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ESSAY

Write a 2-3 page essay on the health of our democracy using your *digital artifact, your peers’ artifacts, and readings(uploaded). (*Digital artifact=some political cartoons which uploaded)Essay is due on Friday at 10AM. There is a grading criteria, please follow the rubric.(uploaded)

Prompt

What is a democracy? Describe 2-3 qualities of a healthy democracy. And, assess the health of our democracy. In your essay, use your digital artifact, reference at least one of your peers’ artifacts, and at least two readings from Weeks 1 and 2.

Essay should also include the following information:

What is a democracy? Draw on what you already know about democracy from your k-12 or your undergraduate courses as well as from anything you looked up in connection for this assignment. When describing the qualities of a healthy democracy that are most important to you, you may draw from the definition of democracy you chose for your artifact post and/or the definitions posted by your peers.
Assess how healthy our democracy is by doing the following:
Describe and discuss the artifact you selected to show how well our democracy is currently working, and why our democracy is working that way.
Discuss whether our democracy reflects the qualities you described.
Incorporate at least one artifact by one of your peers from the course.
Use at least two readings support your arguments/claims.
Essays must include in-text citations and a reference page in APA format.

if may help..

my description on my political cartoon:I chose this political cartoon because it reflects the trends of today’s democracy.We all know that democracy is defined as a form of government in which the people are the first and the highest authority. However, not everyone’s voice and opinion can be heard and considered. In addition, digital media become the main concern in people’s daily life. We can get informations and latest issues easily by turning on televisions and social medias. Also, media has become the main source of information transmission and value creation. Through media, we can be well informed about our community, countries and the world.But some media reports are not comprehensive, and they like to select news reports based on trends to achieve the highest attention rate. For example, negative news is always easier to catch people’s attention. Therefore, the media will filter the information to expose only a part of the information. Just like this political cartoon, there is obviously a large group of people representing positive information, but those journalists and the media only focus on negative information. So only negative information will be presented. This creates the wrong value and is misleading. Not only that, in the first paragraph of Foa and Stryuk reading has also reflected such wrong situation.

“For four decades, Die Welt, one of West Germany’s leading newspapers, refused to acknowledge the existence of an East German state. Since the paper’s editors expected the communist regime to collapse within a matter of years, they put scare quotes around its initials when- ever they discussed the German Democratic Republic (GDR). While other papers reported about the policies pursued by the GDR, Die Welt unfailingly wrote about the “GDR.”” (Foa and Stryuk, page 5). This passage proves that the newspaper as a source of information transmission refused to acknowledge some informations. However, this behavior is wrong, and the information should be presented to the public fairly.

July 2016, Volume 27, Number 3 $14.00

The Danger of Deconsolidation

Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F. Inglehart

The Struggle Over Term Limits in Africa
Brett L. Carter Janette Yarwood Filip Reyntjens

25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong?
Henry E. Hale

Suisheng Zhao on Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival
Bojan Bugari¡c & Tom Ginsburg on Postcommunist Courts

Clive H. Church & Adrian Vatter on Switzerland
Daniel O’Maley on the Internet of Things

Delegative Democracy Revisited
Santiago Anria Catherine Conaghan Frances Hagopian Lindsay Mayka

Juan Pablo Luna Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe

The DemocraTic DisconnecT

Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

Roberto Stefan Foa is a principal investigator of the World Values

Survey and fellow of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research.
His writing has appeared in a wide range of journals, books, and
publications by the UN, OECD, and World Bank. Yascha Mounk is
a lecturer on political theory in Harvard University’s Government
Department and a Carnegie Fellow at New America, a Washington,
D.C.–based think tank. His dissertation on the role of personal re-
sponsibility in contemporary politics and philosophy will be published
by Harvard University Press, and his essays have appeared in Foreign
Affairs, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal.

For four decades, Die Welt, one of West Germany’s leading newspa-
pers, refused to acknowledge the existence of an East German state.
Since the paper’s editors expected the communist regime to collapse
within a matter of years, they put scare quotes around its initials when-
ever they discussed the German Democratic Republic (GDR). While
other papers reported about the policies pursued by the GDR, Die Welt
unfailingly wrote about the “GDR.”

Sometime in the summer of 1989, the paper’s leadership finally de-
cided to give up on the pretense that the East German regime was on the
verge of collapse. The communists had been in power for so long, and
seemed so well-entrenched, that the scare quotes had become an embar-
rassing denial of reality. On 2 August 1989, reporters were allowed to
drop the scare quotes when writing about the GDR for the first time in
the paper’s history. Three months later, the Berlin Wall fell. On 3 Octo-
ber 1990, the GDR ceased to exist.

The editors of Die Welt radically misjudged the signs of the times.
At precisely the moment when they should have realized that support
for the communist regime was dwindling, they finally reconciled them-
selves to its durability. They were hardly alone. The collective failure
of social scientists, policy makers, and journalists to take seriously the

Journal of Democracy Volume 27, Number 3 July 2016
© 2016 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press

TXT saved from NEW by TB on 3/22/16 (4,606 words w/o bio). 4,799 words. TXT.
Notepad saved on 3/31/16 (made from compare docs of NEW.notepad and TXT.
notepad.old). 5,156; AAS saved from author email by TB on 4/18/16; 5,008 words.
PGS created . Updated on

The Danger of Deconsolidation

6 Journal of Democracy

possibility that the Soviet bloc might collapse should serve as a warning.
Even the best-trained and most methodologically rigorous scholars are
liable to assume that the recent past is a reliable guide to the future, and
that extreme events are not going to happen.

Three decades ago, most scholars simply assumed that the Soviet
Union would remain stable. This assumption was suddenly proven false.
Today, we have even greater confidence in the durability of the world’s
affluent, consolidated democracies. But do we have good grounds for
our democratic self-confidence? At first sight, there would seem to be
some reason for concern. Over the last three decades, trust in political
institutions such as parliaments or the courts has precipitously declined
across the established democracies of North America and Western Eu-
rope. So has voter turnout. As party identification has weakened and party
membership has declined, citizens have become less willing to stick with
establishment parties. Instead, voters increasingly endorse single-issue
movements, vote for populist candidates, or support “antisystem” parties
that define themselves in opposition to the status quo. Even in some of the
richest and most politically stable regions of the world, it seems as though
democracy is in a state of serious disrepair.

Most political scientists, however, have steadfastly declined to view
these trends as an indication of structural problems in the functioning of
liberal democracy, much less as a threat to its very existence. A wide
range of leading scholars, including Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris,
Christian Welzel, and Russell J. Dalton, have generally interpreted these
trends as benign indications of the increasing political sophistication of
younger generations of “critical” citizens who are less willing to defer
to traditional elites. Keeping with a distinction made by David Easton
in 1975, many scholars acknowledge that “government legitimacy,” or
support for particular governments, has declined. But they also insist that
“regime legitimacy,” or support for democracy as a system of govern-
ment, remains robust. Thus people may increasingly feel that democracy
is not working well in their country or that the government of the day is
doing a poor job, but this only makes them all the more appreciative of
the fact that liberal democracy allows them to protest the government or
vote it out of office. According to this view, democracies such as France,
Sweden, and the United States remain as consolidated and stable today as
they ever have been.

In our view, however, this optimistic interpretation may no longer be
tenable. Drawing on data from Waves 3 through 6 of the World Values
Surveys (1995–2014), we look at four important types of measures that are
clear indicators of regime legitimacy as opposed to government legitimacy:
citizens’ express support for the system as a whole; the degree to which they
support key institutions of liberal democracy, such as civil rights; their will-
ingness to advance their political causes within the existing political sys-
tem; and their openness to authoritarian alternatives such as military rule.

7Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

What we find is deeply concerning. Citizens in a number of suppos-
edly consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe
have not only grown more critical of their political leaders. Rather, they
have also become more cynical about the value of democracy as a po-
litical system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public
policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alterna-
tives. The crisis of democratic legitimacy extends across a much wider
set of indicators than previously appreciated.

How much importance do citizens of developed countries ascribe to
living in a democracy? Among older generations, the devotion to de-
mocracy is about as fervent and widespread as one might expect: In
the United States, for example, people born during the interwar period
consider democratic governance an almost sacred value. When asked
to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how “essential” it is for them “to live in a
democracy,” 72 percent of those born before World War II check “10,”
the highest value. So do 55 percent of the same cohort in the Neth-
erlands. But, as Figure 1 shows, the millennial generation (those born

Figure 1—“eSSenTial” To liVe in a counTry ThaT iS
goVerned deMocraTically, By age cohorT (decade oF BirTh)

Source: World Values Surveys, Waves 5 and 6 (2005–14). Data pooled from EU member
states. Valid responses: United States, 3,398; European Union, 25,789. Bootstrap 95 percent
confidence intervals are shown in gray.

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s

Europe

United
States

Pe
rc

en
t

Birth Cohort

Percent of respondents rating it “essen-
tial” (a rating of 10 on a 10-point scale)
to “live in a country that is governed
democratically.”

8 Journal of Democracy

since 1980) has grown much more indifferent. Only one in three Dutch
millennials accords maximal importance to living in a democracy; in the
United States, that number is slightly lower, around 30 percent.1

The decline in support for democracy is not just a story of the young
being more critical than the old; it is, in the language of survey research,
owed to a “cohort” effect rather than an “age” effect. Back in 1995,
for example, only 16 percent of Americans born in the 1970s (then in
their late teens or early twenties) believed that democracy was a “bad”
political system for their country. Twenty years later, the number of “an-
tidemocrats” in this same generational cohort had increased by around
4 percentage points, to 20 percent. The next cohort—comprising those
born in the 1980s—is even more antidemocratic: In 2011, 24 percent of
U.S. millennials (then in their late teens or early twenties) considered
democracy to be a “bad” or “very bad” way of running the country.
Although this trend was somewhat more moderate in Europe, it was
nonetheless significant: In 2011, 13 percent of European youth (aged
16 to 24) expressed such a view, up from 8 percent among the same age
group in the mid-1990s (see Figure 2).

Public-opinion data thus suggest a significant generational reversal.
Not so long ago, young people were much more enthusiastic than older
people about democratic values: In the first waves of the World Values
Survey, in 1981–84 and 1990–93, young respondents were much keener
than their elders on protecting freedom of speech and significantly less
likely to embrace political radicalism. Today, the roles have reversed:
On the whole, support for political radicalism in North America and
Western Europe is higher among the young, and support for freedom of
speech lower.2

Withdrawal from Democratic Institutions

People can have an abstract allegiance to “democracy” while si-
multaneously rejecting many key norms and institutions that have tra-
ditionally been regarded as necessary ingredients of democratic gov-
ernance. Therefore, if we are to understand why levels of support for
democracy have changed, we must study the ways in which people’s
conception of democracy, as well as their degree of engagement with
democratic institutions, have changed.3 Beyond support for regular
elections, which are essential even according to the most minimal in-
terpretation of democracy, full-fledged support for democracy should
also entail a commitment to liberal values such as the protection of
key rights and civil liberties, as well as a willingness to use the insti-
tutions of liberal democracy to effect political change.4 So how have
political participation and support for liberal democracy fared in the
recent past?

