Emergency Management

20201015155042tierney2005japanfinal2 20201015155050future_of_em___the_evolution_of_u.s._em___miileti 20201015154923transcript_1_

Discussion post:

Please review the attached transcript, Timeline of Public Safety. Add three disaster events to the timeline: one regional, one national, and one global.

After reviewing the Timeline of Public Safety, explain how the emphasison disaster has changed over time. What factors have influenced the shifts in approach and focus? Discuss how paradigms continue to evolve.

Using Tierney’s and Mileti’s articles from this unit’s studies (attached) as a foundation, explain what future trends are anticipated in emergency management. Research an example of a company or technology that is already utilizing the benefits of future trends.

Future trends are new computer technology or approaches to solving emergency management issues. Identify one future trend and explain how it is being utilized. How does the use of this new approach or focus help prevent, or respond to, a disaster? A future trend can be new technology or a new method that helps in emergency management operations either at an emergency or in daily operations.

please cite all resources

1/8

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U. S. HOMELAND SECURITY

POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

MANAGEMENT OF EXTREME EVENTS

(Paper presented at the First International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction, Kobe,
Japan, January 18-20, 2005)

Kathleen TIERNEY1

1 Professor, Sociology and Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder

E-mail:tierneyk@colorado.edu

SUMMARY
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in profound changes in the U. S.
policy system. The federal government has responded to the events of 9-11 and to the
ongoing terrorist threat by passing new laws, creating the Department of Homeland
Security, issuing Presidential directives, developing new preparedness and crisis
management programs, and re-organizing and redirecting existing programs. Among the
effects of these actions are a decrease in emphasis on preparedness and response for
natural and technological disasters; an increase in the role of law enforcement agencies
and the military in the management of domestic emergencies, accompanied by a decline
in the importance and influence of the emergency management profession; and an
increase in the importance of “special purpose” initiatives that have the potential for
interfering with efforts to develop comprehensive, integrated, all-hazards approaches to
managing extreme events.

INTRODUCTION
Under certain conditions, disasters can serve as “focusing events” that lead to the
development of new legislation, policies, and practices (1, 2). In the U. S., disasters that
have led directly or indirectly to significant policy changes include the 1984 Bhopal,
India chemical disaster, which influenced the passage of Title III of the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act in 1986; the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, to which
the 1990 Oil Pollution Act was a partial response; and earthquakes in California,
including the 1933 Long Beach event, which led to the passage of the Field Act.

The September 11 disaster has had had far-reaching effects spanning a wide range of
policy domains, including policies on waging war and adherence to the laws of war;
policies toward international bodies such as the United Nations; policies on civil liberties,
privacy, and surveillance; immigration law, border security, and the rights of non-citizens.
With respect to laws, policies, and procedures affecting domestic preparedness, response,

2/8

and “consequence management” for extreme events of all types, September 11 was the
ultimate focusing event. While other U. S. disasters have led to significant institutional
realignments and new laws and policies, none has brought about changes of comparable
scope and scale. This paper discusses contrasts new crisis-relevant policy and
programmatic initiatives with pre-9-11 arrangements, and assesses the likely
consequences of these changes.

THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 POLICY LANDSCAPE

The Department of Homeland Security

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was perhaps the most
visible policy response to the events of September 11. The government reorganization
that accompanied the formation of DHS was the largest in U. S. history since President
Truman created the Department of Defense in 1947, incorporating all or part of
twenty-two federal agencies, forty different federal entities, and approximately 180,000
employees.

