Chinese president Xi Jinping

Read the articles by

Lee (2017) (

Attached) and

Gueorguiev (2017) (

Attached) which are required reading for this week, as well as current news articles about Chinese president Xi Jinping.  What appears to motivate Xi’s increasing power?  What is he trying to accomplish?  What are the implications of Xi’s ambitions for U.S. foreign policy? If you were a foreign policy advisor to the President of the United States, what recommendations would you make regarding the United States’ relations with China?

O
ne-man rule is cited as a common source of regime break-
down—what Milan Svolik (2012) refers to as “failures in
power-sharing.” The reason why power-sharing under author-

itarian rule is so hard is self-evident: in the absence of democratic com-
petition there is little to deter incumbent leaders from abusing their
office at the expense of other elites. Against this backdrop, China’s post-
Mao period stands out as an example of relatively effective power-shar-
ing, or what the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) refers to as
“collective leadership.” During this 40-year period, we have observed
between three and six peaceful transitions of power, from one incum-
bent to another. (1)

Rapid concentration of power in President Xi Jinping has raised serious
questions about the efficacy and durability of Chinese power sharing in-
stitutions, leading some observers to conclude that “collective leadership
[in China] is dead.” (2) In this article, I push back on such claims by re-
viewing China’s leadership norms and institutions as well as how they
are being challenged. Building on the work of Slater (2003), I start from
the premise that personalisation and institutionalisation under autocracy
are not a zero-sum game. In the case of China, ambiguous leadership in-
stitutions, coupled with elite complicity, have in fact facilitated Xi’s
power grab.

Instead, I argue that the dangers of personalisation are more likely to con-
cern future governance challenges. First, departure from collective decision-
making procedures, coupled with increasing censorship, is likely to
discourage critical voices from participating in the political discourse. This
chilling effect will make it harder for the regime to anticipate future chal-
lenges and avoid unnecessary policy blunders. Second, anti-corruption
purges, combined with an apparent desire to seed loyalists, has either dis-
couraged or prevented younger contenders from moving up through the
ranks, effectively thinning out the pipeline of future leaders. This potential
shortage of qualified contenders will affect the Party irrespective of whether
Xi remains in office.

Chinese elite politics under Xi Jinping

In explaining the CCP’s durability, scholars point to China-specific leader-
ship institutions, norms, and procedures, which in theory facilitate stable
power sharing. In particular, prior research points to: organisational frag-
mentation that prevents incumbents from monopolising power (Lampton
and Lieberthal 1992; Xu 2011), age and term limits that prevent incumbents
from entrenching themselves in office (Ma 2016; Nathan 2003; Shirk 2002;
Manion 1993), along with procedures for collective decision-making that
incorporate lower levels through reciprocal accountability (Shirk 1993; Hu
2014).

Recent consolidation and personalisation of power around Xi Jinping raises
serious questions about each of the above. Over the last five years, Xi has
resurrected the titles of “Core Leader” (Miller 2016), immortalised his ide-
ological “thought” into the CCP constitution (Miller 2017), (3) and revised
the national constitution to remove term limits for the office of the presi-
dency. (4) How did Xi Jinping accumulate such an unprecedented amount of
personal power and what does it mean for the future of elite politics in
China?

I begin by outlining the boundaries of collective leadership and examine
just how far Xi has pushed them. Like Slater, who examined packing, rigging,
and circumventing of Malaysia’s leadership institutions under Mohamad
Mahathir, I focus on challenges posed by Xi Jinping towards the separation

N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 • c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s p e e r – r e v i e w e d a r t i c l e 17

1. Hua Guofeng briefly succeeded Mao Zedong before relinquishing control to Deng Xiaoping. Deng
initially designated two successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. After helping bring both down,
Deng fully handed the reigns to Jiang Zemin. Jiang relinquished power to Hu Jintao in 2002, who
then handed it to Xi Jinping in 2012.

2. For example, see: Jeremy Page and Chun Han Wong. “Xi Jinping Is Alone at the Top and Collective
Leadership ‘Is Dead’,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-
xi-elevated-to-mao-status-1508825969 (accessed on 15 November 2017).

3. The CCP added Deng’s name and thought to the constitution after he died in 1997.

4. “China’s National Legislature Adopts Constitutional Amendment,” Xinhua, 13 March 2018,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/11/c_137031606.htm (accessed on 15 March 2018).

China p e r s p e c t i v e s

Special feature

Dictator’s Shadow
Chinese Elite Politics Under Xi Jinping

DIMITAR D. GUEORGUIEV

ABSTRACT: President Xi Jinping is arguably the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman Mao. Recent constitutional revisions and a mid-
term leadership reshuffle has only substantiated the fear that Xi, like Mao, has no intention of handing over power to a future successor. Does
Xi’s rise signal an end to collective leadership and does a stronger president translate into a weaker party? In this article, I review the methods
by which Xi has come to consolidate power as well as the implications for Chinese elite politics in the future. Drawing insights from the compa-
rative literature, I question the zero-sum relationship between executive and institutional strength. Although Xi has certainly amassed unpre-
cedented personal power, it has not necessarily come at the expense of the Party. Instead, the dangers of Xi Jinping’s power grab are more likely
to result from a chilling effect on dissenting opinions and thinning out of the leadership pipeline, each of which is likely to undermine gover-
ning capacity over the medium to long-term.

KEYWORDS: China, Authoritarian Regimes, Elite Politics, Power Sharing, Collective Leadership, Institutions, Succession.

of powers, norms surrounding succession, and procedures for collective de-
cision-making in China. Although each of these features are aimed at con-
straining despotic rule, each is also subordinate to the primary goal of
political domination by the CCP. As such, we should allow for the possibility
that personalisation of power can occur even if a ruling party’s key institu-
tions are still intact (Slater 2003).

Circumventing the separation of powers

The 17th Party Congress Communique from 2007 defines collective lead-
ership as “a system with a division of responsibilities among individual lead-
ers to prevent arbitrary decision-making by a single top leader.” (5) In stark
contrast, the first PB meeting of the 19th Congress in October 2017 con-
cluded that “centralised and unified leadership by the Party is the highest
principle of the leadership.” Most recently, Xi Jinping’s outgoing anti-cor-
ruption czar, Wang Qishan, penned an essay in People’s Daily outlining
“problems with separating party and state,” and explaining why future chal-
lenges would require doing away with this division. (6)

Anticipating Wang’s thesis, Xi Jinping is actively blurring the divisions between
politics, economics, and military affairs since stepping into office in 2012. This
distortion of boundaries is clearly visible in the number and span of leadership
positions currently held by Xi Jinping, referred to by some as the “chairman of
everything.” (7) By Cheng Li’s (2016) count, Xi now holds a total of 12 top posts
in the country’s most powerful leadership bodies (see Table 1).

With the exception of the core titles of General Party Secretary, Presi-
dent, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the remaining
positions fall into the category of “leading groups,” which are informal
bodies of extreme power—often having more influence than respective
ministries. The mere presence of so many leading groups seems itself a
contradiction to collective leadership, separation of power, and constitu-
tional authority more broadly. Yet, this is precisely what they are designed
to do, i.e., overcome bureaucratic or organisational barriers, pool resources,
and push through policy agendas (Miller 2008). Whether intended or not,
CCP leaders, beginning with Mao, (8) have routinely taken advantage of the
leading groups to bypass opposition and assert control; Xi Jinping is just
the latest.

What is perhaps different, however, is how Xi’s leading groups cross-cut
and overlap multiple policy arenas, some of which have traditionally fallen

under the purview of other Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members
and State Council ministers. For instance, the vaguely named Central Lead-
ing Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms conceivably oversees
anything from financial markets to environmental regulation. At the same
time, however, Xi has not appropriated portfolios that were not his for the
taking. As Table 1 summarises, seven of Xi’s titles have precedents, insofar
as they were previously held by Hu Jintao, and by Jiang Zemin before him.
The remaining five offices were conjured up during Xi’s first term in office,
and there is nothing in formal or informal party guidelines that discourages
such action. For instance, the National Security Commission gives Xi indirect
control over both foreign and domestic security, without expressly taking
over those portfolios. Similarly, Xi’s most recent title, Commander-in-Chief
of “PLA Joint Operations,” lays claim to new political territory, as there were
no formal “joint operations” under previous administrations.

In other words, rather than overtly breaking down fences, Xi Jinping ap-
pears to be re-drawing the bounds and meaning of institutional power-shar-
ing. To be sure, the point here is not in any way to downplay Xi’s political
bravado, but rather to highlight the nuanced signalling game Xi is playing.
Put differently, if Xi wanted to demonstrate his dominance and the end of
collective leadership, he might simply appropriate the National Energy Com-
mission (headed by Li Keqiang) or the Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection (CCDI, now run by Zhao Leji). He has not done so, at least not yet.
Instead, Xi has circumvented collective leadership through the institution
of informal leading groups, a practice that predates his tenure and collective
leadership more broadly.

18 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s • N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2

5. Hu Jintao, 以改革创新精神全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程 (Yi gaige chuangxin jingshen
quanmian tuijin dang de jianshe xin de weida gongcheng, Promoting comprehensive Party building
in the spirit of reform and innovation), 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, 15 October 2007,
cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104098/6379184.html (accessed on 15 November 2017).

6. Wang Qishan, 开启新时代 踏上新征程 (Kaiqi xin shidai ta shang xin zhengcheng, Opening a
new era, stepping out on a new path), People’s Daily, 7 November 2017, paper.people.com.cn/
rmrb/html/2017-11/07/nw.D110000renmrb_20171107_1-02.htm (accessed on 15 November
2017).

7. For instance, see: Javier Hernandez, “China’s ‘Chairman of Everything’: Behind Xi Jinping’s Many
Titles,” The New York Times, 25 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/asia/china-
xi-jinping-titles-chairman.html (accessed on 15 November 2017).

8. In 1966, Mao Zedong installed loyalists to the Central Leading Small Group on the Cultural Rev-
olution to oversee a mass youth uprising and a widespread purge of his rivals and CCP elite more
broadly. During his tenure, Jiang Zemin repeatedly refashioned the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group,
at times leaning on generals or diplomats, reflecting changes in his Cross-Straits strategy (Hsiao
2013).

Special feature

Table 1 – Leadership Positions Held by Xi Jinping

Leadership body Title Tenure since Precedent

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Gen. Secretary 2012.11 Y

Central Military Commission of the CCP Chair 2012.11 Y

Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs Head 2012.11 Y

Presidency of the People’s Republic of China President 2013.03 Y

Central Military Commission of the PRC Chair 2013.03 Y

Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs, National Security Head 2013.03 Y

Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Work Head 2013.03 Y

PRC National Security Committee Chair 2013.11 new

Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Chair 2013.11 new

Central Leading Group for Network Security and Information Techology Head 2014.02 new

Leading Group for Deepening Reform of National Defense and Military Head 2014.02 new

PLA Joint Operations Command Center Cmdr. in Chief 2016.04 new

Note: Based on Li (2016) and expanded upon records from China Vitae Research Library.

Even if there is still some separation of power at the very top, Xi is dra-
matically reshaping the way power is organised just below. These effects
are most vivid within the military. Though often seen as an arm of the CCP,
the PLA has traditionally enjoyed a measure of autonomy from the political
state, at times acting in violation of or even contradiction to the aims of
the leadership (Cheung 2001). Since Xi took office, however, thousands of
military personnel, including hundreds of senior officers, have been purged
and the traditional system of regional command, a vestige of the PLA’s land-
based limitations, has been scrapped and replaced with five theatres under
the direct oversight of the Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by
Xi. (9) The CMC itself was downsized from 11 members to seven, (10) and in
December 2017, the CCP Central Committee (CCOM) announced that the
People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), a force of more than 600,000 overseen
by both the State Council and the CMC since 1982, would be put under the
direct command of the CMC alone, beginning on 1 January 2018.

Consolidation within China’s cabinet mirrors that of the military. As of
March 2017, the State Council, chaired by Premier Li Keqiang, has been re-
duced from 35 members to 27. As in the case of the military, the merger of
prominent ministries and the creation of new agencies and administrations
is being touted on grounds of modernisation and efficiency. (11) This claim is
not unwarranted. For instance, the recently proposed Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, a State Immigration Administration, and an Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency each address policy arenas that
have only really emerged over the last decade.