A battery of questions on interpretations of democracy was not fielded

9Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

in the World Values Survey until 2005, so there is not enough time-series
data to measure directly how citizens’ understanding of democracy has
evolved over time. It is possible, however, to analyze differences between
generational cohorts as a proxy. Taking the pooled data from Europe and
the United States, we find that attitudes toward liberal institutions do not
differ radically among different generations. But a liberal conception of
democracy is somewhat less entrenched among millenials (born since the
1980s) than their baby-boomer parents (born during the first two decades
after the Second World War). In the United States, for example, 41 per-
cent of those born during the interwar and initial postwar decades state
that it is “absolutely essential” in a democracy that “civil rights protect
people’s liberty.” Among millennials, this share falls to 32 percent. In the
European Union, these figures are 45 and 39 percent, respectively.

Any minimally liberal understanding of representative democracy
needs to encompass the notion that elections should be free and fair.
So it is disquieting that in mature democracies such an interpretation
of democracy, though still endorsed by a clear majority of the popu-

Europe,
2010–12

United States,
2011

United States,

1995

Europe,
1995–97

Figure 2—“haVing a deMocraTic PoliTical SySTeM” iS a “Bad”
or “Very Bad” Way To “run ThiS counTry”

20%

15%

10%

Source: World Values Surveys, Waves 3 to 6 (1995–2014). Data for Europe includes a con-
stant country sample in both waves: Germany, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Romania,
Poland, and the United Kingdom. Valid responses: United States, 1995: 1,452; United States,
2011: 2,164; European countries, 1995–97: 6,052; European countries, 2010–12: 8,197.

Age Group

Pe
rc
en
t

65+ 45–64 35–44 25–34 16–24

Percent responding that “having a democratic political system” is a
“bad” or “very bad” way to “run this country,” by age group.

10 Journal of Democracy

lation, is weaker among younger voters. In the United States, for ex-
ample, only 10 percent of citizens born in the interwar years and 14
percent of baby-boomers say that it is “unimportant” in a democracy for
people to “choose their leaders in free elections” (with “unimportant”
defined as 1 to 5 on a 10-point scale of importance). Among millenni-
als, this figure rises to 26 percent. In Europe, there is a similar, though
less dramatic, pattern, with 9 percent of the interwar and baby-boomer
generations versus 13 percent of millennials responding that free and
fair elections are unimportant. (Since we lack time-series data on these
measures, these findings are preliminary and will have to be confirmed
by future surveys.) Moreover, there is no broad reason to assume that
young people should, in general, be prone to a less liberal interpretation
of democracy, as the opposite pattern is found in places such as China,
India, and sub-Saharan Africa.

The health of a democracy depends not only on support for key politi-
cal values such as civil rights, but also on the active participation of an
informed citizenry. Indeed, following in the tradition of Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba’s classic 1963 work The Civic Culture, successive
studies have shown that civic engagement affects democracy’s ability to
deliver public goods, to hold officials accountable, and to provide effec-
tive government. This makes it all the more troubling that there has been
a long-documented withdrawal from formal democratic participation:
Since the 1960s, voter turnout has fallen and political-party membership
has plummeted in virtually all established democracies.

Just as younger generations are less committed to the importance of
democracy, so too are they less likely to be politically engaged. In fact, in
both Western Europe and North America, interest in politics has rapidly
and markedly declined among the young. At the same time, it has either
remained stable or even increased among older cohorts. As a result, over-
all levels of engagement have remained steady at around 60 percent in the
United States and about 50 percent in Europe. In other words, the aggre-
gate figure, important as it is in its own right, masks the most striking part
of the story: the quickly widening generational gap in political apathy.

In 1990, both a majority of young Americans (those between the ages
of 16 and 35) and a majority of older Americans (36 years and older)
reported being “fairly interested” or “very interested” in politics—53
and 63 percent, respectively. By 2010, the share of young Americans
professing an interest in politics had dropped by more than 12 percent-
age points and the share of older Americans had risen by 4 percentage
points. As a result, the generation gap had widened from 10 percentage
points to 26 percentage points. Among European respondents, who on
the whole report less interest in politics than do their American coun-
terparts, this phenomenon is even starker: The gap between young and
old more than tripled between 1990 and 2010, from 4 to 14 percentage
points. This is attributable almost solely to a rapid loss of interest among

11Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

young respondents. Whereas the share of Europeans aged 36 or older
who were interested in politics remained stable at 52 percent, among the
young that figured dropped from 48 to 38 percent (see Figure 3).

In both advanced and emerging democracies, the generation that
came of age during the 1960s withdrew from traditional forms of politi-
cal engagement, such as joining political parties and voting. This trend
has continued, with millennials even less likely than their parents to
participate in the democratic system via formal institutions. Most schol-
ars have resisted the conclusion that young people are worryingly disen-
gaged from democratic politics by arguing that a decline in conventional
forms of political participation has been compensated for by a rise in
“nonconventional” forms of activism, such as membership in new social
movements or participation in protests and boycotts.5 Recent data from
Wave 5 (2005–2009) and Wave 6 (2010–14) of the World Values Sur-
vey, however, suggest that this no longer holds true: The baby-boomer
generation has not managed to transfer its proclivity to engage in non-
conventional forms of activism to its children and grandchildren. As a
result, more recent generations are not just disengaged from the formal
institutions of liberal democracy; they are also less likely to participate
in nonconventional political activities, such as joining new social move-
ments or participating in political protest.

Historically, citizens have been more likely to engage in protests
when they are young. So it is striking that, in the United States, one
in eleven baby-boomers has joined a demonstration in the past twelve
months, but only one in fifteen millennials has done so. In Europe, the
picture is a little more mixed: Young respondents are more likely than
older ones to have attended protests in the course of the past twelve
months, but they do so at lower levels than previous cohorts did at the
same age. This decline in political engagement is even more marked for
such measures as active membership in new social movements. Partici-
pation in humanitarian and human-rights organizations, for example, is
about half as high among the young as among older age cohorts. Thus
we find that millennials across Western Europe and North America are
less engaged than their elders, both in traditional forms of political par-
ticipation and in oppositional civic activity.

Rising Support for Authoritarian Alternatives

It is clear that citizens today express less of an attachment to liberal
democracy, interpret the nature of democracy in a less liberal way, and
have less hope of affecting public policy through active participation in
the political process than they once did. What is not clear is how serious
a warning sign this is for democratic politics and institutions. Dwindling
support for, and engagement with, political institutions might simply re-
flect the fact that liberal democracy no longer faces any serious competi-

12 Journal of Democracy

tion from alternative regime forms. Perhaps the real reason that citizens
who came of age after the end of the Cold War do not express the same
fervor in supporting liberal democracy is not that they are indifferent
toward their system of government, but simply that they have never ex-
perienced a real threat to it. Although this optimistic reading may at first
seem plausible, it does not square with the fact that explicit support for
authoritarian regime forms is also on the rise.

In the past three decades, the share of U.S. citizens who think that it
would be a “good” or “very good” thing for the “army to rule”—a pa-
tently undemocratic stance—has steadily risen. In 1995, just one in six-
teen respondents agreed with that position; today, one in six agree. While
those who hold this view remain in the minority, they can no longer be
dismissed as a small fringe, especially since there have been similar in-
creases in the number of those who favor a “strong leader who doesn’t
have to bother with parliament and elections” and those who want experts
rather than the government to “take decisions” for the country. Nor is the
United States the only country to exhibit this trend. The proportion agree-
ing that it would be better to have the army rule has risen in most mature
democracies, including Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Similarly, while 43 percent of older Americans, including those born
between the world wars and their baby-boomer children, do not believe
that it is legitimate in a democracy for the military to take over when

Figure 3—The Widening “PoliTical aPaThy gaP”

53%

41%
48%

38%

63%
67%

52% 52%

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%

1990 2010 1990 2010

United States Europe

In
te

re
st

ed
in

P
ol

iti
cs

16-35 36+
Note: We compared the shares of U.S. and European respondents who reported being
“fairly interested” or “very interested” in politics across two age cohorts: those 16 to
35 years old and those 36 or older. European countries included in both waves (constant
sample) are Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. Number of
valid responses: United States, 1990: 1,812; United States, 2011: 2,210; Europe, 1990–93:
13,588; Europe, 2010–12: 8,771.
Source: World Values Surveys, Waves 2 (1990–94) and 6 (2010–14).

13Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

the government is incompetent or failing to do its job, the figure among
millennials is much lower at 19 percent. In Europe, the generation gap is
somewhat less stark but equally clear, with 53 percent of older Europe-
ans and only 36 percent of millennials strongly rejecting the notion that
a government’s incompetence can justify having the army “take over.”

Strikingly, such undemocratic sentiments have risen especially
quickly among the wealthy. In 1995, the “rich” (defined as deciles 8 to
10 on a ten-point income scale) were the most opposed to undemocratic
viewpoints, such as the suggestion that their country would be better off
if the “army” ruled. Lower-income respondents (defined as deciles 1 to
5) were most in favor of such a proposition. Since then, relative support
for undemocratic institutions has reversed. In almost every region, the
rich are now more likely than the poor to express approval for “having
the army rule.” In the United States, for example, only 5 percent of up-
per-income citizens thought that army rule was a “good” or “very good”
idea in the mid-1990s. That figure has since risen to 16 percent. By way
of comparison, in Latin America in the mid-1990s, a decade after the
return to civilian rule, 21 percent of upper-income respondents still sup-
ported military rule. That figure now stands at 33 percent.

The idea that support for military rule has markedly increased among
wealthy citizens of long-established liberal democracies is so counter-
intuitive that it naturally invites skepticism. Yet it is consistent with
similar survey items that measure citizens’ openness to other authoritar-
ian alternatives. In the United States, among all age cohorts, the share
of citizens who believe that it would be better to have a “strong leader”
who does not have to “bother with parliament and elections” has also
risen over time: In 1995, 24 percent of respondents held this view; by
2011, that figure had increased to 32 percent. Meanwhile, the proportion
of citizens who approve of “having experts, not government, make deci-
sions according to what they think is best for the country” has grown
from 36 to 49 percent. One reason for these changes is that whereas
two decades ago affluent citizens were much more likely than people of
lower income groups to defend democratic institutions, the wealthy are
now moderately more likely than others to favor a strong leader who can
ignore democratic institutions (see Figure 4 below).

Remarkably, the trend toward openness to nondemocratic alternatives
is especially strong among citizens who are both young and rich. Return-
ing to the question of approval for military rule, in 1995 only 6 percent
of rich young Americans (those born since 1970) believed that it would
be a “good” thing for the army to take over; today, this view is held by
35 percent of rich young Americans. Nor is the United States an outlier
among mature democracies. In Europe in 1995, 6 percent of high-income
earners born since 1970 favored the possibility of “army rule”; today, 17
percent of young upper-income Europeans favor it. This is a striking find-
ing: Rising support for illiberal politics is driven not only by the disem-

14 Journal of Democracy

powered, middle-aged,
and underemployed. Its
vocal supporters can
also be found among
the young, wealthy, and
privileged.

While support for
military rule among the
young and the wealthy
may seem like an aber-
ration, their embrace of
nondemocratic prac-
tices and institutions
should not come as a
surprise. If we widen
the historical lens, we
see that, with the ex-
ception of a brief peri-
od in the late twentieth
century, democracy has
usually been associated
with redistributive de-
mands by the poor and
therefore regarded with

skepticism by elites. The newfound aversion to democratic institutions
among rich citizens in the West may be no more than a return to the
historical norm.6

Is Democracy Deconsolidating?

