Administrative Crime Analysis Worksheet
While APA style is not required for the body of this assignment, solid academic writing is expected, and in-text citations and references should be presented using APA documentation. information is attached for the assignment.
JUS-640 Topic 6 Administrative Crime Analysis Worksheet
Scoring Guide
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Imagine that you are a Crime Analyst tasked with monitoring burglaries in the area surrounding the two Major League Baseball fields in Chicago.
Access the Chicago Police Department CLEAR map: You will be retrieving the data for burglaries from each of the following “Wards” (Wards, are the equivalent to City Council districts) which are near the two baseball fields: Wards 11, 32, 44, and 47. Do the following for each Ward: Step 1: Use the default date range period (two weeks from today’s date). Step 2: Using the “Click a search by Method” taskbar, click on “Ward”. Step 3: Select from the dropdown menu the number of the Ward you want to view, i.e. 11. Step 4: Go to the taskbar entitled: “Optional: Change Parameters to Filter Results before clicking GO”. Under “Crime Types”, select “Burglary”. And under “Hours” and “Locations” select “ALL”. Step 5: Go to the “Wards” dropdown to the Ward number you selected and click “GO”. Check each of the four Wards, and record the number of burglaries, and the day of the week on which they occurred. Find the Ward with the lowest number of burglaries, calculate the midpoint between them and use that number as the target. Use this data to complete the table below. Part I: Complete the table below, using your assigned textbook readings as a model. This table constitutes a crime reduction plan (See pages 405-409). Part II: Provide a 150-200-word rationale for the decisions you made in the table above. |
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Grading Criteria |
Points |
Comments |
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Part I: Crime Reduction Goal Development Table |
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1. Goal (Broad/General goal) |
0/5 |
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2. Success Indicator (Outcome) |
0/10 |
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3. Baseline (trend analysis of all burglaries in the four Wards) |
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4. Target (Specific goal) |
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5. Strategies (how you will meet the goal) |
0/15 |
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6. Performance Indicator (Outputs: Audit what was done. How they will Evaluate effectiveness) |
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Part II: Rationale Provide a 150-200-word rationale for the decisions you made in the table. |
0/20 |
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Be sure to cite three to five relevant scholarly sources in support of your content. Use only sources found at the GCU Library, government websites, or those provided in Topic Materials. |
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While APA style is not required for the body of this assignment, solid academic writing is expected, and in-text citations and references should be presented using APA documentation guidelines, which can be found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. |
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Total |
0/100 |
JUS-640 Topic 6 Crime Reduction Goal Development Worksheet
Note the assignment instructions in the syllabus.
Imagine that you are a Crime Analyst tasked with monitoring burglaries in the area surrounding the two Major League Baseball fields in Chicago.
Access the Chicago Police Department CLEAR map:
http://gis.chicagopolice.org/CLEARMap/startPage.htm#
You will be retrieving the data for burglaries from each of the following “Wards” (Wards, are the equivalent to City Council districts) which are near the two baseball fields: Wards 11, 32, 44, and 47.
Do the following for each Ward:
Step 1: Use the default date range period (two weeks from today’s date).
Step 2: Using the “Click a search by Method” taskbar, click on “Ward”.
Step 3: Select from the dropdown menu the number of the Ward you want to view, i.e. 11.
Step 4: Go to the taskbar entitled: “Optional: Change Parameters to Filter Results before clicking GO”. Under “Crime Types”, select “Burglary”. And under “Hours” and “Locations” select “ALL”.
Step 5: Go to the “Wards” dropdown to the Ward number you selected and click “GO”.
Check each of the four Wards, and record the number of burglaries, and the day of the week on which they occurred.
Find the Ward with the lowest number of burglaries, calculate the midpoint between them and use that number as the target. Use this data to complete the table below.
Part I:
Complete the table below, using your assigned textbook readings as a model. This table constitutes a crime reduction plan. Pages 405-409
Parameter
Goal- Burglary
Goal (Broad/General goal)
Success Indicator (Outcome)
Baseline (trend analysis of all burglaries in the four Wards)
Target (Specific goal)
Strategies (how you will meet the goal)
Performance Indicator (Outputs: Audit what was done. How they will Evaluate effectiveness)
Part II:
Provide a 150-200-word rationale for the decisions you made in the table above.
References
THE NUMBERS DILEMMA: THE CHIMERA OF MODERN POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS
JAMES F. GILSINAN*
INTRODUCTION
In the lexicon of dyadic American folk sayings, “motherhood and apple
pie” is. being joined by “transparency and accotmtability.” Similarly, like
“motherhood and apple pie,” one takes on the iconic nature of the saying at
considerable risk. After all, who could be against transparency and
accountability? Management gum Stephen R. Covey argues that,
“[ajccountability breeds response-ability.”^ This formulation neatly captures,
the assumed relationship between accountability and performance. There is
also an assumed relationship between transparency and a robust democratic
system.̂ Joumalist Peter Finn notes, a “basic tenet of a healthy democracy is
open dialogue and transparency.” Finally, accountability and transparency are
seen as reinforcing each other.” Being held accountable assvunes that one’s
actions are available for review and critique.’ Indeed, the Dodd-Fratik Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in the wake of the recent
financial meltdown, attempts to regulate the disclosure requirements of
fmancial firms on the asstimption that such mandated transparency will result
in better performance on the part of banks and other financial institutions.^
Police departments in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to
jump on the transparency and accountability bandwagon.^ The increasing use
* E. Desmond Lee Professor in Collaborative Regional Education, Department of Public Policy
Studies, Saint Louis University.
1. STEPHEN R. COVEY, PRINCIPLE-CENTERED LEADERSHIP 49 (1990).
2. Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999).
3. Peter Fenn, POLITICO: THE ARENA (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.politico.com/arena/
perm/Peter_Fenn_l 49A409A-FDA2-41EA-ACA1-41133DF86F66.html.
4. Joshua N. Auerbach, Police Accountability in Kenya, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 275, 282
(2003).
5. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. R. 29, 29 (2005). .
6. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 & What it Means for Joe & Jane
Consumer, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 101 (2010).
7. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. .1107, 1163 (2000).
93
94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX11:93
of accessible, web-based, real time crime data, using geographic information
system (GIS) technology to display neighborhood crime pattems, represents
the move toward transparency on the part of major city police departments.^
Similarly, the rapid adoption of COMPSTAT-like programs in mid to large
size departments speaks to a willingness to be held accountable for crime
occurrences and their control.’ Unfortunately, there are a multitude of reasons
why systems designed to increase transparency and accountability will not
work and, in fact, may make the very goals sought by programs of
organizational reform less likely to be achieved.
In this Article, I argue that there are five obstacles facing police reformers
seeking to increase transparency and accountability in law enforcement
organizations.’ Moreover, these obstacles are nearly insurmountable.” The
phrase “nearly insurmountable” means that while change can and will occur,
the changes will, at best, be at the margins of the organization—and, at worst,
such changes may make situations in need of correction more problematic.’^
This pessimistic assessment is due to the nature of the numbers themselves; the
nature of organizations, particularly those that do not produce an objective
product; the culture of policing; the institutional environment in which the
police operate; and the larger cultures’ failure to distinguish among the
concepts of data, information, and knowledge.’^
I. THE SIREN SONG OF COUNTING AND NUMBERS
When presented with a table of numbers that purport to objectively
measure or describe a phenomenon, in keeping with the dictates of
accountability or transparency, or both, the reader is often lulled into a state of
process amnesia. Numbers are always the end product of a series of decisions,
many of which are subjective and somewhat arbitrary.”’ There are at least six
decision points that affect the “objective” nature of the numbers being
reported.’^ The first is obviously the decision to count one thing rather than
another.’^
8. W. at 1175.
9. John R. Firman, Deconstructing COMPSTAT to Clarify its Intent, 2 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (2003).
10. See m/ra Parts I-V.
11. See Gary W. Sykes, The Functional Nature of Police Reform: The ‘Myth’ of Controlling
the Police, 2 JUST. Q. 51, 53 (1985).
12. Id
13. See infra nott 111.
14. Craig D. Uchida, Carol Bridgeforth & Charles F. Wellford, Law Enforcement Statistics:
The State of the Art, 5 AM. J. POLICE 23, 29 (1986).
15. Id
16. Id
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 95
The simple act of deciding to count or not count something confers or
denies a certain importance to an object or outcome. A number of criminal
justice examples illustrate the point.
Until the early 1970s, domestic assault did not “coiinf as a serious
offense.’̂ On the other hand, homosexual activity between consenting adults
did “count” as a crime. In fact, why do we bother to count crime at all? Those
familiar with the history and the development of the FBI Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR) know the reason certain kinds of crime were counted was
motivated by a political goal: shielding top police officials from the periodic
crime cmsades of the tabloid press.” The sensationalism of crime reporting,
and the consequent threat to the job stability of a police chief, literally could be
count-ered by the “objectivity” of numbers.^” Of course, since its beginning,
the UCR has been plagued by a second subjective decision point prior to
arriving at a number: What counts as an instance of a phenomenon?^’
The specifically political nature of this decision point is noted by Deborah
Stone who points out that counting requires classification, which in tum
requires judgments about inclusion and exclusion—who or what is in or out.̂ ^
Again, the history of the UCR nicely illustrates this dilemma. Crime categories
have been known to expand or contract depending on the circumstances at
hand. Thus, a mtinicipality heavily dependent on tourism may employ very
narrow definitions of what constitutes a criminal act, thereby keeping crime
rates low. At budget time, a crime wave, based on expanding the category of
what coimts as a crime, may be helpful in obtaining additional resources.
The third decision point that illustrates the subjective nature of a number is
the choice of a procedure for counting to one. ‘̂’ This may seem
straightforward—one thing is one thing. But alas, one thing may be made up of
multiple parts; thus, the question becomes whether to count the parts separately
or as a unit. The UCR solves this dilemma by introducing a time dimension in
17. Faith E. Lutze & Megan L. Symons, The Evolution of Domestic Violence Policy
Through Masculine Institutions: From Discipline to Protection to Collaborative Empowerment, 2
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 319,322 (2003).
18. Bennett Wolff, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1279, 1281
(1981).
19. Michael D. Maltz, Crime Statistics: A Historical Perspective, 23 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 32, 33 (1977).
20. /¿a t33-34.
21. Id
22. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 146
(3d ed. 2002).
23. Crime Reporting in the Age of Technology, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. (Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C), 2000, at 12.
24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
96 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI1:93
deciding how to count to one.̂ ^ For example, if a car is vandalized as part of a
series of auto vandalisms that all occurred within the same, designated time
period, then that incident is counted as one occurrence of vandalism, even if
twenty cars were involved.̂ *
The above example introduces the fourth challenge to numeric
objectivity—the inability to understand what a number means unless the
context in which the number was produced is also provided.^’ Put another way,
this is the siren song of numbers. Numbers appear to be objective and not
tainted by context. Moreover, with too much contextual description, the
elegant efficiency of numeric description is lost. This is a particular problem in
attempting to use numbers either to provide transparency or to improve
performance through accountability.^’ There is a well-known aphorism that
attests to the need for context:
The Govemment are very keen on amassing statistics—they collect them, add
them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful
diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of those figures comes in
the first instance from chowly dar (village watchman), who just puts down
what he damn pleases.
This nineteenth century British waming continues to be of relevance in
assessing modem, twenty-first century police intelligence units charged with
analyzing data for the constmction of actionable law enforcement
interventions.^ ‘ In a recent study of British police intelligence analysis units,
one analyst is quoted as saying, “the quota of information that we work on is as
good as the officer puts on there. If you look at the standards of the [officers’]
reports, they’re absolutely appalling. You know, and they’ve got the house
number wrong, they’ve got the beat wrong.””̂ The respondent goes on to note
that these mistakes result in the identification of false hot spots—^places of
peak crime occurrences. The important point of this, however, is that the
analysts make the best of the data they are given and report a de-contextualized
version of an event (a series of numbers). As the authors note, those numbers
fail to convey either the fluid nature of a criminal occurrence, and, thus, some
25. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
HANDBOOK 12 (2004).
26. Id
27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. 5eeUchida, Bridgeforth & Wellford, .yt/pra note 14, at 25.
29. See Martin Innes et al., ‘The Appliance of Science?’ The Theory and Practice of Crime
Intelligence Analysis, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 50-52 (2005).
30. JosiAH STAMP, SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS OF MODERN LIFE 258-59 (1929).
31. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 50-52.
32. Id
33. Id
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA . 97
of its underlying causes, or the interpretive work of the analyzer who fills in
gaps in the data so that it becomes “sensical.”^”
The inability to convey context exacerbates a fifth characteristic of
numbers, the objectification of evaluative criteria—i.e., disguising judgment as
measurement.̂ ^ Deborah Stone gives a wonderful example of this process:
“Paul Samuelson’s best-selling (economic) textbook declared in its 1970
edition that ftill-employment was about 3.5 percent tmemployment; by the
time of its 1985 edition, the natural rate of tmemployment had grown to around
6 percent.”^*
Of course, today, the Obama administration would celebrate a 7 percent
tmemployment rate. The tendency of numbers to disguise a judgment as a
measurement makes it difficult to hold the entities reporting the numbers
accountable and to ensure organizational transparency.'”
Finally, as noted previously, the act of counting something confers a status
on, or suggests the importance of, the thing counted.”̂ Therefore, both the
counter and the coimted react to the process of numbering.^’ Organizationally,
this refers to producing good numbers whether the entity is a police agency
employing COMPSTAT or a school system participating in high stakes testing.
The number becomes a goal in and of itself—separate from what the number
represents. This unfortunately became the experience of the NYPD over the
course of implementing COMPSTAT.”” In a study by John Etemo and Eli
Silverman, field commanders quickly leamed that they needed to look good
(i.e. have good numbers) when presenting at COMPSTAT meetings if they
wanted to avoid public humiliation.'” This resulted first in commanders
spending inordinate amounts of time constmcting data charts, rather than
actually implementing the crime control sfrategies that the analysis might have
suggested.”̂ Secondly, there was a strong temptation to manipulate the
numbers.”̂ Thus, to tmly understand what a number means, it is necessary to
know about the organization that produces the number. It is to this issue that
we now tum.
