfully changing the status quo depends on the number of veto players and
their preferences (i.e. their position towards the new policy). Thus, when analyzing the stability
of institutional arrangements, the fi rst step should focus on the decision-making procedure, and
the second on actors empowered as veto players by the decision rule.

United Nations Security Council reform requires a two-thirds majority of UN states, plus
consent of the P-5. A large majority of UN members rejects the current UNSC set-up, but a
group of states does not necessarily benefi t from reform and holds a privileged position in the
decision process on such reform. In principle, every additional seat in a reformed UNSC
implies a loss of power for the P-5: more non-permanent members increases the number of
affi rmative votes needed to adopt a resolution and new permanent members would weaken
the power position of the P-5. A similar mechanism exists for other possible veto players:
nearly all regional UN groupings (almost) constitute a blocking minority. A veto player will
not support solutions that are suboptimal to the status quo.

Security Council reform: power, preferences and obstacles

The Allies and victors of the Second World War created and shaped the UN. The seat alloca-
tion in the UNSC refl ected the global power distribution of 1945 (Morris 2000: 266–8). The
applied criteria of population and territory, economic and military power, and intellectual
resources, decreased the number of potential candidates for permanent membership to just a
few Great Powers, which are the current P-5 (Fassbender 1998: 164; Klabbers 2010: 80–81).
Provisions of the UN Charter detail the UNSC seat distribution, constituting the status quo
after the 1966 enlargement (e.g. Weiss and Young 2005: 140). There are 15 members, of
which fi ve are permanent: the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, China
and the Russian Federation (as the successor of the Soviet Union). The UN General Assembly
(UNGA) elects the non-permanent UNSC members for two-year terms; immediate re-
election is prohibited (UN Charter, Article 23). By adopting Resolution 1991A of 17
December 1963, the UNGA introduced an offi cial regional distribution for non-permanent
UNSC positions: three seats for Africa, two for Latin America, two for Asia, two for Western
Europe and one for Eastern Europe. The general threshold for UNSC decisions is nine
affi rmative votes (UN Charter, Article 27).

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

Compared to the 1945 situation, the prevailing argument holds that the UNSC set-up no
longer refl ects a global power distribution (Zifcak 2009: 14). However, it is probably more
diffi cult today to provide reasons for countries to become new permanent or non-permanent
UNSC members. As we intend to show, if the power distribution has profoundly changed,
we have to ask on what objective basis countries should be allocated seats in a potentially
reformed UNSC. To assess this, we use Dahl’s concept of power (cited in O’Neill 1997: 60):
‘[P]ower is the probability that one party can change another’s behavior; that is, the proba-
bility it can get the other to do what it might not have done otherwise.’ We use three indica-
tors to operationalize this concept of power: population size, economic power expressed by
gross domestic product (GDP), and the number of UN Conventions to which member-states
are party as a measure refl ecting adherence to international rules. All three indicators we
employ arguably constitute sources of power on a global scale and are quantifi able in fairly
straightforward ways.

To obtain insights into changed power distributions over time, we measure the indicators
as follows. All three indicators are transformed into an ordinal ranking (for all UN states). To
determine an aggregate value for a country’s power position, we take the average position of
the three rankings. However, as we are interested in a more qualitative assessment of the
world’s power distribution than an exact quantitative measurement, we regard the loss of
information due to ordinal ranking as acceptable for the needs of this analysis. Moreover, we
assume that all three indicators carry similar importance, and we therefore weigh them
equally. Through this methodology, as the results in Annex 28.1 show, we can observe that
only three of the P-5 are still among the fi ve most powerful countries of the world. If the
UNSC were created today, other countries, such as Germany, Italy or India would possibly
be considered as permanent members.

If the UN Security Council were created today

On the basis of Annex 28.1, we create a model of the UNSC that would refl ect the new power
distributions. For this purpose, the fi rst 25 countries in Annex 28.1 are included, as this
approximately corresponds to the size of the UNSC that most of the recent reform proposals
suggest. If the UNSC were created today, in terms of regional affi liations, it would possibly
look as shown in Table 28.1.

In this assessment, Africa would only be allocated one seat (for Nigeria) and thus be repre-
sented less than it is currently. However, if other indicators were chosen for the ranking, like
‘territory’, ‘cultural and intellectual resources’ or ‘raw materials’, this pattern might obviously
change. Populous states (e.g. China, India) and economically signifi cant states (e.g. Australia,
Japan and Korea) in Asia, as well as the Americas and Western Europe, would gain seats.
Eastern Europe would slightly increase its representation as well. Moreover, the Middle East
(currently only represented with one seat alternating between the Asian and the African group
based on informal practice) would obtain two seats. If we consider only the fi rst 15 countries
in Annex 28.1 (indicated in bold in Table 28.1), Africa would receive no seat at all, and the
general pattern of representation would shift towards Western Europe. Interestingly, all candi-
dates mentioned in the major proposals for UNSC reform are indeed included in this list.

Based on our three indicators, after observing that the power distribution in the world has
changed rather profoundly, we now assess whether our argument of path dependence may
support this fi nding. First, we can observe that there is a difference between the UNSC status
quo and the seat distribution of a hypothetical UNSC: from the fi ve most powerful countries
in 1945, only three are still in this position now. Europe and Asia have signifi cantly gained

381

Reforming the UN Security Council

importance according to our three indicators. America has also become more powerful in
general terms, whereas Africa seems to have lost power. All three of the former ‘enemy states’
(Germany, Italy and Japan) are now, in fact, among the 15 most powerful countries in the
world, but are not permanently represented in the UNSC. Therefore, the institution has not
adapted to the shift in the global power distribution. The persistence of the 1945/1966 UNSC
set-up seems to show the importance of status quo bias.

Closing the power gap?

There is a signifi cant gap between the UN Charter’s institutional arrangement designed to
refl ect the power distribution of 1945 and the current situation. Both the present regional seat
distribution and the veto privilege would probably have no chance for success if the institu-
tion were established now. Can the ‘power gap’ be closed with specifi c proposals for reform?
Since the creation of the UN there have been a number of reform efforts, among them
proposals on how to adapt the composition of the UNSC (Hosli et al. 2011). Among the most
prominent are former president of the UNSC, Ismail Razali’s proposal (A/S1/47/Annex 11,
20 March 1997), the two proposals by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (A/59/565, 2 December 2004: 66–9), and elaborating on these the proposals by the
Group of Four (G4) (A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005), Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (A/59/L.68,
21 July 2005) and the African Union (AU) (A/59/L.67, 14 July 2005).

The major reform proposals, in terms of the total number of seats and type of UNSC
membership (permanent or non-permanent), are shown in Table 28.2. First, concerning the
size of a potentially reformed UNSC, enlargement proposals range from 24 to 26 states. A
decisive (and divisive) issue is the category of these new seats. Some reform proposals suggest
new permanent seats (up to six in practice), whereas others seek to increase the number of non-
permanent seats exclusively. The AU proposal suggests extending veto rights to new permanent
members, whereas other proposals do not touch upon this politically delicate theme. In addition

Table 28.1 A hypothetical set-up for the United Nations Security Council

Africa Asia incl.
Oceania

America Western
Europe

Eastern
Europe

Middle
East

UNSC seats according to
hypothetical model

1 6 5 8 3 2

UN member-states Nigeria China
India
Japan
Australia
Philippines
Korea (Rep.)

Mexico Germany Russian
Federation
Poland
Romania

Turkey
Egypt Brazil France

USA Italy
Canada UK
Argentina Spain

Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden

UNSC seats according
to the status quo

3 3 3 4 2 –

Note: For results based on earlier indicators, see Dörfl er (2009). Countries indicated in bold are among the fi rst 15
countries in a ‘global power ranking’ based on three indicators (given in Annex 28.1).

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

to this, the UFC as well as the Model B reform proposal suggest abolishing the prohibition of
immediate re-election for non-permanent members. With this possibility for re-election, a
country could belong to the UNSC for a longer time span, creating quasi-permanent seats.

The introduction of ‘rotating’ or ‘regional’ seats such as one for the EU is not part of any
of the major reform proposals. Likewise, no proposal contains the limitation or abolition of
the veto privilege of the P-5, possibly due to pragmatic reasoning expecting P-5 resistance.
Finally, the future majority threshold is to be determined. The proposals refl ected in
Table 28.2 aim for a qualifi ed majority of about 60 per cent of UNSC membership, i.e. a
threshold comparable to the current arrangement (on effects of the threshold, see O’Neill
1997; Hosli et al. 2011).

Do the reform proposals ‘fi ll the gap’ due to the shifting global power distribution? Or do
they lie somewhere between the status quo and today’s global power balance? If the reform
proposals refl ect the current global power distribution, the institution can be expected to
adapt to changes in its environment. If they are found to be between the status quo and the
current power distribution, however (and hence some ‘gap’ still exists), the institutional
development appears to be path-dependent.

The discrepancy between the reform proposals and the current power distribution, as
assessed on the basis of our three indicators, is shown in Table 28.2. Africa, in all reform
proposals, is rather over-represented compared to the actual global power distribution. This
may partially be due to the indicators we use, which may not focus as much on other factors
defi ning the relative strength of some African countries. In comparison, this assessment shows
that both Asia and Europe are under-represented. America, however, would maintain about
the same number of seats. As noted, none of the reform proposals touches upon the veto
privilege or the position of the P-5. As shown earlier, two of the P-5 would not receive a veto
right if the institution were created today. Altogether, the gap between the status quo and
today’s power distribution does not appear to be closed; at least not on the basis of the indica-
tors used in our analysis.

Table 28.2 Overview of reform proposals (by region)

Africa Asia America Western
Europe

Eastern
Europe

Total

Status quo 0 / 3 1 / 2 1 / 2 2 / 2 1 / 1 15
Hypothetical Set-up (15) 0 4 3 6 2 15
Hypothetical Set-up (25) 1 8 5 8 3 25
Razali Plan 1 / 4 3 / 3 2 / 3 3 / 2 1 / 2 24
High-level Panel
Model A 2 / 4 3 / 3 2 / 4 4 / 2 24
Group of Four 2 / 4 3 / 3 2 / 3 3 / 2 1 / 2 25
High-level Panel
Model B 0 / 4 / 2 1 / 3 / 2 1 / 3 / 2 3 / 1 / 2 24
Uniting for Consensus 0 / 6 1 / 5 1 / 4 2 / 3 1 / 2 25
African Union 2 / 5 3 / 3 2 / 3 3 / 2 1 / 2 26

Source: Adapted from Dörfl er (2009). Note: The fi rst fi gure in each cell represents permanent seats; the second shows
non-permanent (in Model B, the four-year non-permanent seats), and the third fi gure the two-year non-permanent
seats. The AU proposal includes the veto for new permanent members. Model B and the UFC proposals abolish the
prohibition of immediate re-election.

383

Reforming the UN Security Council

Why is UNSC reform so diffi cult to achieve? An important issue seems to be the level of
the decision-making threshold for institutional change. The threshold defi nes which actors
are necessary to change the institution and conversely, who can block the decision to reform.
Finally, we examine if a winning coalition could exist favouring a specifi c path for reform,
given the current distribution of preferences of UN states. In order to change the size, compo-
sition, veto privileges and majority threshold applicable to the UNSC, the UN Charter text
of Articles 23 and 27 has to be amended. To achieve this, the UN Charter could be altered in
two ways. First, through the main provisions of Article 108, which require a two-thirds
majority in the General Assembly and ratifi cation (Putnam 1988) by two-thirds of the
UNGA, including the P-5. To date, however, the UN Charter has been amended only three
times according to Article 108 (Simma 2002). The second possibility is prescribed in
Article 109 of the UN Charter, stipulating that in addition to nine of the 15 UNSC members,
two-thirds of the UNGA membership can convene a conference of UN member-states. All
amendments adopted at such a conference can enter into force when two-thirds of the
UNGA, as well as the P-5, have ratifi ed the amendment. However, so far, Article 109 of
the UN Charter has never been applied in practice (ibid.).

In short, a Charter amendment requires a two-thirds majority in the UNGA, as well as the
approval of the P-5, which hold a veto on any amendment. As there is a general tendency in
the UN to work within the framework of regional groupings, it is important to focus on these
entities to assess the decisive actors needed for a reform proposal to succeed. With 193 states,
the two-thirds majority threshold in the UNGA amounts to 129 votes; accordingly, 65 UN
member-states can form a blocking minority.

The distribution of shares in total UNGA votes for the fi ve offi cial UN regional groups is
important for assessing the likelihood that specifi c proposals can be adopted (assuming the
regional groups vote fairly cohesively in the UNGA). The African group currently consti-
tutes about 28.2 per cent of total UNGA membership. Similarly, the Asian group holds about
27.6 per cent. Accordingly, both of these regional groupings are almost able to form a blocking
minority by themselves within the UNGA. The other three regional groupings – Latin
America and the Caribbean (17.2 per cent), Western Europe and Others (15.1 per cent), and
Eastern Europe (12.0 per cent) – have a combined share of about 44 per cent of UNGA
membership. Likewise, a coalition of the ‘Latin American and Caribbean’ and the ‘Western
Europe and Others’ group has a combined share of almost 33 per cent in the UNGA. Even in
the case that all other regional groupings in the UNGA are united in support of a proposal,
however, the Asian group, the Western European and Others Group, and the Eastern
European Group each have at least one of the P-5 members with veto power in their group. 1

The analysis of potential obstacles to reform necessitates a focus on all potential veto players
according to the provisions of the UN Charter. Clearly, the potential veto players are all of the
P-5 and the large UN regional groups, but there are also informal groups spanning several
regions. In practice, the sponsors of each of the reform proposals aim to gather a large number
of supporting nations – partially across the boundaries of the existing regional groupings. For
example, the supporters of the major reform proposals, the G4 and UFC respectively, encom-
pass several countries from different continents. The contents of these proposals, and respec-
tive support in terms of shares in UN membership, are discussed in the following sections.

Preferences and prospects for reform

To systematically assess UN member-state preferences on UNSC reform, we fi rst employ a
data collection issued by the Center for UN Reform Education. 2 This document, from

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

8 December 2008, contains structured information on member-state preferences for UNSC
reform, but data are missing for a large number of UNGA members. In order to get a more
complete assessment of member-states’ positions on UNSC reform, we studied a compilation
of statements from member-state representatives in a UN context, as provided on the Reform
the UN website (http://www.reformtheun.org). In addition, to obtain information on the
preferences of particularly important states for the reform process on the three major
dimensions of contestation concerning UNSC reform (e.g. the P-5), we have analysed the
websites of their Permanent Missions to the UN. For countries for which data were still
lacking, we substituted missing information with the preferences of closely affi liated groups.
Accordingly, in the case of African countries for which we lacked information, for example,
we substituted their preference profi le with that of the offi cial AU position (i.e. the
AU proposal). The same procedure was used to substitute missing country preferences for
the G4 and UFC supporters, as well as for smaller groups of states, such as those belonging to
the Caribbean Community.

Generally, however, it was quite diffi cult to update and complete the information in the
spreadsheet provided by the Center for UN Reform Education, partly due to the use of diplo-
matic language in offi cial statements. Many UN members do not openly state which solution
they actually prefer, partly due to negotiation dynamics, especially those attempts to prevent
negotiations from turning away from their own preferred positions. In offi cial statements, UN
member-states often hide behind general claims, such as the need for a ‘more equal geograph-
ical representation’ or the demand for a ‘consensus decision’ instead of ‘hasty majority deci-
sions’. Finally, some UN states do not necessarily benefi t from a reformed UNSC – e.g.
because they are too small to be considered potentially legitimate members of the UNSC or
do not participate in the discourse on UNSC reform at all – and it therefore remains unclear
what coalition they would support if a vote on UNSC reform were to be taken.

Nonetheless, after a search for respective information (notably on the basis of offi cial state-
ments), a majority of positions was assembled for the three dimensions that we consider as
major areas of contestation and on which major reform proposals vary (see also Dörfl er 2009).
These dimensions are: 1) the size of the enlarged UNSC, 2) the categories of (new) seats and
3) the veto issue. The actual data coverage for the different dimensions analysed here, with
the second dimension split into two subcategories, is as follows: 55 per cent coverage in terms
of UN member-state preferences for the future size of the UNSC, 79 per cent for the aspect
of permanent seats and 77 per cent for non-permanent seats, and 56 per cent as regards UN
member-state positions on veto power. In order to assess prospects for UNSC reform, it is
important to evaluate this information in terms of the contents of member-state preferences.
Subsequently, on the basis of our data set on UNSC reform, we will show the aggregate
values in terms of membership support for specifi c UNSC reform proposals.

The size of a reformed UN Security Council

Regarding the size of the enlarged UNSC (see Figure 28.1), we can observe two major
groups of countries supporting the option of either 25 or 26 seats. Interestingly, inbetween
these two groups are other states that would accept either 25 or 26 seats. Clearly, a solution
for a UNSC consisting of 25 or 26 members has strong global support. In fact, in our analysis,
we fi nd only three UN member-states that prefer the considerably smaller size of the current
15, or the option of 21 members. Similarly, we only have two countries in our data collection
that publicly support the option of a UNSC consisting of more than 26 members. Hence, 26
is likely to constitute a de facto maximum for a reformed UNSC.

http://www.reformtheun.org

385

Reforming the UN Security Council

According to our data, in contrast to the majority of UN member-states, the P-5 tend to
favour (if at all) an increase by only a few seats based on arguments related to UNSC effi –
ciency. In general, from the perspective of the P-5, the UNSC works well and every reform
would weaken their power position as enshrined in the UN Charter (Zifcak 2009: 25–6).
Although the difference in terms of the number of seats compared to today’s constellation
might only be about fi ve, such a change is quite important for the P-5; in the current
system, they only need four more votes by non-permanent UNSC members to adopt a
resolution. With a more signifi cant UNSC enlargement to 25 members, an additional ten
votes would be needed. Whether this is easy or more diffi cult to achieve, however, also
depends on the preference constellation of (future) members of the UNSC (Alexopoulos and
Bourantonis 2008).

New permanent and new non-permanent seats

As regards the categories of potential new UNSC seats, it is important to distinguish between
support for new permanent and new non-permanent seats. Figure 28.2 shows the distribution of
UN member-state preferences on this issue, in terms of cumulative fi gures.

Figure 28.1 Preferred size of an enlarged UN Security Council

Figure 28.2 Introduction of new permanent seats (cumulative values)

a
2V)
<4—oI—

_Q
E3
Z

1 2

21 25 25 to 26

at least 2626
Preferred size o f enlarged Council?

<✓>a)
•M(Z
tt
“S
c;
■Q
E3
Z

140

120

100

80
60
40
20

0
Yes No

Add new permanent members?

Missing

39UFC8

G425

53 AU

Yes55

2/3
majority

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

386

Our data show a collection of 133 states generally supporting the creation of new permanent
seats, with the AU as the largest unifi ed group demonstrating a clear preference on this issue.
The second largest support group with a similar position to the AU is the G4. Together these
groups combine a vote share of about 40 per cent of UNGA membership. Another, less
unifi ed group supporting the introduction of new permanent seats consists of states not affi li-
ated with one of these two groups. If we provide a cumulative value for all states generally
preferring the creation of new permanent seats in the UNSC (Figure 28.2), we see that a
two-thirds majority is already in place. By comparison, the group of states rejecting the intro-
duction of new permanent seats is quite small, encompassing only 20 states. Opposition to the
introduction of new permanent seats stems largely from countries supporting the UFC
proposal.

Concerning the introduction of new non-permanent seats, as Figure 28.3 demonstrates,
there is clear support for UNSC enlargement. This result is unsurprising, as most states gener-
ally agree on the idea of a larger UNSC, and even states opposing new permanent seats tend
to favour enlargement within the non-permanent category.

Nonetheless, we have to distinguish between states preferring a smaller increase in non-
permanent seats (such as the proposals of the G4 or the AU) and those favouring a
larger increase in the non-permanent membership category but no increase in permanent
membership (this notably applies to the UFC group). On this dimension, we also fi nd a
small number of UN states favouring the creation of a new category of seats (either as
‘semi-permanent’ members for larger states, or another, special category for smaller
UN members).

The veto privilege

Finally, in terms of the veto privilege, we fi nd more variation in member-state preferences,
as Figure 28.4 demonstrates. This is due to the many options for the role of a veto within a
reformed UNSC, including limitation, abolition, or expansion of, veto privileges.

As Figure 28.4 shows, three groups can be discerned in terms of divisions on this issue.
The supporters of the G4 propose no expansion of the veto privilege to new permanent
members and do not challenge the privileged position of the P-5, probably to avoid P-5 oppo-
sition. In contrast, the African Union group aims to implement an extension of the veto right
to new permanent members (which would, according to their own proposal, be countries

Figure 28.3 Introduction of new non- permanent seats

t/1
CL)

4-Jre
■M
C / 1

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Yes, G4

Yes, AU
model

Yes

12
4 2

Yes, UFC
model

Yes, but
creation of

No Missing

new
category

Add new non-permanent members?

387

Reforming the UN Security Council

from the African continent). A third group, as Figure 28.4 shows, generally prefers to decrease
the importance of the veto privilege, which, according to members of this group, constitutes
an unjustifi ed and anachronistic phenomenon. Members in this category propose to either
limit the veto privilege to certain issues, such as Chapter VII resolutions, or abolish it entirely.
Overall, rational motivations seem to drive UN member-states’ positions, as many generally
seek to marginalize the issue of the veto privilege, knowing that the P-5 would block sugges-
tions to abolish the veto. Therefore, these states either scale down their position (as within the
proposal of the G4), or argue, for example, that if the veto is not to be abolished or limited,
it should at least not be extended to new permanent members. Overall, however, none of the
groups is getting close to achieving a signifi cant majority position on this dimension.
Accordingly, this is the most divisive issue for UNSC reform.

Clearly, reform proposals for the UNSC face steep hurdles to acceptance. But on some
dimensions of contestation, a necessary majority may already be in place. Notably, the murky
issue of veto rights and their potential application in the future as well as the question of
which countries should qualify to become new (permanent) UNSC members seem to divide
UN membership. For various reasons, shown here and elsewhere, reform of the UNSC is
very diffi cult to achieve, but by focusing attention on specifi c aspects of preference heteroge-
neity within the UNGA, a compromise solution could still be in reach.

Conclusion

This chapter aims to explain the diffi culty of UNSC reform, by drawing on insights from
path dependency approaches, complemented by veto player theory. The UNSC in its current
composition is not based on power positions in the international system. However, institu-
tional provisions for UN Charter reform specify a high hurdle for UN Charter amendments
(O’Neill 1997; Sutterlin 1997: 163) and grant a veto player position to the P-5 and two of the
largest UN regional groupings. Accordingly, the decision-making procedure for UN Charter
amendment and the empowerment of veto players greatly infl uences prospects for UNSC
reform, and poses a major obstacle to possible change.

Figure 28.4 The veto issue

2
a
Vi

*6
L_
CDJD
E
3
Z

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

0
No expansion of

veto

Decrease

importance if not
extended to new

permanent
members

Decrease
importance of

veto
Missing
12
84

53
15

Extend veto to
new permanent

members

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

388

In analyzing potential support for the size of an enlarged UNSC, we observe a large number
of states preferring enlargement of the UNSC to 25 or 26 states. Concerning the seat categories,
a majority of states supports the creation of new permanent seats, and a large majority an
increase in non-permanent seats. Regarding the veto privilege, however, member-state prefer-
ences are more heterogeneous: some states favour an extension of the veto; some propose no
change; and fi nally, some demand abolishing or at least limiting the veto privilege. Accordingly,
this may be the most contentious and divisive issue that needs to be settled.

Altogether, UNSC reform still requires a draft text that would combine the preferences and
positions mentioned here. The chair of the ‘intergovernmental negotiations’ on UNSC reform,
Zahir Tanin, issued a basis for this on 10 May 2010. Since then, several text-based negotiations
have taken place. The major challenge is to include the preferences of different majorities into
one single draft text that meets the two-thirds majority requirement and has the support of the
P-5, which excludes fi nding a compromise in a step-by-step fashion. It remains to be seen
whether UN member-states will be able to consolidate their diverging preferences in favour of
a compromise solution that would overcome the many obstacles for reform.

Recommended for further reading

Hurd (1997), O’Neill (1997) and Weiss and Young (2005).

Annex 28.1 The global distribution of power: ranking on the basis of three indicators

Rank Member-
state

Population GDP UN Conventions
member-state is
party to

Mean value
of ranks

Years served on UNSC
(in % of total
eligibility)

1 Germany 15 4 14 11,00 25.0
2 France 21 5 10 12,00 PM
3 Russian Fed. 9 11 26 15,33 PM
4 Italy 23 8 16 15,67 20.7
5 UK 22 6 19 15,67 PM
6 China 1 2 49 17,33 PM
7 India 2 9 41 17,33 20.6
8 Spain 28 12 13 17,67 13.8
9 Mexico 11 14 32 19,00 10.3
10 Brazil 5 7 56 22,67 29.4
11 US 3 1 69 24,33 PM
12 Poland 34 20 20 24,67 13.2
13 Turkey 18 17 43 26,00 10.3
14 Japan 10 3 65 26,00 35.1
15 Netherlands 60 16 2 26,00 13.2

16 Canada 37 10 37 28,00 17.6
17 Australia 51 13 29 31,00 11.8
18 Nigeria 7 43 49 33,00 15.1
19 Argentina 33 27 42 34,00 23.5
20 Philippines 12 44 47 34,33 8.8
21 Belgium 75 21 8 34,67 14.7
22 Egypt 16 38 56 36,67 10.3

389

Reforming the UN Security Council

Notes
1 For respective data see the UN website http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.

shtml . The total number of UN member states is 193; Kiribati is currently not a member of any
regional group. Africa includes South Sudan; Asia excludes Kiribati; the group Western Europe
and Others includes the US (formally an observer), and includes Israel. Due to rounding, the
percentages do not add up to exactly 100.