One of the key findings of comparative politics is the astonishing
stability of wealthy consolidated democracies. In the first years of their
existence, both poor and wealthy democracies are vulnerable to regime
change. Poor democracies remain in danger even when they have been
democratic for a number of years and have successfully changed gov-
ernments through elections. Democracies that are both wealthy and con-
solidated, however, appear to be safe: As Adam Przeworski and Fer-
nando Limongi have shown, no consolidated democracy with a GDP per
capita of over $6,000 in 1985 international prices has ever collapsed.7

This key finding has underwritten an important body of literature on
democratization and regime stability, but it has simultaneously occluded
an entire area of study. Apparently secure in the knowledge that wealthy
consolidated democracies will not experience regime breakdown, politi-
cal scientists have abstained from pursuing questions that would seem to
be among the most fundamental for the discipline: What can empirical

Pe
rc
en
t

Source: World Values Surveys, Waves 3 through 6
(1995–2014). Data from the U.S. sample only. Upper-
income defined as the top three income deciles (8–10
on a 10-point scale). Lower and middle income defined
as the bottom seven deciles (1–7 on a 10-point income
scale). Sample size: upper-income respondents (1,172);
lower- and middle-income respondents (4,659).

Percent of respondents replying that it
would be “good” or “very good” to have a
“strong leader” who doesn’t have to “bother
with parliament and elections.”

2000 2005 2010

Figure 4—SuPPorT For auThoriTarianiSM
By incoMe in The u.S.

Year

Upper-Income
Respondents

15%

35%

30%

25%

20%
1995

Lower- and
Middle-Income
Respondents

15Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

indicators tell us about whether rich consolidated democracies are as
stable as they were in the past? Do empirical indicators give us reason to
believe that seemingly stable democracies may be in trouble? And what
might happen if wealthy democracies do eventually start to experience
occasional breakdown, as have virtually all other political-regime types
in the history of mankind?

In the famous formulation of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, democra-
cies are consolidated when they are the “only game in town.”8 This meta-
phor is as elusive as it is evocative. What does it mean, in concrete terms,
for democracy to be the only game in town? In our view, the degree to
which a democracy is consolidated depends on three key characteristics:
the degree of popular support for democracy as a system of government;
the degree to which antisystem parties and movements are weak or nonex-
istent; and the degree to which the democratic rules are accepted.

This empirical understanding of democratic consolidation opens up
conceptual space for the possibility of “democratic deconsolidation.” In
theory, it is possible that, even in the seemingly consolidated democracies
of North America and Western Europe, democracy may one day cease to
be the “only game in town”: Citizens who once accepted democracy as the
only legitimate form of government could become more open to authori-
tarian alternatives. Stable party systems in which all major forces were
once united in support of democracy could enter into phases of extreme
instability or witness the meteoric rise of antisystem parties. Finally, rules
that were once respected by all important political players could suddenly
come under attack by politicians jostling for partisan advantage.

It is at least plausible to think that such a process of democratic decon-
solidation may already be underway in a number of established democra-
cies in North America and Western Europe. In the United States, citizens
have rapidly lost faith in the political system; in early March 2016, for
example, public approval of Congress stood at a mere 13 percent. Wealthy
businessman and television personality Donald Trump, having attracted
fervent and surprisingly broad support by railing against the political sys-
tem and promising policies that would openly violate the rights of ethnic
and religious minorities, appears to have won the Republican nomina-
tion for the presidency of the United States. Meanwhile, even mainstream
political actors are increasingly willing to violate the informal rules for
the sake of partisan advantage: To name but one example of the resulting
gridlock and constitutional dysfunction, the U.S. Senate has refused even
to consider President Barack Obama’s nominee for a vacant seat on the
Supreme Court.

In Europe, too, there have been many signs of democratic deconsoli-
dation in recent years. Approval ratings for the continent’s leading poli-
ticians stand at record lows, and citizens have grown deeply mistrustful
of their political institutions. Far-right populist parties, such as France’s
National Front or the Sweden Democrats, have risen from obscurity to

16 Journal of Democracy

transform the party system of virtually every Western European coun-
try. Meanwhile, parts of Central and Eastern Europe bear witness to
the institutional and ideological transformations that might be afoot: In
Poland and Hungary, populist strongmen have begun to put pressure on
critical media, to violate minority rights, and to undermine key institu-
tions such as independent courts.

To answer the question of whether democracy is deconsolidating in
these countries in a rigorous manner would require a research program
of considerable breadth that is beyond the scope of a single essay focus-
ing on public-opinion data. But before such a project can get off the
ground, an important empirical puzzle needs to be identified and a set of
coherent explanatory goals formulated.

If we take the number of people who claim to endorse democracy
at face value, no regime type in the history of mankind has held such
universal and global appeal as democracy does today. Yet the reality of
contemporary democracies looks rather less triumphant than this fact
might suggest. Citizens of democracies are less and less content with
their institutions; they are more and more willing to jettison institutions
and norms that have traditionally been regarded as central components
of democracy; and they are increasingly attracted to alternative regime
forms.

Far from showing that citizens have merely become more willing to
criticize particular governments because their expectations of democracy
have grown, this indicates a deep tension at the heart of contemporary
politics: Even as democracy has come to be the only form of govern-
ment widely viewed as legitimate, it has lost the trust of many citizens
who no longer believe that democracy can deliver on their most pressing
needs and preferences. The optimistic view that this decline in confidence
merely represents a temporary downturn is no more than a pleasing as-
sumption, based in part on a reluctance to call into question the vaunted
stability of affluent democracies.

Democracies do not die overnight, nor do democracies that have be-
gun to deconsolidate necessarily fail. But we suspect that the degree of
democratic consolidation is one of the most important factors in deter-
mining the likelihood of democratic breakdown. In a world where most
citizens fervently support democracy, where antisystem parties are mar-
ginal or nonexistent, and where major political forces respect the rules
of the political game, democratic breakdown is extremely unlikely. It is
no longer certain, however, that this is the world we live in.

Even if subsequent research should show that democratic deconsolida-
tion really is underway, this would not mean that any particular democra-
cy would soon collapse. Nor is it obvious that the democracy that had de-
consolidated the most would be the first to fail. Regime change is always
a matter of accident as well as intention, of historical circumstances as
well as structural preconditions. But if democratic deconsolidation were

17Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

proven to be in progress, it would mean that what was once unthinkable
should no longer be considered outside the realm of possibility. As de-
mocracies deconsolidate, the prospect of democratic breakdown becomes
increasingly likely—even in parts of the world that have long been spared
such instability. If political scientists are to avoid being blindsided by the
demise of established democracies in the coming decades, as they were by
the fall of communism a few decades ago, they need to find out whether
democratic deconsolidation is happening; to explain the possible causes
of this development; to delineate its likely consequences (present and fu-
ture); and to ponder the potential remedies.

NOTES

1. These gaps remain consistent at other points in the spectrum. If we take responses of
9 or 10, then the rate declines from 85 percent among Americans born in the 1930s to 43
percent among those born since the 1980s, and from 68 percent of Europeans born in the
1930s to 59 percent born since the 1980s. At the other end of the spectrum, the share of
respondents expressing no clear importance to living in a democracy (1 to 5 on the scale)
constitutes only 4 percent of Americans born in the 1930s, but 21 percent of millennials,
and 6 percent of Europeans born in the 1930s, but 11 percent of millennials.

2. Support for radicalism is measured by responses to a left-right political scale, with
“1” as radical left and “10” as radical right. In both Europe and North America, self-
reported political radicalism is higher among the youngest age cohort (born since 1980)
than any previous generation in any previous survey.

3. Andreas Schedler and Rodolfo Sarsfield, “Democrats with Adjectives: Linking Di-
rect and Indirect Measures of Democratic Support,” European Journal of Political Re-
search 46 (August 2007): 637–59, and Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “How People
View Democracy: Africans’ Surprising Universalism,” Journal of Democracy (January
2001): 107–21.

4. See Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and José Antônio Cheibub, eds., The Democracy
Sourcebook (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); and Alejandro Moreno and Christian Welzel,
“Enlightening People: The Spark of Emancipative Values,” in Russell J. Dalton and Chris-
tian Welzel, eds., The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

5. Christian Welzel, Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Eman-
cipation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and Pippa Norris, Democratic
Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

6. Two recent contributions to this argument are Carles Boix, Democracy and Redis-
tribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James
A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).

7. Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and
Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

8. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolida-
tion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

UNEQUAL
VOICES
Who Speaks for California?

Part II

FEBRUARY

017

Advancement Project is a next generation, multiracial civil
rights organization. In California we champion the struggle for
greater equity and opportunity for all, fostering upward mobility
in communities most impacted by economic and racial injustice.
We build alliances and trust, use data-driven policy solutions,
create innovative tools and work alongside communities to ignite
social transformation!

Our Political Voice program nurtures a healthy democracy by
amplifying the voices of low-income communities of color in all
political processes and ensuring that government responds to
those voices.

University of California, Riverside

School of Public Policy

Serving Inland Southern California and Beyond

Our mission is to train a new generation of forward-thinking public
policy leaders equipped to address the complex, interrelated
challenges of poverty, disease, illiteracy, climate change, energy
security, pollution and more. Their training will be informed by (i)
a diverse, interdisciplinary curriculum that emphasizes evidence-
based policy research as well as cross-learning from both
international and domestic problem-solving experiences, and (ii) a
rich internship program that emphasizes experiential learning.

We help change makers understand why people engage politically,
through a comprehensive set of research methods and by careful
examination of ethnorace, gender, class, geography, sexuality, etc.
We help change makers ask and answer the right questions to
unlock the power of the New American Majority. Using a culturally
competent lens, we help clients align their research needs and
strategic goals and then apply our multidisciplinary tools to
conduct research of the highest caliber. We provide effective,
customized research services that are designed and carried out in
accordance with the unique needs of each partner.

FEBRUARY 201

Written by

John Dobard, Manager of Political Voice,
Advancement Project

Kim Engie, Data and Research Analyst,
Advancement Project

Karthick Ramakrishnan, Professor,
School of Public Policy,

University of California Riverside

Sono Shah, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science,
University of California Riverside

Lisa García Bedolla, Principal and Co-Founder,
American Majority Project Research Institute

Unequal Voices,

Part II

was made possible by
a generous grant from The James Irvine Foundation.

UNEQUAL
VOICES
Who Speaks for California?

Part II

Executive Summary

Racial Disparities in Democracy: Barriers to Justice in California

Gaps in Political Participation Among Adults (18+)

Gaps in Political Participation Among Millennials (18-34)

Racial Overrepresentation and Underrepresentation in Political Participation

What Predicts and Overcomes Racial Disparities in Political Participation?

Policy Reform for Change

Increase Participation in Democracy: Move California Toward Greater Justice

Notes

References

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reform existing public participation
infrastructure to create new opportunities for

political participation and socialization.

Enact local public participation ordinances
to institutionalize new forms of democratic
engagement in municipal

decision-making.

Create a statewide public participation
program to support government efforts to

improve democratic engagement.

Encourage more widespread adoption of
practices that regularly gauge constituent

sentiment and the quality of representation.

California’s democracy is neither adequately participatory
nor representative. Although California has been a
majority-minority state since 2000, its democracy does
not reflect that demographic reality.

Part I of Unequal Voices, released in June 2016, highlights
trends in political participation based on government
data between 2004 and 2014. That analysis found
significant disparities between whites and people of
color in voting rates in presidential, midterm, and local
elections. It also found that these gaps persist in most
forms of political participation beyond voting, such as
contacting public officials, contributing time and/or
money to a campaign, attending political meetings, and
engaging in consumer activism.

