Criminal Justice Senior Capstone.
Please select a topic that relates to Criminal Justice.
Strictly Traditional Research Project – with approval of the instructor, students will develop an original and scholarly research paper on an approved topic in Criminal Justice. Students will identify a gap in Criminal Justice knowledge created by an area that may not have been previously addressed in previous courses content or choose a topic that may have been covered in a prior class that serves as inspiration for greater knowledge on the subject matter, idea, or concept. Through formal academic and systematic inquiry, students will research, collect, organize, and produce an analysis of the information obtained from both primary and secondary sources, and write a formal research paper. Student research paper projects will conclude with a 25-page (minimum) scholarly report in standard academic English and with appropriate APA documentation, which successfully fills the identified gap in knowledge on the selected topic. Students additionally will be required to make a presentation to the overall class outlining the conceptualization and development of their Capstone option.
50% – Content – Did the student address the assigned topic? Were the resources used peer reviewed? DO NOT USE WIKIPEDIA! Instructor’s golden rule: If a reference is missing information in order to properly cite the resource then do not use it!
25% – Grammar/Writing mechanics
25% – APA – Please invest in the 6th Edition of the manual.
SECTIONI- INTRODUCTION
In the introduction, you are attempting to inform the reader about the rationale behind the work, justifying why your work is an essential component of research in the field.
The introduction does not have a strict word limit, unlike the abstract, but it should be as concise as possible. It can be a tricky part of the paper to write, so many scientists and researchers prefer to write it last, ensuring that they miss no major points.
The introduction gives an overall review of the paper, but does address a few slightly different issues from the abstract.
It works upon the principle of introducing the topic of the paper and setting it into a broad context, gradually narrowing down to a research problem, thesis and hypothesis. A good introduction explains how you mean to solve the research problem, and creates ‘leads’ to make the reader want to delve further into your work.
You should assume that your paper is aimed at someone with a good working knowledge of your particular field.
Background
Like in any good Hollywood movie, the first task of the introduction is to set the scene, giving your paper a context and seeing how it fits in with previous research in the field.
Whilst not the only way, this section, comprising the first paragraphs of your introduction, can be based around a historical narrative, from the very first research in the field to the current day.
In many fields, this could-make up an entire essay in itself, so you have to stick to relevant information.
Importan
c
e
This leads into the rationale behind the research, revealing whether it is building upon previous research, looking at something that everybody else has overlooked, or improving upon a previous research project that delivered unclear results.
This section can then flow into how you are going to fill the gap, laying out your objectives and methodology.
Limitations
The introduction is the place to highlight any weaknesses in the approach from the start.
As long as you warn the reader about this, so that they are aware of the shortcomings, then they can easily judge the validity of the research. This is much better than making them wait until you point it out in the discussion.
Assumptions
You should also point out any assumptions that you make about conditions during the research. You should set out your basic principles before embarking upon the process: any research will be built around some assumptions.
For example, if you were performing educational research, you may assume that
all students at the same school are from a very similar socio-economic background. If for example, you referred to police officers in your research, you may assume
that all are credentialed to make arrests.
Tips
There are a few tips that can help you write a strong introduction, arousing interest and encouraging the reader to read the rest of your work.
• Keep
it
Simple
A long and rambling introduction will soon put people off and lose you marks. Stick closely to your topic, and structure your introduction in a way that flows.
Defiile the Problem
The entire introduction should logically end at the research question and thesis statement or hypothesis. The reader, by the end of the introduction, should know exactly what you are trying to achieve with the paper. In addition, your conclusion and discussion will refer back to the introduction, and this is easier if you have a clearly defined problem.
Organization
_ As you write the paper, you may find that it goes in a slightly different direction than planned. In this case, go with the flow, but make sure that you adjust the introduction accordingly. Once your introduction is complete, you can now think about attacking the rest of the paper.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 1
Are Law Enforcement Personnel Abusing Their Power through the Implementation of the
4th Amendment
James Adams
Atlanta Metropolitan State College
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 2
Introduction
In a law-governed society, such as the United States, the Constitution is the Supreme
Law. It spells out not just the procedures and caveats for the creation of laws and
operationalization of state machinery but also serves as the basis for all legal and political actions
on top of protecting the individual liberties (freedoms or rights) of the citizens. This has been so
for over two centuries. During these 200 plus years, only 27 amendments out of a total of 33
attempts have befallen that document. That accords the amendments an eminence or importance,
which makes every one of them enormously significant. The first ten of these alterations are
collectively known as the Bill of Rights, and very few (if any) provisions of the Bill sprouted so
directly out of the colonial experience as the 4th Amendment, embodying as it did the safeguards
against the use of the controversial “writs of assistance” in British America (Legal Information
Institute, 2020). The Amendment addresses search and seizure law and establishes a cap on the
authority of the State and its agents or instruments in law enforcement to infringe on personal
space or intrude on private property without probable cause (basis) or judicial superintendence.
The 4th Amendment compels the government to follow a clear standard in enforcing laws when it
comes to the privacy of the American public, and that privacy is fundamentally paramount until
reasonable suspicion to suggest otherwise is shown. In particular, the Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized (Dixon Jr., 2016, para. 2).
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 3
However, this provision has divided opinions and the Court for years and has even seen
several reversals of precedents made. For example, in Harris v. the United States (1947), the
Supreme Court (hereafter the Court) approved as “reasonable” that a general and pervasive
warrantless search pursuant to detention did not contravene the provisions of the 4th Amendment
(Vile et al., 2013). In 1948, however, the Court not only annulled (Trupiano et al. v. the United
States) but also abrogated convictions (McDonald et al. v. the United States) based on evidence
obtained through warrantless search incident to an arrest. The Court also espoused the decisions
of prior rulings, such as Boyd v. the United States [1886] and also Weeks v. United States [1914]
that in seizing goods from the person of the arrestee, law enforcement agents must acquire and
use warrants sensibly. In so doing, the Court asserted two fundamental things: first, that the
rights of privacy, as well as personal security, are guarded by the 4th Amendment and second,
that the preservation and guarantee of these rights are at the very core of constitutional liberty
(Legal Information Institute, 2020).
