Military History Paper

Requirement:  Research “THUNDER RUN IN BAGDAD” in the attached 16 cases of mission command which demonstrates the use of the Principles of Mission Command Starts on page 105 and ends on 118. Each principle can also be found in the attached ADP 6-0. 

In your own words Use 117 and 118 to help write a 5 page (body of text) paper that thoroughly describes the use of mission command principles. Address the six Principles of Mission Command in your analysis. Discuss how the commander’s use of those principles affected the outcome of the battle, and whether or not the commander executed good or bad mission command. Use 2 additional peer reviewed outside sources. MUST BE IN ACTIVE VOICE

Structure: 

a. Introduction paragraph

b. History of the Battle (one or two paragraphs)

c. Analysis of the use of Principles of Mission Command (80% of the paper)

d. Conclusion paragraph

Formatting: 

a. Microsoft Word document

b. Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) or Turabian

MUST BE PEER REVIEWED.

16 Cases of
Mission Command
General Editor
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.
Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

16 Cases of
Mission Command
General Editor
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.
Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ii
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Wright, Donald P., 1964-
16 cases of Mission Command/general editor, Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.
ISBN 978-0-9891372-1-8
1. Command of troops–Case studies. 2. Tactics–Case studies. 3.
Operational art (Military science)–Case studies. 4. United States–History,
Military–Case studies. I. Title.
UB210.W76 2013
355.3’30410973–dc23
2013019494
Second edition: July 2013
Carl W. Fischer
Editing and layout
Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover
a wide variety of military history topics. The
views expressed in this CSI Press publication are
those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of
the Department of the Army or the Department
of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications
available for downloading can be found at:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp
The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an
official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on
any republication without the express written permission of the Director
of CSI.

iii
Foreword
For the US Army to succeed in the 21st Century, Soldiers of all ranks
must understand and use Mission Command. Mission Command empowers
leaders at all levels, allowing them to synchronize all warfighting functions
and information systems to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against
a range of adversaries.
This collection of historical vignettes seeks to sharpen our understanding
of Mission Command philosophy and practice by providing examples from
the past in which Mission Command principles played a decisive role.
Some vignettes show junior officers following their commander ’s intent
and exercising disciplined initiative in very chaotic combat operations.
Others recount how field grade officers built cohesive teams that relied on
mutual trust to achieve key operational objectives.
Each historical account is complemented by an annotated explanation
of how the six Mission Command principles shaped the action. For this
reason, the collection is ideal for leader development in the Army school
system as well as for unit and individual professional development.
Mission Command places great responsibility on our Soldiers.
I am confident that the vignettes offered in this volume will help
leaders at all levels better understand and execute Mission Command.
David G. Perkins
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding

v
Introduction
In 2012, the US Army formally issued new doctrine on Mission
Command, the philosophy and practice of command that serves as a
foundation for Unified Land Operations. That doctrine defines Mission
Command as, “the exercise of authority and direction by the
commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative
within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders
in the conduct of unified land operations.” To provide a framework for
the practice of Mission Command, the doctrine established six principles:
Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
Create shared understanding
Provide a clear commander’s intent
Exercise disciplined initiative
Use mission orders
Accept prudent risk
Soon thereafter the Army began a focused effort to educate and train
leaders on Mission Command as a way to prepare them for unpredictable
and complex conflicts yet to appear on the horizon.
In early 2013, the Combat Studies Institute became involved in this
effort by writing a series of Mission Command case studies for use at
the US Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk.
Those case studies form the core of this collection. Each case includes
a brief account of a military action followed by an explanatory section
that demonstrates how the case illustrates Mission Command principles.
This structure was designed for use in training and schools but is equally
conducive for self-study programs.
None of the 16 cases in this volume offer examples of leaders
practicing Mission Command perfectly. Some of the actions described, in
fact, come from early periods in which the lack of radio and other modern
communications made any level of command and control very difficult to
attain.
The real value of these cases lies in their ability to clearly convey how
past leaders employed principles such as the use of commander’s intent
and the exercise of disciplined initiative to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative. In this way, the past breathes life into current doctrine, making
it more tangible and understandable.

vi
We at the Combat Studies Institute hope that these cases will enhance
the way in which today’s Soldiers understand the philosophy and practice
of Mission Command as they prepare for future operations.

CSI-The Past is Prologue!
Roderick M. Cox
Colonel, US Army
Director, Combat Studies Institute

vii
Contents
Section 1: Cases at Corps/Division Level
1. Failure of Command at Pea Ridge, 1862 ………………………………………. 1
2. Extending the Line at Little Round Top, July 1863 ………………………. 17
Section 2: Cases at Brigade/Regiment/Battalion Level
3. Nelson, Mission Command, and The Battle of Nile ……………………… 31
4. Assault on Queenston Heights, October 1812 ……………………………… 41
5. A Motorized Infantry Regiment Crosses the Meuse River,
May 1940 …………………………………………………………………………………… 53
6. Corregidor: Triumph in the Philippines ………………………………………. 67
7. Assault River Crossing at Nijmegen, 1944 ………………………………….. 79
8. Sicily, 1943: Initiative Prevails at Biazza Ridge …………………………… 89
9. Thunder Run in Baghdad, 2003 ……………………………………………….. 105
10. The Drive to Bastogne ……………………………………………………………119
Section 3: Cases at Company/Platoon/Squad Level
11. An Engineer Assault Team Crosses the Meuse, May 1940 …………. 133
12. Capturing Eben-Emael: the Key to the Low Countries ……………… 143
13. The Bridge at Mayenne, France 1944 ……………………………………… 155
14. The Victory at Tarin Kowt …………………………………………………….. 165
15. The Attack on the Ranch House, August 2007 …………………………. 175
16. Operation NASHVILLE: Breaking the Taliban’s Stranglehold in
Kandahar, 2010 …………………………………………………………………………. 195
About the Contributors …………………………………………………………… 205

viii
List of Contributors
Richard V. Barbuto, Ph.D.
Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.
Mark T. Gerges, Ph.D.
Kendall D. Gott
Colonel Thomas E. Hanson, Ph.D.
Gregory S. Hospodor, Ph.D.
Kevin M. Hymel
John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.
John J. McGrath
Nicholas A. Murray, D.Phil.
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Section 1: Cases at Corps/Division Level

1
Failure of Command at Pea Ridge, 1862
Colonel Thomas E. Hanson, Ph.D.
After a tumultuous summer, the state of Missouri remained a flashpoint
in the Civil War as 1861 ended. Confederate forces, unable to eradicate
Union authority, retained control of the southern third of the state. In late
1861 General Ulysses S. Grant designed a campaign to seize control of the
upper Tennessee River early the following year. Doing so would require
secure lines of communication from St. Louis and Cairo, Illinois, to keep
his army supplied. After seizing Forts Henry and Donelson in February,
Grant proposed to move deeper into west Tennessee to confront a rebel
army led by MG Albert Sydney Johnston. Doing so, however, would ex-
pose Grant to attacks by Confederate forces in Arkansas. Indeed, Johnston
hoped to call on the 8,700 Confederate regulars in Arkansas to help block
Grant’s invasion of the lower Mississippi Valley. While supporting this
plan’s operational goals, Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his
cabinet hoped that at the strategic level, continued rebel operations in Mis-
souri would isolate Grant from his base or prevent his campaign altogether.
Union commanders, however, refused to cede the initiative to the Confed-
erates. The resulting campaign west of the Mississippi River ended with
a decisive Confederate defeat at Pea Ridge (Elkhorn Tavern), Arkansas,
forever ending Southern hopes of adding Missouri as a full member of the
Confederacy while facilitating Union occupation of much of Tennessee.
Although initially caught off guard by an un-
expected winter campaign, Confederate forces
owed their defeat at Pea Ridge in March of 1862
to the inability of their commander, MG Earl Van
Dorn, to understand or apply the tenets of mission
command. The federal commander, BG Samuel
R. Curtis, better understood the requirements of
both the art and science of mission command
than Van Dorn, who ignored both the advice of
his subordinates and his own senses in pressing
an attack after the original goals became unattain-
able.
President Abraham Lincoln directed MG Henry
Halleck, commander of the Department of the Missouri, to both keep Mis-
souri for the Union and support military operations to defeat the rebellion.
Halleck, in turn, organized the forces under his command to secure these
objectives. Grant received command of two divisions of 17,000 soldiers
and 13 gunboats to execute offensive operations. Curtis assumed com-
Earl Van Dorn.
Courtesy Wilsons Creek
National Battlefield
WICR 31608.

2
mand of the Army of the Southwest, a force of approxi-
mately 12,000 men and a significant artillery capabili-
ty. Curtis believed that to secure Missouri (and Grant’s
right flank) he needed to seize the initiative by con-
ducting a winter campaign against Confederate forces
led by former Missouri governor and would-be war
hero MG Sterling Price. Price’s impressively-named
Missouri State Guard was in fact a loosely-organized
militia that numbered between 6,000 and 8,000 who
were ill equipped for active military operations. As
many as 2,000 of these men lacked muskets. One con-
temporary described Price’s force as “a mere gathering
of brave but undisciplined troops, coming and going at
pleasure.” Nevertheless, as long as they remained in
the field they posed a threat to Union control of Missouri.
The charismatic Price, a Mexican War veteran nicknamed “Old Pap”
by his men, became the de facto senior Confederate officer in Missouri in
August of 1861, when he and Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch de-
feated Union forces under Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon at Wilson’s
Creek, Missouri. Price remained in southwestern Missouri throughout
1861 and into the new year while McCulloch returned to northwest Ar-
kansas. Curtis, determined to rid Missouri of Confederate influence once
and for all, established a supply base at a railhead in Rolla under the su-
pervision of a promising young captain named Phillip H. Sheridan. Curtis
then directed his men to shed much of their baggage and campaign gear so
they could travel quickly. The Army of the Southwest set off from Leba-
non, Missouri on February 10, 1862. The weather became an adversary to
both armies as temperatures plummeted below freezing and drifting snow
blanketed the land.
Unprepared for battle, Price sent increasingly frantic pleas for help from
BG James McIntosh, McCulloch’s deputy. Rebuffed by McIntosh, Price
abandoned Springfield, Missouri and began a hasty retreat south, intent
on joining with McCulloch’s forces in northwest Arkansas. This was a
bitter pill for Price, as he regarded McCulloch as a rival and his personal
nemesis. President Davis and Confederate Secretary of War Judah Ben-
jamin blamed Price for the discord; in response to Price’s repeated plea to
Samuel Ryan Curtis.
Courtesy Wilsons
Creek
National Battlefield
WICR 31443.

3
be commissioned a major general in the Confederate Army (and thus to
outrank McCulloch), President Davis instead chose West Point graduate
Van Dorn to assume command of the Confederate District of the Trans-
Mississippi.
A veteran of the eastern theater, Van Dorn was a native of Port Gibson,
Mississippi (and thus a near neighbor to the Jefferson Davis family). Ser-
vice in Mexico awakened a burning ambition in the dashing cavalryman
that the outbreak of war in 1861 turned into an all-consuming passion
for glory. Professionally, Van Dorn was a dim bulb; Confederate Gen-
eral Richard Ewell once remarked that Van Dorn had “learned all about
commanding fifty United States dragoons, and forgotten everything else”
during his pre-1861 career. Historian Earl Hess observed that Van Dorn’s
“zeal for closing with the enemy was matched by his impatience with re-
connaissance, logistics, and staff work of any kind.” Van Dorn assumed
command at Little Rock on 29 January 1862 and immediately began plan-
ning an invasion of Missouri. In his own words, the endstate he visualized
was “to make a reputation and serve my country conspicuously or to fail.
I must not, shall not, do the latter. I must have St. Louis—then Huzza!”
Van Dorn hoped a spectacular victory would facilitate his triumphant re-
turn to the Eastern Theater, where the Confederate cavalry that he had
trained was now garnering laurels under MG J.E.B. Stuart and not Earl
Van Dorn.
Curtis’ pursuit of Price forced Van Dorn to postpone his invasion of
Missouri to defend Confederate soil. Price begged McCulloch for rein-
forcements but was refused. Angry at being ejected from Missouri and
by McCulloch’s snub, Price failed to notify McCulloch or Van Dorn of
Curtis’ presence until after he crossed into Arkansas on 16 February. The
report sent the Confederates into a frenzy of activity as they hastened to
assemble their forces. Van Dorn, who had yet to visit McCulloch or in-
spect his troops, began a nine-day overland trip from Pocahontas to Van
Buren. Along the way he fell into the icy Arkansas River and developed a
serious fever, significantly degrading his already overtaxed intellect.

4
Figure 1.
Van Dorn’s opponent was a complete opposite in temperament and
training. Although both Curtis and Van Dorn were graduates of the Unit-
ed States Military Academy (1831 and 1842, respectively). All similar-
ity ended there. Curtis almost immediately resigned his commission and
practiced law in Ohio and later in Iowa until elected to Congress in1856.
Volunteering to serve during the Mexican War, he saw no combat but
served as a military governor of several conquered cities before returning
to civil life. An early member of the Republican Party, he was considered
for cabinet positions in the Lincoln Administration before resigning his
seat in Congress to return military service in 1861. Cool and thoughtful
with a thorough legal education and long life experience, Curtis possessed
an agile mind and at Pea Ridge demonstrated an intuitive feel for events
that served him well. He was also a shrewd judge of character who always
looked to employ his subordinates at tasks for which they were best suited.
Like Van Dorn’s force, Curtis’ army included two very different sets of
soldiers. Two of his small divisions were composed of a mix of native-

5
born and immigrant troops from Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa. These ele-
ments were commanded by COL Jefferson C. Davis (3d Division) and
COL Eugene A. Carr (4th Division). Like Curtis, they were graduates
of the Academy and veterans of the Mexican War. Both men were also
present for the defeat at Wilson’s Creek the previous summer, a disaster
for which many in the north blamed MG Franz Sigel, now Curtis’ titular
deputy and the driving force behind the other two divisions in the Army
of the Southwest. Sigel, a German immigrant, graduated from the Mili-
tary Academy at Karlsruhe and led anti-Prussian revolutionary forces in
the revolutions of 1848 before coming to America. Settling in St. Louis,
he became a leading pro-Union figure among German émigrés living in
the United States. Commissioned a brigadier general of volunteers in
1861, Sigel led one contingent of federal troops at Wilson’s Creek while
BG Nathaniel Lyon led the other. Sigel’s half-hearted attempt to link up
with Lyon doomed the latter to defeat (and death), while Sigel escaped
to safety and whispered charges of cowardice. Sigel’s influence with
German-Americans, however, prevented Lincoln from removing him. In
early 1862 Sigel’s two-division force was composed almost entirely of
German emigrants from Missouri and Illinois, commanded by COL Peter
J. Osterhaus (1st Division) and BG Alexander S. Asboth (2d Division).
Like Sigel, both had been officers in European armies before coming to
the United States.
Crossing into Arkansas on 17 February 1862, Curtis’ lead elements
caught up with Price just as the latter’s exhausted militia linked up with
McCulloch’s Confederate regulars. A sharp engagement took place about
four miles south of Elkhorn Tavern on the Wire Road (so named because
it followed the telegraph wire route), causing Curtis to halt his pursuit
and consolidate his force. The Confederates withdrew south to Fayette-
ville which they abandoned a few days later after plundering the town
and leaving their fellow citizens unprepared for the remaining months of
winter. Curtis now faced an operational dilemma. He had technically
exceeded his authority by invading the Confederacy. Halleck had ordered
him to eliminate the threat posed by Price. Driving Price into the arms
of another rebel army had not necessarily done that. As long as Price’s
army existed it could return to Missouri. Unlike most of his contempo-
raries, Curtis clearly understood that his mission required the destruction
of Price’s army, not simply its removal from Union territory. However,
he was now over 200 miles from the railhead at Rolla and dependent on
wagon trains to resupply his force. In addition, he had depleted his force
by nearly 20 percent in order to garrison Springfield, Missouri and other

6
critical locations along his line of march. Finally, the Ozark Plateau in late
winter offered little food for man or horse. Curtis realized he could not
pursue Price and McCulloch deeper into Arkansas without risking being
cut off from his supplies but he could not withdraw and cede the opera-
tional initiative to Van Dorn. Therefore, he resolved to defend Missouri
from just inside the Arkansas state line. Curtis established his defenses
astride the Wire Road east of Bentonville, spreading his forces to facilitate
foraging. From 19 February to 5 March, Sigel’s two divisions occupied
positions west of the Wire Road near Bentonville while Carr’s and Davis’
divisions camped near Curtis’ headquarters at Cross Hollow on the Wire
Road. Carr dispatched a 700-man detachment of infantry, cavalry, and
artillery to Huntsville, 35 miles southeast of Cross Hollow on 4 March in
an attempt to arrest local Confederate leaders. Finding nothing significant,
COL William Vandever decided to spend the night of 5-6 March in Hunts-
ville and return during daylight hours.
Earl Van Dorn, exhausted and feverish after his overland trek across Ar-
kansas, met with Price and McCulloch at Strickler’s Station on 3 March.
Van Dorn’s adjutant, Dabney Maury, immediately noted the difference
between Van Dorn’s chief subordinates. Price had hosted Van Dorn to a
sumptuous feast upon the latter’s arrival the night prior despite the meager
rations available to Price’s men. McCulloch’s headquarters, however, was
spartan in furnishings and businesslike in atmosphere. Maury recognized
that unlike Price, McCulloch and his staff possessed “the stern seriousness
of soldiers trained to arms.” Moreover, McCulloch presented Van Dorn
with a detailed description of Curtis’ dispositions and a proposed plan of
attack, for which he had issued preparatory guidance two days earlier. Van
Dorn instantly grasped that Curtis’ two wings were not mutually support-
ing, and “resolved to attack him at once,” believing that if he smashed
the Army of the Southwest he could still get to St. Louis and glory. He
ordered an attack for the following day, March 5, 1862.
Van Dorn’s plan was elegantly simple. McIntosh’s brigade of 3,000
Texas and Arkansas cavalrymen would march north on the Wire Road and
demonstrate in front of Curtis’ position at Cross Hollow. By doing so,
they would screen the remainder of McCulloch’s division (5,700-soldiers
with 18 artillery pieces) and Price’s division of about 6,800 Missourians
with 47 artillery pieces. Van Dorn believed his infantry could move north
and defeat Sigel before he or Curtis could identify the threat because Cur-
tis possessed a significantly weaker cavalry capability. To ensure rapid
movement, Van Dorn issued explicit orders to travel lightly. Each soldier
would carry just his rifle, 40 rounds of ammunition, a single blanket,

7
Figure 2.
and rations for three days. Only an emergency supply of ammunition and
a single day’s rations would accompany the attacking column. Van Dorn
planned for his men to resupply themselves from captured stores after de-
feating Curtis. He gave no thought to other contingencies or the fact that
after defeating the federal army, he would be responsible for feeding pris-
oners as well as his own soldiers.

8
Van Dorn made several mistakes at this crucial juncture. First, he did
not know his subordinates except by reputation. Neither Price nor Mc-
Culloch were graduates of the Military Academy and President Davis and
Secretary Benjamin considered them equally unqualified for high com-
mand. Van Dorn shared these prejudices and did not bother to learn about
either man’s skills or experience. Had he done so, he would have discov-
ered that McCulloch was a veteran of both the Texas Revolution and the
Mexican War and served as a Texas Ranger for two decades. He possessed
unsurpassed battlefield experience against both conventional and uncon-
ventional opponents. Universally admired by his troops, McCulloch was
a no-nonsense commander and able tactician. His thorough preparations
enabled Van Dorn to attack as soon as he arrived in northwest Arkansas.
Second, Van Dorn’s indifference to the condition of his men bordered
on dereliction of duty. Price’s men had walked over 200 miles in less
than 10 days with little food. McCulloch’s troops had shared their food
with Price’s men, depleting their own supplies, and then had burned tons
of food and equipment when they abandoned Fayetteville. Living under
canvas in the snow and sleet of the Boston Mountains in February and
March had not allowed Price’s men to recover nor did such conditions al-
low McCulloch’s men to retain their strength. Nevertheless, Van Dorn’s
plan depended on his soldiers’ ability to ignore fatigue, hunger, and harsh
environmental conditions to rapidly close with Sigel’s stationary divisions.
Third, Van Dorn’s quest for quantitative superiority diluted the quality
of his force when he accepted two late additions to what he now called his
“Army of the West.” The first was two green (and unarmed) regiments of
Arkansas infantry. These men were ultimately left behind but their pres-
ence further burdened an already deficient supply of food and equipment.
The second addition was two small regiments of Indian “volunteer” infan-
try (1st and 2d Cherokee Mounted Rifles of about 700 men altogether) and
two companies of Texas cavalry. This unsavory group was commanded by
BG Albert Pike, a morbidly obese political appointee who combined poor
judgment with a complete lack of qualification for his position. Pike’s
Cherokees were a mixed bag of adventurers, restless youth, and brigands,
most of who agreed to serve only after pocketing Pike’s generous boun-
ties. Distrusted by the Confederates and hated by the federals, their per-
formance on and off the battlefield left much to be desired.
Van Dorn’s army broke camp on 4 March and began moving north
into a blizzard. The Confederates’ enthusiasm lessened with each step
as Van Dorn set a hellish pace while riding in his covered ambulance.
One of Price’s men remarked afterward that Van Dorn “had forgotten he

9
was riding and we were walking.” The column halted for the night in
the burned-out ruins of Fayetteville where the Confederates spent a cold
night wrapped in their single blankets. The next day’s march was equally
miserable with snow and freezing temperatures combining with the stress
of the march to cause numerous stragglers. Late in the day, the 3d Texas
Cavalry blundered into a Union outpost on the Elms Springs Road south
of Bentonville. The federal infantrymen defended their position before
withdrawing in good order to report what they had seen. Van Dorn’s hope
for tactical surprise disappeared with them.
Before news of Van Dorn’s movement reached Curtis, he had already
decided to shrink his footprint by concentrating on the high ground just
north of where the Wire Road crossed Little Sugar Creek. Multiple reports
of a general Confederate movement reinforced his intuition, and Curtis
lost no time in ordering Sigel to bring his divisions east. Meanwhile, COL
Vandever and his little detachment set out to return to the main body at
0300 on 6 March. Spurred by reports of approaching Confederate cavalry,
Vandever’s column closed on the new defensive positions at 2000 after
covering the 35 miles without loss of a single soldier, horse, or artillery
piece. By then, Sigel had begun moving his forces, and after personally
commanding the rear guard in several hot engagements, he joined Curtis
two hours after Vandever. Van Dorn’s plan lay in ruins. Not only had
Curtis and Sigel not been caught unaware, the Confederates now faced a
united Federal Army entrenched on commanding high ground.
At this point, had Van Dorn chosen to make effective use of McIntosh’s
cavalry brigade, he could have fixed Curtis in his positions with superior
numbers of infantry and a large artillery contingent while the cavalry sev-
ered Curtis’s single line of communication. Doing so would have required
considerable patience, however, which Van Dorn did not possess. Instead,
at a council with McCulloch and Price, a feverish Van Dorn accepted the
former’s suggestion that the entire army attempt a turning movement by
sidestepping the federal position to the northwest using the Bentonville
Detour to travel around Pea Ridge and seize the Detour’s junction with the
Wire Road near Elkhorn Tavern. Against the advice of both his principal
subordinates, Van Dorn demanded that the necessary movement begin im-
mediately on the night of 6 March. The men were exhausted, cold, and
hungry—with empty ration bags owing to Van Dorn’s strict orders to trav-
el lightly. McCulloch asked Van Dorn to reconsider his movement order
to allow the soldiers to sleep for a few hours and attack the following day.
Van Dorn would hear none of this. His glory depended on beating Curtis
to the punch and forcing him to surrender.

10
Van Dorn based his analysis of the situation on a fatal assumption.
He believed that Curtis was concentrating in order to retreat, not fight,
and closed his mind to any alternative. Curtis’ subordinates, however,
understood their commander meant to destroy the Confederate force and
sought opportunities to set the conditions for success. COL Grenville
Dodge, commanding a brigade in Carr’s division, suggested to Curtis that
the Bentonville Detour be sown with obstacles to hinder exactly what Van
Dorn now proposed to do. As a result, when the Confederates moved into
the narrow defile, they soon encountered two separate “mazes” of felled
trees which Dodge’s men had constructed. Moreover, poor Confederate
staff work placed the infantry and artillery ahead of the cavalry in the
movement order. As a result, the rebels’ first indication of a problem was
when Price’s infantry blundered into the fallen trees just after midnight.
Instead of being formed for battle as the sun rose, Van Dorn’s column was
stretched out over a dozen miles and men by the hundreds straggled in the
woods along the road prostrated by hunger and fatigue.
Figure 3.
Like his initial plan, Van Dorn’s second attack order seemed simple.
Moreover, the intended target of the attack was a high payoff target. The
entire supply train of the Army of the Southwest was scattered across the
open ground adjacent to the Elkhorn Tavern. Had the Confederates moved
successfully to the federal rear and seized the Wire Road at the tavern,
Curtis would have been faced with re-orienting his force 180 degrees and
launching a hasty attack, or surrender. Because Price’s exhausted infantry
could not concentrate, however, by the time Van Dorn began his attack,

11
Carr had moved the Union trains out of danger and had established a de-
fensive line against which Price’s men would batter themselves for most
of the afternoon. In an attempt to remain on schedule, Van Dorn had modi-
fied his plan when he realized he could not bring his entire force to bear in
time for battle. Realizing the Detour was hopelessly clogged, Van Dorn
directed McCulloch to leave the Detour and take the Ford Road laterally
across Pea Ridge and linkup with Van Dorn’s force at Elkhorn Tavern. In
doing so, however, McCulloch marched blindly into a decisive engage-
ment of his own, leaving Price to attack unsupported.
McCulloch welcomed his new orders after spending most of the eve-
ning immobile in subfreezing temperatures due to the congestion on the
Bentonville Detour. Extricating his men, his entire division moved east
toward the pass between Big Mountain and Little Mountain. Even be-
fore sunrise, however, federal pickets identified the threat and Curtis dis-
patched Osterhaus with instructions to locate and engage this force. Os-
terhaus deployed three infantry regiments with three batteries and several
cavalry companies into Oberson’s Field, facing north. A spoiling attack
by a detachment of the 3d Iowa Cavalry met with disaster when nearly all
3,000 men of McIntosh’s cavalry brigade charged their attackers. Three
guns were lost and over 100 men were killed or captured. In their only
active involvement in the battle, Pike’s Cherokees swooped down on the
hopelessly outnumbered Federals. Several Iowans were scalped and muti-
lated before the Indians were frightened away by Union artillery fire.
Figure 4.

12
Rather than bypass Osterhaus, McCulloch halted his force in column
on the Ford Road. McCulloch assumed command of half of the infantry
brigade himself, leaving Colonel Louis Hébert in command of the other
half. He ordered Hébert to form for a general attack and move forward
when he heard McCulloch’s wing engage the Union line. McIntosh was
directed to reform his cavalry and prepare to resume the march. Only
Goode’s Texas battery was unlimbered to support the assault; three others
remained on the road. Union 12-pound howitzers, firing blindly, inflict-
ed severe losses on the infantry ranks and their shots went mostly unan-
swered. Chance again intervened on the battlefield when McCulloch was
shot down while making a personal reconnaissance. His death was kept
secret for fear of demoralizing his men; McIntosh was informed and as-
sumed command but he was killed in exactly the same way less than two
hours later. Hébert mistook the fusillade which killed McIntosh as the
signal to advance. His well-trained Louisianans, the cream of Van Dorn’s
army, were mowed down when two additional Union brigades arrived to
reinforce Osterhaus and caught Hébert’s men in an L-shaped kill sack.
Hébert himself was captured after wandering through the Union lines, de-
lirious from thirst, hunger and fatigue. What remained of McCulloch’s
command disintegrated. Some retreated west to the Confederate trains
while the rest under Pike backtracked to the Bentonville Detour and fol-
lowed the Confederate main body. They did not link up with Van Dorn
until dawn of the following day.
Figure 5.

13
When he sent Osterhaus to the west, Curtis was also aware of Price’s
movement on the Bentonville Detour. What he did not yet know was
which of the three threats (south, north, or west) was Van Dorn’s main ef-
fort and which were feints. On his own volition, COL Dodge directed his
entire brigade to abandon their positions overlooking Little Sugar Creek
and move to Elkhorn Tavern, so sure was Dodge that the main Confeder-
ate attack would come in that area. Coming upon Dodge’s troops, Curtis
ordered Dodge (who was Osterhaus’ subordinate) to reinforce COL Carr’s
weak division at the Tavern around 1100. Shortly afterward, Curtis rode
to his forward positions overlooking the creek and after listening to the
lackluster firing of a diversionary Confederate force, directed Asboth to
abandon the entrenchments above Little Sugar Creek and form a defensive
line about 1,000 yards west of Elkhorn Tavern. By the time Price’s ex-
hausted Missourians had fought their way out of Cross Timber Hollow and
onto Pea Ridge, they were incapable of overcoming the federal defenses.
They passed the night of 7-8 March where the advance had stopped, not
bothering to entrench.

Figure 6.
All through the night, while Pike led the remnants of McCulloch’s
division to Van Dorn, the Union leadership rearranged their defenses. By

14
sunrise on the 8th, Curtis had successfully reoriented his entire army to
face Van Dorn. In the growing glare of a clear frozen day, exhausted rebels
awoke to see the sun glinting on the bayonets and illuminating the colors
of the Army of the Southwest, arrayed across their front and supported by
nearly 50 guns. General Sigel, after playing almost no part in the previous
day’s fighting, personally sited the Union artillery. Van Dorn’s artillery,
by contrast, had used up almost all its ammunition during the previous
day’s attacks and again, poor staff work prevented timely resupply. Out
of ammunition, rebel gunners resorted to loading nails, horseshoes, tools,
and forks and knives but could not prevent the surging lines of blue from
prevailing. In the only instance of its kind in the Civil War, the entire
Army of the Southwest charged Van Dorn’s lines, sweeping the exhausted
Confederates into a rout so complete that Missouri and Arkansas ceased
to be active theaters of war for nearly a year. Although not destroyed, Van
Dorn’s army required months to reconstitute and therefore couldn’t rein-
force Johnston for his battle against Grant at Shiloh a month later.
For further reading
William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess. Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the
West. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
Earl J. Hess, Richard W. Hatcher III, William Garrett Piston, and William
L. Shea. Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, & Prairie Grove: A Battlefield
Guide with a Section on the Wire Road. Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 2006.
William L. Shea. The Campaign for Pea Ridge. National Park Civil War
Series. Washington, DC: Eastern National Publishing, 2001.
For further viewing
Mark Kachelmeier. Pea Ridge: The Turning Point
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sr1aO-nrxdY
Smithsonian Institute. Rare Footage of Civil War Veterans Doing the
Rebel Yell

Battle of Pea Ridge Reenactment.

15
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Pea Ridge case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. Van Dorn commanded
through force of will rather than by understanding his subordinates and
seeking to secure their wholehearted support. His lack of understanding
of BG McCulloch’s experience and capability was particularly damaging
during the campaign and when the battle began.
2. Create Shared Understanding. Van Dorn relied on McCulloch and
Price to provide him with the details of terrain and the Union dispositions.
He made no plan to utilize his vastly superior cavalry capability as a
reconnaissance or raiding force. As a result, he allowed Curtis to reorient
his forces without distraction and condemned his men to march along the
Bentonville Detour into the obstacles created by Dodge’s men. A quick
reconnaissance by cavalry would have revealed the blockage, and enabled
the entire force to shift to the Ford Road. Had Van Dorn chosen that course
of action he would have overwhelmed Curtis.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. Van Dorn’s intent, “personal
glory,” was hard to measure, and the key tasks provided to his subordinates
were not always clearly explained. As a result, McIntosh allowed himself
to be surprised by the Union outpost on Elm Springs Road because he
failed to understand the criticality of the counter-reconnaissance fight.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. No one in Van Dorn’s army appears
to have understood the importance of flexibility, or of the requirement
to adapt to changing conditions by altering plans while staying within
the commander’s intent. McCulloch allowed himself to be sucked into a
meaningless engagement rather than come to Price’s support on 7 March.
As a result, Price was unable to overcome Union resistance. Similarly,
McIntosh, Hebert, and Pike demonstrated only a slavish obedience to the
plan. McIntosh and Hebert in particular should be faulted for not pressing
McCulloch to either bypass Osterhaus or apply the full weight of the
division’s artillery.

16
5. Use Mission Orders. Van Dorn did issue mission orders throughout
the short campaign, but only because he preferred to avoid details.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. Van Dorn accepted risk in his moving to
Curtis’ rear, where he was also putting Curtis between himself and his
own line of communication. Had he been able to concentrate and attack on
schedule, it would have paid off. But by ignoring the condition of his men,
the weather, the terrain, and the fact that he failed to clearly communicate
to McCulloch not to delay his movement on the Ford Road, he himself set
the conditions for his own defeat.

17
Extending the Line at Little Round Top, July 1863
John J. McGrath
At the Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863, Union forces failed
to dislodge GEN Robert E. Lee’s Confederates from positions south of
the Rappahannock River in Virginia halfway between Washington and
Richmond. In response to his victory, Lee led his forces on an invasion of
the northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania. This invasion set the
stage for an ultimate showdown between his forces and those of the Union
Army of the Potomac commanded by MG Joseph Hooker. When a chance
encounter between Confederate infantry and Union cavalry northwest of
the crossroads town of Gettysburg on 1 July 1863 evolved accidentally
into a major battle, Lee had his showdown.
As most of the Confederate forces were closer to Gettysburg than
were the Union forces, they were able to consolidate more quickly north
of Gettysburg and overwhelm the Federal troops, forcing them to retreat
through the town and occupy high ground to the south as darkness arrived
on the battlefield. Several days earlier, MG George Meade, formerly Fifth
Corps Commander, had replaced Hooker as the commander of the Army
of the Potomac. During the night, the bulk of both armies arrived. Meade
decided to defend the high ground south of Gettysburg the next day while
awaiting the arrival of his last two (Fifth and Sixth) Corps. At the same
time, Lee decided to follow up his success with an attack against Meade’s
forces on 2 July 1863.
Lee decided to have his Second Corps, commanded by LTG James
Longstreet, mass against the Union left (southern) flank and attack it in
a maneuver designed to overwhelm the Union position by outflanking it.
Lee and Longstreet had used just such a maneuver successfully almost
a year earlier at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Longstreet intended to
march his command using covering terrain in order to surprise the Federal
defenders and then to attack en echelon, a technique in which each of
his units would attack in succession from south to north in order to have
maximum effect of the defenders, who could be expected to be responding
to the previous attacks when the subsequent ones commenced.