This report shows that racial disparity trends in
participation beyond voting continue. Using original
telephone survey data from 2016, we analyzed the rates
at which Californians contact public officials, contribute
money to campaigns, attend public meetings, protest,
engage in consumer activism, and sign petitions in
person or online. The survey design allowed for closely
examining rates of participation within the general adult
population (aged 18+), as well as within the millennial
(aged 18-34) and Asian American

populations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Asian Americans and Latinos
are under-represented in most

political activities, while whites are
overrepresented.

There are significant national-origin
differences among Asian Americans, with
Chinese, Korean, and Hmong Americans

tending to participate the least.

Attendance at public meetings is one of
the few activities in which whites do not

participate at the highest rate.

Racial disparities in political
participation are being reproduced in

the millennial generation.

Racial disparities are best explained by
people of color being less empowered
to participate, due to either structural

obstacles or poor mobilization by political
parties and campaigns, rather than a lack

of interest in politics.

Participation in civic associations and
mobilization by political parties and
campaigns can overcome barriers to

political

participation.

KEY FINDINGS

SOLUTIONS

Incorporate high-quality civic education
curriculum into K-12 school districts across the
state to provide all students the opportunity to

develop civic knowledge and skills.

1 | Racial Disparities:
Understanding Barriers to Justice in California

Nationally, the prospects for greater racial and economic justice appear slim. By contrast, California is poised

to make progress toward greater equity and opportunity. The state has a majority-minority population,

strong multiracial and statewide networks of community organizations, and the largest number of union

members in the country. Conditions such as these have facilitated the passage and implementation of public

policies that address the needs of disadvantaged

communities.

Nevertheless, progress for these communities has been uneven, and there are significant local and statewide

challenges that remain. Now that the 2016 election cycle is complete and our elected representatives have

been sworn in, a new cycle of governance begins. The struggle for racial and economic justice will now

shift largely from the electoral arena to the legislative and administrative arenas. Decisions will be made

regarding which issues are important enough to receive legislative attention, what policies will address

those issues, and how well those policies will be implemented.

To meet local and statewide challenges, it is imperative that more

Californians participate in the policymaking process, especially low-

income Californians and people of color. These Californians and their allies

absolutely must turn out to vote in the upcoming elections. But it is just

as important that their voices are amplified within those governmental

processes that hold officials accountable for passing and implementing

important policies beneficial to all Californians.

Part I of Unequal Voices, released in June 2016, highlights trends in

political participation based on government data (Current Population

Survey) between 2004 and 2014. This report presents an analysis of original

telephone survey data from 2016.1 The responses mainly offer data on

political participation in the legislative and administrative arenas, such as contacting public officials, attending

political meetings, and signing petitions. They also offer information on predictors of participation, such as

socioeconomic status, political discussions, and community participation.2

The survey data largely affirm the findings from the government data: There are significant racial disparities

across a range of political activities, and whites are overrepresented in political participation.

The survey was designed to take a closer look at participation rates among millennials

and Asian Americans.

In the case of millennials, we find that disparities within the larger adult population are largely replicated

within the young adult population. For instance, white millennials generally participate at higher rates than

millennials of color, even though youth of color make up two-thirds of the state’s millennial population.

There are significant
racial disparities across

a range of political
activities, and whites

are overrepresented in
political participation.

Reducing and eliminating
racial disparities in participation

through structural reform will
build a more representative and

participatory

democracy.

Our analysis also reveals that although Asian Americans

participate at lower rates overall, there are significant

differences within the population. For example, Indian

Americans regularly participate at higher rates, whereas

Chinese, Korean, and Hmong Americans regularly

participate at lower rates.

When combined with the results described in Unequal

Voices, Part I, the disparities confirm that racial gaps

in political participation between whites and people

of color have been the norm in California for at least

the last 12 years. Changing that norm is a racial and

economic justice issue because the gaps in participation

result in racial disparities in political influence, and

the structural factors that largely explain those gaps

disproportionately affect low-income Californians of

color. If we address these disparities, people of color

will, for the first time, have a representative voice in

public policy decision-making.

With the shared goal of a healthy democracy, advocates

for racial and economic justice must find common

purpose with advocates for good governance and

democratic engagement. By reducing and eliminating

racial disparities in participation through structural

reform, we will build a more representative and

participatory democracy. That revitalized democracy will

then turn the prospect of greater racial and economic

justice in California into a reality.

2 | Gaps in Political Participation
Among Adults (18+)

Political participation is not only about voting. There are many other ways

individuals and groups can engage in the political process, which is often

referred to as non-electoral participation, or participation beyond voting.

Participation beyond voting is an important way community residents can

make their voices heard in the policymaking process between elections. In this

section, we present survey findings about a variety of these activities, including

contacting public officials, contributing money to political campaigns, attending

public meetings, protesting, engaging in consumer activism, and signing

petitions in person or online.

TH
E

AS
IA

N
AM

ER
IC

AN
A

ND
P

AC
IF

IC
IS

LA
ND

ER
C

ON
TE

XT Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) are the fastest-growing racial
groups in California. There are about 6.3 million AAPIs in California, accounting
for about 1 out of every 6 residents in the state (16%). Asian Americans and
Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders are distinct racial groups as measured by
the U.S. Census, and there are significant differences in educational attainment,
language proficiency, and economic outcomes within each group. Thus, for
example, Filipino and Chinese Americans, the largest Asian origin populations
in the state, tend to have higher-than-average levels of educational attainment
and income, while Vietnamese Americans (the third largest group) and various
other Southeast Asian groups such as Cambodian, Hmong, and Laotian Americans
score well below the statewide average on these measures. In addition, Pacific
Islanders are, on the whole, much more likely than Asian Americans to be born
in the United States, and tend to face greater disadvantages with respect to
educational attainment, income, and health outcomes.

Counties in Southern California and the Bay Area have the largest AAPI
populations in the state, but there are also significant Southeast Asian
populations in the Central Valley. There have been long-settled populations
of Asian Americans in various parts of the state that bear the legacy of not
only early waves of migration such as the 1849 Gold Rush and agricultural
entrepreneurship of Japanese and Indian Americans in the Central Valley, but
also of discriminatory laws and actions ranging from internment to “alien
land laws” and anti-Asian riots. The biggest increase in the Asian American
population occurred in the decades following the expansion of U.S. immigration
law in 1965, with a notable increase in the Southeast Asian population in the
1970s following the end of the Vietnam War. The last two decades have seen
a significant increase in the suburban Asian population, particularly in the
counties of Orange, Santa Clara, Alameda, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Riverside.
For more details on the AAPI population in California, visit http://AAPIdata.com/.

Rates of contacting public
officials were especially low
among Asian Americans and

Latinos.

Attendance at public meetings
is one of the few political

activities in which whites do not
participate at the highest rate.

Blacks and Pacific Islanders
reported relatively high rates

of campaign contributions.

Among Asian Americans,
groups with lower

socioeconomic status protest
more frequently than those with

higher socioeconomic status.

Petition signing is one of the
more frequent acts of political

participation in California.

KEY FINDINGS

Participation Method: Contacting Public Officials
Contacting public officials is an important way for constituents to voice their policy preferences or concerns.

Contact can take various forms, such as making phone calls and office visits, and sending emails, tweets, and

other forms of social media communication.

Contacting elected officials offers several advantages that go beyond voting. Constituents are not limited

to a single act of participation, nor are they limited to participating at a specific time or place. Additionally,

contact also enables constituents to hold their representatives accountable between elections.

In a recent study, those who emailed a public official were equally likely to receive a response and equally

likely to be satisfied with the interaction as those who contacted in person, by phone, or by letter (Smith

et al. 2009). In some cases, targeted contacts by constituents significantly increased the likelihood of a

representative supporting relevant pieces of legislation (Bergan and Cole 2015).

Despite these potential benefits, few constituents reported contacting a public official, especially respondents

of color (Table 1). Rates of contact were especially low among Asian Americans (9%) and Latinos (7%). Among

Asian American groups, participation rates ranged from a low of 4% (Cambodian Americans) to highs of 13%

(Indian Americans) and 19% (Japanese Americans).

Participation Method: Contributing Money to Campaigns
Campaign contributions help constituents elect candidates they support and gain access to elected

officials. In the 2015-16 election cycle, candidates received $176 million in in-state contributions, according

to California’s campaign finance database (Cal-Access). Prior research has

shown that elected officials tend to meet with donors more often than non-

donors, and they also tend to better represent the preferences of donors

over their general constituencies (Kalla and Broockman 2016; Barber 2016;

Bartels 2008).

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN RATES OF CONTACTING ELECTED OFFICIALS

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

17% 9% 18% 7% 18% 26%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

4% 9% 9% 5% 13% 19% 6% 8%

TABLE

As a group, donors
tend to be whiter,
wealthier, and more
educated than the rest
of the population.

Past research has also shown campaign contributions to be a fairly exclusive activity, involving significant

class and racial disparities. As a group, donors tend to be whiter, wealthier, and more educated than the rest

of the population. For example, a recent nationwide analysis of campaign contributions found that in the

2012 and 2014 election cycles, 91% of federal election donors were white (McElwee, Schaffner, and Rhodes

2016).

Among respondents in our 2016 survey, overall rates of political contributions were higher than those found

in prior studies (Wong et al. 2011). It is possible that small-donor contributions to presidential candidates

such as Bernie Sanders might have increased the number of contributors in California without changing

racial disparities in levels of giving. This is an issue that deserves further analysis based on Federal Election

Commission contribution data. Still, it is remarkable to note that blacks (27%) and Pacific Islanders (26%) in

California reported relatively high rates of campaign contributions. By contrast, Asian Americans (13%) and

Latinos (9%) were much less likely to report making political contributions.

Participation Method: Attending Public Meetings
Public meetings or hearings, such as those offered through a school board or city council, give the public

an important opportunity to convey information to officials. Interestingly, attendance in public meetings

is one of the few actions in which whites do not participate at the highest rate. Pacific Islanders and black

respondents reported attending public meetings (35% and 30%, respectively) at higher rates as compared

to whites (26%).

Similar to work by other scholars (Fraga and Frost 2010), we find that Latinos reported attending public

meetings at comparable rates to whites (24% and 26%, respectively). Asian Americans, however, have

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN RATES OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

21% 13% 27% 9% 26% 33%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

9% 9% 16% 5% 22% 14% 7% 12%

TABLE
2

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN ATTENDING PUBLIC MEETINGS

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

24% 14% 30% 24% 35% 26%

TABLE
3

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

30% 7% 14% 15% 27% 16% 11% 16%

Pacific Islanders
and blacks reported
attending public
meetings at higher
rates compared
to whites.

considerably lower rates of participation in public meetings (14%), with rates lowest

among Chinese Americans (7%) and highest among Cambodian (30%) and Indian

Americans (27%).

These results differ from what we found in our initial report using Current Population

Survey data. Due to recent research by other scholars, who found that blacks

are significantly more likely to attend public meetings than whites (Williamson

& Scicchitano 2015) and that Latinos are likely to report attending school board

meetings (Fraga and Frost 2010), we worded our survey question to specifically mention city council and

school board meetings as “public meetings.” This factor may help to explain our results. Another possible

explanation is that the launch of the Local Control Accountability Plan process in school districts throughout

California increased individuals’ opportunities to attend public meetings. At a minimum, we still find

important differences across groups, suggesting the need for further research into this important question.