The reorganization merged together agencies (or parts of agencies) with very diverse
organizational structures, missions, and cultures, and, importantly, diverse ideas about the
management of domestic threats and emergencies. In the emergency management arena,
the overall effect of the reorganization has been to expand the role of defense- and law
enforcement-oriented agencies concerned exclusively with terrorism while curtailing the
role and decreasing the prestige of entities with all-hazards emergency management
responsibilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was
formerly an independent agency within the executive branch of government whose
director had de facto cabinet status, was incorporated into DHS as lead agency for
emergency preparedness and response. FEMA, which is the only agency within DHS that
is charged specifically with reducing the losses associated with non-terrorism-related
disasters, has lost significant visibility and financial and human resources in the
reorganization. As a small agency within a massive bureaucracy, its activities are now
overshadowed by much larger and better-funded entities within DHS. Indicative of this
shift, much of the responsibility, authority, and budget for preparedness for terrorism
events, which might logically have been assigned to FEMA, are now channeled to the
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), an entity that was transferred into DHS from
the Department of Justice. ODP has taken on many and varied responsibilities, including
overseeing preparedness assessments on a city-by-city basis, training, planning, exercises,
and the provision of grants to local agencies. ODP manages a number of important DHS
programs, including the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Homeland Security Grant
Program, and the Metropolitan Medical Response System, which was transferred from
FEMA. Unlike FEMA’s director, the director of ODP is confirmed by the United States
Senate, which is yet another indication of the relative importance of this office.

3/8

Since ODP had its origins in the Department of Justice, it is not surprising that it defines
domestic preparedness primarily in terms of law enforcement functions. For example,
ODP’s “Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security” (3) give priority to police and
other public safety agencies. One effect of ODP involvement has been to institutionalize
a system of terrorism prevention and management that is largely separate from the
existing emergency management system. Another has been to increase direct “top-down”
oversight of local preparedness activities on a scale that had not existed prior to 9-11.

The decline in FEMA’s prestige and influence in the wake of 9-11 has caused great
concern among U. S. emergency management experts. Testifying before the U. S.
Congress in March, 2004, former FEMA director James Lee Witt warned that the
nation’s ability to respond to disasters of all types has been weakened by some
post-September 11 agency realignments. In written testimony regarding the loss of
cabinet status for the FEMA director and the current position of FEMA within DHS, Witt
stated that “I assure you that we could not have been as responsive and effective during
disasters as we were during my tenure as FEMA director, had there been layers of federal
bureaucracy between myself and the White House” (4).

As a consequence of the increased flow of resources into law enforcement agencies and
counterterrorism programs from ODP and other sources, preparedness for natural and
technological disasters has assumed far less importance on the public policy agenda.
Moreover, as agencies based on command-and-control principles assume greater
importance in local preparedness efforts, the influence of organizations that focus on
hazards other than terrorism and that operate in a broadly inclusive fashion and on the
basis of co-ordination, rather than control, has waned.

At the same time, questions exist regarding the power and influence of DHS vis-à-vis
other more-established federal entities, including the Pentagon and the Department of
Justice. These tensions were evident in the summer of 2004, when Attorney General
John Ashcroft, rather than Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, released information
indicating a heightened terrorism threat against major financial institutions.

Mirroring shifts at the federal government level, law enforcement agencies are
increasingly assuming influential positions in homeland preparedness at the local
government level, in some cases supplanting local emergency management organizations.
Some emergency management professionals have criticized this trend as potentially
weakening community crisis management programs, rather than strengthening them.
Jerome Hauer of George Washington University, the former director of the New York
City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, has been publicly critical of the manner
in which the city has reorganized its crisis management functions in the wake of 9-11. In
an opinion piece in the New York Times, Hauer faulted New York’s current mayor,
Michael Bloomberg, for increasingly placing authority for managing emergencies in the
hands of the police department—an agency that according to Hauer has historically been
weak with respect to interagency coordination and disaster preparedness—while
diminishing the role of the more-inclusive Office of Emergency Management (5).

4/8

Presidential Homeland Security Directives and Resulting Actions

Direct Presidential action is also transforming the U. S. crisis management policy system
most notably through a series of homeland security presidential directives (HSPDs) that
have been issued since 9-11. The two directives that are most relevant for extreme
event management are HSPD-5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” and HSPD-8,
“National Preparedness.” The stated aim of HSPD-5 was to improve the nation’s
capacity to respond to domestic disasters by creating a single, comprehensive incident
management system. To this end, HSPD-5 mandated the development of a “concept of
operations” for disasters that would incorporate all levels of government as well as crisis
and consequence management functions within one unifying management framework.
The Secretary of Homeland Security was given responsibility for implementing HSPD-5
by developing a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management
System (NIMS). Under this directive, all federal agencies were required to adopt NIMS
and to make its adoption a requirement for other governmental entities receiving federal
assistance. HSPD-8, “National Preparedness,” gives the Secretary of Homeland Security
broad authority in establishing a “national preparedness goal” and implementing
programs to improve “prevention, response, and recovery” operations.1 Although the
directive explicitly calls for actions that address all hazards within a risk-based
framework, its major focus is on preparedness for terrorism-related events. Similarly,
while HSPD-8 is intended to address issues related to preparedness, a broad term that is
generally conceptualized as an integrative and comprehensive process, the directive is
mainly concerned with training and equipping emergency response agencies.