18
Figure 1. Map. General Situation, 1 July 1863.
Meade planned on defending the high ground south of the town with a
continuous line anchored on two hills (Culp’s Hill and Little Round Top)
on each flank. The position from north to south consisted of Culp’s Hill,
Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and Little Round Top and formed a semi-
circle around Culp’s and Cemetery Hill with a longer line extending south
along Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top. Initially defending the extreme
southern end of this line was MG Daniel Sickles’ Third Corps. Sickles was
still smarting from being ordered to retreat from a strong position at Hazel
Grove during the Battle of Chancellorsville several weeks earlier and
being forced to fight on less favorable ground. Accordingly, using his own

19
initiative, he advanced his corps forward to the west to positions along the
Emmitsburg Road which he felt were superior to those assigned him. To
cover this advanced position, Sickles placed two brigades on his left flank.
However, Little Round Top, to the rear of the new Third Corps line, was
left unoccupied.
Sickles initiative failed to take into account the intent of his commander,
Meade, for fighting the battle. Meade planned to fight a defensive battle
along a continuous line that did not have any gaps and was anchored by two
prominent terrain features that would make it difficult for the Confederates
to outflank it. Sickles’ deployment, conducted in a manner uncoordinated
with the rest of the army, left Meade’s left flank exposed right at the very
place where Lee planned to attack with Longstreet’s corps.
Little Round Top, while smaller in elevation than its southern neighbor,
Round Top, was of greater military significance than the higher hill mass,
both of which were covered by extensive foliage, because local farmers
had recently cleared the western slope of Little Round Top of cover giving
troops located on the hilltop extensive fields of observation and fire to the
west towards the Emmitsburg Road and Seminary Ridge (where the bulk
of the Confederate forces were assembled) as wells as to the north along
Cemetery Ridge. A military force occupying Little Round Top would,
therefore, possess a great advantage.
With Sickles occupying forward positions along the Emmitsburg Road,
Longstreet’s attack force, after a laborious and convoluted march behind
Seminary Ridge that took most of the day of 2 July, emerged in covered
attack positions on Sickles’ left flank late in the afternoon. Longstreet
intended to open his attack with MG John Hood’s First Division followed
by MG Lafayette McLaws’ Second Division, to Hood’s right opposite
Sickles’ main line. From their start positions, Hood’s brigades would
overlap and outflank the two brigades that Sickles had placed to cover his
left and advance directly on Little Round Top. Unless Union forces were
promptly moved to the hill, Hood threatened to outflank the whole Union
position without much of a fight. Such a situation had doomed the Federal
defenders at the Battle of Second Bull Run.
Meade had been holding the recently arrived Fifth Corps in reserve
to the rear of the main position when his last major unit, the Sixth Corps,
arrived. The Union commander decided to reinforce the left flank with the
Fifth Corps, placing the tired Sixth Corps in reserve. Accordingly, Meade
rode with his staff to the left in advance of the corps to determine the best
location for the new unit and then discovered that Sickles had moved his
troops forward of their assigned positions. At about the same time, Hood’s
men began their attack. Since Hood’s right wing was close to Sickles’

20
troops, they opened fire from a distance, indicating to Meade that it was
too late to have Sickles return to his assigned posting. To accommodate
the gap in the lines, Meade now ordered MG George Sykes’ Fifth Corps,
already on its way to the left flank, to reinforce Sickles. Meanwhile, Meade
noticed the danger in the vicinity of Little Round Top and instructed his
chief engineer, BG Gouverneur Warren who was accompanying him,
according to one of Warren’s aides, as follows, “Warren! I hear a little
peppering going on in the direction of the little hill off yonder. I wish that
you would ride over and if anything serious is going on … attend to it.”
With this guidance, Warren and several aides rode to the summit of
Little Round Top and found it occupied only by a small signal station. Not
sure of the enemy situation, the chief engineer sent a courier down to a
battery posted with Sickles’ flank guard west of Little Round Top and had
the battery fire a round over the dense foliage to the southwest of Little
Round Top, vegetation which could cover the advance of a considerable
body of enemy troops. As the round passed over the trees, Warren could
see the gleam from the bayonets of the advancing Confederate infantry
as the men flinched at the sound of the cannon shot. It was obvious that
enemy forces were located in a position to outflank not only Sickles’ corps
but the entire army.
Warren knew he had to take immediate action. He promptly sent
couriers to Sickles requesting a unit to garrison Little Round Top. Since
the Third Corps was now in action, Warren felt that he had little hope of
getting help from that quarter. However, he did notice that the first elements
of Sykes’ Fifth Corps were arriving along the road north of Little Round
Top, sent by Meade to reinforce Sickles. Warren’s courier to Sickles,
1LT Ranald Mackenzie, had received the expected negative response to
his request for aid. However, while returning to Warren, Mackenzie ran
into Sykes who agreed to send a brigade from his lead division to Little
Round Top. When Mackenzie was unable to immediately find the division
commander, the commander of the lead brigade, COL Strong Vincent,
realized the gravity of the situation and volunteered to move his brigade
without delay to Little Round Top. The brigade, officially the Third
Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps, consisted of four regiments of: 16th
Michigan, the 44th New York, the 83d Pennsylvania, and the 20th Maine.
Feeling the west side of the hill was protected by the troops of the Third
Corps he could plainly see from the height, Vincent deployed his brigade
on the southern side of Little Round Top. As deployed, the brigade had no
troops on either its left or right flanks. The left flank, defended by the 16th

21
Michigan, was protected at least in the abstract, by the distant Third Corps
but the left flank, where the 20th Maine was positioned, was the extreme
left flank of the entire army, at least until reinforcements arrived. Within
minutes of the brigade’s deployment, it was attacked by two brigades of
the Confederate right flanking force.
Figure 2. Map. Longstreet’s Attack.
The two brigades were from Hood’s division. On the extreme right, was
BG Evander Law’s brigade of five Alabama regiments. To Law’s immediate
left, advanced BG Jerome Robertson’s brigade with two Texas regiments.
The pair of brigades had conducted an exhaustive advance, covered by the
wooded terrain. In the process, Law’s two left regiments got tied down in
the fighting with Sickles flank guard around a rocky outcropping dubbed
Devil’s Den. Robertson took up the space in the middle of Law’s brigade.
The deployment of Vincent’s brigade placed it right in front of Law and
Robertson’s advance on Little Round Top. The tired Confederates twice
advanced out of the cover of the trees and charged up the rugged, rocky,
open terrain on the south side of Little Round Top. Vincent’s men fought
heroically and repulsed these two attacks. The Confederates prepared for
a third advance.

22
Meanwhile, the Fifth Corps artillery chief had ordered a six-gun
battery commanded by 1LT Charles Hazlett to move to Little Round Top
to support the corps projected move to reinforce Sickles. It took some time
for the guns to be manhandled to the top of the hill. Hazlett was familiar
with Warren, having supported the brigade he commanded at the Second
Battle of Bull Run the year before. Warren briefly helped to manhandle
the guns up the slope. However, he soon rode off to find reinforcements
himself.
Warren went down to the east-west road north of Little Round Top
where he encountered BG Stephen Weed’s brigade (Third Brigade, Second
Division, Fifth Corps) moving westerly on the road, the advance element
of Sykes’ second division marching forward to reinforce Sickles. When
Warren arrived, Weed, the brigade commander, was forward with Sickles.
Leading the brigade’s march was COL Patrick O’Rorke, the commander
of the 140th New York.
COL Patrick O’Rorke
National Archives

23
Warren knew O’Rorke well. He had been an instructor at West Point
when O’Rorke finished first in the class of 1861. Warren had previously
commanded the same brigade during the Seven Days Battles, Second
Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. O’Rorke had commanded it at
Chancellorsville. The 140th New York (under O’Rorke) had been part of
the brigade since the Battle of Fredericksburg, when Warren still was in
command. Of the other three regiments in the brigade, one (the 146th New
York) had served under Warren and also contained former members of his
original regiment (the 5th New York). The other two regiments (the 91st
and 155th Pennsylvania) were veteran units but had previously served in
other brigades.
Warren rode up to O’Rorke and asked for a regiment to man the hill.
The New Yorker told his former commander that his current brigade
commander (Weed) had moved forward and expected the brigade to follow.
Warren told him, “Never mind that, bring your regiment up here and I
will take responsibility.” Given his knowledge of Warren’s character and
tactical abilities, O’Rorke did not hesitate further. He turned his regiment
to the left and, led by one of Warren’s aides, began climbing the hill.
Although their first two attacks had been repulsed, the Confederates
still had hopes of breaking through the Federal defenses. On the right, the
15th Alabama had discovered the Union left flank and Law felt one more
push could collapse it. On the left, Robertson’s two regiments were now
reinforced with Law’s 48th Alabama, a unit which had been delayed by
the fighting near Devil’s Den but was now free to advance to the left of
the two Texas regiments. The addition of the 48th Alabama meant that the
Confederate attack frontage on Vincent’s left opposite the 16th Michigan
now overlapped that of the defenders. The 48th Alabama would be able to
outflank and overwhelm the 16th Michigan while it was fighting to its front
against Robertson’s Texans. With other Confederate units attacking the
rest of the brigade, Vincent’s command was threatened with destruction.
The battle soon became intense between the 16th Michigan and the 48th
Alabama and 4th and 5th Texas. Vincent personally commanded until he
was mortally wounded. It seemed his brigade was about to collapse.

24
Figure 3. Map. O’Rorke Reinforces Little Round Top.
At this moment, O’Rorke’s men appeared over the top of the hill
advancing quickly in a column of fours around Hazlett’s guns and aiming
for the exact point of the Confederate breakthrough. O’Rorke, with
sword drawn, led the regiment down towards the enemy. At this point,
one of the advancing Alabamans fired at and killed O’Rorke. Rather than
demoralizing the New Yorkers, O’Rorke’s death made the men angry and
more aggressive. The regiment opened fire and drove down the forward
slope of the hill, setting up a defensive line to the right of the 16th Michigan.

25
After minutes of fierce close combat, the Confederate attack was spent and
the Southerners retreated to the cover of the trees at the bottom of the hill.
Although there were still some further attacks on the front of the 20th
Maine to the left, these were ultimately repulsed. The 140th New York
had saved Vincent’s men from being overwhelmed on the right and had
secured Little Round Top for the rest of the battle. This short defensive
battle had cost the regiment dearly. Out of about 500 men, casualties were
25 dead including COL O’Rorke, 89 wounded and 18 missing.
The regiment was soon reinforced by the rest of Weed’s brigade. The
brigade had continued down the road in response to its assigned mission
and linked up with its commander. BG Stephen Weed had been recently
promoted to command of the brigade. As an artilleryman, Weed’s previous
assignment was as commander of the Fifth Corps artillery brigade. One of
his aides was Warren’s younger brother. While forward, a courier informed
Weed that Sykes, his corps commander, had changed the brigade’s mission.
The unit would join the 140th New York on Little Round Top. By the time
Weed’s men arrived on the hilltop and took up positions to the right of the
140th, the major action was over. However, Confederate snipers continued
to fire at the defenders. Both Weed and Hazlett were mortally wounded by
these sharpshooters.
The defense of Little Round Top succeeded for several reasons.
Meade gave Warren guidance and expected that he would do what was
necessary to protect the army’s left flank. Warren, in turn, displayed
vigorous initiative, energetically seeking out units to fill the gap on the
hill. As a former brigade commander In the Fifth Corps, he was familiar to
all the senior officers he encountered. This familiarity enhanced his ability
to persuade commanders to move their troops according to his general
instructions even though they were not under his command. O’Rorke,
in particular, responded vigorously and, while he gave his life for this
reaction, the arrival of his troops saved the day for the Union position just
in time.
For Further Reading
Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds. Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, 4 vols. New York: Century Company, 1884-89. Reprint,
New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956.
Oliver Norton. The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, Gettysburg,
July 2, 1863. New York: Neale, 1913.
Harry Pfanz. Gettysburg: The Second Day. Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 1987.

26
United States War Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington, DC: War Department, 1880-1901), Volume 27, Part 1.

27
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Little Round Top case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. All units of this
operation were veteran organizations, most of which had worked together
in the past. Warren had previously commanded Weed’s brigade and knew
all its senior officers. Weed had previously been an artillery battery and
brigade commander who had supported the units and senior officers
involved. Warren knew O’Rorke from when the former had been his
brigade commander. Hazlett’s battery had supported Warren’s brigade at
the Second Battle of Bull Run.
2. Create Shared Understanding. Warren was on Meade’s staff as
chief engineer and present for all major decisions. He had toured the lines
with Meade and was, therefore, very familiar with Meade’s concept for
the defense. O’Rorke and Weed, having previously served with or under
Warren, were also familiar with his tactical sense and were able to quickly
respond to his instructions without requiring time consuming details. All
officers involved quickly realized the danger posed by a Confederate
attack on Little Round Top and responded energetically.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. Meade gave clear guidance
but it was of such a general nature that Sickles’ interpreted it for his own
means. Other officers, including Sykes, Warren, O’Rorke and Weed, were
forced to use their own initiative to recover from Sickles’ interpretation,
which threatened the whole left flank of the army. That these officers, all
of whom, unlike Sickles, were professionally trained, were able to respond
as Meade expected them to, demonstrates that Meade’s intent was clear to
them.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Meade’s intent clearly provided
latitude for initiative among his subordinates within certain parameters.
These limits, while seeming obvious to the military professional, were

28
less apparent to political generals such as Sickles. While subordinates
were granted freedom in deploying their units, this was limited in that
no subordinate commander could place his unit in a position that may be
optimal for the unit but less than optimal for the army as a whole, particularly
without coordination with the effected units. Therefore, sickles displayed
undisciplined initiative. However, Warren, Vincent, O’Rorke and Weed all
demonstrated disciplined initiative, adjusting their decisions and actions
within Meade’s general concept of defense to a changing enemy situation
that required a swift response. Vincent and O’Rorke displayed initiative
at an even lower level, responding without orders from their immediate
commanders to what they saw as an emergency situation. Their responses
proved to be correct.
5. Use Mission Orders. Meade had only been in command of the
Army of the Potomac for several days by the time of the battle. As such
he typically issued general directives and appointed key subordinates to
lead parts of the army in his absence. The use of such general directives
led to situations such as Sickles’ deployment, where Meade’s intent was
not followed. However, using the mission paradigm, the army commander
responded by depending on key subordinates, such as chief engineer
Warren, to translate his intent into action on the battlefield and respond
to changes in the situation (such as an imminent enemy attack on an
unoccupied Little Round Top).
6. Accept Prudent Risk. The uncertainty of the nature of the Confederate
attack played a key role in this action. Sickles, unaware of the exact axis
of the Confederate attack, chose to occupy a position more advantageous
for his corps but less advantageous for the army as a whole. Then he
compounded his imprudence by failing to coordinate his movements with
the rest of the army. Meade quickly realized the uncertainty on his left flank
and prudently sent reinforcements there from the Fifth Corps as soon as
they became available. From these reinforcements, which were originally
given relatively vague missions, subordinates on the spot were able to
prudently change these missions into new assignments by taking the risk
that the continued possession of Little Round Top by friendly forces was
more important than any other tasks these units could have been doing at
the time.

Section 2: Cases at Brigade/Regiment/Battalion Level

31
Nelson, Mission Command, and The Battle of Nile
John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.
The Battle of the Nile occurred off the coast of Egypt on the night
of 1-2 August 1798. The Nile numbers among the most decisive naval
engagements in modern history and remains a monument to the superior
training, tactics, organization, and especially leadership of the Royal Navy
of the period. This vignette looks at the supreme commander of the British
Fleet at the Nile, Admiral Lord Viscount Horatio Nelson, Baron of the
Nile. One finds all the elements of mission command employed by Nelson
in his annihilation of the French fleet anchored not far from the Nile
Delta at Aboukir Bay that night. Nelson left a profound legacy to mission
command that still affects how navies, and especially the United States
Navy, operate today. Nelson codified for the Royal and all other navies,
the guiding principle of pre-battle centralized planning and decentralized
violent execution in combat while at the same time underwriting the
tactical initiative of his subordinates. His subordinates in turn relied in a
similar fashion on the teamwork and initiative of their crews. Similarly,
we find that Nelson’s commander, Admiral John Jervis, also exercised a
form of mission command in how he “controlled” his talented subordinate.
The vignette thus demonstrates how mission command at all echelons of
command can be a profound force multiplier.
* * *
The period prior to the actual battle has much to teach us about mission
command in the Royal Navy, what Nelson himself called the “The Nelson
Touch.”
In 1798, France and Great Britain had already been at war with each
other for five years after the French Republic beheaded King Louis XVI.
Since then, the war between France and most of the rest of Europe had
gone back and forth and the stalemate had only been broken in 1797 by
the fabulous victories of a young French general in Italy named Napoleon
Bonaparte. For much of 1797, Britain faced the French alone including
a threat of invasion. The British disposed of this threat through battle
and luck. The French had hoped to invade the British Isles proper using
a combination of three fleets: the Spanish, Dutch, and French. However,
British admirals had smashed the first two fleets at the battles of Cape
St. Vincent (February 1797) and Camperdown (October 1797). As a final
blow, a late season hurricane destroyed many of the French bateaux (light
flat-bottomed boats) that were being built up for the invasion of England

32
in late 1797, although the French fleet without the Dutch would have
probably cancelled the invasion even without the storm damage. Napoleon
proposed to the Directory (French National Government in 1797) that he
instead attack Great Britain by the indirect route by seizing Malta and
Egypt to threaten Britain’s long and vulnerable line of communication
with its most important colony in India. The Directory, wanting to get rid
of the political threat posed by General Bonaparte, agreed and dispatched
him with over 44,000 troops and the entire French Mediterranean Fleet
to accomplish this task. Bonaparte captured Malta and then proceeded
leisurely to Egypt where he landed unmolested and defeated the local
Egyptian Mameluke Army at the Battle of the Pyramids (July 1798).
In 1797, Horatio Nelson was one of the youngest admirals in the Royal
Navy and with Admiral John Jervis commanding the British Mediterranean
Fleet; Nelson won everlasting glory at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent.
It was here that the first elements of Nelson’s decentralized command
style are first clearly seen. Nelson, disobeying the famous Standing
Battle Orders that were rigid tactical doctrine of the Royal Navy of that
day, wore (maneuvered) out of the battle line without orders and sailed
straight for the middle of the Spanish column where the most powerful
ships sailed, including the massive flagship Santissima Trinidad with 140
guns. Nelson’s aggressiveness and ability to act independently had been
known in the fleet but now they were on display for all to see. Jervis,
aboard the Victory with 100 guns, saw Nelson now engage seven enemy
battleships with his one. He approved the action and signaled the Diadem
and Excellent to support him. Jervis then sent out the same signal to the
remainder of his ships that Nelson himself sent from Victory at Trafalgar,
“Engage the enemy more closely.” Obviously, Jervis had created a shared
understanding with subordinates. Nelson followed this success with his
first defeat in an amphibious assault on the Spanish garrison at Tenerife in
the Canary Islands, where he lost his right arm.
Nelson’s record at Cape St. Vincent ensured his assignment to the
critical theater of the war in 1798 again under Jervis. Nelson raised his
flag on Vanguard in late March and set sail for the Gulf of Cadiz. Jervis’s
confidence in Nelson was unbounded. As soon as Nelson arrived to join
the fleet on blockade duty of Cadiz, Jervis detached him on an independent
command with a small squadron to enter the Mediterranean and keep
an eye on the French fleet in Toulon. Jervis forwarded another eleven
battleships to Nelson in May 1798, an unprecedented command for such a
junior admiral which caused much grumbling amongst the many admirals
senior to him without sea command. Jervis instructed Nelson to search

33
for Bonaparte’s invasion force, suspected to be bound for Egypt. Nelson’s
plan was simple, intercept the invasion fleet and destroy Napoleon and his
army at sea.
Jervis’s faith in Nelson was rewarded but not right away. Nelson’s
impatience almost did him in but he was tenacious in pursuit of his quarry.
Nelson had been off Toulon prior to his reinforcement but had sailed
off and then had his small squadron scattered by a storm. Napoleon had
departed on 19 May, escorted by the French fleet under Admiral Francois-
Paul Brueys. Nelson was desperately short of frigates (he had only three)
to provide him intelligence and he guessed Napoleon’s destination was
Naples. Napoleon instead went to Malta and quickly conquered that small
island. Nelson realized his mistake and determined that Napoleon’s next
objective was Alexandria, Egypt. He arrived off Alexandria on 29 June and
found nothing. Brueys and Napoleon had taken a different route via Crete
and sailed far slower than Nelson imagined. Nelson missed a great chance
by not waiting off Alexandria, instead second-guessing himself and sailing
north to Turkey to seek the French fleet. While Nelson sailed north, the
French arrived and began to debark their troops. It seemed that Nelson had
lost the game of cat and mouse and missed a golden opportunity to destroy
both a French Army and a French Fleet.
Nelson did not give up. Off Sicily, he learned of his mistake and
doubled back to Alexandria. He arrived late on 1 August and found the
transports empty but Brueys’ 13 battleships and many smaller warships
lay anchored close in to shore in the shallow and treacherous shoal water
of Aboukir Bay. Brueys had unwisely sent half of his gun crews ashore
to assist Napoleon with the land campaign. He also thought himself
unassailable so close in to the shore. The final nail in his coffin was the late
hour of the day. Surely Nelson would not attack in such dangerous waters
in the dark. Nelson, demonstrating his intuitive grasp of the weakness of
the French, instantly decided to attack.
Nelson had already planned for this moment and so could make the
decision almost instantaneously to attack the vulnerable French ships. To
understand how he prepared, one must go back many years. First, Nelson
actively fought for the welfare of his sailors from the beginning of his
career until his death in combat in 1805. This was known by the sailors
who served under him and generated a confidence in his decision-making
and leadership. Second, Nelson’s rapid and seemingly “snap” decision-
making in combat was not so much luck or intuition, although these
certainly played a role, but were in the words of one historian, “achieved
by decisions made in the quiet of his cabin.” In other words, Nelson

34
prepared himself intellectually at all times for decision making, tactical
and otherwise, through reflection during the often lengthy downtime that
one experiences at sea.
For this battle, Nelson had the complete confidence of his 14 battleship
captains and this was rewarded by his confidence in them. Nelson also had
the advantage of having some of the best captains, ships, and crews in the
entire Royal Navy under his command at this battle. The 10 battleships
that St. Vincent sent him under Sir Thomas Troubridge, who had served
as a midshipman with Nelson, were later referred to by Nelson himself as
“the finest Squadron that ever sailed the Ocean.” He also knew most of
their captains personally after having served with most them in combat,
three he knew by reputation alone. He soon remedied this deficiency by
proactive efforts. After barely missing the French at Alexandria and as he
sailed about looking for them, Nelson instituted the policy of bringing his
captains aboard the flagship individually to eat with him and share ideas.
In the words of a contemporary observer, “he would fully develop them to
his own ideas of the different and best modes of Attack…they could [as a
result] ascertain with precision what were the ideas and intentions of their
commander without the aid of further instructions.”
Nelson brought his four most senior captains aboard his flagship HMS
Vanguard on 22 June and asked them for their opinion on which way the
French might have gone. They all voted for Alexandria as they were all
thinking along the same lines as Nelson. This shows how interested the
admiral was and how much he trusted in his subordinates’ judgment. Just
before turning the squadron back to Alexandria on 17 July, Nelson brought
all 14 captains to the flagship to ensure commonality of purpose and a
shared understanding for what he expected from them in the battle he
was convinced would occur soon if he could only find the French Fleet.
Nelson’s only real “error” prior to the battle involved his reluctance to
formally appoint a second-in-command since he was actually junior in
terms of service time to several of his subordinate captains and did not want
to upset the cohesion of the team. Perhaps he was thinking that if he was
killed (a distinct possibility given his habit of being in the thick of battle),
they would all continue to do their duty out of sense of obligation to him
rather than have their own fighting focus diminished by petty jealousies.
As the British fleet closed on the French in Aboukir Bay, Nelson had
14 battleships to 13 of the French but the French had the heavier weight of
gunnery in bigger ships and bigger guns. Upon sighting the enemy fleet,
Nelson issued signals 53 and 54 from the Royal Navy’s official signal
books. The first simply alerted all the crews of his fleet to “prepare for

35
battle.” The second directed them to be ready to anchor at a moment’s
notice by the stern of the ship, a rare maneuver requiring the rigging of a
very large anchor and cable at the rear of each ship. This order meant, as
well, that each captain and his crew would have to anchor under enemy fire
while unable to fire their guns and fully occupied with furling (taking down)
all of their sails. Obviously both a cohesive team and shared understanding
had to be present for this unprecedented tactic to be executed properly.
Each captain, and more importantly their crews, knew exactly what this
maneuver meant and welcomed it. Further, each captain received the order
and executed it without signaling back to Nelson for any further guidance.
This was only possible because they all knew their commander intimately,
they knew their ships (their “weapons system”) intimately, and they knew
that their enemy was unprepared both for battle and especially for this
unprecedented maneuver. Nelson intended for his anchoring to take place
in a single battle line between the French line and the open sea.
Battle of the Nile – British double envelopment of the French Fleet.
The second, we might say higher, level of mission command emerges
in what the captains then did in response to Nelson’s guidance to them
about relying on their own initiative. Since he was in the rear aboard
Vanguard with (74 guns), Nelson effectively gave his captains free
reign when he sent the signal to his ships at 1730 “to form line as most
convenient,” leaving it to their discretion how to approach the French
fleet. The execution was not without some flaws. Captain Troubridge on
Culloden (74 guns) ran aground just north of the French on the approach,

36
but this accident served to let the ships behind know where the hazard
lay. Several ships performed the anchoring maneuver badly and paid with
heavy casualties as a result of being out of position but Nelson’s other
captains served him well. The aggressive captain of the lead ship Goliath
(74 guns) was Captain Sir Thomas Foley. He instantly made the decision to
go behind the first French ships and inside the French line. About half the
other captains followed his initiative while Nelson signaled the remainder
to follow the Majestic (74 guns) on the northern side (see figure). This
resulted in a double envelopment of the French ships in the first part of the
line. Their mates further down the line were anchored solid and could not
help them.
To make matters worse, some of the French ships had not strung cable
between their neighbors to counter the known British tactic of “breaking
the line” and then shooting broadsides longitudinally into the aft and bows
of the anchored French ships. Again, taking local tactical initiative, several
British ships of the line performed this maneuver, especially Leander (50
guns) and Alexander (74 guns), dealing out further bloody devastation
against the hapless French ships that were their targets. The night sky of
Alexandria was lit up with the din and spectacle of burning French ships as
Nelson pounded the French Fleet to pieces while his ships proceeded down
the line. Brueys’ flagship L’Orient (120 guns), the largest battleship in
the world, was surrounded and absorbed incredible punishment. L’Orient
managed a devastating return broadside against the first British ship she
faced, Bellerophon (74 guns), which, mishandling the anchoring tactic,
drifted away with heavy casualties. Around 2100 Brueys himself was
killed and his ship set afire by some combustible grenades that Captain
Alexander Ball of the Alexander had specially prepared to set French ships
afire if he could get close enough. Only Admiral Pierre Villeneuve in the
rear escaped with two battleships and two frigates. The rest of the French
Fleet, including 11 battleships, was destroyed or taken. Nelson, in the
thick of the fighting as usual, received a nasty head wound.
The battle continued through the night. The last two French ships,
Tonnant (80 guns) and Timoleon (74 guns) surrendered around daybreak.
Nelson had not lost a single ship and had less than 900 casualties, most of
these in ships that had mishandled the anchoring maneuver. By destroying
the French fleet, he had effectively checkmated France’s strategy by
stranding Napoleon’s army in Egypt. When Napoleon attempted to fight
his way through Ottoman Turkish territory in order to gain passage
to Europe or even India, he was confounded again by that other great
naval hero Sir Sydney Smith who successfully led the defense of Acre

37
on his own initiative, forcing Napoleon to turn back to Egypt. Napoleon
abandoned his army in 1799 and returned to France where he took over the
government in a coup d’etat.
After the Nile, Nelson’s fame reached unparalleled heights. The
Sultan of Turkey presented him with an elaborate diamond decoration that
Nelson wore on his large bicorn hat. The King rewarded him with the
title of Lord Nelson, Baron of the Nile, and his income doubled when he
received a ten thousand pound gift from the grateful East India Company.
He was the darling of the press and had reached what today is known as
“rock star” status. All of the complaining against both Nelson and Jervis
ceased, Jervis feeling more than vindicated by his decision to give the
young admiral a chance to strike a key blow. Many historians consider
the Nile to be Nelson’s most important victory, strategically and tactically.
However, for Nelson, his captains and crews at the Nile remained forever
in his heart and in his correspondence as his “band of brothers.”
For Further Reading
Terry Coleman. The Nelson Touch. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2002.
Arthur Herman. To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the
Modern World. New York: Harper Collins, 2004.
Roger Knight. The Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievement of Horatio
Nelson. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
Tom Pocock . Horatio Nelson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.
John Sugden. Nelson: The Sword of Albion. New York: Henry Hold and
Company, 2012.

39
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Battle of the Nile case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. All units of this
operation were veteran formations, most of which had worked together
in the past, including Nelson’s superior in command Admiral John Jervis,
Lord St. Vincent.
2. Create Shared Understanding. Admiral Nelson shared his vision
both individually and collectively with his captains. In turn, the captains
of at least 11 ships seem to have shared this vision with their crews given
their crews’ flawless execution of the dangerous stern anchoring maneuver
under fire.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. Nelson provided intent over
time, such as at one on one dinners in his cabin with individual subordinates
or larger meetings while at anchor with several captains at a time. His clear
objective focused on the destruction or capture of the entire French Fleet
while anchored or afloat. Nelson’s signals to his captains at the outset of
the battle set the tone and intent for the entire engagement.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Once Nelson sent his final signal
to the entire fleet, he gave his captains free reign. One of them initiated
the famous “doubling” tactic inside the French line in the most dangerous
shoal waters of the bay, which Nelson supported with his own maneuvers
and signals.
5. Use Mission Orders. British orders came from a pre-published
list in the Royal Navy Signal book as informed by the Standing Battle
Orders and, most importantly, the pre-battle briefings of the commander.
These approximated today’s mission orders, his presumption being that
he need not provide detailed guidance since he expected his captains to
all have mastered the pre-planned responses implied in signals and the
Battle Orders. The commander had a wide range of signals to choose from
to add additional clarity and flexibility. The constraints of naval combat
using signal flags mandated clear, cogent orders that would be understood
immediately by a subordinate captain.

40
6. Accept Prudent Risk. By the standards of any other navy, the risk
in attacking at night, in shoal water, under fire, while performing one of
the most difficult anchoring maneuvers would normally be characterized
as very risky, even foolhardy. However, Nelson’s confidence in the
seamanship of his captains, and their confidence in their crews and in
Nelson mitigated this risk. Further, in the Royal Navy, while the risk
for this sort of thing would probably have been considered a bit beyond
the norm, Nelson’s methods at this battle were universally applauded
by his fellow officers and by the senior leadership. After all, he had a
slight superiority in numbers of ships over the French. It would have been
considered a dereliction of duty and possibly a courts martial offense for a
British officer to have NOT attacked the French, although possibly not as
quickly and rapidly as Nelson did.

41
Assault on Queenston Heights, October 1812
Richard V. Barbuto, Ph.D.
In the dark early hours of a cold October day, a small group of
American infantry conducted an opposed river crossing to capture a gun
that threatened to defeat the major US operation – the invasion of Canada.
Despite the ultimate failure of the invasion, the activities of the men of this
intrepid band cleared the way for their comrades to cross the treacherous
waters of the Niagara River in relative security.
On 18 June 1812, the United States declared war on the British Empire.
President James Madison was determined to secure neutral shipping rights
and to stop the forced impressment of American sailors on the high seas by
Royal Navy captains looking to replenish their crews. Congress had taken
steps in January to prepare America for war by authorizing the formation
of new regiments of infantry, artillery, and light dragoons. However,
selecting hundreds of new officers and recruiting thousands of new soldiers
took time. Madison hoped to capture the key city of Montreal on the Saint
Lawrence River in 1812 and to follow up by seizing the fortress city of
Quebec the following year. However, execution fell short of intentions.
The first invasion of Canada, across the Detroit River in July, ended up
with the surrender of 2,400 regulars and militiamen in August.
The second invasion attempt, under New York militia MG Stephen
van Rensselaer, was expected to secure the Niagara River and to stand
ready for continued operations in support of the main invasion to take
Montreal scheduled for November. The Niagara River is a 37-mile long
strait emptying the waters of Lake Erie into Lake Ontario. The area is
cut by a steep-sided 180-foot tall escarpment that hinders north-south
movement. Because of the rapids leading to Niagara Falls and the steep
gorge north of the falls, the river was crossable for only a portion of its
length. The British had established artillery positions covering the likely
crossing sites to prevent a US assault.
MG van Rensselaer, who had no military experience himself, depended
heavily upon his distant cousin, LTC Solomon van Rensselaer. Solomon
had served as a junior officer in “Mad Anthony” Wayne’s successful war
against the Indians of the Old Northwest in 1794. Solomon had been shot
in the lungs but survived his near-fatal wounds. He left the regular army
and joined the New York militia. Now back in the field, he planned the
operation that would land an army of 4,000 militiamen and regulars on
Canadian shores to secure the invasion route.

42
MG van Rensselaer chose to cross the Niagara River near the village
of Queenston at the foot of the escarpment. At this point, the flat ground
on the top of the escarpment was called Queenston Heights. The river
spilled out of the Niagara Gorge at about four miles per hour. The flow,
generally north, was characterized by back currents and swirling eddies
that appeared and disappeared without warning. The river’s banks were
steep and between twenty and forty feet tall. While for most of its length
the river came right up to the banks, at intervals there appeared narrow
gravel beaches allowing the boats to land and the soldiers to disembark.
The best landing place was at the foot of Queenston Village where a
winding road connected a small dock to the river road atop the bank.
The commander of British forces along the Niagara River was none
other than the brave and daring MG Isaac Brock who had forced the
surrender of the garrison at Detroit. Despite being greatly outnumbered
by American forces across the Niagara River, Brock had built a balanced
defense and had established a system by which the local militia could
quickly be summoned in response to an American invasion. Brock
stationed two companies of regulars of the Forty-Ninth Regiment of
Foot at Queenston with one company in the village and the other atop
Queenston Heights. He placed a nine-pounder gun at the Queenston
Landing and an eighteen-pounder gun in a redan (fortification) about two-
thirds of the way up the escarpment. The redan was little more than a low
stone wall on a narrow ledge on the slope of the steep hill. British and
Canadian gunners in the redan had a clear field of fire across the river to
the potential embarkation points and could fire at boats as they transited
the dangerous waters. However, because the slope leading to the redan
was so steep, the gun could not be depressed to sweep the approaches to it
from the low ground below. The Americans were well aware of both guns
and judged the artillery piece in the redan as the most serious threat to the
river crossing.
The command team of the van Rensselaer cousins planned to cross the
river with 13 boats. All 13 boats together could carry 300 soldiers in each
wave. The army secured the services of civilian boatmen to pilot the boats.
The boatmen would man the tillers while eight soldiers in each craft pulled
the oars. Van Rensselaer estimated that it would take about 10 minutes to
cross the river. Given up to 10 minutes to load and unload soldiers, the
entire round trip would consume about thirty minutes. There were four
thousand soldiers plus artillery and wagons of supplies and ammunition
to cross. It was possible, even likely, that some boats would be lost while
crossing, either sunk or swept downstream by the current. Neither the

43
general nor his chief planner saw these parameters and constraints as
serious. While there were additional boats available for use, the general
did not order these brought to the embarkation site.
Figure 1. Initial US crossing and confrontation with British Infantry, 0400-0530, 13
October 1812.
The American army in its earliest wars demonstrated a profound
tension and lack of trust between its regular and militia components. This
issue nearly scuttled the crossing. General van Rensselaer designated

44
Solomon to lead the attack and to be its tactical commander in Canada.
Regular Army LTC John Chrystie, who was senior in rank to Solomon
van Rensselaer, had to agree to follow the militiaman’s plan or not to
participate in the operation. Solomon ordered the first wave of 300 men to
be composed of 150 regulars from Chrystie’s Thirteenth Infantry and 150
of the best-trained New York militia. The Thirteenth Infantry was a newly-
formed unit and it is arguable that its soldiers were no better trained or
led than the best militia companies. John Chrystie and his men joined the
invasion only hours before the boats were to embark. Chrystie may have
seen the crossing site in daylight but was uninformed of the details of the
topography and roads on the Canadian side.
The mission of the first wave of invaders was to seize the eighteen-
pounder gun in the redan. Other American artillery could not range this
large gun because of its altitude. The American guns would engage the
nine-pounder at Queenston Landing and strike targets of opportunity.
Chrystie started loading the boats at about 0330 hours on 13 October.
While he clearly understood that he was to fill only half the boats, he
nonetheless filled them all. When van Rensselaer arrived with his small
staff and the picked militiamen, he was understandably angered. However,
he knew that to have any chance of success of taking the artillery piece,
the first wave would have to cross in darkness. Swallowing his frustration,
van Rensselaer ordered his staff into a boat and gave the order for all the
vessels to push off.
The crossing did not occur without mishap. LTC Chrystie’s boat and
two others were swept downriver. Perhaps the pilots lost their nerve and
covertly sabotaged the voyage. Chrystie’s party was making no headway
and he ordered the three boats to return to the New York shore to try
again. Solomon van Rensselaer was entirely unaware that his second-in-
command was no longer with the crossing party.
The 10 remaining boats did not head for Queenston Landing. Instead
their pilots brought them ashore on a shale beach at the base of the
escarpment. As they approached shore, however, British sentries fired
down from atop the riverbank into the darkness, killing LT John Valleau
and wounding several soldiers. The sentries fled, no doubt reporting the
American landing. The infantrymen, now about 225 in number, slowly
climbed the steep banks in the darkness. CPT John E. Wool, not finding
Chrystie or van Rensselaer, took command and formed the men in a
column facing the redan, preparing the men to scale the heights. Arriving

45
in the last boat, van Rensselaer was slow to join the assault party. In the
darkness, van Rensselaer sent his judge advocate, Stephen Lush, to the
head of the column with orders to begin the ascent. Both Wool and van
Rensselaer wondered at the whereabouts of John Chrystie.
Figure 2. CPT John Wool’s detachment ascends Queenston Heights, 0530-0700,
13 October 1812.