Participation Method: Protest Activity
Contributing to campaigns, contacting elected officials, and attending public meetings can all be

considered conventional forms of institutionally oriented political participation. Past research has indicated,

however, that marginalized groups tend to also engage in activities such as protests and boycotts, which are

considered outside the traditional avenues of communication with policymakers (Tate 1993; García Bedolla

2014). Indeed, these activities are often interpreted as challenging existing power structures or as methods

of seeking representation (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Our findings indicate that it is not only marginalized communities who engage in protest. Indeed, protest

activity by whites (12%) is on par with rates of participation among blacks and Latinos (14% each). As is the

case with many other forms of political participation, Asian Americans tend to have the lowest rates of

participation in protest activity (8%), although there is significant variation across sub-groups, with Vietnamese

Americans having the highest levels (18%) and Korean Americans having the lowest (3%). In general, protest

activity seems to be much more frequent among Asian-origin groups with lower socioeconomic status

(Hmong, Cambodian, and Vietnamese) than those with higher levels of socioeconomic status, such as Indian

and Chinese Americans.

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PROTEST AND CONSUMER ACTIVISM

12% 8% 6% 11% 8% 6% 3% 18%

16% 3% 15% 3% 18% 13% 11% 28%

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

12% 8% 14% 14% 11% 12%

Protest

Consumer
Activism 24% 13% 25% 16% 22% 31%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese
Protest

Consumer
Activism

TABLE
4

1010

Participation Method: Consumer Activism
Individuals can also choose to influence policymakers by engaging in consumer activism, such as

“buycotting” or boycotting products from companies (i.e., intentionally purchasing or not purchasing

goods or services), to gain leverage on a particular issue. Although these strategic campaigns are often

considered outside the traditional avenues of influence, they can have significant effects on policy.

An excellent example of this is North Carolina’s House Bill 2 (HB2), which blocked transgender people from

using the bathroom of their choice. The passage of

HB2 was met with widespread criticism and calls for

companies to refrain from doing business either in or

with the state. Since the bill’s passing, several major

businesses and entertainers cancelled or moved

events from North Carolina, with some estimating

that North Carolina lost more than $395 million as a

result (Grey Ellis 2016). This consumer activism played

a key role in leading the state legislature to consider

repealing the law through a special session, though

North Carolina’s Senate voted against repeal and its

House ultimately did not vote at all.

Our findings indicate that individuals regularly

engage in consumer activism, with nearly one in four

Californians reporting participating in buycotting or

boycotting activities. Among racial groups, whites

participate at the highest levels, with nearly one in

three reporting consumer activism compared to one

in four blacks. Pacific Islanders, Asian Americans,

and Latinos all participate at rates lower than the

California average, with just 13% of Asian Americans

reporting having engaged in

consumer activism.

Even after examining Asian American sub-groups, we

still see participation below average for most groups,

with the exception of Vietnamese respondents.

Californians regularly engage
in consumer activism – nearly
one in four participated in
buycotting or boycotting.

Participation Method: Signing Petitions &

E-Petitions

Signing petitions is an important form of political participation in California for several reasons. Citizens who

choose to sign petitions to place initiatives on statewide and local ballots have more influence in the agenda-

setting process than non-participants. In addition, e-petitions can play an important role in communicating

constituent preferences on particular issues to elected officials. This mechanism is particularly important for

state and local legislative districts, where surveys of constituents can be cost-prohibitive.

Petition signing is one of the more frequent acts of political participation in California, with about one in

three respondents (36%) reporting participation. As in other political activities, however, there are large racial

disparities, with whites being by far the most likely to participate (46%), and Latinos and Asian Americans

the least likely (27% and 24%, respectively). Within the Asian American category, Chinese Americans have

the lowest rates of petition signing (16%), while Indian Americans, Japanese Americans, and Vietnamese

Americans have much higher rates of participation, averaging around 30%.

When we examine those who sign online or e-petitions, the disparities remain. First, a smaller proportion

of respondents sign e-petitions (24%) than sign paper petitions (36%). However, as we discuss later, rates

of e-participation are higher among millennials. Latinos and Asian Americans reported engaging in this

activity significantly less than whites. Finally, even though Chinese Americans have participated in prominent

e-petitions on matters ranging from affirmative action to data disaggregation in California and have

received significant news interest as a result, we find that Chinese Americans have among the lowest rates

of participation in signing e-petitions.

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PETITION SIGNING

22% 16% 24% 18% 31% 29% 26% 29%

24% 8% 17% 8% 27% 20% 15% 18%

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

36% 24%

% 27% 40% 46%

E-Petitions 24% 16% 20% 18% 30% 31%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

Sign Petition

Sign Petition
E-Petitions

TABLE
5

3 | Gaps in Political Participation
Among Millennials (18-34)

More than eight million young people will enter the California electorate

between 2015 and 2030 (García Bedolla and Echaveste 2015). Seventy

percent of these new eligible voters will be people of color, with 53% Latino.

Given the size and diversity of the millennial population, it is important to

understand their civic engagement and determine whether the types of

political activities they engage in vary by population group.

Students of color lack as many opportunities to participate in high-quality

civics education as compared to their white counterparts (Kahne and

Middaugh 2009). Similarly, data from the Youth Participatory Politics project,

which explored youth political activity both virtually and in the real world,

showed important variations in how youth from different groups choose

to engage (Cohen et al. 2012). These studies show significant variance in

opportunities to learn about civics and invitations to engage in politics

across different youth communities. It is therefore unsurprising that we find

important racial differences in the types of political activities millennials

engage in.

Despite comprising only 35% of our millennial survey population, white

millennials made up the majority of youth who reported taking part in

political activities. White millennials accounted for 70% of those who reported

contacting elected officials and making political contributions, 63% of those who reported boycotting, and almost

60% of those who reported signing a petition. Thus, similar to the older adult population, white millennials in

California are significantly overrepresented in terms of their political voice.

We also find that millennials of color generally choose to engage in different

sorts of political activities than do white youth, and that Asian American and

Latino millennials are least likely to engage in a wide variety of political activities

(Figure 1). This suggests that the differences are not merely a product of personal

preference, but also a reflection of how millennials of different backgrounds see

themselves in relation to the political system (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012).

White millennials
made up the

majority of youth
who reported
taking part in

political activities.

Disparities within the general
adult population are largely
replicated within the young

adult population.

There is very little difference
between millennials and older
Californian adults in attending

public meetings.

Black youth were the most
likely to report participating in

protest activity.

Millennials were 15% more
likely than older adults to report

having signed an e-petition.

KEY FINDINGS

Participation Method: Contacting Public Officials
As discussed above, contacting public officials is an important way for constituents to get their voices heard in

the policymaking process. Given that few Californians reported engaging in this activity, it is not surprising that

only 14% of millennials (compared to 18% of older adults) reported having made this sort of contact (Figure 2).

But there are significant differences among millennials, with white millennials almost three times as likely as Asian

American or Latino millennials to have engaged in this activity (Figure 1).

RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN MILLENNIAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY
FIG 1

Note: Data come from authors’ analysis of data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey (Ramakrishnan et al., 2016).

Participation Method: Contributing to Political Campaigns
Undoubtedly, generational disparities in resources account for older adults being more likely to report

having made political contributions, as seen in Figure 2. Among millennials, we see that political giving is

driven predominantly by whites, who are twice as likely as blacks and three times as likely as Latinos and

Asian Americans to report having made political contributions.

Participation Method: Attending Political Meetings
The idea that millennials are generally disengaged in institutional activity is undermined by what we see in

Figure 1, which shows significant attendance at political meetings, such as those for city council or a school

board. Contrary to expectations, we find very little difference between millennials and older Californian

adults in terms of their meeting attendance (Figure 2). However, which millennials attend these meetings

varies significantly by race. Black millennials are two-and-a-half times as likely as Asian American millennials

to report this kind of community activity. White and Pacific Islander millennials are the second most likely.

MILLENNIAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY AS COMPARED TO OLDER ADULTS
FIG 2

Note: Data come from authors’ analysis of data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey (Ramakrishnan et al., 2016).

Participation Method: Protest Activity
Millennials were about two-and-a-half times more likely to report having engaged in protest activities than

older adults. Among millennials, we see in Figure 1 that black youth were the most likely to report having

participated in these kinds of activities. This may possibly be attributable to the mobilization among black

millennials that has occurred as a result of the Movement for Black Lives. Asian Americans, by contrast, were

about half as likely to report having engaged in protests as any other group of millennial youth.

Participation Method: Consumer Activism
Millennials were more likely than older adult Californians to report buycotting or boycotting certain products.

Similar to what we found for many political activities, whites were the most likely to report having engaged

in consumer activism, and Asian Americans the least likely.

Participation Method: Signing Petitions and E-Petitions
With the rise of social media, it is assumed that millennials are more active in activities readily available

online, such as signing petitions. Figures 1 and 2 appear to support this assumption. Millennials were 15%

more likely than older adults to report having signed an e-petition. Again, we see racial differences in

engagement, with whites and Pacific Islanders the most likely to report having engaged in this activity, and

Asian Americans and blacks the least likely.

Millennials were
more likely than older
Californians to report
buycotting or boycotting
certain products.

1616

4 | Racial Overrepresentation
and Underrepresentation in
Political Participation

In the previous two sections, we have examined racial disparities in political

participation by inspecting differential rates of participation across groups.

Another important way to understand these disparities is to take a snapshot

of each group’s share of the participating population and compare those

patterns to the adult resident population. These kinds of analyses are often

done with respect to voting; after each election, we seek to understand

each racial group’s share of the electorate, and the extent to which any

particular group may be overrepresented or underrepresented.

Unequal Voices, Part II extends the analogy to other forms of participation

– for example, to examine the degree to which Latinos may be

underrepresented in an activity, such as contacting public officials versus

attending public meetings. As we can see from Figure 3, Latinos and

Asian Americans are underrepresented and whites are overrepresented in

most forms of political participation in California, while black participation

is on par with that group’s share of the adult population. Even though

OVERREPRESENTATION AND UNDERREPRESENTATION IN
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA

FIG 3

Whites are overrepresented
in most forms of political

participation.

Latinos and Asian Americans
combined account for only

one quarter or one third of the
participating population in many

political activities.

Whites are the most politically
empowered group in California’s

democracy.
KEY FINDINGS

Note: Bars aggregate to slightly less than 100% because of groups not included in the survey (Native Americans and “other”
racial groups). Population data is derived from CA Department of Finance Population Projections (Table P-3); survey data are
weighted to the California population and reflect only the groups included in the survey.

Latinos and Asian Americans combined are a majority of California’s

adult population, they account for only one quarter or one third of the

participating population in many political activities.

Racial disparities are particularly significant when it comes to contacting

public officials and making political contributions. This is troubling given

prior research that shows these forms of participation are the surest

paths for constituents to gain access to elected officials and influence

policy agendas. Latino and Asian American underrepresentation is also

apparent in important activities like signing petitions and engaging in

consumer activism.

Protest activity and attending public meetings are the bright spots in terms

of showing lower racial disparities in political participation. But even in

these instances, Asian Americans remain significantly underrepresented:

they make up 14% of the adult population, but only 8% of the population

that is heard at public meetings of school boards and city councils.