The notable disputes over search and seizure in post-colonial America have therefore
consistently revolved around the character of warrants, particularly with regards to the scope of
the right to search and seize pursuant to arrest. But while the right or legality of law enforcement
to search an arrestee without a warrant is absolute and undisputed, the extent or how far afield
(nihil ad rem) into domains – both within and without – the purview and control of the arrestee
the search may delve is a subject of great judicial contention and disagreement to date (Legal
Information Institute, 2020). Envisaging the direction of the jurisprudence of the 4th Amendment
is even much more difficult today, given the intersection of legislation and technology and the
continued advancements happening on the technological front (Dixon Jr., 2016). This article
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 4
intends to define the scope of the 4th Amendment, its envisioned purpose by the framers of the
Constitution, how it is implemented today, and the various security and privacy issues, it raises
in light of the advancement in technology. Fundamentally, the ensuing discussion seeks to
determine whether (or not) law enforcement agents abuse their power via the implementation of
the provisions of the Amendment, and what in essence, can or should be done to address the
issue (Dixon Jr., 2016).
Literature Review
The Doctrine and Provisions of the 4th Amendment
The Bill of Rights aimed at protecting American citizens from their government. At the
time of its development the Framers were attempting to limit the power of the government from
rummaging into people’s private lives and property. Therefore, to make sure American citizens
do not go through the unpleasant experiences the forefathers suffered through under British
colonies with the privacy invasions that the colonial ‘general warrants” brought, it was envisaged
that the government and its agents should neither abridge the freedom of speech, prohibit the
right to assembly, nor snoop into the lives of the citizens
(Van Buren, 2014).
This is, however,
the quintessence of the Constitutional era that, in more ways than not, ended with the 9/11
incident. Thus, and contrary to the post-9/11 era, privacy seems to work differently in now Post-
Constitutional America, and there are several ways the 4th Amendment cannot protect the citizens
anymore today. At the border and airports as well as online, one is not safe from unreasonable
searches and seizures (Van Buren, 2014). It is in the latter instance, the online environment, that
Solove (2002) provides compelling arguments.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 5
In the current Information Age, defined not only by a digitized and highly globalized
society but also by an increasing amount of information, including the personal type, are being
contained in digital records maintained by third-party entities (3Ps). Prominent of these 3Ps are
ISPs (Internet Service Providers) (e.g., Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T Internet), phone and cable
companies, websites, and a host of private sector enterprises like hotels, employers, and
landlords. Some buildings have even gone a notch higher and use CCTV cameras and biometric
identification devices (e.g., facial and fingerprint or retinal scanners) to control access into
premises. The aggregation of the information in these digital records to create digital dossiers are
unfortunately fast finding a way into the hands of the government and its agents, especially for
law enforcement purposes. Law enforcement agencies, hereafter LEAs, are long known to seek
personal information (PI) about persons or organizations from various 3Ps to aid in their
investigation of drug and human trafficking, fraud, and other numerous types of criminal
activities like white-collar crime, smuggling and money laundering, and child porno (Solove,
2002). PI can also help LEAs detect espionage, outlaws, and drug distribution rings.
Apart from the records articulated above, the proliferating use of the Internet has grown
to become of the government’s most potent and greatest information-gathering tools. The Internet
has two inherent and critical aspects that make it powerful in data collection. Firstly, it offers and
portrays a false sense of privacy and anonymity. This secrecy is, however, usually non-existent.
This is because beyond the subscriber’s aliases, the ISP account might also contain such
Personally identifiable information, or PII, as the name, phone number, and address (both
physical and e-mail) of the subscriber, financial information (e.g., credit/debit and account), and
web browsing history. By knowing the pseudonym and screen names of Internet users, the
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 6
government can identify an individual as was exemplified in the Timothy R. McVeigh v. Cohen
(1998) judicial proceedings (Shenon, 1998). Mr. McVeigh was being charged by the Navy for
violating its “Don’t ask, do not tell” (DADT) policy. The Navy was found culpable of not
sticking to its own DADT policy as well as contravening the provisions of the ECPA (1986)
(Electronics Communications Privacy Act). Secondly, the Internet is unrivaled in the amount and
degree of information it can gather and store – from peoples’ favorite music to destinations,
contact lists, surfing history, and general cyberspace footprint. Substantively because of the
increasing use of the Internet and blurring lines between privacy and societal interest, the
implementation of the 4th Amendment is nowadays different in more ways than one compared to
its original intended purpose (Shenon, 1998).
In the aftermath of 9/11, the impetus for LEAs to gather personal data has significantly
increased, since such information can be extremely helpful in profiling individuals for
meticulous searches and tracking down suspected terrorists. The willingness of the private sector
to supply such information also increased considerably in the post 9/11 era. After the attacks,
background check companies increased in number, and ISPs relaxed their anonymous web
browsing features while several developed service level agreements (SLAs) to avail information
to LEAs. Indeed, during moments of crisis, studies show that the incentives to divulge
information, including PI to the government is considerable, and most do not want to sit on
information that might impede the apprehension of a mass murderer or terrorist. They, therefore,
tend to collaborate. But when the private sector refuses to cooperate by not surrendering the
information being sought, they can be constrained to do so through subpoenas and court orders.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 7
As illustrated hitherto, these regulatory instruments differ from warrants as they provide very
little protection to the person under investigation.
Detailed records about a person’s Internet activities, purchases and shopping, and social
network contacts and posts can help the government to generate a profile of the person’s lifestyle,
travel patterns, interests, political beliefs, financial status, personal associations, and even
psychological wellbeing. However, the increasing flow of PI to LEAs poses momentous
problems with far-reaching social and legal ramifications. Unfettered and insufficiently checked,
government information-gathering, according to Solove (2002) can lead, to three types of harms:
societal steady creep towards totalitarianism, chilling of the democratic spaces and interference
with individual self-determination, and proliferation of harms due to bureaucratic settings. The
manifestations of these ills are rampant, and media is awash with headlines of human rights
infringement, crackdowns, and illegal detention of immigrants or perceived Islamic terrorists all
in the name of counterterrorism and homeland security. Schwartz (1999), for example, illustrates
how government information-gathering can stifle democracy and self-determination using the
theory of “Constitutive Privacy.” This conceptualization of privacy and security seeks to
establish borderlines about PI in order to constrain the individual as well as redefine the terms of
life within a given community.