46
Meanwhile, the local British Commander, CPT James Dennis, roused
his troops from their slumber. The men had been resting in their uniforms
with weapons at their sides and were soon ready to march. The two British
guns, spying Chrystie’s boats in the river, opened fire. Not knowing where
the Americans might land, Dennis kept most of his men near the village.
He led a company of grenadiers and some militiamen at hand toward the
reported landing at the base of the escarpment. In the darkness, the two
bodies of infantrymen, British and American, stumbled into one another
and opened a furious firefight.
The Americans eventually drove off the grenadiers but not before
losing a number of men. Six of 11 officers were down, two mortally
wounded. Two of the five company commanders were out of the fight.
Wool had turned sideways to give an order to his company when a British
musketball passed through both buttocks. He fainted momentarily but
was soon revived. Van Rensselaer was even less lucky. Leading from the
front, he received five bullet wounds to his legs and a heel. Knocked to
the ground, his white trousers red with his blood, the weakened colonel
ordered Lush to wrap him in his greatcoat so that the soldiers would
not view him and lose their courage. Van Rensselaer sent Lush up and
down the lines searching unsuccessfully for Chrystie. Van Rensselaer
understood that he could no longer command and he ordered the survivors
to gather at the edge of the riverbank to await Chrystie or reinforcements.
He did not know that in the emerging light, British artillery had discovered
the embarkation site. The eighteen- and nine-pounder guns were slowly
pouring solid shot and spherical case shot against the New York shore. The
Americans were unaware of this new munition, later named shrapnel after
its British inventor. They mistakenly thought that grapeshot was blowing
through the ranks of soldiers trying to enter the boats. The returning boats
brought wounded and dead with them, the sight of the casualties having
the expected effect on raw troops. Some of the civilian pilots abandoned
their boats and their duties. The American crossing plan was fast falling
apart. A crisis had arrived and 200 American soldiers were alone on a
foreign shore with no boats to return them.
Wool joined van Rensselaer to assess the situation. It was clear to both
leaders that their party would be taken prisoner unless the redan gun was
silenced. Wool was determined to complete the mission, to lead his shaken
soldiers once again into danger with no guarantee and little likelihood of
success. Wool, of course, had scant appreciation for the topography. Van
Rensselaer directed militia LT John Gansevoort to guide the column, not

47
up the face of the escarpment, but into the Niagara Gorge. There they
would be concealed from sight as they picked their way skyward. Van
Rensselaer also directed Lush to bring up the rear of the column with
orders to shoot anyone who shirked his duty. As the sun’s rays broke the
darkness, the intrepid band began their improbable task.
Wool’s detachment climbed single file up a narrow trail in the face of
the gorge, slowly ascending more than 200 feet. While they progressed,
American artillery found and silenced the nine-pounder at Queenston
Landing. Four more boats put into the water, contending only with the
redan gun. However, these boats did not row toward van Rensselaer’s
landing site, but instead headed down river away from the redan battery
in an attempt to land north of the village of Queenston. The four boats
closed onto the Canadian shore as British infantry 40 feet above them,
fired directly into the craft. LTC James Fenwick had no choice but to
surrender as his men were cut to pieces. However, MAJ James Mullany
gathered several men about him. They placed a few wounded soldiers into
one of the boats and managed to push off, eventually regaining the New
York shore.
MG Brock had heard the cannon fire to the south and departed Fort
George riding quickly to Queenston. Once there he conferred with CPT
Dennis to assess the situation. Satisfied that this was the main American
attack, Brock issued orders for more regulars and militia to concentrate at
Queenston. He visited the redan battery to encourage the crew and to get
a better view of the American shore. He then descended the escarpment to
direct the actions of the newly arriving troops.
While Brock was in Queenston, Wool and his party arrived at the
summit of their climb. Wool led his men to the brow of the escarpment and
found the redan battery below. Despite his painful wounds, CPT Wool led
the line of troops downward. Seeing the oncoming enemy, the artillerists
abandoned their gun and withdrew down the slope. Finally, the menacing
cannon was out of action. Wool disposed his men to defend the redan from
all directions. He was not about to lose his prize.
Sometime during the early hours of battle, CPT Dennis had ordered the
company of British regulars that were stationed on Queenston Heights to
reinforce the troops in the village below. Had he not done so, it is probable
that they would have been available to push the Americans off the Heights
and secure the eighteen-pounder, keeping it in the fight.

48
View from the New York shore toward LTC Van Rensselaer’s landing site. The
Niagara Escarpment and the Brock Memorial are in the background.
Author’s collection.
Perhaps more impetuous than prudent, Isaac Brock now made a fateful
decision. He was determined to recapture his lost gun which he believed
to be key to the defense. Brock galloped through Queenston gathering
regulars and militiamen about him. He led them south through the village
to the base of the steep slope of the escarpment. To the Americans in the
redan, there was no mistaking the general resplendent in his gold-trimmed
scarlet coat. Brock dismounted and sword in hand advanced at the front of
a thin line of British and Canadian soldiers. A shot hit him in the hand, yet
he continued his climb, urging his men forward. An unknown American
soldier moved forward from the redan, took careful aim, and put a bullet
in Brock’s chest inches from his heart. Brock collapsed and his attack with
him. In a minute the brilliant conqueror of Detroit lay slain.

49
View from the redan position, looking toward the New York shore.
Author’s collection.
Over the next several hours, the Americans enjoyed a brief respite
and as many as 1,000 crossed the river now that the two guns had been
eliminated. Wool was evacuated as was Solomon van Rensselaer. Chrystie
and Mullany managed to cross the river and take their commands atop
Queenston Heights. LTC Winfield Scott assumed overall tactical command
on the heights. Ultimately, though, the Americans forfeited what their
intrepid leaders, John Wool and Solomon van Rensselaer among them,
had gained. Eventually the militiamen still in New York saw a column of
British marching from Fort George to the sound of the guns. They heard
the fierce yells of native warriors allied to the British who were sniping at
their comrades in Canada. They saw dozens of dead and wounded pulled
out of returning boats. Despite the pleas of MG van Rensselaer and their
militia officers, upwards of 3,000 militiamen invoked their constitutional
right not to be ordered out of the country against their will.
Brock’s second in command, MG Roger Hale Sheaffe, advanced
by a far road to the top of the heights. He led a determined attack that
overpowered Scott’s line. Several Americans were seen plunging down the
sides of the gorge to their deaths. Others attempted to swim the Niagara.
None succeeded. Scott surrendered more than nine hundred men. Sheaffe
eventually released the militiamen, but the regulars were marched into
captivity.

50
MG van Rensselaer resigned his commission. He returned to his
estates in Albany and to a hero’s welcome. Many understood that this
defeat was due more to the general unpreparedness of the army than to
his inadequacies. In 1813, van Rensselaer ran for governor of New York,
losing by fewer than 4,000 votes. After the war he started a college that is
now known as Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Solomon van Rensselaer
unsuccessfully vied for a command in the regular army despite never fully
recovering from his wounds. John Ellis Wool, whose unwavering pursuit
of the mission set up the conditions for victory, continued in the Army
after the war. He rose to the rank of brevet major general for his gallant
leadership in the war with Mexico. Wool served actively in the Civil War
until his resignation in 1863 with the rank of major general.
For Further Reading
Robert Malcomson. A Very Brilliant Affair: the Battle of Queenston
Heights, 1812. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
Pierre Berton. The Invasion of Canada, 1812-1813. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1980.
George F.G. Stanley. The War of 1812: Land Operations. Canadian War
Museum Historical Publication No. 18. Macmillan of Canada, 1983.
Benson J. Lossing. The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812. Facsimile
Edition. Somersworth: New Hampshire Publishing Company, 1976.

51
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Queenston case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. The raw recruits of
the Thirteenth US Infantry followed their officers in a dangerous, nighttime
opposed river crossing. Despite the loss of many of their officers, none
shied away from a perilous climb up the steep sides of the Niagara Gorge.
They assaulted the redan and defended it against a determined attack led
by the most well-known and courageous of enemy leaders. These actions
were certainly the result of mutual trust between officers and men.
2. Create Shared Understanding. Solomon van Rensselaer, John
Wool, and the other officers understood that putting the redan gun out
of operation was critical to the success of the mission. If they failed, the
invasion would very likely fail as well.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. While the historical record
is not entirely established, it appears that General van Rensselaer, through
LTC van Rensselaer, provided every officer in the Thirteenth Infantry an
understanding of the critical nature of their assignment.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Even when Wool and Solomon
van Rensselaer were separated in the darkness and Chrystie was nowhere
to be found, the officers and sergeants formed up the troops to prepare for
an assault. They quickly responded to an attack by veteran British troops.
Wool, with the assent of the surviving officers, and despite an incomplete
appreciation of the situation, decided to continue the dangerous mission.
5. Use Mission Orders. Van Rensselaer and Wool changed the plan
on the spot by deciding to enter the gorge rather than to attack the redan
directly. Wool and his men remained focused on the goal, to capture the
gun, rather than adhere to the original plan.
6. Accept Prudent Risk? Wool did not know what lay in wait at the top
of Queenston Heights. He did not know, although he must have suspected,
that he was outnumbered and that reinforcements were not forthcoming.

52
However, he also understood that he might very well achieve surprise if
he gained Queenston Heights and assaulted downhill to overrun the redan
gun. Van Rensselear helped mitigate risk by directing Wool’s forces into
the gorge where they would be hidden from British view and from which
they could ascend the heights on a concealed avenue of approach.

53
A Motorized Infantry Regiment Crosses the Meuse River,
May 1940
John J. McGrath
As part of the German main effort in the French campaign, the 1st
Panzer Division was one of the spearhead elements of a large armored
force which advanced through the Ardennes Forest and reached the
obstacle of the Meuse River less than three days after the start of the
offensive. Instead of reorganizing along the river and waiting for less
mobile infantry elements to arrive to force crossings, the 1st Panzer
Division used its internal resources of boats and infantry to immediately
cross the river and create a bridgehead. Then the regiment attacked and
secured key terrain that made the French defenses untenable and allowed
the German divisions to the north and south to cross the river after initial
failures. Then the German forces advanced deep into the allied rear area
and cut the northern third of the allied armies off from the rest by reaching
the English Channel on 19 May.
In May 1940, the German and Allied forces had been facing each
other for over seven months in a period known as the Phony War. While
the French and British mobilized and prepared for a German offensive,
Belgium and the Netherlands, although positioned in the direct path of
any probable German offensive, remained neutral. Meanwhile, the Nazi
state proceeded to finish the conquest of Poland, aided greatly by Soviet
intervention in the later stages. In April 1940, the Germans conducted a
risky campaign with only a small number of troops to occupy Denmark
and Norway, as Hitler feared the British were about to occupy the latter
country, which would cut German access to key mineral resources in
Sweden. In the ensuing operations, Denmark and the southern part of
Norway were quickly conquered but the Germans were still fighting and
losing to an Allied expeditionary force at Narvik in northern Norway when
the campaign in the west started. The German dictator, Adolf Hitler, had
not intended to delay the German offensive in the west until May 1940.
However, circumstances continually delayed the start of the attack. During
this period, the German plan was continually revised. Planning focused on
how best to use the limited available armored forces.
In the interwar years, the Germans had developed two key concepts
that played a big role in the success of the 1940 campaign. The first of
these was the creation of the panzer division, a combined arms force
that emphasized the massing of tanks supported by other arms in a
flexible organization capable of offensive action based on the initiative
of commanders at all levels. The second development was the creation

54
of a tactical air force, the Luftwaffe, whose operations were designed to
provide responsive and aggressive close air support for the ground troops.
The primary aerial weapons platform was the Stuka dive bomber, which,
essentially, provided German mobile units with the equivalent of highly
effective long-range artillery. These two elements were tested in Poland
in September 1939. While the Germans enjoyed success in that campaign,
there were many teething problems which the Wehrmacht (German Armed
Forces) used the Phony War period to correct.
Ironically, as the 1940 campaign opened, the British and French had
both more and better tanks than the Germans. However, their tanks were
organized primarily in pure tank units which were employed primarily
in an infantry support role. The few armored division type organizations
the French and British fielded had been hastily organized after seeing the
success of armored forces in Poland. In contrast, the Germans, although
fielding generally inferior tanks, massed them in panzer divisions,
supported those tanks with infantry and other arms, and equipped each
individual tank with a radio set.
Despite the fielding of the panzer divisions, the armored forces remained
only a small part of the overall German military organization, which was
composed overwhelmingly of leg infantry divisions whose artillery and
supply wagons were pulled by horses. The German Wehrmacht fielded
only 10 panzer divisions in 1940 and eight motorized infantry divisions, in
which horses were replaced by trucks. Accordingly, German planning for
the campaign was primarily a matter of determining how best to use the
limited number of armored and motorized divisions.
The plan ultimately adopted, massed seven panzer divisions and
six motorized infantry divisions in the center of the front opposite the
Ardennes forest in Belgium. While the offensive opened with a secondary
assault on Holland and Belgium spearheaded by the remaining three panzer
divisions and paratroopers, the main effort would advance quickly through
the Ardennes, overwhelm the main French defensive line along the Meuse
River, and then advance rapidly to the English Channel, cutting the Allied
front in half and isolating any forces in northern France and Belgium.
The plan’s effectiveness was amplified because the Allies expected the
Germans to repeat the 1914 Schlieffen Plan in which the German Army
massed forces on their right flank. The British and French intended to send
their best forces into Belgium to meet the expected German maneuver
head on and fight it to a standstill. With the German main effort actually
advancing further south in the Ardennes, the Allied plan had the effect of
sending the best troops into the lion’s mouth.

55
Figure 1. The Opposing Plans.
In the German Army of 1940 “mission command,” known as
Auftragstaktik, was more than a doctrine. It was the primary method of
command throughout the force and had been since World War I with
antecedents going back to the early 19th century. In the German model,
mission command consisted of the issuing of short operational orders
which gave subordinates a concise and clear idea of the commander’s
notion of the mission and a list of coordinating measures, such as unit
boundaries. The order also provided all the support assets available to the
higher commander to facilitate the subordinate’s accomplishment of the
mission. How the subordinate accomplished the mission was up to his own
devices. To execute such an operational culture, the Wehrmacht depended
on a corps of professional officers and NCOs which was the legacy of the
small Army of the Interwar Period (1919-1939), and, at higher levels, a
group of elite planners and operations officers – the General Staff officer
corps. German leaders at all levels in 1940 were expected to provide
immediate solutions to combat problems without waiting for guidance

56
from higher levels but in accordance with the higher headquarters general
concept for which mission the unit was to accomplish.
In 1940, panzer division organization was more tank heavy than it would
be later in the war, but it was nevertheless a combined arms unit. After the
Polish campaign, the number of panzer divisions was doubled, creating
variations in organizational structure, particularly among the newer units,
in the 1940 campaign. For illustrative purposes, the organization of the 1st
Panzer Division, the subject of this study, is presented. In this division,
the tanks were organized into a brigade of two regiments, each with two
tank battalions, giving the division a total of four tank battalions. There
was also a motorized infantry brigade that contained a motorized infantry
regiment with three battalions and a separate motorcycle infantry battalion.
The ratio of infantry battalions to tank battalions was therefore equal. The
division also contained a motorized artillery regiment, a reconnaissance
battalion, and an engineer battalion. For combat operations, the panzer
division divided its elements into combined arms battle groups (originally
called Gefechtsgruppen, later Kampfgruppen), typically joining battalions
of armor, infantry and artillery together, along with smaller units of
engineers and other support elements, under a single commander.
The Ardennes forest, into which these divisions would attack, could
prove to be a major obstacle to the German advance, if defended by the
Allies in strength. The terrain was rugged and cut by many small rivers.
Armored and other vehicles were restricted in their movements to roads
that could easily be blocked. The narrowness caused traffic jams. These
terrain-based difficulties made allied planners discount a major German
armored movement in the region. The Germans understood this and
reinforced the idea by planning to start their offensive with a glider assault
on the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael north of the Ardennes, misleading
the Allied commanders as to where the German main effort was.
In May 1940, the 1st Panzer Division, commanded by LTG Friedrich
Kirchner, was part of GEN Heinz Guderian’s XIX Motorized Corps
(Activated as the XIX Armee Korps and sometimes called the XIX Panzer
Korps), a command that contained three panzer divisions and a separate
motorized infantry regiment. Guderian was one of the German armored
pioneers and his force was the spearhead of the main German effort in the
campaign. All three of his panzer divisions contained four tank battalions.
Starting on 10 May 1940 the three panzer divisions travelled along parallel
routes through the Ardennes aimed at reaching and crossing the Meuse
River, the expected main French defensive line, near Sedan as soon as
possible. The 1st Panzer Division was in the center of the corps front,
giving it the key role at the Meuse River.

57
Opposing the panzers initially was a covering force consisting of
Belgian Ardennes Division a force of light and motorcycle infantry and
the French 5th Light Cavalry Division (5e Division Légère de Cavalerie
or 5e DLC). The latter was a new division consisting of a horse cavalry
brigade and a mechanized cavalry brigade. It was hindered in its mission as
it was unable to enter Belgian territory until the Germans invaded. As the
campaign began and the German tanks crossed into Belgium, the French
and Belgians fought tenaciously but were no match for the massed panzer
force. Defending the main Meuse line was the 55th Infantry Division.
This unit was a second tier French reserve organization which had been
mobilized in September and manned with older reservists. Along the
Meuse, the French had erected a fortified line of pillboxes and entrenched
artillery positions. This line was a northern extension of the Maginot Line
but was far less formidable. The French felt that the natural obstacles of
the Ardennes and the Meuse would protect the defense in this sector and
delay any German advance in the area.
Figure 2. The German Advance Through the Ardennes, 10-13 May 1940.
In advancing through the 70-mile expanse of the Ardennes, Guderian
expected his troops to reach the Meuse in four days and cross it on the fifth.
His divisions were through the Belgian border defenses on the first day and
reached the Semois River, the last major obstacle before the Meuse, on the
morning of the third day. After one of the 1st Panzer Division’s motorized

58
infantry regiments the 1st Rifle Regiment attacked and cleared the town of
Bouillon on the Semois that same day, advance elements of the 1st Panzer
Division reached the Meuse that night, a day ahead of schedule. There the
divisions reorganized for the crossing, with the motorized infantry to lead
the way.
German Troops Advance on Sedan, 12 May 1940.
National Archives.
The German plan depended upon surprise. The massing of the panzer
forces in the Ardennes sector could hardly have been expected by the
Allied planners, so it was important that the maneuver only be revealed
after the main French defensive line, which was along the Meuse River,
had been ruptured. Otherwise, the allies may have been able to respond
by sending reinforcements to the sector which could result in a failure to
breakthrough. For this reason the German leadership down to the lowest
NCOs in the 1st Panzer Division, were motivated to use initiative and
daring to keep the advance moving forward.
The swiftness of the advance forced Guderian to adopt a river crossing
plan used in a wargame the previous month as the order for crossing the
Meuse. German staff officers merely changed time schedules and objectives
to match with the current situation and sent the revised operations order
to the units. In turn, the units sent similar orders to their subordinates.
The simplicity of this method clearly showed the familiarity of the leaders
in the corps and the 1st Panzer Division. Guderian commented in his
memoirs on how well he knew the commanders of all his subordinate

59
units. LTG Friedrich Kirchner, the commander of the 1st Panzer Division,
had commanded the division’s infantry brigade in Poland and had been
the division commander since November 1939. The division chief of staff,
MAJ Walther Wenck, had held his position in the Polish campaign. The 1st
Rifle Regiment commander, LTC Hermann Balck, had held his post since
November 1939. MAJ von Jagow, the 2d Battalion commander, had been
in that position since December.
German infantry carry a raft in preparation for crossing the Meuse, May 1940.
National Archives.
The resulting corps operations orders were relatively simple. The
warning order was issued at 1750 hours on 12 May and only consisted of
five paragraphs and less than 200 words. The 1st Panzer Division, in turn,
issued a terse warning order at 1845 hours. The warning orders adopted
the exercise plan used the month before. The units would cross the river
with units given the same tasks they had had in the exercise. The corps
operations order was issued at 0815 hours on 13 May and was two and
a half pages long. The 1st Panzer Division issued its order at noon. This
order was five pages long and included an artillery fire plan and timetable.
The mission statement was as follows: “1st Panzer Division… will be
ready to attack at 1600 hours. After mopping up inside the Meuse bend it
will push forward to the Bellevue-Torcy road. The division will proceed
to attack the Bois de la Marfée heights and will push on to a line Chéhéry-
Chaumont.”

60
Panzer II and Panzer I in the west.
National Archives.
Engineer units moved forward and placed crossing equipment near the
bank of the river. Arriving by trucks, the 2d Battalion, 1st Rifle Regiment,
1st Panzer Division, MAJ von Jagow commanding, reached an assembly
area just short of the west bank of the Meuse at 0600.The battalion was
designated to conduct the initial assault river crossing. Since the Germans
expected tough French resistance, an extensive aerial and artillery
preparation was planned before the river crossing. Two hours after the
infantry arrived, this preparation began. The infantrymen rested behind the
river bank for eight hours while most of the Luftwaffe’s available attack
bombers and all the artillery available in the corps bombarded the French
defensive positions across the river.
At 1600 the 120 men of the battalion’s 7th Company, commanded
by 1LT Georg Feig, climbed over the sea wall overlooking the west bank
of the river carrying assault boats that they then loaded into and rowed
across the river. Feig had served as a platoon leader in the same company
in the Polish campaign and was an original member of the regiment.
The company was stopped at the far bank by a wire obstacle but quickly
cut an opening in it using demolitions and advanced forward, bypassing
forward bunkers and attacking them from the rear. The defenders, stunned
by the aerial bombing and the swiftness of the German crossing, quickly
surrendered. When French artillery fired at Feig’s men from wooded high

61
ground to the west, he moved quickly to silence the guns. The artillerymen
abandoned their guns and fled before the advancing German infantry.
Figure 3. Crossing the Meuse at Sedan.
Followed by the rest of the battalion, the other two battalions of the
regiment and the divisional motorcycle infantry battalion, Feig’s men
continued to advance and captured a key railroad crossing a kilometer
from the river by 1730. By midnight, they had secured the high ground
overlooking the crossing site three kilometers from the river, silencing the
French artillery that had been stationed there. During the advance, Feig’s
men were joined at times by their battalion commander, MAJ von Jagow,
and the regimental commander, LTC Balck, who encouraged the men and
directed the arrival of reinforcements.

62
After the capture of the artillery, Balck assembled his battalion
and company commanders and issued new orders, “We’ve got a small
lane through the enemy. Let’s break through.” Balck later commented,
“Something that is easy today can cost us rivers of blood tomorrow.” The
regiment advanced an additional kilometer, capturing all its objectives
for the initial bridgehead including the key heights of Hill 301. The
three battalions of the rifle regiment and the division motorcycle infantry
battalion were now across the river. The Grossdeutschland (GD) motorized
infantry regiment, attached to the division, crossed south of Balck’s men.
Once the engineers built bridges over the now secure crossing site, the
tanks and other vehicles crossed the next morning. Additional divisions
crossed the Meuse after the 1st Panzer. Guderian’s corps and the other
corps of the German main thrust then advanced westward deep into the
Allied rear area, reaching the English Channel coast on 20 May and
effectively winning the campaign. The British evacuated their troops from
the trap at Dunkirk and France surrendered in June.
Feig remained with the 1st Panzer Division for most of the war rising
to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was awarded the Iron Cross Second
and First Class for his exploits in France in 1940 and won the Knight’s
Cross as a company commander in Russia in December 1941. Jagow was
killed two weeks after the crossing of the Meuse. Balck rose to be an army
and army group commander by 1944. Guderian was relieved by Hitler
in 1941 in Russia but returned a year later as the Inspector of Armored
Troops. In 1944 he became the Chief of the General Staff, a position from
which he retired several weeks before the end of the war.
The crossing of the Meuse shows mission command at its best. The
Germans were able to adjust and synchronize their operations because
of the flexibility afforded them by their system of issuing orders. This
was particularly reflected in the adoption of a plan previously used in an
exercise as the framework under which the river crossing was executed.
In his memoirs, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the man who as Army
Group A chief of staff had created the campaign plan used at Sedan,
remarked on the German Army’s use of mission command as follows,
“Individual leadership was fostered on a scale unrivaled in any other army
right down to the most junior NCO or infantryman and in this lay the
secret of our success.”
For Further Reading
Karl-Heinz Frieser with John Greenwood. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The
1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2005.

63
Heinz Guderian. Panzer Leader. Translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon.
Washington, DC: Zenger, 1952.
Franz Kurowski. Panzergrenadier Aces: German Mechanized Infantrymen
in World War II. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2010.
Erich von Manstein. Lost Victories. New York: Presidio, 1982.

65
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Principles of Mission Command in the Crossing of the Meuse case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. The division was
cohesive. It had played a key role in the September 1939 Polish campaign.
Its commander, LTG Friedrich Kirchner, had commanded the division’s
infantry brigade in that operation and had been the division commander
since November 1939. The division chief of staff, Major Walther Wenck,
had held his position in the Polish campaign. The 1st Rifle Regiment
commander, LTC Hermann Balck, had held his post since November 1939.
Jagow, the battalion commander, had been in command since December.
Fieg, the company commander, had served as a platoon leader in the same
company in the Polish campaign.
2. Create Shared Understanding. The Germans adopted an operations
order for the river crossing which had been previously used in a wargame
a month earlier. Accordingly all the leaders and soldiers had practiced a
similar operation. And they understood clearly what the overall goal of
the operation was: get across the river and penetrate as deeply as possible
behind French lines.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. XIX Motorized Corps
commander General Heinz Guderian designated the 1st Panzer Division
as the corps main effort. The corps itself was the main effort of the entire
German offensive. As such all leaders at all levels realized the importance
of getting across the Meuse River as quickly as possible. The 2d Battalion,
1st Rifle Regiment, led the river crossing and its 7 Company was the
spearhead.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Guderian was displaying initiative
that bordered on the undisciplined. He pushed his troops across the river
as soon as they got there because he feared higher headquarters would
demand a pause to await the arrival of slow marching infantry that would
reduce the surprise-created-by-speed factor that he felt was key to the
overall success of the operation. At the lower level the German leaders

66
pushed across the river vigorously and continued to advance until the high
ground overlooking the river over three kilometers away was seized. 7th
Company was perhaps the most aggressive in these actions but it was not
the only unit in the regiment to display this type of initiative.
5. Use Mission Orders. The German command system was based on
mission orders. It was not just doctrine. It had become a philosophy and
practice closer to a standard operating procedure. In their education and
their exercises German Army officers and NCOs were inculcated with the
principles of initiative, prudent risk, and mission orders.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. The Germans needed to get across the river
before the French reinforced their defenses. There was the natural risk
of any river crossing against prepared defensives (which there were) but
the Germans mitigated these by using the Luftwaffe as mobile artillery.
The 1st Rifle Regiment’s crossing offers a number of examples of leaders
accepting reasonable risk. Perhaps the best was LTC Balck’s decision
to continue to attack after taking out the French artillery position. He
recognized the risk in penetrating deeper into French territory but saw the
risk as greater if they put off the advance until later.

67
Corregidor
Triumph in the Philippines
Kendall D. Gott
In 1945, the strategically important task of clearing the Philippines
main island of Luzon and capturing the port of Manila required the seizing
of the island of Corregidor which guarded Manila Bay. In 1942, Japanese
amphibious forces had taken very heavy losses in it capture and an airborne
operation was conceived to prevent such casualties to the Americans. In a
textbook display of good planning and excellent coordination between the
services, the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team (PRCT) overcame
difficult terrain and a desperate Japanese defense. As with all airborne
operations, decentralized command, flexibility, personal initiative, and
innovation were key elements in the successful conclusion of this mission.
By January 1945, the operations to recapture the Philippines from the
occupying Japanese were in full swing with the northern island of Luzon
as the main effort. The bulk of the Japanese were stationed there and the
port of Manila would serve as a vital base to support future operations.
The island of Corregidor guarded the entrance to the bay and any enemy
forces left there could harass shipping and serve as a rallying point for
any Japanese evacuating the mainland. The Americans had lost Corregidor
after a dogged defense in 1942 and its recapture would be a great symbolic
success.
GEN Douglas MacArthur outlined a general plan to the Sixth Army
Commander, GEN Krueger, envisioning an airborne and amphibious assault
of Corregidor following an intensive aerial bombardment and supported
by naval gunfire. On 3 February, the Army G3 Operations tapped the 503d
PRCT for the airborne drop and the reinforced 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry
(3-34 IN) from the 24th Infantry Division for the amphibious landing.
Both of these units were hardened veterans of the Pacific war and they
would be ready for the proposed date of attack of 16 February. The 317th
Troop Carrier Group of C-47s as well as naval forces quickly assembled
their forces and needed logistical support within those short 13 days.
The decision to use airborne troops on Corregidor deserves examination.
The island is but three and a half miles long and one and a half miles wide
at its widest point. From above it looks like a tadpole with a large hill
called Topside to the west forming the head and a long thin range of hills
and ravines forming the tail to the east, called Bottomside. The area around
Bottomside featured sandy beaches ideal for an amphibious landing and

68
the airfield was located here too. However, the Japanese had used this
area in their assault in 1942 and suffered tremendous losses as they had
to advance up the hills and across the island to Topside. The Americans
wanted to avoid that scenario by seizing the high ground first and then
bring in reinforcements across the water. As with all airborne operations,
surprise is vital, and the planners thought the defending Japanese were not
expecting or prepared for an airborne assault. The Sixth Army staff was
correct in that respect of the Japanese defenders on Corregidor but it was
only a guess.
Information about the defending Japanese was scant and was a product
of guesswork as the defenders were dug in deep. The staff estimates
placed about 850 defenders on the island but in fact there were over 5,000
Japanese. Commanded by Captain Akira Itagaki of the Imperial Navy, they
were organized into provisional units and assigned sectors of the coastline
to defend. The defenders made use of both caves and tunnels that went
deep underground on the island. Over half of the garrison was positioned
on Malinta Hill in reserve with detachments in the scattered ravines
around the island. Fortunately for the Americans, this left the open ground
of Topside fairly lightly defended from air assault. Although warned of
a possible airborne assault Captain Itagaki conducted a careful terrain
analysis and thought a parachute attack was not feasible. Consequently,
he made no preparations for one. The Americans received a report that the
Japanese had erected sharp poles and other anti-parachute obstacles on the
proposed drop zones but it was untrue. Quite simply, the Japanese thought
an airborne assault was impossible and made no plans to defend against
one. However, Itagaki and his men were determined to hold Corregidor to
the last man.
Map 1. Japanese dispositions on Corregidor, January 1945.