Data on participation among millennials indicate that these racial

disparities are being reproduced in the next generation. Even though whites accounted for only

35% of the millennial population in our survey, they accounted for a majority of millennials who made

campaign contributions, contacted public officials, and participated in consumer activism, and they were

also overrepresented in petition activity. As with the overall population, attending public meetings and

protesting were the only activities in which white millennials were not overrepresented in their political

participation.

RACIAL OVERREPRESENTATION AND UNDERREPRESENTATION IN CALIFORNIA MILLENNIALS
FIG 4

Racial disparities are
particularly significant
when it comes to
contacting public
officials and making
political contributions.
Research shows these
are the surest ways to
gain access to elected
officials and influence
policy agendas.

Note: Population data derived from CA Department of Finance Population Projections (Table P-3); survey data are weighted to
the California population and reflect groups included in the survey (Native Americans and other racial groups not included).

1818

Using this data on participation activities, we devised a summary measure of political
empowerment in California: the Index of Political Empowerment (IPE).

The IPE combines the non-electoral forms of participation because our analysis reveals
that participation in these different activities is highly correlated. For instance, people who
contact public officials are also very likely to attend public meetings and vice versa. Those
who argue that certain types of political participation are more consequential than others
may prefer to see these activities in disaggregated form, as in Figures 3 and 4 above.

We find that whites participate the most in California’s democracy, as shown in Figure 5,
followed by Pacific Islanders and blacks. Asian Americans and Latinos rank the lowest on
political empowerment, a fact that is extremely concerning given that these populations
currently represent a majority of California’s population and are expected to grow
significantly in the future.

INDEX OF POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT, BY RACIAL GROUP IN CALIFORNIA

The Index of Political Empowerment

Note: Index ranges from a minimum of 0 activities to a maximum of 7

FIG 5

1919

5 | What Predicts and Overcomes Racial
Disparities in Political Participation?

This report has provided a detailed look at the inequities that exist across

varying types of political participation in California. In our analysis, a clear

pattern emerges: in most types of activities, whites are overrepresented,

and Asian Americans and Latinos are underrepresented. Once we establish

these important facts and consider their implications, another important

question emerges: what accounts for these racial gaps in political

participation?

To answer this, we examine survey data on potential barriers, such as lack

of socioeconomic resources and low levels of English proficiency, political

interest, and sense of political efficacy. Next, we discuss factors that can

help overcome these barriers, including those operating at a social level

(discussing politics with family and friends and posting online about politics

and race relations) and at the level of organizations and institutions (civic

participation and mobilization efforts by parties and campaigns).

To preview our findings, our analysis indicates that barriers to participation,

particularly those stemming from a lack of outreach by parties and

campaigns, as well as educational and language barriers, bear some of the

strongest relationships to political disempowerment. By contrast, political

apathy plays a relatively small role. Thus, it is not that people of color do not

want to participate or do not care about achieving a healthy democracy,

but rather that they are much less likely to be empowered to participate,

either through mobilization or through the removal of other obstacles.

Socioeconomic Barriers

Past research has indicated that socioeconomic factors like educational attainment and income are significant

predictors of participation, especially for white Americans. There are several reasons for this: those with lower

levels of educational attainment and income are less likely to be part of social networks that mobilize people

into politics, they have had fewer opportunities to develop civic skills, and they are also less likely to be

homeowners and have a stake in local policy issues.

There are significant differences in socioeconomic status across racial groups in California, with whites and

Asian Americans significantly more likely to have a bachelor’s degree than the statewide average, and blacks,

Latinos, and Pacific Islanders less so. Similarly, blacks, Latinos, and Pacific Islanders are much less likely than

whites and Asian Americans to earn over $100,000 a year.

B A R R I E R S T O PA R T I C I PAT I O N

Low political interest is most
prevalent among whites and

least prevalent among Latinos.

Latinos and Asian Americans
were much less likely to
feel adequately equipped

or empowered to understand
the process of politics and

decision-making.

Black millennials were much
more likely than those of any

other group to report engaging
in political discussion and

community problem-solving.

Those who participate in civic
associations have significantly

higher levels of political
empowerment.

Those who have been mobilized
by political parties or campaigns

also have significantly higher
levels of political empowerment.

KEY FINDINGS

2020

Political Interest

Political apathy is often cited as a barrier to participation. Those who have low interest in politics are less

likely to be informed about candidates and issues, particularly at the state and local level (Delli Carpini and

Keeter 1996). Those with low levels of political interest also have less motivation to get involved in politics.3

There are significant differences in political interest across racial groups in

California. Interestingly, low political interest is most prevalent among whites

and least prevalent among Latinos, running counter to expectations, given

the racial disparities in participation. Similar patterns hold true across racial

groups for millennials. Thus, political apathy is an unlikely explanation for why

Latinos and Asian Americans under-participate in California’s democracy,

and we need to look to other factors to explain racial gaps.

Thus, we can expect socioeconomic barriers to account for part of the participation disparities by race,

particularly between whites and Latinos, but it cannot account for participation disparities between whites

and Asian Americans.

SOCIOECONOMIC RESOURCES BY RACE IN CALIFORNIA

Bachelor or Higher Income < $35,000 Income > $100,000

California Average 32% 28% 32%

Asian American 51% 23% 43%

Black 24% 41% 20%

Latino 12% 35% 18%

Pacific Islander 17% 26% 25%

White 42% 24% 38%

TABLE
6

LEVELS OF POLITICAL INTEREST BY RACE IN CALIFORNIA

Low Medium High

Asian American 52% 35% 13%

Black 56% 28% 16%

Latino 45% 39% 16%

Pacific Islander 51% 38% 11%

White 71% 24% 5%

Low political interest is
most prevalent among
whites and least prevalent
among Latinos, running
counter to expectations,
given the racial disparities
in participation.

TABLE
7

Sense of Political Efficacy

In addition to political interest, there are other attitudinal factors that can serve as barriers to participation.

These include a sense of external efficacy, often measured as the extent to which individuals believe that

public officials care what people like them think, and a sense of internal efficacy, often measured as the

extent to which individuals believe that politics and government are too complicated for people like them

to really understand. We find that racial gaps in internal political efficacy tend to mirror racial gaps in

participation, with Latinos and Asian Americans much less likely to feel adequately equipped or empowered

to understand the process of politics and decision-making. These same racial gaps reproduce themselves

among millennials. By contrast, there are no statistically significant differences with respect to racial gaps in

external efficacy, either among millennials or among the overall adult population in California.

Language Barriers

Language barriers can also hamper political participation, as shown in many previous studies (Tam Cho 1999;

Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Wong et al. 2011). Without robust levels of language assistance at the state and

local level, individuals with low English proficiency are less likely to have the requisite information needed to

participate in politics, and they are less likely to be mobilized into politics by parties and campaigns (Wong

et al. 2011; Parkin and Zlotnick 2011).

Among our survey respondents, Latinos and Asian Americans had much lower levels of English proficiency

(54% and 57%, respectively) than Pacific Islanders (97%), whites (99%), and blacks (100%). These patterns

mirror the documented racial gaps in participation, and we believe that language proficiency plays a

significant role in accounting for the observed racial disparities in political empowerment among Latinos

and Asian Americans.

Among millennials, English proficiency was lower among Asian Americans (73%) than among Latinos (88%).

This is understandable given that nearly a majority of the Asian American millennial population in California

is foreign-born, compared to less than a quarter of the Latino millennial population.

Note: Internal political efficacy is measured by those who agree that people like them can understand politics; external political efficacy is measured by
those who agree that politicians care about what people like them think. 4

POLITICAL EFFICACY BY RACE IN CALIFORNIA

Internal Political Efficacy External Political Efficacy

Asian American 26% 25%

Black 39% 29%

Latino 30% 31%

Pacific Islander 37% 34%

White 45% 29%

TABLE
8

2222

Here we turn to structural pillars of civic engagement that play an important role in influencing individuals’

levels of political participation. For example, prior research has indicated that working with others to solve

community problems and belonging to community organizations are both significant predictors of political

engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). These activities have been shown to provide individuals

with the skills, motivation, and opportunities for mobilization that lead to an increase in political participation

(García Bedolla 2005; Wong 2006). In addition to civic participation, other factors like discussing politics with

friends and family and contact by political parties have been noted as important to overcoming barriers to

political participation.

Engaging in Political Discussion

Engaging in discussion of political issues and news with friends and family is an important part of the political

socialization process. Discussing politics and current events with others can lead adolescents to score higher

on measures of civic life, such as political knowledge, and be more likely to participate in other types of

behaviors such as voting (McIntosh, Hart, and Youniss 2007).

Political discussion can therefore be considered a structural or social context factor that can either deter

or foster civic participation. We analyze traditional measures of political discussion, such as those involving

friends and family, and newer forms of political discussion, such as posting information about politics online

via platforms like Facebook and Twitter.

The rates of political discussion we found in our survey are encouraging. A majority of each racial group in

California takes part in political discussions with family or friends. However, racial gaps still exist. Nearly nine

in 10 whites reported discussing politics with friends, compared to only about six in 10 Asian Americans. Asian

Americans and Latinos had the lowest reported rates of political discussion. This may relate to their status

as immigrant-origin communities, but it means that members of these communities have social networks

that are simply less politicized than those of whites or blacks, potentially decreasing their opportunities

F A C T O R S T H AT C A N O V E R C O M E PA R T I C I PAT I O N B A R R I E R S

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN DISCUSSING POLITICS

46% 51% 65% 44% 78% 71% 60% 70%

30% 24% 18% 25% 20% 10% 11% 14%

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

77% 63% 80% 67% 70% 89%

29% 20% 32% 25% 33% 33%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

Discuss with
family/friends

Post about
politics online

TABLE
9

for political engagement (Knoke 1990). Among Asian Americans, a majority of all but two ethnic groups

(Cambodian and Hmong) reported engaging in political discussions.

In terms of specifically political social media activities, we see rates of participation that are slightly more

equal among racial groups compared to other popular forms of civic participation. One in three Pacific

Islanders, whites, and blacks reported engaging in political social media activity, compared to one in four

Latinos and one in five Asians. Among Asian Americans, we see larger variations in participation, with

Cambodian, Hmong, and Chinese participating at higher rates than other Asian sub-groups.

The popular narrative is that millennials are much more disengaged from politics than their older adult

counterparts. Yet, looking at Figure 6 we see that millennials were more likely than older adults to report

talking about politics with family and friends.

However, we also see that there are important racial differences among millennials. White millennials were

30% more likely to report discussing politics with family and friends than Asian American millennials. Similar

racial disparities exist among millennials when it comes to posting information about politics online.5

If we understand political socialization as operating through social networks, then these findings suggest

that Asian American and Latino millennials are situated within networks that contain much less political

conversation. This disparity makes it more difficult for these individuals to have access to the political

information needed to support their civic engagement.

POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AMONG MILLENNIALS
FIG 6

2424

Community Participation

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

24% 9% 26% 11% 33% 34% 20% 15%

13% 27% 42% 11% 45% 55% 56% 28%

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

36% 20% 42% 26% 44% 47%

42% 38% 42% 31% 51% 52%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

Solve Community
Problems

Involved in Comm-
unity Organization

Community participation (i.e., Californians working with their neighbors to solve common problems) is an

important aspect of healthy civic life. As indicated earlier, community participation can help individuals

overcome barriers to participation by furnishing them with the requisite skills, motivation, and mobilization.