2 This data set is available at www.centerforunreform.org/node/377

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Bourantonis , D. ( 1998 ) ‘ Reform of the UN Security Council and the Non-Aligned States ’, International
Peacekeeping , 5 ( 1 ): 89 – 109 .

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332 – 7 .

Dörfl er , T. ( 2009 ) Die Schwierigkeit der Reform des Weltsicherheitsrats: Pfadabhängigkeit als Erklärung für
institutionelle Kontinuität , Saarbrücken : VDM-Verlag Dr. Müller .

Fassbender , B. ( 1998 ) UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective ,
The Hague : Kluwer .

—— ( 2003 ) ‘ All Illusions Shattered? Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform the UN
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Hosli , M.O. , Moody , R. , O’Donovan , B. et al. ( 2011 ) ‘ Squaring the Circle? Distributive and Collective
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23 Sweden 86 22 7 38,33 9.0
24 Korea (Rep.) 25 15 76 38,67 9.1
25 Romania 52 48 18 39,33 12.1

Notes: For results based on earlier indicators, see Dörfl er (2009).

Data sources:

Population as of 2010 and GDP (2010, in USD): World Bank data, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

Number of UN Conventions a member-state is party to (as of 2012): UN Treaty Series Database, UN Treaty Collection,
available at http://treaties.un.org. This indicator includes all ‘multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General’
containing the word ‘Convention’ in its title.

Years served on the UNSC : UN and UNSC websites; the indicator gives the percentage of years served in relation to the
number of years the state was eligible. PM = permanent member.

The values for Population, GDP and UN Conventions show member-state is party to the country ranks in the respective
category; the average value is calculated as the mean of these rankings.

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

http://treaties.un.org

http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml

http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/377

http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml

Thomas Dörfl er and Madeleine O. Hosli

390

Hurd , I. ( 1997 ) ‘ Security Council Reform ’, in B.M. Russett , and I. Hurd ( eds ) The Once and Future
Security Council , New York : St. Martin’s Press , 135 – 52 .

—— ( 2002 ) ‘ Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council ’, Global Governance ,
8 ( 1 ): 35 – 51 .

—— ( 2008 ) ‘ Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform ’,
Global Governance , 14 ( 2 ): 199 – 217 .

Klabbers , J. ( 2010 ) ‘ Refl ections on the Politics of Institutional Reform ’, in P.G. Danchin and H. Fischer
( eds ) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press ,
76 – 93 .

Kugel , A. ( 2009 ) Reform of the Security Council – A New Approach? New York : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
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Mahoney , J. ( 2000 ) ‘ Path Dependence in Historical Sociology ’, Theory and Society , 29 ( 4 ): 507 – 48 .
Malik , J.M. ( 2005 ) ‘ Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto ’, World Policy Journal , 22 ( 1 ):

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—— ( 2000b ) ‘ The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change ’, Governance: An
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—— ( 2004 ) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis , Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
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Putnam , R. ( 1988 ) ‘ Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games ’, International
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Simma , B. ( 2002 ) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary , München : Beck .
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Security Council , New York : St. Martin’s Press , 1 – 11 .
Tsebelis , G. ( 2002 ) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work , New York : Russell Sage Foundation .
Voeten , E. ( 2008 ) ‘ Why No UN Security Council Reform? Lessons for and from Institutionalist

Theory ’, in D. Bourantonis , K. Ifantis and P. Tsakonas ( eds ) Multilateralism and Security Institutions in
an Era of Globalization , Abing don : Routledge , 288 – 305 .

Volger , H. ( 2008 ) Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen , Munich : Oldenbourg .
Weiss , T.G. ( 2005 ) Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse: The Implausible versus the Plausible ,

New York : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Offi ce, Dialogue on Globalization Briefi ng
Papers 14 .

Weiss , T.G. and Young , K.E. ( 2005 ) ‘ Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform? ’, Security
Dialogue , 36 ( 2 ): 131 – 54 .

Zifcak , S. ( 2009 ) United Nations Reform. Heading North or South? Abingdon : Routledge .

Cover��
Half Title��
Title Page��
Copyright Page��
Table of Contents��
List of figures��
List of tables and annexes��
Contributors��
Abbreviations��
This volume��
1. International organization as a field of research since 1910��

The early years of the field��
A new way of thinking about cooperation between states��
Realism: less and more nuanced��
A new research programme: opening up the black box��
Regimes and institutions, rather than organizations��
The English School on institutions��
Constructivism and international organizations��
Multilaterism and global governance��
NGOs, social movements and transnational advocacy networks��
International organizations as organizations: neo- institutionalism��
The internal functioning of international organizations��
Conclusion��
References��

Part I: Documentation, data sets and sources��

2. International organizations: available information and documentation��
League of Nations documentation��
Purpose and structure of United Nations documentation��
Global issues on the UN agenda��
Intergovernmental organizations in a broader context��
Regional and multiregional organizations��
International law, technical agencies, and the environment��
International documentation in the digital era��
References��
3. Data sets and quantitative research in the study of intergovernmental organizations��
Correlates of War international governmental organization data set��
Examples of organization-specific data sets��
Future applications of quantitative data on IGOs��
Notes��
References��
4. Data and analyses of voting in the United Nations General Assembly��
Description of United Nations voting data��
Voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly��
United Nations votes as indicators for state preferences��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
5. The INGO research agenda: a community approach to challenges in method and theory��
Challenges of researching INGOs��
Moving research forward��
Conclusion��
References��
6. Globalized public opinion data: international comparative surveys and regional barometers��
Public opinion data in a globalized world��
Development of international comparative surveys��
International comparative surveys��
Commercial survey��
Other comparative international surveys��
Conclusion��
References��
7. What does transnational history tell us about a world with international organizations? The historians’ point of view��
A transnational history perspective��
International organizations in transnational perspective��
Assessing the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History��
The League of Nations Search Engine (LONSEA)��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
8. International organizations and the idea of equality��
Inequality, the classical state system and its legacies��
The United Nations, decolonization and the evolution of the idea of international equality��
Inequality globalizes: neoliberalism and global economic integration��
Ideas of global equality in a hierarchical international system: the role of international organizations��
Global and international inequality today��
Conclusion��
References��
9. Between independence and accountability: exploring the legal autonomy of international organizations��
From contract to constitution: the emergence of a new legal actor��
Finding autonomy: legal powers and constitutional development��
The complex layers of autonomy within international organizations��
Balancing autonomy and responsibility��
Notes��
References��

Part II: International secretariats as bureaucracies��

10. International bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations perspective��
Public Administration as the basis for studying international bureaucracies��
The conception of international bureaucracies in the field of International Relations��
Perspectives in studying international bureaucracies��
Note��
References��
11. Problem solving by international bureaucracies: the influence of international secretariats on world politics��
The influence of international bureaucracies in world politics��
How can the variation in influence be explained?��
Conclusion��
References��
12. International bureaucracy: organizational structure and behavioural implications��
Four conventional claims in existing research��
An organizational theory approach��
Empirical observations��
The logic of hierarchy in the Commission and the OECD and WTO Secretariats��
The logic of portfolio in the Commission and the OECD and WTO Secretariats��
Conclusion��
Note��
References��
13. International organizations and their bureaucratic oversight mechanisms: the democratic deficit, accountability, and transparency��
The concepts: democratic deficit, accountability, and transparency��
Access to information policies and practices of international organizations��
Oversight offices and policies��
Factors explaining the emergence of oversight mechanisms in international organizations��
Oversight effectivenes and the way ahead��
References��
14. Consultative and observer status of NGOs in intergovernmental organizations��
Importance to International Relations scholarship��
Key concepts��
Observable trends��
Existing explanations for consultative status at IGOs��
Unifying argument: states grant NGOs consultative status to benefit monitoring efforts��
Descriptive statistics��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��

Part III: Actors within international bureaucracies��

15. Multilateral diplomats in the early twenty- first century��
The multilateral diplomatic arena��
Diplomats operating in the multilateral arena��
Functions and challenges of multilateral diplomats��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
16. Secretaries-General of international organizations: leadership capacity and qualities��
Research emphasis on the United Nations Secretary-General��
Secretaries-General across international organizations��
International organization Secretariats and the Secretary-General��
Analyzing Secretary-General leadership��
International organization theory and the Secretary-General��
Conclusion��
References��
17. The Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General��
The origin of the Special Representatives��
The legal and political basis of the Special Representatives’ work��
The development of Special Representatives��
The evaluation of Special Representatives��
Notes��
References��
18. Multilateral diplomats of Central European states before and after 1989��
Central European multilateral diplomats in the League of Nations��
Diplomats in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact��
Central European diplomats in the UN system and the CSCE��
Central European multilateral diplomats after the end of the Cold War��
Conclusion��
References��
19. The professionalization of international non-governmental organizations
INGOs and democracy: the international level��
The professionalization puzzle��
Adaptation and professionalization: conceptual considerations��
Professionalization: empirical illustrations��
Professionalization: input and output legitimacy in the humanitarian sector��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
20. The values of staff in international organizations��
Studies on international organizations��
International organizations and their employees: cosmopolitanism��
Motivations and values in the public and voluntary domains��
Values of paid and unpaid employees in international organizations��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��

Part IV: Processes within international bureaucracies��

21.
What is happening to the staffof the European institutions?A cross- disciplinary view
How to assess the Eurocrats��
EU civil servants: a social group relative to others��
Different members . . .��
. . . embedded in a common historical and social construction��
Changes and challenges for the model��
References��
22. Reinvigorating the “Second” United Nations
Overwhelming bureaucracy and underwhelming leadership��
Problems in international secretariats��
The logic of reforming the Second United Nations��
Improving the Second United Nations��
Improving the intellectual capacity��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
23.
The role and power of the chairs ininternational organizations
The chairmanship office in perspective: insights from literature��
On functions and autonomy: what chairs do and at what cost��
On effectiveness: a typology of parameters conditioning the chair’s performance��
The need for further research��
References��
24.
International organizations andcrisis management
International organizations and international crisis defined��
Literature on international organizations: absence of crisis��
Literature on crises: absence of international organizations��
International organizations and crises in the twenty first century��
Conclusion��
References��
25.
Informal normsShaping behavior ininternational negotiations
International negotiations: informality in diplomacy��
Debates over development of informal norms��
Theorizing the impact of informal norms��
Informal norms in practice��
Conclusion��
References��
26. From internationalization to internalization Spirals of contentions��
Internationalization: from local problems to global debate��
Institutionalization: from global debate to global norms��
Localization: from global norms back to local problems��
Conclusion��
References��
27. Learning in international organizations
Challenges to the study of organizational learning in international organizations��
Key questions in the analysis of organizational learning in international organizations��
Advancing research on organizational learning in international organizations��
Notes��
References��

Part V: Challenges to international organizations��

28. Reforming the United Nations Security Council: proposals, strategies and preferences��
The challenge of Security Council reform��
Explaining institutional inertia: path dependency and veto players��
Security Council reform: power, preferences and obstacles��
If the UN Security Council were created today��
Closing the power gap?��
Preferences and prospects for reform��
The size of a reformed UN Security Council��
New permanent and new non-permanent seats��
The veto privilege��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
29. The need for rethinking the United Nations: modernizing through civil society��
Concepts signify more than words��
A short history of international organizations and NGOs��
Changing civil societies’ relations with international organizations��
Civil Societies’ role in seeking authoritative global institutions��
References��
30. The use, effectiveness, and unintended consequences of economic sanctions by intergovernmental organizations��
How often do IGOs initiate economic sanctions?��
Are IGO-led sanctions effective?��
What are the major unintended consequences of economic sanctions for target countries?��
Policy implications and the future use of IGO-led sanctions��
Notes��
References��
31. Public–private voluntary initiatives: enlisting corporations for the provision of public goods��
Voluntary initiatives and international organizations��
Why do corporations engage in public–private voluntary initiatives?��
Do public–private voluntary initiatives make a difference to corporate conduct?��
Conclusion��
References��
32. The politics of inter- regionalism: relations between international regional organizations��
Theories��
Inter-regionalism and the European Union��
EU–Africa��
EU–Americas��
EU–Asia��
South–South inter-regionalism on the same continent��
South–South cross-continental interregionalism��
Conclusion: the politics of interregionalism��
Notes��
References��
33. International organizations in Asia and the Pacific��
International organizations in Asia and the Pacific��
US-led Pan-Pacific organizations in the period of colonialism��
Postwar international organization in the context of decolonization and the Cold War��
The establishment of ASEAN��
Economic development in Asia: APEC and ASEAN’s changing character��
The aftermath of the Asian financial crisis: the emergence of wider Asian institutions��
Conclusion��
References��

Part VI: Expanding international architectures��

34. International judicial institutions in international relations: functions, authority and legitimacy��
The expanding institutional architecture��
Functions��
Authority��
Conclusion��
References��
35. The global human mobility architecture��
Refugees and migrants: two different architectures��
The refugee architecture: responding to forced migration��
The global migration architecture: responding to economic migration��
Global human mobility: towards convergence?��
Notes��
References��
36. The architecture of international monetary and financial governance��
International financial institutions before the Second World War��
The Bretton Woods system (1944–73)��
Neoliberal globalization and instability (1973–2007)��
Global financial crisis (2007–12)��
Conclusion��
References��
37. The global trade architecture: an expanding agenda in times of fragmentation��
Trade at the crossroads of economics, law and political science��
Main institutional patterns of the trade regime��
The asymmetrically expanding trade agenda��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��
38. Multilateralism under transformation: international organizations and ‘clubs’��
Characteristics of multilateral club practices��
A wide range of club practices��
Quantitative and qualitative evolutions��
Evolutions of clubs result from demands for multilateralism��
Ambivalent dynamics between clubs and international organizations��
Oligarchic reactions��
Conclusion��
Notes��
References��

Index��

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ROUNDTABLE: NONPROLIFERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation:
Perception and Reality
Jacques E. C. Hymans*

N
uclear weapons proliferation is at the top of the news these days. Most

recent reports have focused on the nuclear efforts of Iran and North

Korea, but they also typically warn that those two acute diplomatic

headaches may merely be the harbingers of a much darker future. Indeed, foreign

policy sages often claim that what worries them most is not the small arsenals that

Tehran and Pyongyang could build for themselves, but rather the potential that

their reckless behavior could catalyze a process of runaway nuclear proliferation,

international disorder, and, ultimately, nuclear war.

The United States is right to be vigilant against the threat of nuclear prolifer-

ation. But such vigilance can all too easily lend itself to exaggeration and overreac-

tion, as the  invasion of Iraq painfully demonstrates. In this essay, I critique

two intellectual assumptions that have contributed mightily to Washington’s

puffed-up perceptions of the proliferation threat. I then spell out the policy impli-

cations of a more appropriate analysis of that threat.

The first standard assumption undergirding the anticipation of rampant pro-

liferation is that states that abstain from nuclear weapons are resisting the dictates

of their narrow self-interest—and that while this may be a laudable policy, it is

also an unsustainable one. According to this line of thinking, sooner or later

some external shock, such as an Iranian dash for the bomb, can be expected to

jolt many states out of their nuclear self-restraint.

*Thanks to Myrna Hymans, Rieko Kage, Richard Ned Lebow, Benoît Pelopidas, and Tuong Vu for their com-
ments. This essay draws in part upon material from Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions:
Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, ), reproduced with
permission.

Ethics & International Affairs, , no.  (), pp. –.
©  Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
doi:./SX

281

This assumption is highly questionable. There have been many supposedly

destabilizing shocks to the global nonproliferation norm over the years. These

include the Indian nuclear test of , the revelation of Israel’s secret nuclear

arsenal in , the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of , and the North

Korean nuclear tests of , , and , to mention just a few. Yet, despite

these provocations, today fewer states are engaged in suspicious nuclear activities

than ever before. The nonproliferation norm is much more solidly entrenched

than most observers believe.

The historical resilience of the nonproliferation norm becomes much less sur-

prising when we realize that abstention from nuclear weapons is not a bizarre

departure from states’ normal pursuit of national security and international stand-

ing. The effects of nuclear weapons are huge, indiscriminate, and long-lasting.

Most thinkers have focused on the offense these monstrous characteristics give

to the human conscience. But it is equally important to note that these same

characteristics also render the bomb useless for almost all military purposes.

Therefore, states that try to build new nuclear weapons arsenals have increasingly

been seen not as prudent and pragmatic, but instead as paranoid and power-mad.

This essentially limits the bomb’s appeal to those few state leaders who really are

paranoid and power-mad.

The second—and even more fundamental—assumption undergirding the antici-

pation of rampant proliferation is that more than forty states now have the latent

capacity to build the bomb within just a few years, if they wished to do so.

Former CIA Director George Tenet offers an even darker assessment: “In the cur-

rent marketplace, if you have a hundred million dollars, you can be your own

nuclear power.” In other words, getting the bomb today is merely a matter of

money—and not even all that much money. If Tenet is right, then a mere trickle

of new nuclear weapon states could rapidly turn into an unmanageable cascade.

This assumption of ubiquitous latent nuclear capacity, however, is just as ques-

tionable as the assumption of ubiquitous latent nuclear intentions. It is true that

some of the obstacles to building the bomb are lower than they used to be. For

instance, most of the scientific secrets of the original nuclear weapons projects

have long since been revealed, and many highly sensitive technologies are now

available on the international black market. But the actual experiences of recent

nuclear weapons projects contradict the conventional wisdom that the bomb is

now easily within the reach of all but the most hapless members of the inter-

national state system. The fact is that recent nuclear weapons projects have not

282 Jacques E. C. Hymans

fared much better than their predecessors did; instead, they have fared much

worse. This puzzling global trend demands careful examination.

The above chart summarizes the history of all the dedicated nuclear weapons

projects since the start of the nuclear age. By “dedicated” projects, I mean projects

that were the result of a clear commitment at the highest political levels to produce

the bomb, and not just tentative explorations or diplomatic feints. There is a rough

consensus among international security scholars that seventeen dedicated nuclear

weapons projects have been launched since the beginning of the nuclear age. The

seventeen cases are lined up along the X-axis according to their start date. The

black bars in the chart represent the number of years the successful projects took to

produce their first big explosion or, in the cases of Israel and Pakistan, to allegedly

produce untested but operational nuclear weapons. The white bars represent the

number of years the unsuccessful projects lasted until they were shut down. Finally,

there is a striped bar for the case of Iran, because its ultimate outcome is uncertain.

One may quibble with the interpretation of this or that country case, but the general

patterns I will be discussing here persist even if we apply alternative codings.

If technological difficulty were the key factor driving proliferation outcomes,

then early nuclear weapons projects should have taken many years to complete

Source: Updated from Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, p. .

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 283

and should have experienced a high failure rate, whereas more recent projects

should have taken much less time and should have experienced a much lower fail-

ure rate. But as the above chart clearly demonstrates, precisely the opposite has

happened. All of the dedicated nuclear weapons projects that were launched

before  succeeded, and their average time to the first nuclear test (or to the

direct induction of operational weapons without a test) was about seven years.

By contrast, only three of the ten dedicated nuclear weapons projects that were

launched since  have succeeded, and they needed an average of about seven-

teen years to do so. As for Iran, Israeli intelligence recently pushed back its esti-

mated earliest potential date for a first Iranian bomb to –—and this for a

nuclear program that was launched way back in the mid-s. Whatever Iran’s

ultimate nuclear intentions may be, the country’s extremely slow technical pro-

gress to date is clearly consistent with the general proliferation slowdown.

Explaining the

Slowdown

Why have nuclear weapons projects around the world become increasingly ineffi-

cient and prone to failure since the s? One reasonable hypothesis is that the

slowdown is due to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Almost every state in the

world is now party to the treaty and has signed NPT safeguards agreements that

make its nuclear activities relatively transparent to the outside world. This is a

good thing. But the NPT does not deserve the lion’s share of the credit for the

global proliferation slowdown. Recall that the main puzzle is not why so many

states have chosen to abstain from building the bomb, but rather why the numer-

ous states that aggressively flouted the NPT in recent years have so often fallen

into nuclear R&D quagmires. This record of dysfunction could conceivably be

chalked up to the difficulties of getting around the NPT regime’s technical safe-

guards, on-site inspections, and export bans. Yet it is universally acknowledged

that those mechanisms were quite feeble until the early s. For instance, the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western intelligence services

were unaware of Saddam Hussein’s massive nuclear weapons project before stum-

bling across it at the end of the first Gulf War in . Therefore, even if we sti-

pulate that the nonproliferation regime today is very tough to deceive or

circumvent—a claim that many would dispute—it was undeniably much less for-

midable in the s and s, and yet the great proliferation slowdown was

already well in evidence at that time. Thus, for all the merits of the NPT, it

284 Jacques E. C. Hymans

was not the “silver bullet” that caused the trend toward nuclear weapons project

inefficiency.

A second, more convincing hypothesis starts from the observation that most of

the states that tried to obtain nuclear weapons during the first two decades of the

nuclear age were in the developed world, but most of the states that have

attempted to do so since that time have been in the developing world. What is

it about most developing countries that might cause their nuclear weapons pro-

jects to run so inefficiently? One might guess that they cannot afford to devote

the same amount of money as wealthier countries to their nuclear projects. But

Iraq was able to spend a billion dollars on its nuclear weapons efforts during

the s, and it came up short anyway. In fact, the average per capita income

(in constant  international dollars) of the states that built the bomb was

$, at the start of their projects, but the average of the unsuccessful ones

was considerably higher—$,. Clearly, we need to probe beneath such brute

quantitative indicators to understand the true sources of developing country

nuclear weapons project inefficiency.

The R&D success stories of the first four members of the nuclear club—the

United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France—provide a good start-

ing point for analysis. The classic historical studies of these efforts concur that

their efficient performance was due in large measure to their scientific and tech-

nical (S&T) workers’ autonomy and professionalism. In other words, the S&T

workers were not merely well-educated but were also able to control their own

work process. Therefore, key decisions could be based on well-considered expert

reasoning rather than arbitrary commands or political ideology. Moreover, the

workers’ enjoyment of autonomy mixed with their feelings of nationalism to gen-

erate a strong collective motivation to achieve the project’s goal. This pattern can

be seen in the totalitarian Soviet Union as well as in the three democratic

countries.

If autonomous professionalism is the key to nuclear weapons success, then why

haven’t more recent proliferant states from the developing world respected it, too?

The simple answer is that they have been highly prone to nuclear program mis-

management; the deeper answer is that their state institutions have made them

prone to mismanagement. Most developed countries can be described—to borrow

the language of Max Weber—as having “legal-rational” institutions. In other

words, they feature strong institutional barriers against the top-down politiciza-

tion of bureaucratic policy implementation, especially on scientific and technical

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 285

questions. Political leaders in such contexts may well want to interfere in technical

decision-making, but doing so is costly and runs contrary to standing behavioral

norms. Consequently, they adopt a management model that is respectful of the

S&T workers’ need for autonomy. This choice creates the conditions for profes-

sionalism to flourish.

By contrast, most developing countries can be described—again, following

Weber—as having “neopatrimonial” institutions. In other words, they feature

“big man” rule and lack the strong institutional barriers that characterize

Weberian legal-rational states. Political leaders in such contexts find it easy to

interfere in technical decision-making; in fact, the bureaucracy practically expects

it of them. Consequently, they adopt a management model that undermines pro-

fessionalism. And the more strongly a neopatrimonial state’s leaders desire the

bomb, the more invasive their management of the nuclear program is likely to be.

In sum, when you start with legal-rational state institutions, you are likely to

end up with the kind of management that facilitates the efficient operation of

nuclear weapons projects: management that is respectful both of the laws of ther-

modynamics and of the professional S&T workers who understand those laws.

This was the typical pattern of the early nuclear efforts, most of which were car-

ried out by developed countries. On the other hand, when you start with neopa-

trimonial state institutions, you are likely to end up with the kind of management

that undercuts the efficient operation of nuclear weapons projects: management

that privileges considerations of ideology or political expediency over those of

empirical science, and favors sycophants over committed professionals. This

has been the typical pattern of the more recent nuclear efforts, most of which

were carried out by developing countries. (As for the nuclear weapons projects

of countries that stand somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, the manage-

ment approach they adopt tends to reflect the overall direction in which their

state institutions have been evolving.)

I am not claiming that neopatrimonial states are incapable of building the

bomb. What I am claiming is that their nuclear weapons projects will usually

take much longer and will fail much more often than most international security

analysts would dare to hope. Moreover, since many states are still finding it so

difficult to build the bomb, we should be very skeptical of claims that stateless ter-

rorist groups could easily make one, too.

Note that although most developing states are neopatrimonial, some are not.

India, for instance, boasts a relatively strong legal-rational institutional framework

286 Jacques E. C. Hymans

that dates back to the “steel frame” bureaucracy of the British Raj. Given this

background, it is not surprising that Indian scientists and engineers were able

to take a dominant role in their country’s nuclear program, leading to a long series

of impressive technological breakthroughs and, ultimately, a test explosion in 

—only ten years after the country’s so-called “peaceful nuclear explosive” project

had been launched.

China’s Nuclear Miracle and Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage

The merit of the hypotheses that I have sketched above can be seen in a wide var-

iety of historical cases, including two cases that at first glance appear to contradict

my argument: China in the s and s, and Iraq in the s.

China in the s and s was diplomatically isolated, economically back-

ward, and socially in turmoil. Yet it was able to explode its first nuclear device

as early as —a mere nine years after its nuclear weapons project was

launched, and three years in advance of its original target date. How did China

do it? In their classic work China Builds the Bomb, historians John Lewis and

Xue Litai emphasize the great professional commitment of China’s nuclear scien-

tists and engineers, which, in turn, was fostered by the management “genius” of

the project leader, General Nie Rongzhen. Nie’s genius was to privilege pro-

fessional expertise over political reliability, which was a real departure from the

normal management culture of Maoist China. “As a manager, I am a servant,”

Nie liked to say. “I’m willing to serve the experts and their work.” The results

were spectacular.