34. Id
35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36. STONE, supra note 22, at 169.
37. Id at 176-77.
38. Id at 178.
39. Wat 187.
40. See John A. Etemo & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City Police Department’s
Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?, 8 INT’L J. OF POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 218, 219-26 (2006).
41. /¿at223.
42. Id at 228.
43. Id at
227.
98 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX11:93
II. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE PROBLEM OF REFORM
Daniel Kahneman, in a popular sutnmary of current brain research,
suggests that there are, at least metaphorically, two systems that control
thitiking.’*’* System one is intuitive, quick thinking, and bases conclusions on
mental frames developed through past experience.'” These fVames or beliefs
are the templates used to explain the world as someone encounters it.’*̂ System
two is slower and engages in deliberative assessments of information.’*’
However, system two responses require effort, and according to Kahneman,
system two often lacks the requisite effort.”^ Therefore, if system one presents
an explanation that seems to make sense and accords with past experience,
system two will accept the conclusions of system one without ftirther analysis
and cntique.
This observation is parallel to an observation made by Herbert Simon
about organizational decision-making. Decision-making in organizations
does not involve analyzing all of the information available, but, instead, is
represented by a process of “satisficing.”” The decision-maker uses mies of
thumb, that is, how this current situation is like a previous situation and what
the appropriate response was in that previous situation.’^ The use of analogous
situations to make decisions mirror what has been discovered by brain
research—neither as individuals nor as members of organizations do we
optimize our decision-making, picking the best of all possible altematives.
Instead, we satisfice, picking the altemative that best seems to fit, without
expending a great deal of energy to review—in a systematic way—all other
possible choices.’^
Of course, this approach, both individually and organizationally, has some
advantages.”* It conserves energy and allows for efficient decision-making.”
In most cases, such decision-making processes or standard operating
44. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FASTAND SLOW 20 (2011).
45. Id at 105.
46. / ¿a t 21-22.
47. /¿a t49 .
48. / ¿ a t31 .
49. Id. at 24.
50. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER
54 (2009).
51. Id
52. Id at 52.
53. Id at 52-53.
54. See id. at 53.
55. / ¿ a t 54.
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 99
procedures result in the individual or the organization moving forward to
accomplish the task at hand.̂ ^
The disadvantage of this course of action is that often individuals and
organizations do not engage in an analytical process that would prevent major
problems.̂ ^ Higher order analytical routines are most often employed after the
CO
fact—what went wrong and why? Post-mortems sometimes result in changed
ways of behaving, but these soon become standard operating procedures and
satisficing once again becomes the preferred mode of decision-making.^’
This suggests that changing the core activity of an organization and its
routines of decision-making is very, very difficult. This may be particularly
tme in the public sector, where assessing performance is hindered by the lack
of a concrete product or outcome.* ‘̂ Performance criteria are instead infiuenced
by political considerations, budgets, and the public
In this kind of decision environment, it makes sense to ask whether any
particular decision is based on technical or institutional criteria. A decision
based on technical criteria responds to a change in the outside environment. ‘̂’
A new product or service is required to keep the organization competitive.^”
Therefore, stmctures are designed or redesigned to efficiently and effectively
meet this demand.̂ ^ The organization that successfully navigates its
environment’s technical demands is rewarded with more resources.*^ Failure to
do so jeopardizes resources.̂ ^ When an organization employs technical
decision processes, it is engaging in a more sophisticated and analytical routine
than simply satisficing.*^
A decision based on institutional criteria is much closer to the satisficing
model or the system one brain model.*’ The criteria for judging the success of
56. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER
54 (2009).
57. See id. at 53; K. A. Arehibald, Three Views of the Expert’s Role in Policymaking:
Systems Analysis, Incrementalism, and the Clinical Approach, 1 POL’Y SCI. 73, 76, 82 (1970).
58. See Archibald, supra note 57, at 76.
59. Id
60. / ¿ a t 8 2 .
61. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 114-15.
62. See id.
63. See Sidney G. Winter, The Satisficing Principle in Capability Learning, 21 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J., 981,982(2000).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 983; James Willis et al.. Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based
Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147,
150(2007).
67. See Winter, supra note 63, at 982.
68. W. at 983.
69. See Willis et al.,5«pra note 66, at 151.
100 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI1:93
the organization involve neither efficiency nor effectiveness.'” The criteria
instead involve judging the legitimacy of the organization based on cultural
beliefs about how an organization should look and act.” Perceived legitimacy
rather than efficacy is what counts.’^ Organizations operating in this kind of
decision climate gain recognition and resoiu-ces by: conforming to cultural
beliefs and expectations about what it is they are supposed to do; and by
becoming isomorphic with other institutions in their environment that have
been rewarded for particular behaviors.”
Research describing the adoption of COMPSTAT suggests that the
adoption has been spurred primarily by institutional considerations.”’ The rapid
deployment of COMPSTAT mirrors an almost fadlike acceptance of the
process rather than a careñil and analytical investigation of how the process
might adopt to a particular local situation or what pros and cons such adoption
might entail.’^
Change spurred by the dynamic of institutional isomorphism is likely to be
superficial. Core technologies and procedures are unlikely to be impacted.”
This certainly seems to be the case with COMPSTAT.’̂
In a study of three police departments that had adopted COMPSTAT,
James Willis and his colleagues concluded that COMPSTAT simply raised
reactive policing strategies to new levels. Police would respond quickly to a
spike in crime, producing what the authors called a “whack-a-mole” effect.””
Contrary to the assumptions of careful plarming and the development of long
term strategies, COMPSTAT simply encouraged business as usual, only even
more so. Further, while commanders felt responsible for crime in their
districts, there was very little communication to beat officers conceming
COMPSTAT trends—with the result that officers’ daily routines were not
impacted by the analysis derived from the gathered data. ‘̂
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Matthew J. Giblin, Structural Elaboration and Institutional Isomorphism: The Case of
Crime Analysis Units, 29 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 643, 645 (2006).
73. Id
74. Willis et al., supra note 66, at 161.
75. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 219.
76. Matthew J. Giblin & George W. Burruss, Developing a Measurement Model of
Institutional Processes in Policing, 32 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT., 351,
355 (2009).
77. See id
78. See Willis et al. supra note 66, at 152, 174-75.
79. / ¿a t 174.
80. / ¿a t 175.
81. / ¿a t 164-65.
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 101
Other studies have suggested that COMPSTAT also increased the gulf
between the command culture and the street cop culture.̂ ^ For example, in
New York, commanders took credit for dips in the crime rate, while passing
blame to subordinates if the crime rate spiked in an area.̂ ^
The concept of work culture is an important element in trying to
understand why organizational change in general, and change toward more
accountability and transparency, in particular, is difficult to achieve. ‘̂’ In public
sector agencies, the organizational dynamics just described, together with the
cultural dynamics of such organizations, make the likelihood of fundamental
change even more remote.̂ ^ We ttim to the role of cultural dynamics next.
III. THE CULTURES OF MODERN DAY POLICING
Our understanding of the cultural complexity of the modem police agency
has come a long way from the studies of the 1970s, which concentrated
primarily on the culture of the street officer.̂ * By the end of the decade, it was
clear that police organizations had at least two distinct culttires: a street cop
culture and a management culttire.̂ ^ Today, it is recognized that there are
multiple cultures within police agencies consisting not only of beat officers and
higher ranked managers—but civilian cultures which span a fairly large
professional hierarchy from clerical support staff, through 911 call-takers and
dispatchers, to highly trained and credentialed personnel in such vmits as
research and development, human resource management, and forensics.̂ ^
Although not studied quite as intensively as the police subcultures, these
other subcultures are beginning to receive more attention.^’ In a study this
Author conducted on police call-takers, it was evident their work culture was
influenced by the stress and strains of being sfreet level bureaucrats with too
82. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 222-23.
83. W. at 224.
84. Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
339,346(1983).
85. Peter J. Robertson & Sonal J. Senevir, Outcomes of Planned Organizational Change in
the Public Sector: A Meta-Analytic Comparison to the Private Sector, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547,
548(1995).
86. See JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 57 (4th ed. 2011).
87. ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND
MANAGEMENT COPS 1 (1983).
88. David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209-10, 1229-30
(2006).
89. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MEGAN A. ALDERDEN, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE, JOB
SATISFACTION AMONG CIVILIANS IN POLICING l (2011), available at http://www.nationalpolice
research.org/job-satisfaction-among-civilia/.
102 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX1I:93
few resources to meet increasing demands.'” Many of the sfrategies they
adopted were attempts to gain greater confrol over their work situation while
still trying to meet the demands for service emanating from 911 calls.” Chief
among the sfrategies they employed was attempting to fit a caller’s demand
into a pre-existing definition of a situation that permitted the dispatch of a
car.’^ Call-takers would often prompt callers as to how to appropriately frame
their request.’^ A key conclusion of this study was that police agencies do not
respond directly to a situation, but instead respond to an organizationally
projected frame that takes ambiguous information and forms it into an
understandable pattem to which the agency can then respond in a routine
fashion.'”
A similar conclusion was reached in a study conducted by this Author and
a colleague focused on a police research and development (R&D) unit.’^ The
source of the ambiguous information for this unit was demands for data that
would help other organizational units within the department make a decision
about a problematic situation.’* Interestingly, the problem-solving sequence for
the R&D tmit did not start with an analysis of the problem they were supposed
to research, but with an analysis of the political situation and the agenda of the
person making the request.” Once there was consensus on the real agenda and
on a solution that would meet both political and practical realities, “research”
OR
was conducted to support this solution. Often, the research consisted of
calling other police R&D units to see what they suggested in similar
circumstances.” This closed system of information processing allowed the
organization to do what it would normally do anyway. “Research” simply
reinforced standard operating procedures.
More recent research on police research units reinforces these initial
observations.'”^ Martin Itmes and his colleagues adopt the term “bricolage” to
describe the tasks performed by crime analysts in two British police
90. See James F. Gilsinan, They is Clowning Tough: 911 and the Social Construction of
Reality, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 332 (1989).
91. See id
92. Id at 332-33.
93. See id. at 340.
94. Id at 341.
95. See generally James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, Bending Granite: Attempts to Change
the Management Perspective of American Criminologists and Police Reformers, 15 J. POLICE
SCI. & ADMIN. 196(1987).
96. SeeW. at 197-98.
97. Wat 198-99.
98. See/’rf. atl99.
99. W. at 197.
100. / ¿ a t 202, 203.
101. James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, iwpra note’95, at 203. (1987).
102. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 54-55.
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 103
agencies.'”^ Crime analysts work with what they are given and take messy,
contingent, and incomplete data to constmct an objective, scientific product.’°’*
They put together the bric-a-brac of what they receive from field reports and
constmct a coherent pattem of events.”” The gaps in data are filled in by what
everybody knows to be “tme” about how criminals operate.'”^ The resulting
product is a reproduction of the world that allows the department to enact its
environment, i.e. project an image of a situation that allows for the carrying out
of standard operating procedures.””
While units that can contribute to transparency and accountability do not
operate in ways that can easily achieve either characteristic, there are forces
within the constellation of institutions of which any police agency is a part that
encourages the particular organizational and cultural dynamics previously
discussed.'”^
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
To paraphrase a piece of folk wisdom, no institution is an island.
Institutions exist as part of a constellation of similar agencies.'”‘ This
institutional ecology creates a dynamic in which like organizations compete,
cooperate, and engage in mutual adjustment.”” Similar organizations also
provide a benchmark against which other organizations can be assessed.” ‘
A large body of research points to the different dynamics that exist in
public sector constellations and private sector constellations.”^ Organizational
stmctures within the private sector respond to the technical demands of their
environments.”” Stmctures are adopted, modified, or abandoned based on the
need for efficiency and effectiveness—and are traits measured in terms of
profitability.”” This metric can be used to assess one organization’s standing
vis-à-vis other similar organizations.”‘ If a competitor is doing better, there is
103. / ¿ a t 5 0 .
104. /¿at 51.
105. See i¿ at 42, 4 7 ^ 8 .
106. Seei¿ at 43, 53.
107. / ¿ a t 5 4 .
108. Innes et al , supra note 29, at 40, 49-50.
109. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, 48 AM. SOC. REV.
147, 152(1983).
110. Seeí¿
111. Seeí¿
112. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES xi-xii (1980); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977); Willis
et al., supra note 66, at 147.
113. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 150.
114. See¡¿
115. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 152.
104 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII:93
an effort to find out why and to perhaps change the organizational stmcture to
match the stmcture of the more successful entity.”*
The dynamic in the public sector is fueled less by demonstrating
organizational effectiveness and more by demonstrating organizational
legitimacy.”^ Public sector organizations operate in environments that have no
clear technology for achieving results, no clear metrics for measuring success,
and no clear link between an action and an outcome.”^ Marshall Meyer and
Lynne Zucker define such organizations as permanently failing.”‘ They
survive despite an inability to demonstrate technical efficiency by substituting
demonstrations of conformity with culture demands and beliefs.’^° They
operate in accordance with how the culture says an organization of this t)^e
should operate.’^’
As noted above, the two models of organizational response have been
termed the technical model and the institutional model.’^^ In studies of police
agencies, the institutional model is ascendant.’^” Again, this suggests strong
pressures on individual police agencies to become isomorphic with their
institutional environments.’^”
There are three sources of pressure toward isomorphism.’^^ When
organizations change in response to ftinding opportunities, or in response to
more powerful organizations—for example legislative committees—they are
experiencing coercive isomorphism.’^* If the change is in response to licensure
requirements or accreditation criteria, there is normative pressure to
conform.’^’ Finally, if the organization itself seeks to mimic a successñil
organization in the same institutional constellation, the conformity is described
as mimetic.
All three conformity pressures are nicely illustrated in the recent history of
police agencies in the United States.’^’ In 1968, the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration was formed as part of the Johnson administration’s
116. See id
117. See Giblin, supra note 72, at 644-45.
118. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 151.
119. MARSHALL W. MEYER & LYNNE G. ZUCKER, PERMANENTLY FAILING ORGANIZATIONS
21-22(1989).
120. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 151-52.
121. See id.
122. See id at \50.
123. Giblin, 5«pA-a note 72, at 643.
124. W. at 645.
125. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 150.