69
COL George M. Jones commanded the 503d PRCT during the
operation and received the mission from XI Corps on 3 February. He and
his staff were tasked to do the specific planning for the airborne operation,
although no doubt the XI Corps, Army Air Force, and US Navy staffs were
involved. COL Jones arranged for an aerial reconnoiter of Corregidor for
himself, the battalion commanders, and selected staff officers. Just before
the operation, the regimental commander held a formation and briefed each
member of the 503d PRCT on the mission and concept of the operation.
Each man knew exactly what he was to do and what was expected of him.
The pilots of the 317th Troop Carrier Group attended every operations
briefing and were encouraged to provide comments and suggestions, of
which many were incorporated into the plan. Liaison teams from the 7th
Fleet and the 5th and 13th Air Forces were present and representatives of
the 3-34 IN were on hand as well. Communications and resupply issues
were identified and provided for.
Topside was the key terrain feature on Corregidor and dominated the
island. The airborne planners weighed the options and decided to designate
the old parade ground and the nearby small golf course as the drop zone.
Each of these was only approximately 300 meters long by 200 meters
wide. In addition to their small size, the area in and around the drop zone
was interspersed with the ruins of the old barracks and post buildings as
well as the shattered trees and shell craters from the preparatory bombing.
Correlating the factors of wind speed and drift, the 51 available C-47
transports were required fly multiple passes at 400 feet above the drop zone
for over an hour to drop each lift. This was because the very short time over
target allowed only six to eight paratroopers to exit on each pass. Little
anti-aircraft fire was expected as the bombing and strafing which began on
22 January would keep the Japanese down during the drop but the first lift
jump casualties were expected to be about 20 percent due to the condition
of the fields and expected high winds. Incidentally, any excessive drift in
the 25 knot winds would send paratroopers over the island and into the sea
incurring even more losses. The final plan had the 3d Battalion making the
morning drop at 0830 and securing the drop zone. There it would prepare
for the 2d Battalion’s arrival at 1230. The 1st Battalion was slated for
arrival the next morning. The amphibious force was scheduled to hit the
beach at 1030 to take advantage of any covering fire the airborne forces
were able to provide. After these events, the plan was extremely broad,
devoid of details largely because the precise location of enemy forces
was unknown. The regimental commander divided Topside into battalion

70
sectors and charged his units to locate the Japanese and kill them. The
regimental order, for example, directed 2d Battalion to “exploit the area
to the north and west of the drop area destroying all enemy encountered.”
Once Topside was cleared of enemy forces the combined airborne and
infantry forces were to sweep eastward to clear the rest of the island. Air
and naval forces would support the operation by fire throughout.
Inherent with any airborne operation is the probability that unit cohesion
would be highly difficult to maintain as paratroopers get scattered across a
hostile drop zone. Each man of the 503d PRCT was trained to link up with
any friendly unit he came across and continue the mission if he was unable
to find his own element. Each man knew the concept of the operation and
the commander’s intent. Commanders at all echelons were provided with
radios for communicating with their higher headquarters but terrain and
other factors could render these useless. Officers and noncommissioned
officers were expected to take the initiative in these situations and continue
on with the objective. The commanders of the 503d PRCT and the 3-34 IN
knew their men well and put high trust in their subordinate commanders’
judgment.
Preparatory fire began in earnest as the date for the assault drew near.
By 16 February, the 5th and 13th Army aircraft had dropped approximately
3,000 tons of bombs and napalm on Corregidor. Known and suspected gun
emplacements were hit and strafed. The naval bombardment had begun
on 13 February with the five heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, and 14
destroyers of Task Group 77-3 directing most of their fire at Topside. The
Navy also positioned PT boats to rescue any paratroopers or infantrymen
that found themselves in the water.
The airborne phase began on schedule on the morning of 16 February.
There was no opposition during the first pass and only sporadic firing from
the Japanese during the first lift. By 0945, 3d Battalion was on the ground.
COL Jones and much of his headquarters landed and assembled as well.
The 3d Battalion immediately went to work establishing a perimeter for the
inbound second lift as well as preparing to clear Topside and provide cover
fire for the arrival of the 3-34 IN by sea. The arriving infantrymen were
aboard 25 landing craft medium (LCM) under the watchful eye of two .50
caliber machine guns from the 503d PRCT covering their approach.
The men of the 3-34 IN arrived at the beach on schedule at 1030 and
the first four waves met no opposition. Japanese machine guns opened
up though as the fifth wave landed and detonated prepositioned mines. A
supporting M4 Sherman tank, an M7 self-propelled gun, and a 37mm anti-

71
tank gun were lost. However two companies of the 3-34 IN pushed on and
were atop Malinta Hill by 1100. It was apparent that both the air drops and
amphibious landings were a complete surprise to the Japanese defenders.
The naval and air bombardment had kept the defenders under cover and
the coordinated assaults diverted attention from each other. By the time
the Japanese had recovered their shock, the first objectives of the operation
were held and the Americans were firmly on the island.
Map 2. The initial assault, 16 February 1945.
The first lift of the 3d Battalion exceeded the casualty estimates of 20
percent. Alarmed at these losses, there was a staff discussion to consider
halting the second lift but COL Jones decided to continue. The 2d Battalion
arrived at 1240, almost a half hour behind schedule. This drop also came
under sporadic Japanese fire but suffered fewer casualties than the first. The
2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion in perimeter defense. Meanwhile,
the 3d Battalion was tasked to search and destroy all remaining Japanese
forces on Topside. By nightfall, most of the old American facilities around
the parade ground were secure. There were Japanese defenders in the many
ravines along the coast but no one knew exactly where or in what strength.
The combined first day regimental casualty rate was 14 percent, most
of which was caused by injuries on landing. There were only 55 combat
casualties, a number far less than anticipated. That evening COL Jones
requested that XI Corps cancel the morning drop and send the remaining
battalion by sea. The request was quickly approved and the 1st Battalion,
503d PRCT marshaled to the landing craft. This battalion task force entered
the fight roughly on schedule and avoided the injuries of an airdrop in
marginal weather and with a drop zone in poor condition.
The Japanese were in no mood to surrender but they were badly out-
classed in firepower and outmaneuvered. They also suffered a loss that

72
morning which proved catastrophic. During the first lift, a small number
of American paratroopers that drifted away from the drop zone landed
near an observation post being visited by Captain Itagaki, the senior
Japanese commander on the island. Quickly forming an ad hoc squad,
these Soldiers killed Itagaki and apparently there was no clear line of
command succession. Even if there had been, the wire communications
relied upon by the garrison were cut by the days of bombing and gunfire.
The only means for the Japanese to communicate was by courier which
was nearly impossible in the situation. For the defenders, the battle quickly
devolved into a series of badly coordinated “banzai” charges and small
unit actions. It was fanaticism at its best but it had no real hope of repelling
the Americans. On the first day alone, the Japanese lost over 300 men and
the second day would see the loss of nearly a thousand more for little or
no gain.
The 1st Battalion and other reinforcements landed ashore in the
afternoon of 17 February and joined in the efforts to clear Topside, an effort
which would take six days. The Japanese fought ferociously throughout.
On the night of 21 February, they detonated the tons of ammunition and
explosives stored in the tunnels under Malinta Hill, presumably as a prelude
to a counterattack westward or a withdrawal to the east. The massive blast
literally shook the entire hill and hundreds of Japanese perished inside
the tunnels. Several hundred of them did make it to Bottomside while
about 600 massed for a counterattack to the west. Heavy indirect fire was
brought against this force and it too retreated eastward after suffering
tremendous casualties.
Map 3. The second day, February 17, 1945.
After the three parachute battalions were on Topside by Day 2, the
operation plan directed each unit to operate in a sector with 1st Battalion on
the south and southeast side, 2d Battalion on the east, and 3d Battalion on
the west. COL Jones had not designated specific objectives but gave each

73
subordinate commander the latitude to send forces where he expected to
find enemy units, the overarching objective being the complete clearance
of the island. The plan only required the battalions to coordinate their
movements and actions with higher headquarters and each other. During
the operations on Topside, a general pattern of combat developed. First,
aircraft or naval fire support were called upon to strike known or suspected
Japanese positions. The Americans then assaulted the position immediately
as the fires lifted. If this failed, the 75mm pack howitzers or one of the few
supporting tanks was brought forward for direct fire. If that failed, small
teams armed with flamethrowers and demolitions crept forward to seal
cave or tunnel entrances. The platoon leader of the regimental Demolition
Platoon developed a method to neutralize the larger fortifications that
proved impervious to these methods.
All of these clearing operations placed a premium on personal initiative
and decentralized control to the lowest levels. In fact, several units
innovated by taking advantage of the Japanese desire to regain positions
they had lost to the Americans despite the risks associated with the action.
During the day, the US units used fire and maneuver to dislodge Japanese
elements from their bunker or machinegun positions. Just before dusk the
paratroopers abandoned the position but only after ensuring that it was
targeted by indirect fire and nearby crew-served weapons. The Japanese
reoccupied the position after dark. Once the sun came up, they were easily
destroyed by the fires planned the night before.
Map 4. The final push, 18-26 February 1945.
With Topside generally secured by 24 February, the US force pushed
eastward to clear and secure Bottomside. There continued to be stiff
resistance and suicidal counterattacks but the end was in sight. Organized
resistance ceased shortly after 1100 on 26 February when the Japanese

74
detonated an underground arsenal at Monkey Point, killing most of the
few remaining defenders. COL Jones formally presented the island of
Corregidor to GEN MacArthur on 2 March and the battle was officially
over. Both the 503d PRCT and 3-34 IN were quickly withdrawn from the
island to prepare for operations in the south Philippines.
For Further Reading
Gerard M. Devlin. Back to Corregidor: America Retakes the Rock. New
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
E.M. Flannagan Jr. Corregidor, The Rock Force Assault, 1945. New York,
Random House Digital Collection, 2012.
Samuel E. Morrison. The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao,
the Visayas 1944-1945 (History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II), New York, Castle Street Press, 2001.

75
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Corregidor case
1. Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust. All units of this
operation were veteran formations, most of which had worked together in
the past. Cohesive teams and mutual trust had been formed through hard
training and combat. Although a large number of replacement personnel
arrived just days before the battle, the unit command structures were firmly
in place. Combat leaders at all echelons were well trained and experienced.
At the task force level the 3-34 Infantry Battalion was selected in large
part because it had worked with the 503d PRCT in the past. Additionally,
the air support and air transport elements also had a long relationship with
the 503d PRCT.
2. Create Shared Understanding. All participants and supporting
elements had a shared understanding the mission and commanders intent.
The importance of the recapture of Corregidor was clear to all. All of the
men were briefed on each phase of the operation and their part in it. Pilots
and staff of the air and naval forces supporting the operations attended
the planning sessions and provided input. These forces also insured they
had common radios and procedures in place, and provided liaison teams
as well.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. The commander of 503d
PRCT provided a clear commander’s intent to subordinate commanders
and down to each man. Although the concept of seizing and clearing
the island of every Japanese defender is a simple one, the phases of the
operation were highly choreographed and each element knew what was
expected of it. Each paratrooper and infantryman on Corregidor and
those supporting them from the air or sea was made aware of the plan and
proved adept a reacting to a fluid situation. In the regimental operation
order, mission statements to the subordinate battalions were general and
clear. One example of this type of mission statement was that received
by 2d Battalion, “exploit the area to the north and west of the drop area

76
destroying all enemy encountered.” Battalions were given sectors to clear
rather than specific objectives. Coordination was required with higher
headquarters and lateral units but freedom of action was maximized.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. The paratroopers and soldiers who
made the landings were veterans of the Pacific war, and were highly adept
at the squad and platoon operations used to clear bunkers and fortifications
held by determined Japanese defenders. This disciplined initiative was
key to the success of this operation as small units rooted out the Japanese
defenders scattered across the island. Both paratroopers and infantry
excelled at this as it had become routine in combat operations in the
Pacific. High leader casualties and poor communications demanded that
all combat commanders took stock in the situation and acted accordingly
towards mission accomplishment. On Corregidor this was displayed
repeatedly by squad and platoon leaders. One excellent example on Day
1 of the operation was the creation of the ad hoc squad that killed the
Japanese commander. At the task force level COL Jones made the decision
to cancel the third drop and bring the battalion in by sea. His chain of
command concurred with this assessment from the man on the ground
and supported the decision fully. At battalion-level and below, units had
freedom of action to introduce new techniques and tactics. The innovation
of abandoning positions to Japanese at night is one good example of this.
This innovation, which ran counter to accepted practice of holding seized
terrain, allowed for the relatively easy elimination of the enemy once
morning came.
5. Use Mission Orders. The 503d PRCT used the formal orders
process prior to the drop. The nature of airborne operations during the war
necessitated planning for a wide dispersal of soldiers during the drop and
difficulty in organizing into original formations once on the ground. The
mission orders for this operation took this all into account. Paratroopers
were expected to carry on with the mission even if their leader was not
present and to use whatever means at hand to do it. The orders were broad
and maximized freedom of action for subordinate units. Battalions were
assigned sectors rather than specific objectives and timetables. At lower
levels, small units conducted patrols and once engaged, fire and maneuver,
developing their own innovative techniques and tactics to solve problems
such as those posed by Japanese elements inside reinforced tunnels.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. The use of an airborne drop was intended to
surprise the Japanese and avoid the high casualties of an amphibious assault.
The Americans accepted prudent risk by attempting an airborne assault
on Corregidor. The drop zones were very small, the terrain hazardous,

77
the winds high, and the number of Japanese badly miscalculated. If the
assault went badly there would be great difficulty in extracting the force,
but the odds for success were calculated and the mission went forward.
However, one can wonder if the operation would have gone forward as
planned had the Americans known there were over 5,000 Japanese on the
island. During the operation COL Jones’ decision to call off the third drop
proved very prudent. He calculated the anticipated losses due to injury as
too great and instead brought the battalion in by sea. His decision proved
correct as the injuries were avoided and the battalion arrived intact only a
few hours behind schedule.

79
Assault River Crossing at Nijmegen, 1944
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.
In August 1944, the Allies were pushing toward Germany in attempt
to defeat the Third Reich before winter arrived. Standing between Allied
forces and the German heartland was the Rhine River, which Hitler planned
to use to use as a formidable line of defense. Understanding that crossing
the Rhine would take time and cost many lives, the Allied Command
planned an audacious operation called Market-Garden that would quickly
seize a major bridge over the Rhine in the Netherlands. Once secure, that
bridge, located in the Dutch town of Arnhem, would be used as a gate
through which Allied forces would pour into Germany. Success in this
operation would require surprise and speed. To gain surprise, the Allied
Commanders chose to drop two US Airborne Divisions, the 82d and 101st,
in the Netherlands to seize and secure a series of six bridges along the
road to Arnhem. The bridge over the Rhine itself would be seized by the
British 1st Airborne Division dropped near the town of Arnhem. Once the
Airborne forces were in control of the bridges, the British XXX Corps, a
powerful force composed of mobile armored units, would fight quickly
up the route to relieve the British Paratroopers in Arnhem and secure the
gateway into the Third Reich.
The 82d Airborne Division’s mission was to capture key terrain in
the vicinity of the Dutch cities of Grave and Nijmegen. This included
five bridges, the largest of which spanned the Waal River in Nijmegen.
Because there was a limited number of aircraft available to drop the
paratroopers and tow the gliders, the division’s combat power would land
in the Nijmegen area over a three day period. So MG James Gavin, the
division commander, designated the main Nijmegen Bridge as a priority,
tasking the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) to send a battalion
to seize that bridge as soon as possible on the first day of the operation.
A railroad bridge over the Waal downstream from the main Nijmegen
Bridge was not a priority objective. Two other regiments, the 504th PIR
and 505th PIR, were directed to seize and hold four bridges in the vicinity
of Grave and high ground near the town of Groesbeek on the first day
as well. Glider-borne forces, including artillery and support units, would
follow on the second and third days to help consolidate the gains made by
the paratroop regiments.

80
Figure 1. Plan for Market-Garden.
The jumps on the first day, 17 September, went well with little initial
German opposition. Most of the division’s first day objectives were seized
quickly but the main Nijmegen Bridge remained in German hands. An
assault by Company A, 508th PIR had run into staunch German resistance
on the south side of the bridge. Two additional American assaults on the
bridge on Day 2 came within a block of the bridge entrance but were

81
ultimately repulsed as the Germans had greatly reinforced their positions.
The problem for MG Gavin and the 82d Airborne was how to secure
the bridge so that the tanks of XXX Corps, rapidly approaching from the
south, could cross the Waal and make their way to Arnhem to relieve the 1st
Airborne that had seized the bridge over the Rhine and were holding on to
it by their fingernails. On Day 2 of Market-Garden, Gavin began thinking
about the tactical problem posed by the strong German positions on the
south side of the bridge but other priorities prevented him from launching
an immediate attempt to seize it. On Day 3 when reconnaissance elements
of XXX Corps made contact with the 82d, Gavin was forced to act and
finalized a wholly new plan that seemed to be the only means of meeting
the intent of the larger operation. Although not equipped with assault
boats, Gavin intended to envelop the German positions on the bridge by
sending two battalions of the 504th PIR across the Waal River in a variety
of civilian watercraft. Once on the north side of the river, the battalion’s
Soldiers would attack and seize the northern end of the Nijmegen Bridge.
At the same time, 2d Battalion, 505th PIR, with support from a British
tank battalion, would attack the southern side of the bridge. Gavin’s hope
was that the simultaneous attacks on both sides would force the Germans
to retreat, leaving the bridge open to the Allies.
When a quick search turned up few civilian boats, British staff officers
in XXX Corps arranged for their engineers to bring assault boats up to
Nijmegen for the crossing but because the boats could not be at Nijmegen
until the afternoon of the next day (Day 4), Gavin unhappily planned for the
assault crossing to begin in the afternoon. To mitigate the risk of a daylight
crossing, he arranged for a great deal of fire support, including mortars,
tanks, artillery, and rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft, targeting the far side of
the Waal River which was defended in strength by German forces. Gavin
briefed the entire plan to the XXX Corps staff and the leaders of the 504th
PIR on the evening of Day 3.
The assault crossing would be led by 3d Battalion, 504th PIR,
commanded by a 27 year old MAJ Julian Cook. Cook had served with the
regiment since Sicily and had rigorously trained his battalion, made up of
hardened veterans, in England before the 504th PIR deployed to Europe.
Once Cook got his rifle companies across and secured a bridgehead on the
north side of the river, the 1st Battalion of the regiment would follow and
secure the western flank. The landing site was approximately two miles
west (down river) from the Nijmegen Bridge. After consolidating on the
northern bank, two of Cook’s companies (H and I) would move east down
the river bank, locate an earthen railroad embankment, and follow that

82
north until they hit the road leading from the main Nijmegen Bridge. They
would then turn southeast and assault the north end of the bridge moving
companies abreast, one on either side of the road. Company G would
follow to protect the rear of the two companies in the assault. By early
evening, Gavin hoped to have the bridge in allied possession and the tanks
of XXX Corps rolling across it on their way north to Arnhem.
The realities of the terrain and the enemy’s dispositions posed serious
obstacles to the operation achieving a quick victory. When MAJ Cook first
saw the intended crossing site, he realized for the first time that the river
was 400 yards wide and its current was swift. At that point, the battalion
commander recalled thinking that someone above him had come up with
“a real nightmare.” He then saw that if they succeeded in getting across
this watery expanse, his Paratroopers would then have to cross a flat plain
devoid of cover and concealment and which was 700 hundred yards in
length until they could finally find cover behind a 30 foot high dike. Cook
and his staff officers quickly identified German gun positions along the
northern bank that could sweep the river and plain with machinegun
and cannon fire. Several Dutch stone forts on the north side served as
strongpoints for the German defense of the bridge at Nijmegen and would
have to be attacked if paratroopers were to make it all the way to their
objective. Finally, there was the railroad bridge on the river approximately
1,500 yards to the east of the crossing site. German units had set up 20 mm
gun positions on that structure that could easily fire down on the men of
the 504th PIR as they crossed the river and plain.
Despite his concerns, Cook planned for his forces to consolidate at
the dike and then follow the scheme of maneuver that directed H and I
Companies to assault the north end of the bridge by moving southeast
down the road. All understood that the intent of the division commander
was the seizure of the northern end and the opening of the bridge. In the
early afternoon on the day of the assault, officers briefed their men on the
mission and intent as they waited for the boats to arrive. Many recalled
feeling that the operation was like a Normandy-style landing and that they
had not trained for that type of mission but the Soldiers also understood
that the Nijmegen Bridge had to be taken if the British Paratroopers at
Arnhem were to be relieved.
The 26 boats arrived at the crossing site at 1430, approximately 30
minutes before the close air support would arrive and artillery barrage
would begin. The Soldiers were surprised to find that they were small craft
(19 feet long) with a wood frame and canvas skin. A US Engineer company
had been assigned to operate the boats and found quickly that many of them
were missing paddles. The Engineers went ahead and assembled them,

83
after which the units in the first wave – Companies H and I and part of the
battalion HQ – moved to their assigned boats and began loading equipment
and ammunition. To many, it was clear that the boats would have a hard
time making it across the Waal even without the Germans shooting at them
but there was little time to ponder their plight as the artillery began to fire
and the Typhoons arrived to pound the German positions on the far side of
the river. Smoke rounds quickly formed a screen that would provide some
concealment for the Soldiers.
For most of the paratroopers, getting the boats into the water and
moving across the river was a terrifying experience. Despite the smoke
screen, enemy gunners quickly discovered the activities at the launch site
and began firing at the men struggling with the heavy boats. Once on the
water, men paddled with whatever they had to include paddles, rifle butts,
and hands. German machine gun and mortar fire hit many of the boats
during the crossing. The current made some of the boats almost impossible
to steer. MAJ Cook, the battalion commander, led the first wave and
recalled chanting, “Hail Mary, Full of Grace” as he paddled.
Of the 26 boats that left the southern bank, only half made it across
in usable condition. Some did not make it at all. Officers and NCOs
who made it to the north side quickly rallied groups of paratroopers that
were still alive and not severely wounded and began leading them across
the plain through more German fire. The wounded were gathered at a
makeshift aid station. The Engineers began paddling the usable boats back
to the southern side of the river. They would ultimately make several trips
across the river, bringing the remainder of Cook’s battalion over as well as
elements of the 1-504 PIR.
Those in the first wave that made it to the dike quickly organized,
located enemy positions on the dike, and began a ferocious battle for control
of that key terrain. Many Germans surrendered while others had to be
killed with grenades and in brutal hand to hand combat. The chaos during
the river crossing and sprint to the dike had broken up squad, platoon,
and company integrity. The paratroopers at the dike instead formed small
groups and, understanding the mission and intent, had taken control of that
position and begun to consolidate.
The battalion’s disorganization meant that MAJ Cook’s plan to have H
and I Companies attack abreast down the road toward the north end of the
bridge was no longer feasible. Instead, officers and NCOs formed small
groups and moved toward the Nijmegen Bridge, their ultimate objective.
One of Company I’s Soldiers, SGT George Leoleis, recalled the actions of

84
his small group, stating, “We were separated from any other men but we
knew in what direction to head for, down the road toward the bridge.” The
commander of Company G found that by late afternoon, the group he led
included Soldiers from companies H and I as well as his own company and
the battalion communications and medical sections. MAJ Cook, and his
operations officer, CPT Keep, quickly put together a group of 30 men and
began moving east from the dike through orchards and down ditches. Keep
recalled that they formed ad hoc squads and used bounding movements
across open areas and from one house to another as they approached the
bridge. By quickly grabbing the initiative in this manner, Keep believed
they were able to keep the German defenders off balance, preventing them
from reorganizing.
1LT Jim Megallas, a platoon leader in Company H, gathered about a
dozen men from his platoon and moved to assault one of the Dutch forts
from which the Germans were using a 20 mm gun to fire at the dike and
at units crossing the river. Megallas’ force concentrated small arms fire on
the fort, suppressing the German gunners. One of Megallas’ NCOs, SGT
Leroy Richmond, then swam the moat surrounding the fort and tried to kill
the Germans inside. Megallas quickly called him off, and remembering
that the bridge was the objective, decided to move his group further east,
leaving the fort for other units to seize.

Figure 2. Assault river crossing at Nijmegen, 20 September 1944.

85
Some small groups followed the battalion plan and moved north along
the railroad embankment to the road. There they met a great deal of German
resistance. Another group led by CPT Carl Kappel, the commander of H
Company, reached the embankment and rather than go north according to
the plan, turned south toward the river. They hoped to find a way under
the railroad bridge that would then open up a direct route to the main
Nijmegen Bridge just 1,000 yards away. Kappel’s group was so successful
that it seized the railroad bridge from the Germans. CPT Moffatt Burriss,
the commander of I Company, then took charge of another ad hoc group
gathered at the railroad bridge and began moving east toward the main
bridge. Along the way, they had had to stop and clear a number of buildings
on the banks of the river. Burriss’ group arrived under the main bridge at
the same time that British tanks started crossing the bridge from the south
side where the attack of the 505 PIR had been successful. The paratroopers
from 3-504 went running up steps leading to the road surface above and
met relatively little German resistance. In fact, the Germans defending
the main bridge, threatened by the envelopment from the river crossing,
had begun to pull back to the north away from the bridge. By 1915 that
evening, the intact bridge was in Allied hands.
The fight at Nijmegen had been a success. Part of that victory can
clearly be attributed to MG Gavin’s vision of using an assault river
crossing to envelop the Nijmegen Bridge from two directions but equally
important was the way in which the Soldiers of the 3-504 PIR carried out
the assault. Without their courage, devotion to the mission, and initiative at
individual- and small-unit levels, it is difficult to envision how the crossing
operation could have succeeded. The cost in lives was high. Twenty eight
paratroopers from the 3-504 PIR made the ultimate sacrifice. H Company
lost 15 killed or missing in action and suffered another 38 wounded.
Another 40 of the battalion’s Soldiers were wounded but the actions that
day allowed Allied forces to move toward Arnhem. Although the bridge
over the Rhine did not remain in British hands, XXX Corps was able to
extricate part of the surrounded 1st Airborne Division, saving thousands of
British Soldiers from death or capture.
For Further Reading
Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far Simon Schuster, New York, 1974.
Phil Nordyke, All American All the Way: The Combat History of the 82d
Airborne Division in World War II, Zenith Press, Saint Paul, Minnesota
(2005)

86
T. Moffatt Burriss, Strike and Hold, Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia,
2000.

87
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Nijmegen case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. Many of the 3-504
PIR’s Soldiers had served together in combat for years. The battalion
commander, MAJ Cook, had been with the regiment since 1943. He had
trained his men hard while in England in 1944 preparing for operations
in Europe. CPT Moffatt Burriss, the H Company Commander, had been
with the 3-504 PIR throughout this period as well and commanded HQ
Company during the Anzio invasion. By the time they were preparing
for the river crossing, the men of the 3-504 had fought together for
days, learning each other’s strengths and weaknesses, building trust, and
developing greater cohesion. The battalion commander and his company
commanders likewise had established close relationships.
2. Create Shared Understanding. MG Gavin briefed his plan for the
assault crossing to his entire staff and 504th PIR leaders. MAJ Cook was
then able to brief his leaders before the assault started. While waiting
for the boats to arrive, subordinate leaders explained the mission to their
Soldiers. All understood that the overarching mission was to seize the
northern end of the main Nijmegen Bridge.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. From Gavin’s level down
to squad leaders in the 3-504 PIR, it is evident that commander’s intent
was effectively passed down. At Gavin’s level, he understood that seizing
the Nijmegen Bridge was critical to the success of Market Garden. At the
battalion level and lower, the actions of the small groups on the northern
side of the river are evidence of an intent understood by all.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. At Gavin’s level, the division
commander and his staff took the initiative to develop the plan for an
envelopment of the bridge by using an assault river crossing. The actions
of the small groups on the northern side of the river show commissioned
officers and NCOs, in the chaos of combat, organizing small groups to

88
move toward the objective. SGT Leoleis statement about his small group
taking initiative to achieve the mission is an excellent example of this:
“We were separated from any other men, but we knew in what direction
to head for, down the road toward the bridge.” 1LT Megallas’ decision to
end his attack on the Dutch fort in order to move his troops toward the
most important objective is an excellent example of initiative that was
disciplined. Because he understood the commander’s intent and needs of
the mission, he chose to bypass the fort, despite the fact that it represented
a very real threat to US units.
5. Use Mission Orders. As noted above, using general briefings and
discussions before the river crossing, the mission was made clear to
all down to Soldier level. The scheme of maneuver was simple and the
objectives very clear. The mission orders were the key to success. They
allowed for the small ad hoc groups to ignore the planned approach to
the bridge and retain freedom of movement and decision-making. This
enabled them to get to the northern end of the bridge in an unplanned but
effective way.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. MG Gavin had been managing risk carefully
since his division landed outside of Nijmegen. His attempts to mitigate
risk had led to his decision not to risk his troops in an all out frontal assault
on the southern end of the bridge but by Day 3, the larger objectives of
Market Garden, specifically the relief of the British 1st Airborne, overrode
these concerns and Gavin made the decision to make the river crossing,
understanding the danger involved. He attempted to mitigate the risk
inherent in the daylight crossing of a river against an entrenched enemy by
arranging for fire support and a smoke screen but this was only partially
successful.

89
Sicily, 1943
Initiative Prevails at Biazza Ridge
Gregory S. Hospodor, Ph.D.
The largest engagement involving paratroopers of the 82d Airborne
Division during the July 1943 invasion of Sicily, codenamed HUSKY,
occurred on what the All-Americans called Biazza Ridge. The intense
fighting was not part of the detailed airborne pre-invasion plan.
Nevertheless, this “accidental” battle between a small primarily paratroop
force led by COL James Gavin and powerful elements of the German
Hermann Goering Division played a key role in securing the success of the
landings. Furthermore, the battle for Biazza Ridge and the chain of events
leading up to it illustrate the importance of flexibility, resourcefulness,
personal initiative, decentralized command, cohesiveness built through
rigorous training, and reliance on the commander’s intent.
The road to Biazza Ridge began in January 1943 at a conference held
in Casablanca, French Morocco. In a series of meetings, strategic-level
civilian and military leaders from the United States and Great Britain
decided to follow up the conquest of North Africa by invading Sicily. They
hoped that taking the three-cornered, roughly 10,000-square-mile island
would achieve three ends: secure sea lines of communication through the
Mediterranean thereby freeing up a significant amount of indispensible
shipping, knock Italy out of the war, and relieve pressure on the Russian
front by drawing German strength south.
It fell to GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of Allied forces
in the Mediterranean, to turn strategic intent into a workable operational
plan while at the same time seeing the North Africa campaign to a successful
conclusion. The Allied order of battle for the invasion included the
equivalent of over 12 American, Canadian, and British infantry, armored,
and airborne divisions; over 4,900 aircraft of the US Army Air Force and
the Royal Air Force; and over 3,500 ships under the control of the US
Navy and the Royal Navy. Eisenhower’s orders from the Combined Chiefs
of Staff required that a separate headquarters be set up to plan the ground
portion of the invasion. Consequently, Force 141, which later became
15th Army Group Headquarters commanded by Field Marshal Sir Harold
Alexander, began planning in January 1943. Subordinate headquarters
for each national ground contingent, Force 545, later 8th (GB) Army
commanded by General Sir Bernard Montgomery, and Force 343, later 7th
(US) Army commanded by LTG George Patton, were also stood up. After

90
considerable debate, no little acrimony, and a lot of staff work, the final
plan necessitated that, according to 7th Army Field Order Number One,
“FORCE 141 … supported by combined US and British Air and Naval
Forces, assaults the southeastern portion of SICILY to capture it as a base
for further operation.” Thus, Patton and Monty’s forces would be landing
side by side on an over 100-mile front with the mission of establishing a
firm lodgment ashore.
Patton’s lineup for the impending invasion along a 70-mile stretch
of coast included II Corps Headquarters under LTG Omar Bradley, four
infantry divisions (1st, 3rd, 9th, and 45th), one armored division (2d)
and the 82d Airborne Division. The final plan envisioned 3d Division
(reinforced) landing furthest west with the missions of seizing the small
port of Licata and providing a firm flank for 7th Army. Elements of the
veteran 1st Division and two ranger battalions would land in the middle at
Gela, seize the town and the Ponte Olivo airfield, and serve as a floating
reserve. It was here that the relatively flat open terrain invited a German
and Italian counterattack. The 45th Division, a National Guard unit
fresh from the United States, would land furthest east, link in with the
8th Army, capture the Cosimo and Biscari (today’s Acate) airfields, and
exploit inland. Elements of the 2d Armored Division would land with the
assault waves and serve as floating reserve. The 9th Division, with 39th
Regimental Combat Team and artillery on call, remained in Tunisia as the
Army’s follow-on reserve. The greatest threat to the US operation, and
indeed any amphibious landing, was that the troops storming ashore suffer
a coordinated counterattack early in the assault phase. To mitigate this
risk, especially apparent in the vulnerable Gela sector, planners quickly
settled upon the use of airborne troops. Broadly stated, the mission of the
paratroopers was to assist the amphibious troops to get and stay ashore.
Planners quickly tapped the 82d Airborne Division for the job.
The concept of divisional airborne assault was relatively new to the
United States Army. Indeed, many of the leaders of the 82d Airborne,
such as its commander, MG Matthew Ridgeway and the 505th Parachute
Infantry Regiment’s commander, COL James Gavin, played a key role
in turning the idea into reality. The Army activated the 82d as the first
parachute division in March 1942. Like many units in the rapidly growing
army, it suffered growing pains, perhaps more than most because of its
specialized role. There were shortages of parachutes, transport aircraft,
and gliders. Frequent reorganization and personnel reassignment meant
that training and unit cohesion suffered. Consequently, a March 1943
inspection revealed that the unit had completed one-third the amount of
training of a regular infantry division and was thus unprepared for combat

91
operations. There was, however, no shortage of volunteers because of
the allure of extra pay, jump boots, a unique uniform, and the promise of
rigorous training and adventure. Nor was there a shortage of leadership
because the unit tended to attract and promote leaders for whom the
challenge of starting something new was seen as an opportunity and who
relished an environment that prized the exercise of individual initiative
more than many conventional army units. Generally, then, the quality of
the division’s human material was a cut above its contemporaries. When
the 82d arrived in North Africa in early May 1943, two months before the
first test of the airborne division concept in battle, it remained a unit with
vast but as yet unrealized potential.
Figure 1. 82d Airborne Division actual drops on Sicily.
In the blast furnace of North Africa, leaders honed the edge of the
division and pushed their troopers hard. At Oujda, French Morocco, the
daytime heat was intense and training typically began at dusk and continued
until dawn. Infantry tactics and night navigation were practiced over and

92
over again. Training emphasized individual initiative and flexibility because
the unique nature of airborne delivery almost guaranteed the necessity of
ad hoc reorganization on the ground, especially at night. Furthermore, after
landing, troopers could not count on immediate resupply and were thus
familiarized with enemy weapons and ammunition as well as encouraged
to innovate with whatever they found in order to accomplish the mission.
When possible, training was tailored to the requirements of the mission
while keeping the objective of the invasion a secret. Paratroopers could
expect to face at least some of the concrete and fortified positions that
dotted the invasion zone. Accordingly, leaders constructed mock-ups of
characteristic positions and conducted live fire exercises in their reduction
by day and night. The importance of cutting telephone and telegraph lines
was also stressed and physical training reached a new pitch. After the 82d
moved to the airfields in Tunisia from which it would launch the assault,
leaders went over the plan in detail with the help of aerial photographs and
maps. One benefit of the deployment to North Africa was that the combing
of experienced men to fill out new airborne units ceased, which along with
the rigorous training, proved a boon to unit cohesion. Conditions for drop
training proved less than ideal as too few aircraft, a divided air-ground
command structure, frequent high winds, lack of suitable “soft” drop zones,
and the necessity to stage forward to embarkation airfields in Tunisia on 21
June led to less jumps than leaders preferred. The 52d Troop Carrier Wing,
the primary lift assigned to the division, was qualified for both glider and
parachute operations but was inexperienced. Consequently, drop training,
especially at night, proved less than satisfactory and often resulted in high
injury rates. Nevertheless, the 82d, with the clock ticking rapidly toward
D-Day, maximized its training time in North Africa to the extent possible.
It was as prepared as it could be for the test to come if not as prepared as
its leaders wished.
As unit leaders honed the division’s edge, detailed planning for the
drop went forward. The primary mission of the division within the overall
Husky plan was to assist the troops landing on the beaches by interdicting
Axis reserves. Initial planning conducted outside the division had identified
the Gela area as most vulnerable to counterattack. Because the open Gela
plain was unsuitable for light infantry to confront conventional infantry
and armor, planners ascertained the relatively treeless high ground to the
east of the plain, called the Piano Lupo, was appropriate for the drop.
On the Piano Lupo, the terrain was more restrictive, which would benefit
the paratroopers as they battled heavier enemy forces. Three further
considerations also favored the site: it possessed suitable drop zones;

93
through it ran the best, and thus most likely, avenues of approach to the 1st
Division and Ranger landing beaches; and taking the high ground would
deny direct observation of the landing area and reverse slope gun positions
to enemy artillery. Army group planners envisioned that, once the 1st
Division was established ashore and linked up with the paratroopers, the
82d would assist in taking the important Ponte Olivo airfield complex.
Higher level planners also determined that the airborne assault would take
place at night roughly two hours before the 0245 hours, 10 July, time set
for H-Hour.
The Gela Plain, Ponte Olivo airfield, and the Piano Lupo (distance).
From page 186, Sicily and the Surrender of Sicily.
Within the parameters described above, division planners had
essentially a free hand to decide how best to accomplish the assigned
missions. The major problem that they confronted was a lack of lift
(250 aircraft of the 52d Troop Carrier Wing, 64th Troop Carrier Group,
and 316th Troop Carrier Group) which restricted the initial drop to four
battalions plus attachments. MG Ridgeway tasked COL James Gavin’s
505th PIR (reinforced) with accomplishing the division’s initial objectives
while the rest of the 504th stood ready for parachute insertion on D+1 or
D+2 and the balance of the artillery and 325th Glider Infantry Regiment
to arrive by glider (if available) in the third lift. The 505th task force
totaled 3,405 men and comprised three battalions of the 505th Parachute

94
Infantry, Third Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry, three batteries
of 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion with 75mm pack howitzers,
Company B of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, a detachment of the
82d Airborne Medical Company, air and naval gunfire support parties, and
prisoner of war interrogation personnel. Division planners came up with a
simple direct plan to seize the Piano Lupo. The regimental headquarters,
First and Second Battalions of the 505th, and two batteries of the 456th
would land north of a key highway intersection called “the Y junction,”
seize it, and prepare to meet any counterattacks that came their way. The
3/505th and C/456th would land south of the Y junction and seize the
high ground overlooking it. Meanwhile, 3/504th would land south of the
town of Niscemi and block the roads leading out of it. A small detachment
equipped with demolitions would land near the Ponte Dirillo road and
railroad crossings of the Dirillo (or Acate) River, demolish them, and set up
a roadblock until infantry from 45th Division’s 180th Regimental Combat
Team relieved them. Although there was no time for a full scale rehearsal,
Gavin, his battalion commanders, and the air group commanders flew the
route under lighting conditions similar to those expected on the night of the
drop and were able clearly to identify key checkpoints and terrain features.
Planners, within the confines of operational security, also made clear to
key leaders how the airborne plan fit into the intent of the larger army
mission of establishing a solid foothold ashore. In a note distributed just
prior to emplaning for Sicily, Gavin translated the essence of the mission
in terms that any trooper could understand, “Let us carry the fight to the
enemy … Attack violently. Destroy him wherever found.” The soul of the
mission was, as Gavin recognized, engaging the enemy to help out the
men who would soon be wading ashore.
As the first aircraft took off from airfields near Kairouan, Tunisia,
at 2015 hours, 9 July, few could have imagined that the detailed drop
plan was about to fall apart. The night flight to Sicily required several
course changes, mandated radio silence, and required low-level flying to
avoid possible radar detection. Completing the requirements of the troop
carrying mission would have been difficult in the best of conditions and
in a crosswind that blew from the northwest at 25 to 35 miles per hour, it
proved a challenge that few of the combat inexperienced aircrews could
master. The result was a drop that, with few notable exceptions, scattered
paratroopers far and wide. At least four hundred landed behind the British
beaches where some helped capture the towns of Avola and Noto, 65 miles
from their intended drop zones. Many sticks were still recorded as missing
over a month later. Most, however, found themselves far to the east of

95
the Piano Lupo in the 45th Division’s zone and on terrain that bore little
resemblance to that which they had studied on maps and aerial photographs
back in North Africa. Perhaps 12 percent of the force, Gavin later estimated,
landed anywhere near according to plan. Fortunately, those few 505th and
504th troopers that did drop on or near their intended DZs were able to
seize the Y junction and block the road south from Nescemi after severe
fighting and thereby preventing a coordinated corps-level counterattack
from developing against the Gela beachhead on D+1. Consequently,
soldiers from 1st Division and rangers primarily faced counterattacks by the
Italian 4th Livorno Division as they established themselves ashore rather
than facing the combined might of both it and German Hermann Goering
Division. In the darkness all over southeastern Sicily, individual troopers
rolled up their sticks, formed small groups, and set about determining
where they were prior to following Gavin’s instructions to carry the fight
to the enemy. Although the abortive drop made fully organized activity
impossible, the actions of these widely-scattered extemporized guerrilla
bands caused confusion among the enemy. For the 45th Division, the
unintended screen of paratroops proved an unexpected boon and assisted
the division in establishing itself ashore. For example, one large group
from MAJ Mark Alexander’s 2/505th captured Santa Croce Camerina, a
45th Division objective.
Paratroopers preparing to emplane for Sicily, 9 July 1943.
From page 116, Sicily and the Surrender of Sicily.
COL James Gavin’s experience on D+1 and D+2 encapsulated that
of many of his paratroopers. Gavin landed hard 30 miles southeast of the

96
DZ. He had no idea where he was, had no radio, suffered a leg injury upon
landing, and soon found him among a small group of paratroopers. For the
moment, the task force commander controlled 20 men. Gavin later wrote
that gun flashes to his northeast at least assured him that he was indeed
in Sicily. In doubt about exactly what to do but resolved to do something
useful, he decided to move to the sound of the guns, a maxim remembered
from his West Point days. Thus his tiny band set out northwest. Despite
his injury, Gavin set a blistering pace so that when dawn arrived six hours
later, only six men remained with him. The group then ran into a platoon
strongpoint and took small arms and mortar fire, losing one man. Gavin’s
band returned fire, evaded, moved cross-country, and took cover. The
COL spent one the longest days of his life hiding in a ditch with CPT
Ben Vandervoort, the regimental S-3. Because of the danger of stumbling
into another firefight while moving across exposed terrain, Gavin spent
a sleepless, frustrating, and infuriating day ruminating over the fate of
his command. Clearly the jump plan was in ruins but was the task force
destroyed as a result? He considered his first day as a combat leader a
failure, which affirmed a steely determination to find his command and
engage the enemy. At nightfall, the group set out to the northwest where
they bumped into a cluster of wounded and injured 505th troopers and, at
0230 hours five miles southwest of Vittoria, a 45th Division outpost. For
the first time Gavin now knew exactly where he was, fifteen miles from
the Piano Lupo. The group, now numbering eight, continued on to Vittoria
where Gavin borrowed a jeep. He set out west along the highway to Gela
and quickly came upon roughly 250 men, primarily from LTC Edward
Krause’s 3-505th that had fortified a tomato field. The day before, the
regimental executive officer, LTC Herbert Batcheller, had ordered Krause
to cease marching west and to dig in where he was. Gavin now angrily
ordered Krause, who had failed to emplace outposts around his position, to
get moving. Gavin sensed that something big was happening and that time
was not on the paratroopers’ side. Consequently, he drafted a platoon of
airborne engineers and hurriedly set out west to reconnoiter. Soon the 100
or so foot tall Biazza Ridge (Sicilians call it Biazzo Ridge after the Villa
Biazzo on its crest) loomed in the distance. After over 48 hours without
sleep and an arduous cross-country odyssey, Jim Gavin’s driving desire to
rejoin his task force and to get into the fight placed him at a crossroads in
his career as a combat leader.
Gavin’s instincts were excellent but the first indication that
Generalleutnant Paul Conrath’s Hermann Goering Division was on the
move was inauspicious. Gavin’s group captured a German officer on a
motorcycle who told them that he had come down the road from Biscari.
That could only mean that Highway 115, which pointed like a dagger into

97
the flanks of both the 1st and 45th Division landing zones, was open at
least as far as the intersection with the Biscari road. At about the same
time, the sound of intense firing echoed up ahead.
Figure 2. Movement and action on day 2 of operations in Sicily.
Gavin quickly pushed on about a mile and, at 0830 hours, arrived at
Statione di Acate, a small train station where a railroad crossed Highway
115. Less than a mile ahead rested the gently sloping mass of Biazza Ridge.
Gavin ordered the engineers to seize the ridge and led the way. As they
approached the top of the ridge, firing became intense, and 1LT Benjamin
Wechsler, the leader of the engineer platoon, was wounded. Gavin ordered
the engineers to hold their ground and returned to the station where he met
the XO of 3-505th who advised that the battalion would soon arrive and
that LTC Krause had gone to request support from 45th Division. Soon
about 220 paratroopers arrived with a platoon of the 3-180th and a couple
members of a naval fire support party in tow. Gavin ordered a hasty attack
which culminated as it crested the hill.