From today’s vantage point, China’s nuclear achievement may appear to have

been inevitable. In fact, however, the project was regularly imperiled by

Chairman Mao Zedong’s ferociously anti-bureaucratic and neopatrimonial politi-

cal impulses. To realize how close China came to failure in this endeavor, recall

that Nie and his men miraculously brought the nuclear bomb project to fruition

three years ahead of schedule, in . Thus, if Nie had simply been a competent

manager instead of a brilliant one, China would not have had the bomb before

Mao launched his destructive Cultural Revolution in . And a China that

had not built the bomb by the start of the Cultural Revolution likely still would

not have had one by the end of that tumultuous decade, what with the nuclear

program’s top scientists and engineers being packed off to work on pig farms

and the like. Such was the fate of China’s contemporaneous nuclear submarine

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 287

project, for instance. Paradoxically, then, Maoist China’s nuclear experience

demonstrates the tight causal connection between well-ordered state institutions,

respectful nuclear R&D management, and nuclear weapons project efficiency.

China’s nuclear bomb project was the exception that proves the rule about the

difficulty of proliferation for most developing countries.

Now consider the case of Iraq. The shocking discovery of large and well-stocked

secret nuclear facilities at the end of the  Gulf War led many knowledgeable

observers to conclude that Saddam had come within just a few months of obtain-

ing the bomb. Over the course of the s, the suspicion that Iraq was once again

hiding something big kept gnawing at Washington policy-makers and the U.S.

intelligence community. The fear that next time the cavalry might arrive too

late was a key driver of the George W. Bush administration’s decision to invade

the country in .

But that fear was the product of a misunderstanding of the past. The Iraqi

nuclear weapons project was not nearly as advanced as it initially appeared to out-

siders at the end of the first Gulf War in . Despite spending roughly a billion

dollars on the project over nearly a decade, Iraq had produced only tiny quantities

of enriched uranium and zero highly enriched uranium. A major  IAEA

report concluded that if Iraq had been able to continue its uranium enrichment

work unimpeded, it might have obtained a first bomb with indigenously produced

fissile material by  at the earliest. Washington dismissed the IAEA’s analysis

as being far too complacent. However, the IAEA was actually overstating Iraq’s

potential, for the Iraqi nuclear program of the s was a classic case of neopa-

trimonial state mismanagement leading to technical blunders.

The original catalyst for Iraq’s secret project was Israel’s tactically brilliant but

strategically foolish  bombing of the country’s half-built nuclear power plant,

which was not a genuine proliferation threat. Touched to the quick by Israel’s

offense, Iraq’s nuclear scientists and engineers responded enthusiastically to

Saddam’s order to build a nuclear weapon. But in subsequent years, the S&T

workers’ esprit de corps was gradually weakened by a long series of distrustful,

divisive, and domineering actions by the leadership. Meanwhile, the program

became abjectly dependent on unreliable and exploitative foreign suppliers. The

result, in the words of former IAEA inspector Robert Kelley, “was a spectacular

failure.” As Kelley continues, “This was probably one of the most expensive indus-

trial undertakings in the history of mankind in terms of dollars spent to material

produced.” Furthermore, the so-called “crash program” that the Iraqis launched

288 Jacques E. C. Hymans

immediately after invading Kuwait—their attempt to gin up a single bomb within

a few months by misusing a small cache of highly enriched uranium that had been

provided by France and Russia back in the s—also became mired in technical

problems and made almost no progress. Iraq’s badly mismanaged program was

clearly not on the verge of a major breakthrough in the early s.

Nonetheless, one might retort, if Saddam’s project had been left unimpeded,

wouldn’t it eventually have achieved its goal—if not within five years, then per-

haps within ten? Whether Iraq could have conquered all the remaining technical

hurdles is an open question. But more fundamentally, it is a mistake to enter into

this discussion of what-ifs. Counterfactual historical analysis can be a useful tool,

but it quickly loses real-world plausibility unless it is based on a “minimal rewrite”

of the events that sent history down one path instead of another. And much

more than a minimal rewrite is necessary to imagine a big Iraqi nuclear weapons

project remaining under the radar after . To imagine a world in which Iraq’s

nuclear program could have operated freely for another decade, you need to suppose

that the invasion of Kuwait did not take place; and yet it is clear that Saddam’s pol-

itical needs and personality were the driving force behind that conflict. Moreover,

you also have to suppose that Saddam in  was still as supportive of the nuclear

project as he had been in ; but this is probably wrong, too. After all, Saddam

chose not to wait for the first Iraqi bomb to be born before ordering the invasion.

Moreover, during the war he did not act as if his nuclear program was something

that he had to protect at any cost. When the American bombs began to fall, the

regime even required its top nuclear workers to remain inside their facilities as

human shields. It is therefore hard to avoid the conclusion that Saddam had

basically given up on his nuclear scientists by the time he invaded Kuwait.

They had their chance, and they failed—end of story. When we see things from

this perspective, the very half-hearted nature of Iraq’s attempts to reconstitute

its nuclear program after  also becomes much easier to understand.

Proliferation in the Age of Globalization

China, Iraq, and many other states with nuclear ambitions followed the organiz-

ational model of the Manhattan Project, wherein a giant bureaucracy coordinates

the efforts of a huge army of S&T workers. By contrast, many analysts believe that

future nuclear projects will rely on a small cadre of expert managers who look

abroad to get needed materials and know-how much more quickly and cheaply

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 289

than if they tried to do it all by themselves. If that is the case, then perhaps the

organizational and management challenges that have caused the great prolifer-

ation slowdown are about to disappear as a consequence of globalization.

The availability of foreign help for nuclear weapons projects is not a new

phenomenon, however. For instance, the Manhattan Project itself was actually a

joint effort by the United States and United Kingdom. And after the project

achieved its goals, its S&T workers quickly carried their nuclear knowledge to

the four corners of the globe. Since the globalization-proliferation nexus is as

old as proliferation itself, we can study history to anticipate its likely future con-

sequences. The historical record indicates that well-managed nuclear weapons

projects can certainly use foreign help to supercharge their progress. On the

other hand, poorly managed projects are much less able to use foreign help effec-

tively, and their progress can even be undermined by their attempts to take that

shortcut. Recall also that the more recent nuclear weapons projects have indeed

been poorly managed. Consequently, the current wave of globalization is unlikely

to produce a cascade of proliferation.

More specifically, analysts have argued that the nonproliferation dam could

break as a result of the global diffusion of three key nuclear resources: () nuclear

hardware and materials; () nuclear education and training; () experienced

nuclear manpower. Let us consider each of these dangers in turn.

The first danger for nonproliferation stems from the availability of key materials

and nuclear and dual-use equipment on the international black market.

Purchasing such items can of course make life easier for a nuclear program’s

scientists and engineers. Even so, the challenge of applying them to build working

nuclear bombs remains enormous. For instance, Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, an

ideal-typical neopatrimonial state, was a major customer of the Pakistani nuclear

weaponeer A. Q. Khan’s global proliferation network. In , Libya bought a

complete kit for the construction of an industrial-scale centrifuge uranium enrich-

ment plant. It also received Khan’s blueprints for a nuclear explosive device. Yet

the Libyan nuclear weapons project made almost no headway, and Qaddafi gave

up his program in . Indeed, when the IAEA inspectors came to cart away the

contraband equipment, they found much of it still in its original packing crates. In

the words of the blue-ribbon Robb-Silberman commission’s report to the U.S. pre-

sident, the Libyan case underscores the need to avoid making “a fundamental

analytical error—simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean that it

can put them together and make them work.”

290 Jacques E. C. Hymans

The second danger for nonproliferation stems from the global diffusion of cru-

cial scientific knowledge and practical techniques. This process of diffusion has

been greatly accelerated over the years by “Atoms for Peace” policies of inter-

national civil nuclear cooperation. It is undeniable that some scientists and engin-

eers from developing countries have taken advantage of the openness of Western

nuclear laboratories to advance their states’ nuclear weapons projects. For

instance, A. Q. Khan was able to learn his diabolical trade while working in

Holland for the European uranium enrichment consortium URENCO. But

Western scientific openness has also had good consequences for nonproliferation.

For one thing, developing countries’ support for the NPT regime depends in part

on the advanced states remaining true to their promise to spread the benefits of

civilian nuclear power worldwide. Understanding this basic bargain, the IAEA

still pointedly calls itself “the Atoms for Peace agency.” In addition, and perhaps

even more importantly, the spirit of Atoms for Peace has allowed many S&T

workers from developing countries to enjoy formative experiences in the West

that subtly but powerfully turn them against participating in a nuclear weapons

project back home. Their socialization into the cosmopolitan world of science is

a major plus for nonproliferation, because if a state’s S&T professionals do not

want to build the bomb, its top leadership is going to have to wait a very long

time to get it.

Take the case of Yugoslavia. The country’s president for life, Josip Broz Tito,

promoted a very suspicious dual-use nuclear program from the late s onward,

and later explicitly ordered his scientists to produce the bomb. Tito may have

thought his ambitions were within reach because, starting in the early s,

many young Yugoslav scientists and engineers received advanced education and

training in top North American and European nuclear laboratories, learning

much potentially dangerous nuclear knowledge. But they also learned that most

of the world’s top scientists find nuclear weapons loathsome and scientifically

uninteresting. And they learned that they could better advance their careers by

taking up positions outside Yugoslavia. Armed with this knowledge, thousands

of Yugoslav scientists, engineers, metallurgists, and other S&T professionals—

including several key members of Tito’s original nuclear brain trust—made the

choice to leave home for greener pastures in the West. Moreover, some of those

who decided to keep working for Yugoslavia used their international connections

to try to rein in the regime’s military nuclear ambitions. The physicist Ivan Supek

became a prominent anti-nuclear activist, and the engineers Dragoslav Popović

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 291

and Slobodan Nakićenović successively served as director of the IAEA nonproli-
feration safeguards department during the s and s. Meanwhile, the

once-ominous Yugoslav nuclear program gradually spiraled downward “from

‘Big Science’ to Nullity,” to quote the historian Dušan Ražem.

The third danger for nonproliferation stems from the possibility of a “brain

drain” of nuclear S&T workers streaming out of the advanced countries them-

selves. In particular, a common worry in the post–cold war world has been that

just a handful of unemployed ex-Soviet nuclear weaponeers could provide the

“missing link” that transforms nuclear wannabes into genuine nuclear threats.

We have indeed seen an exodus of S&T workers from the former Soviet states

since the early s, but this brain drain has overwhelmingly headed in the

same direction as earlier ones: to North America and Western Europe.

Furthermore, it is necessary to realize that would-be nuclear states do not receive

employment inquiries only from top-notch ex-Soviet weaponeers; they also hear

from many con men, kooks, and spies. How can scientifically challenged, poorly

managed developing countries tell the difference? Often, they cannot.

Argentina is an interesting case in point. At the end of World War II, the

Argentine state recruited at least  scientists and engineers from devastated

Nazi Germany to industrialize its economy and develop advanced military equip-

ment. In , strongman President Juan Perón tapped one of them, an Austrian

physicist named Ronald Richter, to launch a secretive nuclear program aiming to

produce controlled fusion, the holy grail of nuclear researchers. Like a James

Bond villain, Richter proceeded to build a large laboratory on a secluded island

in the Andes Mountains, and four years later he informed Perón that he had

achieved the promised scientific breakthrough. However, not long after Perón

had proudly announced to the world Argentina’s achievement of controlled

fusion, it became clear that Richter was badly misinterpreting the results of his

own experiment. In retrospect, this was hardly surprising, as Richter was a mix-

ture of con man and madman, with zero peer-reviewed publications to his

name. Meanwhile, by throwing his weight behind Richter so completely, Perón

definitively lost the support of Argentina’s own scientific establishment. The

head of the Argentine Physics Association, Enrique Gaviola, said that he would

henceforth be willing to serve the president in one capacity only: as a member

of Richter’s firing squad.

In sum, although many would-be nuclear weapon states today can be expected

to try to acquire foreign-produced hardware, software, and brainpower in pursuit

292 Jacques E. C. Hymans

of their goal, these efforts are unlikely to reverse the great proliferation slowdown.

In fact, as globalization has accelerated, the slowdown has become ever more pro-

nounced. The efficiency of nuclear weapons projects still depends heavily on the

quality of management, and thankfully, high-quality management of nuclear

weapons projects has become very uncommon.

Policy Implications of the Great Proliferation

Slowdown

American liberals and conservatives today are deeply divided on an incredibly

long list of issues, but one thing they share in common is the perception that

nuclear proliferation poses the single greatest threat to American national secur-

ity. In order to fend off this much-feared outcome, many policy-makers and

activists of different ideological stripes have pushed for a radical rethinking of

some of the country’s traditional core foreign policy principles. In particular, the

long-standing U.S. policies of promoting open science, abstaining from preventive

first strikes, and maintaining a large nuclear deterrent force have become major

targets for at least one side of this debate. But when we recognize the durable

empirical reality of the great proliferation slowdown, the difficult policy dilemmas

that are seemingly raised by the specter of proliferation largely dissipate.

The first perceived policy dilemma pits the goal of nonproliferation against the

culture of scientific openness, one of the core values of modern civilization. Fears

of proliferation have intensified to the point where one now hears calls essentially

to return to the McMahon Act restrictions of the late s, which forbade open

discussions even of something as basic as the fission cross-section of

uranium-. But given that the McMahon Act failed to stop the diffusion of

nuclear knowledge in its own day, the idea that a reimposition of draconian

curbs on scientific interchange could prevent proliferation today is frankly prepos-

terous. Moreover, far from being a naïve giveaway to bomb-desiring dictators,

Western scientific openness substantially complicates their road to the bomb by

raising the opportunity costs that developing country S&T workers must consider

before disappearing into a nuclear weapons project. A. Q. Khan surely betrayed

the trust of his URENCO colleagues by stealing information to advance

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ambitions. But we need to weigh the Khan example

against the less well-publicized actions of people such as the Yugoslav physicist

Ivan Supek, who rewarded the trust of his Western friends by fighting against

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 293

Tito’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Would Supek have made the same choice if the

West had shunned him because of the passport he held?

The second perceived policy dilemma pits the goal of nonproliferation against

the strong international norm restricting preventive (or “preemptive”) war.

Despite the intelligence and military fiascos of the  Iraq war, acceptance of

the so-called logic of preemption remains strong in many quarters. In particular,

various current and former high-ranking officials in the United States and Israel

have urged the launching of military attacks against the relatively advanced

nuclear program of Iran. Since Iran’s nuclear work has progressed so slowly, how-

ever, these calls are at best premature. As noted previously, in January , Israeli

intelligence admitted that Iran could not build its first bomb until  or  at

the very earliest. Moreover, given the Israeli intelligence service’s self-described

tendency to “cry wolf” on the Iran nuclear issue, we should not be surprised if

that timeline is pushed back again. In short, there is still ample time for diplo-

macy to try to resolve this difficult problem peacefully.

Those advocating an attack on Iran also fail to recognize that bombing Iran’s

nuclear facilities could actually speed up the country’s attainment of its first

nuclear weapon. Although we do not know much about the internal culture of

Iran’s nuclear program, circumstantial evidence suggests that a key cause of

Iran’s nuclear sluggishness since the program’s start in the s has probably

been the reluctance of the country’s best scientists and engineers to commit them-

selves wholeheartedly to providing a bomb for the ayatollahs. But a U.S. or

Israeli military strike on the Iranian nuclear program would almost certainly

rally Iran’s S&T establishment and public opinion behind the current political lea-

dership and the military nuclear option. Indeed, it may be that such a process is

already underway, due to the recent spate of assassinations of Iranian scientists

and engineers, which are widely rumored to be Israel’s handiwork. For example,

the killing of the young chemical engineer Dr. Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan report-

edly led many students at Iran’s top universities to switch their majors to nuclear

physics and engineering. If we see such a reaction to the death of one scientist,

imagine what would happen if the Israeli Air Force were to destroy the Natanz

uranium enrichment plant. Whatever temporary damage the bombing raid

might do to Iran’s nuclear hardware, it would also surely inflame the Iranian

S&T workers’ spirit of nationalism and anti-imperialism. And in that case, the pat-

tern of slow and halting Iranian progress toward the “ultimate weapon” could

change rapidly.

294 Jacques E. C. Hymans

The third perceived policy dilemma pits the goal of nonproliferation against

America’s policy of maintaining its own nuclear deterrent. Foreign policy emi-

nences, including President Barack Obama and the so-called “four horsemen”

(Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry), have become

highly concerned that the large U.S. nuclear arsenal—which they view as the bed-

rock of national security in the short term—is undermining the cause of nonpro-

liferation, and therefore national security, in the long term. The only way out of

this dilemma, they believe, is to construct a major global nuclear disarmament

initiative that mandates specific, gradual, and verifiable reductions in the capabili-

ties of the nuclear weapon states and nuclear threshold states.

There is much to be said for the idea of reviving serious nuclear disarmament

negotiations. The United States and Russia still have enough bombs to destroy

human civilization, and China may be on its way toward becoming the third

member of this infamous club. The four horsemen’s case for a reinvigorated

nuclear disarmament push, however, leans heavily on the scenario of a coming

proliferation cascade. As I have argued, the overwhelming majority of states

have little desire to acquire a nuclear arsenal, and the few that do are proving to

be terrible at implementing that policy choice. As for terrorist groups, the notion

that they could build the bomb all by themselves is a fantasy, and the possibility

that they might be able to steal or buy what they need is already being minimized

by ongoing international efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear material stockpiles. In

other words, if the reason for nuclear disarmament is the prospect of rampant pro-

liferation, then there is little reason for nuclear disarmament.

What is more, the attempt to base the case for disarmament on the fear of pro-

liferation is likely to backfire in the domestic American political context. By stok-

ing the public’s nuclear fears in this way, advocates of disarmament could well end

up causing the bulk of the American people to demand more nuclear deterrence,

not less. Social psychologists have found that when people’s mortality is made sali-

ent to them, the typical reaction is to become more intellectually rigid and ego-

centric, more prejudiced and self-righteous, and more aggressive and violent

toward threatening “others.” In other words—to paraphrase Obama’s much-

maligned statement during the  campaign—when people feel threatened,

they often respond by clinging ever more tightly to God and their guns.

Therefore, asserting that the threat of runaway proliferation is high actually

plays straight into the hands of those who want the United States to increase its

nuclear arsenal.

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 295

If scare tactics are likely to backfire, do we therefore have no chance of getting to

nuclear zero? In fact, there might be another option. Sociologists Donald

MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi have argued that it is possible to conceive of

the “uninvention” of nuclear weapons via simple disregard rather than a grand

disarmament treaty. After all—as the national laboratories are constantly

reminding us—it is the carefully nurtured communities of weapons researchers

who are the real keepers of the nuclear flame. Therefore, if the bomb were to

be seen not as exciting and powerful, but instead as old-fashioned and useless,

this could lead, in turn, to ever-deeper budget cuts and to the gradual dissipation

of the practical knowledge that constitutes the real DNA of the nuclear estate.

Such a policy of disarmament through disregard would not be without its own

political and technical dangers, and it would require many years before fully com-

ing to fruition. But as I have argued throughout this essay, the robustness of the

great proliferation slowdown suggests that we may well be able to wait that long.

Moreover, even Obama himself has stated that his goal of a globally negotiated,

complete, and verifiable nuclear disarmament might not be achievable in his life-

time, so the respective timelines for the two strategies are not so different. And

during the transition period, the possibility that some of the old bombs still work

should provide sufficient deterrence. There was much wisdom in the old bumper

sticker: “Nuclear Weapons: Rust in Peace.”

NOTES

 See, e.g., “Davos : Kissinger Says Iran Crisis Close,” BBC News, January , , www.bbc.co.
uk/news/business-.

 Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt, “The Little Known Story of De-Proliferation: Why States Give Up
Nuclear Weapon Activities,” in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting
Nuclear Proliferation in the st Century, vol. : The Role of Theory (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, ), pp. –.

 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy
(New York: Cambridge University Press, ), esp. ch. .

 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: United Nations, ), p. .

 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York: HarperCollins, ), p. .
 What follows is a summary of the argument in Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions:
Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, ), chs.  and .

 Philipp C. Bleek, “When Did (and Didn’t) States Proliferate? Coding the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
throughout the Atomic Age,” Occasional Paper, Working Draft . ( revision), James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA.

 For a discussion of the many theoretical and practical reasons for relying on the nuclear test as the stan-
dard means of distinguishing nuclear from nonnuclear weapon states, see Jacques E. C. Hymans and
Matthew S. Gratias, “Iran and the Nuclear Threshold: Where is the Line?” The Nonproliferation
Review , no.  (March ), pp. –.

 Sheera Frenkel, “Israel: Iran slowing nuclear program, won’t have bomb before ,” McClatchy
Newspapers, January , , www.mcclatchydc.com/////israel-iran-slowing-
nuclear-program.html.

296 Jacques E. C. Hymans

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21177535

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/01/28/181276/israel-iran-slowing-nuclear-program.html

 The fact that the slowdown began in the s also falsifies the popular view that it was caused by the
increased U.S. ability to threaten preventive war after the end of the cold war. Cf. Alexandre Debs and
Nuno Monteiro, “Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War”
(Yale University, November , , unpublished), www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/
DebsMonteiro- .

 See, e.g., Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert
Oppenheimer (New York: Random House, ), pp. –; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb:
The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, – (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, ),
pp. – and ; Margaret Gowing with Lorna Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain
and Atomic Energy, –, Vol. : Policy Execution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, ), p. ;
and Gabrielle Hecht, “Political Designs: Nuclear Reactors and National Policy in Postwar France,”
Technology and Culture , no.  (October ), p. .

 Weber’s concept of legal-rational domination should not be confused with the liberal idea of the “rule of
law” as a constraint on state power. On Weber and liberalism, see David Held, Models of Democracy,
rd edition (Polity Press, ), esp. p. .

 Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an
Elusive Concept,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics , no.  (February ), pp. –.

 There is an enormous management literature that accords with these basic hypotheses, beginning with
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, ).

 Christophe Jaffrelot, “India and Pakistan: Interpreting the Divergence of Two Political Trajectories,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs , no.  (), esp. pp. –.

 Robert S. Anderson, Nucleus and Nation: Scientists, International Networks, and Power in India
(University of Chicago Press, ).

 For my complete description of the Iraqi and Chinese cases, see Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions,
chs.  and .

 John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford University Press, ).
 Chen Hong, ed., Nie Rongzhen’s Scientific and Technological Thoughts and Practice (Beijing: National

Defense Industry Press, ), p. .
 John Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear

Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, ).
 Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, ).
 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, October , , Part II.
 Robert E. Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs: The Importance of

Management,” Security Dialogue , no.  (), pp. –.
 Richard Ned Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton University Press, ), p. . Lebow also supports the use of “miracle world” counterfactuals
that do violate the minimal rewrite stricture, but he emphasizes that these are mind-bending thought
experiments, not plausible historical near-misses.

 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, –: A Failed or Impossible Task?”
International Security , no.  (Autumn ).

 James A. Russell, “Peering into the Abyss: Non-State Actors and the  Proliferation Environment,”
Nonproliferation Review , no.  (), pp. –.

 Ferenc Szasz, British Scientists and the Manhattan Project: The Los Alamos Years (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, ).

 See David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York:
The Free Press, ).

 Commission on the Intelligence Communities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March , , ch. , govinfo.library.unt.
edu/wmd/report/wmd_report .

 See www.iaea.org/About/about-iaea.html.
 For my full description of the Yugoslav case, see Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, ch. .
 Dušan Ražem, “Radiation Processing in the Former Yugoslavia, –: From ‘Big Science’ to

Nullity,” Minerva , no.  (Autumn ), pp. –.
 Dorothy S. Zinberg, “The Missing Link? Nuclear Proliferation and the International Mobility of Russian

Nuclear Experts,” UNIDIR Research Paper, no.  (New York: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, ); and Sharon K. Weiner, Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests
and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ).

the threat of nuclear proliferation: perception and reality 297

http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/DebsMonteiro2011-01

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/wmd_report

http://www.iaea.org/About/about-iaea.html

 See Mario A. J. Mariscotti, El secreto atómico de Huemul: crónica del origen de la energía atómica en la
Argentina, th ed. (Buenos Aires: Estudio Sigma, ); and Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, ch. .

 Mariscotti, El secreto atómico de Huemul, p. .
 For instance, both President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry explicitly agreed on this point in

their first televised presidential debate in the  electoral campaign. See “September , 
Debate Transcript” Commission on Presidential Debates, http://www.debates.org/index.php?
page=september---debate-transcript .

 Alisa Carrigan, “Learning to Build the Bomb,” Physics Today , no.  (December ), pp. –.
 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Iran Is Still Botching the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs online, February , ,

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles//jacques-e-c-hymans/iran-is-still-botching-the-bomb.
 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on their Own

—and Why Iran’s Might, Too,” Foreign Affairs , no.  (May/June ), pp. –.
 Lee Ferran, “After Nuke Scientist’s Murder, Iranian Students Switch Majors to Nuclear Sciences:

Official,” ABC News, January , , abcnews.go.com/Blotter/scientists-murder-iran-students-
switch-majors-official/story?id=#.UFIXxaVWt.

 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January , ; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, “Deterrence in
the Age of Nuclear Proliferation,” Wall Street Journal, March , ; and Shultz, Perry, Kissinger,
and Nunn, “Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks,” Wall Street Journal, March , .

 Miles Pomper and Meghan Warren, “Progress Since the  Washington Nuclear Security Summit:
Successes, Shortcomings, and Options for the Future,” conference paper prepared for the  Seoul
Nuclear Security Symposium, March , , cns.miis.edu/stories/_nuclear_security_summit.
htm.