In calling for the development of a new national response plan, HSPD-5 seemingly
ignored the fact that the U. S. already had a plan for coordinating the federal response to
major disasters. The existing Federal Response Plan, which had been developed in the
late 1980’s and adopted in the early 1990’s, had proven effective for coordinating federal
resources in a number of major national emergencies, including the 9-11 attacks. At the
time the new plan was mandated, the U. S. had an internationally recognized emergency
management structure in place that was compatible with its system of “shared
governance.” While the NRP did not supplant that framework, it did make several
important modifications. Under the NRP, the primary responsibility for managing
domestic crises now rests with the Secretary of Homeland Security. The plan also
contains language strongly suggesting that the federal government will in the future
assume more responsibility for directly managing some crises, which significantly
modifies “shared governance” policies that assign responsibility disaster management to
local authorities in affected jurisdictional areas.

In mandating NIMS, the plan also institutionalizes the Incident Command System (ICS)
as the preferred organizational structure for managing disasters for all levels of

1 Interestingly, HSPD-8 defines “prevention” as “activities undertaken by the first responder
community during the early stages of an incident to reduce the likelihood or consequences of
threatened or actual terrorist acts.” The directive does not discuss the concept of mitigation.

5/8

government and within all organizations that play (or wish to play) a role in disaster
response activities. While numerous U. S. jurisdictions and organizations already use
ICS, this directive may nevertheless have problematic consequences. Some critics fault
ICS for overly emphasizing command-and-control principles; they also question the
wisdom of mandating one particular management framework for the many and diverse
organizations that respond to disasters. Emergency management policy expert William
Waugh observes that ICS “was created utilizing management concepts and theories that
are now more than 30 years old” (6) and that current management theory places much
less emphasis on the command-and-control philosophy on which ICS is based. Waugh
also notes that ICS is far more compatible, both structurally and culturally, with
command-oriented organizations like police and fire departments than with the structures
and cultures of the many other types of agencies and groups that play key roles in
responding to disasters but that do not operate according to hierarchical principles. In his
view and that of other critics, top-down management models like ICS (and now NIMS)
are particularly ill-suited to the distinctive challenges disasters present, which call for
flexibility, improvisation, collaborative decision making, and organizational adaptability.
The danger is that in mandating a single, standardized management approach that is
familiar mainly to command-and-control agencies, the NRP will stifle the capacity to
improvise and exclude many entities and groups that make can critical contributions
during extreme events.

More broadly, the push toward universal adoption of NIMS and ICS reflects the highly
questionable assumption that once a consistent management structure is adopted,
preparedness and response effectiveness will automatically improve. Such an assumption
ignores the numerous other factors that contribute to effective disaster management, such
as ongoing contacts among crisis-relevant agencies during non-disaster times, common
understandings of community vulnerability and the likely consequences of extreme
events, realistic training and exercises, and sound public education programs.

The growing emphasis on terrorism readiness and ICS principles has led to a concomitant
emphasis on “first responder” agencies and personnel. In current homeland security
parlance, the term “first responder” refers to uniformed personnel (fire, police, and
emergency services personnel) that arrive at the scene of a disaster. Missing from this
discourse is a recognition that, as numerous studies indicate, ordinary citizens are the true
“first responders” in all disasters. For example, in HSPD-8, a mere two sentences are
devoted to the topic of citizen participation in preparedness activities. New policies and
programs may thus leave vast reserves of talent and capability untapped in future extreme
events.