98
It began to dawn on Gavin that he was confronting a major German
formation. Indeed, he was. The kampfgruppe assailing the ad hoc force
of Americans was the eastern part of a three-pronged Hermann Goering
Division attack on the Gela landing that the paratroops on the Piano Lupo
had helped foil on D+1. This same task group, composed of a company of
heavy Mark VI (Tiger) tanks, a few medium Mark IV tanks, two battalions
of panzer grenadiers, and an armored artillery battalion, had attempted to
force the Ponte Dirillo crossing on D+1 but were repulsed by Company
G, 505th and elements of the 180th Infantry. Significantly, the powerful
kampfgruppe returned up the road to Biscari to regroup only after savaging
the 1-180th, capturing its battalion commander and over two hundred
prisoners. Now with a new and more aggressive commander, the German
unit returned to the site of its earlier defeat with renewed determination
and ferocity.
With an ad hoc command composed primarily of light infantry,
COL Gavin assessed the risk to his force in terms of the overall intent
of his mission of engaging enemy reserves before they had a chance to
attack the beachhead. Clearly, the Germans had the advantage in terms of
equipment, firepower, and numbers. A decision to retreat toward Vittoria
to consolidate with better-equipped elements of the 45th Division could
be justified as there was certainly no guarantee that the Germans would
not do serious damage to Gavin’s force as they had the 1-180th the day
before. However, Gavin determined that he could best contribute to the
7th Army’s fight here and ordered his men to dig in and stand firm. The
after-action report of the 505th makes clear Gavin’s thought process, “It
appeared evident that the Ridge dominated the area between the ACATE
River and VITTORIA and its loss would seriously jeopardize the landings
of the 45th Division. It was decided to hold the Ridge at all cost and if the
tanks entered the defense, to destroy the infantry accompanying them.”
Left unsaid was the fact that troops on Biazza Ridge controlled access to
the undestroyed bridge at Ponte Dirillo on Highway 115. Thus, possession
of the ridge also protected the right flank of hard-pressed 82d and 1st
Division units battling the Germans on the Piano Lupo on D+2.
Gavin’s decision resulted in some of the bitterest fighting of the
Sicilian campaign. The fighting ebbed and flowed all day as the German’s
repeatedly attacked the American position. Gavin’s troops struggled to
scratch shallow foxholes in the hard-baked rocky ground. The troops
possessed few heavy weapons. When direct fire proved ineffective against
heavily armored Tiger tanks, Gavin’s men improvised by firing at the soft
underbellies of the behemoths as they climbed over rises. On more than one
occasion, German tanks drove among the Americans’ fighting positions,

99
engaging individual soldiers with their main guns but the men stood firm
and stripped away the armor’s infantry support which caused each attack
to culminate. Gavin’s blood was up and his men drew inspiration from
his determined hands-on leadership. Indeed, he later wrote that he saw
the battle as an opportunity to test his paratroopers against “the toughest
opposition we could find.” They would not be found wanting.
The battlefield in 2012: the Acate (Dirillo) River valley, Ponte Dirillo, and Biazza
Ridge (distance) as viewed from the northwest.
Author’s collection.
Gavin and his men’s grit and determination made a victory possible, but
left unsupported, attrition would gradually have taken its toll. Fortunately,
the tiny force did not have to carry the day alone and American strength
gradually grew as the day wore on. Other paratroopers marched to the
sound of the fighting. For example, two 75mm pack howitzers of LTC
Harrison Harden’s 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion arrived and
were immediately pressed into service, occasionally dueling over open
sights with German tanks. Harden himself had dropped 32 miles from
the assigned DZ. Later, two 57mm anti-tank guns from the 180th Infantry
added their weight to the fight. During the afternoon, the attached naval
gunfire support party was able to make contact with cruisers and destroyers
offshore. Their 5- and 6-inch salvos served to break up more than one
attack. In total, naval vessels fired over 1,800 rounds of high explosive

100
in support of Gavin’s force. So, too, did 45th Division 155mm howitzers
manifestly contribute to the defense. At 1800 hours, more paratroopers
arrived accompanied by a company of 45th Division Sherman tanks.
This proved the turning point of the battle as Gavin now decided to
counterattack. In the battle’s final major action, the strengthened force,
which included Gavin later wrote, “regimental cooks, clerks, truck drivers,
everyone who could carry a gun,” drove the Germans off the ridge and
back in the direction of Biscari while capturing several trucks, many heavy
weapons, a few tanks, and 12 120mm mortars in the process. Because
of COL Gavin’s leadership and the matchless efforts of his men, Biazza
Ridge was by nightfall on D+2, firmly in American hands.

COL James Gavin with war correspondent “Beaver” Thompson, who jumped with
the 82d, at Statione di Acate near Biazza Ridge, 11 July 1943.
From page 169, Sicily and the Surrender of Sicily.

101
A day had made all the difference. Exhausted after 60 sleepless hours
of almost continuous exertion, Jim Gavin could finally relax a bit and
reflect that he and the paratroopers and soldiers under his command had
indeed passed the test of combat.
For Further Reading
Rick Atkinson. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944.
New York: Henry Holt, 2007.
William B. Breuer. Drop Zone Sicily: Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943.
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983.
Carlo D’Este. Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily. 1988; paperback edition,
New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.
James M Gavin. On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943-
1945. New York: Viking Press, 1978.
Ed Ruggero. Combat Jump: The Young Men who Led the Assault into
Fortress Europe, July 1943. New York: HarperCollins Publishers,
2003.
John C Warren. Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945.
USAF Historical studies: No. 74. Maxwell, AL: USAF Historical
Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955.

103
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command Illustrated in the Biazza Ridge case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. Once in North
Africa, personnel reassignments, except for those due to training injuries,
ceased. This stabilized unit rolls and, when combined with a rigorous and
ambitious training program, enabled leaders to build cohesive teams and
mutual trust. The shared hardship of living together in the harsh North
African climate under primitive conditions also served to build unit
cohesion.
2. Create Shared Understanding. Unit commanders clearly
understood the purpose of the airborne drop within the invasion plan:
to facilitate the establishment of a firm lodgment ashore by engaging
Axis reserves moving toward the beachhead. COL Gavin translated the
overall intent to his men in plain language in a note issued just prior to
embarkation. Although all units understood their role in the detailed plan,
when the drop went awry, “little groups of paratroopers” understood that
engaging the enemy wherever found was the soul of the mission.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. The division’s plan made
clear the intent of the drop and the missions for each element. 82nd Airborne
planners had essentially a free hand to decide how best to meet the intent
handed down from higher headquarters; the division was assigned a sector
for the drop rather than specific objectives. Furthermore, Gavin’s pre-drop
message drove home his intent to the troops—“Let us carry the fight to
the enemy … Attack violently. Destroy him wherever found.” This was
something that any paratrooper, wherever he landed, could understand.
Gavin’s efforts in this regard paid dividends when the drop plan fell apart.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Airborne training in North
Africa made clear that doing something proactive when in an ambiguous
situation was expected and required. Individual and unit training provided

104
troopers with the ability and incentive to operate effectively in ad hoc
organizations. Training in things such as small unit tactics, cutting
communication lines, night navigation, and with enemy weapons also
provided troopers with the skills to succeed as well as the confidence to
take action. All over southeastern Sicily, paratroopers seized opportunities
to make a contribution to the success of the amphibious assault rather
than waiting for orders. COL Gavin clearly took it upon himself to make
things happen. His efforts to get both himself and dispersed 82nd combat
power to the Piano Lupo, the division objective, led directly to the battle
at Biazza Ridge, which greatly contributed to the success of the landings.
5. Use Mission Orders. The 82nd Airborne Division issued formal
orders prior to the drop with detailed schemes of maneuver. This being
said, levels of command higher than division did not prescribe how to
accomplish the division’s mission and allowed subordinate commands
latitude to decide for themselves. Once in Sicily, orders were usually
verbal and communicated intent rather than prescribing specific action.
Gavin’s orders to LTC Krause to march west on D+2 and to the engineers
on Biazza Ridge to hold firm were examples of this. In neither case, did
the task force commander delineate exactly how his intent was to be
accomplished.
6. Accept Prudent Risk.The very real threat of counterattack in the
Gela sector justified the airborne drop. Only the use of airborne troops
promised to prevent or at least disrupt a counterattack against the most
vulnerable portion of 7th Army’s landing zone at the most critical time—
initial debarkation. At Biazza Ridge, Gavin concluded that the risk to the
landing zone posed by the kampfgruppe of the Hermann Goering Division
justified the risk to his tiny force. The bold decision to hold at Biazza Ridge
clearly met the intent of the parachute drop in the first place although the
plan did not anticipate major action there.

105
Thunder Run in Baghdad, 2003
Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.
MG Buford “Buff” Blount faced a critical decision. During the
previous two weeks, his 3d Infantry Division (ID) (Mechanized) had raced
700 kilometers through southern Iraq, reaching the outskirts of Baghdad
in early April 2003. The division had overrun both Baghdad’s airport west
of the city (Objective LIONS) and the key intersection of Highways 8
and 1 (Objective SAINTS) directly south of the city, allowing it to create
a partial cordon around the capital. Blount and the senior leaders of US
Army V Corps, 3d ID’s higher headquarters, now needed to seize the city
and collapse Saddam Hussein’s regime, but how?
Blount and V Corps Commander LTG William S. Wallace had no
concrete intelligence about the capability and intent of the Iraqi forces
protecting Baghdad. To collect intelligence about the conventional and
paramilitary units inside the city, they planned an armored reconnaissance
in force. At 1600 on 4 April, Blount gave the mission to COL David G.
Perkins, commander of 3d ID’s 2d Brigade, for execution the following
morning. Staging out of Objective SAINTS, the battalion-sized column
of M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles would attack
north on Highway 8 into the middle of western Baghdad and then turn
west, linking up with COL William Grimsley’s 1st Brigade, 3d ID, at the
airport. The bold plan, which Wallace judged a “reasonable risk,” was
destined to become the first armored foray into a major city since World
War II.
Perkins assigned the so-called “thunder run” mission to LTC Eric
Schwartz’s Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment (1-64 AR).
Schwartz’s TF 1-64 AR included 731 Soldiers, 30 M1A1 tanks, 14 Bradley
infantry fighting vehicles, 14 engineer vehicles, and other mechanized
support vehicles. Perkins’ intent was to attack up Highway 8 to “create
as much confusion as I can inside the city because I had found that my
Soldiers or my units can react to chaos much better than the enemy can.”
Although the sudden new mission caught Schwartz off guard, he praised
the straightforward commander’s intent and purpose. “The planning was
simple,” he explained. “The thunder run mission was the simplest of all
tasks that we were given. There was no maneuver required. It was simply
battle orders followed by battle drills.”
At 0600 on 5 April, Schwartz’s armored column rolled north up
Highway 8. In the vanguard of the staggered column was CPT Andrew

106
Hilmes’ Alpha Company. COL Perkins accompanied the task force in
his command M113 armored personnel carrier to observe firsthand the
effectiveness and distribution of enemy forces.
Figure 1. 5 April Thunder Run, TF 1-64 AR.
Moments after beginning the movement, the task force came under
intense and sustained fire. Special Republican Guard (SRG) soldiers,
Fedayeen Saddam militiamen, Syrian and Palestinian mercenaries, and
other paramilitary forces unleashed an unremitting barrage of AK-47 rifle
fire, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortar rounds from hastily-
prepared positions adjacent to the highway. As the task force rumbled
north, police cars, taxis, ambulances, garbage trucks, and other civilian
vehicles massed along the highway, depositing hundreds of additional
enemy fighters. The rifle and RPG volleys turned the operation into
something akin to running a gauntlet of fire but it did little to slow the
armored column.

107
TF 1-64 AR Attacking up Highway 8 on 5 April 2003.
Photo Courtesy of the Fort Stewart Museum, US Army.
Near the first overpass on Highway 8, an RPG round exploded in the
rear of SSG Jason Diaz’s tank, immobilizing it. As Diaz’s crew struggled
to put out a growing fire and get the disabled tank rolling again, trailing
Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicles formed a defensive perimeter. The
tankers mowed down dozens of fighters assembling alongside the highway
with coaxial machine gun fire and main gun rounds. Since Perkins’ order
emphasized momentum, LTC Schwartz made the call after half an hour
to abandon Diaz’s tank, recover the crew, retrieve sensitive computer
systems, and attack north deeper into the city.
The armored column passed the Qaddissiyah Expressway ramp towards
downtown Baghdad and turned west in the direction of the airport, entering
crowded residential neighborhoods. Hundreds of paramilitary fighters
and military personnel assaulted Schwartz’s column from all directions,
only to fall victim to the Americans’ overwhelming firepower. The enemy
resorted to placing makeshift concrete barriers across the highway and
even launching suicide vehicle attacks but with no success. After two
hours and 20 minutes, the column arrived at the airport. COL Perkins

108
concluded that the reconnaissance in force had completely surprised the
regime. “[The Iraqis] thought that they could bloody our nose enough on
the outside of the city … that we just would not push through block by
block,” Perkins explained. “They weren’t planning for this very heavy
armored thrust busting right through, coming in[to] the city.”
The thunder run demonstrated that US armored forces could penetrate
Baghdad while suffering minimal casualties. During the movement, TF
1-64 AR sustained one destroyed Abrams tank, one heavily damaged
Bradley, one Soldier killed in action (KIA), and four Soldiers wounded in
action (WIA). Schwartz’s task force killed at least 1,000 Iraqi and Syrian
fighters, destroyed 30 to 40 Russian-manufactured BMP infantry fighting
vehicles and other vehicles, destroyed one T-72 main battle tank, and
eliminated countless roadside bunkers. The operation provided excellent
indicators of enemy tactics, strength, and fighting positions. For instance,
the task force discovered that the enemy preferred to mass fires from
overpasses. Perkins observed that the bridges provided the enemy cover
and concealment and afforded “avenues of approach in the flank.”
LTG Wallace and MG Blount praised the 5 April thunder run. They
envisioned it as a prelude to additional armored missions in and out of the
city that would disrupt Baghdad’s defenses with the paramount goal of
regime collapse. Late on 5 April, Wallace ordered a second such mission
for 7 April. Blount again assigned the task to 2d Brigade.
After returning to SAINTS with TF 1-64 AR and receiving Blount’s
orders, Perkins proposed a bolder course of action to his division
commander. He wanted to take two armor task forces into Baghdad and turn
east at the same intersection where TF 1-64 AR had looped west towards
the airport. The task forces would travel several additional kilometers
and occupy the regime’s downtown government complex on the banks
of the Tigris River, the location of Saddam Hussein’s ornate palaces, his
ruling party’s headquarters, parade grounds, and war monuments. With the
rest of V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force bearing down on
Baghdad from southwest and southeast respectively, Perkins identified the
downtown palaces as the regime’s “center of gravity.” He hoped to avoid
an endless cycle of armored forays that scored tactical victories but did not
hasten strategic success.
Perkins also feared that the US Army was losing the information war.
The Iraqi information minister, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, had taken to
the airwaves and falsely announced that Iraqis had slaughtered US Soldiers
outside of Baghdad. To make matters worse, the British Broadcasting

109
Company was broadcasting al-Sahhaf’s propaganda to the world. Perkins
wanted to send an unmistakable message to Iraqis that the regime’s days
were numbered. “I didn’t want [the false stories] to happen again,” he
emphasized. “[Al-Sahhaf’s disinformation was] falsely emboldening the
Iraqis to continue to fight and defend [the city] … stretching this war
out.” Perkins concluded that the enemy’s relatively unsophisticated and
uncoordinated resistance during the first thunder run showed that such a
bold operation was possible.
On 6 April, Blount brought Perkins’ recommendation before LTG
Wallace. The corps commander dismissed it. Even though Wallace sought
to render the regime “irrelevant,” the plan at Combined Forces Land
Component Command (CFLCC) level at this point intended to topple
the regime through synchronized attrition rather than a dramatic armored
thrust. The CFLCC envisioned creating a cordon of forward operating
bases (FOBs) around Baghdad from which US forces could launch
pinpoint raids and seize critical objectives so that they did not have to clear
the city block by block. From a tactical perspective, Wallace also feared
that Perkins might overextend his line of communication (LOC) between
Objective SAINTS and the palace grounds, isolating the task forces in a
hostile city of five million people without the ability to resupply his units
or evacuate casualties. He directed Blount to take a “less aggressive tactic”
that involved attacking into the city to the point of the airport interchange
but then returning to SAINTS.
The events that unfolded over the next 24 hours serve as a clear
illustration of mission command principles in action. As Perkins prepared
to execute V Corps’ limited objective for the second thunder run, he
conceptualized an additional plan to allow 2d Brigade and its assigned
units to go downtown and “stay the night” if conditions warranted.
Privately, Perkins set four preconditions to meet before he would offer his
option to go downtown and stay during the mission. The preconditions
were based on “lessons learned” during the first thunder run:
1. The 2d Brigade could successfully fight its way into downtown
without becoming fixed.
2. Seizing defensible and symbolic terrain at the downtown palace
complex.
3. Opening and maintaining a ground LOC using Highway 8 and
the Qaddissiyah Expressway between the Tigris River and Objective
SAINTS.
4. Logistical conditions supported remaining overnight.

110
On the afternoon of 6 April, Perkins briefed his intent. Speaking in
a dusty tent without notes, slides, or handouts, Perkins explained to his
subordinate commanders that the entire brigade would conduct a second
thunder run at dawn the next morning. He instructed them to prepare to
spend the night downtown. “We have set the conditions to create the
collapse of the Iraqi regime. Now we’re transitioning from a tactical battle
[sic] to a psychological and informational battle,” he said. Maintaining
momentum during the movement was paramount. “Attack as fast as you
can, and push right through to the center of the city,” Perkins added. “If
a vehicle becomes disabled due to enemy fire, you immediately take the
crew off, put them on another vehicle, and you just leave it.”
The scheme of maneuver had LTC Schwartz’s TF 1-64 AR assuming
the vanguard. If conditions warranted turning northeast towards
downtown, TF 1-64 AR would seize downtown Objective DIANE, which
included the Tomb of the Unknowns, a park, and a zoo. LTC Philip Draper
deCamp’s TF 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment (TF 4-64 AR), would
follow TF 1-64 AR and seize two of Saddam Hussein’s palaces on the
Tigris River (Objectives WOODY EAST and WOODY WEST). The third
battalion, LTC Stephen Twitty’s TF 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment
(TF 3-15 IN), would keep the LOC open between Objective SAINTS
and downtown. To do so, TF 3-15 IN had to control three vital overpass
intersections on Highway 8, designated as CURLY, LARRY, and MOE.
MOE was the key interchange where Perkins’ Soldiers either had to move
east in the direction of downtown or make a U-turn, returning to SAINTS.
For Perkins, controlling the three overpass intersections was decisive to
securing MG Blount’s approval of his option to go downtown.
The second thunder run got off to a rocky start. In the wake of the 5
April attack up Highway 8, the Iraqis had laid a minefield on the highway
north of SAINTS, extending for 500 meters. At 0538 on 7 April, CPT
David Hibner’s company of 2d Brigade engineers hastily cleared 444
mines. By 0600, TF 1-64 AR, TF 4-64 AR, and TF 3-15 IN departed in that
order in a long column. Only eleven minutes into the movement, enemy
small arms fire, RPGs, and mortar rounds erupted from both sides of the
highway. In accordance with COL Perkins’ intent, the two leading task
forces continued to advance and hand over targets to trailing units, which
also recovered the crews of disabled armored vehicles.
Perkins faced his first critical decision an hour into the operation.
As the armored column clanked towards MOE, he radioed BG Lloyd J.
Austin III, Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), explaining that the
level of resistance faced by 2d Brigade was less intense than during the

111
previous thunder run. He stated his preconditions for going downtown,
insisting that he could meet all of them. Without giving a definitive
answer, Austin stated that he would inform Blount. He told Perkins to
continue the advance and see how the fight developed. Shortly after 0700,
the armored column turned east off Highway 8 and, within an hour, seized
DIANE, WOODY EAST, and WOODY WEST. The brigade commander
calculated that he had enough fuel to delay a final decision about formally
requesting an overnight stay until 1000. In his mind, the shock value
of keeping US armor task forces downtown outweighed the significant
risks associated with being isolated in a hostile urban environment.
Figure 2. 7 April Thunder Run, 2d Brigade.
The movement off Highway 8 caused a stir at V Corps headquarters.
When LTG Wallace went to bed on 6 April, he thought that 2d Brigade would
advance to MOE and then make a U-turn, heading back to SAINTS. As the
armored task forces advanced towards the downtown objectives, Wallace
observed the operation on the screen of his Blue Force Tracker. Stunned,
the corps commander asked Blount about the unexpected deviation from
his intent during their regular morning brief. Blount explained Perkins’
estimation that the diminished resistance justified turning downtown and
positioning tanks at Hussein’s palace complex in a dramatic show of the

112
regime’s irrelevance. Tension filled the room as Wallace contemplated the
situation. Finally, Wallace broke the long silence by signaling his eager
approval. According to COL Russell Thaden, the V Corps Deputy G2
(intelligence officer) who was present at the time of the conversation,
Wallace replied, “Go ahead, I trust your judgment. If you think you can
get to the palace and hold it, [its] your call and I’ll clear it [with CLFCC.]”
Refusing to focus on the divergence from his original guidance, Wallace
instead recognized that one of his subordinate commanders had created
an opportunity for success through disciplined initiative and prudent
risk taking. He believed that the overall result of the mission was more
important than the methods used to achieve it. Both the corps and division
commanders therefore deferred to the judgment of the commander on the
ground.
Attacking towards Downtown Baghdad on 7 April 2003.
Photo Courtesy of Fort Stewart Museum, US Army.
Meanwhile, the 2d Brigade faced a rapidly deteriorating situation. As
TF 3-15 IN slugged it out at CURLY, LARRY, and MOE with bands of
determined enemy fighters, a rocket attack disrupted the brigade tactical
operations center (TOC) at Objective SAINTS, killing three Soldiers and
temporarily cutting off communications. In the midst of the mayhem, LTC
Eric Wesley, the 2d Brigade executive officer (XO), calmly orchestrated

113
efforts to triage wounded Soldiers and evacuate disabled vehicles.
Within 45 minutes, Wesley had reestablished communication and set up
a makeshift TOC, minimizing the disruption of command and control.
Perkins praised Wesley and all Soldiers at the TOC for remaining focused
on the mission in the midst of disarray. He later expounded on the Soldiers’
shared understanding of his intent, “Everyone understood how important
it was to stay in the city and not have to fight the fight again.”
Events continued to spiral out of control on Highway 8. As Perkins
reached his self-imposed 1000 deadline for seeking permission to spend
the night, TF 3-15 IN was still fighting to maintain control of the three
interchanges at CURLY, LARRY, AND MOE. Even worse, Iraqi fighters
ambushed the first convoy of heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks
(HEMTTs) hauling much-needed supplies and fuel up Highway 8. Five
HEMTTs were destroyed, two Soldiers killed, and Highway 8 remained
disputed. Fierce fighting around Objective MOE also left a mechanized
infantry company critically short of ammunition.
MG Blount, LTG Wallace, and COL Perkins in Baghdad, April 2003.
Photo Courtesy of Fort Stewart Museum, US Army.
Despite the dire circumstances, COL Perkins refused to rush his
decision. “If you had a decision matrix,” he stated, “it probably d[id] not
pay to spend the night.” Nevertheless, he delayed because he did not want
to surrender symbolic ground or face the possibility of ordering additional

114
armored attacks in the coming days. Withdrawing from the city would also
embolden the regime and provide additional propaganda for the information
minister. Based on extensive pre-war training in Kuwait, Perkins trusted
LTC Twitty’s task force to win the battles at the overpass intersections if
given sufficient time, bought by delaying a decision past 1000. To mitigate
resupply problems, he instituted an “energy conservation plan,” ordering
TF 1-64 AR and TF 4-64 AR tank commanders to turn off their engines.
He then positioned the task forces’ Bradleys at key downtown bridges
and intersections to strengthen the defensive posture. Perkins believed
that such measures would buy him several additional hours before supply
concerns might force him to withdraw.
MG Blount again trusted the judgment of his commander on the
ground. At 1016, he reinforced TF 3-15 IN by moving the 1st Brigade’s
TF 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment (TF 2-7 IN), to occupy and defend
Objective CURLY, allowing TF 3-15 IN to focus on clearing LARRY and
MOE. By late afternoon, the infantry task forces had defeated the Iraqi
fighters along Highway 8 and cleared the LOC for the HEMTTs to move
north to supply Perkins’ brigade.
Just hours before sundown, the fuel and ammunition resupply reached
downtown after a harrowing movement up Highway 8. COL Perkins’
deliberate decision-making and confidence in his subordinate commanders
validated LTG Wallace’s and MG Blount’s trust in him. By early evening,
Wallace approved the decision to spend the night.
There is always a tension between executing mission orders and
exercising disciplined initiative but Wallace clearly understood the benefits
of empowering subordinate commanders to make decisions in a fluid,
complex, and highly unpredictable tactical environment. “COL Perkins,
to his credit … was taking advantage of the situation that was presented
to him on the battlefield,” Wallace explained, “which is what we teach
our young leaders to do.” Ultimately, the second thunder run produced
tactical, strategic, and information victories as television networks soon
broadcasted images of US tanks occupying Saddam Hussein’s former
seat of power. In retrospect, Perkins attributed the 2d Brigade’s success
to the flexibility displayed by Wallace and Blount and their willingness to
empower him with freedom of action:
These thunder runs were successful because the corps and
division-level commanders established clear intent in their orders
and trusted their subordinates’ judgment and abilities to exercise

115
disciplined initiative in response to a fluid, complex problem,
underwriting the risks that they took.
The Iraqi information minister could no longer deny that US Soldiers
occupied Saddam Hussein’s seat of administrative power. The regime
teetered on the brink of an inevitable collapse. Within weeks, the Baathist
government no longer ruled Iraq.
For Further Reading
CPT Jason Conroy. Heavy Metal: A Tank Company’s Battle to Baghdad.
Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.
COL (retired) Gregory Fontenot, LTC E. J. Degen, and LTC David Tohn.
On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Through 01 May 2003. Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, US
Army, 2004.
Jim Lacey. Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day
Assault on Baghdad. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
LTG David G. Perkins. “Mission Command: Reflections from the
Combined Arms Center Commander.” Army 62 (June 2012): 30-34.
COL (retired) John B. Tisserand III. US V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division
(Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations
(March to April 2003). Vol. 3 of Network Centric Warfare Case Study.
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, 2006.
David Zucchino. Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad.
New York: Grove Press, 2004.

117
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Thunder Run case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. After assuming
command of 2d Brigade in June 2001, COL Perkins benefitted from a
low turnover of battalion commanders, fostering stability, continuity, and
mutual trust. A six-month period of intensive training in Kuwait prior
to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 also reinforced mutual trust and
unit cohesiveness. Perkins trusted the collective capability of his Soldiers
because he had seen them repeatedly participate in focused training
missions. Later, he would describe mutual trust as “the bedrock of mission
command.”
2. Create Shared Understanding. The corps, division, and brigade
commanders clearly conveyed their intents, objectives, and key tasks to
subordinate commanders. For instance, during the thunder run missions,
COL Perkins’ battalion commanders understood that maintaining a high
tempo and handing off targets to trailing armored vehicles and units was
critical for mission success.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. Both LTG Wallace and MG
Blount provided clear and concise commanders’ intents for both thunder
run missions. Their intent was to attack into Baghdad in an armored
column to test Saddam Hussein’s urban defense, collect intelligence about
the paramilitary and military units, and maintain pressure on the regime.
COL Perkins’ intent closely mirrored those of his senior commanders. For
the first thunder run, his intent was to attack up Highway 8 to “create
as much confusion as I can inside the city, because I had found that my
Soldiers or my units can react to chaos much better than the enemy can.”
Perkins’ intent for the second thunder run was also clear and succinct.
“You get on that road and you attack as fast as you can, and push right
through to the center of the city,” he stated. “If a vehicle becomes disabled
due to enemy fire, you immediately take the crew off, put them on another
vehicle, and you just leave it.”

118
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Perkins exercised disciplined
initiative by creating an option for his task forces to go and stay downtown
during the 7 April thunder run. As the armored column approached
Objective MOE, Perkins assessed the situation, considered his options,
and made a determination to go downtown. He believed that positioning
two US armor task forces at the regime’s seat of political and military
power would expedite the accomplishment of Wallace’s intent, which he
judged more important than the specifics of the tactical operation. “The
center of gravity for the regime is Baghdad,” he stated. “If you get in there
in what we call the regime district … and if you could stay there, then no
one could say that you’re not there or that you’re not in control over the
city … Saddam can still be alive, but he’s irrelevant.”
5. Use Mission Orders. Perkins issued written and verbal mission
orders for both thunder run missions. For the first reconnaissance in
force, he directed TF 1-64 AR to attack up Highway 8 all the way to the
Baghdad Airport in order to collect intelligence about the composition and
disposition of the Iraqi forces defending the city. The orders emphasized
maintaining momentum, handing over targets to trailing armored vehicles,
and avoiding pitched battles, but they also maximized individual initiative.
Indeed, during the 5 April thunder run, Perkins did not micromanage the
details of the movement. His mission order for the second thunder run
included similar directions and guidance, with the two armor task forces
attacking all the way downtown while TF 3-15 IN seized the three overpass
objectives on Highway 8, opening the LOC between the TOC and Saddam
Hussein’s palace complex. As commander of TF 4-64 AR, LTC deCamp
explained, “the mission was to bypass and not get into a pitched battle.”
6. Accept Prudent Risk. Perkins accepted the risk of attacking into
downtown Baghdad and spending the night because of two mitigating
factors: his firsthand knowledge of the Iraqi resistance and the fulfillment
of the four preconditions he had set for spending the night. Because
he accompanied TF 1-64 AR on the 5 April mission, Perkins was
able to conclude on 7 April that the Iraqi resistance had diminished in
sophistication and coordination, justifying a turn downtown. Upon arriving
at the downtown objectives, he mitigated the risk to his Soldiers by basing
his decision to remain overnight on meeting the four preconditions. A
V Corps after action review (AAR) briefing dated July 2003 praised the
strategic implications of Perkins’ prudent risk taking: “The decision to
leave an armored brigade in the center of Baghdad overnight seemed
unthinkable one day and obvious the next. We must never underestimate
the psychological impact of an American armored force holding the
ground it takes.”