 Daniela Niesta, Immo Fritsche, and Eva Jonas, “Mortality Salience and its Effects on Peace Processes: A
Review,” Social Psychology , no.  (), pp. –.

 Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of
Nuclear Weapons,” The American Journal of Sociology , no.  (July ), pp. –. See also John
Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford
University Press, ), pp. –. The most recent spin is Benjamin Sims and Christopher R.
Henke, “Repairing Credibility: Repositioning Nuclear Weapons Knowledge after the Cold War,”
Social Studies of Science , no.  (June ), pp. –.

 Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, ).

 See Benoît Pelopidas, “Perhaps Not in his Lifetime: The Missing Timeline in the Debate about Nuclear
Disarmament,” paper prepared for the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Program, San Diego, Calif.,
August , .

298 Jacques E. C. Hymans

http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=september-30-2004-debate-transcript

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139013/jacques-e-c-hymans/iran-is-still-botching-the-bomb

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/scientists-murder-iran-students-switch-majors-official/story?id=15377748%23.UFIXxa5VWt8

http://cns.miis.edu/stories/120316_nuclear_security_summit.htm

The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: Perception and Reality

Explaining the Slowdown
China’s Nuclear Miracle and Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage
Proliferation in the Age of Globalization
Policy Implications of the Great Proliferation Slowdown

The International Criminal Court on trial

Kirsten Ainley
London School of Economics

Abstract This article assesses the structure and operation of the International Criminal
Court by setting out a case for the defence of the Court, a case for its prosecution and a
verdict. Defenders of the Court suggest it has had a positive impact because: it has
accelerated moves away from politics and towards ethics in international relations; it goes
a long way towards ending impunity; it is a significant improvement on the previous
system of ad hoc tribunals; it has positive spill-over effects onto domestic criminal systems;
and because the courage of the prosecutor and trial judges has helped to establish the Court
as a force to be reckoned with. Opponents of the Court see it as mired in power politics, too
reliant on the United Nations Security Council and on state power to be truly
independent; failing to bring peace and perhaps even encouraging conflict; and starting to
resemble a neo-colonial project rather than an impartial organ of justice. The verdict on the
Court is mixed. It has gone some way to ending impunity and it is certainly an
improvement on the ad hoc tribunals. However it is inevitably a political body rather than
a purely legal institution, its use as a deterrent is as yet unproven and the expectation that
it can bring peace as well as justice is unrealistic.

Introduction

In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal
justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its
realization. We will do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you . . . to do
yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of
distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice;
that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights will be punished.
(Annan 1999)

As I write, three Congolese nationals, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, are being tried at the International Criminal Court
(ICC), based in the Netherlands. They are charged with war crimes involving the
enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of 15 into the Forces
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo and using them to participate actively in
armed hostilities in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

I am grateful to Stephanie Carvin, David Karp, George Lawson, Gerry Simpson and, in
particular, two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on this article.

Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Volume 24, Number 3, September 2011

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/11/030309–25 q 2011 Centre of International Studies

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2011.558051

Katanga and Ngudjolo are additionally charged with crimes against humanity
including sexual slavery, rape and murder. An arrest warrant for Lubanga, whose
case was the first to be heard by the Court, was issued by the ICC in February 2006,
and the DRC surrendered him to ICC custody in the same month. France
transported him to The Hague, where judges from Bolivia, Costa Rica and the UK
are hearing the case against him; a case that has been assembled by the
Argentinean prosecutor. Arrest warrants for Katanga and Ngudjolo were issued
in July 2007, and they were transferred to ICC custody in the Netherlands in late
2007 (Katanga) and early 2008 (Ngudjolo). Their trial is being heard by judges
from France, Belgium and Mali. If convicted, these men will be guilty of breaches
of a statute that was drafted at a conference of delegates from 160 states, 33 inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) and a coalition of 236 non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in Rome in 1998, and that has now been ratified by 113
states (including every country in South America, every member of the European
Union and 31 African states) and signed by a further 26. For all that the Court may
or may not be able to deliver in terms of universal justice and world peace, its very
existence is remarkable. It seems to significantly challenge those theories of
international relations that see states as self-interested units operating in an
international anarchy governed only by norms of state sovereignty and non-
intervention, and where order, regrettably perhaps, but inevitably, takes priority
over justice.

Yet is this image of the ICC—as a multilateral institution bent only on
providing justice for the ‘innocents of distant wars’—a convenient fiction? Is it
more accurate to understand this institution in a realist frame—as a body that
works to discipline weak states and to protect the powerful? An institution that
the West can use to prosecute the rest? Critics of the institution see the ICC as
deeply political, and all the worse for it. In order to impose some order on the
arguments in favour of and opposed to the Court, and to draw conclusions about
its role in the contemporary international system, this article follows the structure
(but not the order) of a legal case—with arguments presented for the defence of
the court, then arguments against it, followed by a verdict. When examining
arguments in favour of and critical of the ICC, I differentiate between those
arguments which are focused on the project of the ICC as such (that is, which are
concerned with the structure or structural position of the Court, or the content of
the Rome Statute) and those which are focused on the operation of the Court (the
way the Rome Statute is being implemented). In principle, structural elements of
the ICC would be hard to change but operational elements relatively more
straightforward to refine, so arguments which find fault with the structure should
weigh more heavily than those finding fault with process. However, as Justice
Robert Jackson observed of Nuremberg ‘courts try cases, but cases also try
courts’—process can, to some extent at least, influence structure (Jackson 1945).
The Court has not yet completed a case, and only two cases (Katanga and
Ngudjolo are being tried in the same case) have reached the trial phase, thus an
interim verdict is all I attempt below.

The official website of the Rome Statute of the ICC lists the following as
reasons for the establishment of an international criminal court: to achieve justice
for all; to end impunity; to help end conflicts; to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc
tribunals; to take over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or

310 Kirsten Ainley

unable to act; and to deter future war criminals.1 It is simply too early to establish
beyond reasonable doubt whether the Court has achieved these goals, though I
return to them explicitly in the final section and mention them where relevant
throughout. For the most part, however, a rather more prosaic standard is used to
judge the Court against: does the ICC, on balance, have a positive, negative or
negligible impact on the international system, its constituent states and their
inhabitants?

The case for the defence

The case for the defence of the Court suggests that the ICC has a positive impact.
The case is based on five claims: three structural and two operational. First, it is
claimed that the Rome Statute which established the Court is a key document in
the constitutionalisation of international relations (IR) and the process of the
establishment of the Court has accelerated the move away from power politics in
IR towards the realisation of common ethical goals. Second, given that there is a
growing consensus in the international community that atrocities should be
punished, the Court has significant advantages over ad hoc tribunals in doing so.
Third, the Rome Statute definitively establishes the individual responsibility of
perpetrators for crimes, whether or not they are members of a government,
whether or not they directly committed crimes, and whether or not they were
following orders. The Statute, it is claimed, ends impunity. The operational claims
are first, that the Court and the process of its establishment has had positive spill-
over effects in supporting domestic and hybrid criminal investigations and
prosecutions, and second, those who work at the Court have shown significant
courage in challenging not just those actors who flout international law, but also in
challenging each other to ensure that the Court lives up to the highest standards in
its legal practice.

The states, IGOs and NGOs that met in Rome in 1998 managed, against the
odds, to draw up a statute that distils a clear international criminal code from the
disparate decisions of past international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg, Tokyo,
and for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as The Hague Conventions,
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. The majority of the decisions
made at the conference on the drafting of the statute were made by consensus.
Although the United States forced a vote on the statute at the final session of the
conference, thus preventing the hoped for consensual adoption of the draft, 120
states voted in favour, with 21 abstaining and only seven voting against. After the
Rome Conference, states quickly began to ratify the statute, and it entered into
force just four years later, on 1 July 2002, once 60 ratifications had been deposited.
In 2003 the first 18 judges were inaugurated, and Luis Moreno Ocampo was
appointed as Prosecutor of the Court. ‘Situations’ (in the vocabulary of the Rome
Statute) in Uganda and the DRC were referred to the Court in 2004, and situations
in the Central African Republic and in the Darfur region of Sudan were referred in
2005. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has opened investigations in all four of
these situations, and cases against specific defendants have begun to be compiled.

1 ‘Overview’ page on the website of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, ,http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm..

The International Criminal Court on trial 311

On 8 July 2005, the court issued its first arrest warrants, for Joseph Kony, Vincent
Otti and three other officers of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda (the
warrants were under seal until 13 October 2005). On 26 January 2009 the trial
commenced of the Court’s first case: The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. On 31
March 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the OTP authorisation for the first time
to open an investigation proprio motu (that is, on his own initiative rather than
waiting for the situation to be referred by a State Party or the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC)) into the situation of crimes against humanity allegedly
committed in Kenya 2005 – 2009. Alongside these investigations, the OTP is
currently conducting preliminary analyses of situations in a number of countries
including Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia and Palestine.

This relatively swift process for the establishment and full operation of such an
innovative and potentially threatening (to state sovereignty) international
institution is all the more impressive when one considers the length of time it
took for states to write a statute to establish an international criminal court.2 As far
back as 1872, Gustav Moynier, one of the founders of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, called for the creation of a permanent international criminal
court. Yet through a century in which more than 200 million people died in wars
and conflict, many murdered by their own governments, little substantive
progress was made towards establishing a permanent institution to hold to
account those responsible for crimes against humanity (Leitenberg 2006, 1).
Provision was made in Article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles for a special
international tribunal to try ex-German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II for ‘a supreme
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’, thus
establishing the principle of individual criminal responsibility under international
law. The same article noted that the Allies would send ‘a request to the
Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in
order that he may be put on trial’. Ironically, the Netherlands, now seat of the ICC,
refused to extradite the Kaiser so no trial was held.

During the Second World War (WW2), calls were again made for an
international criminal court, but the Allies instead established ad hoc
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute individuals
for crimes against peace (known, at the time, as the crime of crimes), crimes
against humanity and war crimes. These tribunals represented a move forward in
international criminal law to the extent that they targeted individuals rather than
states or peoples as the agents responsible for international crimes, and they
rejected the principle of sovereign immunity (that is the principle that sovereigns

2 Of course, ten years may not seem swift to some readers. The claim here is not that the
establishment of the court was fast in an absolute sense but that, once a Statute had been
agreed, the Court was up and running surprising quickly given the protracted process
leading up to the Rome Conference and given the radical nature of an ICC. The Human
Rights Watch report ‘Courting History’ echoes this view that the 60 ratifications needed
before the Rome Statute entered into force were gained much faster than anticipated, and that
the Court has made significant progress since then. See Courting History, 11 July 2008, 4,
,http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62135/section/4.. Schabas claims that most people
involved in the Rome Conference thought it would take a decade or more before 60 states
had ratified the Statute: ,http://icc-observers.org/2009/03/26/icc-observers-exclusive-
interview-william-schabas-professor-of-human-rights-law-and-director-of-the-irish-centre-
for-human-rights-at-the-national-university-of-ireland-galway/..

312 Kirsten Ainley

are immune from prosecution for acts committed during their time in power). But
the tribunals were widely criticised for breaching the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege (no crime without law) by prosecuting defendants for acts which were not
defined under international treaty law as crimes at the time of their commission
and for doling out ‘victor ’s justice’. Every judge at the Tribunals was a national of
one of the victorious allies and alleged allied crimes were not investigated. In
contrast to (contested—on which more later) claims made about the ICC, the
Tribunals were as much about international politics as they were about
international law, as Gerry Simpson (1997, 9) explains:

As well as trying alleged war criminals, these trials serve as vindication of Western
progress . . . they function as moral demarcations between the accused and the
accuser, they avert attention from war crimes closer to home and, finally, they
contain the message that the untried crimes are not of this magnitude or order.

Post WW2, widespread horror at the extent of losses during the war, and shame at
the Holocaust having taken place in the heart of the ‘civilised’ world, led to an
increase in the volume and codification of law concerning state and individual
behaviour during conflict. The Geneva Conventions were revised and extended,
and in 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The General Assembly, in adopting the
Convention, also requested that the International Law Commission ‘study
the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for
the trial of persons charged with genocide’.3 The Commission reported that the
establishment of an international court to try crimes of genocide or other crimes
against humanity was both desirable and possible, and the General Assembly
established a Special Committee to prepare proposals relating to the establish-
ment of such a court. The Committee prepared a draft statute in 1951 and a revised
draft statute in 1953, but each draft tabled before the General Assembly was
rejected due to disagreements over the definitions of crimes to be covered.
However, by the end of the 1950s, the Cold War had led to such deep divisions in
UN bodies that work on an international criminal court all but ceased.

It took, rather unexpectedly, the drugs trade, and, more predictably, the end of
the Cold War and the conflicts that followed in the 1990s to reinvigorate the drive
towards a permanent Court. In June 1989, Trinidad and Tobago were struggling to
control international drug traffickers operating on their soil and requested the
International Law Commission to resume work on establishing a permanent
institution. Support for the idea grew in a wide range of states, in part because the
end of the Cold War and the supposed triumph of liberalism made an
international criminal court seem like a viable proposition, and also because, after
losing the ability to justify foreign policies by claiming them to be necessary in the
fight against communism, western democracies began to be publicly concerned
with giving their policies an ethical dimension.4 The International Law
Commission prepared a draft statute of an International Criminal Court (1994)
and a draft Code of Crimes (1996), but before a court could be established,
the UNSC came under such pressure to act over the atrocities accompanying

3 General Assembly Resolution 260 B (III), 9 December 1948.
4 See Smith and Light (2001) for an analysis of the rise of ‘ethical foreign policy’.

The International Criminal Court on trial 313

the dissolution of Yugoslavia that it created an ad hoc criminal tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in 1993.5

The genocide in Rwanda prompted the establishment of a second tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in 1994.6 The tribunals were
subsidiary organs of the UNSC, and were tasked with ‘prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be
determined by the Security Council (UNSC) upon the restoration of peace’ in the
case of Yugoslavia and ‘prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994’ in the case of Rwanda.7 These tribunals, while undoubtedly
innovative, are also territorially and temporally tightly bound in their jurisdiction,
as well as expensive and slow in carrying out their work. Funds of almost $1.9
billion (to end 2011) have paid for only 89 cases to be concluded at the ICTY since
1993 (with proceedings on-going in 15 cases, including those against Radovan
Karadzic, captured after eluding arrest for 12 years, and Ratko Mladic, still at
large). Funds of $1.6 billion (to end 2011) have paid for 50 cases to be completed at
the ICTR since 1994 (with 24 cases still in progress).8 The tribunals had some
significant successes, notably in finding Jean Kambanda of Rwanda guilty of
genocide—the first time a head of government has been convicted of the crime—
and in putting Slobodan Milosevic on trial for 66 counts of war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide. Milosevic died in custody in 2006 before a
judgment was reached, but his trial marked the first time a former head of state
had been prosecuted for such grave crimes. While the success of courts is not
marked by trials and convictions alone, the tribunals demonstrated that political
leaders are no longer safe from prosecution.

The high cost and slow pace of the tribunals, the high level of media interest in
them and the brutal nature of the crimes prosecuted by them spurred the
international community towards finally establishing an ICC. The Court it
established was built largely on consensus, but not, for the most part, on
compromise. Its provisions are far-reaching (much more so than the most
powerful states in the system can currently accept, as I discuss below) and the
existence of the Court challenges the notion of state sovereignty more than any
other institution in the contemporary global order. The Court is not an organ of the
UNSC, and the Council has limited powers over its operation—most significantly,
the Council cannot veto prosecutions by the Court. The Court is not limited to
ruling on crimes committed in international conflicts: the Rome Statute includes

5 UNSC Resolutions 808 (1993) and 827 (1993).
6 UNSC Resolution 955 (1994).
7 UNSC Resolution 827 (1993) and UNSC Resolution 955 (1994).
8 Figures taken from websites of the ICTY, ,http://www.icty.org/sid/325. and the

ICTR at ,http://69.94.11.53/default.htm.. A direct comparison between the Tribunals
and the ICC does the Court no favours – having only managed to get two cases to the trial
stage so far, it is costing approximately $135 million per year. Economies of scale should
make the comparison considerably more favourable in the future, as the set-up costs of ad
hoc tribunals will be avoided, but for now the ICC is hardly a bargain.

314 Kirsten Ainley

provision for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed in international and internal armed conflict, and also for the
prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in times of
peace. Cases can be referred to the Court by States Parties to the Statute and by the
UNSC, but they can also be instigated by the Prosecutor, who may be petitioned
by NGOs or other interested parties to open an investigation. The Court can
exercise jurisdiction in cases instigated by the Prosecutor or referred by States
Parties if either the state on whose territory the alleged crime was committed, or
the state of which the accused is a national, is a Party to the Rome Statute.
Additionally, if cases are referred by the UNSC, as is true of the situation in Darfur,
the Court can exercise effective universal jurisdiction. Specific state consent to the
jurisdiction of the Court (through ratifying the Rome Statute or accepting the ad
hoc jurisdiction of the Court) is not required in UNSC referrals, as the Council acts
under its competence in Chapter VII of the UN Charter in referring cases, and the
Charter is binding and legally enforceable on all UN member states. In short, the
Court has significant actual power over leaders and nationals of those states that
have ratified its founding Statute, and significant potential power over leaders and
nationals of those states that have not. If there is a global constitution emerging in
international politics, as an increasing number of commentators claim, then the
Rome Statute is one of the most important elements of it.9

As a centralised, permanent institution for investigating and prosecuting war
crimes, the Court has (or should have) two main structural advantages over ad
hoc tribunals: cost and efficiency. Cost savings may not be obvious yet due to
setup costs and some delays in process, but the ICC staff have achieved a great
deal since 2002, suggesting the structure itself is efficient.10 As well as creating a
functioning court from scratch, including writing administrative and operating
procedures, they have consolidated the decisions of, and learnings from, prior
international criminal tribunals into a single body of knowledge. This knowledge
is disseminated through databases designed to enable those preparing cases for
trial at the ICC (and other international or hybrid domestic – international criminal
tribunals) to access the most up-to-date and authoritative text and readings of the
substantial number of international criminal law statutes, conventions and
precedents now in existence. The ICC Legal Tools project comprises more than
44,000 documents and legal commentaries and provides legal professionals which
a (long overdue) complete library on international criminal law.11 The Court’s

9 For more discussion of international constitutionalism, see Dunoff and Trachtman
(2009); Habermas (2006); Lang (2008); Leiden Journal of International Law (2006),
contributions by Peters, de Wet and Petersmann; Reus-Smit (1997); McDonald and
Johnston (2005); Weller (forthcoming).

10 Schabas notes that there was a slow period for a few years from mid-2003 as the court
failed to begin its first trial in 2005 as predicted, but is moving forward faster now. Schabas
blames process (in the form of the Prosecutor) rather than structure for any delay.
See , http://icc-observers.org/2009/03/26/icc-observers-exclusive-interview-william-
schabas-professor-of-human-rights-law-and-director-of-the-irish-centre-for-human-rights-
at-the-national-university-of-ireland-galway/..

11 See the ICC Legal Tools Project website, ,http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Legal þ Texts þ and þ Tools/Legal þ Tools/., for more details. Maintenance and
development of the project has been outsourced to academic institutions—itself an
innovative move—since 2005.

The International Criminal Court on trial 315

efficiency is also significantly structurally increased vis-à-vis tribunals because it
does not have to wait for the UNSC to establish a tribunal in order to begin an
investigation, so it is neither held up by the slow pace of UNSC decision-making,
nor is it prevented from investigating situations that the UNSC may not be
prepared to set up tribunals for, as long as the crimes involved are committed on
the territory of, or by a national of, a State Party.

The final structural argument for the defence of the Court is the role its Statute
plays in consolidating the decisions of past tribunals on immunity.12 The Statute
seems to go a long way towards ending impunity, one of the key reasons the Court
was established, and a goal which enjoys broad support. Before the establishment
of the ICC, political leaders could generally avoid criminal prosecution or even
civil suits by claiming sovereign immunity (immunity from foreign, and
sometimes domestic, legal proceedings for acts committed in an official capacity
unless the proceedings are consensual). Exceptions were the defendants
prosecuted at Nuremberg, Tokyo and the ad hoc tribunals, but these represent
only a fraction of the political leaders and senior functionaries who bear
responsibility for atrocity over the last century. Article 27 of the Rome Statute
makes clear that official capacity is now judged to be irrelevant both to criminal
responsibility and to mitigation of sentence:

This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. . . .
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.13

Not only are leaders who order atrocities no longer immune from prosecution, nor
are those who follow their orders. Article 33 of the Statute states that the
presumption of the Court is in favour of holding the defendant criminally
responsible (‘The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been
committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior,
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility
unless . . . .’) then allows for the defence of ‘Superior Orders’ to be considered in
cases where ‘(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the
Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the
order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful’.14 Article 33
states that orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly
unlawful in every case, thus making the defence of Superior Orders only possible
in cases of war crimes (and, arguably, aggression) and even then the onus of

12 Immunity is still asserted in other branches of international law. The International
Court of Justice is currently hearing a case Germany vs Italy on Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State in which Germany claims that Italian courts have repeatedly disregarded the
jurisdictional immunity under customary international law of Germany as a sovereign state
by awarding damages to victims of Nazi war crimes during the period of German
occupation 1943 – 1945.

13 Article 27, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
14 Article 33, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

316 Kirsten Ainley

responsibility is on the defendant to know the law. Those who issue illegal orders
but do not directly perpetrate crimes are also covered by the Statute. Article 28
establishes that both military and civilian commanders can be criminally
responsible for acts committed by any subordinates who were or should have
been under their effective command and control. And many other forms of direct
and indirect perpetration of crimes are identified by Article 25 (3): a person can be
responsible for a crime committed with or through another person, a crime she
attempted, ordered, solicited, induced, facilitated, directly and publicly incited (in
respect of genocide) or in any other way intentionally contributed to.15

Arguments in favour of the Court can also be made in terms of its operational
features. Trials are underway, investigations are well-progressed and the UNSC,
States Parties and non-party states alike are referring situations to the Court or
requesting preliminary examinations to begin. Work towards the Court and its
status as a permanent and well-resourced institution have also had positive
benefits to domestic jurisdictions and to other international criminal tribunals.
The Bureau of Stocktaking of the Assembly of States Parties noted in March 2010
that:

experience with assistance to national jurisdictions in combating impunity for war

crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide shows that such assistance can have

significant and substantial spill-over effects on the entire judicial system of the State

receiving assistance. Furthermore, international cooperation in combating the most

serious international crimes can lead to cooperation with regard to other forms of

transnational criminal activity.16

Perhaps the biggest success claimed by the OTP in this respect is Colombia. When
Ocampo was appointed, he regarded the situations in the DRC and in Colombia as
the most pressing.17 However, Colombia has reacted to ICC pressure (and
pressure from the United States) by establishing the Justice and Peace laws, and
has recently claimed impressive results: ‘i) around 50,000 demobilized
individuals; ii) over 18,000 weapons given up and destroyed; iii) the main
leaders of the self-defense groups and their accomplices behind bars awaiting
trials; iv) more than 280,000 people recognized and registered as victims; v) more
than 36,000 criminal actions, previously unknown, being investigated’.18 The
Colombian government credits the OPT with promoting national proceedings by:

Facilitating contacts with independent experts . . . ; Publicly denouncing the

recruitment of child soldiers . . . ; Requesting periodic information about the

progress in the justice and peace investigations . . . ; Conducting visits to Colombia

to meet with State officials, judges, prosecutors, NGOs, and victims . . . ; Making

15 See Ainley (2011) for discussion of how the Rome Statute, while still maintaining an
expansive view of modes of liability for international crimes, is more circumspect in its
treatment of Command Responsibility and liability via indirect perpetration than have been
the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals.

16 Assembly of States Parties Report from the Bureau of Stocktaking: Complementarity,
,http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8R/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG ..

17 Pursuing International Justice: A Conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ,http://
www.cfr.org/publication/21418/pursuing_international_justice.html..

18 Colombia and the Stocktaking Exercise of the ICC, Colombian official publication,
,http://colombiaemb.org/docs/Government%20Results/Brochure%20CPI ..

The International Criminal Court on trial 317

public the decision to analyze the allegations of international networks supporting
armed groups committing crimes in Colombia.19

The ICC Review Conference, held in Kampala in June 2010, affirmed its
commitment to supporting domestic capacity building through a process of
‘positive complementarity’:

[the Review Conference] [e ]ncourages the Court, States Parties and other
stakeholders, including international organizations and civil society to further
explore ways in which to enhance the capacity of national jurisdictions to
investigate and prosecute serious crimes of international concern . . . and [r ]equests
the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties . . . to facilitate the exchange of
information between the Court, States Parties and other stakeholders, including
international organizations and civil society, aimed at strengthening domestic
jurisdictions.20

The ICC has also proved of practical benefit in offering a venue for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone’s trial of Charles Taylor, a trial judged to be impossible to
hold in Freetown due to concerns over security and potential political unrest.

Finally, the prosecutor and judges at the ICC have shown real courage in their
initial actions. Ocampo has used his office not only to focus world attention on
contemporary human rights violations by speaking at public events, and to begin
preliminary examinations of situations in states such as Afghanistan, Georgia,
Cote d’Ivoire, and Chad, without the States Parties involved having referred
themselves to the Court. He has also, somewhat sensationally, requested an arrest
warrant for Sudanese President, Omar al Bashir, on charges of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. His request was granted by the Court
in March 2009 (for a warrant on the basis of war crimes and crimes against
humanity) and in July 2010 (for a warrant on the basis of genocide). Bashir, a
sitting head of state, is now a wanted man. Whether or not charging Bashir with
these crimes was prudent will be touched upon below, but it was certainly brave
for the first prosecutor of a new Court to pursue a president.