Reinforcing Pre-September 11 Trends: Militarization and Stovepipes

Some trends that were already under way during the 1990s were greatly accelerated by
the events of September 11. One such trend involves an extension of military authority in
domestic emergencies. Since the end of the Cold War, military and intelligence
institutions had been increasingly seeking new responsibilities in areas such as

6/8

environmental monitoring and disaster management (7). With the advent of the war on
terror, and with enormous increases in available funding, the domestic missions of
defense- and intelligence-related agencies have further expanded. With respect to defense
activities, for example, prior to September 11, there was no U. S. military entity with a
specific mission to coordinate military operations within U. S. borders. In 2002, the U. S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was created with the express mission of engaging in
homeland defense. Although its responsibilities in the homeland defense area are quite
broad, NORTHCOM’s public communications also stress that it operates according to U.
S. laws governing the provision of military assistance to civil authorities (MACA), which
require that military entities operating within the U. S. do so only in support of decisions
made by civil authorities. Nonetheless, the creation of NORTHCOM does represent a
major policy shift regarding the role of the military in U. S. domestic affairs.

At the same time, terrorism-related concerns have led the Bush administration to
re-evaluate U. S. laws such as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which bars the military
from carrying out domestic law enforcement functions. New interpretations of the PCA
allow considerable latitude in the use of the military within the U. S., not only in
situations involving terrorism, but for a wide range of other purposes. Indeed, the
domestic use of military resources in crises (and potential crises) of all types is becoming
increasingly routine. For example, the military is involved in ongoing efforts to enhance
border security, troops were used extensively to provide security for the 2002 Winter
Olympics in Salt Lake City, military assets were employed in the hunt for the
Washington area sniper, and the military played a major and highly visible role in the
response to the 2004 Florida hurricanes. (Whether it was necessary to deploy troops to
guard Home Depot stores and disaster assistance centers is another matter.)

In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, the military is widely seen as having superior skills
and technologies that can enhance the effectiveness of domestic crisis
management—including the management of disasters. Its expertise is being called upon
in areas such as the design and conduct of terrorism drills in U. S. communities, gaming
and simulation, and surveillance. Former military officers are sought out by civil
authorities and public safety agencies charged with homeland security
responsibilities—again presumably for their superior knowledge and training—and
military entities are being given responsibility for assessing domestic crisis preparedness
programs. (8). Homeland security terminology now includes the concept of the “domestic
battlespace,” a term that is applied both to terrorism-related emergencies and to disasters.

Federal and state military assets have long played a role in responding to disasters and
other domestic crises, but with the recognition that the military would become involved
only if “tasked” to do so under existing laws and policies. However, the position taken by
the current administration—that U. S. is now at war with terrorism and will be for the
foreseeable future—has the potential for drastically expanding military participation
within the nation’s borders in a variety of activities that formerly were considered the
domain of civil authorities, including emergency management. This shift raises questions
regarding the extent to which military culture, doctrine, and modes of operation are

7/8

consistent with the crisis-related needs and requirements of a diverse civil society. War
and domestic emergencies are not analogous, and new domestic military missions that
conflate disaster response with battlefield operations could ultimately be detrimental to
both.

The post-9-11 environment has also been marked by the acceleration of a second trend:
the involvement of “special purpose” entities in crisis and consequence management
activities. Such entities include Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Urban Areas Security
Initiative programs (UASI), which focus specifically on terrorism-related risks from a
law enforcement perspective, and Metropolitan Medical Response Systems (MMRS),
which were established to enhance the emergency response capacity of public health
systems, particularly with respect to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs). All three of these programs predated 9-11, but their importance, as well as their
budgets, have grown as a consequence of the new war on terrorism.

This trend toward “special purpose” preparedness can also be seen in the proliferation of
centers for public health preparedness in schools of public health across the nation. Again,
some investment had been made in addressing public health needs related to terrorism
and WMD prior to 9-11, but in the aftermath of the attacks virtually every school of
public health of any significance has launched initiatives in the homeland security area.
While some centers have been funded by means of competitive grants from federal
agencies, others have received funding through special legislative “earmarks.” As a
consequence of this rapid expansion, needed public health education and preparedness
efforts are often poorly-coordinated and isolated from broader community preparedness
activities.

