cyber security and diversity
Relevance of diversity strategy while securing any set of national assets. Diversity in national infrastructure involves the introduction of intentional differences into systems such as vendor source, deployment approach, network connectivity, targeted standards, programming language, operating system, and software version. Two systems are considered diverse if their key attributes differ, and nondiverse otherwise. The requirement for physical diversity in the design of computing infrastructure is perhaps the most familiar of all diversity-related issues. The idea is that any computing or networking asset that serves as an essential component of some critical function must include physical distribution to increase its survivability. A national diversity program should be developed that would call for coordination between companies and governmental agencies in several .
how the types of threats discussed in the below article could impact our economy, and how implementing Diversity (as discussed in the attachment) could help mitigate these threats?
https://www.resdal.org/Archivo/usa-home-prote.htm
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Chapter
4
Divers
ity
Cyber Attacks
Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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Introduction
• The securing any set of national assets should
include a diversity strategy
• The deliberate introduction of diversity into national
infrastructure to increase security has not been well
explored
• Two system are considered diverse if their key
attributes differ
• Diversity bucks the trend to standardize assets for
efficiency’s sake
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Fig. 4.1 – Diverse and nondiverse
components through attribute
differences
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Diversity and Worm Propagation
• Worm propagation is an example of an attack that
relies on a nondiverse target environment
• Worm functionality in three steps:
– Step #1: Find a target system on the network for
propagation of worm program
– Step #2: Copy program to that system
– Step #3: Remotely execute program
– Repeat
• Diversity may be expensive to introduce, but saves
money on response costs in the long run
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Fig. 4.2 – Mitigating worm activity
through diversity
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Desktop Computer System Diversity
• Most individual computers run the same operating
system software on a standard processor platform
and browse the Internet through one or two popular
search engines with the one of only a couple
browsers
• The typical configuration is a PC running Windows on
an Intel platform, browsing the Internet with Internet
Explorer, searching with Google
• This makes the average home PC user a highly
predictable target
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Fig. 4.3 – Typical PC configuration
showing diversity
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Desktop Computer System Diversity
• Three Considerations
– Platform costs
– Application interoperability
– Support and training
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• Ultimate solution for making desktops more secure
involves their removal
– Not a practical solution
• Cloud computing may offer home PC users a diverse,
protected environment
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Diversity Paradox of Cloud
Computing
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Fig. 4.4 – Spectrum of desktop diversity
options
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Fig. 4.5 – Diversity and attack difficulty
with option of removal
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• Modern telecommunications consist of the following
two types of technologies
– Circuit-switched
– Packet-switched
• When compared to one another, these two
technologies automatically provide diversity
• Diversity may not always be a feasible goal
– Maximizing diversity may defend against large-scale
attacks, but one must also look closely at the entire
architecture
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Network Technology Diversity
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Fig. 4.6 – Worm nonpropagation benefit
from diverse telecommunications
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Fig. 4.7 – Potential for impact
propagation over shared fiber
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• Any essential computing or networking asset that
serves a critical function must include physical
distribution to increase survivability
• Physical diversity has been part of the national asset
system for years
– Backup center diversity
– Supplier/vendor diversity
– Network route diversity
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Physical Diversity
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Fig. 4.8 – Diverse hubs in satellite
SCADA configurations
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• A national diversity program would coordinate
between companies and government agencies
– Critical path analysis
– Cascade modeling
– Procurement discipline
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National Diversity Program