But it is not just those who breach the law who need to beware the Court—
those who practise it are under scrutiny too. The trial judges caused an outcry in
June 2008 by suspending the first ever ICC trial (of Lubanga) on the basis that a
fair trial would not be possible as the prosecutor had not disclosed potentially
exculpatory evidence to the defence team, then by ordering the release of the
defendant (an order which was suspended on appeal).21 The judges suspended
the case again in July 2010 after the prosecutor refused to identify a key witness,
and again ordered the release of Lubanga (an order again suspended on appeal).
The Trial Chamber lifted the initial stay of proceedings in November 2008, but the

19 The International Center for Transitional Justice is much less optimistic about the
domestic accountability process in Colombia, see the ICTJ Briefing, ,http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Stocktaking/V-M.3.ICTJ_CO_RSRC-Impact ..

20 RC/Res 1 ‘Complementarity’, , http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
Resolutions/RC-Res.1-ENG ..

21 The reasoning of the judges is set out in their Decision on the Consequences of Non-
disclosure of Exculpatory Materials, ,http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.
PDF., and their Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ,http://www.icc-cpi.
int/NR/rdonlyres/3A01D0E2-39A2-47A9-82EB-012725EBF91E/277765/ICC01040106
1418ENG ..

318 Kirsten Ainley

second is still in place, demonstrating not only that the Court has in place internal
checks and balances, but also that the judges are determined to apply the highest
legal standards to the operation of the Court.

The case in defence of the Court therefore rests on robust structural claims
about the move the Court seems to signal towards more ethical and law-based
international relations, on the improvements it offers to an ad hoc system and on
the provisions in the Rome Statute to end impunity. The operational claims are
somewhat less far-reaching, but they do suggest that the early operation of the
Court has brought positive benefits in the field of complementarity in particular.
So, a solid case, one might judge, for the defence of the Court. But how does it
weigh against the case for the prosecution?

The case for the prosecution

The case against the Court suggests it either has negligible or negative impact in
international affairs and on the lives of those it seeks to protect. The case can be
constructed using two conceptual oppositions that discussions of the Court, and
international criminal justice in general, are often framed around: law versus
power politics, and justice versus peace. The Court is supposed to be the missing
link in the chain of human rights enforcement, aiming to deter atrocity and bring
about both peace and justice. It will do this, its supporters claim, by rising above
the dirty business of international politics and by prosecuting any and all
individuals guilty of the worst atrocities. In this way, it is supposed, the Court will
help to end conflict. Sceptics of this project suggest that there are structural
problems with the Court both because it has to find a place for itself alongside
powerful political bodies in the international system without becoming one itself,
and because of the assumption made in the pro-global justice discourse that peace
and justice are necessarily positively linked. Operational criticisms concern the
overbearing attitude of the current OTP in its dealings with other actors, and the
judgments made by the prosecutor over which cases to pursue and the manner in
which these are pursued.

International law has long been viewed by liberals as a solution to the
deficiencies of international politics. Politics, particularly the power politics of
sovereign nation-states, are seen as having a tendency to turn violent, evidenced
throughout the twentieth century, which leads to the conviction that politics must
be controlled by law (Kahn 2003; Rivkin and Casey 2003; 2007). There is a romantic
view, prevalent among UN and NGO advocates of the Court, that the ICC is the
instantiation of a global moral code—an institution that rises above power
politics. But the circumstances of its establishment and the first years of its
operation have shown how bound up the court is with political power and
political processes. Criticisms of the Court concern the extent to which it is itself a
political body and the extent to which it is a tool of powerful states. The accusation
that the Court is political suggests that decisions are taken, particularly by the
OTP, that reflect not just legal considerations but power or strategic considerations
about which situations or cases certain states would like the Court to pursue or
refrain from pursuing. It also concerns the extent to which the Court is
undertaking a political task—disciplining some states while insulating others—
using the language of law.

The International Criminal Court on trial 319

The ICC has had to find its place in the international arena alongside political
bodies reluctant to lose any of their influence—most significantly the UNSC and
the United States—and its relationships to these bodies will do much to determine
its future success. The Court was not automatically gifted with either authority or
legitimacy in the system—the Rome Statute was not adopted by the hoped-for
consensus in Rome, but after the majority of states at the Conference voted in
favour of it. That majority did not include the United States and China (which
voted against it), nor India (which abstained). Even though more than half of the
191 member states of the UN are now States Parties to the statute, the big players
in global politics are either absent or actively opposed. The three most powerful
states with permanent seats on the UNSC, the United States, China and Russia,
have not ratified the treaty, nor have any non-European nuclear powers, nor any
Middle Eastern states bar Jordan (the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has
accepted the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court in respect of acts committed on the
territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002, but has not ratified the Rome Statute). The
Assembly of States Parties is dominated by European, African and Latin
American states—evidence of widespread support for the Court, but hardly
indicative of global consensus which would guarantee both power and legitimacy
to the Court. The Court, therefore, and seemingly in opposition to its identity as a
legal institution, must build good working relations with political bodies.

The UNSC, one of the most powerful political institutions in the contemporary
international system, is charged with the maintenance of international peace and
security.22 As such, it took responsibility, until 2002, for ensuring that (some)
individuals who committed crimes under international law were brought to
justice, through the mechanism of ad hoc tribunals. There was much discussion at
Rome about the role the UNSC should play vis-à-vis the ICC. Non-permanent
members of the Council did not want the UNSC to be able to interfere with the
Court, through fear of the international legal process being politicised. But four of
the five permanent members (P5)—all except the UK—thought the Council
should retain significant control over the operation of the Court. In the end the
majority of states in Rome agreed to give the Council the power to defer Court
investigations and prosecutions, but only by positive vote. This means that the
Council is not in a position to approve or veto the actions of the Court. Rather, it
can defer investigations or prosecutions, but only if none of the P5 vetoes such a
resolution, and only if the Council is acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter in deferring, that is, the UNSC must determine the existence of a ‘threat to
the peace’, a ‘breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of aggression’ before it can defer.

The Court may be able to prosecute without UNSC approval, but it needs the
Council to refer cases to it when atrocities have taken place in which the
perpetrators are neither nationals of a State Party, nor have committed the acts on
the territory of a State Party. Counter to the wishes of the ‘Like-Minded Group’
(the most powerful caucus in Rome, composed of delegates from more than 60 of
the participating states and from a well organised coalition of NGOs), who
wanted the Court to have inherent jurisdiction over the crimes set out in the
Statute, the Conference, in a failed attempt to gain US support, agreed that the
Court should only have inherent jurisdiction over the territory and nationals of

22 Article 24:1 of the UN Charter.

320 Kirsten Ainley

States Parties. Situations in which the crimes committed took place on the territory
of a non-party state and were (allegedly) committed by nationals of a non-party
state must be referred to the Court by the UNSC, unless the non-party state has
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. The UNSC’s referral power, while much
less than the P5 wanted, still has significant political implications. Because the
Court cannot exercise automatic jurisdiction over atrocities, it is effectively
prevented from prosecuting crimes allegedly committed by nationals of non-
States Parties who are either members of the P5 or protected by the P5 (unless
those crimes take place on the territory of a State Party). No binding judgment, for
example, is likely to be made on Israeli leaders’ seeming contempt for
international law on proportionality and civilian protection in their attack on
the population of Gaza in 2008 – 2009 as Israel is not a State Party to the ICC, and
the United States would veto any resolution suggesting that the Council refers the
case to the Court. The Court is currently considering whether the PNA acceptance
of the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court gives it authority to prosecute for crimes
committed in the Occupied Territories, though it is unlikely to risk the wrath of the
United States by actually doing so.

Another power retained by the Council is the power to determine when acts of
aggression (that is the illegal use of force) have taken place (Article 39, UN
Charter). Aggression, the ‘crime of crimes’ at Nuremberg and Tokyo, was noted as
a crime in the Rome Statute, but it was not until the ICC Review Conference in
Kampala in 2010 that a definition of the crime was agreed. The key disagreements
revolved around whether or not charges of aggression could be prosecuted at the
Court if the UNSC had not made a prior judgment that aggression had taken
place. The P5 wanted to retain significant power to make such determinations. But
proponents of the Court argued that decisions over the material facts of a case,
especially whether a crime being prosecuted has actually taken place, should be
made by the Court itself rather than by an explicitly political body. In the end, a
complicated compromise was reached that is unlikely to satisfy either side. A
definition of the crime was agreed, along with procedures for prosecuting it, but
only at the price of giving the P5 significant protection.23 Only nationals of a State
Party can be charged with aggression, unless the UNSC refers the situation to the
Court (referrals, of course, can be prevented through use of the veto), and States
Parties to the Rome Statute can opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression.
If the Prosecutor wishes to investigate alleged aggression in the absence of a prior
UNSC resolution establishing that aggression has taken place, he must notify the
Council and wait up to six months for such a resolution to be passed before he can
proceed. The UNSC can defer investigations and prosecutions of aggression in the
same way they can defer for other crimes. Finally, the new aggression provisions
must be passed by the Assembly of States Parties by a two-thirds vote no earlier
than 1 January 2017, plus 30 States Parties must ratify the amendments, before the
Court’s jurisdiction over aggression becomes active. Van Schaack (2010, 8) notes
that the concessions made to state consent attest to ‘the extreme—if not
irrational—antipathy felt by many states toward the Council’. The problems of
aggression and the roles of the ICC and the Council in deciding whether it has

23 RC/Res 6 ‘The crime of aggression’, ,http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG ..

The International Criminal Court on trial 321

taken place, have been deferred for now, but could have significant political
ramifications in the future. A UNSC judgment that aggression has taken place
gives both the state that has been attacked, and other states that wish to assist in
repelling the aggressor (that is to participate in collective self-defence), rights
under the UN Charter to use military force. An ICC finding of aggression could be
used to infer such rights and to claim legitimacy for the retaliatory use of force.
Such a use would be incorrect, as only the UNSC can authorise force, but such
rhetoric could nevertheless be influential given the moral authority many claim
for the ICC.

The Review Conference may have succeeded in limiting UNSC power in the
Court (though only by increasing state power), but there is another problem likely
to emerge if and when the OTP can prosecute aggression. Fear of prosecution for
aggression will make force more politically difficult to use to resolve disputes.
While this may, in general, be a good thing, such an outcome would also have
victims, as the United States among others would be reluctant to answer calls to
intervene in crisis situations such as in Kosovo. The ICTY was in place when the
atrocities in Kosovo began and does not seem to have had any deterrent effect.
Thus we need to be sure that justice is better served by attempting to prosecute
those who commit atrocities rather than trying to stop them doing so via the use of
force.24 The structures of power in international relations and the constraints upon
it are undoubtedly being influenced by the Court, but it is not clear that the
influence is either substantial, or positive. The UNSC is still in a position to be able
to frustrate the operation of the Court if it wishes to do so, but it has much less
leeway than the permanent members of the Council desire.

In order to be effective, the Court needs not just the support of the UNSC, but
also the support of States Parties and non-party states. Unfortunately, this need for
state support threatens the Court’s independence. The operation of international
criminal justice has long relied on the ideological and material support of states—
for instance, the United States made the offer of a significant economic aid
package to Serbia conditional upon the extradition of Milosevic to the ICTY—and
there is no reason to think it will not do so long into the future. The ICTY relied on
SFOR (the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia) to protect its investigators and
enforce its decisions, and the ICTR relied on the ruling Rwandan Bizimungu/-
Kagame regime. The ICC has no standing military or police force and relies
entirely on goodwill and international cooperation. States must arrest suspects,
protect the Court’s investigators and enforce its decisions. There is, therefore, a
structural problem in that the court is incentivised to treat those states upon who it
relies most heavily with undue lenience or favour. Sceptics argue that it is no
coincidence that NATO and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) members have
escaped prosecution at the ICTY and ICTR respectively—without funding and
logistical support from the NATO states in the case of Yugoslavia the ICTY would
have foundered. Without cooperation from the Rwandan government over issues
such as access and visas for witnesses, the ICTR would have been rendered
incapable. With regards to the ICC, while the Court does not rely on any particular

24 See Rudolph (2001) for a discussion of whether prosecuting international crimes is a
way that states can be seen to be ‘doing something’ in the face of human rights abuse,
without having to pay the domestic costs of preventing abuse or atrocity using military
force. See Simpson (2008) on the difficulties and inadvisability of making war a crime.

322 Kirsten Ainley

state or group as heavily as the Tribunals did, it still is too reliant on US approval
or at least acquiescence to be truly neutral. If the United States supports the Court,
then Sudanese or Ugandan intransigence or opposition (see below) can be
overcome. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the Court has done little so far
that is counter to US interests, even while the United States (under the first Bush
administration) was undermining the Court at every opportunity.

The Bush administration’s attitude to much international law is well-known
(though often caricatured). Bush did not quietly oppose or ignore the ICC in the
way that India and China tend to. Rather, he ‘unsigned’ the Rome Statute, cajoled
an estimated 102 states (including many State Parties) into signing ‘bilateral
immunity agreements’ which protect US citizens and officials from the Court and
forced through UNSC Resolution 1422 which guaranteed that non-party states
contributing to peacekeeping missions were immune from the Court. His stance
eventually softened and the United States abstained in order for the UNSC to refer
the situation in Sudan to the Court in 2005, but the United States under Bush both
feared and resisted the independence of the Court. Despite widespread
excitement at the replacement of Bush with Obama and some promising rhetoric,
there are few concrete signs that the new administration will look significantly
more favourably upon the court than the Bush administration did in its later
years. But of much greater concern, the structural position of the United States as
not just any hegemon but a liberal hegemon that can take much of the credit for the
spread of international justice since 1945 means the Court is not taking the kind of
action against the behaviour of the United States and its allies in the War on Terror
that critics believe it should.

The Obama administration’s rhetoric has been relatively positive towards the
Court, but only when the Court is seen to act in US interests, fundamentally
defined in terms of national security. Obama has stated that

[t]he court has pursued charges only in cases of the most serious and systematic
crimes and it is in America’s interests that these most heinous of criminals, like the
perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur, are held accountable. These actions are a
credit to the cause of justice and deserve full American support and cooperation.25

This view has led to a commitment that the United States should cooperate with
the Court, but only ‘in a way that reflects American sovereignty and promotes
our national security interests’.26 In response to written questions by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in January 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton stated that ‘we will end hostility towards the ICC, and look for
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote US
interests by bringing war criminals to justice’.27 In March 2010, in the most
detailed statement yet on the Obama administration’s position, Harold Koh,
Legal Adviser of the US Department of State, announced a policy of ‘principled
engagement with the Court’ and offered US cooperation with the Court in those
prosecutions that are already underway (Koh 2010). At a Press Conference after

25 Quoted from report, ‘Analysis: Obama vs McCain on the ICC’, ,http://www.
globalsolutions.org/in_the_news/analysis_obama_vs_mccain_icc..

26 Quoted from report, ‘Analysis: Obama vs McCain on the ICC’, ,http://www.
globalsolutions.org/in_the_news/analysis_obama_vs_mccain_icc..

27
,http://www.amicc.org/docs/KerryClintonQFRs ..

The International Criminal Court on trial 323

the ICC Review Conference in 2010, at which the US had ‘observer ’ status,
Stephen Rapp, US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, confirmed that
the United States was offering assistance such as ‘information sharing . . . ,
witness protection and diplomatic support, and support and efforts to arrest
suspects’ to the ICC, but only where the ICC ‘is pursuing the same kind of cases
that we prosecuted through . . . international institutions in Rwanda and Sierra
Leone’ (Rapp 2010).

This may sound positive, but Obama’s position is not necessarily an
improvement on his predecessor ’s. Bush eventually realised that the Court could
work in US interests, and therefore allowed the situation in Darfur to be referred
to it, subsequently declaring that the United States would veto any UNSC
resolution requiring the ICC to defer the case once the arrest warrant for Bashir
had been issued. The Obama administration is also prepared to assist the ICC in
prosecuting others, but is still a long way from allowing the Court jurisdiction
over US territory or nationals. The president may have changed, but the United
States has not, and a seismic shift leading to US ratification of the Rome Statute is
unlikely given the US belief in the ultimate authority of its own Constitution and
traditional US reluctance to be bound by international law.28 The hopes of many
Democrats that Obama would seek domestic or international prosecution for
those who allegedly committed war crimes under the last administration have
been dashed and the new administration has expanded the policy of using
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to carry out what look like extra-judicial
executions in the War on Terror.29 The ICC is in the invidious position of coveting
support from a state that largely rejects the authority of international
humanitarian and criminal law with respect to its own actions. The reluctance
of the Court to open investigations in cases involving US allies such as Colombia
and Israel, and even more so the United States itself, leads to the Court effectively
‘avert[ing] attention from war crimes [of the powerful]’, to return to the quote
used earlier about Nuremberg (Simpson 1997, 9). Mamdani (2008) has argued that
the Court has already lost any veneer of impartiality:

[t]he fact of mutual accommodation between the world’s only superpower and an
international institution struggling to find its feet on the ground is clear if we take
into account the four countries where the ICC has launched its investigations:
Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Congo. All are places where the

28 See Kahn (2003) and Ralph (2007) for further discussion of the US position on the
Court.

29 Koh (2010) defends such strikes as legal. For analysis and critique of the position he set
out, and discussion of US use of targeted killing in general, see ‘Obama Administration
announces legal basis for drone attacks’, ,http://www.crimesofwar.org/news-obama2.
html.; ‘The Koh speech and targeting an American citizen’, ,http://opiniojuris.org/2010/
04/14/the-koh-speech-and-targeting-an-american-citizen/.; ‘Ken’s not-yet-response re
drone warfare and targeted killing and Professor Alston’s report’, ,http://opiniojuris.org/
2010/06/03/kens-not-yet-response-re-drone-warfare-and-targeted-killing-and-professor-
alstons-report/.; ‘Sentencing terrorism suspects to death—without trial’, ,http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/02/AR2010090204463.html.. The
careful but critical position of Philip Alston, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, is available here: ,http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G10/137/53/PDF/G1013753 ?OpenElement.. See paragraphs 85 – 86 in
particular.

324 Kirsten Ainley

United States has no major objection to the course chartered by ICC investigations.
Its name notwithstanding, the ICC is rapidly turning into a Western court to try
African crimes against humanity. It has targeted governments that are U.S.
adversaries and ignored actions the United States doesn’t oppose, like those of
Uganda and Rwanda in eastern Congo, effectively conferring impunity on them.

There are structural barriers to the Court acting as an independent, non-political
but still impactful institution. But there are also operational criticisms of the way
the court staff, in particular the OTP, has responded to its role. In its initial
investigations, the OTP has been perceived by its partners and the Trial Chamber
as arrogant and difficult: Phil Clark reports that the ICC has behaved not as one
institution working alongside others to achieve the common goals of peace and
justice in the DRC, but as ‘the lead organisation to which all others are
answerable’ (Clark 2008a). Clark’s research shows that the Court irritated
MONUC (the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC) and the Congolese army to
such an extent, in refusing to acknowledge their assistance in gathering evidence
and arresting suspects, that MONUC has been reluctant to work with the ICC to
arrest the LRA leaders based in north-east Congo. His work also suggests that the
breakdown of relations between MONUC and the ICC is the main reason that the
UN initially refused to let the defence team see evidence it had gathered against
Lubanga, leading to the near collapse of the trial. Clark (2008a) concludes that
‘the Court has generally failed to foster meaningful relations with UN
peacekeeping missions and other ground-level institutions that are vital to its
cause’. There is no structural reason for this failure, and in fact UN bodies should
be well-disposed towards the Court: the animosity that now exists was entirely
avoidable.

Through hard negotiation and majority votes, states as a group have afforded
the Court significantly more power than commentators expected, given the slow
process of reaching consensus on a Statute to create the Court. However they have
not established it as a truly independent institution. The Court is too much reliant
on the UNSC, in particular the P5, making the probability of prosecution at the
ICC of crimes alleged to have been committed by some of the most powerful
actors in the system almost nil. The situation is made even worse by the growing
belief among a range of state and non-state actors that the Court is worse than
ineffectual—it is actually threatening to peace.

The ICC was established in part because it was believed that a permanent
international court would help to end conflict. Peace and justice tend to be
assumed in pro-ICC discourse to be complementary: ‘few topics are of greater
importance than the fight against impunity and the struggle for peace and justice
and human rights in conflict situations in today’s world.’30 But it is the seeming
opposition of peace and justice that is receiving most attention from analysts of
international criminal law at present. The ICC issued arrest warrants for a sitting
president, Bashir of Sudan, at a time when not one but two delicate peace
processes were under threat (in the South and in Darfur), and the initial Sudanese
response to the warrants seem to confirm fears that pursuing justice in the region
will be at the expense of peace. After the first warrant was issued on 4 March 2009,
13 international aid agencies, including Oxfam, Save the Children and Médecins

30 ‘Overview’, ,http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm..

The International Criminal Court on trial 325

Sans Frontières, were expelled from the Darfur region. Peacekeepers have been
attacked, an aid worker has been killed and at least 13 aid workers have been
kidnapped since March 2009.31 Ocampo’s request for a warrant, and the
agreement to this request by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, have drawn
widespread criticism from within Sudan, from other African and Arab states, and
even from UN representatives. In November 2008, Assistant Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet told the Security Council that Ocampo’s attempts to
charge Bashir could potentially derail the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
in South Sudan, and lead to serious security threats to UN peacekeepers in Darfur.
Many UN members have indicated support for suspending ICC action if Bashir
cooperates in bringing peace to Darfur—they assume that peace will not be
possible if justice is done. The Arab League and the African Union called at the
time of the first warrant for the UN Security Council to use its powers, under
Article 16 of the ICC constitution, to suspend the case against Bashir and Security
Council members Burkina Faso, China, Libya, Russia, Uganda and Vietnam were
believed to support the plan.32 China has been particularly outspoken about the
charges against Bashir, stressing that justice threatens peace, and that peace
should be prioritised. A statement from the Foreign Ministry in March 2009 stated
that ‘China expresses its regretfulness and worry over the arrest warrant for the
Sudan president issued by the International Criminal Court. China is opposed to
any action that could interfere with the peaceful situation in Darfur and Sudan. At
the moment, the primary task of the international community is to preserve
stability in the Darfur region.’33 The United States published a ‘Sudan Strategy’ in
October 2009 that affirmed US support for ‘international efforts to bring those
responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur to justice’ but emphasised the
importance of ‘locally-owned accountability and reconciliation mechanisms that
can make peace more sustainable’ and made no mention of whether it supported
the ICC in its case against Bashir. It also offered ‘incentives’ if the Bashir
government ‘acts to improve the situation on the ground and to advance peace’.34

31 It is not clear whether the government of Sudan is directly involved in these actions,
whether they are the responsibility of groups sympathetic to Bashir or, in the case of
kidnappings, the responsibility of groups seeking to earn money through ransom demands.
It is clear that the surge in kidnappings and attacks on aid workers came soon after the first
arrest warrant for Bashir was issued, with five members of Médecins Sans Frontières
kidnapped on 11 March 2009. Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ali Youseff is
reported to have commented: ‘[a]nything that goes wrong [since the warrant] onwards I
personally attribute to the ICC decision.’ ‘Darfur: Doctors Without Borders workers
abducted’, , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/12/darfur-doctors-without-bo_
n_174206.html..

32 ‘Russia signals support to Darfur ICC deferral, UK toughens stance’, ,http://www.
sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30165.. Note that there is currently no mechanism in
the Rome Statute for the warrants to be withdrawn. Article 53 makes clear that the OTP can
decide not to pursue an investigation or prosecution if it is judged not to be in the interests
of justice to do so, but there is no procedure for actors external to the OTP to force the
withdrawal of arrest warrants already issued.

33 Quoted from ‘China calls for ICC case against Sudan president Omar al-Bashir to be
dropped’, , http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
sudan/4940876/China-calls-for-ICC-case-against-Sudan-president-Omar-al-Bashir-to-be-
dropped.html..

34 Sudan Strategy, ‘Sudan: a critical moment, a comprehensive approach’, ,http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm..

326 Kirsten Ainley

Analysts suggest that the strategy gives the United States significant ‘wiggle
room’ to do a deal with Bashir to try to get the warrants withdrawn if Bashir
cooperates to bring peace.35

There is much irony in this situation—the UNSC referred the case to the ICC
in the first place as Sudan is not a Party to the Rome Statute, so the Court would
have had no jurisdiction without the UNSC granting it. But it is also unclear
whether the attempt at justice in investigating the situation in Darfur and issuing
arrest warrants for high level government figures (on 2 May 2007 arrest warrants
were issued for Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmad Muhammad
Harun and Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kushayb) contributed to bringing about
the ceasefire the Sudanese government announced in November 2008. There is
strong feeling that the ceasefire was called by the Sudanese government in an
attempt to persuade the UNSC to suspend the ICC investigation. Payam
Akhavan (2009) has argued that ICC involvement pressured the government to
distance itself from atrocities committed by its proxy fighters the Janjaweed,
which has led to many Janjaweed defecting from the government, thus increasing
the likelihood of peace in the region. Clark (2009), in response, argued that ICC
involvement just changed the way the Sudanese government carried out
violence, attacking civilians more often itself now instead of through the
Janjaweed. The position of African states is also unclear: the African Union has
split over its opposition to the ICC, with State Parties such as Uganda, South
Africa and Botswana claiming that they would arrest Bashir if he was found on
their territory. In addition, the high level panel led by Thabo Mbeki, tasked by the
African Union (AU) in mid-2009 to find a way to resolve the conflict in Darfur,
did not condemn the ICC warrant and recommended a hybrid court and changes
to Sudanese laws to enable the accused (potentially including Bashir) to be tried.
Peace is seen in the panel report as dependent on justice. However, Chad had also
claimed that it would arrest Bashir if he was found on its territory, but in July
2010, Bashir attended a meeting of regional leaders in Chad. It was his first visit
to the territory of an ICC State Party since the first warrant for his arrest was
issued in March 2009. He subsequently visited Kenya, another State Party, to
attend the ceremony of the signing of Kenya’s new constitution. Neither state
made any attempt to arrest him. The AU justified the actions of Chad and Kenya
as follows: ‘both Chad and Kenya, being neighbours of Sudan, have an abiding
interest in ensuring peace and stability in Sudan and in promoting peace, justice

35 See, for instance: ‘The Obama strategy on Sudan: how to downplay the ICC’, ,http://
opiniojuris.org/2009/10/19/the-obama-strategy-on-sudan-how-to-downplay-the-icc/..
The Obama administration has vacillated on Sudan, sometimes seeming to take a hard line
(for instance Obama’s response to Bashir’s visit to Kenya in August 2010 was a clear rebuke
to Kenya for not arresting him: ‘I am disappointed that Kenya hosted Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir in defiance of International Criminal Court arrest warrants for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide . . . we consider it important that Kenya honor its
commitments to the ICC and to international justice’. ‘Statement by President Obama on the
promulgation of Kenya’s new constitution’, ,http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/08/27/statement-president-obama-promulgation-kenyas-new-constitution.
and sometimes preferring carrots to sticks (for instance making no mention of its support
for the ICC in the ‘Sudan Strategy’). This vacillation apparently reflects a split in the
administration as to the correct policy. See ‘Obama’s failure in Sudan’, ,http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/08/29/opinion/29kristof.html?_r ¼ 2&ref ¼ opinion..