These programs and forms of funding were initiated in order to address serious gaps in
response capability, notably challenges associated with intergovernmental collaboration
on law enforcement issues and with inadequate public health emergency response
resources. However, such initiatives also have other unintended consequences. They
encourage collaboration and integration within sectors (e.g., law enforcement and public
health), rather than across the diverse sectors that must be involved in responding to
crises. They also promote specialized planning for particular types of emergencies. In
other words, both in structure and in function, these increasingly influential entities
contravene widely-accepted principles of emergency management, which emphasize the
importance of developing comprehensive, integrated preparedness and response networks
and of all-hazards preparedness activities, rather than hazard-specific ones.

Many post-9-11 investigations have highlighted problems associated with “stovepiping,”
or the tendency for organizations and agencies to closely guard information, carry out
their own specialized activities in isolation from one another, and resist efforts to
encourage cross-agency collaboration. Indeed, DHS itself was created in order overcome
stovepipes, better integrate disparate agencies and programs, and improve
information-sharing and cooperation. It is ironic, then, that some homeland security
initiatives appear to be creating new stovepipes and reinforcing existing organizational

8/8

and institutional barriers. For example, while diverse law enforcement agencies at
different governmental levels may be making progress in working together on
terrorism-related issues, the law enforcement sector itself may have little incentive to take
an active role in broader cross-sectoral preparedness efforts. Rather than promoting
comprehensive preparedness for all potential threats—including disasters and
terrorism—special-purpose initiatives encourage organizations to interact and plan within
their own separate spheres and to focus on particular kinds of threats. Large infusions of
funds into specialized programs only exacerbate the problem.

CONCLUSION

It is far too soon to speculate on longer-term impacts of new initiatives adopted in the
wake of the tragic events of September 11. We may yet see a day when the U. S. declares
victory in the war on terrorism and homeland security becomes less important on the
national policy agenda. Or some future catastrophic disaster may bring about a
re-ordering of national priorities. At this point, however, such possibilities seem remote.
What does seem clear is that post-September 11 policies will very likely result in
permanent and fundamental changes in the nation’s approach to preparing for and
responding to extreme events, including earthquakes and other disasters. Whether those
changes reduce the vulnerability and enhance the resilience of the nation and its
communities in the face of terrorism and other threats is a question that can only be
addressed through future research.

REFERENCES

1. Birkland. T. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997.

2. Rubin, C. and Renda-Tenali, I. Disaster Timeline: Selected Events and Outcomes
(1965-2000). Arlington, VA: Claire B. Rubin and Associates, 2000.

3. Department of Homeland Security. The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines
for Homeland Security. Washington, DC, U. S. Department of Homeland Security,
2003.

4. Witt, J. L. Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations and the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, March 24, 2004.

5. Hauer, J. “Emergency Unpreparedness,” The New York Times, March 15, 2004. On
line at http://www.nytimes.com

6. Waugh, W. L., Jr. Living With Hazards, Dealing With Disasters: An Introduction to
Emergency Management. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

7. Global Disaster Information Network. Harnessing Information and Technology for
Disaster Management. Disaster Information Task Force Report. Washington, DC:
Global Disaster Information Network.

8. Healy, G. “Deployed in the USA: The Creeping Militarization of the Home Front.”
Policy Analysis No. 303, December 17. Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2003.

The Future of Emergency Management

The Evolution of U.S. Emergency Management

Dennis S. Mileti

Professor Emeritus

University of Colorado at Boulder

The character of emergency management continues to change in our nation. These changes are of three general types. First, there are changes in the content of the profession. Second, there are changes in the context for the profession. Third, there surely are changes in the viewpoint or paradigm that guides the profession. The purpose of this text is to elaborate on some observations of and changes in these general categories.

Non-Rational Risk Management

First, we do not manage risks in our nation rationally. We never have. I know we teach the disciplines of risk assessment and risk analysis, but we really aren’t able to use them to manage risk in this nation. So I recommend you teach people to use it. Here is an example, and I am going to pick an example from my own state of California that is quite colorful, but true. In 1931, there was an earthquake in Long Beach and some schools fell down, and the state made it illegal for schools to fall in earthquakes. It passed an law requiring strong seismic resistance in public schools. Then in 19

7

1 there was an earthquake in San Fernandina and a hospital fell down, and the state moved quickly to make it illegal for hospitals to fall in earthquakes. In 1989 there was an earthquake in the Bay Area and part of the Bay Bridge collapsed. Now guess what the state did, it moved swiftly to make it illegal for bridges to fall in earthquakes. That is not rationale risk management. You might say that it is reactive management of risk. And this example is from the State of California. It doesn’t get any better for risk perception of earthquakes in our nation than is the case in California.