126. SeeW.
127. See id. at \52.
128. Id
129. Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 967, 1009-10 (2009).
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 105
war on crime.’^” LEAA provided funding for a variety of innovations in law
enforcement from the adoption of night scopes and helicopters, to college
tuition for police officers.’^’ Much of the frinding was apparently used to
purchase equipment of questionable value for the day-to-day tasks of civilian
law enforcement.’^^ But, for a time, armored personnel carriers, night scopes,
and helicopters were popular among urban police departments.
Currently, many police agencies are demonstrating their legitimacy by
obtaining accreditation from The Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), “the gold standard in public safety.”””’
Accreditation agencies spur normative conformity since the set of standards for
such recognition are standardized for the whole of the profession.’^^ CALEA
claims it is the gold standard among public safety accrediting bodies because
“[t]he primary comerstones that comprise the CALEA Difference and
distinguish CALEA from all other forms of public safety accreditation are
professionalism, stewardship, integrity, diversity, independence, continuous
improvement, objectivity, credibility, consistency, knowledge, experience,
accountability and collaboration.” ‘ *̂
One is immediately stmck by the lofty ambitions of the comerstones and
the difficulty of measuring them. One suspects that the defmitions of the terms
are operationalized on the ground through the application of tacit knowledge,
i.e. the phrase “I don’t know exactly what professionalism is, but I know it
when I see it.”
As noted previously, research on COMPSTAT suggests a mimetic
adoption.'” For example, Willis, et. al., in their study of COMPSTAT,
describe departments seeking to incorporate the strategy within their own
agencies after simply visiting New York, observing how it operated, and
130. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP ‘T OF JUSTICE, L E A A / O J P RETROSPECTIVE: 30
YEARS OF FEDERAL SUPPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/164509
131. / ¿ a t 3; LAW ENFORCEMENT DEV. GRP., THE AEROSPACE CORP., EVALUATION OF
AERIAL VEHICLES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION xviii-xix (1973), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiIesl/Digitization/1421 lNCJRS ; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION 7, 102 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
132. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP ‘T OF JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 4; U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 131, at 1, 16.
133. U.S. DEP ‘T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION POLICE
EQUIPMENT SURVEY OF 1972 xiv, xviii (1974), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/
Digitization/I 3985NCJRS
134. CALEA Gold Standard, COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, INC., http://www.calea.org/content/calea-gold-standard (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
135. Id
136. Id
137. Willis et al., 5Mpra note 66, at 161.
106 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII:93
bringing it back to their own jtirisdictions.’^* There was no technical process of
adopting the strategy to local conditions, nor even a clear reason why it should
be adopted given the unique circumstances of the jurisdiction.”” It would be
hard to imagine a more idoneous example of mimetic adoption.
V. DATA, INFORMATION, AND KNOWLEDGE
In the philosophy of science, it is common to distinguish among the terms
data, information, and knowledge.”'” Although the terms are often used
interchangeably,”” it is useful to distinguish them analytically to imderstand
both the problems and the prospects of achieving transparency and
accountability through the use of “better” intelligence.
Data are simply observations about phenomena.”’^ Information is data that
will make a difference.'””^ Knowledge is information that provides guidance for
action by describing relationships between means and ends.””’ The differences
among these terms can be illustrated by the example of student test scores.'”^
The scores themselves are data.”’* Arrayed to show that minority students do
worse than nonminority students, the data becomes information, particularly to
those interested in minority achievement.”’^ Were further analyses to suggest
what factors influence such achievement, and how a manager might
manipulate these factors, the information would achieve the status of
knowledge.'”^
As the reviews of various strategies for achieving transparency and
accountability suggest, much of what goes into the databases used for
achieving these ends remain simply data.'”” Only occasionally is it processed
in a way to produce information.’^° And rarely, indeed, is it raised to the level
of knowledge.’^’
138. M a t 155.
139. W. at 158.
140. ARNOLD J. MELTSNER & CHRISTOPHER BELLAVITA, THE POLICY ORGANIZATION 29
(1983).
141. Id.
142. tó. at 29-30.
143. W. at30.
144. Id.
145. yrf. a t31.
146. MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, 5Mpra note 140,at31.
147. ld.\ James F. Gilsinan, Information and Knowledge Development Potential: The Public
vs. Private Sector Jobs Demonstration Project, 8 EVALUATION REV. 371, 375 (1984).
148. Id.
149. Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose. . .Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at SR.
150. Id.\
MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, supra note 140, at 32.
151. Rosenthal, 5«pra note 149; MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, .supz-a note 140, at 32.
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 107
Melvin Dubnick provides a useñal list of the things accountability centered
reforms are thought to achieve.’^^ Accountability will enhance fransparency
and, thus, strengthen democratic institutions (“the promise of democracy”).’^^
Abuses of authority will become apparent and correctable (“the promise of
justice”).’^” Accountability will provide oversight of public officials promoting
appropriate behavior (“the promise of ethical behavior”).’^^ Improved
govemment service will result from accountability stmctures (“the promise of
performance”).’^* Concenfrating on the last of these, Dubnick convincingly
demonsfrates that the supposed link between accountability and performance is
anything but certain. ‘ ̂ ‘
Linking accountability to the concept of account giving, Dubnick
demonsfrates how account giving is contingent on the nature of, the reasons
for, the mode of, and the places where accounts are provided. In other
words, there is a performative nature to account giving itself, which makes its
relationship to actually infiuencing performance, in a technical sense,
problematic.’^’ People gather data for all sorts of reasons and give accounts to
achieve a variety of ends. As has been demonstrated throughout this Article,
data is molded into information that serves the immediate purposes of the
account giver, and these can be far removed from the original purposes for
gathering the data in the first place.’*”
The contingent nature of accounts and accoimt giving suggests why
information seldom becomes knowledge.’*’ Instead, data and information
bounce back and forth between each other, as data is applied to and reported by
a variety of account givers and audiences.’*^
There is a similar intervening mechanism when one considers the
dynamics of fransparency. Like accountability, fransparency is thought to be
the holy grail of reform.’ More information can clean up campaign financing,
make consumers safer, and protect homebuyers from unscmpulous lenders.’*”
Why this in fact does not occur, as the last example clearly illusfrates, is that
152. Melvin Dubnick, Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the
Mechanisms, 28 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 376, 376-77 (2005).
153. Id at 376.
154. Id.
155. Id at in.
156. Id
157. Id
158. Dubnick, 5«/7ra note 152, at 391-92, 397.
159. W. at 391-92.
160. W. at 380, 389-90.
161. See generally Gilsinan, supra note 147, at 374-75; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 398;
MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, supra note 140, at 32.
. 162. See generally Gilsinan, supra note 147, at 375-77; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 383-86.
163. Rosenthal, supra note 149; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 376-77, 385.
164. Luna, supra note 7, at 1164-65.
IOS SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII:93
transparency is thought to be achieved through the mechanism of disclosure.’^’
But disclosure is often in the form of data and information, thus lacking the
context necessary to be able to reasonably act on it.’** Anybody who has
bought a house understands that all of the disclosures produced on forms that
the home buyer is required to sign is data that no one has time to read. It fails
to even rise to the level of information. Similarly, detailed labels and
pamphlets accompanying many Pharmaceuticals give a great deal of
information on potentially harmful side effects and negative dmg interactions,
but, again, the detailed disclosure is often overwhelming, so it is left unread.
Hence, the irony—the higher the level of disclosure—the potentially lower
level of transparency.
As Elisabeth Rosenthal notes in her New York Times opinion piece, we
now live in a culture of disclosure where disclostire becomes an end in itself
rather than a means to an end.’*^ The result is less transparency as data dumps
become ways of obfuscating rather than enlightening.’
VI. CONCLUSION
The above analysis suggests at least three lessons conceming the quest for
greater transparency and accountability. Lesson one is there is no such thing as
immaculate perception, despite the allure of numbers suggesting otherwise.’*’
Numbers are always the end result of a process that requires a series of
judgments. These judgments are filtered through organizational, cultural, and
institutional environments which determine what gets counted and how.
Second, all attempts at transparency and accountability are mediated
through social performance mechanisms which alter the direct link between
data, information, and the technical process of applying the intelligence in
ways that achieve the desired ends.’^” In the case of accountability, the
dynamics of account giving results in performative acts that may have little to
do with propelling organizational change—instead what is propelled is the
agenda of the account giver.'” The objective ofthat agenda is often to show
“good” numbers to etihance or protect one’s standing in the organization.’^^
165. Rosenthal, .yupra note 149.
166. JANICE GROSS STEIN, THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 153-54(2001).
167. Rosenthal, .yi/pra note 149.
168. Id
169. See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text; STEIN, supra note 166, at 174-75;
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1491, 1503 (2005).
170. See supra notes 152, 158-159 and accompanying text.
171. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 228; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 396; STONE,
supra note 22, at 186-187.
172. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text; Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at
227.
2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 109
This has certainly been thé case with the implementation of COMPSTAT.’^”
Similarly, in the case of transparency, the mechanism of disclosure creates a
dynamic where disclosure becomes an end in itself.”” Thus, in many instances
data is provided, but not information or knowledge that can be acted on. Data
dumps then become a way of avoiding transparency.’̂ ^
Finally, like brains, organizations appear to have two systems of
processing information. The dominant system depends on standard operating
procedures for assessing information and problem-solving.”^ The key
mechanism of this system appears to be the use of analogy, i.e. how is this new
situation like one we have encountered before and what did we do then.’̂ ^ This
satisficing approach is efficient, but not geared to either critical analysis or
ñindamental organizational change.’^’ The critical thinking system of an
organization is seldom activated before the fact.’̂ ” Only when things have
gone terribly wrong does this system kick in to ask, “what happened and how
can this be avoided in the ñiture?” Interestingly, the quest for accountability
and transparency has often been a product of this kind of analysis.’ ̂
Unfortunately, as this Article has demonstrated, once systems of accountability
and transparency become part of the standard operating procedure of an
organization, they lessen their ability to enhance either accountability or
transparency.
173. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
175. Rosenthal, .supra note 149.
176. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 51.
177. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
178. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 52.
179. See supra notes 50-51, 55-56 and accompanying text.
180. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 53.
181. W. at55.
182. M at 56, 191.
183. See supra ?añ\.
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Rethinking the Compstat process to enhance problem-solving
responses: insights from a randomized field experiment
Brenda J. Bonda* and Anthony A. Bragab
aSawyer Business School, Suffolk University, Boston, MA 02108, USA; bSchool of Criminal
Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07102, USA
Compstat is an important administrative innovation in policing that provides a
much-needed mechanism for holding mid-level managers accountable for controlling
crime rates. Research evidence suggests that Compstat is more likely to generate
reactive crime control responses rather than more creative problem-solving responses.
A randomized field experiment in Lowell, Massachusetts found that ‘problem-solving
meetings’ produced more innovative responses to crime problems and generated
stronger crime control gains when compared to the Compstat process. Analysis of
qualitative data collected to monitor the implementation of the experiment revealed
that important differences in meeting dynamics were associated with observed differ-
ences and suggests promising avenues to improve Compstat processes.
Keywords: Compstat; problem-solving; police management; crime control
Introduction
Compstat has been hailed as one of the most prominent police innovations of the past
20 years (see, e.g. McDonald, 2002; Silverman, 1999). While it has many features,
Compstat can be generally viewed as a combined technical and managerial system that
embeds the technical system for the collection and distribution of police performance
data in a broader managerial system designed to focus the organization on specific
objectives, usually involving crime reduction, by holding a subset of managers account-
able for using organizational resources appropriately in pursuit of these objectives
(Moore, 2003; Moore & Braga, 2003). Since the approach was first implemented by the
New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1994 (Bratton, 1998), Compstat has been
adopted by various police organizations, where police executives attempt to improve
their performance by embracing data-based decision-making, enhanced problem-solving,
and management accountability (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis,
2003).
Despite the extensive diffusion of Compstat across police agencies in the USA and
other countries, the crime control benefits of Compstat remain unclear.1 In fact, the
extant research evidence suggests that Compstat is more likely to generate reactive
crime control responses, such as flooding a problem area with patrol officers (putting
‘cops on the dots’), rather than more creative problem-solving responses designed to
address the conditions that cause crime problems to recur (Dabney, 2010; Weisburd
et al., 2003). This is a concerning limitation of the Compstat process intended to harness
problem-solving decisions to data analysis results. Indeed, there is a growing body of
*Corresponding author. Email: bbond@suffolk.edu
© 2013 Taylor & Francis
Police Practice and Research, 2015
Vol. 16, No. 1, 22–35, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.832250
mailto:bbond@suffolk.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.832250
rigorous research evidence that suggests problem-oriented policing programs generate
stronger crime control gains when compared to traditional police crime control strategies
(Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010). To some observers, the control element of this
reform, most clearly manifested in Compstat meeting dynamics, reinforces the bureau-
cratic paramilitary model of traditional police departments; this, in turn, leads to less
creative responses to crime problems (Weisburd et al., 2003).
In this paper, we reflect upon the outcomes of a randomized field experiment in
Lowell, Massachusetts that found ‘problem-solving meetings’ designed to ensure
adequate treatment dosage in treatment crime hot spots resulted in far more problem-
solving responses and greater crime control gains when compared to the crime-reduction
responses implemented at control hot spots naturally generated by a citywide Compstat
process (Braga & Bond, 2008). Using qualitative data collection and analysis methods,
we compare meeting dynamics to understand why the problem-solving meetings yielded
more innovative and effective crime-reduction interventions relative to Compstat
meetings. The results of our analyses suggest that the inputs and processes of the prob-
lem-solving meetings accounted for the observed differences in strategies and outcomes.
By integrating these dynamics into Compstat meetings, these managerial systems could
be used to good effect in moving police departments towards more robust community
problem-solving activities.
Compstat and problem-solving
Herman Goldstein (1979) argued that the crime control failures of the standard model of
policing could be explained by the fact that police departments were poorly organized
to do something about crime. Compstat sought to overcome this organizational problem
by empowering the command structure to do something about crime problems (Bratton,
1998; Weisburd et al., 2003). As originated by the NYPD, Compstat operates as a stra-
tegic control system implemented to collect and disseminate information on crime prob-
lems and track responses used to control them (McDonald, 2002; Silverman, 1999).