119
The Drive to Bastogne
Kendall D. Gott
During the Battle of the Bulge, the beleaguered 101st Airborne Divi-
sion and Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division were pressed
into a tight perimeter as the German offensive swept around the key city of
Bastogne. The American paratroopers were holding their own but supplies
and ammunition could only come by airdrop and the foul winter weather
hindered all efforts to deliver the needed materiel. Relief for the “battling
bastards” would have to come from the ground. To do just that, the Third
Army under LTG George S. Patton Jr. had shifted its attack to the east and
sent its mobile divisions to the north. It was far from certain that Patton’s
armor and infantry divisions could reach Bastogne before the 101st Air-
borne was forced to surrender. The relief of Bastogne is a classic example
of commanders at all levels using initiative and daring to overcome a de-
termined enemy.
The German winter offensive through the Ardennes region in 1944
was designed to split the British and American Allied line in half, to cap-
ture the port of Antwerp, and then proceed to encircle and destroy four
Allied armies, forcing the Western Allies to negotiate a peace treaty. Once
that was accomplished, The Germans could then fully concentrate on the
eastern front against the armies of the Soviet Union. The offensive was
planned in secrecy and surprise was achieved by combination of Allied
overconfidence, preoccupation with their own offensive plans, and poor
aerial reconnaissance. Although the ability of the Germans to assemble
and organize the forces for this offensive was remarkable, these units were
still beset with shortages in equipment, manpower, and logistics. Fuel was
in critically short supply and the Germans were counting on rapid speed
and capturing Allied fuel stocks to keep the momentum of the attack.
The secrecy of the German preparations had lulled Allied planners
into believing the Ardennes was a quiet sector of the front and had as-
signed relatively green units here to adjust them to combat or placed units
in need of refitting or rest. The heavy overcast weather had grounded the
far superior Allied air forces, preventing reconnaissance flights prior to
the offensive and ground support once it commenced. When the German
offensive began on 16 December, it stunned the Allied units in their path.
Some were pushed back in disorder and others were simply overwhelmed
by the onslaught. The Germans initially advanced quickly but stubborn
resistance formed on the northern shoulder of the offensive around Elsen-
born Ridge at the town of Hofen. In the south, the defenders in Bastogne
blocked German access to key roads they were relying on for success. The

120
stubborn defense by American units dug into the wooded hills covering
the few good roads threw the German timetable behind schedule.
Map 1. The German offensive, December 1944.
The Germans were particularly anxious to seize the vital crossroads
at Bastogne, where the American 101st Airborne Division was hurriedly
deployed to block their advance. By 21 December they had contained the
paratroopers in the town and surrounding hills while the panzer spearhead
continued its drive to the west. However, as long as the Americans held
Bastogne the Germans would have a very difficult time in resupplying
their units and the men used to contain American perimeter were needed
elsewhere. It became critical to the Germans to take Bastogne to keep the
offensive going. It was critical to the Allies to hold Bastogne to disrupt the
German plans.
The 4th Armored Division was part of this northern drive ordered by
General Patton and, its commander, Major General Hugh Gaffey, was
frustrated there was no quick breakthrough possible on the main Arlon-
Bastogne highway. The Germans had expected such a thrust and had de-
ployed strong defenses on this axis which slowed the advance to a crawl.
The heavy firepower of artillery and tanks were blasting the way clear

121
for the infantry but it was still slow going. The common purpose of the
division was to reach Bastogne as quickly as possible before the Germans
could force its surrender.
The 4th Armored Division was task organized into three “combat
commands” which were composed of two to four battalions and task-or-
ganized for the mission at hand. For the drive to Bastogne, Combat Com-
mands A and B (CCA and CCB respectively) were the main efforts, while
Combat Command Reserve (CCR), under the command of COL Wendell
Blanchard, was given the task to screen the left flank of the division along
the axis of advance. For this task, the nucleus of the CCR was the 37d
Tank Battalion under LTC Creighton Abrams, and the 53d Armored In-
fantry Battalion under LTC George Jaques (pronounced Jakes). These two
battalions were task-organized for this mission by swapping companies
so that they were almost a 50-50 mix of tanks and infantry. Although this
was not a permanent organization, the tank and rifle companies of CCR
had teamed together many times in the past. Supporting units included the
94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and a battery of 155mm howitzers
from the 177th Field Artillery Battalion. Various other detachments of en-
gineers, transport, and support units rounded out the organization.
Creighton Williams Abrams Jr. had graduated from West Point in 1936
and served with the 1st Cavalry Division in the years up to 1940. As the
Armor branch formed, he transferred to that branch and served as a tank
company commander in the newly formed 1st Armored Division. Abrams
was reassigned to the 4th Armored Division and served as the regimental
adjutant until June 1942. The 37th Tank Battalion was created during a
reorganization of the division and Abrams was placed in command. Dur-
ing his command, the 37th Tank Battalion was used as the spearhead of the
4th Armored Division and the US Third Army. He constantly managed to
defeat German forces that had the advantage of superior armor and guns
by consistently exploiting the relatively small advantages of speed and
reliability of his vehicles. During the drive across France in 1944, Abrams
forged a reputation as an aggressive tank commander noted for his concern
for soldiers, his emphasis on combat readiness, and his insistence on per-
sonal integrity. LTG George Patton Jr. is often quoted saying of him, “I’m
supposed to be the best tank commander in the Army but I have one peer,
Abe Abrams. He’s the world champion.” Creighton Abrams was to play a
decisive role in the drive to Bastogne.
COL Blanchard had been allowed to select his own route to the assem-
bly area, which was located southwest of Bercheux. CCR column closed
on this site alongside the Neufchateau-Bastogne road shortly before dawn

122
on Christmas Day. Essentially attacking astride a road running generally
to the northeast, the small villages along the way were used as objectives.
Almost nothing was known of the German defenses along the 12-mile
stretch of road to the American perimeter around Bastogne but tough re-
sistance was expected. It was known though that capture of Bastogne was
a top priority for the Germans and they were massing all available forces
into this sector. Shortly after Christmas dawn, the battalions of CCR began
their drive northward expecting strong German resistance to the north and
a very real threat of a counterattack from the west.
The Americans were surprised to find light resistance in Vaux-les-
Rosières and pushed on quickly to Remoiville. Here the Germans had
placed the veteran 3d Battalion of the 14th Fallschirmjäger Regiment,
which was taking advantage of the thick walls and cellars of the old town.
LTC Abrams’ 37th Tank Battalion was in the lead of CCR and paused on
the hills overlooking Remoiville. Four battalions of artillery and a com-
pany of Sherman tanks blasted the town with rapid fire for ten minutes
while A Team formed for an assault (Abrams had further task organized
his companies, providing each with infantry support. These he called A
Team, B Team, and C Team.) As soon as the fires lifted, A Team raced
into the village with machine guns blazing, and once inside, the infantry-
men dismounted from their halftracks and began clearing each building.
The suppressing fire worked, keeping the Germans pinned down. When
they tried to emerge to fight, they were cut down by heavy fire and hand
grenades tossed into the cellars which quickly brought the survivors to
the surface. The fight took most of the afternoon but by dusk, the CCR
had taken 327 prisoners. Elements were pushed about 100 meters past the
town but there was a large road crater where any bypass around it was im-
possible. the crater needed to be filled before the advance could continue.
That night, while the crater was filled, COL Blanchard assembled
his commanders for a meeting. The plan he laid out was for an advance
through Remi Champagne and Clochimont and turn to Sibret and the main
Neufchâteau-Bastogne road. Heavy German defenses were reported at Si-
bret but there was promised air support to help deal with those. As usual,
COL Blanchard mimicked the division commander in assigning an axis of
advance to each of his maneuver commanders, allowing each to develop
his plan to execute the mission. COL Blanchard had faith in his veteran
commanders but still retained some oversight, particularly with the coor-
dination of artillery fires and supporting units.

123
Map 2. The drive to Bastogne, 24-25 December, 1944.
This plan was put into operation on the morning of 26 December as
the lead tanks started for Remi Champagne. The ground was frozen and
the armored vehicles found it easy going even with the blanket of snow.

124
An unexpected but timely arrival of P-47 fighter bombers brought bomb-
ing and strafing runs into the town and surrounding woods, which dis-
sipated enemy resistance quickly but when in closing in on Clochimont,
the CCR carefully deployed in expectation of contact with the main line
of enemy defense and a probable counterattack. These deployments were
complete by 1500. By this time the 3d Tank Battalion was down to 20
Sherman tanks. Meanwhile the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion, weak to
begin with, was short 230 men. Abrams and Jaques met on the road to
discuss the next move. As they talked, dozens of C-47 transports streamed
overhead toward Bastogne to deliver their cargoes. The need to reach the
paratroopers of the 101st Airborne quickly was reinforced.
Abrams suggested they dash through Assenois and straight into
Bastogne. LTC Jaques agreed. The town of Sibret was next on COL
Blanchard’s itinerary but it was known to be strongly held and would take
time and effort to root the Germans out. At 1520, Abrams made a tough
decision. While the bulk of CCR continued with the mission to reduce Si-
bret and other companies positioned to guard the division flank, two com-
panies were detailed for a push straight to Bastogne. It was a risky move
as there may not be enough troops to take Sibret and the two companies
would be vulnerable to a German attack or they could get badly cut up by
strong resistance further up the road.
LTC Abrams radioed his S-3, Captain William Dwight, and directed
him to bring C Team forward. He also contacted the 94th Field Artillery
Battalion through the liaison officer and updated them on his new plan.
Abrams then asked that the 101st Airborne be alerted that American forces
were approaching. CCR was alone in not having telephone wiring laid,
so communications relied on the fickle radios. One result of this was that
COL Blanchard was not yet told of Abrams’ plan nor authorized such a
move. Racing ahead of the general advance could invite confusion and
his forces could get cut up by friendly air and artillery fire, not to mention
fire from any Germans lying in wait, but Creighton Abrams was making
the decision with the best information available at hand. With this move,
he was still able to achieve the common purpose of defending the flank as
well as achieve contact with the 101st Airborne Division. By 1620, the fire
support plan was in place and C Team was in position.

125
Map 3. The drive to Bastogne, 26 December 1944.
Abrams’ C Team at this time consisted of the C companies of both the
37th and 53d battalions and Captain Dwight was now elevated to overall

126
command. Dwight arranged the column with the Sherman tanks up front
and with the halftracks behind and pressed up the road. Just when As-
senois came into view of the lead tank, 10 volley-fires from 13 artillery
batteries crashed into the center of town. Not waiting for the fires to lift,
the tanks gunned their engines and they were soon beside the first build-
ings of the town with the mounted infantry close behind. The smoke and
dust created by the shelling made the center of Assenois almost as dark as
night. So close did the ground attack follow the artillery that not a hostile
shot was fired at the tanks as they raced through the town’s streets. This
was quite fortunate as the Germans had posted eight deadly antitank guns
to cover the road.
The American column pushed on into Assenois but at this point the
attack faltered somewhat. Two tanks had made a wrong turn and a half-
track had fallen in with the tank column. Meanwhile the smoke and fall-
ing light of day reduced visibility to a few yards and added to the con-
fusion. Additionally, the incoming supporting artillery fire rained shell
fragments on the infantry riding in the open top halftracks. These men
quickly dismounted to find the nearest shelter. Over 100 Germans from
the 5th Fallschirmjäger and 26th Volks Grenadier divisions poured out of
the cellars when the supporting fires finally lifted. The fight became that of
savage close combat, much of it hand to hand.
Only five tanks and one halftrack emerged from the ongoing melee in
Assenois to continue towards Bastogne. The rest of C Team was left bat-
tling for their lives in the streets. These tanks and the halftrack pushed on,
spraying likely defensive positions along the road liberally with machine
gun fire as they drove at top speed. The Germans though were able to
quickly place mines in the road which disabled the halftrack. After clear-
ing the mines and collecting the wounded the Sherman tanks continued
on. At 1650 the lead tank spotted some American engineers up ahead pre-
paring to assault a pillbox near the highway. These men turned out to be
from the 326th Engineer Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division. To the
surprise of the Americans, and undoubtedly the Germans too, the pillbox
disintegrated as a tank round struck home. Contact was thus made with
the beleaguered paratroopers. Twenty minutes later, LTC Abrams made
his way to that point and shook hands with Brigadier General Anthony
McAuliffe, the acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division, who
had come to the outpost line to welcome the relieving force.
Fighting continued along the road to Bastogne for several more hours
as the 53d Armored Infantry fought for possession of Assenois. By mid-
night of 26 December, the road was deemed safe enough to send 200 ve-

127
hicles with badly needed supplies to Bastogne, as well as 22 ambulances
to evacuate 652 seriously wounded soldiers there. With dash and élan the
men of the CCR of the 4th Armored Division regained contact with the
101st Airborne Division. The threat of the loss of Bastogne was eliminated
and the fate of the German offensive was sealed. For his actions, Creigh-
ton Abrams received his second Distinguished Service Cross.
For Further Reading
George Forty.Fourth Armored Division in World War II, Minneapolis,
MN: Zenith Press, 2008.
S.L.A. Marshall. Bastogne: The First Eight Days. US Army in
Action Series, Washington: Center of Military History, 1946.
Danny S. Parker. Battle of the Bulge: Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive,
1944–1945, New York: Da Capo Press, 2004.
Lewis Sorley. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the
Army of His Times, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
John Toland. Battle: The Story of the Bulge, Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1999.

129
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Bastogne case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. The division and
combat command commanders had built cohesive teams through rigorous
training prior to deployment into combat and reinforced these teams dur-
ing the advance across France through the summer and autumn of 1944.
At the lower echelons, the companies and battalions of the CCR had been
task-organized often and had fought together many times. The mutual trust
among the commanders is illustrated during operations as generally units
were assigned axis of advance, giving the subordinate commanders the
flexibility to formulate a plan of execution.
2. Create Shared Understanding. The men of the CCR, 4th Armored
Division, had a shared understanding of the objective of the operation of
reaching Bastogne and the embattled 101st Airborne Division. Each man
knew the fate of the paratroopers depended on getting there quickly no
matter what the Germans had planned. This in no small way motivated the
commanders and the men of all arms to give their upmost effort. It was no
secret that the road junction at Bastogne was key to the German plans and
holding it would seriously hamper their offensive.
3. Provide Clear Commander’s Intent. There is no doubt Creighton
Abrams instilled in his men the need to reach Bastogne as quickly as pos-
sible and counted on everyone to do their part. Mission and fragmentary
orders were short and concise but everyone knew his intent, what he want-
ed, and the speed in which he wanted it to happen. This command style
was warranted due to the speed and distances experienced in mechanized
warfare, especially when communications relied on relatively short range
radio sets.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. As the length of the flank increased
so did the need for small unit leadership and initiative. At all levels men
and units exercised discipline initiative in engaging German forces, by-
passing when needed, clearing unexpected mines and obstacles, and main-

130
taining the momentum of the attack. Abrams certainly exercised initiative
when he could not reach COL Blanchard by radio and decided to push on
to Bastogne even though most of his unit was locked in bitter close urban
combat. Abrams had served with COL Blanchard in combat for several
months and knew he had his full support.
5. Use Mission Orders. COL Blanchard and LTC Abrams used mis-
sion orders throughout the operation. Orders were issued in conferences
and unit visits when possible and via radio while on the move. The lat-
ter was necessary as the CCR did not have telephone capability. When
communication was not possible the subordinate leaders made the best
decisions they could, basing them on the situation at hand and remember-
ing the commander’s intent. The mission orders were broad in scope and
encouraged the subordinate units to develop the situation in their assigned
sectors and act accordingly in relation to the overall commander’s intent.
For example, LTC Abrams was told simply to attack along an axis of ad-
vance, clearing all German forces in order to clear a route to Bastogne.
The tactics and methods to do that were not dictated to Abrams but left up
to him.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. Creighton Abrams accepted prudent risk,
weighing the merits of a quick drive to Bastogne against the lethality of
the German defenses in his way. After consideration of the mission, the
objective, and the enemy’s likely situation and intent, he decided to push
forward using speed to his advantage. It could well have ended in disaster
with his unit chopped to pieces. German force dispositions were generally
unknown along the axis of advance, and there was a possibility of deadly
anti-tank fire at almost any point. Detaching a large part of his command
while in contact was risky indeed, as Abrams may not have had enough
forces to complete either mission. The need to relieve the American para-
troopers from the German encirclement made this necessary. It proved to
be the right decision.

Section 3: Cases at Company/Platoon/Squad Level

133
An Engineer Assault Team Crosses the Meuse, May 1940
Mark T. Gerges, Ph.D.
On 10 May 1940, the so called Phony War finally came to an end. The
Germans invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, seven months
after the fall of Poland. French and British divisions rushed forward into
previously neutral Belgium and occupied defensive positions along the
Dyle River line. While large battles occurred along the expected invasion
route in northern Belgium, creeping through the Ardennes forest was the
true main effort of the German invasion. Led by Lieutenant General Heinz
Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps (activated as the XIX Armee Korps and
sometimes called the XIX Motorized Corps), the decisive operation of
the German forces moved on five routes through the narrow forest roads
unobserved and undisturbed by the allied air forces that focused on the
anticipated main effort to the north. By midnight on 12 May, the lead
elements of Guderian’s forces arrived along the eastern bank of the Meuse
River at the French city of Sedan, and throughout the night and early
morning hours of 13 May, the main elements of the XIX Panzer Corps
occupied their assembly areas.
The Meuse River was the main defensive obstacle anchoring the French
defense along this sector. Sedan was the intersection between the Maginot
Line defenses that ended just 20 miles to the south and the flank of the
main Allied efforts in the Low Countries. Because it was the gap and not a
critical threat itself, the Sedan sector was defended by second tier French
reserve divisions. The French defenses were a patchwork of units under
the command of the 55th Infantry Division, a “B” tier division consisting
of reservists who served their active duty commitment in the 1920s, and
for the last 15 years had done only the minimum of active duty training.
Since mobilization the previous year, the division spent the winter and
spring building bunkers to defend their sector along the Meuse River. Well
sited, often constructed of reinforced concrete with machine guns or light
cannons, the positions covered the most likely crossing points. Earth and
wood reinforced bunkers covered the dead space between the more solidly
constructed bunkers, with troops placed in intervals between the bunkers
to protect the flanks. If anything, there were too many bunkers rather than
too few. French soldiers spent more time as construction troops rather
than training on their individual soldier tasks. Complicating the French
defenses, the high command of the French decided after the opening of
the campaign to reinforce the 55th Infantry Division with the 71st Infantry
Division. On paper this looked simple and made sense with the division

134
front of the 55th division reduced from 22 to 14 kilometers. However, the
timing could not have been worse. Ordered to occur on the night of 13-14
May, much of the relief did not occur due to the German attack but still
resulted in additional confusion as battalions prepared to displace just as
the German attack commenced.
The German XIX Panzer Corps consisted of three Panzer divisions and
a separate infantry regiment. The corps was to attack with three divisions
abreast. The main effort was in the center of the corps sector with the 1st
Panzer Division at the Gaulier factory, just west of Sedan. Reinforcing the
division on their left flank was the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment,
an elite unit crossing opposite the suburb of Torcey on the western bank.
On the corps’ right flank, the 2d Panzer Division prepared to cross near
the village of Donchery and on the left most flank of the corps, opposite
the village of Wadelincourt, was the 10th Panzer Division. The attack was
to commence at 1500 on 13 May after five hours of bombardment of the
French positions by German Stuka dive bombers.
The 10th Panzer Division planned to cross with two infantry regiments
abreast, supported by the divisional engineer battalion. At this point
the Meuse River is nearly 60 meters wide and too deep to ford. Other
than near the city of Sedan itself, the 10th Panzer’s approach to the river
would be over 600 to 800 meters of flood plain that provided no cover
or concealment. Fire support for the division was limited. In order to
move rapidly though the Ardennes, the logistics train had been kept to
a minimum, so artillery ammunition was extremely restricted. The 10th
Panzer Division would only have their light 105mm howitzers available to
support the crossing. Their heavy guns supported the XIX Corps artillery
which, along with the Luftwaffe’s JU-87 dive bombers, focused on the
corps’ decisive operation, the 1st Panzer Division crossing in the center.
Compounding the problems facing the division was the narrow roads in
the Ardennes which held up the engineer units with the inflatable rubber
boats needed for the assault. One hour prior to the start time, no boats had
arrived, and the engineer battalion commander rushed to the 10th Panzer
Division’s headquarters promising that the boats would arrive in time.
The division’s engineer battalion, Panzerpionier-Batailion 49 (49th
Panzer Engineer Battalion) formed assault groups with teams of engineers
and infantry squads that would cross in the initial assault to silence the
French bunkers on the opposite bank. Twenty seven year old Feldwebel
(Staff Sergeant) Walter Rubarth of the Second Company of the 49th Panzer

135
Engineer Battalion was assigned to lead one of these assault groups,
consisting of five engineers supported by a squad of six infantrymen from
the 1st Battalion, 86th Rifle Regiment. His orders were to cross the Meuse
River south of a destroyed bridge and seize the bunkers on the opposite
bank to support follow-on crossings by the infantry.
Maneuver of Rubarth’s assault group.
At 1500, the last bombs from the JU-87 dive bombers hit the exposed
French positions, German troops advanced from their assembly areas
towards the river and the plan began to go wrong. It was immediately
obvious that the Luftwaffe bombing had done little damage to the French
artillery as accurate indirect fire fell on the now exposed German troops. In
their haste to prepare their rubber boats for the crossing, the Germans were
observed and heavy French fire landed among the boats and engineers. Of
the 96 boats assigned to the crossing of the 86th Infantry Regiment, 81
were damaged and put out of action. The 86th Infantry Regiment was now
unable to cross and only a single regiment, the 69th, had the equipment
to serve as the division’s decisive operation. Even that assault found itself
stopped dead by heavy and accurate French fire before getting across the
Meuse. All along the 10th Panzer Division’s sector, the crossings were
stopped at the near bank and the 10th Panzer Division was in danger of
catastrophic failure.

136
The Meuse River at Sedan, taken in December 2002. This picture was taken
standing at the crossing site of the 1st Panzer Division looking towards the 10th
Panzer’s crossing sites further south-east.
Author’s collection.
Rubarth and his men had marched five kilometers that morning to
reach their assault positions where Rubarth then went forward to observe
the far bank. The French bunkers were easily seen and a German cannon
was brought forward to provide direct fire support. As the last Stuka
departed the area, Feldwebel Rubarth and his 10-man assault team moved
from their assembly area at a cemetery in the eastern outskirts of Sedan,
along the edge of town, through a sports field, and to the foundations of
the blown bridge, concealed from observation by trees along the river.
Rubarth’s men had only two of the required three-man rubber boats.
Rubarth ordered four men into the first boat and three in the other, leaving
the rest of the squad behind to wait for more boats to become available but
with all the Soldiers’ equipment, the boats were dangerously overloaded
and the water lapped over the gunwales. By mid-river the boats took fire
and Rubarth ordered his machine gunner to fire at the nearest bunker’s
weapon slit. The machine gunner steadied his weapon on the shoulders of
the man in front of him and returned fire while Rubarth’s other men threw
overboard their unnecessary equipment, including entrenching tools, to
lighten the boats. Miraculously, Rubarth’s group landed on the far bank
with no casualties. The men landed near a strong earthen bunker, at which
point French artillery began to fall on the crossing site. As far as Rubarth

137
could see, he and his men were the only German forces to make it to
the western bank and had no support from friendly units pinned-down
on the opposite bank. Rubarth and Private First Class (Gefreiter) Podzus
destroyed the nearest earthen bunker. Cutting through a wire obstacle, his
men then attacked a second bunker, blowing a hole in the rear wall with
a satchel charge and engaging the occupants with small arms and hand
grenades. The French defenders surrendered and German troops on the
far bank of the river began to cheer, encouraging Rubarth and his men.
Continuing to move along a railroad embankment, then wading waist deep
through a swamp, Rubarth’s men destroyed two more earth and wood
bunkers guarding the flank of a major concrete bunker, opening a hole of
300 meters in the French lines. Finally, coming to the road running behind
the railroad embankment, Rubarth’s squad received such heavy fire that
they had to take cover. It was at this point that the feldwebel realized that
he and his men were completely alone and unsupported on the enemy bank
of the Meuse.
Bunker 220 along the railroad embankment at Sedan. Feldwebel Rubarth’s
actions just west of here destroyed the three earthen bunkers along the river
protecting the left flank of this bunker, leaving it vulnerable when follow-on forces
attacked it later in the day. Photo taken in December 2002.
Author’s collection.
Out of ammunition, Rubarth returned to the crossing site. There he
learned that a third boat with his remaining men had been hit and the four
men killed. His platoon leader on the far bank organized men from other

138
squads and rubber boats and four more engineers crossed the river to join
Rubarth with additional satchel charges. While the four reinforcements
brought him back to full strength, it was clear that the 10th Panzer’s attack
was stalled but Rubarth moved back to the railroad embankment and
joined his men.
While machine gun fire pinned the Germans down at the railroad
embankment, the French organized a local counterattack. The attack was
beaten off but one non-commissioned officer was killed and two soldiers
wounded. Reorganizing his remaining men, Rubarth crossed the tracks
and attacked Bunker 8 and then Bunker 9 from the flank, increasing the
breach in the French defenses. He then assaulted the strongest bunker in
the area (Bunker 219), a partially completed concrete position with two
25mm guns located a little to the west. What Rubarth did not know was
that his route, taken because of the French resistance, took him outside of
the 10th Panzer Division’s sector and into the 1st Panzer Division’s. His
attack on Bunkers 8 and 9, then Bunker 219 and its supporting positions,
did nothing to help the 10th Panzer Division, his own unit, still stalled at
the river. However Rubarth’s actions were critical to the battle because
they took his unit to the junction between the French first and second
lines of defenses opposite Sedan. While he had destroyed a couple of
bunkers in the first line opposite the 10th Panzer, his movement west cut
perpendicularly across the French defense, opening a much larger hole and
creating greater confusion among the French defenders.
Taking fire from their right flank, Rubarth and his men continued
moving west where they took fire from bunkers 308 and 6B. Now inside
the 1st Panzer Division’s sector, Rubarth’s actions were having unexpected
results. The two battalions of the Grossdeutschland Regiment, delayed in
house-to-house fighting in the village of Torcey, found the French fire on
their positions lessening. Farther west, the 1st Rifle Regiment of the 1st
Panzer Division penetrated the first line of French defenses and suddenly
advanced into an area with reduced defensive fire due to Rubarth’s actions,
allowing them to consolidate on their objectives near dusk. Taking the
three earthen bunkers along the river between 1500 and 1700 also had
another unforeseen consequence. After 1700, another engineer team
crossed the Meuse near the destroyed bridge, and attacked Bunker 220
from its now unprotected flank and moved south. This attack undermined
the French defense against the 10th Panzer, allowing the division to cross
later that evening.
By dark, Rubarth’s 11-man team had suffered six dead and three
wounded. They consolidated on the heights above the village of

139
Wadelincourt about a kilometer west of the river, linking up with another
engineer platoon from their battalion after nightfall. Feldwebel Walter
Rubarth received a battlefield promotion to lieutenant and was awarded
the Knight’s Cross for his actions on 13 May 1940. After the French
campaign, he served in the 1941 invasion of Russia and was killed outside
of Gzhatsk, Russia on 26 October 1941.
For Further Reading:
Robert A. Doughty. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France,
1940. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990.
Karl-Heinz Frieser. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the
West. Annapolis, MD: The Naval Institute Press, 2005.
Alistair Horne. To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Reading, UK: Cox and
Wymann, Ltd., 1969.

141
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Engineer Assault Team Crosses the Meuse
case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. Despite the fact the
Feldwebel Rubarth’s assault team was a temporary grouping of an
engineer squad and infantry squad for this particular mission, the high
level of training allowed them to operate effectively. All units in the XIX
Panzer Corps could be considered elite due to their combat experience in
Poland and extensive training since the Polish campaign. This experience
led to a high degree of cohesion and trust among the men.
2. Create Shared Understanding. During preparation for the 1940
Campaign, the German Army planned carefully and extensively. The XIX
Panzer Corps and its subordinate organizations rehearsed the mission to
cross the Meuse numerous times in the months leading up to the operation.
The command philosophy and practice at all levels in the German Army
was similar to what the US Army now calls Mission Command with a
major emphasis on giving small units objectives but little other specific
guidance. Officers and NCOs like Rubarth were expected to solve tactical
problems on their own using their resources and initiative. In the case of the
river crossing, the task—an assault river crossing in the face of determined
resistance – placed great importance on small unit leaders finding ways to
reach the far bank of the river and assault the enemy positions so that a
penetration was possible. Rubarth’s squad clearly understood this.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. While the actual orders issued
to Rubarth are lost, the intent and verbal instructions remain—cross the
river and assault the bunkers, which provided clear intent to the soldiers
under his leadership.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Rubarth understood his orders and
the intent, and evaluated these orders on the basis of the situation which
actually existed when he crossed the Meuse. Specific orders to attack
particular bunkers within his division’s sector may have led to disaster

142
because Rubarth moved along the route of French vulnerabilities which just
happened to lead out of his division’s sector into a neighboring division’s.
Lavish adherence to a plan written without the knowledge of the actual
layout of the French defense would have led Rubarth’s men into the beaten
zone of the French bunkers. Instead, Rubarth’s initiative combined with
his understanding of commander’s intent led to his squad playing a pivotal
role in the successful German crossing of the Meuse River.
5. Use Mission Orders. As noted above, the XIX Panzer Corps and
its subordinate organizations rehearsed the mission to cross the Meuse
numerous times in the months leading up to the campaign. The orders for
the crossing were broad and maximized freedom of action for subordinate
units. Divisions were assigned sectors rather than specific objectives and
timetables. Indeed, the entire corps operations order, including the fire
support annex, was only nine pages long. The execution order by the corps
commander upon arriving at the Meuse told his subordinate commanders to
cross the river and capture their objectives according to the map exercises!
Rubarth’s orders allowed him to figure out how to accomplish his mission,
including the route to take and bunkers to attack. He was to cross the river,
assess the situation, and by understanding the division’s broader mission
(cross the Meuse), do what he deemed appropriate at his level to support
his higher command’s mission.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. Feldwebel Rubarth balanced the risk to his
men with the risk to the division’s decisive operation while understanding
the importance of accomplishing his mission. Even when it appeared
that he and his men were the only German forces across the river, he
understood that he must accomplish his mission with the forces available
to him. Still, in choosing his route of advance, he moved his squad along
the path of least French resistance, rather than take on the French bunkers
in a frontal assault. By mitigating risk in this way, he actually was able to
create opportunities for his own soldiers as well as the units on the far side
of the river waiting to cross.

143
Capturing Eben-Emael
The Key to the Low Countries
Nicholas A. Murray, D.Phil.
Fall Gelb, the German plan for the invasion of France and the Low
Countries called for Army Group B, Sixth Army in particular, to quickly
drive through Holland and Belgium in order to help fix the Allied forces in
place. This was in order to facilitate the German main effort to the south,
the Sichelschnitt, which had as its aim the cutting off of the core of Allied
armies in order to destroy them in a large pocket. The Belgian fortress of
Eben-Emael lay on the axis of attack of Sixth Army (Map 1). The fortress
covered several key bridges across the Meuse-Albert Canal just to the
west of Maastricht. The capture of the bridges was crucial to the success
of the German invasion. Eben-Emael was considered by many to be the
most powerful fortress in the world and it needed to be taken quickly if the
German plan was to work. In the first ever glider assault, elements of the
7th Flieger Division rapidly captured the fort opening the way to the west
for Sixth Army. The success of the mission came about as a direct result of
the flexibility, personal initiative, cohesion, and innovation of the Soldiers
and their commanders.
Map 1. The German plan to invade France and the Low Countries.

144
In October 1939 Hitler added an order to Fall Gelb for the capture, by
paratroopers, of Eben Emael to assist in maintaining the high operational
tempo demanded by the plan. GEN Karl Student, commander of 7th
Flieger Division, was tasked with the mission. He allocated CPT Walter
Koch as overall commander for the capture of the bridges and LT Rudolf
Witzig to the specific task of capturing Eben-Emael itself. Witzig was
chosen because he was an excellent officer as well as the fact that he was
the commander of the only paratrooper assault engineer unit, known as
Sturmgruppe Granit, a unit whose skills were essential for an attack upon
a fortress. Tasked with his mission, Witzig began to train his men.
Initially, it was thought that there would only be a week or so to train
the soldiers chosen for the mission. Despite this, Witzig was confident in
the skills of his men and trusted them to do well. As Fall Gelb was delayed
until the spring of 1940, Witzig was able to more thoroughly drill his men
over the six months gap. He oversaw all the aspects of training with CPT
Koch occasionally showing up to check that all was well. Koch left Witzig
to train the men as he saw fit. Koch trusted Witzig and knew that he was
the expert in this type of assault. Thus Koch largely limited his role to
support, providing additional troops for the mission when it became clear
that Witzig’s platoon was not large enough, and facilitating the platoon’s
training without overly interfering. The long period of training reinforced
the already high cohesion of the unit and it allowed for the soldiers to
practice for a variety of scenarios. This provided them with great flexibility
for their mission.
Witzig was also largely responsible for design of the tactical plan of
attack and he worked closely with his senior NCOs to accomplish this. He
was helped by clear mission orders:
Capture by surprise the surface of Eben-Emael. To guarantee the
transit of the Army over the Meuse-Albert Canal, neutralize the
artillery and anti-aircraft casemates and turrets. Break any enemy
resistance and hold until relieved.
Additionally, Witzig pointed out that the process of working with his
subordinates was reinforced by the unit’s “trust and loyalty from bottom
to top and from top to bottom.” This cohesion was to pay great dividends
during the attack itself.
The attack force was arranged in 11 squads of seven or eight men each
for a total of 83 men and two officers. The small size of the squads was
largely a product of the technical specifications of the DFS 230 assault
gliders in which the unit was going to land on the roof of the fort. Gliders

145
were chosen because their lack of engines (less noise) meant that surprise
was more likely. They had the added advantage of being able to land on
a precision target, something that parachuting onto the target could not
guarantee. There was thought to be too great a risk of a loss of surprise if
parachutists took time to concentrate before assaulting their targets. To try
and guarantee that the assault force had at least one officer available, LT
Egon Delica was to land with the First Glider and Witzig with the Eleventh
(Reserve) Glider. The 83 other ranks contained 28 NCOs, who were to
prove crucial to the success of the mission.
Each squad was allocated one main target with the idea that once it
was neutralized they should then start engaging subsidiary positions. As
such, this meant that each glider would land separately from the others
and the men would thus have to act largely on their own initiative, at least
at first. Once the main positions had been dealt with, the Germans were
to establish contact with the other elements of Koch’s force (attacking the
bridges themselves), and coordinate with the lead elements of Sixth Army
to facilitate the river crossing.
The attack was scheduled to be one of the first operations for the
German invasion of the west on 10 May 1940. Despite six months of
training and practice, however, things went wrong shortly after the troops
were airborne. Two of the gliders, which were being towed by transport
aircraft, lost their tows and had to make emergency landings short of the
target: second squad under the command of SGT Max Maier and eleventh
squad (Witzig’s). Thus, the operation lost its commanding officer and a
senior NCO before it arrived.
It is worth looking at both Maier’s and Witzig’s reaction to this setback.
Once the tow rope was lost, thinking quickly, Witzig ordered the glider
pilot to look for a field where they could not only land but from where
they could be re-lifted. This done, as soon as they were on the ground,
Witzig ordered his men to clear a temporary runway and himself set off
to find the nearest German transport airbase. There, he commandeered a
transport plane and flew to collect his glider before heading off to land
several hours late at Eben-Emael. SGT Maier was equally intrepid. He
hitched a ride on a motorbike, with his squad’s CPL P. Meier, to the nearest
town. There he commandeered two small cars to transport his squad to
Eben-Emael. Unable to take the cars further than the Meuse River, he
elected to continue on foot. Maier persuaded some German engineers to
put his men in one of the first boats to cross the river and from there they
made their way (via another commandeered vehicle) to the bridge nearest
to Eben-Emael. This had been demolished by the Belgians. Undaunted

146
Maier attempted to cross the Albert Canal alone to reconnoiter a way
forward but was killed in the process. CPL Meier now took charge and
after waiting a few minutes, he crossed the canal. From there he stole a
bicycle and rode to the fortress. However, he was unable physically to
get to the rest of Sturmgruppe Granit (by this time on top of Eben-Emael
itself) and instead scouted along the moat on the northwestern side of the
fortress before making contact with SGT Haug of fifth squad. Imparting
his story by shouting, he let Haug know that he would attempt to get his
men to the fort as quickly as he could. Heading back to rejoin his men, and
still unable to reach Sturmgruppe Granit, Meier instead linked up with
relieving German troops from Sixth Army and aided them in crossing the
Albert canal. Whilst that was going on, nine other gliders had landed on
the fort and the Soldiers had set about their mission.
Map 2. Fortress Eben-Emael casemates with armored cupolas indicated by
number designation.