At the same time, and just as in the case of military restructuring, it is
hard to ignore how changes within the governing cabinet are blurring the
boundary between state and party. The Financial Stability and Development
Committee (announced in November 2017), for instance, combines eco-
nomic oversight with policymaking powers, each of which has traditionally
been housed in separate kitchens (Naughton 2017). (12) Even more dramat-
ically, a new National Supervision Commission (NSC) merges and absorbs
the functions of the Ministry of Supervision (a state institution) within that
of the CCDI (a party organ). (13) This new branch of government not only ce-
ments Xi Jinping’s signature anti-corruption crusade as permanent fixture
of the party-state, its institutional rank—equal to that of the State Council
and higher than the judicial organs—circumvents the most paramount di-
vision of power and rule of law. (14)

Rigging the transfer of power

The transfer of power in Chinese leadership politics has been guided in re-
cent decades by three reinforcing norms, none of which are formally or
legally outlined in the CCP’s or the PRC’s constitution (Wang and Vangeli
2016). The first, and arguably the most important, concerns age and term
limits. The second and third are about the nomination and the grooming of
future leaders, respectively. Below, I briefly review the origins of these suc-
cession norms and the degree to which they are being followed today.

One of Deng Xiaoping’s pivotal reform efforts was rejuvenating the CCP
ranks by persuading revolutionary leaders into retirement (Manion 1993).
Although Deng refrained from adopting a specific age threshold for top
leaders, age restrictions for provincial and ministerial-level leadership posi-
tions, along with fixed term limits, were adopted into the constitution. These
efforts gradually culminated into norms for retirement, with lower-level
leaders facing mandatory retirement at 60 and mid-level leaders in the Cen-
tral Committee at 65 (Nathan 2003). The norm for top leaders is not in-

scribed in any rule book, but precedent suggests that incumbents may con-
tinue to serve when they are still 67, but not if they have reached 68, a
practice widely known as the “seven-up, eight-down (qi shang, ba xia)”
rule. (15) In practice, this norm, combined with the age demographics of
upper-most leadership cohorts, has also constrained top leaders to two
terms in office, which happens to coincide with the state positions.

Rather than violating the age-based retirement norm, Xi is taking full ad-
vantage of it. Although many expected 69-year-old Wang Qishan, a key Xi
ally and principal agent of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, to stay in the
PBSC, he officially retired from his party portfolio during the 19th Party
Congress. (16) This, of course, did not prevent Wang from taking over the vice-
presidency, a position that carries no age restriction. Furthermore, all 16
members from the 18th PBSC who had passed the age threshold were re-
tired, freeing up slots for Xi loyalists, including the elevation of 67-year-old
Li Zhanshu to the PBSC.

Another, more ambiguous, set of norms concerns the selection and
grooming of successors, a perennial source of friction and uncertainty in
non-democratically constituted regimes. The CCP is thought to have made
in-roads into this problem by extending the succession process across over-
lapping generations, whereby leaders-in-waiting take on key roles within
the PBSC in advance of their expected promotion (Ma 2016). This staggered
approach has two important implications. First, it means that future leaders
are well-socialised into the leadership structure before taking formal posi-
tions. Second, it implies that although incumbents are constrained from di-
rectly naming their own successors they have considerable influence in
nominating contenders to succeed one generation later.

Importantly, therefore, adherence to the “seven-up, eight down” age norm
implies that all members of the 19th PBSC, including Xi, are too old to carry
on the mantle of General Party Secretary after 2022. (17) Xi’s predicament
aside, the key takeaway of the 19th Party Congress was thus the curious
absence of any leader-in-waiting. A surprise constitutional overhaul, con-
ducted behind the scenes of the 2018 national legislative session, helped
clear things up by removing term limits for the office of President (also held
by Xi Jinping). As with the vice-presidency, the presidency carries no age re-

N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 • c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s 19

9. “China’s Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, 1 February 2016, www.xin-
huanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).

10. Charlotte Gao, “Has Xi Fully Consolidated His Power Over the Military?” The Diplomat, 8 January
2018, thediplomat.com/2018/01/has-xi-fully-consolidated-his-power-over-the-military/ (ac-
cessed on 15 January 2018).

11. Government Overhaul Plan, mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_mG6KoJHKvXPpE6YE3zh9w (accessed on 1

5

March 2018).

12. “China Establishes Financial Stability and Development Committee,” Xinhua, 8 November 2017,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/08/c_136737949.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).

13. There is no question as to the CCP’s predominance within the NSC. At the national level 14 out
of the 17 leadership members come with affiliations to either the Central or provincial Disciplinary
Inspection Commissions (DIC). At the provincial level more than 170 of the roughly 300 provincial
committee members have ties to provincial DICs. Author’s calculations based on provincial reports.

14. See: Charlotte Gao, “China Plans to Amend Its Constitution,” The Diplomat, 28 December 2017,
thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-plans-to-amend-its-constitution/ (accessed on 18 January
2018).

15. Wang and Vangeli (2016) refer to this as the “Li Ruihuan Clause” because it was the uncomfortable
task of retiring Li Ruihuan in 1997—then 68 years old—that encouraged members of the 15th
Congress, with strong pressure from Jiang Zemin, to lower the formal retirement age of top leaders
from 70 to 68.

16. See: Wang Xiangwei, “Despite Retirement, Xi’s Right-Hand Man Wang Qishan is Still Within Arm’s
Reach,” South China Morning Post, 2 December 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/arti-
cle/2122250/despite-retirement-xis-right-hand-man-wang-qishan-still-within (accessed on 15
December 2017).

17. Zhao Leji, the youngest member, will be 65 in 2022 and can look forward to no longer than one
more term in the PBSC, which ought to disqualify him from the top spot.

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev – Dictator’s Shadow: Chinese Elite Politics under Xi Jinping

striction, meaning that Xi Jinping can comfortably and legally retain his po-
sition as head of state after 2022. A future accommodation for Xi to hold
concurrent control of the Party’s General Secretary position beyond 2022,
despite his advanced age, will thus be easily defendable.

Packing the balance of power

In addition to institutional divisions and succession norms, many point to
the role of factional politics as providing a de facto balance of power (Cai
and Treisman 2006). Factions revolve around CCP leaders, who play the role
of patrons, leveraging their position of power to cultivate personal networks
of clients (Nathan 1973). Importantly, CCP norms around the transfer of
power facilitate factional competition by creating room for more than one
patron at a time; namely, the incumbent leader and the predecessor. That
is, by preventing incumbents from hand-picking their own successor but al-
lowing them to appoint prospective leaders who might one day succeed
their successor, CCP norms extend the shadow of the incumbent at least
two generations ahead. In theory, this iterative process ought to ensure
some balance of personal power within the top echelon of leaders (Ma
2016). Ironically, although Hu Chunhua is highly unlikely to be promoted in
the future, his presence as one of only three PB members young enough to
be named General Secretary in 2022 is at least a symbolic nod to the idea
of staggered succession, insofar as he is widely seen as having been Hu Jin-
tao’s nominee from 2012.

The present PBSC features representatives from each of China’s most
powerful factions. Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Wang Yang both
hail from the Chinese Communist Youth League and are seen as having
ties to former General Secretary Hu Jintao’s “League faction” (Tuanpai

团派). Han Zheng is most closely associated with former General Secre-
tary Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai clique,” while Zhao Leji and Li Zhanshu are
both seen as part of Xi’s emerging “New Zhijiang army.” The seventh
member, Wang Hu-ning, is a low-profile academic who has connections
with each of the above groupings, having helped pen Jiang’s “Three Rep-
resents,” Hu’s “Scientific Development,” and Xi’s “Socialist Evolution”
theories, each of which is now enshrined in the CCP constitution.

Although the PBSC appears roughly balanced, as already noted, ac-
cording to the “seven up, eight down” rule, practically the entire current
PBSC will have to retire in 2022. The fulcrum of balance is therefore
more likely to be found in the enlarged PB, which is heavily stacked in
Xi’s favour. Among the 18 current PB members who are not in the stand-
ing committee, only three could convincingly be described as members
of either Hu’s or Jiang’s respective cliques, compared to nine who could
be labelled as part of Team Xi (see Table 2). (18) Such groupings are prob-
lematic, both conceptually and analytically. Specifically, identifying a
factional affiliation often boils down to determining a person’s ex-
pressed or perceived loyalty towards a patron (Shih 2008). The problem,
of course, is deciding whether those expressing loyalty to an incumbent
leader are genuine clients, since not demonstrating such allegiance is
not much of an option.

Which individuals made it into the PB is also only half the story. The
recent career jolts to three leaders tied to Hu Jintao is a case in point.
Sun Zhengcai’s removal just before the 19th Congress—at only 54 years
old and an obvious Hu protégé—alongside the unceremonious early re-
tirement of Li Yuanchao and the quiet demotion of Liu Qibao, two
prominent Tuanpai kingpins, signal with very little ambiguity that Hu
Jintao’s remaining influence within the CCP leadership is token at
best. (19) In short, while the current PB reflects some semblance of bal-
ance, when we parse through the optics, it becomes quite clear that Xi
Jinping has taken full advantage of his position to tip the scales sharply
in his favour.

Dampening dissent

The relative ease with which Xi Jinping has refashioned and reconstituted
the institutional infrastructure raises questions about the internal proce-
dures underpinning collective leadership; namely that of Inner-Party Democ-
racy (Lin 2002; Hu 2010). The concept, admittedly vague, rests in the belief
that lower levels of power, despite being selected by the top leaders, exercise
some influence over top leaders and decisions through a process referred
to as “reciprocal accountability” (Shirk 1993). Although reciprocal account-
ability has not been directly demonstrated in China, the process by which
the CCOM ratifies PB decisions and appointments is codified in the consti-
tution. (20)

20 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s • N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2

18. There is no clear-cut way to measure factional alignments. While some look at home town and
schooling experience, others prioritise common work experience. I treat the incumbent leader
during entry into the central committee, widely seen as the inner circle of the CCP, as a key indi-
cator for a possible factional tie. Then, I consider shared working experience and personal con-
nections as confirmation. In the absence of confirmatory links, I do not assign a factional tie.

19. Both Li and Liu were prominent members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the organisa-
tional base for Hu Jintao’s Tuanpai faction. While Li has gone into early retirement, Liu and Zhang
have been demoted from the PB positions in the 18th Congress to CCOM positions in the 19th,
without much explanation.

20. Central Committee members have exercised institutional power vis-à-vis PB members in other
communist systems such as the Soviet Union in 1957 and 1964, and by a no-confidence vote in
Vietnam in 2014.

Special feature

Table 2 – 19th Party Congress Politburo
(Standing Committe Excluded)

Member Age Jiang Hu Xi
CCOM
entry

Hu Chunhua 54 ✔ 2007
Ding Xuexiang 55 ✔ 2017
Chen Min’er 57 ✔ 2012
Li Qiang 58 ✔ 2017
Huang Kunming 61 ✔ 2017
Li Hongzhong 61 – – – 2017

Li Xi 61 ✔ 2017
Cai Qi 62 ✔ 2017
Chen Quanguo 62 ✔ 2012
Guo Shengkun 63 ✔ 2012
Chen Xi 64 ✔ 2012
Yang Xiaodu 64 ✔ 2012
Liu He 65 ✔ 2012
Wang Chen 67 ✔ 2002
Xu Qiliang 67 ✔ 2002
Sun Chunlan 67 ✔ 2007
Yang Jiechi 67 – – – 2007

Zhang Youxia 67 – – – 2007

Note: I treat the incumbent leader during entry into the central committee as a key
indicator for a possible factional tie. Then, I consider shared working experience and
personal connections as confirmatory. In the absence of confirmatory links, I do not
assign a factional tie. Based on records from China Vitae Research Library.

Whereas the 17th and 18th congresses were each preceded by an internal
election, (21) selection in the 19th Congress was conducted by “face-to-face”
consultation, with Xi Jinping personally meeting with 59 senior and retired
leaders to seek their “suggestions.” Other senior leaders also held one-on-
one sessions with 290 ministerial cadres and senior military officers. (22) To
understand what this means procedurally as well as politically, it is worth
briefly digressing for a review of internal polls and consultation.

There are two aspects to internal CCP election procedures that set them
far apart from elections typical in Western democratic contexts. First, they
are secret, so the outcome can never be independently verified. Second,
Chinese internal elections are not contests among competing candidates.
Instead, they operate as straw polls, based on a menu drafted by the PBSC,
from which voters can identify who they would not want to be promoted.
In October 2017, for instance, roughly 8 percent of proposed candidates for
the 19th CCOM were eliminated by negative selection. (23)

This approach departs from positive selection in two important ways. First,
it biases against the rise of popular candidates, a principle that is a mainstay
of collective leadership (Gueorguiev and Schuler 2016). Second, negative
voting allows voters to knock off multiple names at once, which makes it
difficult for voters to coordinate on a preferred candidate. In practice, neg-
ative selection delivers a range of least bad options, thereby empowering
the PBSC to mix and match rather than having to adopt a set meal.