Here is another example of not managing risk rationally. In the 1980’s we abandoned an operational nuclear power plant on Long Island called Shoreham. The result of this is that we’ve had a $5,000,000,000 “paper weight” in Suffolk County, Long Island for twenty years. People in that area of the country simply did not want to accept the risk of a breach of containment in the reactor. The probability of a breach of containment out of the reactor vessel was 1 times 10 to the minus 7. I called up the U.S. Geological Survey in the 80’s and asked “what is the probability of an earthquake large enough to level Manhattan?” The answer they gave me was 1 times 10 to the minus 7, the same probability as a breach of containment at Shoreham. We shut Shoreham down because we feared the risks. Yet, do any of you know any Manhattan residents concerned with the earthquake hazard? One can now fairly ask, what is really going on regarding risk management in our country, since it is certainly not rationale risk management.

More examples of non-rational risk management exist. For example, on September 11th lunatics flew two airliners into the World Trade Center Towers. How many of you have noticed that getting on an airplane in this country has never been the same? What we are doing is protecting ourselves from the risk of terrorist attacks in airplanes. But have any of you noticed anybody protecting us from the risks of terrorist opening up bottles of poisons by air intakes for high rises on sidewalks? You haven’t, and do you know why? A high rise air intake disaster hasn’t happen yet.

I would like to propose that how we manage risks in this nation for all hazards is to not manage it. In fact what we do with risk management is more like a political knee jerk response to what’s on television and in pictures on the front pages of newspapers. This approach to risk management is not based on reason, it is not based on science, it is not based on knowledge, it is political. My request to the attendees of this conference, the people who operate higher education program for hazards management and emergency preparedness, is that you train the next generation of emergency managers to management risk rationally, and to hold political leaders accountable when they seek to management risk in non-rational ways.

Command and Control

Second, I’ve noticed that the 1950s command and control approach to responding to events is back regarding how our nation seeks to manages emergencies. Traditionally, command and control approaches to emergency management has been based on the assumption that public is a problem in emergencies and organizations are the solution. Yet research into emergencies since the 1950’s clearly suggests that any emergency response system that is based on a command and control model doesn’t work. I want to say that again. We’ve known since the 1950’s that if emergency response organization looks like the organizational structure of the United States Army, it doesn’t work.

One can ask, why did our nation throw out our bottom up approach and replace it with a top down approach won’t work? And why are we, since we know such an approach won’t work, letting our nation get away with it? Must we wait for a world-class catastrophe in which emergency response fails to learn this lesson yet one more time? We’ve moved backwards a half a century, and stepped over and ignored all the research done by all the social scientist who have investigated this issue. Let me give you one example of why a command and control approach to emergency management response doesn’t work.

Once again, I will pick on my own state of California. Imagine that you’ve moved to southern California, and that you are having a BBQ in your backyard. Mom is in the kitchen cutting watermelon. And then the big one hits and your house collapses. Are you going to wait for an urban search and rescue crew from Fairfax County, Virginia to come dig mom out? Or are you going to start searching for mom on your own? Now do you get what I mean when I say effective emergency response must be organized from the bottom up? Moreover, the public is actually a resource in an emergency. I request that you train the next generation to make full use of that resource.

A Holistic Approach

Next, we need a holistical approach to emergency management. We need an approach that has local emergency managers address all the hazards that they face, rather than an approach based on local response to programs that the feds come up with one at a time. What I mean is that local plans are needed for response and recovery that covers all the hazards that those locals face, not different response and recovery plans for different hazards one at a time. A plan to warn American citizens when they need to be warned not a different warning plan for dozens of different hazards. A plan for preparedness that includes all hazards, that has appendices specific to specific hazards. Our current national emphasis on the hazrds of terrorism, although warranted, should not assume that the laws of nature were repealed on September 11th. I recommend that you train the next generation to do emergency planning holistically.