These elements are most visibly displayed in Compstat meetings during which precinct
commanders appear before the department’s top brass to report on crime problems in
their precincts and what they are doing about them (Bratton, 1998; Silverman, 1999;
Weisburd, Mastrofski, Willis, & Greenspan, 2006).
A recent Police Foundation study of the implementation of Compstat by US police
departments defined Compstat as a ‘strategic problem-solving’ model that seeks to focus
police organizations on specific crime problems and to empower police organizations to
identify and solve those problems (Weisburd et al., 2003). When compared to common
conceptions of problem-oriented policing programs that tend to focus on line-level prac-
tice (Eck & Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990), Compstat focuses on the ways in which
police agencies can be organized as problem-solving institutions rather than on the spe-
cific problem-solving strategies that police use to address crime problems (Weisburd
et al., 2006). The Police Foundation identified six key elements of Compstat that form a
comprehensive approach for mobilizing police agencies to identify, analyze, and solve
public safety problems: mission clarification; internal accountability; geographic organi-
zation of command; organizational flexibility; data-driven problem identification and
assessment; and innovative problem-solving (Weisburd et al., 2003).
In practice, however, these core elements do not seem to translate into enhanced
problem-solving responses in Compstat agencies. A Police Foundation survey found that
Compstat police agencies were not any more likely to implement innovative
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 23
problem-solving responses than non-Compstat police agencies (Weisburd et al., 2003).
The on-site observations documented a preponderance of traditional responses, such as
saturation patrol and increasing arrests in problem areas. The Police Foundation research
team also conducted deeper ethnographic assessments of three ‘model’ police depart-
ments – including the Lowell Police Department (LPD) – that closely followed the
NYPD Compstat model (Willis, Mastrofski, Weisburd, & Greenspan, 2004). Compstat
police agencies tended to place the greatest emphasis on mission clarification and inter-
nal accountability elements. Unfortunately, the reinforcement of the traditional hierarchi-
cal command structure interfered with the decision-making authority of mid-level
managers and diminished creative problem-solving efforts.
The LPD and Compstat
Lowell, Massachusetts is a small city of some 105,000 residents located about 30 miles
northeast of Boston and has a geographic expanse of 14.5 square miles. After his
appointment in 1995, Superintendent Edward F. Davis adopted Compstat as a central
component of his departmental reforms and closely followed the model developed by
the NYPD; as such, this makes Lowell an ideal research site as the LPD engaged a
model that was widely replicated in police agencies across the USA and many other
nations. As described by Willis et al. (2004), the LPD’s Compstat goals included, ‘elicit-
ing collective input on crime patterns and problem-solving strategies, encouraging infor-
mation sharing on crime locations, victims, and suspects, and facilitating the
deployment of department resources’ (p. 474). LPD Compstat meetings were held on a
bi-weekly basis, led by Superintendent Davis or one of the two Deputy Superintendents,
and typically included 25–30 attendees.2 The captains who led the LPD’s three policing
sectors were the focal point of the Compstat meetings and other mid-level managers
would also be queried as crime problems intersected with their locus of responsibility.
Citywide and sector-level crime trends and hot spot maps were closely reviewed; the
presentation of the data was accompanied by questioning by Davis and the Deputy
Superintendents on the nature of concerning crime trends and concentrations and the
captains’ strategies to address recurring crime problems.
Willis et al. (2004) found that the LPD’s Compstat fostered a clear sense of mission
and accountability relative to crime control. However, they also reported that the process
did not realign decision-making toward street supervisors, nor did it provide sector cap-
tains with greater flexibility in using organizational resources. Although the use of crime
data and analyses for problem and hot spot identification were a centerpiece of the
Compstat process, the captains rarely referenced data beyond personal perceptions and
police reports to understand the conditions that cultivate crime patterns and hot spots.
Further, the Willis et al. (2004) study revealed that captains habitually relied on tradi-
tional crime control tactics rather than engage in more creative and innovative strategies
to deal with crime hot spots. While the LPD’s Compstat was established, in part, to
encourage information sharing and innovative problem-solving, Willis et al. (2004) sug-
gested that Lowell fell short of achieving these goals because the meeting reinforced tra-
ditional, hierarchical command and control constitutions that impeded the reforms and
innovation that they had hoped to achieve.
The current study
This research analyzes process data collected during the implementation of a
randomized controlled trial to test the impact of problem-oriented policing on crime and
24 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga
disorder hot spots in Lowell (Braga & Bond, 2008). Using computerized mapping tech-
nology, 34 crime and disorder hot spots were identified and subsequently matched into
17 like pairs; one member of each pair was randomly allocated to treatment and control
conditions. The intervention period lasted for one year (1 September 2005 through 31
August 2006). Superintendent Davis assigned ultimate responsibility for the implementa-
tion of the problem-oriented policing intervention at the treatment places to the captains
that managed the LPD three policing sectors. The problem-oriented policing intervention
was managed through monthly ‘problem-solving meetings’ designed to ensure adequate
treatment dosage in treatment crime hot spots. The control hot spot areas experienced
the routine amount and kinds of police strategies that such areas in Lowell would expe-
rience without focused intervention – arbitrary patrol interventions, routine follow-up
investigations by detectives, and ad hoc community problem-solving attention.
Policing actions at the control hot spots were managed through the LPD’s bi-weekly
Compstat meetings. These meetings were attended by the research team to document
possible contamination issues – whether the control hot spots were receiving concen-
trated police actions that were similar to the interventions implemented at the treatment
hot spots. While control hot spots were not acknowledged as such, these locations were
routine subjects of Compstat meetings as persistent problem places that required ongo-
ing police attention. When control hot spots were addressed, the research team took
careful notes on the discussion that followed. It is worth noting here that treatment hot
spots would occasionally be mentioned during the Compstat process.
Analytical framework and data collection
The randomized controlled trial design facilitated a structured comparison between the
problem-solving meetings that guided the implementation of the problem-oriented polic-
ing intervention at the treatment hot spots and the Compstat meetings that governed
problem-solving attention in the comparison hot spots. Qualitative data collected to
monitor treatment and control conditions were analyzed to understand the key character-
istics and dynamics of the two sets of management accountability meetings. The analyti-
cal framework draws on group/team3 effectiveness research to examine whether meeting
characteristics and dynamics had an influence on the observed differences. The
Inputs-Process-Outcome (IPO) framework is applied to the LPD meetings to explore the
connection among the inputs into group work, group process behaviors to develop
strategies and tactics to address crime and disorder, and their impact on working group
outcomes (Campion, Medsker & Higgs, 1993; Gladstein, 1984). The application of the
IPO framework to this research is appropriate for two reasons. First, since the LPD was
the site for both sets of meetings, organizational factors were constant. Variations in
organizational culture, hierarchy, policies, and procedures can have strong impacts on
group dynamics. Second, the Compstat and the treatment problem-solving meetings had
very similar crime-reduction and accountability objectives.
Qualitative data were collected using two basic techniques: (1) overt participant
observation; and (2) intensive interviewing of LPD commanders, managers, and officers.
As described by Lofland and Lofland (1984), participant observation is the process in
which a researcher gains a close and intimate familiarity with a given group of individu-
als and their practices through an intensive involvement with people in their natural
environment, usually over an extended period of time. In this study, the LPD was
overtly observed by the research team in two sets of crime control meetings and field
settings as researchers monitoring the implementation of an experiment. Intensive
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 25
interviewing, also described by Lofland and Lofland (1984) as ‘unstructured
interviewing,’ involves recurring guided conversations to discover the subject’s experi-
ence of a particular topic or situation.
Over the course of the experiment, N = 14 monthly problem-solving meetings and
N = 22 bi-monthly Compstat meetings were observed.4 In both meetings, the number of
participants and their level and nature of participation, patterns of participation, partici-
pant roles within the agency, and the content of conversations involving strategies to
address hot spot locations were carefully documented. The research team also
interviewed key LPD staff at scheduled meetings and through informal conversations.5
Qualitative data on the genesis and implementation of crime control strategies were also
collected during N = 52 weekly ride-alongs to monitor progress at treatment hot spots
and N = 12 monthly researcher site observations to document actions taken at control
hot spots.6 We sought to improve reliability of the qualitative data by cross-checking
and probing study participants’ responses to the interview questions. Interview and
meeting observation data were recorded in the form of handwritten notes, transcribed,
and analyzed by the authors.
In the analysis, we selected statements that illustrated themes consistently found
throughout the data. The quotes used were not atypical, with the exception of a few
issues that we indicate a small number of respondents mentioned. We were also careful
throughout the data analysis to ensure that the emerging themes correctly reflected
respondents’ descriptions. Thus, the research team utilized grounded theory methods to
identify recurrent topics in addition to less common but salient issues (Strauss, 1987).
Results
Meeting inputs
While the problem-solving meetings were based on the LPD’s Compstat process, there
were some obvious differences. The problem-solving meetings were held on a monthly
rather than bi-weekly basis. Compstat centered on the identification of crime patterns and
hot spots across the city and within sectors, while problem-solving meetings focused on
17 persistent crime and disorder hot spots. The problem-solving meetings were also
smaller, with a mean of 13 participants that included Davis, then-Deputy Superintendent
Kenneth Lavallee, the three sector captains and selected officers from their commands,
the Community Liaison, the Director of Research and Development, and a civilian ana-
lyst from the Crime Analysis Unit. Compstat meetings averaged 27 participants; the addi-
tional meeting members included other members of the LPD command staff and external
agency representatives (such as probation officers, prosecutors, and others).
It is also important to note here that the Compstat meetings were held in a large
room with the LPD command staff seated around a U-shaped table facing a screen with
projected computerized crime statistics for presentation purposes. Lowering ranking offi-
cers, civilian staff, and members of outside agencies were seated around the table.
Superintendent Davis or one of the Deputy Superintendents led the meeting as a formal
question-and-answer session for particular sector captains with occasional input from
other high-ranking LPD officers on specific issues. In contrast, the problem-solving
meetings were held in a smaller room with all participants (regardless of rank, civilian/
sworn status, or external observer status) sat around a single rectangular table. While
Superintendent Davis or Deputy Superintendent Lavallee led the meetings, the format
was much less formal and there was an expectation that everyone around the table
needed to participate in the discussion.
26 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga
At each problem-solving meeting, the crime analyst presented simple trend analyses
of citizen calls for service and crime incidents in each of the treatment hot spots to
determine whether crime and disorder problems were being positively impacted. If the
data revealed that calls for service were decreasing, Superintendent Davis praised the
captains and their officers and asked them to explain why they believed their actions
were producing the desired effects, and what else could be done to keep calls for ser-
vice decreasing. If the analysis revealed that the number of citizen calls for service had
remained the same or increased, Superintendent Davis peppered the captains with ques-
tions about their plans for dealing with recurring problems in the hot spot areas. The
problem-solving meetings also served as a venue for the command staff, captains, offi-
cers, and other LPD staff to explore and share ideas on plausibly effective prevention
strategies for persistent problems in the treatment places.
While the performance measurement accountability principles were borrowed from
Compstat, the activities at the problem-solving meetings represented an ongoing scan-
ning, analysis, response, and assessment process (see Eck & Spelman, 1987). The routine
measurement and review of strategies in the treatment places served as an important
mechanism to ensure that there was a strong treatment dosage for the experiment. The
problem-solving meetings were designed to ensure that the captains and their officers
were implementing the problem-oriented policing program and adhering to the require-
ments of the experimental research design. These meetings were explicitly focused on
implementing the approach by addressing local community concerns as measured by
trends in citizen calls for service in the treatment hot spot areas, holding police managers
accountable for dealing with identified problems, and serving as a venue to enhance the
creativity of implemented responses through open discussion and idea sharing.
Research on group work suggests that inputs such as group size, group composition,
and task design influence the outcomes of working groups (Campion et al., 1993;
Stewart, 2006). Our analysis documented that the Compstat meetings were larger and
group composition was slightly more varied than the problem-solving meetings. Our
analyses of the qualitative data also suggested neither group size nor composition seem
to exert noteworthy independent effects on the meetings. The smaller size of the
problem-solving meetings may have made it easier to conduct intimate conversations of
particular problems. However, as will be discussed further below, the meeting processes
were much more influential in explaining variations in outcomes between the Compstat
and problem-solving meetings.
Task design represents what the group is attempting to accomplish (Hackman &
Oldham, 1980). In the Compstat meetings, Superintendent Davis tended to guide con-
versations towards clusters of crime incidents within a particular sector, specifically
including the 17 comparison hot spots. In this way, the task designs of the two meetings
were broadly similar as both meetings were intended to produce the same outcomes –
increased problem-solving responses and reduced crime at specific problem places.
However, the geography of targeted crime problems were clearly more variable in the
Compstat meetings as discussions, at times, ranged from specific addresses to neighbor-
hoods. Another important difference was the explicit identification of specific problems
within each targeted treatment hot spot in the problem-solving meetings. On average,
the sector captains identified four problems per treatment hot spot that seemed to
generate recurring crimes. These problems became a ‘caseload’ of work: underlying
conditions associated with these problems were dissected, appropriate responses were
discussed, and response performance was measured repeatedly over the course of the
experiment.
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 27
Meeting process
Meeting process elements include a variety of group dynamics, including communica-
tion and cooperation behaviors, constructive feedback systems, collaborative planning
practices, the level of interdependence and trust among participants, and the functional
diversity and roles participants represent in the organization and group (Williams &
Allen, 2008). Analysis of our qualitative data from the Compstat and problem-solving
meetings suggested that the two working groups had the greatest differences in three
key areas: communication and information sharing, collaborative planning, and the
appreciation of the roles and skill sets of a broader range of group members in
achieving group goals.
Communication and information sharing
Communication and information sharing are recognized as influencing group
effectiveness (Woolley, Gerbasi, Chabris, Kosslyn, & Hackman, 2008). Woolley et al.