In that sense, the National Security Agency (NSA) exposés of Edward Snowden are a
shock to the conscience and the 4th Amendment itself as well. The revelations show that the
government, through the NSA – the national-level intelligence agency of the DoD (Department
of Defense) – spies on the public. Not just without suspicion and probable cause but also without
restraint (Van Buren, 2014). This would meet the requirements of being “unreasonable” in the
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 8
old pre-9/11 constitutional order, but no more. Even civil liberties groups like ACLU (American
Civil Liberties Union) and the EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) warn that such level of
surveillance goes far afield and well beyond what Congress intended and what the Constitution
allows through the 4th Amendment (Macaskill & Dance, 2013). The NSA argues that it requires
all this data to thwart another 9/11 or worse. But to find the “needle in the haystack,” the NSA
contends that it “needs access to the whole haystack” (Macaskill & Dance, 2013).
In addition, inadequate protection of PI imperils deliberate democracy by obstructing the
public from partaking in democratic activities. Private individuals, particularly at times of crises,
are so often than not, susceptible to mistreatment from the government’s exploitation of PI and
intrusion of privacy. From about 1956 to at least around 1971, for example, media has
documented how the government exploited the COINTELPRO – the FBI’s counterintelligence
program – to wiretap the calls and eavesdrop on conversations of radical civil rights leaders and
political opposition in the country (Van Burren, 2014). This misuse of power shows that once
LEAs have got hold of PI, there are very few (if any) regulations governing how such
information can or should be used and how long it can be kept. In the light of recent
developments with terrorism and illegal immigration, the increasingly becoming bureaucratic
nature of modern LEAs can permit discriminatory searches and profiling, inappropriate
applications of discretion, misuse of PI, and even unwarranted interrogation and apprehensions
of disfavored persons (Solove, 2002). In certain quarters, PI has even been misused by
authoritarian governments to round up individuals, repress an individual’s capacity for critical
reflection, and curtail social movements beyond their control (Solove, 2002). This is where the
full implementation of the spirit of the 4th Amendment as originally envisioned comes into play.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 9
Warrant Searches
Regarding warrant searches, the 4th Amendment is as clear as can be: the government has
no right to rummage at will among a citizen’s private effects (Phillips, 2019). It protects, among
several other things, the right of an individual to not have his/her property unreasonably searched
or seized by LEAs. The Framers made that clear following their unpleasant post-independent
experiences with the indignities and privacy invasions that general warrants and “writs of
assistance” entailed. According to Phillips (2019), a search happens when an expectation of
privacy, which an individual or societal in general deems reasonable, is invaded. For it to be
lawful, the search warrant, backed by probable cause, must first be gained. The warrant
commands a law enforcement officer to search for a particular person(s), thing(s), or property
that is listed, and bring it before the Court. A valid search warrant thus needs to meet four critical
requirements. First, the warrant must be duly filled in good faith. Second, it must be based on
sound and reliable information that show probable cause. Third, it must be issued by a neutral
and utterly detached magistrate. Lastly, the warrant must outline clearly the area/place and
person to be searched and the items that need to be seized (Justia Law, 2019). On the other hand,
a search is unreasonable if it lacks adequate ‘individualized suspicion’ or guilt or wrongdoing to
back the finding of ‘probable cause’ (Phillips, 2019).
Warrantless Searches
Law enforcement officers can also conduct a search and seizure without a warrant –
subject to specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. A warrantless search of the
person of an arrester or property can be justified under any one of the following three legal
theories: (1) incident to arrest, (2) with consent, and (3) probable cause and exigent
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 10
circumstances (Phillips, 2019). Other justifications for warrantless search and seizure include
plain sight, smell, and hearing observations, minimal intrusions, and school, airport, as well as
checkpoint/border searches. Exigent circumstances are those that warrant immediate action by a
law enforcement officer to either avert loss of life and property damage or thwart the destruction
of evidence. It can also occur when preventing a suspect from escaping (Phillips, 2019). In
search situations, a search can be undertaken without a warrant. Besides, a warrantless search is
valid and constitutionally permissible when consent to search is given. The consent must,
however, be given freely and voluntarily (Justia Law, 2019). Some of the circumstances that can
affect voluntariness and thus void consent searches include (1) under arrest, (2) use of firearms,
(3) use of threats (e.g., to obtain a warrant, suspend driving license, and what), (4) implying
guilt, and (5) using a ruse amongst others (Phillips, 2019).
Border and Airport Search
While most people consider that they are “in” America once they alight from an
international flight and as a result believe that they are protected by the Bill of Rights, the fact of
the matter is that the US borderline has become increasingly tortuous as long-standing practices
are manipulated to serve the whims and ever-growing desires of the national security state (Van
Buren, 2014). Over the years, the Court has recognized that certain circumstances could render
4th Amendment stipulations impractical and, at times, against the public good. As such, various
exceptions have been crafted. One of these was the “border search.” The premise was that the US
should protect itself by stopping and frisking people entering its borders from without. It is a
concept with a rich history, first enumerated by the First Congress way back in 1789 (Onecle,
2014). In the recent past, the border search doctrine was buttressed by John W. Terry v. the State
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 11
of Ohio (1968) – a milestone judgment in which the Court declared that a law enforcement
officer’s reasonable suspicion of a person’s guilt or impending criminality does not violate the
veto on unreasonable searches and seizures. For both the protection of the individual and the US,
LEAs may perform a quick search on the person as long as there is reasonable doubt the person
in question is dangerous or guilty. Since then, this criterion (known as the ‘Terry’ standard of
reasonable suspicion) and which should be informed by specific, particularized, and articulable
facts, has been extended to traffic stops.