Consultation is a different decision-making process but relies on roughly
the same principles and leans even more sharply in the same top-heavy di-
rection. As in negative voting, its key premise is that decision-makers set
the agenda by defining the proposed list of candidates. Similarly, consulta-
tion also makes it difficult for the input providers to coordinate on preferred
candidates because they are communicating vertically with the senior lead-
ers but not horizontally among themselves. In effect, this provides senior
leaders valuable information without the risk of bottom-up coordination.

There is a cost, however. Not only does the compartmentalisation of input
undermine the institutional basis of reciprocal accountability, face-to-face
consultation, as opposed to a ballot, is unlikely to yield much in the way of
unfiltered information. This risk increases with the personalisation of power,
as any disagreement with nominees or policy proposals could be interpreted
as disagreement with Xi Jinping himself. In other words, the move towards
consultation, in combination with personalisation, will discourage elites
from revealing preferences and speaking out. This, in turn, will compound
the regime’s information problem, make it harder to anticipate opposition,
and increase the chance of policy mistakes (Stromseth et al. 2017).

The end of collective leadership?

Does an ever stronger Xi Jinping translate into a weaker CCP? If we
accept the idea that personalisation is antithetical to institutional sur-
vival, then Xi Jinping’s affront on collective leadership represents a sub-
stantial liability for CCP survival. At the same time, the zero-sum
relationship between personalisation and institutionalisation is not wa-
terproof. As Slater (2003) reminds us, highly institutionalised autocracies
practice norms and procedures to constrain personal power, “but they
are neither the sole nor the primary purposes of authoritarian institu-
tions.” Ultimately, the raison d’etre of authoritarian institutions is not
to prevent one-man rule, but to “supply a regime with the ‘infrastruc-
tural power’ necessary to implement its command over potential [op-
ponents]” (Slater 2003: 82).

Applied to the case of China, there are at least three reasons why Xi’s con-
solidation of power might not have come at the direct expense of the Party.
First, it is important to remember that the seeds of Xi’s unprecedented rise
were sown well in advance of his taking office. Specifically, in reducing the
PBSC from nine to seven members, five of whom would be too old to stay
on past the 19th Congress, CCP elites expressed a preference for centralising
and consolidating power in one leader. Furthermore, Xi’s ability to lead with
a strong hand had everything to do with the fact that Hu Jintao handed
over all key leadership positions in one clean transfer. As Joseph Fewsmith
(2013) put it when commenting on the 18th Congress of 2012:

Ironically the apparent concentration of power in the hands of those
with strong ties to Jiang Zemin may permit Xi Jinping to emerge as
a significantly stronger leader than Hu Jintao in 2002 and later years,
even as this sort of political game could threaten over time the
norms that have provided political stability in the Party.

Surely, Xi Jinping has proven far more capable of personal aggrandisement
than his peers may have ever anticipated, but it was a strongman they asked
for.

Second, by the end of Hu Jintao’s second term, elite politics in China had
given way to a not-so-hidden competition between factional camps. Elite
cohesion was so fraught that in the months leading up to the 18th Congress
rumours floated of an armed coup. (24) In September of 2012, Xi Jinping him-
self went missing for more than two weeks, fuelling speculation of a power
struggle. More generally, elites (not to mention average citizens) were
openly bemoaning corruption, pollution, ballooning government debt, and
widespread ideological apathy. In short, the CCP was in the grip of factional
infighting, and at risk of losing its political compass. While many may have
hoped for liberal reforms as the solution, the temptation of a strong leader
proved highly attractive, even if it risked undermining collective leadership.

Third, many of the festering problems from the end of Hu’s tenure have
not been resolved. Today, China’s debt-to-GDP ratio has edged up to any-
where between 260%, according to official statistics, to around 320, based
on independent assessments (Shih 2017). Similarly, SOE and banking sector
reforms, not to mention lofty promises about rule of law, have made disap-
pointingly little progress over the last five years—something Xi Jinping and
his cabinet have acknowledged and promised to double up on, during
speeches at the 2018 annual legislative session. All this comes at a time of
heightened international insecurity and economic exposure for the Chinese
state. The prospect of a third term for Xi Jinping, if anything, promises some
continuity in policy direction and commitments. In short, Xi’s personalisa-
tion of power in China, as was the case with Mahathir in Malaysia, may have
helped rather than undermined the Party’s position.

N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 • c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s 21

21. Under the original system, senior leaders, including outgoing CCOM and CCDI members, could
nominate and ultimately vote for new CCOM and CCDI members based on a menu of candidates
vetted by the PBSC. In 2012, this procedure was extended to include allowing these voters to
vote on the members of the Politburo Standing Committee as well. See: Wang Xiangwei, “Despite
Retirement, Xi’s Right-Hand Man Wang Qishan is Still Within Arm’s Reach,” op. cit.

22. “How China’s New Central Leadership are Elected,” Xinhua, 26 October 2017, www.xin
huanet.com/english/2017-10/26/c_136707985.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).

23. Elimination in previous congresses is reported to have ranged between 5 and 10 percent. See: “At
Least 8 pct of CPC Central Committee Nominees Voted Off,” Xinhua, 23 October 2017, www.we-
bcitation.org/6x9ue2EXG (accessed on 1 November 2017)

24. While it is impossible to independently verify any of the rumours, the 2015 conviction of Zhou
Yongkang, then China’s security chief, for the unprecedented crime of “non-organization political
activities” lends credence to the notion that some form of extra-institutional contest for power
likely occurred just prior to the 18th Congress.

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev – Dictator’s Shadow: Chinese Elite Politics under Xi Jinping

The argument here is not that personalisation is fully compatible with in-
stitutionalisation, but that when it comes to non-democratic rule there are
higher priorities. Using Slater’s terminology, facilitating Xi’s consolidation
arguably contributed to the CCP’s infrastructural power at a time when se-
rious fissures were emerging. Whether the bet pays off in the long-term is
an open question; but depicting Xi’s rise as coming fully at the expense of
the CCP is misleading. (25)

As institutional theorists and scholars of comparative politics have long
argued, third-party enforcement is a definitional trait of institutions (Streeck
and Thelen 2005), and in a one-party state there is none. Instead, the bite
of authoritarian comes from the risk of violent power struggle that looms
in the background (Boix and Svolik 2013). Xi’s cautious and tedious ap-
proach to circumventing, rigging, and packing demonstrates that he is mind-
ful of such risks. For example, amending the constitution to abolish term
limits for the presidency, a ceremonial position relative to that of general
secretary, did more to signal Xi’s intentions than to facilitate them. Put sim-
ply, publicly floating and then having the entire legislature vote on rule
change that could easily have been circumvented, and doing so five years
in advance seems like a risky approach to committing what has been de-
scribed as an institutional coup. (26)

Finally, even though Xi’s affront on executive constraint has undoubtedly
eroded the credibility of collective leadership, we should be realistic about
how much has really been lost. The expectation that top leaders resign
after two terms, for instance, has been severely discredited, yet, as dis-
cussed earlier, these norms were never formally adopted. Indeed, norms
on term limits remained very much in question up through 2002. Ironi-
cally, their apparent enforcement in 2012, by vesting full power in Xi Jin-
ping, set the stage for their corrosion. Indeed, if we accept the proposition
that institutions for collective leadership, e.g., age-based retirement and
staggered grooming, are intended to prevent personalisation, we must
also acknowledge that such a system also puts incumbents in the difficult
position of either resigning themselves to lame-duck status or ruthlessly
trying to cannibalise their successor (Herz 1952). (27) Whereas Hu Jintao’s
second term is illustrative of the former, Xi Jinping’s is clearly opting for
the latter.

The dictator’s shadow

Even if the rise of a strongman was evident as early as 2012, it was not
until March 2018 that the totality of Xi Jinping’s personalisation of power
came into sharp relief. Though it is now abundantly clear that Xi Jinping is
intent on a third term, his ability to stay in office that long is not a foregone
conclusion, nor is it obvious that he plans to stay on indefinitely. Interest-
ingly, on 12 March 2018, shortly after the NPC voted almost unanimously
to abolish term limits, the state press went on the defensive, arguing that
“the decision does not mean the end of the retirement system for Party
and State leaders, nor does it imply lifetime tenure for any leader.” (28)

While we can dismiss the comfort of the propaganda spin, it is worth con-
sidering: what are the circumstances under which leaders refuse to retire?
The simple answer is always. An alternative explanation is that stepping
down is inherently risky, as authoritarian leaders are far more likely to suffer
violent ends than their democratic counterparts (Cox 2009). These risks do
not subside when an incumbent retires. On the contrary, vulnerability in-
creases as they are no longer in any position to protect themselves, or their
friends. In short, there is good reason to suspect that authoritarian leaders

are deterred from stepping down by a lack of security for their lives and
livelihood, and that of their friends and families (Albertus and Menaldo
2012; Debs 2016; Escriba-Folch 2013). (29)

In the presence of an informal retirement age and fixed terms, such fears
are clear and proximate from day one of an incumbent’s tenure. For some-
one like Xi, who has laid ruin to countless “flies” and several “tigers” since
taking office, these worries are compounded every day as new knives are
secretly sharpened for revenge. As Susan Shirk put it, “Xi has a big target on
his back.” (30) Ironically, Xi might have been spared future retribution had he
abided by party precedent and shielded former and current PB members
from his anti-corruption campaign. By going after the likes of Zhou
Yongkang and Sun Zhengcai, Xi has opened the floodgates and raised the
prospect that his own associates, or perhaps even he himself, could one day
be treated the same way.

Seen in this light, Xi Jinping’s eponymous inscription in the CCP constitu-
tion is probably the closest one could get to an iron-clad guarantee for
peaceful retirement. Put simply, from the perspective of late 2017, it would
seem that Xi Jinping is untouchable, even if he steps down. This, ironically,
may be the strongest justification for thinking that Xi might eventually retire
voluntarily.

However, even if Xi has secured his place in the sun, the same is not true
for his family, friends, or policies, each of which will become vulnerable the
moment Xi is no longer in charge. To protect the people and policies he
holds dear, Xi will have to cast a long shadow that extends well beyond his
eventual departure. Seeing the effects of what such a strategy could bring
requires digging deeper into the party pipeline to examine the leadership
cohorts of tomorrow.

Seeding the pipeline

As discussed earlier, Chinese leadership norms operate by front-loading the
future into the present. For instance, allowing incumbents to groom their
successor’s successor while discouraging them from hand-picking immediate
successors gives incumbents a stake in the perpetuity of the regime without
allowing them to dominate the present or the immediate future (Nathan
2003). By the same token, Xi Jinping’s power grab is just as consequential
for downstream leadership cohorts, irrespective of his own current intentions.

22 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s • N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2

25. It is perhaps worth noting that Mahathir, the personalising Malaysian dictator and protagonist of
Slater’s 2003 article, orchestrated a smooth handover to a successor that same year. Members
of the ruling UMNO wept at his announcement, imploring him to stay on. See: John Roberts,
“Malaysian Prime Minister’s Sudden Resignation Points to Political Instability Ahead,” World So-
cialist Web Site, 5 July 2002, www.wsws.org/en/articles/2002/07/mala-j05.html (accessed on 15
March 2018).

26. While the CCP has a two-thirds majority in the National People’s Congress, it only holds a little
over a third of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference, which also met during the
annual legislative session in March 2018. Even if we are deeply sceptical about the independent
power of China’s legislature, the national focal point of the meeting, combined with the presumed
norms around tenure, means that this event was arguably the best opportunity for Xi’s opponents
to mount a coordinated institutional challenge to his personalisation.

27. Jiang Zemin did considerable damage to Hu Jintao’s tenure by refusing to be a lame-duck leader
prior to handing over power.

28. See: Zhang Jianfang, “Support for Amendments Belies Naysayers’ Prejudice: China Daily Com-
ment,” China Daily, 12 March 2018, english.cctv.com/2018/03/12/ARTIBnPtQNnsXajsS6wTr0e
5180312.shtml?platform=hootsuite (accessed on 15 March 2018).

29. Consider the late Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, who voluntary resigned from power in 1982,
only to be tried (in absentia) and sentenced to death in 1984, or the numerous others like him
who live or have died in exile after stepping down from power.

30. Cited in Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping Unveils China’s New Leaders but No Clear Successor,” The New
York Times, 24 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html
(accessed on 15 November 2017).