The International Criminal Court on trial 327

and reconciliation which can only be achieved through continuous engagement
with the elected government of Sudan’.36 There is no agreement on what the
effect of the ICC in Sudan has been, and with killing in Darfur continuing, the
stakes are very high if we subsequently find out that peace, in this instance, is
threatened by attempts to bring justice.

The dilemma of how to respond to claims that justice is an obstacle to peace is
also faced by the ICC over the situation in Uganda. President Yoweri Museveni
referred the situation in Northern Uganda to the Court in 2003, reportedly after
lobbying from Ocampo (Clark 2008b, 43). The ICC was quick to take up the case,
issued arrest warrants for five of the commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army
for war crimes and crimes against humanity and claimed the Court could help to
end the 20-year conflict in six months (Apps 2005, cited in Clark and Waddell
2008, 45). However, none of the suspects have been arrested to date, and, in 2008,
when movement was finally made towards peace talks in the region, the
involvement of the ICC seemed to derail the process. Museveni refused to execute
arrest warrants for LRA commanders, and instead worked, with UN support, to
negotiate a ceasefire with the group. However, Joseph Kony, head of the LRA and
therefore a key figure in making sure that any peace deal is carried through,
refused to sign an agreement in November 2008 unless the ICC lifted the
outstanding arrest warrants for LRA leaders. As with the situation in Sudan, the
OTP has taken the position that it is an organ of justice: it has found good reasons
to think that serious breaches of international law have taken place, and it is
therefore intending to go ahead with prosecutions.37 The Court has reminded all
States Parties, which includes Uganda, that they have a duty to arrest any person
that the Court has issued a warrant against. However, the Court has also toned
down its rhetoric, claiming not that it can help end the conflict, but that justice is
necessary to punish the LRA leaders for their crimes and to undermine Uganda’s
culture of impunity.

As in Sudan, it is far from clear whether the Court is having a positive,
negative or negligible effect on peace efforts in Uganda. Some commentators are
convinced it is negative, others are less certain.38 Again, justice and peace may
have been positively linked when the Court first began investigating the situation:
the initial ICC referral and the fear of prosecution seem to have been instrumental
in bringing the LRA to the negotiating table in the first place, and the ICC’s
investigation seems to have restricted the flows of arms and resources to the LRA
from Khartoum (O’Brien 2007). Additionally, in an attempt to get the ICC to
withdraw, a special division of the Uganda High Court has been set up to try those
charged by the ICC—a significant about-turn as Museveni proposed amnesties for
the LRA leaders as recently as 2006.39 The proposed solution is still somewhat
lacking soldiers from the Ugandan armed forces, the Uganda People’s Defence

36 African Union Press Release N8 119/2010, 29 August 2010.
37 In a policy paper on the ‘Interests of Justice’ issued in September 2007, the OTP states

that ‘there is a difference between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of
peace and . . . the latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the Office of the
Prosecutor ’, , http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice ..

38 See, for instance, Dowden (2007) and Clark (2007).
39 See Quinn (2009) for detailed discussion of peace negotiations in Uganda.

328 Kirsten Ainley

Forces (UPDF), accused of atrocities during fighting in the north will not stand
trial, but it is more than could have been expected without ICC involvement.
However, critics argue that the effects of the Court are more insidious, for instance
Clark (2009) notes that ICC involvement has displaced LRA violence to north-
eastern DRC. The Court has also been accused of prolonging conflict in Northern
Uganda by issuing warrants only for LRA leaders and ignoring atrocities
committed by UPDF personnel, thus lending legitimacy to violence by
government forces in the region rather than deterring it (Clark 2009).

The Court, again, is in an invidious position. It was assumed by many ICC
supporters that peace would follow as a natural consequence of justice,
particularly once a permanent Court had been established. In fact, in two of the
situations the ICC is involved in, its involvement may be preventing peace. It is
not clear what the effect on the credibility of the ICC would be if it had to suspend
or even abandon its investigations in Sudan and Uganda in order to enable peace
deals, given that part of the rationale for prosecutions is to help bring about peace.
It may be that the Rome Statute needs to be revised to force the prosecutor to take
the interests of peace into account as well as the interests of justice when deciding
which situations and cases to pursue. However, doing this would both bring the
Court into further conflict with the UNSC, and would make it a much more
obviously political institution than it is at present. The perceived shift of the Court
away from being an impartial legal body towards the machinations of power
politics is already too pronounced for some commentators: ‘African states were
keen supporters of the Court in the early years. Now, they seem to be turning
against the Court. This is not a good development. At the same time, the United
States is warming up to the Court. Personally, I liked the court better when it had
the support of African States and was disliked by the US.’40 The structural
arguments against the court, supplemented by criticism of the early actions of the
OTP, constitute a strong case for the prosecution.

The verdict

Tempted as I am to argue that the jury is still out, it is possible to draw tentative
conclusions about the Court and the first decade of its operation. The ICC is, in
structural terms, a tremendous achievement, with significant potential to
permanently alter the vocabulary and processes of international politics. States
have created a Court with more insulation from political power than was
expected, given that the UNSC cannot veto prosecutions and the Prosecutor can
initiate investigations proprio motu. The Court is also exerting its authority in the
international realm (too much so according to its critics), by refusing to bow to
pressure to suspend the pursuit of justice for the cause of peace. However, the
effects of the Court on the situations it is investigating, and the effects of the
international power political structure on the Court, are cause for concern. The
charges against Bashir have only fuelled the view that the ICC is a neo-colonial
project in which Westerners prosecute Africans. Ocampo is examining a variety of

40 William Schabas, in interview, ,http://icc-observers.org/2009/03/26/icc-observers-
exclusive-interview-william-schabas-professor-of-human-rights-law-and-director-of-the-
irish-centre-for-human-rights-at-the-national-university-of-ireland-galway/..

The International Criminal Court on trial 329

non-African situations, and a non-African investigation and cases would certainly
help the Court to appear more global in its reach.41 But any investigation that the
Court pursues is likely to be mired in the same kinds of difficulties faced in
Uganda and Sudan. The ICC can only prosecute crimes committed after the Rome
Statute came into force in July 2002, so its early cases are often going to be
situations in which conflict is still on-going, or only recently ceased, and as such
the Court will necessarily be mired in further controversy.

It is worth reflecting on the reasons (listed in the introduction) given for the
establishment of the Court. Some of the more straightforward reasons to establish
such a Court have been vindicated. The Court is able to remedy at least some of
the deficiencies of the ad hoc tribunals. Structurally, the Court is a significant
improvement because of its permanence. No longer is international justice directly
at the mercy of the UNSC, which may or may not decide to set up ad hoc tribunals
in particular cases. The Court has, in theory and under strict conditions,
jurisdiction over any atrocity committed anywhere in the world. Operationally, as
the initial set-up costs decrease, the Court should become both cheaper and more
efficient than the tribunals. The Court has also shown itself able to take over when
national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act, most clearly in
the case of Kenya. But there are few signs that the Court is attempting to procure
cases—the policy of ‘positive complementarity’, or enhancing domestic justice
systems to mitigate the need for an ICC, enjoys broad support. It is also the case
that this policy can be abused if used to avoid opening ICC investigations into
situations which would prove unpopular with the United States and its allies,
such as Colombia and Israel.

The more utopian reasons to establish an ICC are not so obviously upheld. The
Court is not achieving justice for all, nor is it likely to. It does, however, have the
potential to achieve justice for more. This justice, delivered according to a Statute
which has been ratified by 113 states and in a permanent and publically accessible
institution presided over by judges who seem keen to hold the various organs of the
Court to high standards, should be better justice than has been possible in the past.
Similarly, impunity is significantly reduced by the wording of the Rome Statute and
the rejection of the idea that public office brings immunity is undoubtedly a positive
step. However, if State Parties to the Court continue to entertain instead of arrest a
man charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the message
sent is that being a president makes you untouchable. Equally, if states such as the
United States, China and India stay outside the Rome Statute system, it will appear
that impunity can be bought with power.

The Court is also claimed to deter future war criminals. There is some
anecdotal evidence that making commanders criminally responsible for the acts of
their subordinates deters atrocity (Akhavan 2001; Wippman 1999). But deterrence
is much less likely when committing Rome Statute crimes does not always lead to
being charged by the Court and when being charged does not lead swiftly to arrest
and trial. If there is little likelihood of political leaders facing trial, there is little
likelihood of them being deterred from employing illegal violence in pursuit of

41 To choose to investigate a situation on the basis of its location is, of course, a political
rather than a legal decision. Purists would have to reject such a choice, even if it did help to
dispel the idea that the Court is an anti-African project.

330 Kirsten Ainley

their interests in the future. Thus, instead of helping to end conflicts, the Court
may have little or no effect on them. Most concerning of all, ICC involvement in
situations such as Darfur and Northern Uganda may actually prolong conflict.

The verdict on the ICC is therefore mixed, and the most important conclusion
to draw from the foregoing analysis is the impossibility (yet) of knowing whether
the Court is either an unambiguously positive or an obviously negative addition
to international relations. It is neither an apolitical expression of global moral
consensus, staffed by saints, nor a court of victors’ justice controlled by the United
States to work in the interests of hegemony. The Court has significant power over,
and independence from, states and state-actors such as the UNSC. Yet they still
have more influence on the Court than ICC supporters would wish. And the
power of the Court translates, inevitably, into political power. The Court is a
political institution that does its business using the language of law; a project of
‘legalistic politics’ in which politics and law are inevitably intertwined, because
‘[u]ltimately, war crimes trials pursue political ends through jurisprudential
means’ (Simpson 2007, 23 – 24). Those ends may be admirable, for instance, the
Court may work to prevent those with political power from abusing it and
attacking their own citizens or the citizens of other states. The ends may be
regrettable, for instance the Court may discipline weak states and bolster strong
ones. But they are always and inevitably political. And the political power of state
actors will always and inevitably impact upon the Court: it is one institution
among many in the contemporary international system, and as such must interact
with and sometimes defer to others. The particular contribution of the Court is not
that it is apolitical, but that it uses the structures, language and methods of law to
change the way that politics is practised.

Equally, the Court has great potential to do good through reducing impunity
and increasing the spread of criminal justice. But it is not the solution (it may not
even be a solution) to the problem of ending atrocity. There is reason now to stop
judging the Court on whether it works in the interests of peace, and task it only
with achieving justice. The Court is not well-suited to the role of peacemaker—it is
not a tool of diplomacy and compromise. States, the UNSC and other UN bodies
are far better placed to work towards peace. If justice is a worthy goal, it must be
pursued on its own terms rather than with the utopian justification that trials can
end wars. Few believed an international criminal court possible until just over a
decade ago. It is important now to temper both the optimism and the cynicism
surrounding the institution and frame the debate around what there is evidence to
suggest such a Court can achieve. The potential of the Court to make better justice
available to more people is reason enough, for now, to support it.

Notes on contributor

Kirsten Ainley is a Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of
Economics.

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The Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane*

‘‘L
egitimacy’’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say

that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert

that it has the right to rule—where ruling includes promulgating

rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching costs to non-

compliance and/or benefits to compliance. An institution is legitimate in the so-

ciological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.
1

When people

disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, their disagreements are typically

normative. They are not disagreeing about whether they or others believe that

this institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about whether it has the

right to rule.
2

This essay addresses the normative dimension of recent legitimacy

discussions.

We articulate a global public standard for the normative legitimacy of global

governance institutions. This standard can provide the basis for principled

criticism of global governance institutions and guide reform efforts in circumstan-

ces in which people disagree deeply about the demands of global justice and the

role that global governance institutions should play in meeting them. We stake

* The authors are grateful to Sahar Akhtar, Christian Barry, Thomas Christiano, Michael Doyle, Nicole Has-

soun, Andrew Hurrell, Nan Keohane, Avery Kolers, Joseph S. Nye, John Tasioulas, and two anonymous referees

for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to William Alford, Ryan Goodman, and Gerald

L. Neuman for valuable criticisms and suggestions when such a version was presented at Harvard Law School,

November 3, 2005. We are particularly grateful to comments by Charles Beitz and a number of other colleagues

made at a workshop on the normative and empirical evaluation of global governance, Princeton University,

February 17–18, 2006. Further useful comments were made at the conference on “Legitimacy and International

Law” at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany,

June 13–14, 2006.
1 A thorough review of the sociological literature on organizational legitimacy can be found in Mark C.

Suchman, ‘‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,’’ Academy of Management

Review 20, no. 3 (1995), pp. 571–610.
2 For an excellent discussion of the inadequacy of existing standards of legitimacy for global governance in-

stitutions, see Daniel Bodansky, ‘‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for Interna-

tional Environmental Law?’’ American Journal of International Law 93, no. 3 (1999), pp. 596–624. For an impressive

earlier book on the subject, see Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 1990). Franck’s account focuses on the legitimacy of rules more than institutions and in our judg-

ment does not distinguish clearly enough between the normative and sociological senses of

legitimacy.

405

out a middle ground between an increasingly discredited conception of legitimacy

that conflates legitimacy with international legality understood as state consent,

on the one hand, and the unrealistic view that legitimacy for these institutions re-

quires the same democratic standards that are now applied to states, on the other.

Our approach to the problem of legitimacy integrates conceptual analysis and

moral reasoning with an appreciation of the fact that global governance institu-

tions are novel, still evolving, and characterized by reasonable disagreement

about what their proper goals are and what standards of justice they should

meet. Because both standards and institutions are subject to change as a result of

further reflection and action, we do not claim to discover timeless necessary and

sufficient conditions for legitimacy. Instead, we offer a principled proposal for

how the legitimacy of these institutions ought to be assessed—for the time being.

Essential to our account is the idea that to be legitimate a global governance in-

stitution must possess certain epistemic virtues that facilitate the ongoing critical

revision of its goals, through interaction with agents and organizations outside

the institution. A principled global public standard of legitimacy can help citizens

committed to democratic principles to distinguish legitimate institutions from

illegitimate ones and to achieve a reasonable congruence in their legitimacy

assessments. Were such a standard widely accepted, it could bolster public sup-

port for valuable global governance institutions that either satisfy the standard

or at least make credible efforts to do so.

‘‘Global governance institutions’’ covers a diversity of multilateral entities, in-

cluding the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund

(IMF), various environmental institutions, such as the climate change regime built

around the Kyoto Protocol, judges’ and regulators’ networks, the UN Security

Council, and the new International Criminal Court (ICC).
3

These institutions are

like governments in that they issue rules and publicly attach significant con-

sequences to compliance or failure to comply with them—and claim the authority

to do so. Nonetheless, they do not attempt to perform anything approaching a full

range of governmental functions. These institutions do not seek, as governments

do, to monopolize the legitimate use of violence within a permanently specified

territory, and their design and major actions require the consent of states.

3 A large and growing literature exists on global governance. See, for example, Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey

A. Hart, eds., Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999); Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue,

eds., Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); and David Held and

Anthony McGrew, eds., Governing Globalization (London: Polity Press, 2002).

406 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

Determining whether global governance institutions are legitimate—and

whether they are widely perceived to be so—is an urgent matter. Global gover-

nance institutions can promote international cooperation and also help to con-

struct regulatory frameworks that limit abuses by nonstate actors (from

corporations to narcotraffickers and terrorists) who exploit transnational mobi-

lity. At the same time, however, they constrain the choices facing societies, some-

times limit the exercise of sovereignty by democratic states, and impose burdens

as well as confer benefits. For example, states must belong to the WTO in order

to participate effectively in the world economy, yet WTO membership requires

accepting a large number of quite intrusive rules, authoritatively applied by its

dispute settlement system. Furthermore, individuals can be adversely affected by

global rules—for example, by the blacklists maintained by the Security Council’s

Sanctions Committee
4

or the WTO’s policies on intellectual property in ‘‘essen-

tial medicines.’’ If these institutions lack legitimacy, then their claims to authority

are unfounded and they are not entitled to our support.

Judgments about institutional legitimacy have distinctive practical implica-

tions. Generally speaking, if an institution is legitimate, then this legitimacy

should shape the character of both our responses to the claims it makes on us

and the form that our criticisms of it take. We should support or at least refrain

from interfering with legitimate institutions. Further, agents of legitimate institu-

tions deserve a kind of impersonal respect, even when we voice serious criticisms

of them. Judging an institution to be legitimate, if flawed, focuses critical dis-

course by signaling that the appropriate objective is to reform it, rather than to

reject it outright.

It is important not only that global governance institutions be legitimate,

but that they are perceived to be legitimate. The perception of legitimacy

matters, because, in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive

if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics. If one is unclear about

the appropriate standards of legitimacy or if unrealistically demanding stan-

dards are assumed, then public support for global governance institutions

may be undermined and their effectiveness in providing valuable goods may

be impaired.

4 Erika de Wet, ‘‘The Security Council as Legislator/Executive in Its Fight against Terrorism and against

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Question of Legitimacy’’ (presentation at the conference

‘‘Legitimacy and International Law,’’ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International

Law, Heidelberg, Germany, June 14, 2006).

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 407

ASSESSING LEGITIMACY

The Social Function of Legitimacy Assessments

Global governance institutions are valuable because they create norms and infor-

mation that enable member states and other actors to coordinate their behavior

in mutually beneficial ways.
5

They can reduce transaction costs, create oppor-

tunities for states and other actors to demonstrate credibility, thereby over-

coming commitment problems, and provide public goods, including rule-based,

peaceful resolutions of conflicts.
6

An institution’s ability to perform these valu-

able functions, however, may depend on whether those to whom it addresses

its rules regard them as binding and whether others within the institution’s

domain of operation support or at least do not interfere with its functioning.

It is not enough that the relevant actors agree that some institution is needed;

they must agree that this institution is worthy of support. So, for institutions to

perform their valuable coordinating functions, a higher-order coordination

problem must be solved.
7

Once an institution is in place, ongoing support for it and compliance with its

rules are sometimes simply a matter of self-interest from the perspective of

states, assuming that the institution actually achieves coordination or other ben-

efits that all or at least the more powerful actors regard as valuable.
8

Similarly,

once the rule of the road has been established and penalties for violating it are in

place, most people will find compliance with it to be rational from a purely self-

interested point of view. In the latter case, no question of legitimacy arises, be-

cause the sole function of the institution is coordination and the choice of the

particular coordination point raises no issues on which people are likely to dis-

agree. Global governance institutions are not pure coordination devices in the

way in which the rule of the road is, however. Even though all may agree that

some institution or other is needed in a specific domain (the regulation of global

trade, for example), and all may agree that any of several particular institutions is

5 The emphasis here on the coordinating function should not be misunderstood: global governance institutions

do not merely coordinate state actions in order to satisfy preexisting state preferences. As our analysis will make

clear, they can also help shape state preferences and lead to the development of new norms and institutional

goals.
6 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1984 [20th anniversary edition, 2005]).
7 James D. Fearon, ‘‘Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,’’ International Organization 52,

no. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269–306.
8 This is a major theme of Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1999).

408 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

better than the noninstitutional alternative, different parties, depending upon

their differing interests and moral perspectives, will find some feasible in-

stitutions more attractive than others. The fact that all acknowledge that it is in

their interest to achieve coordinated support for some institution or other may

not be sufficient to assure adequate support for any particular institution.

The concept of legitimacy allows various actors to coordinate their support

for particular institutions by appealing to their common capacity to be moved

by moral reasons, as distinct from purely strategic or exclusively self-interested

reasons. If legitimacy judgments are to perform this coordinating function, how-

ever, actors must not insist that only institutions that are optimal from the stand-

point of their own moral views are acceptable, since this would preclude

coordinated support in the face of diverging normative views. More specifically,

actors must not assume that an institution is worthy of support only if it is fully

just. We thus need a standard of legitimacy that is both accessible from a diver-

sity of moral standpoints and less demanding than a standard of justice. Such a

standard must appeal to various actors’ capacities to be moved by moral reasons,

but without presupposing more moral agreement than exists.

Legitimacy and Self-Interest

It is one thing to say that an institution promotes one’s interests and another to

say that it is legitimate. As Andrew Hurrell points out, the rule-following that re-

sults from a sense of legitimacy is ‘‘distinguishable from purely self-interested or

instrumental behaviour on the one hand, and from straightforward imposed or co-

ercive rule on the other.’’
9

Sometimes self-interest may speak in favor of treating

an institution’s rules as binding; that is, it can be in one’s interest to take the fact

that an institution issues a rule as a weighty reason for complying with it,

independently of a positive assessment of the content of particular rules.

This would be the case if one is likely to do better, from the standpoint of one’s

own interest, by taking the rules as binding than one would by evaluating each

particular rule as to how complying with it would affect one’s interests. Yet clearly

it makes sense to ask whether an institution that promotes one’s interests is legit-

imate. So legitimacy, understood as the right to rule, is a moral notion that cannot

be reduced to rational self-interest. To say that an institution is legitimate implies

9 Andrew Hurrell, ‘‘Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?’’ Review of International

Studies 31, supp. S1 (2005), p. 16.

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 409

that it has the right to rule even if it does not act in accordance with the rational

self-interest of everyone who is subject to its rule.

There are advantages in achieving coordinated support for institutions on the

basis of moral reasons, rather than exclusively on the basis of purely self-

interested ones. First, the appeal to moral reasons is instrumentally valuable in

securing the benefits that only institutions can provide because, as a matter of

psychological fact, moral reasons matter when we try to determine what practical

attitudes should be taken toward particular institutional arrangements. For ex-

ample, we care not only about whether an environmental regulation regime re-

duces air pollutants and thereby produces benefits for all, but also whether it

fairly distributes the costs of the benefits it provides. Given that there is wide-

spread disagreement as to which institutional arrangement would be optimal, we

need to find a shared evaluative perspective that makes it possible for us to

achieve the coordinated support required for effective institutions without re-

quiring us to disregard our most basic moral commitments. Second, and per-

haps most important, if our support for an institution is based on reasons other

than self-interest or the fear of coercion, it may be more stable. What is in our

self-interest may change as circumstances change and the threat of coercion may

not always be credible, and moral commitments can preserve support for valu-

able institutions in such circumstances.

For questions of legitimacy to arise there must be considerable moral disagree-

ment about how institutions should be designed. Yet for agreement about legit-

imacy to be reached, there must be sufficient agreement on the sorts of moral

considerations that are relevant for evaluating alternative institutional designs.

The practice of making legitimacy judgments is grounded in a complex belief—

namely, that while it is true that institutions ought to meet standards more

demanding than mere mutual benefit (relative to some relevant noninstitutional

alternative), they can be worthy of our support even if they do not maximally

serve our interests and even if they do not measure up to our highest moral

standards.
10

10 Legitimacy can also be seen as providing a ‘‘focal point’’ that helps strategic actors select one equilibrium so-

lution among others. For the classic discussion of focal points, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 3. For a critique of theories of cooperation on the basis of

focal point theory, and an application to the European Union, see Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, ‘‘Ideas,

Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market,’’ in Judith Goldstein and

Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 178–85.

410 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

Legitimacy requires not only that institutional agents are justified in carrying

out their roles, but also that those to whom institutional rules are addressed have

content-independent reasons to comply with them, and that those within the

domain of the institution’s operations have content-independent reasons to sup-

port the institution or at least to not interfere with its functioning.
11

One has a

content-independent reason to comply with a rule if and only if one has a reason

to comply regardless of any positive assessment of the content of that rule. For

example, I have a content-independent reason to comply with the rules of a club

to which I belong if I have agreed to follow them and this reason is independent

of whether I judge any particular rule to be a good or useful one.

If I acknowledge an institution as having authority, I thereby acknowledge that

there are content-independent reasons to comply with its rules or at least to not

interfere with their operation. Legitimacy disputes concern not merely what

institutional agents are morally permitted to do but also whether those to whom

the institution addresses its rules should regard it as having authority.

The debate about the legitimacy of global governance institutions engages

both the perspective of states and that of individuals. Indeed, as recent mass pro-

tests against the WTO suggest, politically mobilized individuals can adversely

affect the functioning of global governance institutions, both directly, by disrupt-

ing key meetings, and indirectly, by imposing political costs on their govern-

ments for their support of institutional policies. Legitimacy in the case of global

governance institutions, then, is the right to rule, understood to mean both

that institutional agents are morally justified in making rules and attempting to

secure compliance with them and that people subject to those rules have moral,

content-independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with others’

compliance with them.