Inland stoppings, searches, and seizures in areas away from border points are, however,
another subject altogether. Therefore, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973), the Court held
that warrantless searches of automobiles by the Border Patrol without probable cause or
reasonably objective suspicion contravened the 4th Amendment (Onecle, 2014). In the ruling, the
Court nonetheless invalidated vehicle searches at fixed checkpoints removed from the border
points. A fundamental twist in the current era is that the definitional connotation of the term
“border” has been altered. For instance, upon arriving in the US from overseas, one is not legally
present in America until permitted or otherwise deemed so by DHS (Department of Homeland
Security) (Van Buren, 2014). Until then, therefore, the law exists in a legal vacuum where the
safeguards of the Bill of Rights, as well as the laws of the US, are inapplicable.
Presently, once reasonable searches at border points have morphed into an extensive
‘constitution-free zone, where drones, surveillance, marauding National Security Police (NSP),
the militarization of the borders and inland zones, and malls of the spy state are the norm of the
day (Miller, 2013). In this vast and growing region, the CBP (Customs & Border Protection) can
erect checkpoints and perform warrantless searches, while at airports, search and seizure are
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 12
routine with the ordinary citizens being an exception to the norm. On how many airport searches
and seizures that Americans are subjected is unknown. The best estimates are from ACLU,
which indicate that between 1st October 2008 and 2nd June 2010, over 6,600, about 50% of whom
were American citizens underwent electronic device searches at border points (ACLU, 2010).
The role of the civil service, especially ACLU in the implementation of the constitutional
rights espoused under the 4th Amendment, cannot, therefore, be underestimated. Through the
CLRP (Criminal Law Reform Project), ACLU has been instrumental in safeguarding privacy
rights by mounting opposition against unconstitutional frisking of people, as well as selective
policing targeting communities of color such as mass incarceration and racial inequity (ACLU,
2020). Its other key activities include advocating countrywide reforms in surveillance, public
defense systems, disproportionate sentencing, judicial violations in the guise of public safety,
and general police practices to transform the punishment bureaucracy. ACLU has participated in
key civil rights events such as challenging racial segregation in the public-school system in 1954
in collaboration with NAACP, the fight for abortion rights of women in 1973 in the cases of Doe
v. Bolton and Roe v. Wade, and its defense of the right of a Nazi group to demonstrate in 1978
Illinois where most Holocaust survivors resided to show its commitment to upholding
constitutional rights even for unpopular groups (ACLU, 2020). Most consider the Nazi debacle
one of the organization’s finest and most defining moments in history.
The use of Subpoenas and Court Orders
The extensive use of subpoenas is another way of how legal devices in the US have
morphed to serve the State’s national security interests. Over the recent past, the DoJ
(Department of Justice) has fashioned a Post-Constitutional construal of the 4th Amendment that
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 13
has enabled it to access tens of millions of PI of citizens by using only subpoenas and not
warrants. Warrants permit lawful search and seizure. As the 4th Amendment makes it apparent,
warrants are only issued on ‘probable cause.’ Van Buren (2014) defines probable cause as
having a high standard of proof. A subpoena, on the contrary, is merely a state order to an entity
(e.g., a private person or firm) demanding something, usually the issuance of documents. Also,
subpoenas lack autonomous oversight, and their criteria of provision are comparatively flexible.
Despite violating the guidelines of the 4th Amendment, DoJ has continued to this practice. This
trend also emerged after the Court of Appeal ruled in Warshak v. the United States (2010) that
the warrantless bulk seizure of e-mails violated not only the 4th Amendment but also the federal
privacy statutes and DoJ’s surveillance guidelines (EFF, 2011).
During its investigation, the DoJ ordered the defendant’s ISP to store digital copies of his
future e-mail correspondences prospectively. The government and without a probable cause later
used a subpoena to obtain the preserved e-mail copies. The DoJ pulled this “back door wiretap”
by abusing the provisions of the Stored Communication Act (SCA) (EFF, 2011). The SCA was
enacted in 1986 and accorded the clients of ISPs statutory privacy protection for their data, and
thus control how the government can access the account information (e.g., e-mail, subscriber and
billing information, and logs) held by network service providers (NSPs) of which ISPs are
inherent component (Sammons, 2015). Just like the SCA in which LEAs can request for digital
information using administrative subpoenas or court orders, an FBI operation manual authored
under the Freedom of Information Act (FIA) of 1967, similarly makes it apparent that the FBI
can access e-mails from service providers (e.g., Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo) warrantlessly
(Van Buren, 2014).
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 14
The Complications of Technology
As discussed earlier, technology raises several issues when it comes to the security and
protection of privacy. Findings by some observers, including Van Buren (2014), indeed indicate
that this is not a novel phenomenon. For years, the government has been using clandestine means
including secret recordings of conversations and photos of trysts and meetings, all obtained
covertly to expose the lives of civil rights activists, anti-war protesters, and popular musicians.
Pete Seeger (1919 – 2014), for example, was a subject of secret and intense FBI and CIA
surveillance dating as back as the 1940s because of his political beliefs. He was blacklisted
during the Joseph McCarthy era and even indicted for contempt of Congress (Leopold, 2014).
Martin Luther King was also not spared, and available evidence now indicates that the FI kept
him under constant surveillance, used hidden tape recorders, bugged his home and office, and
wiretapped his conversations in a bid to prove that King was under communism influence
(Christensen, 2008). Given the impact of fast-developing technology, the scale and scope, as
well as efficiency through which the government, NSA, and other LEAs are infringing on
people’s 4th Amendment rights, is staggering. The following is the various ways the use of
technology is violating the privacy and security of citizens as provided under the Amendment.
Drones. Drones are aircraft that are designed to fly without human pilots on board. In the
US, drones have found broad applications in commercial and military sectors. Of importance is
the use of drones in law enforcement to prevent and solve crimes. For example, traffic drones
collect information on the license plate numbers of vehicles for use in solving grand theft auto.
Drones are preferable because they can fly at altitudes beyond the visibility range of normal
eyesight and can be customized in small, maneuverable sizes. Despite these benefits, drone
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 15
surveillance has raised grave concerns regarding privacy. In Maryland, out of every 1 million
license plates, only a paltry 47 (0.0047%) have possible links to criminal activity (McKelvey et
al., 2015). This means that most traffic data are for innocent civilians. The FAA (Federal
Aviation Authority) – the body tasked with drone regulation – focuses mostly on aircraft safety
standards such as licensing and airworthiness certification while overlooking the risk of
infringing on people’s 4th Amendment rights.