National Leadership

Next, we need profoundly useful national leadership. We had it once, but we didn’t have it long. We have hardly ever had it in our nation’s history and we need it again. We need leadership to help locals if we are concerned with terrorism, make good decisions about how they spend the money they have on the technology for terrorism that they are buying rather than waste it. We need to help locals understand how to design an integrated warning system for all hazards that really works. An integrated warning system is more than a buzzer or siren or picking a new buzzing devise. Do you know that its been a quarter century since the Federal Emergency Management Agency has ever given anybody any technical guidance on warning systems. We need leadership, and we need an emergency management community populated by those who would demand it of the people we elect to run our nation.

Shifting Goals

Also, the general goals of emergency management have shifted, in fact the goals have shifted many times. Years ago emergency management was all about shelter, food, and medical care. A decade ago it was about customer satisfaction largely begun after public outcry in Hurricane Andrew. And for a brief time we had the goals of emergency management located exactly where they need to be. Emergency management was seen as a small of the general goal of creating sustainable human communities that can survive both what people and nature throw at them. We must work again to make sure that the boarder goal of achieving disaster resilient communities re-emerges. We must integrate natural hazards sustainability and other hazards sustainability and terrorism all together.

Regarding whatever accomplishments we may achieve in the domain of protecting ourselves from Mother Nature, terrorist acts, or other hazards. Of what good are safe communities if no one can breathe the air? If people don’t have jobs, if the economy is spirally downward, if too many of our citizens have to low standard of living and if the city is being submerged under rising seas. Making disaster resilient communities a national goal has fallen by the wayside and needs to be resurrected and made indigenous to our culture.

Who Emergency Managers Are

Last, there have been and will continue to be changes in who emergency managers are. Half a century ago, emergency managers were people who had retired from the United States Army. A decade ago, emergency managers were people who were civil servants and one day found a better paying job called “Emergency Manager” on a bulletin board where they worked and applied for it. Tomorrow emergency managers will be trained by you and will be armed with all the skills they did to practice their crafts. So I liked to say to all of you that have programs and faculty to foster and teach the next generation in emergency management: thank you for taking this on, thank you for the programs that you have created, thank you for all you have done, and all you will do that I don’t even know about to shape and mold the future of emergency management in the United States.

General Conclusion

Some of the most important emergency management lessons of the past have been forgotten as our nation returns to a top-down command and control paradigm. That perspective has failed so many times in the past. Rational risk-based emergency management is on the decline, not the upswing. A holistic and all-hazards approach was mounted a decade ago, but it now seems on the side line. The adequacy and appropriateness of national leadership is questioned by many. An approach linking emergency management goals to other vital local interests that might integrate the profession into local cultures has been abandoned. And the trend toward increasing the level of self-directed professionalism among emergency managers seems on the decline. The upside of these grim observations is that the lessons of the past with soon be re-learned and, with luck, trends will be reversed.

PAGE

7

Print

TIMELINE OF PUBLIC SAFETY

1736
The first Fire Department was started in Philadelphia by Benjamin Franklin.

1775
The United States Army, United States Navy, and United States Marine Corps are established.

1829
The London Metropolitan Police Force is established in London, England by Sir Robert Peel.

1831-1853
Several cities form their first police departments: the Town of Chicago Police, the Boston Police Department
(based on the London Metropolitan Police Force); New York Police Department, and the Los Angeles City
Guards (that would become the Los Angeles Police Department).

Political Era
During the mid-1850’s-1900, policing was local, informal, and controlled by local political parties. It
emphasized controlling social disorder.

Professional/Reform Era
During 1900-1960’s, policing became professionalized and technology (telephone and automobile)
enhanced operations. Policing became law enforcement-oriented during this era.

Key Events 1940-1960
In 1941, Pearl Harbor in Hawaii was attacked, and the United States entered World War II. In 1947, the
Department of the Air Force established. The U.S. then enters a prolonged Cold War with the Soviet Union
that will last from 1946-1990.

Key Events, 1960’s
The social disorder of the 1960’s compelled policing to change toward a community-service/problem
oriented model that emerged in the 1970’s. This time period also saw a significant growth in Hospital
Emergency Departments. In 1967, the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was developed, and standards
were created.