11 Most contemporary analytic philosophical literature on legitimacy tends to focus exclusively on the legitimacy

of the state and typically assumes a very strong understanding of legitimacy. In particular, it is assumed that

legitimacy entails (1) a content-independent moral obligation to comply with all institutional rules (not just

content-independent moral reasons to comply and/or a content-independent moral obligation to not interfere

with others’ compliance), (2) being justified in using coercion to secure compliance with rules, and (3) being

justified in using coercion to exclude other actors from operating in the institution’s domain. (See, for example,

Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? For and Against

[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005]). It is far from obvious, however, that this very strong con-

ception is even the only conception of legitimacy appropriate for the state, given what is sometimes referred to

as the ‘‘unbundling’’ of sovereignty into various types of decentralized states and the existence of the European

Union. Be that as it may, this state-centered conception is too strong for global governance institutions, which

generally do not wield coercive power or claim such strong authority. For a more detailed development of this

point, see Allen Buchanan, ‘‘The Legitimacy of International Law,’’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas,

eds., The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 411

If it becomes widely believed that an institution does not measure up to stand-

ards of legitimacy, then the result may be a lack of coordination, at least until the

institution changes to conform to the standards or a new institution that better

conforms to them replaces it. Thus, it would be misleading to say simply that the

function of legitimacy judgments is to achieve coordinated support for institu-

tions; rather, their function is to make possible coordinated support based

on moral reasons, while at the same time supplying a critical but realistic

minimal moral standard by which to determine whether institutions are worthy

of support.

Justice and Legitimacy

The foregoing account of the social function of legitimacy assessments helps clar-

ify the relationship between justice and legitimacy. Collapsing legitimacy into

justice undermines the valuable social function of legitimacy assessments. There

are two reasons not to insist that only just institutions have the right to rule.

First, there is sufficient disagreement on what justice requires that such a stand-

ard for legitimacy would thwart the eminently reasonable goal of securing coor-

dinated support for valuable institutions on the basis of moral reasons. Second,

even if we all agreed on what justice requires, withholding support from institu-

tions because they fail to meet the demands of justice would be self-defeating

from the standpoint of justice itself, because progress toward justice requires

effective institutions. To mistake legitimacy for justice is to make the best the

enemy of the good.

COMPETING STANDARDS OF LEGITIMACY

Having explicated our conception of legitimacy, we now explore standards of

legitimacy: the conditions an institution must satisfy in order to have the right to

rule. In this section we articulate three candidates for the appropriate standard of

legitimacy—state consent, consent by democratic states, and global democracy—

and argue that each is inadequate.

State Consent

The first view is relatively simple. Global governance institutions are legitimate if

(and only if) they are created through state consent. In this conception, legit-

imacy is simply a matter of legality. Legally constituted institutions, created by

states according to the recognized procedures of public international law and

412 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

consistent with it, are ipso facto legitimate or at the very least enjoy a strong pre-

sumption of legitimacy.
12

Call this the International Legal Pedigree View (the

Pedigree View, for short). A more sophisticated version of the Pedigree View

would require the periodic reaffirmation of state consent, on the grounds that

states have a legitimate interest in determining whether these institutions are per-

forming as they are supposed to.
13

The Pedigree View fails because it is hard to see how state consent could ren-

der global governance institutions legitimate, given that many states are non-

democratic and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens and are

for that reason themselves illegitimate. State consent in these cases cannot trans-

fer legitimacy for the simple reason that there is no legitimacy to transfer. To as-

sert that state consent, regardless of the character of the state, is sufficient for the

legitimacy of global governance institutions is to regress to a conception of inter-

national order that fails to impose even the most minimal normative require-

ments on states. Indeed, once we abandon that deeply defective conception of

international order, it is hard to see why state consent is even a necessary con-

dition for legitimacy.

It might be argued, however, that even though the consent of illegitimate

states cannot itself make global governance institutions legitimate, there is an

important instrumental justification for treating state consent as a necessary

condition for their legitimacy: doing so provides a check on the tendency of

stronger states to exploit weak ones. In other words, persisting in the fiction that

all states—irrespective of whether they respect the basic rights of their own

citizens—are moral agents worthy of respect serves an important value. This

conception of the state, however, is not a fiction that those who take human

rights seriously can consistently accept.

The proponent of state consent might reply as follows: ‘‘My proposal is not

that we should return to the pernicious fiction of the Morality of States. Instead,

it is that we should agree, for good cosmopolitan reasons, to regard a global gov-

ernance institution as legitimate only if it enjoys the consent of all states.’’ With-

holding legitimacy from global governance institutions, no matter how valuable

12 This view was forcefully expressed by Professor Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University, in comments on a

draft of this essay.
13 For a more detailed discussion, see Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foun-

dations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. ch. 5.

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 413

they are, simply because not all states consent to them, however, would purport

to protect weaker states at the expense of giving a legitimacy veto to tyrannies.

The price is too high. Weak states are in a numerical majority in multilateral in-

stitutions. Generally speaking, they are less threatened by the dominance of

powerful states within the institutions than they are by the actions of such

powerful states acting outside of institutional constraints.

The Consent of Democratic States

The idea that state consent confers legitimacy is much more plausible when re-

stricted to democratic states. On reflection, however, the mere fact of state con-

sent, even when the state in question is democratic and satisfies whatever other

conditions are appropriate for state legitimacy, is not sufficient for the legitimacy

global governance institutions.

From the standpoint of a particular weak democratic state, participation in

global governance institutions such as the WTO is hardly voluntary, since the

state would suffer serious costs by not participating. Yet ‘‘substantial’’ voluntari-

ness is generally thought to be a necessary condition for consent to play a legit-

imating role.
14

Of course, there may be reasonable disagreements over what

counts as substantial voluntariness, but the vulnerability of individual weak states

is serious enough to undercut the view that the consent of democratic states is by

itself sufficient for legitimacy.

There is another reason why the consent of democratic states is not sufficient

for the legitimacy of global governance institutions: the problem of reconciling

democratic values with unavoidable ‘‘bureaucratic discretion’’ that plagues demo-

cratic theory at the domestic level looms even larger in the global case. The prob-

lem is that for a modern state to function, much of what state agents do will

not be subject to democratic decisions, and saying that the public has consented

in some highly general way to whatever it is that state agents do is clearly

inadequate. The difficulty is not in identifying chains of delegation stretching

from the individual citizen to state agents, but rather that at some point the

impact of the popular will on how political power is used becomes so attenuated

as to be merely nominal. Given how problematic democratic authorization is

in the modern state and given that global governance institutions require

14 For a perceptive discussion of how consent to new international trade rules in the Uruguay Round (1986–94)

was merely nominal, since the alternatives for poor countries were so unattractive, see Richard H. Steinberg, ‘‘In

the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO,’’ International

Organization 56, no. 2 (2002), pp. 339–74.

414 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

lengthening the chain of delegation, democratic state consent is not sufficient for

legitimacy.

Still, the consent of democratic states may appear to be necessary, if not suffi-

cient, for the legitimacy of global governance institutions. Indeed, it seems

obvious that for such an institution to attempt to impose its rules on democratic

states without their consent would violate the right of self-determination of the

people of those states. Matters are not so simple, however. A democratic people’s

right of self-determination is not absolute. If the majority persecutes a minority,

the fact that it does so through democratic processes does not render the state in

question immune to sanctions or even to intervention. One might accommodate

this fact by stipulating that a necessary condition for the legitimacy of global

governance institutions is that they enjoy the consent of states that are demo-

cratic and that do a credible job of respecting the rights of all their citizens.

This does not mean that all such states must consent. A few such states may

willfully seek to isolate themselves from global governance (Switzerland only

joined the UN in 2002). Furthermore, democratic states may engage in wars that

are unnecessary and unjust, and resist pressures from international institutions

to desist. It would hardly delegitimize a global governance institution established

to constrain unjust warfare that it was opposed by a democratic state that was

waging an unjust war. A more reasonable position would be that there is a strong

presumption that global governance institutions are illegitimate unless they enjoy

the ongoing consent of democratic states. Let us say, then, that ongoing consent

by rights-respecting democratic states constitutes the democratic channel of

accountability.
15

However valuable the democratic channel of accountability is, it is not suffi-

cient. First, as already noted, the problem of bureaucratic discretion that attenu-

ates the power of majoritarian processes at the domestic level seems even more

serious in the case of global bureaucracies. Second, not all the people who are af-

fected by global governance institutions are citizens of democratic states, so even

if the ongoing consent of democratic states fosters accountability, it may not fos-

ter accountability to them. If—as is the case at present—democratic states tend

to be richer and hence more powerful than nondemocratic ones, then the re-

quirement of ongoing consent by democratic states may actually foster a type of

15 How the requirement of ongoing consent should be operationalized is a complex question we need not try

to answer here; one possibility would be that the treaties creating the institution would have to be periodically

reaffirmed.

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 415

accountability that is detrimental to the interests of the world’s worst-off people.

From the standpoint of any broadly cosmopolitan moral theory, this is a deep

flaw of domestic democracies as ordinarily conceived: government is supposed

to be responsive to the interests and preferences of the ‘‘sovereign people’’—the

people whose government it is—not all people or even all people whose legitimate

interests will be seriously affected by the government’s actions.
16

For these rea-

sons, the consent of democratic states seems insufficient. The idea that the legit-

imacy of global governance institutions requires democracy on a grander scale

may seem plausible.

Global Democracy

Because democracy is now widely thought to be the gold standard for legitimacy

in the case of the state, it may seem obvious that global governance institutions

are legitimate if and only if they are democratic. And since these institutions in-

creasingly affect the welfare of people everywhere, surely this must mean that

they ought to be democratic in the sense of giving everyone an equal say in how

they operate. Call this the Global Democracy View.

The most obvious difficulty with this view is that the social and political con-

ditions for democracy are not met at the global level and there is no reason to

think that they will be in the foreseeable future. At present there is no global po-

litical structure that could provide the basis for democratic control over global

governance institutions, even if one assumes that democracy requires little direct

participation by individuals. Any attempt to create such a structure in the form

of a global democratic federation that relies on existing states as federal units

would lack legitimacy, and hence could not confer legitimacy on global gover-

nance institutions, because, as has already been noted, many states are them-

selves undemocratic or lack other qualities necessary for state legitimacy.

Furthermore, there is at present no global public—no worldwide political com-

munity constituted by a broad consensus recognizing a common domain as the

proper subject of global collective decision-making and habitually communicat-

ing with one another about public issues. Nor is there consensus on a normative

framework within which to deliberate together about a global common interest.

Indeed, there is not even a global consensus that some form of global govern-

ment, much less a global democracy, is needed or appropriate. Finally, once it is

16 Buchanan, ‘‘The Legitimacy of International Law.’’

416 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

understood that it is liberal democracy, democracy that protects individual and

minority rights, that is desirable, the Global Democracy View seems even more

unfeasible. Democracy worth aspiring to is more than elections; it includes a

complex web of institutions, including a free press and media, an active civil so-

ciety, and institutions to check abuses of power by administrative agencies and

elected officials.

Global governance institutions provide benefits that cannot be provided by

states and, as we have argued, securing those benefits may depend upon these in-

stitutions being regarded as legitimate. The value of global governance institu-

tions, therefore, warrants being more critical about the assumption that they

must be democratic on the domestic model and more willing to explore an alter-

native conception of their legitimacy. In the next section we take up this task.

A COMPLEX STANDARD OF LEGITIMACY

Desiderata for a Standard of Legitimacy

Our discussion of the social function of legitimacy assessments and our critique

of the three dominant views on the standard of legitimacy for global governance

institutions (state consent, democratic state consent, and global democracy) sug-

gest that a standard of legitimacy for such institutions should have the following

characteristics:

1. It must provide a reasonable public basis for coordinated support for the

institutions in question, on the basis of moral reasons that are widely ac-

cessible in spite of the persistence of significant moral disagreement—in

particular, about the requirements of justice.

2. It must not confuse legitimacy with justice but nonetheless must not allow

that extremely unjust institutions are legitimate.

3. It must take the ongoing consent of democratic states as a presumptive

necessary condition, though not a sufficient condition, for legitimacy.

4. Although the standard should not make authorization by a global democ-

racy a necessary condition of legitimacy, it should nonetheless promote the

key values that underlie demands for democracy.

5. It must properly reflect the dynamic character of global governance in-

stitutions: the fact that not only the means they employ, but even their

goals, may and ought to change over time.

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 417

6. It must address the two problems we encountered earlier: the problem of

bureaucratic discretion and the tendency of democratic states to disregard

the legitimate interests of foreigners.

The standard of legitimacy must therefore incorporate mechanisms for ac-

countability that are both more robust and more inclusive than that provided by

the consent of democratic states.

Moral Disagreement and Uncertainty

The first desideratum of a standard of legitimacy is complex and warrants fur-

ther explication and emphasis. We have noted that a central feature of the cir-

cumstances of legitimacy is the persistence of disagreement about, first, what the

proper goals of the institution are (given the limitations imposed by state sover-

eignty properly conceived), second, what global justice requires, and third, what

role if any the institution should play in the pursuit of global justice. Moral dis-

agreement is not unique to global governance institutions, but extends also to

the appropriate role of the state.

There are two circumstances in the case of global governance institutions,

however, that exacerbate the problem of moral disagreement. First, in the case of

the state, democratic processes, at least ideally, provide a way of accommodating

these disagreements, by providing a public process that assures every citizen that

she is being treated as an equal, through the electoral process, while, as we have

seen, democracy is unavailable at the global level. Second, although there is a

widespread perception, at least among cosmopolitans broadly speaking, that

there is serious global injustice and that the effective pursuit of global justice re-

quires a significant role for global institutions, it is not possible at present to

provide a principled specification of the division of institutional labor for pursu-

ing global justice. In part the problem is that there is no unified system of global

institutions within which a fair and effective allocation of institutional respon-

sibilities for justice can be devised. How responsibilities for justice ought to be

allocated among global institutions and between states and global institutions

depends chiefly on the answers to two questions: What are the proper respon-

sibilities of states in the pursuit of global justice, taking into account the proper

scope of state sovereignty (because this will determine how extensive the role of

global institutions should be), and what are the capabilities of various global

institutions for contributing to the pursuit of global justice? But neither of

these questions can be answered satisfactorily at present, in part because global

418 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

governance institutions are so new and in part because people have only recently

begun to think seriously about achieving justice on a global scale. So the diffi-

culty is not just that there is considerable moral disagreement about the proper

goals of global governance institutions and about the role these institutions

should play in the pursuit of global justice; there is also moral uncertainty.
17

plausible standard of legitimacy for global governance institutions must some-

how accommodate the facts of moral disagreement and uncertainty.

Three Substantive Criteria

We begin with a set of institutional attributes that have considerable intuitive

appeal:

minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and institutional integrity.

Minimal Moral Acceptability. Global governance institutions, like institutions

generally, must not persist in committing serious injustices. If they do so, they

are not entitled to our support. On our view, the primary instance of a serious

injustice is the violation of human rights. We also believe that the most plausible

conception of human rights is what might be called the basic human interest

conception. This conception, which we can only sketch in broad outlines here,

builds on Joseph Raz’s insight that rights generally are normative relations (in

particular, duties and entitlements), which, if realized, provide important protec-

tions for interests.
18

On this view, to justify the claim that R is a right, one must

identify an interest, support the claim that the interest is of sufficient moral im-

portance to ground duties, explain why the duties are owed to the right holders,

and make the case that if the normative relations in question are satisfied, sig-

nificant protection for the interest will be achieved. Certain rights are properly

called human rights because the duties they entail provide especially important

protections for basic human interests, given the standard threats to those inter-

ests in our world.

What the standard threats are can change over time. For example, when hu-

man societies create legal systems and police and courts to enforce laws, they also

create new opportunities for damaging basic human interests. For this reason,

the content of particular human rights, and even which rights are included

among the human rights, may also change, even though the basic interests that

ground them do not. For example, all human beings, regardless of where or

17 For a valuable discussion that employs a different conception of normative uncertainty, see Monica Hlavac,

‘‘A Developmental Approach to the Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’’ (unpublished paper).
18 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), n. 17.

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 419

when they exist, have a basic interest in physical security, but in a society with a

legal system backed by the coercive power of the state, adequate protection of

this interest requires rights of due process and equal protection under the law.

There is disagreement among basic interest theorists of human rights as to ex-

actly what the list of human rights includes and how the content of particular

rights is to be filled out. There is agreement, however, that the list includes the

rights to physical security, to liberty (understood as at least encompassing free-

dom from slavery, servitude, and forced occupations), and the right to subsis-

tence. Assuming that this is so, we can at least say this much: global governance

institutions (like institutions generally) are legitimate only if they do not persist

in violations of the least controversial human rights. This is a rather minimal

moral requirement for legitimacy. Yet in view of the normative disagreement

and uncertainty that characterize our attitudes toward these institutions, it might

be hard at present to justify a more extensive set of rights that all such institu-

tions are bound to respect. It would certainly be desirable to develop a more

meaningful consensus on stronger human rights standards. What this suggests is

that we should require global governance institutions to respect minimal human

rights, but also expect them to meet higher standards as we gain greater clarity

about the scope of human rights.

For many global governance institutions, it is proper to expect that they

should respect human rights, but not that they should play a major role in pro-

moting human rights. Nonetheless, a theory of legitimacy cannot ignore the fact

that in some cases the dispute over whether a global governance institution is

legitimate is in large part a disagreement over whether it is worthy of support

if it does not actively promote human rights. A proposal for a standard of legit-

imacy for global governance institutions must take into account the fact that

some of these institutions play a more direct and substantial role in securing

human rights than others.

When we see the injustices of our world and appreciate that ameliorating

them requires institutional actions, we are quick to attribute obligations to in-

stitutions and then criticize them for failing to fulfill those obligations. It is

one thing to say that it would be a good thing if a particular global governance

institution took on certain functions that would promote human rights, how-

ever, and quite another to say that it has a duty to do so and that this duty is of

such importance that failure to discharge it makes the institution illegitimate.

There are two mistakes to be avoided here. The first is ‘‘duty dumping,’’ that is,

420 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

arbitrarily assuming that some particular institution has a duty simply because

it has the resources to fulfill it and no other actor is doing so.
19

Duty dumping

not only makes unsupported attributions of institutional responsibility; it also

distracts attention from the difficult task of determining what a fair distribu-

tion of the burdens—among individuals and institutions—for protecting the

human rights in question would be. The second error derives from the first: if

one uncritically assumes that the institution has a duty to provide X and also

assumes that X is a central matter of justice (as is the case with human rights),

then one may conclude that the institution’s failure to provide X is such a seri-

ous injustice as to rob the institution of legitimacy. But the fact that an in-

stitution could provide X and the fact that X is a human right does not imply

that in refraining from providing X the institution commits a serious injustice.

That conclusion would only follow if it were established that the institution has a

duty of justice to provide X. Merely pointing out that the institution could pro-

vide X—or even showing that it is the only existing institution that can do so—is

not sufficient to show that it has a duty of justice or any duty at all to provide X.

We seem to be in a quandary. Contemporary institutions have to operate in

an environment of moral disagreement and uncertainty, which limits the de-

mands we can reasonably place on them to respect or protect particular human

rights. Furthermore, to be sufficiently general, an account of legitimacy must

avoid moral requirements that only apply to some global governance institu-

tions. These considerations suggest the appropriateness of something like the

minimal moral acceptability requirement, understood as refraining from viola-

tions of the least controversial human rights. On the other hand, the standard of

legitimacy should somehow reflect the fact that part of what is at issue in dis-

putes over the legitimacy of some of these institutions is whether they should sat-

isfy more robust demands of justice. In other words, the standard should

acknowledge the fact that where the issue of legitimacy is most urgent, there is

likely to be deep moral disagreement and uncertainty.

In our view, the way out of this impasse is to build the conditions needed for

principled, informed deliberation about moral issues into the standard of legiti-

macy itself. The standard of legitimacy should require minimal moral accept-

ability, but should also accommodate and even encourage the possibility of

developing more determinate and demanding requirements of justice for at least

19 Allen Buchanan and Matthew DeCamp, ‘‘Responsibility for Global Health,’’ Transnational Medicine (forthcoming).

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 421

some of these institutions, as a principled basis for an institutional division of

labor regarding justice emerges.

Comparative Benefit. This second substantive condition for legitimacy is rela-

tively straightforward. The justification for having global governance institutions

is primarily if not exclusively instrumental. The basic reason for states or other

addressees of institutional rules to take them as binding and for individuals

generally to support or at least to not interfere with the operation of these insti-

tutions is that they provide benefits that cannot otherwise be obtained. If an in-

stitution cannot effectively perform the functions invoked to justify its existence,

then this insufficiency undermines its claim to the right to rule.

‘‘Benefit’’ here is comparative. The legitimacy of an institution is called into

question if there is an institutional alternative, providing significantly greater

benefits, that is feasible, accessible without excessive transition costs, and meets

the minimal moral acceptability criterion. The most difficult issues, as discussed

below, concern trade-offs between comparative benefit and our other criteria.

Legitimacy is not to be confused with optimal efficacy and efficiency. The other

values that we discuss are also important in their own right; and in any case, in-

stitutional stability is a virtue. Nevertheless, if an institution steadfastly remains

instrumentally suboptimal when it could take steps to become significantly more

efficient or effective, this could impugn its legitimacy in an indirect way: it would

indicate that those in charge of the institution were either grossly incompetent or

not seriously committed to providing the benefits that were invoked to justify the

creation of the institution in the first place. For instance, as of the beginning of

2006 the United Nations faced the issue of reconstituting a Human Rights Com-

mission that had been discredited by the membership of states that notoriously

abuse human rights, with Libya serving as chair in 2003.
20

Institutional Integrity. If an institution exhibits a pattern of egregious disparity

between its actual performance, on the one hand, and its self-proclaimed proce-

dures or major goals, on the other, its legitimacy is seriously called into question.

The United Nations Oil-for-Food scandal is a case in point. The Oil-for-Food

Program was devised to enable Iraqi oil to be sold, under strict controls, to pay

for food imports under the UN-mandated sanctions of the 1990s. The purpose

20 In March 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the replacement of the Commission on Human

Rights (fifty-three members elected from slates put forward by regional groups) with a smaller Human Rights

Council elected by a two-thirds vote of members of the General Assembly (see his report ‘‘In Larger Freedom,’’

A/59/2005, para. 183).

422 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

was both to prevent malnutrition in Iraq and to counter Iraqi propaganda hold-

ing the United Nations responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of

Iraqi children, without relieving the pressure on Saddam Hussein’s regime to get

rid of its supposed weapons of mass destruction. Yet it led to a great deal of cor-

ruption. Oil-for-Food became a huge program, permitting the government of

Iraq to sell $64.2 billion of oil to 248 companies, and enabling 3,614 companies

to sell $34.5 billion of humanitarian goods to Iraq. Yet more than half of the

companies involved paid illegal surcharges or kickbacks to Saddam and his cro-

nies, resulting in large profits for corporations and pecuniary benefits for some

program administrators, including at least one high-level UN official.
21

The

most damning charge is that neither the Security Council oversight bodies nor

the Office of the Secretary-General followed the UN’s prescribed procedures for

accountability. At least when viewed in the light of the historical record of other,

perhaps less egregious failures of accountability in the use of resources on the

part of the UN, these findings have raised questions about the legitimacy of the

Security Council and the secretariat.

It also appears that an institution should be presumed to be illegitimate if its

practices or procedures predictably undermine the pursuit of the very goals in

terms of which it justifies its existence. Thus, for example, if the fundamental

character of the Security Council’s decision-making process renders that institu-

tion incapable of successfully pursuing what it now acknowledges as one of its

chief goals—stopping large-scale violations of basic human rights—this impugns

its legitimacy. To take another example, Randall Stone has shown that the IMF

during the 1990s inconsistently applied its own standards with respect to its lend-

ing, systematically relaxing enforcement on countries that had rich and powerful

patrons.
22

Similarly, if the WTO claims to provide the benefits of trade liberal-

ization to all of its members, but consistently develops policies that exclude its

weaker members from the benefits of liberalization, this undermines its claim to

legitimacy. If an institution fails to satisfy the integrity criterion, we have reason

to believe that key institutional agents are either untrustworthy or grossly in-

competent, that the institution lacks correctives for these deficiencies, and that

21 For the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program (the

Volcker Committee), dated October 27, 2005, see www.iic-offp.org/story27oct05.htm.
22 Randall W. Stone, ‘‘The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,’’ American Political Science Review 98,

no. 4 (2004), pp. 577–91. See also Randall W. Stone, Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and

the Post-Communist Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 423

the institution is therefore unlikely to be effective in providing the goods that

would give it a claim to our support.

Integrity and comparative benefit are related but distinct. If there are major

discrepancies between an institution’s behavior and its prescribed procedures

and professed goals, then we can have little confidence that it will succeed in

delivering the benefits it is supposed to provide. Integrity, however, is a more

forward-looking, dynamic virtue than comparative benefit, which measures benefit

solely in terms of the current situation. If an institution satisfies the criterion of

integrity, there is reason to be confident that institutional actors will not only

deliver the benefits that are now taken to constitute the proper goals of institu-

tional activity, but also that they will be able to maintain the institution’s effec-

tiveness if its goals change.