While the Amendment safeguards people, their houses, and effects from unreasonable
search and seizure by law enforcement, landmark Supreme Court rulings made in the 1980s
found no such violation regarding observations made by a manned government aircraft without a
warrant. In the 1986 California v. Ciraolo case in which police officers identified marijuana
gardening in the backyard of the suspect from a plane flying at 1000 feet above the ground, the
Court held that a naked-eye observation within the FAA’s public navigable-airspace was not a
violation (Villasenor, 2012). The same verdict was reached in the case of Florida v. Riley and
Dow Chemical Co. v. The United States, involving a 400-feet aerial observation of marijuana
plants and the use of a mapping camera to capture aerial photos of an industrial facility by
investigators, respectively.
These rulings are, however, not the panacea for all cases involving drones, as
demonstrated in Kyllo v. the United States. The Supreme Court found the government guilty of
privacy infringement after using a terrestrial thermal imager to detect indoor marijuana
cultivation (Villasenor, 2012). The government’s actions constituted an unreasonable warrantless
search since the device could discern all indoor human activity that would otherwise be
unknowable without conducting a physical search. The fundamental rule applied by the courts in
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 16
such cases is the question of whether a government’s action was a search and, if so, whether it
was reasonable and required a warrant. While this rule offers some degree of optimism in the
robustness and protectiveness of the 4th Amendment, law enforcement can bypass it in several
ways. First, drones can fly on public transport infrastructures such as roads and public airspaces,
thus avoiding trespassing on private spaces. Second, proving the subjective expectation of
privacy (i.e., privacy regarding personal effects, statements, or activities that are in plain sight of
outsiders) is a challenge for individuals (Koerner, 2015). More clarity is needed to bring the 4th
Amendment at par with the rapid advances in technology.
GPS (Global Positioning System). This technology uses signals from artificial satellites
orbiting the earth to track the locations of tracking devices or receivers. Law enforcement
officers can, therefore, attach a GPS tracker to a vehicle and use it to locate the vehicle at any
time. The dilemma is whether the police can attach or track a GPS- affixed vehicle without a
warrant. Generally, courts have held that GPS installation and monitoring does not constitute a
seizure as defined by the 4th Amendment because it does not affect the possessory interests of
individuals in their property (Josey, 2011). The argument is that the device neither hampers
driving quality nor take up room or draw power from the car engine. Regarding the improper
search criteria, however, courts remain conflicted. While some hold that the GPS devices
monitor activities undertaken in the public space for which the reasonable privacy expectation
does not apply, others assert that the technology breaches privacy rights since the accumulated
trips made by an individual give insight into their behavior than a single trip (Josey, 2011).
In the US v. Garcia case, for instance, the defendant was successfully convicted of
manufacturing meth based on surveillance evidence collected by a GPS device. The argument
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 17
was that the evidence could have easily been obtained through the traditional in-person
surveillance, and therefore permissible. In the US v. Pineda-Moreno case, the courts held that the
affixing of a GPS device on the defendant’s car while in the driveway was not a violation of the
reasonable-expectation rule because the plaintiff had not made any attempt to hide the driveway
from public view by installing a barrier, a fence, or a ‘no trespass’ sign. Some critics have
dismissed the Moreno ruling because it favors the wealthy who can afford to shield their
curtilage from public access while disadvantaging the average citizens to whom such blockade is
impractical and expensive (Josey, 2011). The legal ambiguity surrounding GPS is only poised to
worsen with the proliferation of technology in smartphones and other digital devices.
DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid). The maintenance of DNA profiles for parolees,
supervised releases, probationers, and prisoners is an accepted standard for US law enforcement,
and the courts consider their reasonable privacy expectations regarding their DNA to be highly
diminished (Barbour, 2011). However, the rapidly expanding scope of data-banking as a result of
changes in statutory and federal regulations is raising 4th Amendment violation concerns
regarding the collection of DNA material from arrestees where no reasonable proof or suspicion
exists, as well as the use of criminal’s DNA profiles after conviction. As it stands, no federal
provision or court ruling addresses the storage of DNA for persons who have completed their
sentences. Once incorporated in the CODIS database, any law enforcement agency can access
the records without consent or warrant. In Boroian v. Mueller, the Court held that the
government had the right to retain a felon’s DNA indefinitely post-sentencing and even match it
periodically against other profiles but with a caveat that the felon does not lose his or her right to
reasonable privacy expectation regarding any subsequent use of the profile (Barbour, 2011). This
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 18
ruling implies the existence of circumstances in which subsequent usage of profiles could violate
the 4th Amendment, even though little effort has gone into specifying such situations.
Of concern, is the new use of DNA for familial tracing and non-forensic purposes.
Familial tracing involves the use of DNA material to identify potential relatives of an unknown
suspect (Barbour, 2011). This application violates not only the offender’s privacy rights but also
the rights of innocent family members. Currently, no court case regarding the privacy of genetic
relationships has arisen, leaving the issue in limbo. Regarding non-forensic usage of CODIS,
federal law categorically criminalizes the deliberate disclosure of DNA information to
unauthorized persons and the unauthorized acquisition of such information or sample (Barbour,
2011). However, it bars aggrieved persons from suing the individuals responsible, thus
undermining the enforcement of the law. These emerging issues warrant a re-examination of
existing legislation and judicial precedents.
Third-party doctrine. As discussed thus far, the Supreme Court has held the view that
the information that people willingly disclose to third parties is not covered under the reasonable
expectation of privacy rule of the 4th Amendment. This view, commonly referred to as the third-
party doctrine, has furnished the government with a wealth of information such as website
activity, e-mail contacts, phone numbers, utility expenses, education records, and even banking
transactions. In the Lopez v.US case, for instance, the Court rejected the defendant’s plea for
privacy violation on the grounds that he allowed the IRA agent in his office with full knowledge
that the conversation (i.e., attempted bribery of an undercover IRA officer) could fall into the
government’s hands (Thompson, 2014). The doctrine finds support in the fact that it harmonizes
with the other parts of the 4th Amendment case law, such as public-movement tracking, aerial
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 19
surveillance conducted within public airspace, and searches conducted on trash cans located on
the streets. Critics, on the other hand, argue that information shared with third-party firms are
somewhat compulsory since their services are indispensable to modern living (Thompson, 2014).