TABLE
10

Solve Community
Problems
Involved in Comm-
unity Organization

2525

POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AMONG
MILLENNIALS AS COMPARED TO OLDER ADULTS

Past research has indicated that civic participation promotes important leadership skills and service

experiences useful for political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Positive peer pressure

within community organizations can also help increase motivation. Finally, community organizations are also

grounds for political mobilization, whether through parties and campaigns or through social movement

activity. Here, we use two measures for community participation:

1 Whether individuals have worked with others in their community to solve a problem,

and

2 Whether they are involved in community organizations.

Across all racial groups, we see participation in solving community problems, but there are significant

differences. Whites, blacks, and Pacific Islanders participate at the highest rates, while Latinos and Asian

Americans are much less likely to engage in community problem solving.

Similar patterns hold true when we look at involvement in community organizations, with Latinos and Asian

Americans significantly less likely to be involved as whites, Pacific Islanders, and blacks. There are significant

differences in community participation within the Asian American community, with Indian and Japanese

Americans reporting the highest levels of engagement, while Cambodian, Hmong, and Chinese Americans

reported the lowest levels. The low level of civic participation among Chinese Americans is especially

notable given that they constitute the largest Asian ethnic group in the state.

FIG 7

Mobilization by Parties and Campaigns

Finally, a wealth of prior research indicates that mobilization by political parties and campaigns helps

overcome barriers to participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Harris 1994; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Leighley

2001; Wong 2006; García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). This is particularly true for low-income communities,

where contact by political organizations can help increase levels of political interest, political information,

and a sense of external efficacy.

Our survey results indicate that Latinos and Asian Americans in California are much less likely to be contacted

by political parties (22% and 23%, respectively) than are whites and blacks (30% and 32%, respectively). As

we demonstrate further in the study, this lack of engagement by parties highly impacts racial disparities in

political empowerment, including activities that go well beyond voting.

Popular assumptions hold that millennials are more volunteer-oriented and more willing to engage in collective

activity when it is less focused on formal political institutions. Figure 7 seems to support this perception, with

millennials 7 to 9% more likely to report having engaged in these sorts of activities than older adults.

At the same time, we see the importance of examining differences among millennials of differing racial

backgrounds. Black millennials were much more likely than those of any other group to report engaging in this

sort of volunteer-oriented activity; Asian American millennials were less than half as likely. Again, this suggests

the need to address disparities in the political opportunities available to youth from these different groups.

RACIAL DISPARITIES IN POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Overall Asian American Black Latino Pacific Islander White

26% 23% 32% 22% 25% 30%

Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

15% 22% 27% 19% 25% 31% 15% 18%

TABLE
11

In Unequal Voices, Part I, we outlined factors like political interest and political mobilization as potentially

important in explaining racial gaps in participation. However, we were unable to test the effects of these

factors given the limitations of the dataset we used. Current Population Survey data from the federal

government does not include attitudinal measures, such as political interest, and measures of mobilization,

such as contact by political parties and/or campaigns. Fortunately, our 2016 California survey data contains

these measures, and we are able to analyze their relationship to empowerment.

As we can see from Figure 1, racial gaps in political empowerment are

statistically significant: whites participate the most in California’s democracy,

followed by blacks and Pacific Islanders. Asian Americans and Latinos have

the lowest levels of political empowerment, a fact that is extremely concerning

given that these populations represent a majority of California’s population

today.

When it comes to predicting political empowerment, we find that racial gaps

are partially accounted for by socioeconomic resources. The gap in political

empowerment for Latinos gets halved when we take into account gender,

education, and income, and the gap for Asian Americans gets reduced by

C A N B A R R I E R S B E O V E R C O M E ?

Those who
participate in civic

associations or who
have been mobilized

by political parties
and campaigns have

significantly higher
levels of political

empowerment.

PREDICTING RACIAL GAPS IN POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT, AS COMPARED TO WHITES
FIG 8

Note: Estimates are predicted values of the index of political empowerment, with whites as the baseline.

2828

about 25%. Even after controlling for socioeconomic resources, however, Latinos and Asian Americans still have

significantly lower levels of political empowerment than do whites (See Appendix Table 1 for more details).

Then we considered the role of other barriers, including political apathy, low levels of political efficacy, and

low levels of English proficiency. As expected, all of these factors affect participation levels. Controlling for

these factors reduces racial gaps in political empowerment even further, although they still remain statistically

significant and sizable for Latinos and Asian Americans.

Finally, we controlled for factors that can overcome these barriers, including political discussions, community

participation, and mobilization by political parties. Each of these factors is significantly related to political

empowerment. Importantly, those who participate in civic associations or who have been mobilized by political

parties and campaigns have significantly higher levels of political empowerment (See Appendix Table 1).

These latter two findings are important, as they suggest there are concrete ways to overcome the disadvantages

that Latinos and Asian Americans may face with respect to their political empowerment. As the prior literature

has shown, mobilization by political parties or community organizations helps individuals overcome barriers to

engagement, and civic associations are where constituents gain important skills, motivations, and opportunities

for mobilization (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Wong et al. 2011;

Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2011; García Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Ramírez 2015).

Controlling for all of these factors still leaves some racial disparities intact, but it goes a long way towards

eliminating racial disparities in political empowerment (Figure 8).

6 | Policy Reforms for Change
Our analysis has demonstrated significant gaps in political voice across California’s racial groups. Further, those

gaps persist among millennials.

These disparities are not simply the result of personal choice. As our data on political interest and discussion of

political issues show, Californians of color care about politics. The gaps are instead a reflection of the different

political opportunities available to members of particular racial groups and the political socialization process

they each experience.

For example, lower levels of political discussion among Asian Americans

reflect less politicized social networks. Similarly, lower levels of community

participation among Asian Americans and Latinos reflects fewer efforts to

politically mobilize members of these populations, and fewer opportunities

for those members to participate in politicized civic associations.

How should these structural issues of opportunity and socialization be

addressed? As we suggested in Unequal Voices, Part I, enacting policies to

reduce racial disparities in income, education, and homeownership would

help increase political participation among people of color.

But advocates for greater participation should not focus solely on

socioeconomic factors. Policies that aim to equalize educational and

economic opportunities for specific racial groups are both extremely difficult

to achieve and take a considerable amount of time to have an effect. Also,

as our analysis and the history of mobilization among blacks and low-income

whites suggest, mobilization and outreach by political institutions can

overcome socioeconomic barriers to participation.

We recommend, of course, that advocates continue

to support efforts for greater economic justice. But

their attention should be focused on reforming the

participation infrastructure: “the laws, processes,

institutions, and associations that support regular

opportunities for people to connect with each other,

solve problems, make decisions, and celebrate

community” (Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015, 6).

Reform is needed in communities across California,

particularly those with large Asian American and Latino

populations.

This infrastructure reform will result in significant

progress to increase political participation. It will create

opportunities and support new socialization processes,

thereby directly influencing or offsetting all of the

factors we have identified as facilitating or limiting

participation.

Attention should be
focused on reforming

the participation
infrastructure: “the laws,

processes, institutions,
and associations

that support regular
opportunities for people

to connect with each
other, solve problems,

make decisions, and
celebrate community.”

PARTICIPATION
INFRASTRUCTURE

GOVERNMENTAL

ELECTORAL

EDUCATIONAL

CIVIC

LEGAL

Due largely to the Ralph M. Brown Act of 1953 (Brown Act), the general legal standard for public participation

in policy decision-making is the comment period during a typical public meeting. This standard has become

frustrating for many government officials and community residents. As recent studies have shown, local

officials and civic leaders in the state believe that typical public meetings usually attract a narrow range of

residents, lead to “gripe sessions,” and do not facilitate “meaningful discussions among ordinary residents”

(Immerwahr, Hagelskamp, DiStassi, and Hess 2013).

Local participation ordinances will set a higher legal standard than the Brown Act. Such ordinances should

outline guiding principles for achieving effective participation, call for officials to have public participation

advisory boards, and mandate that officials report regularly on existing disparities and outreach efforts

across race, class, and geographic areas.

The ordinances will result in government officials implementing opportunities for resident engagement

that are better designed and more meaningful than the public comment period. Officials will also

proactively reach out to historically marginalized communities to invite them to participate in decision-

making processes, and they will inform the public about how resident input was used in making a final

decision.

For greater assistance on language and content for participation

ordinances, officials should refer to the Model Municipal Public

Participation Ordinance developed by the Working Group on

Legal Frameworks for Public Participation.6 They should also refer

to Oakland’s Budget Process Transparency and Public Participation

Policy.7 In Oakland’s case, the city council adopted the model

ordinance’s section on guiding principles for the city’s biennial

budget process. Although we encourage a more robust policy,

officials could follow Oakland’s example and start by adopting a

portion of the model ordinance and doing so for a specific issue

instead of for governance more generally.

LEGAL: Local elected officials should pass local public participation ordinances that
institutionalize new forms of democratic engagement in government decision-making.

Local participation
ordinances will
set a higher legal
standard than the
Brown Act.

WE PROVIDE HERE SOME SPECIFIC REFORMS THAT COMMUNITY
RESIDENTS SHOULD ADVOCATE FOR AND THAT POLICYMAKERS

SHOULD ENACT IN THREE OF THE FIVE INFRASTRUCTURE AREAS.

Most local officials view staff and resource limitations as major obstacles to implementing stronger forms

of public engagement (Hagelskamp, Immerwahr, and Hess 2013). A statewide participation program

would combat these limitations. The program should be administered by professionally trained staff who

would support state and municipal governments in efforts to bring community residents into governance

processes. Program staff would provide training and technical assistance, such as support on developing

and implementing outreach models and metrics for tracking progress. Such a program could supplement

anything done at the municipal level and could be administered at the county level to ensure it best suits

the needs of local legislative and municipal districts.

Through a statewide participation program, state and local government officials will have a high-

quality capacity to implement innovative and stronger models of public engagement. They will also

be able to build better relationships with groups of residents that many local officials acknowledge

are difficult to engage, such as racial/ethnic minorities, low-income individuals, and immigrants (ibid.).

If officials have the resources they need to successfully design participation processes and mobilize

residents, more residents will feel welcomed into decision-making processes, have the support they

need to participate (e.g., language assistance8), and have greater impact on policy decisions.

South Australia has an inspiring model of this type of program. In 2013, the South Australian government

established the Better Together program.9 Through the program, the state government proactively and

thoughtfully facilitates participation among citizens in a wide range of decision-making and problem-solving

initiatives, such as citizens’ juries and participatory budgeting. As a result of one citizens’ jury, $6.5 million

was included in the state budget for bike boulevards and greenways. Since 2013, 24,427 votes have been

cast through participatory budgeting initiatives to allocate $1.21 million to community organizations that

provide services to disadvantaged residents and for community-based projects that address economic and

social needs.

B. State and local elected officials should create pilot programs to track and
publically share data on the frequency and quality of representation afforded
to constituents of diverse backgrounds.

For example, a growing number of cities in California and elsewhere have worked with the National Research

Center and International City/County Management Association (ICMA) to conduct regular mail and online

surveys of constituents, known as the National Citizen Survey (NCS). While the NCS provides comparisons

between cities and national benchmarks on issues of governance and community engagement, these

efforts need to be expanded to consider racial disparities at the local level. State and local governments

can also gain more real-time assessments on the quality of constituent engagement. For example, in the

corporate sector, customer service calls are often audited by a third party to gauge the quality of support

provided. Similar programs could be piloted for state and local legislative offices, to ensure that elected

officials and community organizations alike are better aware of any racial disparities that may exist in

constituent access and the quality of their representation.