Special feature

Some potential downstream effects are visible if we look at the compo-
sition of the enlarged CCOM. (31) Roughly 64% of the members of the 19th
CCOM are newcomers. The comparable proportions from 2012 and 2007
were only 48 and 50%, respectively. Whereas much of the turnover in 2007
was the consequence of retirement, a substantial portion of change in 2017
has been forced through corruption-related ousting. In total, 35 members
(18 full and 17 alternates) from the 18th CCOM were punished for corrup-
tion. Only four members suffered a similar fate during Hu Jintao’s entire
tenure. It is worth noting that each of the 35 members punished over the
last five years was young enough to conceivably stay in office past 2022. (32)

Overall, only two of the 376 members in the 19th CCOM were born in the
1970s. Compare that to 25 members born in the 1960s in the 17th CCOM, a
decade earlier. Similarly, of the 204 19th CCOM members with full voting
rights, only 32 were born after 1960 and therefore eligible to stay on for two
full terms in 2022, compared to 70, a decade earlier. By nearly every metric
available, the current CCOM is the oldest since 1992, when the current lead-
ership institutions were first constituted. As illustrated in Figure 1, the age dis-
tribution of the 19th CCOM is heavily skewed to the left, meaning far fewer
younger cadres—especially among alternate members, who represent the
pipeline for CCP leadership in 2032. Indeed, the “Alternates” panel of Figure 1
suggests there is an entire generation of future leaders missing from the CCOM.

The overall shift towards older cadres is partially offset by a small
bump of “53-year-old and under” members, seen in the “Full” panel of
Figure 1. In terms of continuity, these “bridging” cadres are interesting
insofar as they have voting rights to determine the make-up of the PB
during the 20th Congress in 2022 and are young enough to make it into
the 22nd Congress in 2032. If Xi Jinping were worried about the post-
retirement period, it is precisely this group of cadres that would concern
him, since their influence bridges across not one but two prospective
leadership cohorts.

Overall, there are only 10 “bridging” cadres in the 19th Congress. Although
we still do not know enough about this group to assign them to any par-
ticular camp, we can examine their respective career tracks. Lu Hao, who
also happens to be the youngest of the group, rose rapidly through the ranks,
building experience in both local government and central organisations. Lu
has also been in the CCOM since 2012 and governor of Heilongjiang since
2013. As of this writing, however, Lu has received no further promotions,
signalling a potential stall in his career as a once rising star. (33) By contrast,
Zhang Guoqing was parachuted in to serve as mayor of Chongqing from an
industry position, with no other political or administrative experience to
speak of.

The same distinction between stalled risers and powerful newcomers
broadly applies to the rest of the bridging candidates, with veteran tech-
nocrats such as Li Ganjie, Ni Yuefeng, and Huang Shouhong finding them-
selves in roughly the same career grades they occupied a decade ago. By
contrast, Liu Zhenli, Wu Zhenglong, Chen Jining, Jin Zhuanglong, and Meng
Xiangfeng have all made swift entries into top leadership positions without
the thick resumes that typically prop up the weighty portfolios they now
hold. While it would be premature to say this latter set of bridging cadres
are in Xi’s faction, they very likely owe their recent political fortunes to his
patronage.

The advanced overall age of the 19th CCOM warrants a closer look at
younger members. The two youngest—both in the alternates pool—are 43-
year-old Cai Songtao and 47-year-old Zhou Qi. Cai heads the party com-
mittee of impoverished Lankao County in Henan, while Zhou is a prominent

N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 • c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s 23

31. The enlarged CCOM includes full and alternate members.

32. Four members—Wang Sanyun, Wu Aiying, Wang Min, Tian Xiusi—would have to have gotten pro-
moted to the PB in order to stay on.

33. Moreover, Lu’s background as CCYL leader and Hu Jintao protégé are unlikely to win him any
favours within Xi Jinping’s growing network.

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev – Dictator’s Shadow: Chinese Elite Politics under Xi Jinping

19th Congress 18th Congress

17th Congress 16th Congress

Central Committee Alternate Central Committee

404040 50 60 70 45 50 55 60 65
00

.0
5

.1
.1

5
.0
5
.1
.1

5
.2

Note: Based on records from China Vitae Research Library.

Figure 1 – Central Committee Age Distribution

stem cell biologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Both promotions
highlight some of Xi’s top policy priorities for the next five years. (34)

The scarcity of younger cadres within the CCOM implies that future lead-
ership positions may be sourced from outside the traditional pipeline. We
already have several examples. Beijing’s new mayor, Chen Jining, is an envi-
ronmental scientist who rose to prominence primarily within academic cir-
cles, with only a brief two-year stint as Minister of Environmental Protection
(2015-2017). Similarly, both Zhang Guoqing, the new mayor of Chongqing,
and Jin Zhuanglong, deputy director of Civil-Military Integration, come
straight from the military-aerospace industry. Again, these promotions not
only mean more handpicked loyalists in important leadership positions, they
also reinforce key themes in Xi’s policy rhetoric. For instance, Chen Jining’s
placement in Beijing—notorious for its air pollution—is unlikely to have
been a coincidence. (35) Similarly, technology investment, particularly in
aerospace, is a key pillar in Xi’s military modernisation strategy. (36)

More generally, the absence of young faces in the CCOM is disconcerting
for the overall health of the CCP. First, it implies a dearth of eligible talent
for filling future leadership positions. Second, it suggests we should expect
more one-term leaders, who serve only five years in a top leadership posi-
tion before retiring. This would shorten the political cycle and infuse more
uncertainty into long-term policymaking. Furthermore, a dearth of younger
officials means that even if talent were to be found, promotions would have
to be fast-tracked through the system—implying thinner resumes and per-
haps less appreciation for party etiquette in the top levels of leadership to
come.

Discussion

Elite politics under the Xi Jinping administration has been anything but
dull. Former and rising leaders within the Party have been convicted of cor-
ruption and the top echelons of power have been thoroughly reconstituted,
all while Xi Jinping has doubled his portfolio, enshrined his name in the CCP
charter, expanded his anti-corruption campaign to the state and public sec-
tor, and abolished any legal impediments to holding on to power indefi-
nitely. How did Xi Jinping amass such unprecedented levels of personal
power? What does this tell us about the future of the CCP under Xi Jinping
and beyond? Is collective leadership dead, as some have suggested? Are we
in store for a relapse into the strongman politics of the Mao era?

In this review, I have argued that Xi Jinping’s rise was facilitated by CCP
elites, who in 2012 invested full authority into Xi’s office, even before he
entered it. As in the case of Mahathir in Malaysia, we cannot ignore the
possibility that Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power has helped stabilise a
fractured party, at least for the short term. Further, I have shown that the
inherent malleability of Chinese leadership norms and institutions has al-
lowed Xi Jinping to expand his influence and promote his loyalists without
overtly violating them. Indeed, the painstaking manner by which Xi Jinping
has gone about securing his position and policy priorities arguably says less
about his hunger for power than it does about his concern about upsetting
the semblance of institutional legitimacy.

Remember, ambiguous succession norms meant that Xi could have held
on to power without amending the constitution, and he could have kept
Wang Qishan without retiring him from the PBSC only to promote him to
the vice-presidency three months later. Similarly, Xi’s anti-corruption agents
within the CCDI could have imposed their control over procuratorates rel-
atively easily, given overlapping leadership roles. Instead, Xi initiated a com-
plex institutionalisation process for the NSC and subordinated provincial
commissions, (37) backed by a new National Supervision Law that even went
through 30 days of public notice and comment. (38) Curiously enough, it is
believed that this institutionalisation effort, not a grand scheme, set off the
constitutional revision process that opened the door to the removal of term

24 c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s • N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2

34. In 2014, Xi personally adopted Lankao as a pet project for poverty alleviation (Stromseth et al.
2017: 21). More recently, Xi inaugurated an ambitious campaign to wipe out poverty by 2020,
see: Xu Lei, “Xi Urges Stepped-up Efforts to Eradicate Poverty by 2020,” China Daily, 23 February
2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-02/23/content_28310971.htm (accessed on 15
November 2017). In 2016, Xi identified research as one of the core national weakness, urging
more innovation in the physical and biological sciences. See: “The Future of Chinese Research.”
Nature 534(7608): 435–435, 22 June 2016, www.nature.com/news/the-future-of-chinese-re-
search-1.20123 (accessed on 15 November 2017).

35. It is worth noting that the air quality in Beijing has improved remarkably since November 2017,
in large part thanks to the banning of coal burning in the city and surrounding provinces.

36. For a summary and links to the speech, see “7 Things You Need to Know About Xi Jinping’s Vision
of a ‘New Era’ for China,” South China Morning Post, 18 October 2017, www.scmp.com/news/
china/policies-politics/article/2115858/key-points-xis-speech-chinas-communist-party-congress
(accessed on 15 November 2017). Relatedly, Shih (2017) identifies an entire cohort of aerospace
engineers taking on high-profile leadership positions across China, including the governorship of
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hunan, and the party secretary’s office in Heilongjiang.

37. “China to Set Up National Supervision Commission Next Year,” Xinhua, 30 October 2017,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/30/c_136713601.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).

38. Charles Buckley, “In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency Will Be Above the Law,” The
New York Times, 29 November 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jin-
ping-anticorruption.html (accessed on 15 December 2017).

Special feature

Table 3 – Bridging Candidates

CCOM Member Age Office Patron Background Rising

Lu Hao 50 Governor, Heilongjiang Province Hu Localities –

Liu Zhenli 53 Lt. Gen. of the PLA Xi Military Y

Li Ganjie 53 Minister of Environmental Protection N/A Environment –

Wu Zhenglong 53 Governor, Jiangsu Province Xi Localities Y

Zhang Guoqing 53 Mayor, Chongqing Municipal Committee Xi Aerospace Y

Chen Jining 53 Mayor, Beijing Municipality Xi Environment Y

Jin Zhuanglong 53 Dep. Director Civil-Military Integration Comm. Xi Aerospace Y

Meng Xiangfeng 53 Dep. Director of General Office of the CCOM. Xi Discipline Y

Ni Yuefeng 53 General Administration of Customs N/A Discipline –

Huang Shouhong 53 Director, State Council Research Office N/A Management –

Note: I define “bridging candidates” as those who are young enough to enjoy the unique privilege of both influencing the make-up of the next congress in 2022 as well as making
it into the 22nd Congress of 2032. A member is considered “rising” if he or she is consecutively promoted into new portfolios. Based on records from China Vitae Research Library.

limits. (39) In short, it appears that Xi Jinping is both circumventing existing
institutions and cautiously setting up a base, albeit a flimsy one, for new
institutions to follow.

To be clear, none of this is a silver lining for the future of democracy in
China, but it does suggest that one-party rule has not been replaced by
one-man rule. Indeed, Xi’s achievements in consolidating power are just as
consequential for his willingness to one day retire as they are for his ability
to remain in office indefinitely. Put differently, every incumbent leader re-
quires some assurance that neither family, friends, nor legacies will become
a target for retribution once he or she leaves office. This is especially true in
regimes operating under weak rule of law and for incumbents who have
made enemies during their tenure—both of which apply to China and Xi
to the utmost degree. In this light, getting one’s name inscribed in the
preamble of the party constitution is both a signal of supreme power and
an insurance policy for peaceful retirement.

Even though we cannot predict Xi’s intentions, we can observe the more
subtle but systemic impact his power consolidation efforts have had on the
Chinese political and administrative system. The impact is broad but con-
centrated in three areas. First, traditional divisions of power are being

blurred, with party and state functions becoming increasingly indistinguish-
able. Second, with regards to leadership selection and elite decision-making,
we are seeing a departure from intra-party democracy in favour of more
top-heavy modes of consultation. The third concerns future cohorts of
power, where bottlenecks in the leadership pipeline reveal potential short-
ages in qualified contenders for future transitions. While these changes do
not directly impinge on party norms, they pose challenges to the institu-
tional structure of the party-state and its ability to govern.

z Dimitar D. Gueorguiev is Assistant Professor of Political Science at

the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse

University.

Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public

Affairs, 100 Eggers Hall, Syracuse NY 13244-1020

(ddgueorg@syr.edu).

Manuscript received on 2 April 2018. Accepted on 11 May 2018.