Community/Problem-Solving Era
In the thirty-year period of 1970-2001, policing shifted to provide greater interaction with the communities in
which they operate. Policing organizations begin to decentralize to meet the increased demands of their
communities.

Key Events 1970-1990
In 1977, the first Hazardous Materials Response Team was established in Jacksonville, Florida. The 1989
fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany marked the end of the Cold War with the Soviet union, and the end of a
global stabilizing force.

Terrorism in U.S.
February, 1993 – 1st Attack on World Trade Center in New York City.

April, 1995 – Attack on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

January, 2000 – Millennium Terror Attack Foiled.

September, 2001 – 2nd Attack on World Trade Center in New York City and attack on Pentagon in
Washington, DC.

Economical Era
From 2001 to the present, policing has had to account for an increase in responsibilities regarding
homeland security and counter terrorism initiatives. The police organization today must continue crime and
fear reduction strategies by efficiently developing and disseminating information and intelligence and
actively involving the community in the police mission. This era is categorized by information technology

Citation Credits

10/14/20, 12:12 PM
Page 1 of 2

applications, management accountability, proactive directed policing, and response to the community.

New Collaborations
In October, 2002, the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was created. In January, 2003, the
United States Department of Homeland Security emerges as a new key public safety entity.

Hurricane Katrina
In August, 2005, hurricane Katrina makes landfall as a Category Four Hurricane. The devastation caused by
this event reveals continued challenges associated with coordination among public safety entities.

October 2007 California Wildfires
California Wildfires resulting in thousands of acres of burned land, the displacement of close to one million
residents.

April 2010 Oil spill in Gulf of Mexico (affected Florida, Alabama, Mississippi).
Eleven dead, largest oil spill in U.S. history, Estimated between 172 and 185 million gallons of oil spilled.

October 2012 Hurricane Sandy.
Death toll in U.S. 131, largely affected New York and New Jersey. by damaging thousands of homes,
hundreds of miles of roadways, subways and bridges . At one point 8 million people were without power.
Estimated 63 billion in damages.

REFERENCES

Interactive Design:

Instructional Design:

Project Manager:

CREDITS

Anderson, A. G. (2005). The Development of Municipal Departments in the United
States. Journal of Libertarian Studies, (3) 3, 331-359.

Burke, R. (2006). Jacksonville Fire Department: first hazmat team in the United States.
Firehouse Magazine. December, 2006.

Chicago Police Department. (2007). A Brief Timeline History of the Chicago Police
Department. Retrieved February 25, 2007 from:
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/city/webportal/portalContentItemAction.do?
BV_SessionID=@@@@1210206262.1172609661@@@@&BV_EngineID=cccdaddkfimdkdmcefecelldffhdfgn.0&contentOID=536941949&contenTypeName=COC_EDITORIAL&topChannelName=Dept&blockName=Police%2FHistory%2FI+Want+To&context=dept&channelId=0&programId=0&entityName=Police&deptMainCategoryOID=-9079

City of Los Angeles Police Department. (2007). Inside the LAPD: History of the LAPD.
Retrieved February 26, 2007 from:
http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1107

United States Army. (2007). The U.S. Army Center of Military Center of Military History.
Retrieved February 26, 2007 from: http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/AMH-V1/index.htm

United States Marine Corps. (2007). Brief History of the United States Marine Corps.
Retrieved February 26, 2007 from:
http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/Customes_Traditions/Brief_History_USMC.htm

United States Navy. (2007). The Navy: The Continental Period, 1775-1890. Retrieved
February 26, 2007 from: http://www.history.navy.mil/history/history2.htm

United States Department of Homeland Security. (2007). DHS History: Who Became
Part of the Department? Retrieved February 26, 2007 from:
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm

United States Northern Command. (2006). Unite States Northern Command: History.
Retrieved February 25, 2007 from: http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm

Christina Adams, Peter Hentges

Zane Thimmesch-Gill

Karen Dodd

L i c e n s e d u n d e r a C r e a t i v e C o m m o n s A t t r i b u t i o n 3 . 0 L i c e n s e .

10/14/20, 12:12 PM
Page 2 of 2