Such strict adherence to the doctrine will only breed mistrust and suspicion that will hamper
business activities. With the rapid advancement in intangible communication technologies such
as the Internet, these legal issues are bound to get worse and make it exceedingly difficult for
courts to determine privacy violations.
Cloud computing. Regarding cloud storage, the existing doctrine on physical computer
search limits the warrant to the hard drive; it does not consent to search the cloud, necessitating a
separate search warrant for cloud accounts (Kohls, 2012). Here, the cloud network is similar to
the postal service, whereby the government must have a warrant to search packages even though
the sender gives the mail to a third party. The issue with many computer-related warrants is that
they lack particularity – they do not specify the location or items to be searched. As such, law
enforcement agencies exploit this loophole to conduct warrantless searches on cloud network
accounts. While some magistrates have attempted to restrict such warrants by limiting searches
to files with specific extensions, much remains to be done (Kohls, 2012). The third-party
doctrine does not negate privacy expectations and does not, therefore, nullify the need for a
warrant.
Gap in Literature
The protection of privacy and safeguard from infringement, including the collection of PI
by the government, requires some legal caveats and regulatory control – an appropriate
mechanism of balancing privacy with effective enforcement of the law. The first source of
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 20
protection against infringement by LEAs and the government, in general, is the 4th Amendment,
which as articulated previously, proscribes arbitrary searches and seizures, and mandates that
LEAs first obtain judicial sanction before conducting searches or seizures. The superseding role
of the Amendment is thus to safeguard privacy and protect personal dignity against gratuitous
invasion by the government. On many occasions, however, the Court has made it apparent that
there might be no reasonable expectation of privacy in data maintained by 3Ps. Although there
are statutes that offer some form of restrictions on government access to these 3P records, the
checks are limited and can be overruled through the court orders and subpoenas – which in
contrast to the dictates of the 4th Amendment, have comparatively few limits and diminutive
meaningful judicial oversight (Solove, 2002). Moreover, several types and classes of digital
records are covered – a problem compounded by the inadequate and seemingly ineffective legal
rejoinder to the burgeoning problem of state access to data aggregations.
An analogous situation transpired in the late ’20s when the Court ruled in Olmstead v. the
United States (1928) that wiretapping a person’s phone did contravene the 4th Amendment,
asserting that the privacy only included physical invasions and wiretapping does not constitute
the privacy intrusion as there is no physical space to invade. Following and in response to
Olmstead, Congress ratified Section 605 of FCC (1934) (Federal Communication Act) to
regulate and place some checks and balances upon governmental wiretapping or interception of
radio communication (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). It also regulates telephone and
telegram communication. Therefore, in Nardone v. the United States (1939), the Court submitted
that LEAs could violate section 605 of the provision if the law agents either intercepted or
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 21
disclosed the contents of the wiretapped discourse. Derivative evidence – the kind obtained as a
result of a wiretap – was similarly inadmissible in Court (Justia Law, 2020).
In the ruling, the Court also gave forth the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” principle, which
forbids the use of evidence in legal proceedings obtained, directly or otherwise, from evidence
obtained from an illicit search and seizure. The principle sprung from the Exclusionary Doctrine.
This rule mandates the courts to dismiss and eliminate from trial any evidence attained from an
unreasonable search and seizure, illegal arrest, or forced interrogation of the person of the
arrestee. The poisonous tree doctrine, first hinted in Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United
States (1920) and used in Nardone v. United States (1939), deters LEAs from contravening rights
of persons against unreasonable searches as well as seizures (“Fruit of the Poisonous Tree,” n.d.).
There are three exceptions to this: (1) Independent Source Doctrine (e.g., Murray v. the United
States [1988]), (2) Inevitable Discovery Doctrine (e.g., Nix v. Williams [1984]), and (3)
Attenuation Doctrine (e.g., Hudson v. Michigan [2006] (Phillips, 2019).
The FCC (1934), nevertheless, proved it to be grossly ineffective and contradictory at
times. For instance, while the testimony of witnesses could be culled from the exploitation of
wiretapped information (i.e., Goldstein v. the United States 1942), eavesdropping on a
conversation with the consent of a party did not breach the law as demonstrated in Rathbun v. the
United States 1957 (Justia Law, 2020). Olmstead also left a void in the regulation of central
threats to the privacy of individuals in the 20th century in the forms of wiretapping and electronic
surveillance, including the use of drones and CCTV cameras, which has dramatically amplified
without the adequate regulatory controls and prerequisite legislative oversight. Efforts have,
however, been made to plug this gap, and a number of alterations have occurred in the Act since
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 22
1934, most substantially by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Other changes have been
particular, targeting such areas as national security, organized crime, and intelligence gathering,
and included the Omnibus Crime Control Act (1968), the Digital Telephony Act (1994) and the
Patriot Act (2001). In 1967, Olmstead was overruled in Katz v. the United States, a landmark
judicial case that not only redefined what makes up a search and seizure with regards to the
guidelines of the 4th Amendment but also extended the safeguards of the provision beyond the
confines and traditional boundaries of the property and habitations of citizens. Like in Berger v.
New York (1967), the judicial ruling in Charles Katz case further established the ‘Katz test’ that
protects citizens with its ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ condition.