N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 – 2 • c h i n a p e r s p e c t i v e s 25

39. Charlotte Gao, “China Plans to Amend its Constitution,” op cit.

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev – Dictator’s Shadow: Chinese Elite Politics under Xi Jinping

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Journal of Contemporary China, 2017
Vol. 26, no. 105, 325–336
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245505

An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power

Sangkuk Lee

Center for Security and Strategy, Korea institute for Defense analysis, Seoul, South Korea

ABSTRACT
Xi Jinping swiftly centralized political power shortly after the 18th Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) National Congress in 2012, opposing what
was predicted when he was elected general secretary. This action also
compromises China’s long-term efforts to avert an over-concentration of
power among a few elites. This study deals with Xi’s strong ascent to power,
defined as the result of institutional change in China’s political power game
from the perspective of new institutionalism. The author identifies triggers
of institutional change, ideas and norms introduced for changing informal
institutions, and the actual transformation of formal institutions, arguing
that Xi took advantage of social demand for reform coordination as well
as some top elites’ serious political misbehavior to commence institutional
change for the centralization of political power. To do so, Xi introduced new
reform ideas – systemic thinking and top-down design, originating from
complex systems theory – in the name of coordinating and comprehensively
deepening reform. Xi eventually succeeded in justifying the centralization
of power and the establishment of central organizations to deepen reforms
comprehensively and coordinate internal and external security. As a result,
Xi seized power while practically nullifying the principle of division of work.

Introduction

One of the major characteristics of China’s elite politics during the era of ‘‘Reform and Opening up’’ is
that the power of China’s political elites came to be shaped more by political institutions than any other
factor, such as personal networks. This phenomenon has been perpetuated and intensified by the efforts
of top political leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, in the reform era. That is, China’s top leaders pushed for
institutionalizing political elites’ power games by establishing political norms and regulations for the
selection, promotion, resignation, and responsibility of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres.1
As the political game has been institutionalized through the reform leadership’s efforts, the power of
China’s political elites has become determined by their official position and responsibility, authorized
by formal institutions, under the condition of a deficiency of personal charisma and prestige similar
to that which empowered previous revolutionary leaders including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.2

Particularly with Deng Xiaoping’s strong drive, as shown in his 1980s speech, ‘On the reform of the
party and state leadership system’,3 China’s top leaders initiated vigorous institutional reforms to ensure

1for details, see Wang yang, The Building of Institutions for the Party’s Cadres in the New Era [新时期党的干部制度建设] (Beijing:
CCp history publishing house, 2006), pp. 89–176.

2David Shambaugh, ‘the dynamics of elites politics during the Jiang era,’ The China Journal 45 (2001), p. 109; Shiping Zheng, ‘the
new era in Chinese politics,’ Issues and Studies 41(1), (2005), pp. 195–196.

3Deng Xiaoping, ‘on the reform of the party and state leadership system’ [‘党和国家领导制度的改革’], Selected Works of Deng
Xiaoping, Volume 2 (Beijing: Central party literature press, 1994), pp. 320–342.

© 2017 informa uK limited, trading as taylor & francis Group

CONTACT Sangkuk lee korpia@naver.com

mailto: korpia@naver.com

http://www.tandfonline.com

326 S. LEE

that power could not be overly centralized and concentrated in the hands of a few individuals who act
arbitrarily. Specifically, China’s reform leadership reinstated the system of combining ‘collective leader-
ship’ (集体领导) and ‘division of work with individual responsibility’ (个人分工负责), e.g. for party, admin-
istrative, legal, and military affairs. Since then, China’s power politics has been significantly influenced
by the rule of collective decision-making by consensus, with a division of policy responsibility among
the individual members of the CCP’s Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Indeed, the
‘collective leadership system’ and ‘division of work’ have been incorporated in the Party’s authoritative
public documents, including successive party constitutions, political work reports issued at the Party’s
National Congresses, and speeches by top leaders throughout the reform era.4

This political institutionalization of decentralized power in Chinese politics has accordingly affected
the estimation of power of China’s new political leadership, elected in the 18th Party National Congress.
Specifically, some forecasts for Xi Jinping, the Party’s new General Secretary, was that his power would
be significantly more fragile because of the collective leadership system and division of work as well as
his weak personal network with other power elites. Further, there were even predictions that Xi would
be the weakest leader since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.5

However, Xi’s political power, evident within a few years of his inaugural speech as the Party’s General
Secretary, is profoundly different from the aforementioned expectations. Many expert commentaries
on Chinese politics evaluate that Xi Jinping not only consolidated his political power swiftly but also
exerted his influence over more varied policy areas than any previous general secretary in the reform
era, even to the point of Xi’s power surpassing ‘‘the paramount leader,’’ Mao Zedong. These new assess-
ments of Xi’s power are mainly based on analyses of his heading newly introduced as well as existing
organizations for the transformation of modes of exercise of political power. It is estimated that after
making institutional rearrangements for policy decision-making at the central party level, Xi Jinping
could exert significant influence on an almost full range of policy areas: not only the extant duties of
General Secretary – foreign policy, national security, and military affairs, but also domestic security, the
economy, society, and legal affairs, which were assigned to other PBSC members in the past.6 Thus Xi’s
wielding of immense power over broad policy areas significantly surpasses previous leaders’ intentions
and efforts to avert an over-concentration of power and to ensure a decentralization of power during
the 30-year period of the reform era. In this sense, Xi Jinping’s centralization of power can be depicted
as an unusual phenomenon in Chinese reform-era politics.

With this premise, this study will address what factors have contributed to Xi Jinping’s seizure of
power beyond the initial forecasts. In so doing, it will utilize institutional change theory from new
institutionalism. This is because, as previously discussed, Xi’s grip on power depended considerably on
the rearrangement of institutions for policy decision-making at the central level, or transformations in
modes of Chinese top elites’ exercise of power.

4alice miller, ‘the 18th Central Committee leadership with comrade Xi Jinping as general secretary,’ China Leadership Monitor 48,
(2015), p. 1.

5for some predictions for Xi’s weak power, see William a Callahan, ‘Who is Xi Jinping, and where will he lead China?,’ CETRI Website,
8 november 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cetri.be/Who-is-Xi-Jinping-and-where-will?lang=fr; Jiang Xueqin,
‘West should prepare for confusing new Chinese leader,’ CNN, 7 november 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://globalpub-
licsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/07/west-should-prepare-for-confusing-new-chinese-leader/; alice miller, ‘prospects for solidarity
in the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China Leadership Monitor (april 2012); fang yuan, ‘Xi to be ‘weak’ president,’ RFA, 12 november 2012
available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/xi-jinping-11122012110129.html; akio yaita, Xi Jinping: The Weakest Leader
in Communist China [習近平：共產中國最弱勢的領袖] (taipei: Common Wealth magazine, 2012); robert lawrence Kuhn,
How China’s Leaders Think, 2nd ed.(Singapore: Wiley & Sons, 2011), p. xiv.

6See Gao yi, ‘analysis: how Xi Jinping can get to be like Deng Xiaoping?’ [‘分析：怎样的习近平才能是邓小平？’], BBC (18 august
2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/08/140818_deng_xi_comparison_poli-
tics; Chris Buckleynov, ‘Xi Jinping’s rapid rise in China presents challenges to the u.S.,’ The New York Times (11 november 2014),
accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/president-xi-jinping-makes-it-his-mission-to-em-
power-china.html; Jeff mason and Steve holland, ‘obama says China’s Xi has consolidated power quickly, worrying neighbors,’
Reuters (4 December, 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-usa-china-obama-iduSK-
Cn0Jh21420141204; Willy lam, ‘Xi Jinping: a 21st-century mao?,’ Prospect Magazine, 21 may 2015, accessed 18 September 2016,
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/xi-jinping-a-21st-century-mao

http://www.cetri.be/Who-is-Xi-Jinping-and-where-will?lang=fr

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/07/west-should-prepare-for-confusing-new-chinese-leader/

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/07/west-should-prepare-for-confusing-new-chinese-leader/

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/xi-jinping-11122012110129.html

http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/08/140818_deng_xi_comparison_politics

http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/08/140818_deng_xi_comparison_politics

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-usa-china-obama-idUSKCN0JH21420141204

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-usa-china-obama-idUSKCN0JH21420141204

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/xi-jinping-a-21st-century-mao

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 327

According to new institutionalism, institutions are comprised of two basic dimensions. The formal
pillars consist of constitutions, laws, directives, regulations, and other rules that constrain, regularize,
and force agents’ behavior. The non-formal pillars establish principles, such as values and norms that
prescribe the goals of agents’ behavior and the appropriate ways to pursue them. The non-formal pillars
also include culturally shaped and taken-for-granted assumptions through which a certain reality is
perceived, understood, and given meaning by agents.7 From the perspective of new institutionalism,
institutions are endowed with properties of self-enforcement and perpetuation by relevant agents. This
is because many types of institutions are produced through bargaining and political conflict between
individuals and organizations for their own benefit,8 or because agents’ taken-for-grantedness makes
extant institutions self-enforcing.9

Thus, institutional change and rearrangement is frequently triggered by an exogenous shock, the
occurrence of a crisis, or an existing institution’s failure.10 Under the condition of a certain trigger’s action,
some stakeholders such as policy-decision makers and political elites turn to legitimizing and justify-
ing the necessity of institutional change. Sometimes social brokers, such as expert advisers and think
tanks, engage in the process of institutional change by introducing ideas and programs for institutional
redesign. Policy decision-makers as stakeholders make efforts for institutional transformation by inter-
acting with these social brokers.11 The characteristic of institutional change, whether it is fundamental
or partial, depends significantly on political context – for example, the existence of high veto players
who can mobilize institutional or other means of blocking change, and the stratagems of institutional
challengers to overcome the resistance of the veto players.12

With these theoretical guides for institutional change, this study endeavors to illuminate the institu-
tional rearrangement of China’s policy decision-making to explain the phenomenon of Xi’s centralization
of power after the 18th Party Congress. The study focuses on the triggers of institutional change, ideas,
and norms introduced to justify changing institutions, and the transformation of formal institutions.
To achieve this analytical goal, in the next section this study tries to identify what made what factors
caused China’s political elites to form a consensus on resolving the failure of the decentralized power
system and the necessity of centralizing political power. The third section deals with what ideas and
norms have been mobilized to justify or legitimize institutional change by Xi Jinping as an institutional
challenger. These analytic works proceed by identifying the major social brokers who support and
spread the discourse of institutional change. The transformation and its effect on formal institution are
analyzed in the fourth section. These issues are addressed with a focus on Xi’s stratagems for complying
with the party constitution regulating a ‘collective leadership system’ and ‘division of work’ as well as
minimizing other top elites’ (potential) opposition and resistance. The final section summarizes the new
findings in the previous sections and discusses the implications of this analytic result on China’s politics.

Chinese Political Elites’ Reaching Consensus on Remedying the Decentralized Power
System

The negative effects of decentralized power on China’s political environment were already present
from the Hu Jintao era of the mid-2000s, while the requirement of coordinating internal and external

7W. richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th ed., (thousand oaks: SaGe publications,
2013), pp. 55–85.

8Douglass C. north, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1990),
p. 36; avner Greif and Christopher Kingston, ‘institutions: rules or equilibria?,’ in norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero, eds.,
Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting (Berlin: Springer, 2011), p. 14.

9James mahoney and Kathleen thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (new york: Cambridge
university press, 2010), p. 10.

10marc Schneiberg, ‘Combining new institutionalisms: explaining institutional change in american property insurance,’ Sociological
Forum, 20(1), (2005), pp. 93–137.

11John l. Campbell, Institutional and Globalization (princeton and oxford: princeton university press, 2004), pp. 102–103.
12Wolfgang Streeck, and Kathleen thelen, ‘introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies,’ in Wolfgang Streeck and

Kathleen thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (oxford: oxford university press,
2005), pp. 1–39; James mahoney and Kathleen thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, pp. 14–37.