GOVERNMENTAL:
A. State elected officials should create a statewide public participation program for

government officials and staff that supports government efforts to create and
implement new forms of democratic engagement in government.

This curriculum would include, among other features, a sequence of instruction for civic education from

kindergarten through twelfth grade and metrics for tracking the development of students’ civic literacy.

Over the last three decades, civic education in public schools has been deprioritized. Students of color and

low-income students have been particularly affected. Previous research has found racial and socioeconomic

gaps in opportunities for civic education. A survey that included 2,500 juniors and seniors in California high

schools revealed that students of color and low-income students had fewer civic learning opportunities

than white students and students from high socioeconomic status families (Kahne and Middaugh 2008).

Widespread incorporation of high-quality civic education curriculum, especially in districts that

serve large numbers of students of color, will result in greater opportunities to learn about and

discuss community problems and response strategies, experience community service, and simulate

government processes. Students will then graduate with higher levels of civic knowledge, such as an

understanding of which government entity is responsible for addressing a particular community issue. They

will also develop civic skill, such as the ability to persuasively express a concern to an elected official.

Altogether, this will increase their likelihood of participation in civic and political life as adults (Gibson and

Levine 2003; García Bedolla 2005; Kahne, Chi, and Middaugh 2006; McDevitt and Kiousis 2006; McFarland

and Thomas 2006; Hart, Donnelly, Younnis, and Atkins 2007; Kahne and Sporte 2008).

For further guidance on developing curricula and programs, officials and administrators should refer to

the recommendations provided by the California Task Force on K-12 Civic Learning.10 They should also

join the Civic Learning Partnerships program through Power of Democracy – an organization responsible

for implementing the Task Force’s recommendations and offering technical assistance to school officials.11

EDUCATIONAL: School district officials and administrators at the K-12 level, especially
those serving large populations of Asian American and Latino students, should
incorporate high-quality civic education curriculum into their districts.

The health of our democracy is dependent upon its ability to provide opportunities for all Californians

to effectively voice their concerns and policy preferences. By reforming the participation infrastructure

in California, we have the opportunity to be a model for the Unites States on how to build an

inclusive, multiracial democracy. But doing so requires a shared commitment to this goal, targeted

policies, and ongoing evaluation, in order to ensure that our efforts are successful and progressing

in the right direction.

7 | Increase Participation in Democracy:
Move California Toward Greater Justice

Our study shows that there are significant gaps between whites and people of color when considering

non-electoral forms of participation among millennials and the broader adult population. Combined with

recent research showing similar gaps in voting (Baldassare 2016), our findings make it clear that whites are

overrepresented in almost every form of political voice in the state. Our analysis also shows that when non-

electoral forms of participation are considered collectively, whites are by far the most politically empowered

racial group in California.

Closing the racial gap in voting is imperative to ensuring that California has a healthier

and more racially just democracy. However, it is equally important to close the gaps in

non-electoral forms of participation and, more generally, in political empowerment.

California’s democracy is neither adequately participatory nor representative. It

needs to be enriched in particular by more Asian American and Latino voices. This is

especially true in the legislative and administrative arenas, where most public policy

decisions are made and all are implemented.

Our state has community organizers, labor leaders, and government officials who have successfully brought

an increasing number of Californians of color into policymaking processes. But those efforts must be

supplemented with large-scale structural change to combat the structural factors that depress participation

among people of color. That change can happen through racial and economic

justice advocates joining forces with advocates for good governance and

democratic engagement to reform the participation infrastructure in California’s

communities.

Once we have that change, government officials will be more proactive and

capable of facilitating productive political participation. Additionally, all

Californians will have more meaningful opportunities to engage in governance beyond voting, such as

advisory boards, citizens’ juries, and participatory budgeting. Overall, our democracy will be a beacon for

the nation: participatory, representative, and able to deliver public policies that achieve greater racial and

economic justice.

California’s
democracy is

neither adequately
participatory nor

representative.

Structural change will
make our democracy a
beacon for the nation.

Notes
1 We surveyed a diverse mix of 2,574 Californians, including an additional 914 young adults (aged 18-34), from August 10 through October

27, 2016. For more information on the methodology, see the Appendix.

2 According to the California Department of Finance, whites accounted for about 32% of the millennial population in California in 2015. See
http://www.dof.ca.gov/Forecasting/Demographics/.

3 Our fall 2016 survey asked respondents, “How interested are you in politics – very interested, interested, somewhat interested, or not at all
interested?” Low political interest includes those who indicated they were somewhat interested or not at all interested.

4 Our fall 2016 survey asked respondents, “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: a) Sometimes
politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on; and b) Public officials don’t
care much what people like me think.” Respondents were given the following scale: “Disagree strongly; Disagree somewhat; Neither agree
nor disagree; Agree somewhat; Agree strongly; Don’t know; Refuse.”

5 Millennials were more than twice as likely as older adults (47% v. 19%) to report posting information about politics online. Pacific
Islanders and whites were the most likely to post about politics online (58% and 57%, respectively) and Latinos and Asian Americans the
least likely (42% and 37%, respectively).

6 The model ordinance can be found in the following report: http://transformgov.org/m/en/knowledge_network/documents/kn/
Document/305669/Making_Public_Participation_Legal.

7 The policy can be found at the Oakland City Clerk’s website: https://oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.
aspx?ID=1345526&GUID=38E3173A-A96C-4469-AC34-11DED400D670&Options=ID%7CText%7C&Search=84385.

8 On the role of language assistance increasing political participation, see Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005), Hopkins (2011), Marschall and
Rutherford (2016), and Fraga and Merseth (2016).

9 Learn more about the Better Together program at the following website: http://bettertogether.sa.gov.au/.

10 The recommendations can be found in the following report: http://www.powerofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CLTF-Final-
Report .

11 Learn more about Power of Democracy at the following website: http://www.powerofdemocracy.org/.

Baldassare, Mark. 2016. California’s Exclusive Electorate: Who Votes and Why It Matters. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of
California.

Barber, Michael J. 2016. “Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the US Senate.” Public Opinion Quarterly 80
(1): 225-249.

Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Bergan, Daniel E., and Richard T. Cole. 2015. “Call Your Legislator: A Field Experimental Study of the Impact of a Constituency
Mobilization Campaign on Legislative Voting.” Political Behavior 37 (1): 27-42.

Calhoun-Brown, Allison. 1996. “African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of Organizational
Resources.” The Journal of Politics 58 (4): 935-953.

Cohen, Cathy, Joseph Kahne, Ben Bowyer, Ellen Middaugh, and Jon Rogowski. 2012. Participatory Politics: New Media and Youth Political
Action. Oakland: Youth and Participatory Politics Research Network.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fraga, Bernard L., and Julie Lee Merseth. 2016. “Examining the Causal Impact of the Voting Rights Act Language Minority Provisions.”
Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics 1 (1): 31–59.

Fraga Luis R., and Ann Frost. 2010. “Democratic Institutions, Public Engagement, and Latinos in American Public Schools.” Public
Engagement for Public Education, edited by Marion Orr and John Rogers, 117–138. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

García Bedolla, Lisa. 2005. Fluid Borders: Latino Power, Identity, and Politics in Los Angeles. Berkeley: University of California Press.

–––. 2014. Latino Politics, 2nd edition. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

García Bedolla, Lisa, and María Echaveste. 2015. “Voting and Registration in California: Demographic Differences.” Research Report.
Berkeley: UC Berkeley Center for Latino Policy Research.

García Bedolla, Lisa, and Melissa R. Michelson. 2012. Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote
Campaigns. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-scale Field
Experiment.” American Political Science Review 102 (1): 33-48.

Gibson, Cynthia, and Peter Levine. 2003. The Civic Mission of Schools. New York: Carnegie Corporation.

Grey Ellis, Emma. 2016. “Guess How Much That Anti-LGBTQ Law Is Costing North Carolina.” Wired, September, https://www.wired.
com/2016/09/guess-much-anti-lgbtq-law-costing-north-carolina/.

Hagelskamp, Carolin, John Immerwahr, and Jeremy Hess. 2013. Testing the Waters: California’s Local Officials Experiment with New Ways
to Engage the Public. New York: Public Agenda.

Harris, Frederick. 1994. “Something Within: Religion as a Mobilizer of African-American Political Activism.” The Journal of Politics 56 (1):
377-394

Hart, Daniel, Thomas M. Donnelly, James Youniss, and Robert Atkins. 2007. “High School Community Service as a Predictor of Voting and
Volunteering.” American Educational Research Journal 44 (1): 197-219.

Hopkins, Daniel J. 2011. “Translating into Votes: The Electoral Impacts of Spanish-Language Ballots.” American Journal of Political
Science 55 (4): 814–830.

Immerwahr, John, Carolin Hagelskamp, Christopher DiStasi, and Jeremy Hess. 2013. Beyond Business as Usual: Leaders of California’s
Civic Organizations Seek New Ways to Engage the Public in Local Governance. New York: Public Agenda.

Kahne, Joseph, Bernadette Chi, and Ellen Middaugh. 2006. “Building Social Capital for Civic and Political Engagement: The Potential of
High School Civics Courses.” Canadian Journal of Education 29 (2): 387–409.

References

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Kahne, Joseph, and Susan E. Sporte. 2008. “Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students’ Commitment to
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www.AdvancementProjectCA.org/UnequalVoices

Health of Democracy Essay Rubric

Due Week 2 Friday at 12 p.m. (noon)

What is a democracy? Describe 2-3 qualities of a healthy democracy. And, assess the health of
our democracy. In your essay, use your digital artifact, reference at least one of your peers’
artifacts, and at least two readings from Weeks 1 and 2.

Grading Criteria Grade

Organization, Use of Digital Artifact Post(s) and Course Readings

• Organized and well-structured essay with a beginning, a body, and a conclusion.

• Includes a thesis statement that presents the argument of your paper;
thesis/main argument is defended throughout the paper.

• Claims/arguments are backed by evidence from reading(s).

• Transitions between paragraphs.

• Includes all of the following: own digital artifact post, at least one peer’s digital
artifact post, and at least two course readings from Week 1-2.

___

1.5

Define Democracy and Describe 2-3 Qualities of a Healthy Democracy

• Defines democracy: what you know from k-12 or undergraduate course
experiences; and, the definition of democracy that is more compelling to you
(from readings, your digital artifact post, or a peer’s post) and why.

• Describes 2-3 qualities of a healthy democracy (draw from readings, your digital
artifact post’s definition of democracy, and/or peers’ posts).

___

Assess the Health of our Democracy

• Describes and discusses the artifact selected to show how well our democracy is
currently working and why our democracy is working that way.

• Discusses whether our democracy is comprised of the qualities described.

• Draws from peers’ posts and readings.

___

Format – Grammar, Style, Spelling, and Mechanics

• Essay must be 2-3 pages, double-spaced, with 12-point font (Arial, Cambria,
Calibri, or Times).

• Spelling (use spell check!).

• Grammar (commas, fragments, run-on sentences, etc.).

• Mechanics (1 inch margins, citations/references).

• Style (complete sentences, avoid absolutist terms, define terms/concepts and
explain, try to rephrase long quotes).

• APA format for in-text citations and reference page.

___

1.5

Overall Grade: ___ / 10

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