147
The first nine squads each had targets designated for when they landed,
with the tenth and eleventh squads acting as the reserve. Given the failure
of second and eleventh squads to show up, the situation was a little more
complicated. Ideally LT Delica, who was senior on the ground, should have
taken charge. His glider, however, had landed a fair way to the south and
his squad was busy dealing with its target position, a 75mm-gun casemate
(18, Map 2). Unable to contact Witzig or Delica, SGT Helmut Wenzel of
fourth squad took command and established headquarters for Sturmgruppe
Granit inside the machine-gun casemate (19, Map 2), which his men had
captured minutes earlier. SGT Wenzel (described by LT Witzig as “a first
rate man, an old engineer with vast experience, a vigorous troop leader”)
was fully familiar with the mission and continued with the plan. He had
his radioman establish contact with Koch in order to inform the overall
commander when his men had taken their main objectives, as well as to
gain situational awareness as to the whereabouts of the relieving troops.
Meanwhile the other squads had landed in proximity to their targets and
set about dealing with them. As Witzig described it, “they didn’t need to
ask questions. They had their orders, and they did them.”
Squad eight, under SGT Unger, had been the first to land and they
immediately set about dealing with their target, a 75mm-gun position in an
armored cupola (31, Map 2). Being the first to land, they came under a hail
of small-arms fire and they took their first casualty almost immediately.
They close-assaulted a Belgian position which threatened their advance
on the main objective. They did so with the help of fifth squad which had
already successfully disposed of their own targets: the anti-aircraft guns
(29, Map 2) and the armored observation cupola (30, Map 2). SGT Haug,
of fifth squad, had used his initiative to support eighth squad’s attack. This
was a crucial and timely intervention as the Belgian Soldiers inside the
cupola had just loaded two 75mm rounds when the German engineers
detonated their shaped charge knocking out the position. The Germans
then blew in the armored access doors of the gun position effectively
forcing the Belgians to abandon it.
Separately, squad three, under SGT Arendt, had an unanticipated
difficulty in their attack on another of the 75mm-gun casemates (12, Map
2). Their plan anticipated an access door to the casemate, or possibly
an armored observation cupola, through which they might neutralize
the casemate’s garrison. However, there was no obvious door and no
observation cupola. SGT Arendt decided to improvise. He detailed his
men to blow in one of the gun mounts. This was a difficult task as the
charges were not designed for this and neither had his men trained to do it.
They managed, however, to place a charge in one of the gun embrasures

148
before detonating it, destroying one of the 75mm guns. This also put out
of action the casemate, into which they could now enter. Rather than stop
with the neutralization of the casemate, SGT Arendt entered and dropped
explosives down a connecting stairwell. This had the effect of deterring
any Belgian defenders from seeking to re-occupy this casemate.
The targets on the fortress were dealt with in a fashion similar to the
above, with the exception of the 120mm-gun cupola (24, Map 2), and a
75mm-gun casemate (26, Map 2). These had been the targets of squad two,
which had not arrived. This presented a problem. The 120mm-gun cupola
contained the most dangerous weapons on the fortress and it was essential
that they were dealt with. Glider pilot Heiner Lange of fifth squad realized
the danger and took it upon himself to knock out the cupola. Although
he was not an actual engineer, he had trained with his compatriots and
was familiar with how the explosives worked. Despite being wounded,
he succeeded in detonating his charge. This, however, did not completely
succeed in knocking out the position. It only partially damaged the guns
and the Belgian crew re-occupied the position until fifth squad again
attacked it and eventually put it permanently out of action. These actions
show great initiative, as this was not a part of the plan for fifth squad. This
left one of second squad’s positions to deal with. SGT Wenzel, in command
in the absence of Witzig, ordered tenth squad, under SGT Hübel, to attack
the position and it was put out of action relatively promptly.
Although not all of the Belgian positions had been completely
destroyed, the fort had been sufficiently neutralized for Wenzel to signal
Koch that the mission was accomplished. All that remained was to make
sure the fortress stayed relatively quiet. No small undertaking with such
a small force. Witzig’s glider landed on the fort at around 0800, about
three to four hours after the start of the action. He liaised with Wenzel and
discovered that their relief by 4th Panzer Division, originally expected
at 1000 hours, was hours behind schedule. Witzig now had to deal with
Belgian counter-attacks without the expected support. Witzig organized
his men to set up a defense of the surface of the fort and called in the
help of the Luftwaffe. This is where the German’s superior combined
arms really counted. Belgian troops moving towards German positions on
Eben-Emael were subjected to numerous air raids which both slowed them
down and reduced their combat power. Despite this, Belgian troops made
several attempts to clear the roof of the fort and to re-occupy their gun
positions. Ultimately these attempts failed to alter the outcome. German
initiative and combined arms, along with the dogged tenacity of the
German engineers, would allow Witzig’s men to hold on overnight. That

149
being said, his position was serious. His men were short of ammunition,
explosives, and most importantly drinking water. Witzig was not sure how
much longer his men could hold.
The Albert Canal as seen from Fort Eben Emael.
US Army photo.
In order to facilitate the relieving troops crossing the Albert Canal,
several troops from eighth squad swam across the canal to act as guides for
the reinforcements. The subsequent attempts to cross the canal by relieving
troops from the 51st Pioneer Battalion came to naught as a machine-gun
and anti-tank gun casemate (17, Map 2) covered the canal and could not
easily be attacked (it was tucked down by the edge of the canal, a fair
way below the level of the fort). The steep walls of the cut, through which
the canal went, prohibited easy access to it. Witzig’s men improvised by
lowering explosive charges down and shoveling dirt to block the casemate’s
observation slits. Although this did not stop the Belgian machine-gun fire,
it did reduce its effect. However, the relieving pioneers in rubber boats
were still unable to get across the canal in daylight.
SGT Portsteffen, of the 51st Pioneer Battalion, had made several
attempts to cross the canal with his men during the late afternoon and
evening. All had failed. He decided to wait until dark before again
attempting a sortie. This time he and his men were successful. Regrouping
on the western side of the canal, they worked their way up the dry moat on
the northeast side of Eben-Emael to casemate 4 (Map 2). This casemate
had unsuccessfully been attacked several times by Witzig’s men, who
needed to neutralize it to open a route for the relieving forces. At casemate
4, Portsteffen personally used a flamethrower to suppress the bunker

150
before his men neutralized it with explosives. This opened a route over the
casemate and up the steep side of the fortress to the surface. Portsteffen,
alone, ascended the side of the fortress eventually meeting with men from
ninth squad. Witzig joined them at around 0700 on 11 May. Sturmgruppe
Granit had held its position for almost 24 hours longer than anticipated.
Now out of water and short of ammunition, the relief was just in time.
Portion of Fort Eben Emael.
US Army photo.
Relieving Sturmgruppe Granit, the men of 51st Pioneer Battalion,
guided by Portsteffen, proceeded to reduce the remaining Belgian
positions. By mid-morning they had forced most of the defenders into
the interior of the fort. With more forces and combat power arriving, the
Germans were now in almost complete control of the surface of the fort.
Still, however, there was desultory resistance. This ended at 1215 when
the Belgian garrison surrendered. They had suffered 88 casualties inside
the fort and around 1,000 prisoners fell into German hands. Of the 85 men
of Sturmgruppe Granit, 24 were killed or wounded (28% of the force).
Despite this high casualty rate, the fact that the glider troops accomplished
their mission demonstrated the high level of trust and cohesion among
them. This operation was also an enormous propaganda coup for the
Germans. They had tried something never before attempted in war and
they had pulled it off. After the operation, junior officers and NCOs were
prominent among those receiving awards for outstanding leadership and
initiative at Eben-Emael.

151
The capture of Eben-Emael opened the route across the Albert Canal
and through central Belgium. The German Blitzkrieg invasion of France
and the Low Countries would likely not have proceeded as well without
the success of this daring mission. The exercise of disciplined initiative
by the junior leaders was absolutely critical to the success of the mission.
For Further Reading
Simon Dunstan. Fort Eben-Emael: the key to Hitler’s victory in the West
(Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing) 2005.
James E. Mrazek. The Fall of Eben-Emael (Novato, CA: Presidio Press)
1999.
Tim Saunders. Fort Eben-Emael (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books
Ltd.) 2005.
Gilberto Villahermosa. Hitler’s Paratrooper: the life and battles of Rudolf
Witzig (London, UK: Frontline Press) 2010.

153
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Principles of Mission Command in the Eben-Emael case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. The officers and men
were the only paratrooper engineers in the German forces, and they spent
around six months together training specifically for the assault on Eben-
Emael. After the operation, Witzig pointed out that the process of working
with his subordinates was reinforced by the unit’s “trust and loyalty from
bottom to top and from top to bottom.”
2. Create Shared Understanding. The long time the men spent together
in training for the mission meant that they all knew what they were required
to do, and could see that everyone was up to the task in hand. Furthermore,
their task was clearly set out for them.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. In the operational order, the
mission was very simply and clearly set out:
“Capture by surprise the surface of Eben-Emael. To guarantee the
transit of the Army over the Meuse-Albert Canal, neutralize the artillery
and anti-aircraft casemates and turrets. Break any enemy resistance and
hold until relieved.”
This easily translated into simple but clear instructions for each of the
unit’s teams on the mission itself. While this allowed the unit to create its
own detailed plan to capture the fort, it also allowed the freedom of action
if that plan did not go smoothly.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. The paratrooper engineers who
attacked the fort were highly adept at the squad and platoon level and
possessed great confidence in their leaders. They had regularly practiced
attacking fortifications and they were practiced with their equipment
and training. Although the mission was given to the regiment itself, its
commander passed on the task to CPT Koch. He periodically oversaw
training for the attack, and in turn largely deferred to LT Witzig who was
charged with carrying out the mission. Thus, initiative was devolved to

154
the lowest appropriate level. Additionally, the Soldiers of 51st Pioneer
Battalion that linked up with Sturmgruppe Granit also displayed
exceptional initiative, particularly Sergeant Portsteffen whose men were
the first pioneers to assault across the canal to relieve the airborne troops
at Eben-Emael.
5. Use Mission Orders. Although formal orders were given prior
to the assault on Eben-Emael, they were fairly broad and maximized
freedom of action for subordinate units. Individual squads were assigned
enemy positions to attack, with the understanding that the mission
required flexibility. To that end, each glider contained a considerable
amount of engineering equipment over that required for its specific role.
It is worth noting, LT Witzig’s personal glider as well as another, were
delayed. However, despite lacking their assigned leader and effective
communication, SGT Wenzel took charge and proceeded to adapt to the
situation at hand. The setback of two gliders failing initially to show up
did not prevent the troops successfully conducting the mission without
their commander. To a large extent this success is explained by LT Witzig
himself who described SGT Wenzel as “a first rate man, an old engineer
with vast experience, a vigorous troop leader.” LT Witzig went on to
describe why the men were so successful despite the loss of their senior
leaders: “they didn’t need to ask questions. They had their orders, and they
did them.”
6. Accept Prudent Risk. The use of the first ever glider attack was a
significant risk. However, the sheer surprise gained mitigated against a
more effective enemy reaction. In addition, the immense importance of
Eben-Emael meant that a high degree of risk was acceptable in relation to
the potential gain from success. If the mission failed there was a significant
risk of very high casualties as the main force attempted a forced river
crossing under heavy defensive artillery fire.

155
The Bridge at Mayenne, France 1944
Kevin M. Hymel
LTG George S. Patton, Jr. needed to capture the French town of
Mayenne if he was to destroy the German Seventh Army. In early August
of 1944, Patton’s newly activated Third Army was on the move, but with
most of his armor heading west into Brittany, the capture of the town
and its three bridges over the Mayenne River afforded him an excellent
location to begin an eastern encirclement with the British assisting by
pushing south from Caen. If the Germans managed to destroy the three
bridges, however, they could stall the encirclement and safely escape. To
capture these vital bridges intact, Patton chose BG Raymond S. McLain’s
90th Infantry Division (ID).
McLain had commanded the unit for less than 10 days. The 90th ID
had been considered a problem division since landing in Normandy on
D-Day where it initially performed poorly against the Germans. The unit’s
crest, “T” and “O,” stood for “Texas and Oklahoma,” the home of the
division’s officers in World War I. The men however preferred the letters
to stand for “Tough ‘Ombres.” McLain intended the unit to live up to
the aggressive title. By the end of his second day in command, he had
relieved 16 officers. BG William Weaver, a no-nonsense warrior who led
by example, was assigned as McLain’s assistant division commander.
With the Germans all over Patton’s front reeling in confusion, McClain
took immediate advantage of the situation. He organized Task Force (TF)
Weaver, under the command of BG Weaver, to serve as a fast hard-hitting
mobile strike force that would exploit any penetration of enemy lines. The
task force was composed around COL George B. Barth’s 357th Infantry
Regiment. McClain increased its strength by adding the 712th Tank
Battalion, a company from the 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the
345th Field Artillery Battalion. In addition, the 90th Reconnaissance Troop
would serve as the TF’s eyes and the 315th Engineer Battalion would clear
mines and obstacles. A squadron of Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighter
bombers provided air support while a company from the 315th Medical
Battalion cared for the wounded.
Late on the night of 4 August, COL Barth was called to division
headquarters. After being informed that his infantry regiment was to be
part of TF Weaver, Barth was given his mission. “The force was ordered to
drive south and seize Mayenne, a big town 30 miles behind the enemy front
line,” Barth recalled. “It was thought that there was only light resistance at
the point we were ordered to break through.”

156
As the sun rose on 5 August, the task force headed out from St. Hilaire
with the armor and reconnaissance vehicles screening up front while
infantry-laden trucks followed close behind. Other elements followed,
averaging 20 miles an hour. People lining the streets threw flowers at the
advancing soldiers. When the columns slowed, the locals ran forward and
offered bottles of wine. Members of the French Resistance also approached
offering information on enemy positions.
“The men seemed to sense the fact that something big was in the wind,”
reported COL Barth. “An undercurrent of excitement seemed to go down
the column and you could almost see the men’s spirits rise. Morale was
on the way up.” The task force reached the outskirts of Mayenne around
1430 where two reconnaissance vehicles suddenly blew up at a roadblock.
From the woods on both sides of the road, German infantry opened fire
with machine guns and anti-tank weapons. Barth rushed forward through
enemy fire to direct his mortar teams, and then directed a company-level
assault on the German position. The men quickly took the roadblock. The
battle to capture Mayenne had begun.
BG Weaver, scouting up front with a carbine in hand, led the task
force into the city. “I remember General Weaver moving out in front of
us,” recalled 1LT Burrows Stevens, the commander of Company B. “I had
to run to keep up with him.” Weaver decided on a two-pronged attack. He
ordered MAJ Edward Hamilton to attack the bridge in the center of the
city with his 1st Battalion. Weaver then ordered Barth to dismount the rest
of the regiment from the trucks, envelop the town from the south, and cut
off roads leading out of Mayenne to the east. Hamilton pushed his men and
tanks forward, encountering only slight resistance. To ensure no surprises,
his artillery and tanks hit possible enemy positions on the high ground on
the western edge of the city. Hamilton’s men quickly captured the western
section of the city only to discover that Germans had destroyed the two
southern bridges spanning the river and had rigged the third for demolition.
1LT Richard Smith, a mortar section leader, shot the locks off a door
to a house on the riverfront. After running to the attic he observed that
the bridge was rigged with eight 500-pound aerial bombs. On its eastern
edge, the Germans had posted two 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, a 20 mm
anti-aircraft gun, and several tanks. Using his new perch as an observation
post, he called for and adjusted mortar fire to drive away one of the enemy
gun crews.
As the Americans pondered the best way to capture the bridge, they
came under fire from the Germans on the east bank. Unexpectedly, a

157
German tank on the western side of the river approached from the north,
heading for the American positions. Hamilton called artillery on the tank
and ordered his anti-tank platoon north to block any enemy attempts at
flanking his left. As the one anti-tank team repositioned their gun to fire on
the tank, German artillery opened up, killing one man and wounding two
others but the team was still able to fire their anti-tank gun, dispatching
the German tank.
Sherman tanks then took up positions along the river and began firing
at the Germans on the other side. Behind US lines on the west bank, a lone
German vehicle pulled up intending to cross the bridge. The occupants
did not realize they were now in American territory. A single round from
a tank destroyer at point-blank range ended the vehicle’s journey. “The
result,” reported Hamilton, “was carnage.” When exchange fire hit a
French civilian, SSG Charlie Lancaster broke cover, raced over to the man
and carried him to safety.
From a corner building near the bridge, MAJ Hamilton issued his plan
of action. “It was simple and straight,” recalled 1LT Stevens. Hamilton
planned to hit the far bank with a 10-minute artillery barrage. As soon as
it ended, Stevens’ Company B would rush across the bridge followed by
engineers who would disable the eight bombs. Finally, tanks would cross
to support the infantry and engineers. Machine gunners would provide
covering fire from buildings along the river and along a wall on the west
bank.
As planned, the artillery began pounding away at the German positions
at1750. One round hit a stockpile of 88 mm ammunition sending a huge
blast into the air and a pall of smoke over the attack route. Realizing the
smoke would obscure the enemy’s view of the bridge, Hamilton ordered a
halt to the artillery and told 1LT Stevens to immediately charge the bridge.
At that moment, the plan fell apart. The lead infantry squad froze. Only a
lone tank, commanded by 1LT Charley Lombardi, clanked over the bridge
with its cannon firing.
Seeing this disaster in the making, 1LT Stevens called, “Follow me!”
and ran out behind Lombardi’s tank emptying his only weapon, a German
Walther P-38 pistol. Inspired by Stevens’ courage, the squad and two
engineers followed. Along with a hail of machine gun and small arms fire,
the enemy fired rounds from the 20 mm anti-aircraft gun down the length
of the bridge. One shell tore into engineer PVT James McRacken and, as
Hamilton recalled, he “momentarily seemed to disappear.” The round that
killed McCracken also tore the leg off the other engineer.

158
Without engineers, the infantrymen cut some of the wires leading to
the bombs as they moved toward the opposite bank. SSG Raymon Lopez
led the men to the row homes along the eastern bank where they tossed
grenades into cellars and fired their rifles at every window. Lombardi’s
tank rolled off the bridge, engaged a German gun and its crew, and then
moved up onto the high ground at the far eastern side of the town.
1LT Stevens’ men found themselves alone on the eastern bank. The
platoon directed to follow them had not crossed the bridge. Instead of
supporting Stevens’ unit, some of these men scrambled into doorways
along the street for protection. As MAJ Hamilton charged down the street
ordering the men to fire their weapons, 1LT Smith began pushing the men
out of their hiding places. While this was going on, Stevens returned to
the bridge, disabled the remaining German demolitions, and crossed to the
west side to look for the missing platoon. Finding the lieutenant in charge
paralyzed with fear, Stevens ordered the platoon sergeant to get his men
moving. Stevens then assured the cowering soldiers that the first squad
had crossed with no casualties (he had passed McCracken’s lifeless body
on his return trip and knew this was not the case) and that all the Germans
next to the river had been cleared out.
Stevens’ encouragement, along with cajoling from other officers and
NCOs, finally got the platoon moving across the bridge. A platoon of tanks
followed. As the men began to run, a German vehicle appeared behind
them, also moving in the direction of the bridge but a soldier halted it with
a single bazooka round. It turned out to be an ambulance packed with 12
wounded men. Miraculously, none were hurt from the round.
The men then stormed the bridge under fire. An enemy bullet bounced
off a sergeant’s helmet and killed the soldier beside him. Stevens stopped
along the way and picked up the M-1 rifle lying next to McCracken’s body.
“[I] had to wipe the blood off it,” Stevens recalled. Once the rest of the
battalion crossed, Hamilton sent a company south in search of COL Barth.
They would not have trouble finding him. Earlier, Barth had led his
two battalions down to the river’s edge encountering only sporadic rifle
fire but finding the two bridges destroyed. When he saw truck-loads of
Germans fleeing the city he decided to immediately cross the river without
waiting for rubber assault craft. His men found a skiff and a large leaky
boat for their amphibious assault. They improvised oars by tearing down
a nearby fence and using its boards. The men were unsure of their fleet’s
seaworthiness but Barth reassured them by crossing with the first flotilla.

159
As they reached the eastern bank, the men climbed out of the boats and
up the wooded hillside. Once the boats had crossed, Barth and an engineer
paddled the boats back to the west bank to manage the operation.
TF Weaver seizes the bridge at Mayenne.
On the east bank, CPT Max Kocour, spotted a French farmer who put
his finger to his mouth to make the “quiet” sign and pointed to a farmhouse
door. Kocour cocked both his M3 “grease gun” and his .45-cal. pistol
before quietly creeping along the wall to the door. Peering inside, he spied
three Germans sitting around a table eating lunch with their rifles stacked
near the door.
Kocour quickly stepped in the doorway and placed himself between
the Germans and their weapons. “Hande hoch!” he ordered. The Germans
only half-heartedly obeyed. A now furious Kocour shouted, “Patton, ser
gross panzer! Erschiesen sie! (Patton has large tanks. They will shoot
you!)” It worked. The Germans threw their hands up. The Frenchman
and four of his friends collected the rifles and helped Kocour escort the
prisoners down to the river. Kocour sang the Star Spangled Banner as he
walked while the Frenchmen cheered “Vive Americain!”
While Kocour was capturing his quarry, inflatable rafts finally arrived
on the west bank and more men crossed. By 1030, two battalions were
safely across and making their way east to block the roads leading into
Mayenne. In crossing the river in the makeshift vessels, COL Barth had
made a risky decision that paid huge dividends. “We took a chance and
were lucky,” remembered Barth.

160
Back at the bridge, 1LT Stevens reorganized his scrambled units and
directed them to protect the bridgehead. 1LT Lombardi, who had led the
attack in his lone tank, went back to replenish his ammunition. More men,
tanks, and tank destroyers crossed the bridge and spread out, expanding
the bridgehead. They reached some railroad tracks where they observed
a German tank but before the men could engage, the tank turned and
rushed out of the city. Stevens’ men pushed through the town until they
made contact with Barth’s men. The linkup was complete. Mayenne and
its bridge were safely in American hands. The Americans immediately
established a defensive perimeter east of the city.
As it grew dark, BG Weaver ordered a halt and organized a defense
of the city. All night long, Germans stumbled into 90th Division positions.
The Americans captured large numbers of bewildered Germans who could
not believe their enemy was so far forward. When four German vehicles
drove into La Ferichard Hotel, which served as COL Barth’s command
post, an American platoon knocked out each vehicle and rounded up the
prisoners right outside Barth’s front door. “The Germans apparently had
no idea where we were and stray vehicles kept barging into the town,”
explained Barth.
Hamilton also found himself face-to-face with confused Germans.
Just after 2300, two German vehicles rolled up to his command post
and three men got out of the first car. They were immediately fired on
and the Germans surrendered. “Suddenly,” recalled Hamilton, “we were
fired on from behind the two vehicles.” The two German officers from
the second vehicle had been ducking behind the first, hoping to escape.
At that moment, a jeep mounting a .50-cal. machine gun roared around
a corner and fired on the second vehicle, setting it on fire. Two captains,
wielding Tommy guns, then ran around one side of the vehicles, killing
and wounding all the Germans. The fire Hamilton encountered had been
from his own troops. Their work had been accurate and intense. “The
dead officer was so full of holes that he grotesquely resembled a sieve,”
explained Hamilton.
The tally of German vehicles destroyed included seven cars, two
motorcycles, and one truck. The Americans also destroyed two 88 mm
artillery pieces. The Germans were dazed and confused. Well west of
the town, German bombers dropped flares on suspected Allied positions,
unaware how far east the Americans had advanced.
The next morning, 6 August, the citizens of Mayenne emerged from
their hiding places. One group unfurled a special flag. It was a homemade

161
Stars and Stripes the locals had sewn to welcome American soldiers during
World War I. They had hidden the flag for the last four years until they
were sure the Germans were gone. The flag represented the town’s official
liberation.
While the victory at Mayenne was not perfect, officers and NCOs
proved capable of inspiring their men to achieve the unit’s goals. The bridge
over the Mayenne River proved vital for the Allied drive surrounding the
Germans in the Falaise Pocket, an operation which resulted in the killing
or capture of close to 50,000 German soldiers and the destruction of over
300 tanks and other armored vehicles. The 90th ID was one of the few units
that actually remained in Third Army for the entire European campaign.
At the end of the war Patton claimed that the division was among his very
best.
For Further Reading
John Colbey and Melissa Robert. War From the Ground Up: The 90th
Infantry Division in World War II, Eakin Pr., 1991.
John C. McManus. Americans in Normandy: The Summer of 1944–The
American War from the Normandy Beaches to Falaise, Forge Books,
2005.
Martin Blumenson. Breakout and Pursuit: US Army in World War II:
The European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1961.

162
One of the destroyed bridges in Mayenne, south of the bridge seized by the 1st
Battalion, 357th Infantry.
The National Archives
SC 192484 (Signal Corps)

163
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Principles of Mission Command Illustrated in the Mayenne case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. Since landing in
France in June 1944, the 90th Division had experienced tough combat and
had seen its morale drop. LTG Patton chose to change the leadership of
the division by appointing BG McLain as the commander and assigning
BG Weaver as assistant division commander. Both men had an excellent
reputation as tough warriors, which served to start rebuilding trust
among subordinate leaders in the division. McLain reinforced the need
for command competence by relieving 16 ineffectual field officers in the
first several days of his tenure. Because his immediate mission required
aggressive offensive operations against the Germans, he built a task force
with an aggressive commander, BG William Weaver, at the helm. That
decision served to enhance cohesion among the units of the 90th Division.
2. Create Shared Understanding. When BG McClain called COL
Barth, the 357th Infantry Regiment commander, to his headquarters, he
ensured that the larger goal of the upcoming Mayenne operation was clear.
Barth’s regiment – and the other elements of the task force – would need
to seize the city’s bridges so that US forces could continue their drive
through German forces.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. BG McClain articulated his
intent clearly when he provided COL Barth a simple mission: capture
Mayenne and seize its bridges intact. The details of how this objective was
to be attained were left to Barth and BG Weaver to figure out.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. The operation to seize the bridges
at Mayenne offers numerous examples of disciplined initiative. Early
in the operation, MAJ Hamilton altered the plan to cross the bridge by
halting the artillery barrage before it was complete in order to use the
German smoke to conceal the American crossing. Seeing the lead platoon
balk at crossing the bridge, 1LT Stevens showed great personal courage
and led the way across. He later pushed men out of their hiding places

164
and directed the platoon sergeant to get his unit to the eastern side of the
river. At a higher level, while the intact bridge was under assault, Colonel
Barth immediately tried to find ways across the river after discovering that
the two southern bridges had been destroyed. Barth immediately secured
skiffs and other watercraft to begin ferrying his men across the river, rather
than wait for assault boats. This tedious action assisted in expanding and
securing the bridgehead on the eastern side the river.
5. Use Mission Orders. BG McLain did not tell his subordinates how
to capture the bridges at Mayenne, only that they had to take them. In
addition, BG Weaver let MAJ Hamilton develop his own plan of action for
capturing the bridge intact, who in turn, came up with a sound attack plan
that despite some difficulties, succeeded. BG Weaver also used mission
orders when he ordered COL Barth to envelop the town from the south.
He did not tell Barth how to do it, but merely gave him general guidance
on what was to be achieved.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. The bridges over the Mayenne River had to
be taken intact. BG Weaver accepted reasonable risk by dividing his forces
and planning a two-pronged attack. This diluted his combat power but by
sending COL Barth with two battalions to the southern side of the town
to envelop enemy forces, he hoped to confuse the Germans and perhaps
unhinge their defenses. At the intact bridge, MAJ Hamilton accepted risk
in terminating the artillery barrage early in order to mask his attack with
the smoke that obscured the bridge.

165
The Victory at Tarin Kowt
Donald P. Wright, Ph.D.
The Coalition campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
began in late 2001, just a month after the 9-11 terror attacks on New
York City and the Pentagon. Because of Afghanistan’s remoteness, US
commanders chose to partner with anti-Taliban militia leaders within the
country itself as the main weapon of choice to overthrow Taliban power.
To enable these militias, the US inserted a number of Army Special Forces
teams that would advise the militia commanders and coordinate Coalition
airpower in support of operations against Taliban forces.
The teams sent into Afghanistan, formally known as US Army Special
Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODAs), were trained specifically
to work with foreign military forces. Each ODA was made up of 12
Soldiers, two officers and 10 non-commissioned officers. Each Soldier
had a particular role to play in team operations and was highly trained in
his occupational skill. To qualify for Special Forces, a Soldier not only
had to be physically fit and competent with his weapon and equipment, he
also had to be highly intelligent and adaptive. ODAs were expected to live
with foreign soldiers, adapt to their cultural norms, and form close bonds
with them. Often operating in isolation from other US forces, Special
Forces Soldiers had to be able to make sound decisions quickly based
on information they collected from their partners. The ODAs sent into
Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 were expected to do all of these things.
Most importantly, they had broad latitude to work with Afghan militia
leaders to obtain the Coalition’s ultimate objective of the end of Taliban
power.
On 14 November 2001, ODA 574 along with personnel from the
Air Force and other US organizations arrived in southern Afghanistan to
link up with the Afghan political leader Hamid Karzai and his small anti-
Taliban militia. Although of Pashtun ethnicity, like the great majority of
the Taliban, Karzai hoped to lead the fight against the Taliban in southern
Afghanistan. The team’s mission was to “infiltrate the Oruzgan province,
link up with Hamid Karzai and his Pashtun fighters, and advise and assist
his forces in order to destabilize and eliminate the Taliban regime there.”
On his arrival, the ODA leader CPT Jason Amerine sat down with
Karzai to establish a relationship with him and understand the situation
as Karzai comprehended it. Amerine had briefly met Karzai in Pakistan
one month earlier when he accompanied a more senior US commander
in initial discussions on how they could work with the Pashtun leader

166
in the fight against the Taliban. Now that they were both in Afghanistan,
Karzai told the American officer that the key to winning Kandahar as well
as Uruzgan province was to capture the town of Tarin Kowt located 75
miles north of Kandahar city. Hamid Karzai described Tarin Kowt as the
heart of the Taliban movement and all the major leaders of the Taliban
movement had families in and around Tarin Kowt. Mullah Omar was from
Deh Rawod which was just to the west of Tarin Kowt. The seizure of Tarin
Kowt would therefore strike a blow to Taliban morale. Further, Karzai
believed that by taking Tarin Kowt, all of the Pashtun villagers would
essentially surrender or turn completely to his cause.
Figure 1. Southern Afghanistan and ODA 574/Karzai.
Amerine then gathered his team, pulled out some maps, and developed
a plan to take Tarin Kowt. That plan amounted to a siege. Karzai’s forces
along with their SF advisors would close off the mountain passes leading
into the town. Karzai had reasoned that once that was accomplished, the
town would simply surrender. Additionally, he informed CPT Amerine
that there were already friendly fighters in Tarin Kowt who would foment
an uprising if necessary. Given the small numbers of troops that were
available, his ODA and the 150 Afghan fighters in Karzai’s small group,
Amerine told Karzai that they would have to create a larger force but

167
this would take time and Amerine imagined a long period of arming and
training Afghan volunteers before the town could be taken. While halted
at a small village some 30 miles southwest of Tarin Kowt, ODA 574 began
arranging for the shipment of more weapons and ammunition. Hundreds
of people arrived to try and get weapons but most were only interested
in protecting their own homes and villages. With the recruiting effort
just starting, news arrived on 16 November that stunned Amerine and
his Soldiers. Key leaders in Tarin Kowt had risen up against the Taliban
governor, killed him and his bodyguards, and seized control of the town.
They wanted help from Karzai and the Americans especially because they
expected the Taliban to act quickly and forcefully restore their control of
the town.
The news of the uprising presented Amerine with a dilemma. If they
moved into Tarin Kowt and the Taliban launched a counterattack, Karzai’s
forces were too small to defend the town. It was doubtful that in the
short time they would have before an attack, enough reliable and capable
volunteers could be recruited. Still, Amerine knew he had the trump card of
American air power on his side. It was a difficult choice but Amerine and
ODA 574 decided to support Karzai’s insistence that they go immediately
to Tarin Kowt and take advantage of the military and political opportunity.
Piling into a motley collection of beat up trucks and other vehicles sent
by village elders, the ODA and their Afghan partners bounced along the
mountain roads to the town. En route, Karzai worried that the population
of Tarin Kowt might be angry that American Soldiers had accompanied his
force to the town. His fears were quickly quelled though when the town’s
people warmly welcomed the Soldiers.
Once in the town, Karzai met immediately with the town leaders who
had led the uprising, leaving military matters to ODA 574. He stayed
busy getting in touch with other Pashtun leaders in the area, constantly
recruiting fighters and supporters, and undermining the Taliban’s rule in
the process. Many of the area’s leaders came to speak with Karzai and offer
information on al-Qaeda and Taliban elements near the town. He also
discovered that many of the Muslim clerics in the region were supportive
of his actions. Early that evening, other informants brought him the news
that he had been expecting, a large force of Taliban was en route to Tarin
Kowt.
Karzai quickly requested that Amerine meet him and his local
supporters so that they could explain the situation. The Afghan leaders
proceeded to matter-of-factly mention that hundreds of Taliban troops

168
were approaching the town and that the enemy force, mounted on a large
number of trucks, would probably arrive sometime the next day. Amerine
remembered, “It took me a second to digest it. At that point, I said, ‘Well,
it was nice meeting all of you. I think we need to organize a force now
and do what we can to defend this town.’” The Special Forces captain
attempted to excuse himself so that he could start preparing to oppose
the threat. His Afghan hosts, however, would not hear of it. Since it was
the first day of Ramadan, they insisted that he stay, drink tea, eat, and
talk. Sensing that he could not embarrass his hosts, Amerine stayed just
long enough to satisfy their request, then quickly made his exit but not
before asking Karzai to send every fighter he could find to the ODA’s
headquarters as soon as possible.
Returning to his men, Amerine pulled them together and told them
about the impending arrival of the Taliban forces stating, “Well they’re
coming from Kandahar. We know it’s a large convoy.” The captain
then ordered a number of actions. His communications sergeant began
contacting the team’s headquarters to inform them about the imminent
assault. The team’s Air Force enlisted terminal attack controller (ETAC)
passed warning orders through those channels to let the Air Force and
Navy know that their support would soon be required at Tarin Kowt.
Amerine’s team worked into the night to arm all the new Afghan fighters
that showed up and develop a plan to hold the town.
After midnight on 17 November, after receiving a report that Coalition
aircraft had spotted a convoy moving north toward Tarin Kowt, Amerine
ordered the aircraft to drop bombs on what he believed was the lead
element of the Taliban attack. He then took his ODA and 30 Afghan
fighters out of the town on the main road leading south. He spotted a
plateau approximately eight miles from Tarin Kowt from which the team
could observe one of the roads from Kandahar as it came through a pass
at the south end of a broad valley. Amerine established what he called the
Overlook Observation Point on the plateau. The Taliban convoy traveling
to Tarin Kowt would have to enter the valley from the pass on the other
side. Excellent fields of observation across the valley would allow the
ODA and Karzai’s men the opportunity to use close air support and other
weapons to engage the Taliban before they even reached the outskirts of
Tarin Kowt.