328 S. LEE

securities was proposed persistently in the reform era.13 That is, some of China’s officials and adminis-
trative experts raised concerns that the leadership system of ‘collective leadership’ and ‘division of work’
caused China’s poor governance and administrative performance, including ministry selfishness, inef-
fectiveness of policy decision-making, irresponsibility of officials, and procrastination of reform.14 Thus,
they proposed establishing a new organization for reform coordination at the central party or central
government level. Furthermore, they asserted that this organization should precede Chinese reforms in
the social and economic sectors by coordinating individual ministries’ and local government interests.15

The demands of installing a coordinating organization to deepen reform smoothly were voiced loudly
before and after the 18th CCP National Congress of 2012 by some of China’s high-ranking officials and
administrative experts from leading internal and external think tanks. They accentuated that ministerial
and regional self-centeredness should have been overcome by introducing a new central government
organization in order to further deepen China’s reform.16 Specially, a research report titled ‘‘China 2030’’,
jointly published in February 2012 by the Development Research Center of the State Council, Finance
Ministry, and World Bank, emphasized that ‘‘a high-powered reform commission needs to be established
by – and with the full support of – the highest level of government,’’ while pointing out a variety of
obstacles, like Chinese officialdom’s vested interests, to advancing reform.17

While these voices for solving the problems of the decentralized power system were rising, a series
of unexpected political events gave Chinese politics a shock shortly before the 18th Party Congress
in 2012. That is, the Party’s Chongqing Secretariat, Bo Xilai was removed from the Party as well as the
Politburo in September 2012. Bo was considered an effective candidate for membership of the PBSC at
the 18th Congress in 2012, since, as a member of the Politburo, he was armed with the Chongqing devel-
opment model, the ‘‘Singing Red Song’’ campaign, and a strong personal network among princelings.18
However, Bo was dismissed from the Party on a charge of abuse of power, graft, serious party disciplinary
violation, and attempting to establish a politically independent ‘‘kingdom’’ in Chongqing.19 In addition,
the chief of the Party’s General Office, Ling Jihua was reported to have committed a variety of abuses
of power and corruption in March 2012. He was considered very close to General Secretary Hu Jintao.

13See David m. lampton, ‘Xi Jinping and the national Security Commission: policy coordination and political power,’ Journal of
Contemporary China 24(95), (2015), pp. 4–9; fan Chuangui, ‘the profound and figurative meaning of proposing overall national
security outlook’ [‘‘总体国家安全观’提出之背后深意’], Legal Daily (21 april 2014), p. 4.

14alice l. miller, ‘prospects for solidarity in the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China Leadership Monitor 37, (2012), pp. 9–11; David m.
lampton, Following the Leaders: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley, los angeles, and london: university
of California press, 2014), p. 68.

15for details, huang Xiaohua, ‘Chi fulin member: establishing central reform coordination organization’ [‘迟福林委员：建立中央
改革协调机构’], Hainan Daily (13 march 2008), p. 2; Kuang Xianming ‘the goals and missions of the eleventh five-year reform:
the overview of meeting for reform situation’ [‘十一五’改革:目标与任务 – 改革形势分析会综述’], Review of Economic
Research,76(2005), pp. 17–22; Gao Shangquan, ‘Some opinions on report of government work (draft for comments)’ [‘对《政
府工作报告（征求意见稿）》的几点意见’], Reformdata.org (february 2005), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.
reformdata.org/index.do?m=wap&a=show&catid=301&typeid=&id=5141; Gao Shangquan, ‘accelerating reforms in key areas:
pushing for China’s economic transformation’ [‘加快重点领域改革 推进中国经济转型’], China Reform, 12 (2010), pp. 42–43.

16for examples, see Geng Kuanmou, ‘Chu fulin: a top-down design transmits three signals, a reform organization at central level should
be established’ [‘迟福林：顶层设计释放三个信号 应建中央层面改革协调机构’], People’s Daily Online, 12 march 2012,
accessed 18 September 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/148980/17355259.html; an (unknown) editorialist, ‘Coordination
mechanism for improving system reform’ [‘完善体制改革的统筹协调机制’], South China Daily (19 february 2013), p. 2; 陈佳
贵主编, Report On China’s Economic System Reform 2012 to Build a Mature Socialist Market Economy [中国经济体制改革报
告 2012: 建设成熟的社会主义市场经济体制] (Beijing: economy management publishing house, 2012); ren Zhongyuan, et al.,
‘unveiling: comprehensive interpretation for reform roadmap’ [‘揭幕：改革路线图全解读’], New Century, 44 (2013), accessed 18
September 2016, http://www.cb.com.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=26&id=1023059&all; Wang Zhangjiang,
‘a series of conversations on scientific development: do not make top-down design deformed’ [‘科学发展系列谈：莫让’顶层
设计’走形’], China Youth Daily, 2 July 2012, p. 2.

17the World Bank & Development research Center of the State Council, the people’s republic of China, China 2030: Building a
Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society (Washington: the World Bank, 2012), pp. 66–67.

18Xiansheng tian, ‘When Chongqing challenges Beijing: the Bo Xilai case,’ in Xiaobing li and Xiansheng tian, eds., Evolution of Power:
China’s Struggle, Survival, and Success (lanham: lexington Books, 2014), pp. 323–350.

19Wang yuanyuan, ed., ‘Bo Xilai expelled from CpC, public office,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 2012, accessed 18
September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm; Cheng li, ‘the Bo Xilai crisis: a
curse or a blessing for China?,’ Brookings, 18 april 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
interviews/2012/04/18-china-boxilai-li

http://www.reformdata.org/index.do?m=wap&a=show&catid=301&typeid=&id=5141

http://www.reformdata.org/index.do?m=wap&a=show&catid=301&typeid=&id=5141

http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/148980/17355259.html

http://www.cb.com.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=26&id=1023059&all

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm

http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2012/04/18-china-boxilai-li

http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2012/04/18-china-boxilai-li

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 329

Moreover, a member of the 17th PBSC, Zhou Yongkang was accused of unreasonable power extension
by utilizing the authority of the Central Political and Legal Affair Committee (CPLAC) authority, e.g. by
controlling China’s courts and the procuratorates.20 After their news releases, Ling Jihua was relegated
to head of the United Front Work Department from chief of the Party’s General Office, one of the Party’s
most powerful organizations, in July 2012. Additionally, according to the Party’s official newspaper, The
People’s Daily,21 the Party’s investigation over the Zhou Yongkang case commenced with the launch
of an investigation into charges of the corruption of Tao Yunchun as early as March 2012. Tao was the
head of the China National Petroleum Corporation and considered one of Zhou Yongkang’s associates.22

Meanwhile, a CCP official theory periodical, ‘Seeking Truth’ (Qiu Shi, 求是) presented a drawback of
China’s decentralized power system by citing a Chinese political scientist in August 2012. Remarkably,
this journal directly criticized the system of combining ‘collective leadership’ and ‘division of work with
individual policy responsibility’ among the individual members of PBSC. With pointing out the impact
of the Bo Xilai scandal on China’s politics, the journal argued that the decentralized power system had
led to the ineffectiveness of government system, the corruption of government officials, their political
irresponsibility, and damage to national interest.23

With the civilian voices for reform coordination as well as the unexpected political scandals, the
18th Party Congress suggested that the Party would push for centralizing political power. This fact
was in evidence in Hu Jintao’s work report for the 18th Party Congress of November 2012, written after
extensive discussion and consultation within and among Chinese political elites.24 Specifically, the work
report for the 18th Party Congress placed greater emphasis on enforcing party discipline and upholding
centralized leadership than any other report in the reform era. Remarkably, the work report excluded
the concepts of collective leadership and division of work that had been stressed in successive party
reports from the 15th Congress of 1997 to the 17th Congress of 2007.25 Moreover, the report underlined
that ‘the Party ‘should improve the mechanism for coordinating structural reforms and conduct major
reforms in a holistic way according to the overall plan’’26 in the section on ‘‘deepening reform of the
administrative system’’. These statements regarding the centralization of power represent an historical
first in the Party’s work reports.27 In addition, the work report emphasized that ‘the Party ‘should improve
the national security strategy and its work mechanism,’’ while pointing out the importance of political
security, economic security, social security, ecological security, and military security.28 This suggests that
the consensus of the Chinese political elites over institutional rearrangement was formed in order to
precede reform effectively and to enforce national security capabilities.

20Sun Chun, ‘ling Jinhua’s entering the pBSC is hopeless, making efforts to enter the politburo,’ [‘令計劃入常無望 努力入局’], China’s
Secret Report, 1 (october 2012), pp. 14–20; Zhou yongkun, ‘the history and evolution of the political and legal affair Commission’
[‘政法委的历史与演变’], Spring and Autumn Annals, 9 (September 2012), pp. 7–14.

21‘a whole record for the investigation into the Zhou yongkang case for two years’ [‘周永康案查办两年全纪录’], People’s Daily
Online, 30 July 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0730/c1001-25370099.html

22after the 18th party Congress, the party’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping publically criticized Bo Xiali, Zhou yongkang, and ling Jihua
for violating the party’s political discipline (政治纪律) and political rules (政治规矩) thus putting the party in much greater peril by
pointing out that they built ‘‘an independent kingdom’’ (独立王国) for their personal interests at their jurisdiction. See Zhong Zuyi,
‘resolutely safeguard the authority of the party Central Committee’ [‘坚决维护党中央权威’], Seeking Truth, 18 (September 2015).

23Zheng yongnian, ‘the 18th CCp national Congress and China’s reform issues’ [‘十八大与中国的改革问题’], 2 august 2012, Seeking
Truth Website, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/tslj/201208/t20120824_177566.htm

24for the process of drafting the report of the 18th party Congress, Xu Jingyue, Wu Jing, and Zhao Chao, ‘a political declaration and
a program of action for winning new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics: recording the birth of the report for the
18th party congress’ [‘夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的政治宣言和行动纲领: 党的十八大报告诞生记’], People’s Daily (21
november 2012), p. 1.

25for the work reports of the successive party congresses since the foundation of the party, see the Archives of the CCP National
Congresses [中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库], accessed 18 September 2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/
index.html

26‘hu Jintao’s report at 18th party Congress,’ The Xinhua News Agency, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_6.htm

27Du Qiang, ‘Wang yukai, a professor of China’s national School of administration: the establishment of independent organization
for considering system reform’ [‘国家行政学院教授汪玉凯：设独立机构协调体制改革’], Yunnan Information Daily, 10
november 2012, p. a09.

28‘hu Jintao’s report at 18th party Congress’.

http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0730/c1001-25370099.html

http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/tslj/201208/t20120824_177566.htm

http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html

http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_6.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_6.htm

330 S. LEE

Xi Jinping’s Infusing ‘Systemic Thinking’ and ‘Top-down Design’ for ‘Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms’

Under this socio-political context, in order to centralize political power and to eventually exert his
influence over widespread policy areas, Xi Jinping, the Party’s General Secretary, actively publicized his
new approach and reform methodologies, including ‘systemic thinking’ and ‘top-down design’ as will
be discussed. Xi’s methodology for China’s deepening reform is based on a complex systems theory,
especially the open complex giant system (OCGS).29

The OCGS theory considers a social system as a type of OCGS, ‘where the quantity of subsystems is
extremely large, the subsystems have a hierarchical structure and complex interrelations within them;
finally their energy, material and information exchange are open to the outside, self-adaptive and
evolutionary’.30 Furthermore, this systems theory regards society as an organic whole constructed by
interconnections, interactions, and mutual effects between economic institutions, socio-political insti-
tutions, and ideological and cultural systems.31 Systems theorists perceive that the traditional reduc-
tionism of the exact sciences cannot provide an effective methodology to solve social OCGS problems
effectively.32 Thus, the proponents of OCGS propose employing the methodology of meta-synthesis (
综合集成法) and establishing the Department of Integrative System Design (总体设计部, DISD) to be
responsible for the comprehensive analysis, design, and planning in considering an entire complex
system rather than its specific subsystem.33

Indeed, this kind of complex systems engineering, based on the OCGS theory, was applied to some
of China’s major policy decisions or large-scale project performances in various areas including military,
economy, education, and transportation for a time.34 In addition, the Party has already asked its cadres
to learn systems theory. For example, the systems theory titled ‘systematic thought and creative capa-
bility’ (系统思想与创新能力), is one of the major subjects for Party cadres in the Central Party School.35
Moreover, some of China’s top leaders presented their interests about systems theory. Specifically, Xi
Jinping accepted systems theory comparatively earlier, as reflected in his book, the New Sayings from
Zhejiang (之江新语) of 2007, which contains his endorsement of ‘strategic thinking’ as well as a ‘four-in-
One’ (四位一体) development planning by an integrated approach for economy, politics, culture, and
society.36 Former top leaders such as Hu Jintao set a high value on this OCGS theory earlier as well.37

Finally, China’s 17th Party leadership decided to apply the core concepts of complex systems engi-
neering and the DISD in proceeding with China’s economic reform. Concretely, ‘Proposals on the Twelfth
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development’ (关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十
二五年规划的建议) adopted at the fifth plenary session of the 17th Party Central Committee in 2010
promoted strengthening ‘top-down design’ (顶层设计) and an ‘overall plan’ 总体规划) to deepen eco-
nomic reform.38 According to the People’s Daily Online, the concept of top-down design, originating

29See Qian Xuesen, yu Jingyuan, and Dai ruwei, ‘a new discipline of science: the study of open complex giant system and its meth-
odology’ [‘一个科学新领域: 开放的复杂巨系统及其方法论’], Chinese Journal of Nature, 13(1), (1990), pp. 3–10.