Although Olmstead was overruled, its spirit, especially in the modern era where the
continued advancement in technology raises new questions on the expectations of privacy, has
been resuscitated. Solove (2002) is prescient when he asserts that the prevailing conception of
privacy by the Court is a kind of absolute secrecy that ought to be protected. It has expressed, on
a number of occasions, an interest in protecting private data and intimate information that
citizens conceal. But since in the conception of the Court, the information entrusted to 3Ps are
exposed to others, it is not private and consequently not protected by the 4th Amendment. This
comprehension of privacy, as both Solove (2002) and Tokson (2016) aptly assert, is neither in
tandem nor responsive to life in the contemporary Information Age, where PI exists as digitized
data on virtual cyberspace and therefore poses a significant threat to privacy. The only available
legal form of regulatory control is statutory, but which in all intents and purposes has shown to
be appallingly inadequate.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 23
The protection of privacy as conceded in such studies as Solove, 2002), Schulhofer
(2012), as well as Macaskill and Dance (2013), requires a formulation of a responsive
architecture of power. Created by law, this architecture embodies the way that regulations
structuralize social relationships. Laws devise and fabricate in which people live in by shaping
each individual’s relationships with others, societal institutions, and the State. In an ideal world,
laws ought to create an architecture of power that maintains appropriate checks and balances of
power in these relationships. According to Solove (2002), such a balance is vital not just for
individual dignity and self-fulfillment, but also for such fundamental values as democracy and
freedom. In the highly bureaucratized society, the security and privacy of PI are an integral
component of this relationship. Beyond constitutionalizing human rights, erecting legal
safeguards to protect the privacy of PI by regulating its collection, retention, and usage is
paramount. The tenet of this recommendation or assertion is having a responsible and amicable
relationship with the State. This means, and Solove (2002) asserts, that this architecture of power
must incorporate and address two critical issues. Firstly, by addressing how to control the masses
without infringing on their rights or stifling liberty, that is, how to properly balance societal order
and freedom. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, by ascertaining how to control the
government and its machinations. This includes, among others, by ensuring that the (1) state
remains accountable to the citizens, (2) government officials are prevented from misusing their
power, and (3) that the potential growth of state power that might override the overall power of
the citizens is curbed.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 24
Limitations and Assumptions of the 4th Amendment
It is well-established and as subsequently enumerated using Court cases that there is an
utter lack of consistency as well as clarity in 4th Amendment decisions. This has resulted from
the judicial failure to articulate the underlying principles of the Amendment clearly. Without
such clarity, Bacigal (1978) argues, courts cannot sustainably and legally discern among varying
factual situations. In fact, one unaddressed question within the 4th Amendment jurisprudence is
whether the amendment should be considered from an individual standpoint or a limitation
perspective. These two are different: the former view emphasizes the protection of the interests,
namely privacy and security, of the individual citizens, while the later accentuates the need to
regulate governmental conduct (Bacigal, 1978). Although these two perspectives of the 4th
Amendment are complementary, the selection of one over the other can make them mutually
exclusive, resulting in different legal outcomes.
The implementation of the 4th Amendment has also suffered implementation limitation
because, like other Bill of Rights, the Amendment was intended by the Framers to serve as
restrictions not on the individual states but on the federal government. However, through the
incorporation doctrine, in which specific Constitutional provisions outlined in the Bill of Rights
are included on the limits imposed upon the state, the 4th Amendment has been applied, albeit,
varyingly across states (e.g., in Mapp v. Ohio [1961] and Aguilar v. Texas [1964]) (Maddex,
2002). Also known as selective incorporation, this doctrine makes the Bill of Rights binding on
all states, holding them at the same standard as the federal government on several constitutional
rights, including the provisions of the 4th Amendment (JRank, 2020). Rather than using the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment to universally apply the Bill of Rights
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 25
to states, the Court has applied selected elements of these amendments to various states using the
Due Process Clause. This application began way back in 1925 with the Gitlow v. New York case.
Over the years, although with varying consistencies and legal circumstances, the Court has ruled
(e.g., Palko v. Connecticut [1937]) that certain privileges and immunities covered by the Bill of
Rights are critical and inherently fundamental that states must abide by them via the Due Process
Clause (JRank, 2020).
Despite these seemingly conflicting nuances to the way the 4th Amendment can be
examined, its central component, however, can be best stated as: a search or seizure is reasonable
only if the weight of its justification is proportionate or thereabouts to the resultant level of
intrusion. Slobogin (2007) calls this concept the “proportionality principle” (p. 21). While this
principle can, at times, produce rules that are contrary to the current law, it is not without
precedent in the Court’s own case law, particularly in Terry v. Ohio (1968). In this case, the
Court not only established a framework for analyzing the overall scope of protection as outlined
under the 4th Amendment but provided precedence that ought to inform the analysis of the same
today. In its verdict, the Court opined that there is no test for ascertaining reasonableness.
Instead, it is necessary to balance the need to search or seize against the invasion that the
exercise brings about. Based on this, the proportionality principle holds that a stop and frisk need
to be justified not by higher standards of probable cause but rather on reasonable suspicion
(Slobogin, 2007).
Limitations of the Study
The potential of the government to violate the constitutional rights of individual citizens
is never off the table, particularly during times of crises, and as the post-9/11 era continues to
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 26
demonstrate. This article has thus examined ways through which the police might abuse their
power. It has also explored caveats put in place by the 4th Amendment to shield the public from
such events. In order to do this, the article synthesized and critically reviewed the literature on
the same. While there were no difficulties encountered in gathering the information, as all
sources used were freely and publicly available via the internet, sifting through the numerous
sources of information presented a little challenge. Information on the 4th Amendment is
copious, and choosing the right ones was time-consuming. Some sources of information were
good but lacked identifiable authorship and were therefore disregarded. There were no
assumptions made prior to the commencement of the study. It was, however, hoped that the
findings of the research would add knowledge about the limits and assumptions of the 4th
Amendment.
Pathway Incorporation
The tension between privacy and law enforcement, especially regarding national security
interests, is and continues to be an enduring force in the US. This has been well articulated thus
far. By its very nature, and as the National Research Council (NRC) (2007) rightly observes, law
enforcement is an information-rich activity – and the media (both mass and social) plays a
critical role in it as people in the contemporary American society increasingly depend on media
reports as their primary source of information from which they draw conclusions and opinions.