Epistemic Aspects of Legitimacy

Minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and institutional integrity are

plausible presumptive substantive requirements for the legitimacy of global gov-

ernance institutions. It would be excessive to claim that they are necessary condi-

tions simpliciter, because there might be extraordinary circumstances in which an

institution would fail to satisfy one or two of them, yet still reasonably be re-

garded as legitimate. This might be the case if there were no feasible and acces-

sible alternative institutional arrangement, if the noninstitutional alternative

were sufficiently grim, and if there was reason to believe that the institution had

the resources and the political will to correct the deficiency. How much we ex-

pect of an institution should depend, inter alia, upon how valuable the benefits it

provides are and whether there are acceptable, feasible alternatives to it. For ex-

ample, we might be warranted in regarding an institution as legitimate even

though it lacked integrity, if it were nonetheless providing important protections

for basic human rights and the alternatives to relying on it were even less accept-

able. In contrast, the fact that an institution is effective in incrementally liberaliz-

ing trade would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption that it is illegitimate

because it abuses human rights.
23

Our three substantive conditions are best thought of as what Rawls calls

‘‘counting principles’’: the more of them an institution satisfies, and the higher

the degree to which it satisfies them, the stronger its claim to legitimacy.
24

23 We are indebted to Andrew Hurrell for this example.
24 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

424 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

There are two limitations on the applicability of these three criteria, however.

The first is the problem of factual knowledge: being able to make reasonable judg-

ments about whether an institution satisfies any of the three substantive con-

ditions requires considerable information about the workings of the institution

and their effects in a number of domains, as well as about the likely effects of fea-

sible alternatives. Some institutions may not only fail to supply the needed in-

formation, however; they may, whether deliberately or otherwise, make such

information either impossible for outsiders to obtain or make obtaining it pro-

hibitively costly. Even if the institution does not try to limit access to the relevant

information, it may not be accessible, in suitably integrated, understandable

form.

The second difficulty with taking the three substantive conditions as jointly

sufficient for legitimacy is the problem of moral disagreement and uncertainty no-

ted earlier. Even if there is sufficient agreement on what counts as the violation of

basic human rights, there are ongoing disputes about whether some global gover-

nance institutions should meet higher moral standards. As emphasized above,

there is not only disagreement but also uncertainty as to the role that some of

these institutions should play in the pursuit of global justice, chiefly because we

do not have a coherent idea of what the institutional division of labor for achiev-

ing global justice would look like.

Furthermore, merely requiring that global governance institutions not violate

basic human rights is unresponsive to the familiar complaint that rich countries

unfairly dominate them, and that even if they provide benefits to all, the richer

members receive unjustifiably greater benefits. Although all parties may agree

that fairness matters, however, there are likely to be disagreements about what

fairness would consist of, disputes about whether fairness would suffice or

whether equality is required, and about how equality is to be understood and even

over what is to be made equal (welfare, opportunities, resources, and so on). So,

quite apart from the issue of what positive role, if any, these institutions should

play in the pursuit of global justice, there is disagreement about what standards

of fairness they should meet internally. There is also likely to be disagreement

about how unfair an institution must be to lack legitimacy. A proposal for a

public global standard of legitimacy must not gloss over these disagreements.

In the following sections we argue that the proper response to both the prob-

lem of factual knowledge and the problem of moral disagreement and uncer-

tainty is to focus on what might be called the epistemic-deliberative quality of the

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 425

institution, the extent to which the institution provides reliable information

needed for grappling with normative disagreement and uncertainty concerning

its proper functions. To lay the groundwork for that argument we begin by con-

sidering two items that are often assumed to be obvious requirements for the le-

gitimacy of global governance institutions: accountability and transparency.

Accountability. Critics of global governance institutions often complain that

they lack accountability. To understand the strengths and limitations of account-

ability as a gauge of legitimacy, we start with a skeletal but serviceable analysis of

accountability. Accountability includes three elements: first, standards that those

who are held accountable are expected to meet; second, information available to

accountability holders, who can then apply the standards in question to the per-

formance of those who are held to account; and third, the ability of these ac-

countability holders to impose sanctions—to attach costs to the failure to meet

the standards. The need for information about whether the institution is meeting

the standards accountability holders apply means that a degree of transparency

regarding the institution’s operations is essential to any form of accountability.

It is misleading to say that global governance institutions are illegitimate be-

cause they lack accountability and to suggest that the key to making them legiti-

mate is to make them accountable. Most global governance institutions,

including those whose legitimacy is most strenuously denied, include mecha-

nisms for accountability.
25

The problem is that existing patterns of account-

ability are morally inadequate. For example, the World Bank has traditionally

exhibited a high degree of accountability, but it has been accountability to the

biggest donor countries, and the Bank therefore has to act in conformity with

their interests, at least insofar as they agree. This kind of accountability does not

ensure meaningful participation by those affected by rules or due consideration

of their legitimate interests.
26

A high degree of accountability in this case may

serve to perpetuate the defects of the institution.

So accountability per se is not sufficient; it must be the right sort of accountabil-

ity. At the very least, this means that there must be effective provisions in the struc-

ture of the institution to hold institutional agents accountable for acting in ways

25 Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, ‘‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,’’ American

Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005), pp. 29–44. See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘‘Redefining

Accountability for Global Governance,’’ in Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, eds., Governance in a Global Econo-

my: Political Authority in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 386–411.
26 For a discussion, see Ngaire Woods, ‘‘Holding Intergovernmental Institutions to Account,’’ Ethics � Interna-
tional Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003), pp. 69–80.

426 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

that ensure satisfaction of the minimal moral acceptability and comparative benefit

conditions. But accountability understood in this narrow way is not sufficiently

dynamic to serve as an assurance of the legitimacy of global governance institutions,

given that in some cases there is serious disagreement about what the goals of the

institution should be and, more specifically, about what role if any the institution

should play in the pursuit of global justice. The point is that what the terms of

accountability ought to be—what standards of accountability ought to be employed,

who the accountability holders should be, and whose interests the accountability

holders should represent—cannot be definitively ascertained without knowing

what role, if any, the institution should play in the pursuit of global justice.

Therefore, what might be called narrow accountability—accountability with-

out provision for contestation of the terms of accountability—is insufficient for

legitimacy, given the facts of moral disagreement and uncertainty. Because what

constitutes appropriate accountability is itself subject to reasonable dispute, the

legitimacy of global governance institutions depends in part upon whether they

operate in such a way as to facilitate principled, factually informed deliberation

about the terms of accountability. There must be provisions for revising existing

standards of accountability and current conceptions of who the proper account-

ability holders are and whose interests they should represent.

Transparency. Achieving transparency is often touted as the proper response

to worries about the legitimacy of global governance institutions.
27

But trans-

parency by itself is inadequate. First, if transparency means merely the availability

of accurate information about how the institution works, it is insufficient even

for narrow accountability—that is, for ensuring that the institution is accurately

evaluated in accordance with the current terms of accountability. If information

about how the institution operates is to serve the end of narrow accountability, it

must be (a) accessible at reasonable cost, (b) properly integrated and interpreted,

and (c) directed to the accountability holders. Furthermore, (d) the accountability

holders must be adequately motivated to use it properly in evaluating the per-

formance of the relevant institutional agents. Second, if, as we have suggested,

the capacity for critically revising the terms of accountability is necessary for le-

gitimacy, information about how the institution works must be available not

only to those who are presently designated as accountability holders, but also to

those who may contest the terms of accountability.

27 Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003).

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 427

Broad transparency is needed for critical revisability of the terms of account-

ability. Both institutional practices and the moral principles that shape the terms

of accountability must be revisable in the light of critical reflection and discus-

sion.
28

Under conditions of broad transparency, information produced initially

to enable institutionally designated accountability holders to assess officials’ per-

formance may be appropriated by agents external to the institution, such as non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors in transnational civil

society, and used to support more fundamental criticisms, not only of the in-

stitution’s processes and structures, but even of its most fundamental goals and

its role in the pursuit of global justice.

One especially important dimension of broad transparency is responsibility for

public justification.
29

Institutional actors must offer public justifications of at least

the more controversial and consequential institutional policies and must facilitate

timely critical responses to them. Potential critics must be in a position to de-

termine whether the public justifications are cogent, whether they are consistent

with the current terms of accountability, and whether, if taken seriously, these justi-

fications call for revision of the current terms of responsibility. To help ensure this

dimension of broad transparency, it may be worthwhile to draw on, while adapting,

the notice and comment procedures of administrative law at the domestic level.
30

Earlier we noted that although comparative benefit, minimal moral acceptability,

and integrity are reasonable presumptive necessary conditions for legitimacy, it

may be difficult for those outside the institution to determine whether these condi-

tions are satisfied. We suggest that broad transparency can serve as a proxy for sat-

isfaction of the minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and integrity

criteria. For example, it may be easier for outsiders to discover that an institution is

28 For a discussion of the role of critical revisability in practical reasoning, with parallels to theoretical reasoning,

see Allen Buchanan, ‘‘Revisability and Rational Choice,’’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 3 (1975), pp. 395–408.
29 For an illuminating account of the legitimacy of health care institutions that emphasizes responsibility for justi-

fications, see Norman Daniels and James Sabin, ‘‘Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation,

and the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers,’’ Philosophy � Public Affairs 26, no. 4 (1997), pp. 303–50.
30 See Richard B. Stewart, ‘‘Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century,’’ New York University Law Review

78, no. 2 (2003), pp. 437–60; and Benedict Kingsbury, Nikon Kirsch, and Richard B. Stewart, ‘‘The Emergence of

Global Administrative Law,’’ Law and Contemporary Problems 68, nos. 3 and 4 (2005). See also Daniel Esty,

‘‘Toward Good Global Governance: The Role of Administrative Law’’ (paper presented at a conference on global

administrative law, New York University, April 21–23, 2005). See also John Wickham, ‘‘Toward a Green Multi-

lateral Investment Framework: NAFTA and the Search for Models,’’Georgetown International Environmental

Law Review 12, no. 3 (2000), pp. 617–46; James Salzman,‘‘Labor Rights, Globalization, and Institutions: The Role

and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,’’ Michigan Journal of Interna-

tional Law 21, no. 4 (2000), pp. 769–848; and OECD, Getting to Grips with Globalization: The OECD in a Chang-

ing World (Paris: OECD Publications, 2004).

428 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

not responding to demands for information relevant to determining whether it is

violating its own prescribed procedures, than to determine whether in fact it is vio-

lating them. Similarly, it may be very difficult to determine whether an institution

is comparatively effective in solving certain global problems, but much easier to tell

whether it generates—or systematically restricts access to—the information out-

siders would need to evaluate its effectiveness. If an institution persistently fails to

cooperate in making available to outsiders the information that would be needed

to determine whether the three presumptive necessary conditions are satisfied, that

by itself creates a presumption that it is illegitimate.

Legitimate global governance institutions should possess three epistemic virtues.

First, because their chief function is to achieve coordination, they must generate

and properly direct reliable information about coordination points; otherwise they

will not satisfy the condition of comparative benefit. Second, because accountability

is required to determine whether they are in fact performing their current coordi-

nating functions efficiently and effectively requires narrow transparency, they must

at least be transparent in the narrow sense. They must also have effective provisions

for integrating and interpreting the information current accountability holders

need and for directing it to them. Third, and most demanding, they must have the

capacity for revising the terms of accountability, and this requires broad trans-

parency: institutions must facilitate positive information externalities to permit in-

clusive, informed contestation of their current terms of accountability. There must

be provision for ongoing deliberation about what global justice requires and how

the institution in question fits into a division of institutional responsibilities for

achieving it.

Overcoming Informational Asymmetries

A fundamental problem of institutional accountability is that insiders generally

have better information about the institution than outsiders. Outsiders can de-

termine whether institutions enjoy the consent of states, and whether states are

democratic; but it may be very difficult for them to reach well-informed conclu-

sions about the minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and integrity

conditions. Our emphasis on epistemic institutional virtues is well suited to illu-

minate these problems of asymmetrical information.

First, if institutional agents persist in failing to provide public justifications for

their policies and withhold other information critical to the evaluation of insti-

tutional performance, we have good reason to believe the institution is not

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 429

satisfying the substantive criteria for legitimacy.
31

Second, there may be an asym-

metry of knowledge in the other direction as well, and this can have beneficial

consequences for institutional accountability. Consider issue areas such as hu-

man rights and the environment, which are richly populated with independent

NGOs that seek to monitor and criticize national governments and global gover-

nance institutions and to suggest policy alternatives. Suppose that in these do-

mains there is a division of labor among external epistemic actors. Some

individuals and groups seek information about certain types of issues, while

others focus on other aspects, each drawing on distinct but in some cases over-

lapping groups of experts. Still others specialize in integrating and interpreting

information gathered by other external epistemic actors.

The fact that the information held by external epistemic actors is dispersed

will make it difficult for institutional agents to know what is known about their

behavior or to predict when potentially damaging information may be integrated

and interpreted in ways that make it politically potent. The institutional agents’

awareness of this asymmetry will provide incentives for avoiding behavior for

which they may be criticized. A condition of productive uncertainty will exist:

although institutional agents will know that external epistemic actors do not

possess the full range of knowledge that they do, they will know that there are

many individuals and organizations gathering information about the institution.

Further, they will know that some of the information that external epistemic

actors have access to can serve as a reliable proxy for information they cannot

access. Finally, they will also know that potentially damaging information that

is currently harmless because it is dispersed among many external epistemic

agents may at any time be integrated and interpreted in such a way as to make it

politically effective, but they will not be able to predict when this will occur.

Under these conditions, institutional agents will have significant incentives to re-

frain from behavior that will attract damning criticism, despite the fundamental

asymmetry of knowledge between insiders and outsiders.

This is not to say that the effects of transparency will always be benign. In-

deed, under some circumstances transparency can have malign effects. As David

Stasavage points out, ‘‘open-door bargaining . . . encourages representatives to

31 The analogy in the economics of information is to the market for used cars. A potential buyer of a used car

would be justified in inferring poor quality if the seller were unwilling to let him have the car thoroughly exam-

ined by a competent mechanic. See George A. Akerlof, ‘‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the

Market Mechanism,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970), pp. 488–500.

430 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

posture by adopting overly aggressive bargaining positions that increase the risks

of breakdown in negotiations.’’
32

When issues combine highly charged symbolic

elements with the need for incentives, conflicts between transparency and effi-

ciency may be severe. Our claim is not that outcomes are necessarily better the

more transparent institutions are. Rather, it is that the dispersal of information

among a plurality of external epistemic actors provides some counterbalance to

informational asymmetries favoring insiders. There should be a very strong but

rebuttable presumption of transparency, because the ills of too much trans-

parency can be corrected by deeper, more sophisticated public discussion,

whereas there can be no democratic response to secret action by bureaucracies

not accountable to the public.

Furthermore, if national legislatures are to retain their relevance—if what we

have called the democratic accountability channel is to be effective—they must

be able to review the policies of global governance institutions.
33

For legislatures

to have information essential to performing these functions, they need a flow of

information from transnational civil society. Monitoring is best done pluralisti-

cally by transnational civil society, whereas the sanctions aspects of accountability

are more effectively carried out by legislatures. With respect both to the monitor-

ing and sanctioning functions, broad transparency is conducive to the principled

revisability of institutions and to their improvement through increasingly in-

clusive criticism and more deeply probing discussion over time.

Institutional agents generally have incentives to prevent outsiders from getting

information that may eventually be interpreted and integrated in damaging ways

and to deprive outsiders of information that can serve as a reliable proxy to as-

sess institutional legitimacy. The very reasons that make the epistemic virtues

valuable from the standpoint of assessing institutional legitimacy may therefore

tempt institutional agents to ensure that their institutions do not exemplify these

virtues. But institutional agents are also aware that it is important for their insti-

tutions to be widely regarded as legitimate. Outsiders deprived of access to infor-

mation are likely to react as does the prospective buyer of a used car who is

prevented from taking it to an independent mechanic. They will discount the

32 David Stasavage, ‘‘Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining,’’

International Organization 58, no. 4 (2004), pp. 667–704.
33 On the role of legislatures with respect to the legitimacy of an international legal order, see Rudiger Wolfrum,

‘‘Legitimacy in International Law: Some Introductory Considerations’’ (paper prepared for the conference

‘‘Legitimacy in International Law’’ at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International

Law, Heidelberg, Germany, June 13–14, 2006).

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 431

claims of the insiders and may conclude that the institution is illegitimate. So if

there is a broad consensus among outsiders that institutions are not legitimate

unless they exemplify the epistemic virtues, institutional agents will have a

weighty reason to ensure that their institutions do so.

Contestation and Revisability: Links to External Actors and Institutions

We have argued that the legitimacy of global governance institutions depends

upon whether there is ongoing, informed, principled contestation of their goals

and terms of accountability. This process of contestation and revision depends

upon activities of actors outside the institution. It is not enough for the institu-

tions to make information available. Other agents, whose interests and commit-

ments do not coincide too closely with those of the institution, must provide a

check on the reliability of the information, integrate it, and make it available in

understandable, usable form, to all who have a legitimate interest in the opera-

tions of the institution. Such activities can produce positive feedback, in which

appeal to standards of legitimacy by the external epistemic actors not only in-

creases compliance with existing standards but also leads to improvements in the

quality of these standards themselves. For these reasons, in the absence of global

democracy, and given the limitations of the democratic channel described ear-

lier, legitimacy depends crucially upon not only the epistemic virtues of the insti-

tution itself but also on the activities of external epistemic actors. Effective linkage

between the institution and external epistemic actors constitutes what might be

called the transnational civil society channel of accountability.

The needed external epistemic actors, if they are effective, will themselves be

institutionally organized.
34

Institutional legitimacy, then, is not simply a func-

tion of the institution’s characteristics; it also depends upon the broader institu-

tional environment in which the particular institution exists. To borrow a

biological metaphor, ours is an ecological conception of legitimacy.

All three elements of our complex standard of legitimacy are now in place.

First, global governance institutions should enjoy the ongoing consent of demo-

cratic states. That is, the democratic accountability channel must function rea-

sonably well. Second, these institutions should satisfy the substantive criteria of

minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and institutional integrity.

34 We use the term ‘‘external epistemic actor’’ here broadly, to include individuals and groups outside the

institution in question who gain knowledge about the institution, interpret and integrate such knowledge, and

exchange it with others, in ways that are intended to influence institutional behavior, whether directly or

indirectly (through the mediation of the activities of other individuals and groups).

432 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

Third, they should possess the epistemic virtues needed to make credible judg-

ments about whether the three substantive criteria are satisfied and to achieve

the ongoing contestation and critical revision of their goals, their terms of ac-

countability, and ultimately their role in a division of labor for the pursuit of

global justice, through their interaction with effective external epistemic agents.

The Complex Standard frames the legitimacy of global governance institutions

as both dynamic and relational. Its emphasis on the conditions for ongoing con-

testation and critical revision of the most basic features of the institutions cap-

tures the exceptional moral disagreement and uncertainty that characterize the

circumstances of legitimacy for this type of institution. While acknowledging the

facts of moral disagreement and uncertainty, the Complex Standard includes

provisions for developing more robust moral requirements for institutions over

time. The Complex Standard also makes it clear that whether the institution is

legitimate does not depend solely upon its own characteristics, but also upon the

epistemic-deliberative relationships between the institution and epistemic actors

outside it.

A Place for Democratic Values in the Absence of Global Democracy

Earlier we argued that it is a mistake to hold global governance institutions to

the standard of democratic legitimacy that is now widely applied to states. We

now want to suggest that when the Complex Standard of legitimacy we propose

is satisfied, important democratic values will be served. For purposes of the

present discussion we will assume, rather than argue, that among the most im-

portant democratic values are the following: first, equal regard for the funda-

mental interests of all persons; second, decision-making about the public order

through principled, collective deliberation; and third, mutual respect for persons

as beings who are guided by reasons.

If the Complex Standard of legitimacy we propose is satisfied, all three of these

values will be served. To the extent that connections between the institutions

and external epistemic actors provide access to information that is not restricted

to certain groups but available globally, it becomes harder for institutions to

continue to exclude consideration of the interests of certain groups, and we

move closer toward the ideal of equal regard for the fundamental interests of all.

Furthermore, by making information available globally, networks of external

epistemic actors are in effect addressing all people as individuals for whom moral

reasons, not just the threat of coercion, determine whether they regard an

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 433

institution’s rules as authoritative. Finally, if the Complex Standard of legitimacy

is satisfied, every feature of the institution becomes a potential object of prin-

cipled, informed, collective deliberation, and eligibility for participation in delib-

eration will not be restricted by institutional interests.
35

Consistency with Democratic Sovereignty

One source of doubts about the legitimacy of global governance institutions is

the worry that they are incompatible with democratic sovereignty. Our analysis

shows why and how global governance should constrain democratic sovereignty.

The standard of legitimacy we propose is designed inter alia to help global gover-

nance institutions correct for the tendency of democratic governments to dis-

regard the interests and preferences of those outside their own publics. It does

this chiefly in two ways. First, the emphasis on the role of external institutional

epistemic actors in achieving broad accountability helps to ensure more inclusive

representation of interests and preferences over time. Second, the requirement of

minimal moral acceptability, understood as nonviolation of basic human rights,

provides an important protection for the most vulnerable: if this condition is

met, democratic publics cannot ignore the most serious ‘‘negative externalities’’

of their policy choices. Global governance institutions that satisfy our standard of

legitimacy should not be viewed as undermining democratic sovereignty, but

rather as enabling democracies to function justly.

A legitimate global order will include human rights institutions that promote

the conditions for the proper functioning of democracy (the right to basic edu-

cation, the right to freedom of expression and association, and so on) in coun-

tries that are democratizing and help sustain these conditions in countries that

already have democratic institutions. Critics of global governance institutions

that claim they are illegitimate because they constrain democratic sovereignty

either beg the question by assuming that the ‘‘will of the people’’ should not

be constrained so as to take into account the interests of those outside their

polity or they underestimate the extent to which democracy depends upon

global governance institutions.

35 On our view, the legitimacy of global governance institutions, at present at least, does not require participation

in the critical evaluation of institutional goals and policies by all who are affected by them; but if the standard of

legitimacy we recommend were accepted, opportunities for participation would expand.

434 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

Having articulated the Complex Standard, and indicated how it reflects several

key democratic values, we can now show, briefly, how it satisfies the desiderata

for a standard of legitimacy we set out earlier.

1. The Complex Standard provides a reasonable basis for coordinated sup-

port of institutions that meet the standard, support based on moral rea-

sons that are widely accessible in the circumstances under which legitimacy

is an issue. To serve the social function of legitimacy assessments, the

Complex Standard only requires a consensus on the importance of not

violating the most widely recognized human rights, broad agreement that

comparative benefit and integrity are also presumptive necessary condi-

tions of legitimacy, and a commitment to inclusive, informed deliberation

directed toward resolving or at least reducing the moral disagreement and

uncertainty that characterize our practical attitudes toward these in-

stitutions. In other words, the Complex Standard steers a middle course

between requiring more moral agreement than is available in the circum-

stances of legitimacy and abandoning the attempt to construct a more ro-

bust, shared moral perspective from which to evaluate global governance

institutions. In particular, the Complex Standard acknowledges that the

role that these institutions ought to play in a more just world order is both

deeply contested and probably not knowable at present.

2. In requiring only minimal moral acceptability at present, the Complex

Standard acknowledges that legitimacy does not require justice, but at the

same time affirms the intuition that extreme injustice, understood as vio-

lation of the most widely recognized human rights, robs an institution of

legitimacy.

3. The Complex Standard takes the ongoing consent of democratic states to

be a presumptive necessity, though not a sufficient condition for legitimacy.

4. The Complex Standard rejects the assumption that global governance in-

stitutions cannot be legitimate unless there is global democracy, but at the

same time promotes some of the key democratic values, including in-

formed, public deliberation conducted on the assumption that every in-

dividual has standing to participate and the requirement that key

institutional policies must be publicly justified.

5. The Complex Standard reflects a proper appreciation of the dynamic, ex-

perimental character of global governance institutions and of the fact that

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 435

not only the means they employ but even the goals they pursue may and

probably should change over time.

6. The Complex Standard’s requirement of a functioning transnational civil

society channel of accountability—an array of overlapping networks of ex-

ternal epistemic actors—helps to compensate for the limitations of ac-

countability through democratic state consent.

The central argument of this essay can now be summarized. The Complex

Standard provides a reasonable basis for agreement in legitimacy assessments of

global governance institutions. When the comparative benefit condition is satis-

fied, the institution provides goods that are not readily obtainable without it.

These goods, however, can be reliably provided only if coordination is achieved,

and achieving coordination without excessive costs requires that the relevant

agents regard the institution’s rules as presumptively binding—that is, that they

take the fact that the rule is issued by the institution as a content-independent

reason for compliance. The instrumental value of institutions that satisfy the com-

parative benefit condition also gives individuals generally a content-independent

reason not to interfere with the functioning of the institutions. Satisfaction of the

minimal moral acceptability condition rules out the more serious moral objec-

tions that might otherwise undercut the instrumental reasons for supporting the

institution. Satisfaction of the other conditions of the Complex Standard, taken

together, provides moral reasons to support or at least not interfere with the insti-

tution. Among the most important of these reasons is that the institution has

epistemic virtues that facilitate the development of more demanding standards

and the progressive improvement of the institution itself. Thus, when a global

governance institution meets the demands of the Complex Standard, there is jus-

tification for saying that it has the right to rule, not merely that it is beneficial.

CONCLUSION

In this essay we have offered a proposal for a public standard of legitimacy for

global governance institutions. These institutions supply important benefits that

neither states nor traditional treaty-based relationships among states can provide,

but they are quite new, often fragile, and still evolving. Politically mobilized chal-

lenges to the legitimacy of these institutions jeopardize the support they need to

function effectively, in spite of the fact that these challenges are typically un-

principled and possibly grounded in unrealistic demands that confuse justice

436 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane

with legitimacy. A principled global public standard of legitimacy could facilitate

more responsible criticism while at the same time providing guidance for im-

provement, through a process of institutionalized, collective learning, both about

what it is reasonable to expect from global governance institutions and about

how to achieve it. Our hope is that the proposal offered in this paper serves these

purposes.

the legitimacy of global governance institutions 437

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