30Jifa Gu, Xijin tang, ‘Some developments in the studies of meta-synthesis system approach,’ Journal of Systems Science and Systems
Engineering, 12(2), (2003), p. 172.

31Xu Guozhi eds., Systems Science [系统科学] (Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific and educational press, 2000), pp. 307–308.
32Qian Xuesen, yu Jingyuan, and Dai ruwei, ‘a new discipline of science: the study of open complex giant system and its methodology,’

p. 9; Jifa Gu, Xijin tang, ‘Some developments in the studies of meta-synthesis system approach,’ p. 172.
33Sun Dongchuan eds., Introduction to Systems Engineering [系统工程引论], 3rd ed. (Beijing: tsinghua university press, 2014); Dai

ruwei, li yaodong, and li Qiudan, Social Intelligence and Meta-synthetic System [社会智能与综合集成系统] (Beijing: posts &
telecommunications press, 2012), pp. 79–83.

34Sun Dongchuan ed., Introduction to Systems Engineering, pp. 376–424.
35Zheng na, ‘the decryption of the Central party School’ [‘解密’中央党校’], The People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), 2 July 2010, p. 4.
36for the evidences of systems theory’s impact on Xi Jiping, see ‘World vision and strategic thinking should be established’ [‘要有
世界眼光和战略思维’] and ‘the dialectical unity of four-in-one’ [‘四位一体’的辩证统一’], in Xi Jinping, New Sayings from
Zhejiang[之江新语] (hangzhou: Zhejiang people’s publishing house, 2007), pp. 20, 201.

37Sun Dongchuan, eds., Introduction to Systems Engineering, preface, and p. 64.
38tang yi eds. Unabridged Dictionary for China’s Society Construction [中国社会建设大辞典] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science

press, 2013), p. 65; Zeng Jun, ‘utilizing top-down design to deepen reform’ [‘用’顶层设计’来深化改革’], Study Times, 13 June
2011, accessed 18 September 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14885422.html

http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14885422.html

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 331

from systems theory, indicates the government’s strategic management in political terms. The kernel
of top-down design is setting strategic goals on whole (整体性), comprehensive (全面性), long-term
(长远性), and overall (全局性) ways. Notably, the top-down design cannot do without an architect,
like Deng Xiaoping, who is officially recognized as ‘the chief architect of China’s economic reforms and
socialist modernization’.39 As this article from the People’s Daily suggests, the concept of top-down
design intrinsically takes a positive view of the emergence of a powerful leader.

After being elected as the helmsman of the CCP in November 2012, Xi Jinping assertively prioritized
applying his new approaches and methods, developed from systems theory, to deal with a whole slate
of reforms beyond just economic reform. According to the Party Central Document Research Bureau,
the first and best examples of Xi’s reform approach and methodology were his remarks during a tour in
Guangdong province in December 2012. During this tour, Xi Jinping warned that China had entered a
period of overcoming major difficulties, a deep-water zone (深水区) in its drive to break through barriers
to reform presented by ideological differences and vested interests. Xi targeted reform and opening
up as crucial movements for deciding China’s fate today and for determining whether the country will
achieve its ‘Two Centenary Goals’ (两个一百年目标) by 2021 and 2049, the years marking the centennial
anniversaries of the founding of the CCP and the PRC, respectively, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation. Thus, Xi asked the Party and the people to adhere to the path of reform and opening up and to
put greater focus on pursuing reform in a more systematic (系统性), whole (整体性) and coordinated
way (协调性). Xi added that deepening reform and opening up requires firm confidence, consensus,
top-down design (顶层设计), an overall plan (总体规划), and coordinated steps (协调推进), outlining
comprehensively deepening reforms (全面深化改革) involving the organic combination of political,
economic, social, cultural, and ecological reforms as a type of complex systems engineering.40

After this tour, Xi Jinping made efforts to garner support for his new approach to reform from
China’s political elites from the larger society through a variety of channels, including his tour of the
provinces, Central Party meetings, and talk meetings. To publicize this new reform methodology, Xi
utilized, among others, the Central Conference on Economic Work of December 2012, the second col-
lective study session of the Party’s Politburo of December 2012, the second plenary meeting of the
18th Party’s Central Committee of February 2013, Xi’s Hubei inspection tour of July 2013, and talks with
non-partisan members convened by the Party Central Committee in September 2013. In these, Xi urged
the organic synthesis of economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological reforms by top-down design
and implementation of an overall plan to comprehensively deepen reforms.41

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping directly demanded that the Party cadres study and apply his reform methodol-
ogy to their works. For example, the Party’s Central Organization Department (COD) under Xi’s leadership
of the Party Construction Leading Group publicized various reform theories, including a methodology
for strategic thinking and system thinking aimed at cadres in a book, The Lecture Hall of Cadres’ Courses
(干部选学大讲堂), which was published in May 2012, shortly before the 18th Party Congress.42

Moreover, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and the COD jointly demanded that the
Leading Party Members’ Groups (党组) and Party Committees (党委). including government organ-
izations, civic organizations, some crucial state enterprises, universities, and China’s military earnestly
organize activities for the study of new reform methodologies using the book Ten Lectures on Marxist
Philosophy (马克思主义哲学十讲). Both organizations pointed out that Party cadres’ capacities for

39Wang hejin, ‘Bite words and chew characters’ [‘咬文嚼字’发布 ‘2014年十大流行语’], People’s Daily Online, 15 December 2014,
accessed 18 September 2016, http://culture.people.com.cn/n/2014/1215/c87423-26211903.html

40‘Xi Jinping vows no stop in reform, opening up,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 11 December 2012, accessed 18 September 2016,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/11/c_132034269.htm; CCp Central Document research Bureau ed., The
Selection of Xi Jinping’s Discourses on Comprehensively Deepening Reform [习近平关于全面深化改革论述摘编] (Beijing:
Central party literature press, 2014), pp. 30-31.

41for details, see the CCp Central Document research Bureau ed., The Selection of Xi Jinping’s Discourses on Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms, pp. 32–50.

42See the CoD Cadre education Bureau ed., The Lecture Hall of Cadres’ Courses: the Selection of Courses for the Department- and
Bureau-Level Cadres of Central or State Organs [干部选学大讲堂: 中央和国家机关司局级干部选学课程选编], Vol. 1 (Beijing:
party Building reading publishing house, 2012), pp. 68–87, 112–136.

http://culture.people.com.cn/n/2014/1215/c87423-26211903.html

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/11/c_132034269.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/11/c_132034269.htm

332 S. LEE

strategic management, comprehensive policy decision-making, and controlling the overall situation
would be enhanced by studying this book.43 The book contains ‘modern Marxist’ theories regarding
systemic thinking (系统思维), strategic thinking (战略思维), creative thinking (创新思维), and contra-
diction theory (矛盾论), which are based on the various remarks and speeches of Xi Jinping as well as
the words of other prominent Marxist and Chinese leaders, including Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Mao
Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping.44

Meanwhile, some social brokers, such as Chi Fulin, director of the China Institute for Reform and
Development, and Wang Zhangjiang, director of the Party Building Teaching and Research Department
of the Central Party School, proposed establishing a new central organization to coordinate reforms
by taking the opportunity of the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of March 2013.45 Specifically, Gao Shangquan, former
vice chair of the National Development and Reform Commission and president of the China Economic
System Reform Research Association, proposed setting up the Leading Group for Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms to take on the responsibility of top-down design and overall planning for the
Party top leadership in April 2013. Gao asserted that this leading group should be headed by the
Party’s General Secretary and elected that the Premier be its vice-head as well, while pointing out that
comprehensively deepening reforms involve implementing the overall plan for reforms of the political
system, cultural system, social system, and ecological system as well as economic system reform.46 Gao’s
proposal to establish the central coordination organization received the attraction of the China’s top
leaders. Specifically, Zhang Gaoli, Vice Premier expressed his gratitude to Gao’s concern and attachment
to the party. Zhang asked the drafting group for the work report of the third plenary session of the 18th
Party Central Committee to study Gao’s proposal in May 2013.47

These supports from society as well as the efforts of Xi Jinping himself eventually led to a consensus
of China’s political elites not only to apply the top-down design and overall plan, but also to establish
coordination organizations to do so at the central party level. Specifically, the third plenary session of
the 18th Party Central Committee decided that the Party would establish the Central Leading Group
for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CDR) and the National Security Commission in November
2013.48 When expounding this Central Party’s decision in explanatory notes, Xi Jinping stressed that
‘comprehensively deepening reform is a complicated systems engineering project, which requires
more than one or several departments to carry out. Therefore, leadership at a higher level should be
established for this purpose’.49

As for the establishment of a national security commission, in the aforementioned explanatory notes
of November 2013, Xi emphasized that China’s security system would be improved by constructing a
strong platform to coordinate security work in order to safeguard state sovereignty, national security,
and development interests and to maintain political and social stability.50 In April 2014, remarkably, Xi
Jinping introduced an overall national security outlook (总体国家安全观) as a normative foundation for

43’the Central propaganda Department and the Central organization Department release a notice demanding the organization of
earnest study of Ten Lectures on Marxism Philosophy (Textbook for Party-Members and Cadres)’ [‘中宣部中组部通知要求:
认真组织学习《马克思主义哲学十讲(党员干部读本)》’], People’s Daily (26 December 2013), p. 4.

44according to China’s systems theorists, these types of thinking are deeply connected with systems theory. for details, see Ten
Lectures on Marxism Philosophy (Textbook for Party-Members and Cadres [马克思主义哲学十讲(党员干部读本)] (Beijing:
Study press & party Building reading materials publishers, 2012).

45Wang Quanbao, ‘the decryption of the leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening reforms’ [‘解密全面深化改革领导小
组’], People Digest, 2 (2014), pp. 18–19.

46Ibid; Gao Shangquan, ‘proposals on the topics of the third plenum of the 18th national Congress’ [‘关于十八届三中全会主题
的建议’], CIRD Brief, 947 (June 2013), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cird.cn/WeareCird/research/Briefing/201306/
t20130615_169353.htm

47Wang Quanbao, ‘the decryption of the leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening reforms,’ p. 18.
48‘Decision of the CCCpC on some major issues concerning comprehensively deepening the reform,’ China.org.cn, 17 January 2014,

accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm
49‘explanatory notes for the ‘decision of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China on some major issues concerning

Comprehensively Deepening the reforms’, China.org.cn, 16 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.
cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31210122.htm

50Ibid.

http://www.cird.cn/WeAreCird/Research/Briefing/201306/t20130615_169353.htm

http://www.cird.cn/WeAreCird/Research/Briefing/201306/t20130615_169353.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31210122.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31210122.htm

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 333

the function and authority of China’s new security organization and national security system. Concretely,
Xi Jinping asserted that, ‘to implement the overall national security outlook, China must place impor-
tance on both external and internal security. Domestically, China will pursue development, reform, and
stability and foster a safe environment … Externally, the country will seek peace, cooperation, a win-win
situation and a harmonious world’.51 This concept of overall national security outlook originated from
systems theory in terms of its emphasis on not only the nation’s comprehensiveness of security (全面
性), wholeness (整体性), and systematicity (系统性).52 Moreover, the concept has been influenced by
systemic security theory, which was developed by Chinese scholars,53 as seen from Xi Jinping’s prior-
itizing the building of a national security system for covering the spheres of politics, territory, military,
economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural resources.54

The Fundamental Change of Power Structure by Partially Rearranging Formal
Institutions

As discussed in the previous section, Xi Jinping significantly succeeded in making China’s political elites
reach consensus on centralizing the powers of the party, the state, and the military by his reform meth-
ods, such as top-down design and overall planning, from complex systems engineering. Nevertheless,
obstacles remain to the formal institutionalization of centralizing power. For example, the revised Party
Constitution of 2012 still stipulates that ‘the Party Committees at all levels function on the principle
of combining collective leadership and division of work with individual responsibility. All major issues
shall be decided upon by the Party Committees after discussion in accordance with the principles
of collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual consultations and decision by meetings’ in
article 10 of the chapter on the party organizational system.55 This tension between new norms and
formal regulation regarding the centralization of power forced Xi Jinping to push for partially changing
formal institutions in various ways.