(2008) asserts that it is more than just information sharing that matters, but rather the
revealing, organizing, and pooling of information that matters most to outcomes. The
LPD Compstat meetings almost always involved one-to-one communication between
the lead executive officer and the sector captains in a mechanical and, often, superficial
manner. Similar to the observations made by Willis et al. (2004), communication
exchanges were usually perfunctory, involving quick reviews of identified problems and
brief reports on responses by the sector captains. While we did not observe any
instances where sector captains were publicly humiliated, the communications by the
lead executive officer were highly authoritarian in nature and occasionally dismissive
when the sector captains provided answers that were believed to be uninformed or
incorrect.
Unless the Superintendent prompted another meeting member to contribute, the
captain of the reporting sector was the only person discussing problems at these varying
high-crime places. Moreover, these discussions often did not lead to conversations on
appropriate problem-solving responses that were linked to underlying conditions and
dynamics. Over the course of the study, we documented N = 170 distinct discussions of
spatial crime problems at Compstat meetings. Only 25.8% (N = 44) of these discussions
were followed by a problem-oriented conversation about the varied ways LPD officers
could impact these persistent spatial crime problems. Unfortunately, the resulting
responses usually included a preponderance of traditional enforcement actions.
Many instances were noted where deficient problem-solving was driven by a lack of
engagement of low-ranking officers and civilian staff. For instance, in Compstat meeting
1, the Superintendent asked the North Sector captain to report on his plans for address-
ing community concerns over an assault hot spot in the downtown area. The captain
responded by simply stating that he was ‘redeploying officers to address community
concerns and complaints.’ The community liaison was not asked to report on commu-
nity concerns and substance of the LPD’s response to the problem. In fact, across the
observed Compstat Meetings, this important LPD staff member was rarely asked to
comment on any police-community communication issues.
In Compstat meeting 19, the Superintendent requested the East Sector captain to
explain some concerning increases in sector-wide property and violent crime trends by
reflecting on the content of the underlying crime incident reports. The captain responded
by stating, ‘Chief, I don’t know how these statistics are generated, and I’m not sure I
28 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga
ever will.’ The crime analyst who was managing the presentation of crime statistics for
the Compstat meetings was not asked to provide any insights on the underlying crime
incident reports. Rather than engage in what could have been a valuable conversation
about the data, the conversation moved to the next topic. After each of these Compstat
meetings, we asked the community liaison and crime analyst why they did not offer any
insights. Both expressed concerns that it would be detrimental to their careers if they
offered information that contradicted their superiors. This parallels previous research
findings that most Compstat participants do not contribute information to avoid the
perception of questioning authority (Weisburd et al., 2006; Willis et al., 2004).
Problem-solving meetings fostered a more participatory and democratic problem-
solving approach, without minimizing the accountability of captains. The communica-
tion tone of the lead executive officer was less formal, more engaging, and inclusive.
Captains were encouraged to discuss crime problems and their problem-solving ideas,
without a fear of being embarrassed if an idea was incomplete or failed. All meeting
members were expected to contribute and share information. In problem-solving meet-
ing 5, the crime analyst began the conversation on treatment hot spots in the West Sec-
tor by observing, ‘Three hot spot areas seem to be driving the numbers, so maybe we
should focus on those areas.’ The West Sector captain and two patrol officers then fol-
lowed this observation by identifying the underlying problems that might be driving the
increases and the entire group contributed to the search for potential responses. In prob-
lem-solving meeting 5, Superintendent Davis suggested, ‘Let’s look at the hot spots
with crime reductions so we can try to understand why other hot spots are not showing
the same decreases.’ Instead of offering the same perfunctory replies used in Compstat
meetings, the sector captains engaged in a thoughtful discourse on the observed differ-
ences. Other participants, such as the community liaison, enriched the discussion by
contributing information based on what they knew from their work in the hot spots.
Problem-solving meeting members were encouraged to participate with the intent of
offering feedback in order to improve upon, rather than simply criticize, ideas. In orga-
nizational research, this is known as ‘voice behavior’ (LePine & Dyne, 1998 and this
manner of risk-taking communication has been found to influence group outcomes posi-
tively (Edmondson, 1999). For instance, in problem-solving meeting 3, Deputy Superin-
tendent Lavallee asked participating officers if their strategies at their various treatment
hot spots included serving warrants. The East Sector lieutenant responded by stating
‘we are focusing on car break problems in this hot spot because that is our biggest
problem, and while warrant checks are important, they are not of greatest concern to the
police or the community at the moment.’ Deputy Lavallee accepted this explanation
without questioning the lieutenant’s judgment, suggesting a dynamic in support of open
and honest communication without fear of reprimand. Risk-taking communication was
rarely observed at Compstat Meetings. Captains typically responded to strategy
suggestions with assent (see also Willis et al., 2004).
Collaborative planning
Given the limited communication among participants, very little collaborative planning
was observed in the Compstat meetings (an observation also made by Willis et al.,
2004). Collaborative planning reinforces ‘shared mental models’ – an idea which sug-
gests that when a group of individuals have similar understandings about their work,
when they use these understandings to coordinate work, and when they focus on solving
the task at hand, there may be positive effects on communication and coordination in
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 29
pursuit of group goals (Mohammed & Dumville, 2001). For instance, during a discus-
sion of increasing citywide assault incidents in Compstat meeting 18, the Investigations
Division captain suggested that an upward trend in domestic assaults might account for
some important portion of the trend. Unfortunately, this captain neither made subsequent
plans to work with crime analysis to investigate the domestic violence claim nor engage
the lieutenant in charge of Family Services (i.e. domestic violence unit) about develop-
ing plans to address any observable increases in domestic assaults. In fact, out of the
N = 170 distinct discussions of geographic crime problems, we observed only 10.6%
involved some form of collaborative planning.
In contrast, collaborative planning was observed as routine work among the
participants in the problem-solving meetings. For instance, during problem-solving meet-
ing 7, a dilapidated home was noted to be recently damaged by fire in one of the West
Sector treatment hot spots. The concern was that the building was unsafe, and may attract
crime and disorder problems. In response, the West Sector captain and community liaison
contacted the Department of Public Works to secure the building and then organized a
neighborhood walk that included police, fire department, and inspectional and neighbor-
hood services staff. When they were not engaged in active planning at the problem-solv-
ing meetings, sector captains and other meeting participants routinely discussed their
collaborative efforts with external partners when addressing identified crime and disorder
problems. For example, in problem-solving meeting 2, when discussing two adjacent
vacant and unkempt lots that accounted for multiple disorder problems, the East Sector
lieutenant specifically noted that he worked with the Department of Public Works to clear
the public vacant lot, a local bank to identify the owner of the private vacant lot, and the
fire department to address alleyway obstruction code violations (i.e. large debris and piles
of trash that blocked police access to the alley).
Appreciation of the roles and skill sets from a broader range of group members
‘Transactive memory’ reflects the awareness among working group members of each
other’s knowledge and skills that are organized and coordinated to achieve a task
(Austin, 2003). Scholars suggest that when expertise is understood and respected, and
when there is an understanding of contributions to an end product, goal attainment is
more likely (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, & Snoek, 1964). Failure to recognize the expertise
and role of others, combined with passive involvement in working group settings, influ-
ences how participants behave and how others perceive their role. These are reciprocally
reinforcing concepts in that how the role is perceived contributes to how the role mani-
fests itself, which in turn contributes to how the role is perceived (Kahn et al., 1964).
While mostly the same people participated in both set of meetings, the working group
assembled in the problem-solving meetings showed a distinctly different transactive
memory pattern in achieving work tasks.
In problem-solving meetings, sector captains consistently engaged the crime ana-
lysts, community liaison, and low-ranking officers under their command to understand
the underlying conditions that caused persistent crime and disorder problems in the
treatment hot spots and to shape the responses to control these criminogenic situations
and dynamics. The conversations were far richer than the usual hierarchical communica-
tion patterns. In essence, the high-ranking officers seem to have a much better
appreciation for the so-called ‘democracy of talents’ (Billups, 1987) in the room.
Problem-solving meetings facilitated the use of participants’ knowledge and skills, and
fostered a sense of interdependence for addressing hot spot challenges. Good
30 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga
contributions to the discussion of problems and the development of appropriate
responses were value no matter who made the suggestions. In turn, the productivity of
these interactions spurred additional information sharing and collaborations among the
participants.
Unlike Compstat meetings, sector sergeants and patrol officers often participated in
problem-solving meetings to offer an assessment of what was going on in a given hot
spot. Their participation was reflective of their familiarity to the problems occurring on
the street. These low-ranking officers relished the opportunity to be influential in devel-
oping crime control plans. For instance, during problem-solving meeting 14, a North
Sector officer initiated a discussion on the relationship between parking and disorderly
behavior in his hot spots area. He came to the meeting with a methodical analysis of
calls for service and incident data, as well as aerial photos and street boundary data
from city engineers. His analysis suggested that an effective response would require a
change in parking regulations, as well as intense engagement with landlords to facilitate
new parking practices. During problem-solving meeting 3, the North Sector Captain
expressed concern over increased calls for service in a treatment hot spot that included
housing for the local University. To better understand the problem, he turned to the
crime analyst and asked, ‘I’d like to conduct a more in-depth review so I can better
understand what is happening. Can I get more data maybe even by time and day of
week so I can get a broader sense of the situation up there and create a more targeted
strategy?’ Rather than quickly respond with data output, the analyst offered to meet with
the Captain and his staff to discuss how additional data (beyond LPD calls for service
and incident reports), might better inform the strategy.
Recognition of member knowledge and skills in the Compstat meetings was rare.
Indeed, in only 21 (12.3%) of the 170 problem place discussions did we observe a low-
ranking or civilian staff member contribute to the Captain’s report. Compstat partici-
pants rarely spoke up or offered support, possibly adhering to a hierarchical culture by
deferring communications to those of higher authority (Willis et al., 2004). While not
an explicit element of the Compstat meetings, the sessions seemed to be oriented
towards the exclusion of low-ranking sworn officers and civilians who held valuable
knowledge and expertise. It often seemed that high-ranking sworn officers were viewed
as having ‘the answers’ regarding the problems of places and desirable ways to deal
with them. Indeed, the ‘one-on-one’ conversations between the Superintendent and the
sector captains did not recognizing the knowledge and expertise of others in the room
that were closer to the problems being discussed.
Meeting outcomes
A growing body of IPO research reveals that the group work processes powerfully
influence outcomes (Williams & Allen, 2008). This analysis of qualitative process data
collected to monitor a randomized field experiment supports this perspective on the rele-
vance of group dynamics to producing desired outcomes. When compared to the actions
taken in the control hot spots via Compstat, the randomized field experiment revealed
that the treatment coordinated through the problem-solving meetings generated 6.8 times
as many situational prevention measures (75 responses v. 11 responses), 2.4 times as
many social service prevention strategies (17 responses v. 7 responses), and 29% more
misdemeanor arrests to control disorderly behavior (789 arrests v. 611 arrests) (Braga &
Bond, 2008). Moreover, the enhanced responses generated by the problem-solving
meetings also produced superior crime control gains when compared to the strategies
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 31
driven by the Compstat system. The randomized field experiment reported that the
problem-solving treatment generated a 20% reduction in citizen calls for service in
treatment hot spots relative to control hot spots without displacing crime problems into
surrounding areas (Braga & Bond, 2008).
These results were somewhat surprising to the LPD command staff as the Compstat
and problem-solving meetings shared the same personnel and included many of the
same elements: identification of crime and disorder hot spots through computerized
mapping and data analysis, the encouraged use of problem-solving as a means to control
identified hot spots, review by commanding officers of plans to alleviate problems at
hot spots, and publicly holding sector captains accountable for the performance of
implemented strategies. Despite these broad similarities, the experiment found that the
problem-solving meetings generated increased outputs (more problem-solving strategies)
that led to improved outcomes (reduced calls for service). It seemed that the inputs and
processes of the problem-solving meetings had overcome some of the limitations of the
Compstat meetings identified by Willis et al. (2004) that resulted in more traditional
responses to identified crime problems.
Conclusion
Compstat is an important administrative innovation in policing that provides a
much-needed mechanism for holding mid-level managers accountable for controlling
crime rates. Compstat principles have also been applied to improve manager account-
ability in other police work matters such as overtime budgets, detective functions, and
personnel issues. While the system has many desirable properties, Compstat, as cur-
rently practiced in many police departments, may not be optimally designed to produce
desired crime-reduction effects. When compared to non-Compstat police departments,
police departments that use Compstat have been found to be more likely to implement
traditional crime control strategies rather than community problem-solving strategies to
address crime problems (Weisburd et al., 2003). Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel (2010)
suggested a new form of Compstat that supports collective problem-solving, maintains
accountability, and more fully embraces community policing. They observed that this
may require diminishing the formality of the chain of command in crime control meet-
ings to support more collaborative problem-solving by a wider range of meeting partici-
pants.
It is important to note here that the
meetings
compared in this study had somewhat different purposes. As suggested by others (e.g.
Willis et al. 2004), the LPD Compstat was not only engaged as a crime-reduction strat-
egy, but also as a kind of theatrical display designed to demonstrate to both internal and
external audiences to the police organization that management is in charge and holding
subordinates accountable. In general, Compstat is well suited to making top manage-
ment appear as if it can make the organization responsive, and it appears to do so for
those who routinely appear before it (e.g. sector captains). However, the approach does
not appear to have much effect further down the organization where the actual work of
police is done. On the other hand, the LPD problem-solving meetings focused less on
maintaining a formal set of processes (e.g. the brass asks questions and the subordinates
answer) and more on maintaining a supportive environment where innovative strategies
were designed with the explicit intent of generating actual crime reductions. The process
was not the event; the outcome was. In Compstat, the key players seemed to play
their assigned parts, with a very predictable and more constrained outcome. In the
32 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga
problem-solving meetings, there was a greater chance for creativity to blossom and for
officers to help each other.
This study advances the observations of Willis et al. (2010) and others by
demonstrating that changes to crime control meeting processes can indeed produce more
desirable outputs and outcomes. Despite similarities in meeting facilitators and
participants, the stifling dynamics of the traditional police hierarchy were absent from
the problem-solving meetings. This allowed for more discourse and information sharing
by all attendees. A more democratic, inclusive approach to meeting participation was
critically important. Regardless of their status in the organization, all participants were
engaged in the discussion with the intent of organizing and crafting creative and
effective solutions to crime problems. As a result, more diverse perspectives and ideas
were brought into discussions. These perspectives challenged and broadened the groups’
understanding of crime and disorder problems, and supported the creative and
innovative problem-solving objective of the meeting.