Regarding law enforcement, by virtue of general inaccessibility to police work, the average
knowledge, as well as understanding of investigations, is often lacking or limited at best (Mullis,
2009). This has led the public to rely on media sources for information – a phenomenon that
often leads to biased opinions. Coupled with media portrayal of crime, this limited understanding
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 27
of the public on matters law enforcement creates several issues for not only the police force but
also the criminal justice system and the society as a whole. Depending on the trending news
story’s slant, the media can paint the police either negatively or positively. A negative story
involving a police officer, for example, can paint the entire force as corrupt, malfeasant, and
inappropriate. Sometimes, like in the case of the infamous Rodney King (1991-1992), the media
depiction of the police can take a racial or ethnic direction. In this scenario, negative police
misbehavior was repeatedly depicted in the media, resulting in increased public dissatisfaction
with LEAs, especially among the minority groups (Mullis, 2009).
Public perceptions of the police are of extreme importance because LEAs cannot function
effectively without the support of the citizenry. Studies show that a lack of public support would
render LEAs unable to carry out proper investigations, apprehend criminals, become deficient in
pertinent information necessary to solve crimes, and unable to attract quality recruits into the
force with diverse socio-cultural backgrounds (Franklin et al., 2019). The portrayal of law
enforcement officers in multimedia programming, and criminal/investigative television shows
(e.g., crime-based reality television movies and crime dramas) also have an impact on the
societal perception of police officers. For example, in most television shows, law enforcement
officers are often depicted as having complete control and usually seen as heroic even when
breaking laws or using excessive force in the pursuit of justice. In other shows, the police
officers act as vigilantes and tend to violate civil liberties and contravene laid-down guidelines to
pursue justice. Moreover, most crimes presented in these dramas are often solved and criminals
apprehended, which is not true in real life but is only included in the plot of the drama for
entertainment purposes (Franklin et al., 2019).
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 28
Furthermore, the exaggeration of the nature and extent of crime by the media also portray
a negative picture of the police force. When the depiction of excellent police work in television
dramas fails to be replicated in real life, such sensational reporting augments the size of the
matter, leaving the public more concerned about public order and safety. Regardless of the
downside of crime and police work coverage, media reporting of criminal activities and court
proceedings is necessary and beneficial to society. This is because by acting as a watchdog of
LEAs, the media ensures accountability for police procedures, including adherence to the
provisions of the 4th Amendment (Mullis, 2009). It is imperative for police officers not to be
allowed to act outside the law and without being held accountable for their actions.
Unfortunately, police misconduct is still a persistent evil in the LEAs that is perpetuated by the
broad, discretionary powers the officers wield (Schaffer, 2018). In certain instances, police
misconduct is prevalent and so commonplace that many are oblivious of it and do not even
realize that the misbehavior is both illegal and actionable. Common examples of police
misconduct and misuse of their power of the 4th Amendment are (1) misuse of their position of
power, (2) false arrests resulting from illegal search and seizures, and (3) excessive or
unreasonable force (Schaffer, 2018).
Constitutionally, law enforcement officers are barred from using their position of
authority for illicit or unintended purposes, and more so, for private gain. Sadly, unscrupulous
police officers are known to coerce private citizens into doing or saying things that they are
supposed to do, under the pretext of governmental power. The misuse of power can take various
forms but often occur in the form of excessive or deadly force, bribery, and even sexual assault
during cavity searches, stop-and-frisks, or pat-downs (Schaffer, 2018). In most cases, the misuse
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 29
of power occurs side by side with false arrests, which are often associated with unlawful searches
and seizures under the 4th Amendment. On the use of deadly or excessive force, police officers
are only permitted to use a reasonable amount of force when placing an individual under arrest or
to protect themselves (Schaffer, 2018). The use of force, however, varies from one situation to
another. Thanks to the increasing use of police bodycams and taser guns, the excessive force
claims are proliferating and becoming more successful under the 4th Amendment.
Conclusion
The 4th Amendment has undoubtedly played a key role in shielding American citizens
from the unnecessary and unreasonable intrusion of their privacy by law enforcement agencies.
In the past, proving the violation of the statute was relatively easy since there were only limited
physical avenues through which the agencies could legally obtain information or monitor the
activities of suspected criminals. Today, however, the proliferation of digital devices has made it
difficult for courts to determine the definition and scope of privacy, causing concerns over the
rising cases of violations by the police. These litigious conflicts are only poised to worsen as
communication technologies evolve. There is, therefore, an urgent and indispensable need to
expand both statutory law and court jurisprudence to reflect the new technological landscape.
Luckily, one of the fundamental architectures that endeavors to protect the privacy of individuals
by safeguarding the integrity and sanctity of PI and property is the 4th Amendment. The wisdom
of the Amendment breathes life into the Madisonian concept of governance that aspires to
balance state control and public liberty while keeping government power under check.
Substantially, the 4th Amendment curbs searches and seizures in two ways: via the
reasonableness requirement and through legal safeguards in the form of warrants and probable
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 30
cause requisite. These manifest the fragmentation of power among the various governmental
organs that James Madison Jr. (1751-1836), the 4th US president (1809-1817), considered
paramount for restraining the power of the government.
Running Head: Law Enforcement & The Implantation of the 4th Amendment 31
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Good afternoon,
Thank you for submitting your topic. You stated, “The Effectiveness of Community Corrections in the US Criminal Justice system.” Two things:
1. You need to identify a specific Community Correctional practice.
2. What offender population within the Criminal Justice system do you wish to use to measure this effectiveness?
After answering these two questions, your topic should look something like this,
The Effectiveness of …….. (Community Correctional Practice identified) on (Offender Populations identified).
Go ahead and update your topic and start on your Introduction. It is due February 4th. Submit the updated topic to me as soon as possible.
Good afternoon,
Thank you for submitting your topic. You stated, “The Effectiveness of Community Corrections in the US Criminal Justice system.” Two things:
1. You need to identify a specific Community Correctional practice.
2. What offender population within the Criminal Justice system do you wish to use to measure this effectiveness?
After answering these two questions, your topic should look something like this,
The Effectiveness of …….. (Community Correctional Practice identified) on (Offender Populations identified).
Go ahead and update your topic and start on your Introduction. It is due February 4th. Submit the updated topic to me as soon as possible.