First, Xi Jinping outwardly retained the ‘division of work’ system at the central level by keeping
most extant positions for China’s top leaders while consolidating power by restructuring them slightly.
Concretely, since the 18th Party National Congress, the number of the PBSC members has been curtailed
from nine to seven and the head of the CPLAC has been excluded from the PBSC. Xi Jinping directly led
the system of Political and Legal Affairs as well, while Meng Jianzhu, a member of the Politburo, was
elected as Secretary of the CPLAC.56 As a result, Xi Jinping has been put in charge of both domestic
and external security through this institutional restructuring, leading to Xi’s taking stronger power, as
compared with former General Secretary Hu Jintao. In addition, some newly introduced coordination
organizations functioned in earnest after the 18th Congress. Xi Jinping has become further empowered
by heading these central organizations on China’s military reform and security, namely the Central

51See Zhu ningzhu, ‘national security matter of prime importance: president Xi,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 15 april 2014, accessed
18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264574.htm

52See liu yuejin, ‘the overall national security outlook in the great security era’ [‘大安全时代的总体国家安全观’], Beijing Daily,
19 may 2014, p. 17.

53for systemic security theory, see liu yuejin, ‘the systemic security outlook and its three layers’ [‘系统安全观及其三层次’], Journal
of University of International Relations, 2 (June 2001), pp. 3–9; liu yuejin, ed., The Science of National Security [国家安全
学] (Beijing: China university of political Science and law press, 2004); Che li, ‘national security outlook in the new situation
should be the comprehensive systemic security outlook’ [‘新形势下的国家安全观应是全方位的系统安全观’], The Journal
of International Security Studies, 6 (november 2008), pp. 87–87.

54Zhu ningzhu, ‘national security matter of prime importance: president Xi’.
55‘Constitution of the Communist party of China,’ revised and adopted at the eighteenth national Congress of the Communist party

of China on november 14, 2012, China.org.cn, 16 november 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/chi-
na/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm

56huang Shan, ‘the individual works of the seven pBSC members is clear: there is a difference with the earlier predictions from the outside
world’ [‘七常委分工明确: 与早前外界预测有差别’]，International Business Times, 16 march 2013, accessed 18 September 2016,
http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/23659/20130316/104910.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264574.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm

http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/23659/20130316/104910.htm

http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/23659/20130316/104910.htm

334 S. LEE

Leading Group for Maritime Rights Work (中央海洋权益工作领导小组) from September 2012, the
Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization (中央网络安全和信息化领导小组)
from February 2014, and the CMC’s Leading Group for National Defense and Military Reform (深化国
防和军队改革领导小组) from March 2014.57

Nevertheless, these institutional rearrangements did not directly affect the political power of other
top elites. As shown in Table 1, the power structure of the 18th PBSC membership closely resembles
that of the 17th PBSC only when considering the existing positions inherited from the Hu Jintao era
and the aforementioned new positions. In other words, an individual member of the PBSC seems to
have his own responsibilities within each policy area, such as foreign affairs, military, administration,
legal affairs, political consultation, and party discipline in compliance with the principle of ‘division of
work with individual responsibility’.58

However, the principle of division of labor has been significantly nullified by establishing two central
coordination organizations: the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CDR)
and the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). At first, with the decision of establishing the CDR
Leading Group, Xi Jinping was elected as a leader of the CDR Leading Group in December 2013 by the
Politburo. This leading group has been authorized to ‘design reform on an overall basis, arranging and
coordinating reform, pushing forward reform as a whole, and supervising the implementation of reform
plans’.59 The leading group covers general policy areas in the name of researching and deciding major
guidelines, policies, and overall plans for systemic reforms in the economic, political, cultural, social, and
ecological sectors as well as the party system.60 As such, in January 2014, the leading group established
specialized sub-groups for reforms in six areas, such as economy and ecological civilization, democracy
and law, cultural system, social system, party building system, and discipline inspection system.61

57See the source of table 1.
58outwardly, the principle of division of work seems to be complied with well within the politburo, similar to the pBSC. for the

division of work in the politburo including the pBSC members, see yan yirong, ‘China’s political system of division of six author-
ities’ [‘中国的六权分工政治体制’], The Observer, 14 December 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/
Zuoyilong/2014_12_14_303270_s.shtml

59‘president Xi to head leading group for overall reform,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 30 December 2013, accessed 18 September 2016,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/30/c_133007127.htm

60Ibid.
61‘China’s reform leading group holds first meeting,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 22 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://

news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm

Table 1. the power Structure of 18th pBSC by their official posts.

*official posts have been introduced before the 18th party national congress except for the posts in bold.
Sources: for the data of the responsibility for the pBSC members, see Zou Chunxia, ‘the positions of the pBSC members in the

leading groups’ [‘政治局常委的小组职务’], Beijing youth Daily, 23 June 2014, p. a3; ‘What types of leading groups are the pB-
SC’s seven members in charge of, respectively?’ [‘政治局七常委担任哪些领导小组的领导职务?’], the observer, 12 July 2013,
accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/Dounong/2013_07_12_157600.shtml; Wang mei, ‘the center releases a
signal to raise the stand of unification work many times this year’ [‘今年中央多次释放统战工作’升格’信号’], the Beijing news
(31 July 2015), a06; alice miller, ‘the work system of the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China leadership monitor, 41 (Spring 2013): 1–13.

PBSC Member Official Positions
Xi Jinping General Secretary, prC Chairman, Central military Commission(CmC) Chairman, foreign affairs Work Central

leading Group Director (lGD), taiwan Work lGD, finance & economy lGD, Central maritime rights Work
lDG, Internet Security and Informatization LGD, CMC’s National Defense and Military Reform LGD,
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms LGD, Central National Security Commission Chairman

li Keqiang premier, Central institutional organization Commission Chairman, national energy Commission Chairman,
State Council’ Western China Development lGD

Zhang Dejiang national people’s Congress Chairman, hong Kong-macao lGD
yu Zhengsheng political Consultative Conference Chairman, Xinjiang Work lGD, tibet Work lGD
liu yunshan CCp Central Secretariat, Central party School president, ideology and propaganda lGD, party Building lGD,

Central party’s mass line educational practice lGD
Wang Qishan Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline inspection
Zhang Gaoli Vice premier

http://www.guancha.cn/ZuoYiLong/2014_12_14_303270_s.shtml

http://www.guancha.cn/ZuoYiLong/2014_12_14_303270_s.shtml

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/30/c_133007127.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 335

Additionally, the CDR Leading group leads major reforms at the central level and addresses major
issues with nationwide significance and long-term impact involving different regions and departments.
It guides, pushes forward, and supervises the implementation of major reform policies.62 The leading
group is more powerful than any other central leading group because not only do the Party’s provincial
committees establish the provincial leading group for comprehensively deepening reform, but the party
committees on all levels also perform the duty of pushing forward reform as a whole, and supervise
the implementation of reform plans under the leadership of the CDR Leading Group.63

China’s new national security organization has weakened the principle of division of work as well.
With the establishment of the CNSC in January 2014, Xi Jinping was elected as leader of this commis-
sion. The commission answers to the Politburo and the PBSC, and is responsible for decision-making,
deliberation, and coordination on national security work. It is in charge of ‘making overall plans and
coordinating major issues and major work concerning national security’. The responsibilities of the
commission include construction of the rule of law system concerning state security, research, resolving
major issues of national security, setting principles and policies, as well as stipulating and implementing
strategies.64

Moreover, these responsibilities of the security commission have legal bases because of the PRC’s
National Security Law (NSL), which was passed on 1 July 2015 at the 15th meeting of the 12th NPC
Standing Committee.65 Remarkably, the legal foundation of the NSL as well as the theoretical basis of
the overall national security outlook, containing a holistic security concept, empowers the CNSC to
cover general policy issues regarding internal and external, traditional and non-traditional, individual
and collective security.66 Specifically, according to the NSL’s article 2, ‘national security refers to the
relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state’s power to govern, sovereignty, unity
and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and
other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security’. Thus, the NSL
covers the areas of politics, territorial issues, the military, the economy (including energy, finance, and
food), culture, anti-terrorism, society, science, technology, outer space, cyberspace, information, ecology,
nuclear power, and natural resources.

In its essence, the functions, heads, and authority of the CDR Leading Group and the CNSC illustrate
why the system of division of work in Xi Jinping era cannot effectively perform its function of preventing
the concentration of all power in the hands of a few top leaders. Moreover, Xi Jinping is armed with
strong power because he can exert his influence over entire policy areas through these organizations
while he holds the armed forces and information in an almost monopolistic way through other channels,
such as the CMC, the system of Political and Legal Affairs, and the leading group for internet security.

Conclusion

The previous sections attempted to solve the enigma of Xi Jinping’s taking centralized power promptly
by relying on institutional change theory. These efforts led not only to identifying Xi Jinping’s power
consolidation as the phenomenon of institutional change regarding China’s policy-making and its
political power game, but also to figuring out the power game changer, Xi Jinping’s stratagems for
rearranging political norms and formal institutions to exert political power.

62‘president Xi to head leading group for overall reform’.
63See Wang Shu, ‘eight questions on the Central leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening reform’ [‘中央全面深化改革领
导小组八问’], The Beijing News, 14 november 2013, p. a06.

64‘Xi Jinping to lead national security commission,’ China Daily Online, 24 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17257409.htm

65See articles 4 and 5 of the national Security law of the prC.
66for overall national security look, see liu Dan, ed., ‘Commentary: China to follow specific national security strategy,’ The Xinhua News

Agency, 16 april 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/16/c_133267984.htm

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17257409.htm

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17257409.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/16/c_133267984.htm

336 S. LEE

To summarize these findings, Xi Jinping took advantage of social demand for reform coordination
as well as the serious political misbehavior committed by some major players of China’s power politics
before the 18th National Congress to commence institutional change for the centralization of polit-
ical power. With rising social voices for solving ministry and individual selfishness as well as political
scandals, Xi Jinping actively made efforts to weaken the logic of justifying decentralized power which
had been cemented during the reform era by pointing out China’s reform as complex systems engi-
neering. Rather, in order to deepen reforms comprehensively and to achieve the ‘Chinese dream,’ Xi
has attempted to implement a new reform methodology, including top-down design, an overall plan,
and a coordinated push forward, which stem from complex systems engineering and the principle of
the Department of Overall Design.67

In spite of acquiring the support of political elites for (or, at least, without accruing noticeable resist-
ance against) his reform methodology, Xi Jinping could not completely obey the principle of ‘division
of work’ as stipulated in the current Party Constitution. Instead, Xi adopted a strategy of retaining most
of the existing framework for the power structure and policy decision-making while incapacitating the
work division system itself. That is, Xi established new organizations such as the CDR Leading Group
and the CNSC. Through these two organizations as well as other leading groups under his leadership,
he can exert his influence to cover the overall policy area in the party and the government – the leg-
islative body, the judicature, the administration, and the military. Indeed, both of these organizations
are superior to other leading groups and commissions that are headed by other top elites because of
the support of the Party Committees at all levels or China’s law as well as their coverage.

Xi Jinping, as a new architect of China’s reform, therefore, can take responsibility for overall policy
areas beyond the former General Secretary’s existing sphere of influence. In other words, Xi can have
his direct political influence over party affairs (organization, ideology, and discipline), administrative
affairs (economy, society, culture, ecology, health), legal affairs (legislation and jurisdiction), and military
affairs. Thus, Xi’s way of exercising power is very different from that of former general secretaries in
the reform era. The former general secretaries could not directly exercise such political influence over
the policy areas of other PBSC members other than the specific policy area under his authority. They
could have a circuitous effect on the policy area of other the PBSC members by personal exchanges
and negotiations, and cooperation between their own organizations.68

In conclusion, Xi Jinping has seized strong power by reconfiguring reform norms and values, and
partially rearranging formal institutions. In spite of its nominal survival, the principle of division of work
has therefore been practically and significantly excluded in China’s power politics.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Sangkuk Lee is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) in Seoul, South Korea. He was a visiting
scholar at the Center for Chinese Studies, UC Berkeley. Before joining KIDA, he was a research professor in the Department
of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. His current research interests include China’s politics,
foreign policy, and national security. He can be reached at korpia@naver.com

67for a comparison between the Department of overall Design and top-down design, see Wei hong-sen, ‘the Department of overall
Design and top-down design’ [‘总体设计部与顶层设计: 学习十八届三中全会的一点认识’], Journal of Systems Science,
22(4), (2014), pp. 4–9.

68for details on the way a certain pBSC member affected the policy areas of other pBSC members in the previous party sessions, see hu
angang, China’s Collective Leadership System [中国集体领导体制] (Beijing: Chinese people’s university press, 2013), pp. 61–62.

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