The practice of problem-oriented policing is essentially about insight, imagination,
and creativity (Goldstein, 1990). These important ingredients to the problem-solving
process seem to be minimized in Compstat meeting settings where only a small number
of high-ranking officers who are distant from the day-to-day street work in communities
are the primary participants. The meetings miss out on the experiential knowledge assets
of low-ranking officers and civilian staff. This undermines the productivity of the meet-
ings. Our research suggests that crime control meetings, such as Compstat, can be orga-
nized to maximize the ability of police departments to implement creative problem-
oriented responses to recurring crime and disorder problems. Drawing on the Lowell
experience, other police departments should design their meeting processes to enhance
communication and information sharing among participants, facilitate collaborative plan-
ning in the design of problem-solving strategies, and appreciate the roles and skill sets
of a broader range of group members in achieving group goals. Indeed, further research
on these more collaborative Compstat meeting dynamics would generate valuable
knowledge to guide future iterations of these important management accountability
meetings.
This research was supported under Award 2004-DB-BX-0014 from the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice through the Programs Division
of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security. The authors thank former
Superintendent Edward F. Davis, Superintendent Kenneth Lavallee, and other officers, and staff
from the Lowell Police Department for their valuable assistance in the completion of this research.
The journal editor and anonymous reviewers also provided helpful comments that improved upon
earlier drafts. The points of view in this article represent are those of the authors and do not nec-
essarily represent the official position of the US Department of Justice, Massachusetts Executive
Office of Public Safety and Security, or Lowell Police Department.
1. For instance, both Eck and Maguire (2000) and Rosenfeld et al. (2005) found little evidence
that Compstat was associated with noteworthy reductions in homicide in New York City.
However, Mazerolle et al. (2007) and Jang et al. (2010) found that the implementation of
Compstat was associated with reductions in property crimes.
2. These attendees included Sector Captains and their selected Lieutenants and Sergeants; other
Bureau and Unit Captains and Lieutenants (such as Investigations, Housing Authority, Family
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 33
Services and Traffic Bureau), members of the Crime Analysis and Intelligence Unit, a civilian
Community Liaison, and civilian managers who led the Communications Division and
Research and Development. Other Lowell City Department Heads (e.g. Inspectional Services,
Neighborhood Services) and the Lowell District Court Probation Chief were regular partici-
pants as well.
3. This collection of work utilizes the term group and team interchangeably (Williams & Allen,
2008).
4. Monthly problem-solving meeting continued for two months after the 12-month-intervention
period ended. Unfortunately, the research team was not able to observe two Compstat
meetings during the 12–month-intervention period due to scheduling conflicts.
5. The research team conducted recurring unstructured interviews with the Superintendent, the
Deputy Superintendent in Charge of Operations, the three sector Captains and three
Lieutenants from those sectors, the Lieutenant in charge of the Crime Analysis Unit, the
Sergeant who commanded the Vice and Narcotics Unit, the Sergeant who served as the liai-
son to the Lowell Housing Authority, a civilian crime analyst assigned to the experiment, and
the civilian Community Liaison specialist.
6. Weekly ride-alongs were conducted with the lieutenants, sergeants, and patrol officers
responsible for implementing the treatment strategies in the three policing sectors. Researchers
conducted monthly visits to the control sites to monitor these locations.
Brenda J. Bond is an associate professor in the Institute for Public Service at the Sawyer Business
School, Suffolk University. Her main research interests are administrative tools in policing such as
Compstat, Crime Analysis, and Police Research and Development practices, the challenges of
implementing evidence-based policing, and inter-organizational public safety strategies.
Anthony A. Braga is the Don M. Gottfredson professor of Evidence-Based Criminology in the
School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University and a senior research fellow in the Program in
Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University. He is currently the president and
an elected Fellow of the Academy of Experimental Criminology.
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Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 35
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- Abstract
- Introduction
- The LPD and Compstat
- The current study
- Analytical framework and data collection
- Results
- Conclusion
Compstat and problem-solving
Meeting inputs
Meeting process
Communication and information sharing
Collaborative planning
Appreciation of the roles and skill sets from a broader range of group members
Meeting outcomes
Acknowledgments
Notes
Notes on contributors
References
Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Science and Justice
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/scijus
Olivier Ribaux a,⁎, Benjamin Talbot Wright b
a Ecole des Sciences Criminelles, School of Forensic Science, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
b Centre for Forensic Science, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
⁎ Corresponding author at: University of Lausanne, E
Batochime, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
E-mail address: Olivier.Ribaux@unil.ch (O. Ribaux).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001
1355-0306/© 2014 Forensic Science Society. Published by
a b s t r a c t
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 29 January 2014
Received in revised form 14 April 2014
Accepted 6 May 2014
Keywords:
Forensic intelligence
Policing
Crime analysis
Research and Development (‘R&D’) in forensic science currently focuses on innovative technologies improving
the efficiency of existing forensic processes, from the detection of marks and traces at the scene, to their presen-
tation in Court. R&D approached from this perspective provides no response to doubts raised by recent crimino-
logical studies, which question the effective contribution of forensic science to crime reduction, and to policing in
general.
Traces (i.e. forensic case data), as remnants of criminal activity are collected and used in various forms of crime
monitoring and investigation. The aforementioned doubts therefore need to be addressed by expressing how in-
formation is conveyed by traces in these processes. Modelling from this standpoint expands the scope of forensic
science and provides new R&D opportunities. Twelve propositions for R&D are stated in order to pave the way.
© 2014 Forensic Science Society. Published by
Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserv
ed.
1. Introduction
The influential report produced under the auspices of the US Nation-
al Academies of Sciences in 2009, is an almost mandatory starting point
for debating Research and Development (‘R&D’) in forensic science [39].
Its focus on the development of specialised technologies and its valida-
tion provides for what are all inarguably challenges for forensic science
laboratories which serve the Justice System [9,38,46,56].
Some commentators have however pointed to many anomalies with
the current paradigm taken for granted by the Report. At least, it is ac-
knowledged that forensic science does not limit itself to the application
of a patchwork of technologies deployed in the laboratory [21,23,30,32,
47,58]. A school of thought goes further to suggest a change of attitude
to respond to the emerging crisis epitomised by the tragic closure of
some of the more established traditional laboratories. A discipline
should be (re-)built around the study of the ‘trace’, the remnant of a
unique criminal activity that occurred in the past. The information it
conveys is not only restricted to serve the Court process but should
also support the study of many types of crime activities, following a
variety of objectives [35,36,52,53].
This paper aims at structuring this debate by stating twelve inter-
connected propositions, at different levels of generality, to be tested
by research. They should be considered as a preliminary construct
open to evolution.
cole des Sciences Criminelles,
Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserv
1.1. Is this expansion necessary?
Proposition 1. Expanding R&D in forensic science beyond its delineation
in the report is a necessity for providing a discipline with a sufficient ambi-
tion to justify its existence, ensure its own coherency and favour its sustain-
able development.
The need to consider the contribution of forensic science beyond the
laboratory is already occasionally postulated by scholars [30], but the
scientific literature on this issue remains rare [52]. There are many pos-
sibilities to specify territories to be explored [37]. They have overlapping
shapes. We propose one possible configuration that helps to pinpoint
risks and opportunities for forensic science to engage in these areas.
1.2. What should this expansion cover?
The most evident step for such an expansion consists of adopting a
global view that goes from the crime scene to the presentation of evi-
dence in Court. In this context, the traditional laboratory is situated as
one possible structure responsible for performing specialised operations.
Proposition 2. Research in forensic science covers the study of its contri-
bution along the whole chain of the justice process, from the crime scene,
to the presentation of forensic information in Court.
This elementary expansion for forensic science is not a given. There
are many inhibitors that dissuade researchers to embark on such a ven-
ture. Some commentators even deny, or strictly limit, an expanded role
for forensic science along this chain:
ed.
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001&domain=pdf
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001
mailto:Olivier.Ribaux@unil.ch
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13550306
495O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
‘Expanding the forensic scientists’ domain to the ‘activity level’
destroys the line between their expertise in their specific forensic
discipline and a more general (and dangerous) claim to general
investigative expertise ([46: 70]).
This confined view is mainly justified by the need to keep scientific
independence, mitigating contextual bias and avoiding encroachment
upon each other competencies.
Such statements are particularly stimulating for research. They
immediately lead to directly address the question of the application of
forensic science. Would it truly deserve existence, by merely bringing
small/simple pieces of evidence before the justice system (source level
involvement only)? And in doing so endangering the fairness of the
judicial process at such an increased cost?
The extremity of this confinement should be more carefully studied,
because it is not immediately apparent when adjoined with Polanyi’s
statement:
‘Even the most strictly mechanized procedure leaves something to
personal skill in the exercise of which an individual bias may enter’
([41]: 19).
And combined with Rosenthal affirmation:
‘It costs something to reduce errors, and it costs more and more to
get rid of each error as there are fewer of them left’ [49].
Reconstructing specific events that occurred in the past is subject to
many forms of uncertainty. Whatever the level of sophistication of pro-
cedures and models for making decisions, forensic failures will continue
to occur unavoidably. Each high profile case will invariably put a little
more pressure on the system with the effect of progressively confining
scientific laboratories in the landscape of the justice system.
This reduction in the scope of laboratories may open space for more
fragile information and biased forms of reasoning to prosper in crime
investigation. This could not be more evident than in the collection of
human information (interview) that is guided by forensic results, in
the complete absence of forensic advice.
An alternative response to the collapse of some independent labora-
tories is to rebuild forensic capacity within police organisations. It may
be another natural evolution of systems searching to fill gaps created.
Is this movement already a reality? Research could empirically test
this hypothesis.
The reality of this confinement is often tempered by the employ-
ment of a case manager in the laboratory. This still understudied func-
tion focuses on mitigating risks of biases produced by observer effects.
It proceeds by separating the management of the case from the evalua-
tion of observations, and by filtering contextual information about the
case through sequential unmasking procedures [56]. However, this
defensive function provides little indication on how forensic science
and crime investigation should logically be articulated to favour the
resolution of investigative problems. This needs to be studied also.
Whatever the viewpoint, forensic science cannot operate in isola-
tion. Indeed, lack of research dedicated to expressing this articulation al-
lows space for pervasive misunderstandings and tensions between
organisations and individuals to prosper. It is also true that no guarantee
can be made for forensic case data to be safely and transparently
exploited to its full potential in the variety of processes it serves.
The study of the whole chain brings into focus two of its important
components: (a) the contribution of forensic science to crime investiga-
tion and (b) crime scene investigation itself.
1.2.1. Studying how forensic science may integrate with crime investigation
The proposition to adopt a global view that starts at the scene and
ends in Court forces the study of different forms of articulation of foren-
sic science within crime investigation, and their respective conse-
quences on the whole process.
This is an area of many controversies. They occur in a judicial context
that is itself poorly formalised [25], and which is the target of many crit-
icisms. In particular, in his 1984 seminal paper, Egger [14] pinpointed
the incapacity of police systems to connect dots, leading to disastrous
failures in serial murder investigations. He denounced the fragmenta-
tion of crime investigation as it causes linkage blindness.
This is where the fragmentation of forensic science, confined in spe-
cialities and silos, certainly does not address these systemic weaknesses
coined by Egger. Research may examine how the fluidity of the treat-
ment of scientific information is inhibited by traditional organisational
settings of forensic laboratories. Thus, the following statement chal-
lenges the usual pathway designed for forensic science.
Proposition 3. Crime investigation is holistic, and forensic science is a
significant contributor to it.
In shaping police organisations during the last decade, the focus has
been on how crime analysts, investigators, forensic scientists and other
contributors differ through their speciality, while they actually partici-
pate collectively to the same process of crime investigation. Digital
traces have added new dimensions to the picture. They are used almost
systematically and are central to most of today’s investigations. A prom-
ising avenue for research would be to consider what the actors (i.e. the
various contributors to the investigations bringing their own knowl-
edge and expertise) share, and what kind of collaboration must be
stimulated to favour and regulate problem solving. Indeed, the term
investigation contains at its root vestige, which means in French the
remnant of an activity, the mark, the ‘trace’ [10]; exactly what forensic
science studies according to Margot [36]. Adopting this view allows
the definition of stable concepts and frameworks.
A research programme could thus examine, as its object, a system
composed of different kinds of investigators (e.g. police investigator,
forensic investigator, criminal intelligence analysts) trying to solve
problems through a collective approach, by bringing their specific
knowledge and skills in treating specific types of information. A lot of
empirical studies could be launched around this system, its functioning,
its adaptation to the investigation of specific cases, its transparency and
its effectiveness.
This kind of research will inevitably address the question of organising
forensic science with respect to the fragmentation of the investigative
process. Various forms of bias and their consequences have been inten-
sively discussed in forensic literature. This catalysed the debate of
marginalising the forensic scientist from the investigation. However, the
consequences of this fragmentation and de-contextualisation have been
far less considered. This opens an important consideration that is directly
related with a more holistic view of the investigation.
Proposition 4. The fragmentation of processes in systems and the distanc-
ing of scientists from other figures of the investigation might contribute to a
variety of failures, not addressed by laboratory quality management. Thus,
contextualisation and de-contextualisation must be studied in mirror,
depending on needs and expectations of the criminal justice process.
There are already many documented illustrations where such fail-
ures have occurred. One significant example is the Byford’s report on
the Yorkshire Ripper inquiry in 1981 [6]. So called ‘Byford scientists’
have since the mid 90s deployed good practices in the role of forensic
investigators, contributing concretely to the resolution of many serious
crimes [1,57].
It is their responsibility to generate a productive collaboration with
the other ‘actors’ (i.e. a contributing figure), of the investigation. Similar
models have since been developed in many laboratories. These scien-
tists have a global view on forensic case data available in the context
of a case. They provide advice on how to treat it by defining sequences
of operations, as well as evaluating and integrating results with other
parts of the investigation. Priorities are defined for optimising informa-
tion gained and, at the same time, avoiding costly and superfluous
496 O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
operations. However, the nature of the contribution of this generalist,
even if it is well admitted in the field, is very rarely debated in the scien-
tific literature [1,54,55]. Consequently, the realisation of this task
remains largely tacit and therefore needs to be formalised in order to
ensure transparency (see proposition five). We experience this same
modelling gap at the scene.
1.2.2. Studying forensic science at the crime scene
Empirical research has detected many unexplained discrepancies
when measuring performance at the crime scene. They have been recur-
rently made evident not only across jurisdictions and operational units,
but also when making comparisons within the same units [2]. Such
results are compounded by the disparity of views about the character
of crime scene examination as shown by a survey conducted in Scotland
[33]. As it turns out, a significant number of respondents, among them
forensic scientists from the laboratory and crime scene examiners
themselves, still consider it as substantially ‘mechanical’ (can be carried
out by applying a set of predefined learned procedures that allow little
space for inductive thinking).
Such unexplained disparities should raise many more questions for
research. Standard operating procedures for crime scene examination
and lab-on-a-chip technologies are on the way to implementation be-
fore intensive research is performed to understand the underlying
logic of the treatment. We risk putting the cart before the horse.
A set of studies should deserve more attention in this context. For
instance, Kelty and Julian [24] have identified seven qualities that char-
acterise high performance crime scene examiners selected by peers:
knowledge, life experience, professionalism, approach to life, cognitive
abilities, communication and stress management. These dimensions
overlap with the recurrent themes identified in the literature reviewed
by Ludwig and Fraser [32] on what factors seem to influence forensic
science effectiveness (and weaknesses) in dealing with high volume
crime.
The results are signs that crime scene examination is not mechanical
in character. It rather belongs to an imaginative type of activity. They
encourage associations of ideas, favour the use of a solid scientific back-
ground to regulate reasoning, and allow the deployment of abilities
Fig. 1. The reconstruction process. A criminal activity perturbs the physical environment (a)
developed (d). The consequences are eventually tested, refuted, discriminated and evaluated t
to intensively communicate and exchange information. Such signs indi-
cate the types of frameworks to be elaborated or how to recruit people.
But research must go far further in deciphering the underlying logic
operating at the scene and in crime investigation.
1.2.3. The study of an investigative and crime scene logic
Let us use a very simplified model in order to sketch the modelling
challenge (Fig. 1).
Forensic science deals with activities that are unique, and that gener-
ate material (or digital) exchanges, according to Locard’s principle. After
a certain time (Δt), crime scene investigators attend the scene and
collect specimens.
Crime reconstruction consists of developing hypotheses about the
activity, objects and individuals. A series of cycles aim at discriminating
and refuting hypotheses, as well as develop new hypotheses. Beliefs
change as a function of newly available information.
The active development of hypotheses about what occurred in the
specific situation is at the core of the process. Crime scene investigators
intensively apply this ‘abductive’ logic at the scene [11]. At the other
extremity of the judicial process, the Court, the expert evaluates infor-
mation from the perspective of the remaining hypotheses of the defence
and of the prosecutor. At this stage, a more deductive style of reasoning
takes place for the forensic scientist, in a stabilised cycle (probabilities of
observations knowing the proposition of the prosecutor, and respec-
tively of the defence).
There is still much to be understood beyond this very simplified
model. Taking part in the expression of an investigative logic is
suggested as a priority for forensic science.
Proposition 5. Research in forensic science needs an epistemological
component for elaborating upon the foundations of an investigative logic
exploiting information conveyed by traces (forensic case data).
This very limited overview shows that the quality of crime scene ex-
amination and forensic investigation is mainly determined by the ability
to draw relevant hypotheses from observations in the specific circum-
stances of the case, and to regulate their management. Moreover, the
potential contribution of forensic science in crime investigation is of a
. Relevant specimen is recognised, collected and measured (b). Alternative hypothesis is
hrough experiments.
497O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
broad variety, when viewed with such a clinical perspective [58]. It is
felt to be significant, but this is still not demonstrated by research.
An epistemological exploration can lead for instance to suggest links
between works such as Peirce semiotic [13], the evidential paradigm of
the historian Carlo Ginzburg [16], the method of historical science that
searches for explanations to past singular events on the basis of current-
ly observable marks [7,8], the scientific investigation of crime defined
by Kind [25], the use of probabilities in the investigation suggested by
Jackson et al. [22], and case-based reasoning when successful solutions
to previous problems are used to deal with a new similar situation [26].
Probably many other approaches can be integrated where traces are
recognised as signs providing information on what occurred in the past.
1.3. Questioning the effectiveness of forensic science
This background causes other concerns about how to appropriately
integrate innovative and flourishing technologies. The laboratory-
centric view of forensic science causes deviation from this fundamental
question. It focuses mainly on technologies rather than on the value of
information conveyed by forensic case data. Peter Deforest wrote in
1999:
‘Has the field advanced?’ On the face of it there would seem to be no
question that the field of criminalistics has advanced. But has it?
While we have forged ahead technologically, in my view we have
backslid with respect to our core activity — that of applying science
and scientific reasoning to criminal and civil investigations ([12:
197]).
Technologies are aimed at supporting the resolution of problems.
But the specific problem under scrutiny, as well as the global impact
of forensic science on solving and reducing crime often remains relegat-
ed behind the prescriptive application of procedures and technologies.
The rapid evolution of technologies may provide an explanation of
this deviation. DNA came about 80 years after the implementation of
fingerprints. But the quantity of electronic data has since exploded, at
a time scale that is equivalent to about half a professional career. ‘Big
data’ has become an effective issue in less than one generation of
students [51]. Efforts to assimilate these changes are tremendous. The
Policing debate
Fig. 2. Order of magnitude of the DNA evi
market is stimulated to push new technologies at a rate that exceeds
our own ability to integrate them. Lab-on-a-chip and big data technolo-
gies are at the door, but the current paradigm provides no solution for
avoiding a further destabilisation of the discipline. A solid vision elabo-
rated through a strong focus on fundamental research has become
indispensable in our rapidly evolving system.
Another exciting avenue for research exists here.
Proposition 6. Refocusing forensic science on problem solving will
provide a more central position to the discipline in crime investigation, as
well as greater stability and sustainability.
By focusing on means rather than ends and distancing from other
actors, current forensic systems forget to consider their global effective-
ness in policing [53]. Indeed, when it is measured, an embarrassing
evidence funnel is made visible, i.e. there is a huge gap between what
is collected at the scene and what is effectively used at the end of the
judicial process. This gap is made always more explicit through the so
called end-to-end studies on the use of DNA profiles (Fig. 2).
They show that the chance for a trace, generated by the activity of
the offender, to be eventually presented at Court, remains very low,
no matter how extensively technology is deployed.
Information is lost at various decision points throughout the case
handling process. Registering the case and attending the scene, process-
ing the crime scene and choosing if a specimen must be sent to the lab-
oratory are examples of choices to be made. Many factors influence the
extraction of the profile, the comparison of the profile with the content
of databases, the interpretation of matches, the integration of results
into the investigation, the use of this evidence in reporting, and eventu-
ally the use of the piece of evidence at Court. Regardless, when seen as a
whole, the process provides a questioning picture for the effectiveness
of forensic science.
Such evaluations however are unfair. These indicators do not grasp
the broad variety of useful information brought to the investigation by
forensic science. The UK Parliamentary Select Committee ‘Forensic
Science on Trial’ acknowledged this in 2005:
‘The main contribution that forensic science makes to the criminal
justice system is the generation of intelligence to assist investiga-
tions’ ([20]: 8).
Justice / Forensic debate
dence funnel for high volume crime.
image of Fig.�2
498 O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
There are unfortunately still very few empirical bases to ground this
assertion.
Beyond investigation, forensic science is understood according to
the lines debated in the scientific literature. Development centres on
serving the Court process, yet it is evaluated on how it supports crime
control or crime reduction strategies in policing (see Fig. 2). There is a
tension here that needs urgently to be made visible by research, because
this misunderstanding may have dramatic consequences in deciding
the future of forensic science [2,5,48,57].
1.4. Forensic science in policing
There is again a lack of models and almost no scientific debate to
express the potential of forensic science in policing.
Proposition 7. Forensic science can and should contribute to, and actively
engage in policing.
Going into policing is another controversial possible expansion for
forensic science. As Inman and Rudin state, forensic science is required
to strictly stay focussed on the court’s need:
‘The scientific analysis is only performed at the behest of someone
seeking to introduce the evidence into a court of law’ ([21:15]).
In this context, can forensic science enter into the policing debate,
which is a discipline that has acquired some autonomy from the justice
system?
This is also a delicate question, but let’s have a quick and simplified
look at a contemporary policing debate in order to better identify risks
and opportunities. It may actually be that the broad use of separate fo-
rensic identification techniques in a court-oriented strategy is already
contributing to overwhelm actors of the system. The order of magnitude
of the number of matches obtained through biometric systems has
changed. Estimations already indicate that the treatment of all the
matches obtained at a national and international level through auto-
matic data exchanges becomes intractable. At the same time, the real
effect of this traditional intensive case-by-case identification method
is controversial in terms of crime reduction [44].
But what are the alternatives? Mostly they focus much more on the
study of repetitive crimes. They started to emerge in the 1970s along
many different lines. Goldstein has initiated one of the most important
streams [17]. He defined ‘problem oriented policing’ (POP), which
aims at providing a proactive component to the organisation. The pro-
cess concentrates efforts on Scanning repetitive and persistent criminal
or security problems encountered by the police in their daily operations
(S). Their Analysis (A) encourages then inferring the causes of the prob-
lem identified. Elaboration of possible Responses for mitigating the
problem, choosing and implementing what is expected to be the more
efficient solutions are the next steps of the approach (R). The systematic
Assessment and adaptation of the chosen dispositive finalises the pro-
cess (A). The focus is on mitigating the problem by preferring preven-
tive approaches, not necessarily by arresting or identifying individuals.
This method has become very popular in policing and known under
the acronym SARA.
Does forensic science really have something to do with problem ori-
ented policing? There are actually many examples of such implications.
One such experience in Boston is particularly interesting and was the
object of scientific papers written by Braga [3,4], a distinguished special-
ist in problem oriented policing. It was eventually recognised that the
systematic comparisons of bullets collected at crime scenes ‘helped
guide violence prevention efforts by establishing patterns in particular
areas and among specific individuals’. Of importance is to notice that
this programme was not led by the police, but by other institutions
that had to deal with the problem. Policing does not mean that the
police are the only actors, or even that they must lead such projects or
to what degree they participate in the application of the method.
What is common in these modern strategies, beyond problem solv-
ing policing, is the focus on repetitive crimes under all their forms. Even
if different streams in policing exist, they tend to be regrouped under
the umbrella of ‘intelligence-led policing’.
This opens the door to potential fears prompted by the misinterpre-
tation of the term ‘intelligence’. Thus, has forensic science to compro-
mise with intelligence by developing a forensic intelligence branch?
Maybe the term itself ‘forensic intelligence’ which is occasionally
regarded an oxymoron, is not an appropriate one. The term seeks only
to express that forensic case data has the potential to contribute in a
structured way to the detection and strategic approach towards repeti-
tive crime, the support of preventative policing models, and the disrup-
tion of criminal enterprises in crime reduction.
The first generation of intelligence-led policing systems was much
more based on the results of research in criminology, that clearly
showed that a few minority of offenders were responsible for a high
proportion of crimes reported [42].
Targeting and neutralising these so-called prolific offenders would
hopefully significantly reduce crime. Obviously, the problem was how
to target prolific offenders. Traditional police solutions can be intrusive,
and predicting recidivism is far from obvious. How forensic science can
support this process in a more neutral way is thus a critical question to
be evaluated within this framework.
This way of considering forensic science in policing changes the
metrics, and even the econometrics, for evaluating its efficiency. In
this framework, assessing the following proposition takes an evident
importance.
Proposition 8. The adoption of intelligence-led policing changes how to
consider the effectiveness of forensic science. Intelligence-led crime scene
processing and crime scene linking become central.
Let us take one example to obtain an understanding of the dimen-
sion of the challenge.
1.5. Forensic science and intelligence-led policing: an example
A crime scene investigator attends scenes of residential burglaries
into the same building. He collects on the door of each premise an
earmark. He notices a horizontal line on the top of the mark, which is
assumed to be caused by a cap. Despite his significant experience, the
investigator has never noticed such a mark. The discovery of this unusu-
al line catalyses the detection of a repetition. With such a filter in mind,
he retrieves from the files, two other earmarks collected ten days and
one month before. He thus extended his initial vision of the series,
thanks to this retrospective analysis.
He will further add three other cases, then again two others, but with
a lower quality. Even by recognising that the common origin of the
marks present uncertainties, he extends his view on the series. From
all the marks gathered through this comparison process, the morpholo-
gy of the ears appears more clearly. This convinces him to add eventual-
ly two other marks to the series, but on which no horizontal line was
visible. All these earmarks have been collected on residential burglaries
perpetrated in the same way. These cases are distributed throughout
the same region over a period of two months. The day after the first
intervention, with the whole profile in mind, the investigator collects
new marks presenting the same horizontal line. The assumed perpetra-
tor did not operate alone, because other marks were also collected.
Together with shoemarks and glovemarks, other comparisons now
consolidate this perception of growing repetition.
At this stage, the series crystallises and the whole crime scene
investigator’s unit is made aware of its profile, together with crime an-
alysts and detectives. New cases are now regularly added into the series
thanks to the awareness of crime scene investigators attending new
499O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
cases. Later in the construction of the repetition, the correspondence of
partial DNA profiles extracted from three marks adds confidence in
some of the links. According to the geographical profile of the series,
other police forces were warned about the existence of the series and
new links across jurisdictions can be added to it from this initiative.
This work eventually had a great impact on resource allocation,
investigation, the arrest of the perpetrator and how evidence was
eventually structured for Court purpose.
This mechanism may look very familiar to many practitioners. In a
survey covering 6 police departments in Switzerland with 73 partici-
pants, it was found that 80% of crime scene investigators recognised
the need to make the effort to know about current crime series before
attending scenes [43].
Such reasoning processes are almost absent from scientific literature.
It needs to be clearly expressed in order to improve transparency. The
examples rest on tacit logical operations, and conceal the variety of deci-
sions made by forensic analysts concerning how this information is inte-
grated with crime analysis. The adequate level of formalisation is difficult
to be defined, because it must promote the subtlety of the human mind to
draw analogies of all sorts [45]. Mechanisms to mitigate cognitive biases
must be also implemented as a counterpart to this flexibility.
But are these efforts worth it? The type of recovered marks that
catalysed the discovery of the series does not belong to evidence that
is usually searched for. No standard operating procedure for dealing
with high volume crime would have anticipated the possibility to find
a horizontal mark on a door. This observation came about, more due
to a difficultly expressed culmination of crime scene investigator cogni-
tive, qualities both professional and technical, and an openness to
remain surprised by something not included in the standard method.
This way of thinking has led to solve a significant number of burglar-
ies in proportion with the high volume crime rate this particular region
suffered during this period. The approach consisted of targeting this
particular (group of) prolific offender(s) by thinking about what foren-
sic science could do to neutralise them. It was perfectly in line with
intelligence-led policing philosophy, but not with the standard way
of processing the massive flow of data in high volume crime. By
recognising the importance of repetitive crimes, the demarcation be-
tween the clinical method of approaching serious crime and the statis-
tical way of treating massive flow of high volume crime data, blurs.
This is the challenge we put to forensic science research: to develop
such a proposition. This research programme could provide a great alter-
native to improve transparency in ‘targeting the prolific offender’. In turn,
these efforts could dramatically change the shape of the evidence funnel
and modify the metric for evaluating the effectiveness of forensic science.
1.6. Forensic science and data mining
Intelligence-led policing and the increasing quantity of available
information lead naturally to the search for affinities between forensic
science and movements related to ‘big data’ and ‘data mining’. The
view emerges that big data generated by new traceability of human
activities can be mined by new technologies to provide solutions to
crime problems. This generates unrealistic expectations: the ‘ideal’ of a
computerised machine extracting relevant patterns and hypothesis
directly from big amounts of data shows possibilities of application
that are much more restricted than what is occasionally hailed. It is
not obvious to what degree this process is even possible without
injecting existing knowledge and involving human reasoning to guide
the search [18].
Proposition 9. Situate the scope of methods and techniques for mining
forensic case data.
Criminological findings regarding prolific offenders can, in fact, pro-
vide more specific orientations for developing research projects in this
area, without framing the search in a too narrow way. For example:
Proposition 10. As criminological research recurrently shows that few
(groups of) offenders are committing a majority of crime, desistance,
changes of behaviour and new activities are made detectable in analysing
time series in forensic case data.
Possibilities to detect tendencies through the occurrence of sole
mark patterns are a consequence of this statement. Fig. 3 is a cumulative
curve of the occurrence of a specific sole mark pattern collected at
burglaries crime scenes. This curve does not directly point to a specific
burglar, but rather attracts the attention of the forensic crime analyst
towards a set of data likely to point to repetitive crimes. This detected
pattern must be then analysed by integrating other contextual informa-
tion (e.g. spatio-temporal, modus operandi).
As another illustration among many, some evolution in the make
and model of firearms used by offenders inferred from bullets collected
at crime scenes, points to the activity perpetrated by a specific crime
organisation and has oriented priorities and operations throughout
inquiries [19].
1.7. Forensic science and criminology
The study of crime cannot entirely abstract from its physical or nu-
merical substrate. How could we reason about fire without knowledge
of combustion? Infer about illicit drug trafficking and consumption
without knowledge of chemical profiles? Approach violent crime with-
out considering physical harm? Navigate goods counterfeiting without
considering internet infrastructures?
Conversely, the collection and interpretation of forensic case data for
explaining the activity call for the use of theories of criminology. This is
our broader proposition in terms of R&D to reconsider connections be-
tween both disciplines, while fundamental sciences have distanced
them by erecting often irrelevant barriers [40].
Proposition 11. Integrate forensic science and criminology to support the
study of crime.
Very simple examples illustrate obvious opportunities. For in-
stance the family of theories regrouped under the umbrella of envi-
ronmental criminology, or opportunities theories, study crime in its
immediate physical and social environment [59]. How could these
theories be of no use for crime scene investigators, when their
main focus is to imagine how the offender has overcome all the con-
straints imposed by their immediate environment? There is huge
potential to be realised by using theories focused on the settings
for crime [15]. Particularly in the UK, some awareness of these pos-
sibilities already exists, complemented by good specific research,
but forensic research overall remains very shy in supporting such
avenues.
Emerging studies go further. They show that there is a growing in-
terest for criminologists to use the solid structure provided by DNA
links for testing hypothesis on the structure of high volume crime, the
mobility of offenders, or aspects pertaining to criminal careers [27–29,
31,50].
2. Conclusion
If forensic science chooses to stay in the shell of the laboratory, it
must dramatically restrict its ambitions. Bringing progressively less
relevant information for a higher cost is not justifiable.
Theorising an expansion is a real challenge in the function of the
newfound traceability of human’s operation that changes the nature
and the order of magnitude of the quantity of available information.
By paraphrasing concerns of groups of scholars about research related
with the police [34], this is the final and general proposition to promote
a fundamental programme.
Fig. 3. Plot of accumulated footwear impressions vs burglary scene attendance (by courtesy of Samuel Rodrigues).
500 O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501
Proposition 12. Research on forensic science should be prioritised, rather
than research for forensic science considered within the current justice
paradigm.
Forensic science should be treated as an entity to be made the object
of future research. This means not only developing and validating new
tools and methods within the forensic’s paradigm promoted by the
report (research for forensic science), but also debating its nature
(research on forensic science).
Research on such an entity utilising fewer, more concise, fundamental
pillars affords discipline and universality to its findings. The outcomes of
so oriented inquiry are a deeper, more thorough understanding of the sci-
ence, more valuable, valid and versatile methods and a more mature,
grounded forensic science community overall.
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- Expanding forensic science through forensic intelligence
1. Introduction
1.1. Is this expansion necessary?
1.2. What should this expansion cover?
1.2.1. Studying how forensic science may integrate with crime investigation
1.2.2. Studying forensic science at the crime scene
1.2.3. The study of an investigative and crime scene logic
1.3. Questioning the effectiveness of forensic science
1.4. Forensic science in policing
1.5. Forensic science and intelligence-led policing: an example
1.6. Forensic science and data mining
1.7. Forensic science and criminology
2. Conclusion
References
Mr. Friend is a
crime analyst
with the Santa
Cruz, California,
Police
Department.
Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime
By Zach Friend, M.P.P.
4/9/2013
Nationwide law enforcement agencies face the problem
of doing more with less. Departments slash budgets
and implement furloughs, while management struggles
to meet the public safety needs of the community. The
Santa Cruz, California, Police Department handles the
same issues with increasing property crimes and
service calls and diminishing staff. Unable to hire more
officers, the department searched for a nontraditional
solution.
In late 2010 researchers published a paper that the
department believed might hold the answer. They
proposed that it was possible to predict certain crimes,
much like scientists forecast earthquake aftershocks.
An “aftercrime” often follows an initial crime. The time and location of previous criminal activity helps to
determine future offenses. These researchers developed an algorithm (mathematical procedure) that
calculates future crime locations.1
Equalizing Resources
The Santa Cruz Police Department has 94 sworn officers and serves a population of 60,000. A
university, amusement park, and beach push the seasonal population to 150,000. Department personnel
contacted a Santa Clara University professor to apply the algorithm, hoping that leveraging technology
would improve their efforts. The police chief indicated that the department could not hire more officers.
He felt that the program could allocate dwindling resources more efficiently.
Santa Cruz police envisioned deploying officers by shift to the most targeted locations in the city. The
predictive policing model helped to alert officers to targeted locations in real time, a significant
improvement over traditional tactics.
Making it Work
The algorithm is a culmination of anthropological and criminological behavior research. It uses complex
mathematics to estimate crime and predict future hot spots. Researchers based these studies on
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“Gateway to the Summit,”
which references the city’s
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Home • Stats & Services • Reports and Publications • LEB • 2013 • April • Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime
FBI — Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/…
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information that officers inherently know. For example, when people are victims, the chance that they or
their neighbors will be victimized again increases. Offenders criminalize familiar areas. There are
detectable patterns associated with the times and locations of their crimes.
Using an earthquake aftershock algorithm, the system employs verified crime data to predict future
offenses in 500-square-foot locations. The program uses historical information combined with current
data to determine patterns. The system needs between 1,200 and 2,000 data points, including
burglaries, batteries, assaults, or other crimes, for the most accuracy. Santa Cruz, averaging between
400 and 600 burglaries per year, used 5 years of data.
Throughout the experiment the Santa Cruz Police Department focused on burglaries— vehicular,
residential, and commercial—and motor vehicle thefts.2 The system works on gang violence, batteries,
aggravated assaults, drug crimes, and bike thefts. It functions on all property crimes and violent crimes
that have enough data points and are not crimes of passion, such as domestic violence. Homicides
generally do not provide enough data points to produce accurate predictions.
Using the Data
To add an extra layer of security, employees transfer the data on designated crime types from the
records management system (RMS) to the secure Web-based system. The algorithm requires the date,
time, type, and location of a crime. This is public data, which adds another level of security in case
someone intercepts the information. No one submits, collects, or uses personal data. The system
processes the information through the algorithm and combines it with historical crime data to make
predictions.
Staff members log in, just like they do on an e-mail account, and the system generates hot spot maps.
For Santa Cruz police, there are 15 hot spot maps per shift. Distributed through roll calls, these maps
indicate 500-square-foot locations. Officers pass through these areas when they are not obligated to
address other calls. No one dispatches or requires them to patrol the sites; they do it as part of their
routine extra checks. Some agencies using the program designate predictive policing units to run patrols,
while others use unmarked cars to traverse hotspots.
The Santa Cruz Police Department decided not to mandate the patrols. Personnel thought it would
eliminate the feeling of an administrative directive and empower officers to be as proactive as their call
levels allowed. When police enter and clear the hot spot locations, they notify dispatch with a designated
clearing code. This enables dispatch personnel to collect data on the frequency of the officers’ presence
in the hot spots.
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Evaluating the Process
During the first 6 months of the program, the department made over 2 dozen arrests within the hot spot
locations. However, the true measure of the program’s success is not apprehensions, but the reduction
of crime. Santa Cruz police officers indicated an initial 11 percent reduction in burglaries and a 4 percent
decrease in motor vehicle thefts. As time progresses, the reductions increase. Over a 6-month period,
burglaries declined 19 percent.
The system requires 6 months of data to assess whether the method actually is reducing the crime rate.
Because the Santa Cruz police did not introduce any additional variables—no additional officers were
hired, shift lengths continued, patrol structure remained the same—the department attributed the crime
reduction to the model.
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) tested the method under a controlled experiment. The
project scientifically proved the model’s effectiveness. The city has a larger population and more
complex patrol needs than Santa Cruz. Researchers established the experiment in the Foothill Division
with a population of 300,000 people. They compared the predictive policing system with LAPD’s best
practices.
Similar to the Santa Cruz test, the department distributed maps to officers at the beginning of roll call. On
some days analysts produced the maps using traditional LAPD hot spot methods. On other days, they
used the algorithm. No one told the officers where the maps came from. Graphically they looked the
same.
The algorithm provided twice the accuracy that LAPD’s current practices produced. While property crime
was up .4 percent throughout Los Angeles, Foothill’s declined by 12 percent. Foothill benefitted from the
largest crime reduction of any division during the experiment.
People found it hard to understand that an algorithm performed similar to a crime analyst. Eventually,
even the most skeptical individuals realized that the method worked. The LAPD expanded the program
to other divisions serving a total population of over 1.5 million people. Each one that implemented the
predictive policing software achieved crime reduction. The department recognized that the predictive
policing system is a large improvement over previously used approaches. When looking at a map from 1
week, the assumption is that the next week will be the same. The computer eliminates the bias that
people have.
Gaining Support
As with any new program, questions and concerns arise. People resist change. The Santa Cruz Police
Department worked with officers to develop maps and solicit feedback before implementation of the
program. The department emphasized that the program does not replace officer intuition but
supplements it.
The Santa Cruz Police Department found that veteran officers usually identify 8 or 9 of the 15 hot spot
locations. Newer officers discover 1 or 2 of the areas. This validates skilled police officers’ intuition,
provides additional targeted locations, and imparts tactical information for new officers. The maps
reinforce existing knowledge and inform about targeting locations. They standardize information across
shifts and experience levels.
The algorithm combines historic and daily crime information, produces real-time predictions of areas to
patrol, and normalizes information among shifts. It eliminates the concern about adequate information
sharing. Officers obtaining the daily hot spot maps receive any information they missed due to vacation,
illness, or regular days off.
The program shares information graphically. It does not replace the value of senior officers teaching
younger ones or the need for roll calls to discuss crime trends. It cannot replace police officers’
knowledge and skills and does not remove the officer from the equation. It puts law enforcement in the
right time and place to prevent crime.
Conclusion
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Additional departments in the states of California, Washington, South Carolina, Arizona, Tennessee, and
Illinois have implemented the program. In November 2011 Time Magazine named predictive policing one
of 50 best inventions for 2011.3 The Santa Cruz police chief acknowledged the recognition, but said the
accolades are less important than the crime reduction. According to the chief, “Innovation is the key to
modern policing, and we’re proud to be leveraging technology in a way that keeps our community
safer.”4
Endnotes
1 Dr. George Mohler, Santa Clara University, California, and Dr. P. Jeffrey Brantingham, University of
California at Los Angeles, California, developed the algorithm (mathematical model) for predictive
policing.
2 George Mohler, P. Jeffrey Brantingham, and Zach Friend conducted the research in Santa Cruz,
California.
3 Lev Grossman, Cleo Brock-Abraham, Nick Carbone, Eric Dodds, Jeffrey Kluger, Alice Park, Nate
Rawlings, Claire Suddath, Feifei Sun, Mark Thompson, Bryan Walsh, and Kayla Webley, “The 50 Best
Inventions of 2011,” Time Magazine, November 28, 2011. www.time.com/time/magazine/article
/0,9171,2099708-13,00.html (accessed September 27, 2012).
4 Santa Cruz Police Chief Kevin Vogel.
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