169
Figure 2. Tarin Kowt/Overlook Observation Point.

170
ODA 574 with Hamid Karzai. CPT Amerine in back row, second from the right.
US Army photo.
Early that morning, Amerine and his team suddenly saw dozens of
Taliban vehicles emerge from the pass and spread out on the valley floor
heading north. Amerine told his combat controller to begin bringing in
the close air support. Using a laser designator, the team’s ETAC directed
the first bomb onto the Taliban formation destroying a vehicle in the lead
element. It began to look like ODA 574 was about to defeat the Taliban.
Then an inexplicable event occurred, one that Amerine described as
feeling like “we were seizing defeat from the jaws of victory.” Karzai’s
men panicked. The lack of training among these militiamen demonstrated
itself with graphic clarity when they perceived that the battle was not going
well and their best option at that point was to withdraw to Tarin Kowt. To
make matters worse, without Karzai or any other English speakers at the
observation point, the men of ODA 574 could not communicate with the
panic-stricken Afghan tribesmen. The Afghans hopped into the vehicles
and were only prevented from driving off immediately by the members of
ODA 574 who literally stepped in front of the vehicles to get them to stop.
If the trucks left, the Americans had no way to get back to Tarin Kowt.
Reluctantly, the Soldiers of ODA 574 jumped aboard the trucks and went
with their charges back to the town.
With the Taliban convoy continuing its advance toward the town,
ODA 574 and Karzai had to turn the situation around. In Tarin Kowt, the

171
team met with Karzai and after a quick consultation, ODA 574 sped south
of town again to establish another observation post which they could use
for calling in close air support. They found a new site much closer to
the town and once again, Amerine’s team began calling in airstrikes on
the approaching enemy forces. At the same time, Afghan fighters began
appearing near the ODA’s position to help defend the town.
With the renewal of the attacks on the Taliban, ODA 574 ran into
a new and wholly unexpected problem, crowds of civilians from Tarin
Kowt had begun arriving to watch the battle. The ODA had not expected
to have to deal with this type of situation. CPT Amerine called it a “circus
atmosphere” in which Afghan children attempted to rummage through their
equipment and older civilians meandered around the defensive position.
One member of ODA 574 pleaded with an English-speaking Afghan to at
least send the children back to Tarin Kowt because of the danger of the
situation. Thankfully none of the townspeople was injured as the pace of
the attacks on the Taliban convoy increased.
Initially, the lead trucks were targeted to slow the convoy down. When
those vehicles were destroyed, the Coalition aircraft simply began working
their way back through the convoy which was now very spread out. When
they ran out of bombs, several pilots began making strafing runs against
the Taliban vehicles. While the enemy columns had approached their
position, the men of ODA 574 were relieved to see that the aircraft had
ultimately stopped the attack’s forward momentum.
Sometime after 0800, another unexpected surprise struck the ODA.
Two of the Taliban trucks had found an alternate route into Tarin Kowt.
The American troops began to hear small arms fire on their flank which
indicated the enemy was close by. The mounting gunfire caused Amerine
to think that perhaps the battle was not yet won. Unbeknownst to him, a
number of villagers had moved to the threatened area and fought off the
Taliban attackers. That action actually signaled the end of the battle. For
the next two hours, the remnants of the convoy took hit after hit from close
air support (CAS) sorties as the Taliban tried to make their way back to
Kandahar.
Before and during the battle, Karzai had become concerned about the
perception among his fellow Afghans that the US Soldiers had precipitated
the Taliban attack on Tarin Kowt. On the day of the attack, one of the local
mullahs paid a visit to Karzai to speak with him. Karzai was anxious that
the mullah, who spoke for others, was going to tell him that the Taliban
attacked the town because there were Americans in Tarin Kowt and that

172
Karzai and his supporters must leave. If this statement was communicated,
Karzai was certain that others in the region would turn against his efforts to
liberate southern Afghanistan from the Taliban. His fears were thankfully
dashed when the mullah instead told him, “If the Americans hadn’t been
here, we would have all been killed.” That statement was an indication that
the military victory had also become a political success.
ODA 574 and Hamid Karzai’s small force, assisted greatly by Coalition
air support, had clearly triumphed over the Taliban at Tarin Kowt. COL
John Mulholland, the senior US Special Operations officer in Afghanistan,
later viewed the engagement at Tarin Kowt as “pivotal” to the Coalition’s
efforts in southern Afghanistan. Furthermore, Mulholland argued that the
Taliban recognized the potential threat posed by Karzai to their legitimacy
in the region and tried to destroy Karzai and his supporters. According to
Mulholland, when that attack failed, the Taliban grew greatly concerned
about their hold on the south.
This belief seemed borne out by the success Hamid Karzai enjoyed
in rallying other Pashtuns to his cause. CPT Amerine not only witnessed
firsthand the destruction of the Taliban forces, he also saw the reaction
of other Pashtun Afghans to Karzai. He realized the tremendous
psychological and political importance the victory had and its resulting
impact on the enemy. Karzai’s tireless work in securing political support
from the various groups in the Tarin Kowt area, and elsewhere as it would
turn out, made ODA 574’s future tasks less difficult. Amerine explained
that this support translated into rapport and trust with the Pashtuns in the
area and enabled him and his team to look ahead to the next task of the
liberation of the city of Kandahar.
The battle of Tarin Kowt was clearly an instance where a well-trained
and mentally agile group of Special Forces Soldiers combined with air
power, indigenous partners, and a deep understanding of commander’s
intent, achieved a major victory. This was a textbook example of how
a small well-trained force could employ unconventional warfare for a
superlative result.
For Further Reading
Eric Blehm. The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets
Fought for A New Afghanistan (2010)
Donald P. Wright, et al. A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation
Enduring Freedom, October 2001 – September 2005 (2010)
Charles H. Briscoe et al. Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan (2003)

173
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Tarin Kowt case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. ODA 574 was a small
unit composed of very experienced and well-trained Soldiers. The team
had been training in Kazakhstan when 9-11 occurred. They then returned
to FT Campbell and prepared specifically to go into Afghanistan and work
with anti-Taliban forces. Each member knew his team mates well and
trusted them implicitly.
2. Create Shared Understanding. ODA 574’s higher headquarters
had established a clear vision for the endstate in southern Afghanistan. It
focused on winning over Pashtun support and ultimately taking control
of Uruzgan province and Kandahar city. CPT Amerine understood this
and had his vision of the mission reinforced when he briefly met with
Hamid Karzai in Pakistan in October 2001 before both men moved into
Afghanistan. It was clear to Amerine what he had to do and even who his
Afghan partner would be. Throughout their time in southern Afghanistan,
Amerine and Karzai consulted and reassured one another of their mission
and shared goal.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. The team’s mission was
to “infiltrate the Uruzgan province, link up with Hamid Karzai and his
Pashtun fighters, and advise and assist his forces in order to destabilize
and eliminate the Taliban regime there.” This mission was articulated so
broadly that it resembled a commander’s intent, in that it emphasized the
“what” rather than the “how” and “when.” As such, it left a great deal
of latitude for freedom of action. CPT Amerine and his team would take
advantage of this latitude as the political and military situation changed
radically and rapidly around them.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. The success in seizing and securing
Tarin Kowt was made possible by ODA 574’s exercise of disciplined
initiative. The two best examples of this was CPT Amerine’s reliance on
Karzai’s political advice about need to take Tarin Kowt before moving

174
toward Kandahar, and ODA 574’s immediate move into Tarin Kowt
despite concerns about Taliban counterattack against the small US/
Karzai force. Amerine did not seek permission for these actions from his
higher headquarters. Instead, he acted within his understanding of his
commander’s intent and the trust he had in his Afghan partner, Karzai.
5. Use Mission Orders. As noted above, ODA 574’s mission statement
was “to infiltrate the Uruzgan province, link up with Hamid Karzai and
his Pashtun fighters, and advise and assist his forces in order to destabilize
and eliminate the Taliban regime there.” This statement emphasized the
“what” and the endstate rather than the “how” and “when.” With the
political landscape of southern Afghanistan so much in flux, CPT Amerine
was given a broad mission statement that allowed him great latitude in
making decisions based on the conditions he found on the ground. This
enabled the great success he and his team had in Tarin Kowt.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. Without question, the riskiest decision CPT
Amerine made in this action was to move into Tarin Kowt with only his
ODA and a small band of Afghan militia to face a Taliban counterattack.
The risk was mitigated by his ability to direct Coalition airpower against
the Taliban. That close air support in fact defeated the Taliban attempt to
retake Tarin Kowt, ensuring that the Coalition effort in southern Afghanistan
would continue. The decision also helped build rapport with Karzai who
was sure it was the right move based on his understanding of the political
situation. In the fall of 2001, the combination of Coalition firepower and
Afghan political leadership proved to be a winning partnership in southern
Afghanistan, as it had been in the north of that country.

175
The Attack on the Ranch House, August 2007
John J. McGrath
On 22 August 2007, insurgents conducted a deliberate attack against
a combined US Army-Afghan combat outpost (COP) outside the village
of Aranas, called COP Ranch House, in central Nuristan Province. The
attack against half a platoon of troops from C Company, 2-503d IN, 173d
Airborne Brigade, was initially successful with the attackers breaking
through the outpost’s perimeter in a section manned by paramilitary local
Afghan Security Guards (ASG). However, the defenders fought back
vigorously and soon repulsed the attack with no American fatalities. Key
insurgent leader Hazrat Omar was killed in the attack. At the time the
Ranch House position was perhaps the most remote American outpost in
Afghanistan, located in the rugged southern foothills of the Hindu Kush
range in an area isolated from roads and rivers. Because of this remoteness,
the American command had planned to close the outpost before the attack
and it was, in fact, closed in October 2007. After its closure, many of the
American troops involved in the action were ambushed southwest of the
former post while returning from a foot patrol to Aranas on 7 November
2007. In this action, six Americans were killed.
Aranas is the largest community in the central Nuristani district of
Waygal. The town sits on the south-facing northern slope of an eastward
running valley that branches off from the Waygal River, the major terrain
feature in the district, several miles to the south east. The Waygal flows
south from the Hindu Kush into Kunar Province joining with the Pech
River at Nangalam about ten miles southwest of Aranas. In 2007, Aranas
and its outlying area had about 6,000 inhabitants making it a metropolis
for the area. The population of Nuristan is a unique ethnic group, neither
Iranian (like the Pashtuns who lived to the south in Kunar) nor Indic (like
the people who lived to the east in Pakistan) but distantly related to both
groups. Nuristan is an isolated area even for Afghanistan. Governmental
control had long been a weak and distant concept to the Waygali Nuristanis.
Aranas had long been recognized as a hotbed of insurgency by American
intelligence analysts, providing an area from which the enemy could launch
attacks into the vital Kunar and Pech valleys from long established base
camp areas. Therefore, as part of a long term counterinsurgency strategy,
the Coalition leadership felt it was essential to establish an American-
Afghan outpost in the area, both to limit insurgent activities in the region
and to use as a base from which to conduct counterinsurgency activities
among the local population.

176
Figure 1. Coalition positions in the Waygal Valley, 2007.
American operations in the area were extremely limited before 2006.
A forward operating base (FOB) called Camp Blessing was built near
Manoguy at the point where the Waygal flowed into the Pech River in
2003 about 15 miles south of Aranas in Kunar Province. A pair of 105-
mm howitzers and several 120-mm mortars were placed at the outpost,
which was initially manned only by a small Special Forces element and
later a platoon of US Marines. The 105-mm guns were later replaced by
two 155-mm howitzers. The situation changed in 2006 when troops from
the 3d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Task Force Spartan), and the

177
3d Brigade, 201st Corps of the Afghan National Army, deployed into a
number of newly created or expanded FOBs (forward operating bases)
and combat outposts in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces.
Afghan Soldiers in front of The Ranch House.
US Army photo.
TF Spartan’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (1-32 IN), established
two outposts in the Waygal Valley in August 2006. One of these, COP
Ranch House, was located just northeast of Aranas on a high 7,000 foot
mountainside. The position was centered on a large one-story wooden
building, a former schoolhouse that resembled the Ponderosa ranch house
on the 1960s television show Bonanza, a comparison which gave the
outpost its name. The site was virtually impossible to reach by motorized
vehicle and the helicopter landing zone (LZ) was placed on top of the
Ranch House building, the only available area flat enough to accommodate
an aircraft. Since the building backed up against the steep mountainside,
the Americans had to use explosives and engineer equipment brought in by
sling load to carve out an adequate LZ. Eventually an LZ large enough to
accommodate a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, the aircraft used for medical
evacuations (MEDEVAC), was created. The larger CH-47 Chinooks, the
mainstay for resupply missions, still had to sling-load cargo above the LZ
in order to deliver its loads. With no roads suitable for HMMWVs, the unit
often used donkeys for ground resupply as well. In addition to the Ranch

178
House, 1-32 IN established a second position at a small hamlet known as
Bella on the Waygal River southwest of the Ranch House, roughly a third
of the distance between Aranas and Camp Blessing or three kilometers
(1.5 miles) as the crow flies but seven kilometers (four miles) by foot
trail, southwest of the Ranch House. The American units split a platoon
between both outposts in 2006 and 2007, placing approximately 20 troops
at each position.
At the Ranch House outpost, the 1-32 IN troops built a defensive
perimeter to the northeast of the Ranch House building eventually
consisting of a series of six positions, generally of sandbagged wooden
towers and concertina wire which encircled the whole post. Americans
manned four of the positions which were numbered 1 to 4 starting from
the north extending to the east and around back to the west. A fifth position
was later added between posts 3 and 4 to the southeast of the perimeter.
This post was manned by members of the Afghan Security Guards (ASG),
a locally recruited force. A small detachment of Afghan soldiers (Afghan
National Army or ANA) manned a guard post built onto the north side of
the Ranch House building. Two additional ANA positions were located
directly behind and to the left and right of the ASG site (Post 5) between
it and Post 4.
In the center of the position was a small aid station, a bunker used as a
tactical operations center (TOC), a rations supply point and a mortar firing
position equipped with a 60-mm mortar from the company mortar section.
The ASG also established an observation post two kilometers northwest of
the Ranch House on a mountaintop that was visible from both the Ranch
House and Bella and which was used to provide overwatch for patrols
travelling between the two outposts.
Although located only 20 kilometers (12 miles) northeast of Camp
Blessing, the rugged terrain around the Ranch House made the position
arguably the most remote in Afghanistan. The site ran along an east-west
running spur with the eastern end higher than the western portion. The
outpost was built on a slope that rose about 300 meters in elevation from
the low point at the LZ to the highest position, Post 3. The elevation at the
Ranch House building was about 7,300 feet. The slope continued beyond
the end of the outpost perimeter several hundred meters to a ridgeline
that was at an elevation of 8,400 feet. The position was located within 25
meters of the outlying houses of Aranas proper to the southwest and had
several cottages or bandehs located on the slopes surrounding the other
sides of the perimeter.

179
Figure 2. The Set Up of COP Ranch House.
The operations at the Ranch House outpost were part of the ongoing
counterinsurgency campaign. The troops at the COP conducted a mix of
missions including securing the local population, providing humanitarian
assistance, and establishing a presence of the central Afghan government.
As such, the commander’s intent was to ensure that the outpost could
sustain and protect itself in order to conduct such tasks. The combat
outpost needed to be adequately defended both to deter insurgent activities
in the area and to instill confidence among the inhabitants to support the
activities of the Coalition and the Afghan government.
When Task Force Rock, the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (2-503 IN),
173d Airborne Brigade, took over the Ranch House outpost on 26 May
2007, the position had not experienced any direct enemy contact since
March. The new unit modified the defenses slightly by emplacing more
Claymore mines around the perimeter than their predecessors had, shifting
the perimeter concertina barbed wire farther out in several locations, and

180
adding more sandbags to the positions and building alternate fighting
positions in case any of the existing positions were destroyed in a large
enemy attack. Because of the difficulty in resupplying the position, the
perimeter wire was only a single strand of concertina fence which was
stretched around obstructions such as large rocks.
Shortly after the 2-503 IN took over the Ranch House in May 2007,
the outpost was fired upon while some of the defenders were conducting a
nighttime ambush patrol. The enemy directed PKM machine gun and RPG
rocket fires at the ASG position, Post 5, for about an hour. This post was
considered to be a weak link in the defense as a steep slope overlooked
the position from the east. After this encounter, the outpost remained
quiet for almost three months while other areas in the TF Rock sector,
particularly the Korengal and Pech valleys, had almost daily contact with
the insurgents. Meanwhile, the Ranch House garrison frequently heard
rumors of impending attacks, none of which materialized. The lack of
action and the repetitive false warnings meant that when an attack did
come, the defenders, while prepared, were nevertheless surprised.
The ASG contingent in the Waygal Valley had been established by
the 1-32 IN. This force was locally recruited and given only rudimentary
military training. ASG members were used as scouts and to buttress
defensive positions by manning some positions particularly observation
posts. Just before its departure, the 1-32 IN had expanded the size of the
ASG contingent from 25 to 45. The recruitment of the ASG was done to
give the local population an investment in the Coalition presence in the
area as well as provide an economic boost. However, the ASG troops and
leadership soon proved to be unreliable.
As noted earlier, the five numbered posts included four manned by
Americans. The posts were built out of plywood lumber and sandbags and,
in most cases, were combination guard posts and sleeping quarters. The
guard posts were built up on elevated towers equipped with crew served
weapons. The weapons were a combination of Mk-19 automatic grenade
launchers, M240B machine guns, Squad automatic weapons (SAW) and
Javelin antiarmor missile systems. Posts 3 and 4 had sleeping quarters
under the tower which had no direct entrance to the tower from the sleeping
area. Posts 1 and 2 had offset sleeping areas. While the sleeping quarters
for Post 1 were only 15 meters away, Post 2’s was a relatively distant 50
meters. In addition to reinforcing positions, sandbags were used to build
staircases on the steep hillside to facilitate troop movement. Unlike at
other sites in northeastern Afghanistan, the perimeter of the Ranch House
combat outpost was not made of HESCO fabric barriers. The prefabricated

181
HESCOs were bulky and required extensive dirt fill and a Bobcat front end
loader to fill them. While there was a Bobcat at the site, the terrain did not
contain adequate amounts of dirt and the slope restricted the effective use
of the Bobcat to the landing zone area. Plywood and sandbags provided
the fortifications at the Ranch House.
Despite its location, the Ranch House outpost had excellent
communications systems on site which in the summer of 2007 including
a tactical satellite radio (TACSAT) and secure internet protocol router
(SIPR)-capable very small aperture terminal (VSAT). The VSAT provided
classified messaging. The SIPR and non-secure communications, which
depended on satellite connections, were sometimes down due to weather
conditions. On one occasion these communications means were briefly
lost when an RPG round hit the antennas. At the time of the attack, the
communications were functional. An unnamed US Army signals specialist,
properly referred to as a SIPR point of presence (SPOP) technician, was at
the outpost during the attack. The TOC also had FM radio communications
with each post and with company commander CPT Matthew Myer at
Bella. An antenna array, including a large satellite dish, sat on top of the
TOC bunker.
An array of fire support assets was available to the Ranch House
defenders. The outpost itself contained one 60-mm mortar whose gunners
had trained to provide close-in fires. At Bella were two 120-mm mortars
and at Camp Blessing were a pair of 155-mm howitzers, each capable of
ranging the area around the Ranch House. There was also a pair of Air
Force A-10 close support jet aircraft and Army Apache attack helicopters
on call for missions in the area. While the mortars and howitzers were
immediately available, the fixed and rotary wing assets were stationed at
Bagram Airbase and Jalalabad and required between 30 minutes and an
hour to be on station.
In the TF Rock area of operations, 21 August 2007 was a relatively
quiet day but this calm was deceptive. The enemy was well prepared to
attack the outpost. Aranas insurgent leader Hazrat Omar would personally
lead the attack which would include both the employment of supporting
fire positions all around the outpost and an assault force which would mass
against the southeastern corner of the perimeter where the Afghan troops
were positioned. Enemy intelligence on the outpost and its garrison was
extensive. After the battle a detailed schematic of the outpost’s setup was
discovered on a captured camera.
On the morning of 22 August 2007, there were 20 members of the
1st Platoon, C Company, 2-503 IN, and the supporting mortar squad

182
at the Ranch House position. This force included one officer, eight
noncommissioned officers and 11 enlisted men. A medic from the brigade
medical company (B Company, 173d Support Battalion) and a forward
observer were also attached to the platoon. Among the paratroopers
were 13 who had not yet seen combat. The outpost commander was the
platoon leader, 1LT Matthew Ferrara. Ferrara’s senior NCO was Weapons
Squad Leader SSG David Dzwik. Dzwik was assisted by SSG Erich
Phillips, who led the 60-mm mortar squad. In addition to the Americans
there were about 22 ANA soldiers and about 45 ASG fighters, including
those at the distant OP. Advising the ANA detachment was a small US
Marine embedded training team (ETT). With the rest of Ferrara’s platoon
providing the garrison at COP Bella, company commander Myer, rotated
between Camp Blessing, where the company’s 2d Platoon was located,
and Bella. On 22 August, Myer was at Bella. Typically the squads rotated
between patrolling the areas around the COP and manning the defenses of
the outpost. Platoon headquarters and mortar personnel often augmented
the patrolling units.
Before dawn that day at the Ranch House, all was quiet. The defenders
were manning their posts at the routine security level of 25 percent,
which meant at each position an average of one person was awake at
any given time. Not expecting a dawn attack, stand to (i.e. 100 percent
alert) procedures were not in place. The ASG at Post 5 were awake and
conducting morning prayers per Islamic custom. Although the defenders
routinely sent out patrols at irregular intervals night and day, no patrols
were out during this predawn period.
At 0454 hours, with dawn approaching, the quiet was suddenly
broken. At the Ranch House a force of four or five insurgents appeared on
the hillside about 100 meters south and east of the outpost in the rugged
terrain between the outpost and Aranas. The enemy was dressed in BDU-
style clothing similar to that which had been issued to ASG personnel. The
attackers focused their fires on the ASG position (Post 5), Post 3, and the
TOC position. As it was in the most vulnerable position, the garrison at
Post 3 had the least time to get ready once the attack began. Accordingly
the enemy was able to concentrate against the position with only the
return fire of the M240 machine gun from the duty soldier in the tower. In
rapid succession four RPG rounds struck the post virtually destroying it
and damaging the Mk-19 grenade launcher and M240 posted there. The
paratrooper on duty in the tower, SPC Jeddah Deloria, survived in the
wreckage wounded but still capable of fighting. With the radio destroyed
at Post 3, the NCOIC there, SGT Carlos Gonzales, sent SPC Charles Bell
to Post 2 to report and continue the fight.

183
Gonzales himself was wounded shortly thereafter and with the enemy
approaching the ruins of the post, he too withdrew to Post 2. Before
departing, however, he told Deloria to lie still so the enemy would not
notice him and that he’d send soldiers to get him. At Post 2, Bell reported
the situation at Post 3 to SPC Sean Langevin, the soldier on duty there,
and began firing that post’s Mk 19 grenade launcher at the insurgents now
closing in on Post 3. RPG rounds started landing near Post 2 hindering the
ability of SGT John Relph, the NCO in charge, and PFC Adam Spotanski
from moving up to the platform from their sleeping quarters. Langevin
provided covering fire and the duo managed to reach the post platform and
begin firing in the direction of the attackers. After Gonzalez’s arrival at the
post, Relph and Spotanski attempted to move to Post 3 to rescue Deloria
but were unable to do so because of the volume of enemy fire.
After the brief opening volley, the ASG and ANA elements located at
and near Post 5 broke contact and withdrew to the center of the perimeter.
Many of the ASG men withdrew completely, retreating into Aranas and
the countryside away from the enemy positions. The withdrawal left the
southeastern portion of the perimeter undefended. The attackers did not
Figure 3. The Initial Attack on the Ranch House.

184
immediately take advantage, initially preferring to mass fires against all
the positions in the outpost before advancing across the now abandoned
portions of the perimeter. The American defenders fought back vigorously,
firing off all prepositioned Claymore mines, throwing hand grenades and
returning the enemy fire with machine guns and volleys of 40-mm grenade
rounds.
With all positions under heavy fire, the American defenders spent the
early part of the fight returning small arms fire and setting off Claymore
mines. Only Post 1 remained relatively unscathed although its garrison
also returned fire in all directions. In the TOC, 1LT Ferrara immediately
contacted Captain Myer at Bella via FM and satellite radio. Myer promptly
requested close air support from the battalion TOC at Camp Blessing.
Realizing there was at least a 30-minute period before such support could
arrive on the battlefield, Ferrara also requested 120-mm mortar fires from
Bella against enemy forces aiming RPGs and machine gun fires at the
TOC. The attack had started so suddenly that the enemy was already too
close to fire the 155-mm field artillery guns at Camp Blessing due to the
danger of fratricide. The 120-mm mortars at Bella posed similar risks and
Ferrara and Myer aimed their fires at ridgelines 200-300 meters away from
the Ranch House against more distant enemy positions and presumed rear
echelons of the advancing insurgent forces. The battalion commander, LTC
William Ostlund, alerted the unit quick reaction force (QRF), two squads
from A Company, stationed in the Pech Valley about 16 kilometers (ten
miles) south of Aranas. The squads would be airlifted, with one earmarked
to reinforce Bella which both Myer and Ostlund feared would be attacked,
and the other to the Ranch House position.
As the intense initial firefight continued, a force of about 20 insurgents
took advantage of the destruction of Post 3 and the abandonment of Post 5 to
advance through the newly created gap inside the perimeter of the outpost
in an effort to overwhelm and overrun the defenders. In this they were
partially assisted by their wearing of BDU-style uniforms that prevented
the Americans from distinguishing the assaulters from ASG troops. As
the enemy forces closed in on the northern positions, their fires became
more intense aided by a stockpile of RPGs captured at Post 5. These fires
soon damaged the antenna array located on the roof of the TOC bunker,
cutting a wire to the satellite dish and otherwise damaging the remaining
antennas. Ferrara and his radio operators, SGT Conrad Begaye and SPC
Kain Schilling, lost communications with the outlying posts and with CPT
Myer at Bella. After about four minutes, Ferrara was able to reestablish
contact with Myer by moving his FM radio outside the TOC bunker and

185
using a smaller undamaged antenna. Begaye and Schilling covered their
platoon leader as he continued to relay updates and requests for support to
their company commander.
SSG Erich Phillips was an experienced noncommissioned officer
with a background as a scout and as a mortar gunner. At the Ranch
House, he technically served as the leader of the small 60-mm mortar
squad but Ferrara and Dzwik depended upon him for his knowledge and
professionalism, frequently using him as a patrol leader. At the start of
the fight, Phillips was asleep in his quarters near the mortar position. He
quickly got into action and marshaled an ad hoc group from around the
mortar and TOC positions to defend the new line to the south. SPC Jason
Baldwin, a mortarman, and SPC Kyle White, the platoon radio operator,
had been reinforcing Post 1 when the battle started. With that post under
the least pressure, the two men ran to the mortar area where they linked
up with Phillips who had already assembled mortar gunner SPC Hector
Chavez, platoon forward observer Schilling, and platoon medic SPC Kyle
Dirkintis into a small reserve force he intended to use to counterattack or
otherwise restore the defensive perimeter. As this force was formed, ANA
and ASG Afghans fled past them from the direction of Post 5 towards the
ANA post near the LZ.
Ferrara told Phillips that contact had been lost with Posts 3 and 4. The
men at the TOC/mortar area could hear the sounds of firing still coming
from Post 4 but Post 3 was a smoldering ruin. Word reached Phillips from
Post 2 to where the garrison of Post 3 had evacuated, that Deloria was still
at Post 3, probably wounded. Ferrara reported the wounding of Deloria to
Myer, who immediately requested the dispatch of a medical evacuation
helicopter. The enemy pressure on Phillips’ group prevented an immediate
rescue effort. The fire was so intense and the insurgents so close at less
than 15 meters away that when Phillips and Baldwin attempted to load
the 60-mm mortar, enemy machine gun and AK-47 rounds impacting
around the tube made the attempt too dangerous. Instead the group began
returning fire with their personal small arms.
To the southwest, Post 4 was now isolated from the rest of the
defenders and was receiving fire from three sides. SPC Jeffrey Shaw had
been on duty when the attack began and he initially fired to the east against
the enemy elements concentrating against posts 5 and 3. Within minutes
the rest of the garrison, SGT Michael Johnson, PFC Gregory Rauwolf,
and SPC Robert Remmel, arrived from their sleeping area as the position
began to receive fire from insurgents located to the west. While Johnson
and Remmel stayed at the post, Shaw and Rauwolf moved to secondary

186
positions to facilitate firing at the enemy approaching from the east. Enemy
fire from the direction of the evacuated ASG position struck Remmel in the
back. Meanwhile Shaw and Rauwolf shot two dozen 40 millimeter rounds
from his M203 and Rauwolf fired 200 rounds of 7.62 millimeter M240
machine gun ammunition. The enemy to the east was soon suppressed and
unable to advance from that direction towards Post 4.
The enemy pressure remained intense, however. While Rauwolf
treated the wounded Remmel, Johnson took over the M240 machine
gun in the tower, occasionally mixing in M203 rounds from his personal
weapon. Shaw added his fire from the secondary position on the ground
nearby. The volume of fire received at the tower became so large that
Johnson was forced to move to his secondary position. From there he
and Shaw continued to fight and were joined by five Afghan soldiers and
their American advisor. During this action, Shaw received wounds in his
arms preventing him from using his rifle. Johnson and the Afghan group
continued to man their weapons until the end of the fight.
Figure 4. The Counterattack at Ranch House.

187
Back at the TOC, insurgent pressure continued to increase. Baldwin
and Phillips threw several grenades toward the enemy at the outpost’s
latrine, which now marked the frontline. Mortarman Chavez informed
Phillips that Gonzalez was wounded at Post 2. Phillips decided to grab the
platoon medic and go to that post to check on Gonzalez. Phillips and medic
Dirkintis then ran the 20-meter distance to Post 2 under enemy fire while
Baldwin covered their movement by throwing volleys of grenades towards
the enemy near the latrine. Once there, Dirkintis was quickly wounded
in the shoulder by RPG shrapnel as insurgent fighters began closing in
on Post 2. To blunt this advance, Relph and Phillips threw several hand
grenades while Bell fired the post’s M240 machine gun. However, Bell
was soon targeted and wounded by small arms fire.
Despite his wound and after some quick first aid, Bell resumed firing
toward Post 3. Langevin supported Bell by firing a squad automatic
weapon (SAW) while Relph fired his M4 carbine. Langevin was slightly
wounded in the leg but continued to man the SAW. Meanwhile, Relph
was seriously wounded and joined Gonzalez in the bunker below the post
where the two NCOs passed grenades up to Langevin who threw them at
the enemy who were now quickly approaching the position.
Near Post 2, Phillips felt that Dirkintis’ wounds required immediate
treatment at the aid station and he began dragging the medic back towards
that location while Langevin covered him from Post 2. On the way back,
enemy fire became so intense that Phillips left Dirkintis in a culvert and
returned to organize the defense near the TOC. Once there he sent Chavez,
who had received specialized medical training, back to conduct first aid
on the wounded medic. After treating Dirkintis’ wounds and ensuring he
was in a relatively safe, covered position, Chavez returned to the TOC area
and joined the defense, providing M203 fire. Phillips had immediately
deployed the small force near the TOC with a loose line between Post
2 and the TOC area to ensure that there were no gaps through which the
enemy could advance.
While Phillips was gone, Baldwin had put the 60-mm mortar into
action, firing it in hand-held mode, with several rounds going through
the roof of the ASG post. Baldwin alternated mortar rounds with hand
grenades as the insurgents continued to close on his position. Upon his
return, Phillips assisted Baldwin with the mortar. The duo fired about 20
rounds at the enemy position in the perimeter breach. The nearest rounds
landed only 63 meters from the Americans. The insurgents tried to rush
the mortar position approaching to within ten meters before Baldwin’s fire
killed the leader of the local insurgent cell and the attacking enemy force

188
commander, Hazrat Omar. The combined effect of the defenders’ fire and
the sudden loss of leadership stopped the insurgent advance.
The defending paratroopers expected a renewed enemy advance and
hoped that close air support arrived soon. The pair of US Air Force A-10
aircraft that Myer had summoned at the start of the action arrived in the
general area of Aranas one hour and four minutes after the start of the
attack. With the airplanes on site, Myer passed direct communications
with them to Ferrara. The A-10 is an aircraft designed specifically to
provide close air support to ground forces. As such, it has armored plating
to allow it to survive ground fire, a nose cannon capable of firing 65
30-mm rounds a second and up to six Maverick air-to-surface missiles
mounted on its wings. With the opposing forces so close together, both
Ferrara and the pilots had to be careful to avoid fratricide. The fact that
the ASG post was now on fire, the result of Baldwin’s mortar gunnery,
aided the pilots in identifying the enemy positions. In order to verify this,
the A-10s dropped several flares and a white phosphorus round on the
suspected enemy positions. After receiving Ferrara’s acknowledgement
that the aiming points were, in fact, occupied by the insurgents, the airmen
prepared to conduct gun runs.
The first A-10, codenamed HAWG-17, orbited the battle area and
moved into its gun run from west to east, flying across the southern edge of
the outpost firing a spray of 30-mm rounds from its nose gun from near the
TOC to the ASG post. The gun run followed the same basic orientation that
Baldwin and Phillips had used when firing the mortar. Ferrara observed
the rounds as landing almost exactly where he wanted them to, with the
nearest rounds falling within 50 meters of the TOC. Phillips saw the A-10
fly right over the TOC with the closest rounds impacting near Chavez
and Dirkintis. The A-10 also placed two missiles into the ASG tower. The
aerial support had the desired effect. With the enemy advance already
halted by Omar’s death, the intensity of the insurgents’ fire immediately
decreased by half.
A second gun run followed the first. This run, while along the same
trajectory as the first, started closer to the TOC, at a slightly steeper angle.
Shrapnel from the closest impacts slightly wounded Begaye, who was
standing near Ferrara. While enemy fires had decreased, they had not
stopped totally and were still intense in several places. At Post 2 Langevin
noticed insurgent rounds landing within 20 meters of his position and a
force of about 20 men throwing grenades at the aid station from higher
ground above it.

189
Throughout the action, 1LT Ferrara had been calling in casualty
reports, revised with updated information. Two medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) helicopters, escorted by an Apache gunship, had flown
from Jalalabad to Asadabad, where it waited for the fighting to die down.
Once the QRF was ready to go, it was delayed, with the MEDEVAC flight
getting the priority. At Camp Blessing, the battalion supply officer (S4)
prepared an ammunition resupply “speedball” bundle for aerial delivery.
However, since the Ranch House defenders had actually fallen back onto
their ammunition resupply point stockpiled with more than the unit’s basic
load, the speedball proved to be unnecessary.
After the second A-10 gun run, insurgent fire and pressure gradually died
down. Ferrara now saw the opportunity to rescue Deloria buried in the ruins
of Post 3. He dispatched Phillips on this mission, who took Baldwin and one
of the ANA advisors with him. Instead of going directly to Post 3, Phillips
stopped at Post 2 on the way to check on the wounded men there. Of the four
– Gonzales, Bell, Relph and Langevin – only Gonzalez required immediate
attention and Spotanski, an unwounded member of the garrison, took him
to the aid station. Spotanski soon returned and when Phillips proceeded to
Post 3, he took him along. Baldwin, the slightly wounded Langevin and
the remaining garrison of Post 2 covered the advance. The duo reached
the wrecked position with only a few enemy potshots aimed at them and
found Deloria under the debris. While they dug him out, Baldwin and
Langevin also moved up to the destroyed position. Deloria, escorted by
Phillips, was able to walk on his own to the aid station while Baldwin,
Langevin and Spotanski manned Post 3 with a squad automatic weapon as
their primary armament, clearing out the wreckage at the same time. In the
process of clearing out the debris, Spotanski fell and impaled himself on a
pole, becoming the last American casualty of the action.
The first MEDEVAC helicopter arrived after the insurgent fire had
been mostly silent for a half hour. While the enemy outside the outpost
was observed evacuating their casualties, the second MEDEVAC aircraft
was fired on at a distance south of the Ranch House. Meanwhile the troops
moved all the wounded down to the landing zone for evacuation and the
ANA soldiers cleared the portion of the outpost formerly overrun by the
insurgents and reoccupied their original positions. Within minutes of the
departure of the first MEDEVAC flight, the members of the QRF, a squad
from A Company, and the 1st Platoon’s platoon sergeant, SFC William
Stockard, arrived. As planned, another squad reinforced Bella.
With the wounded and injured evacuated, the situation at the Ranch
House outpost returned to its pre-battle quiet. Although the ASG had

190
returned, the former ASG post was now manned by Americans. The
attack refocused the attention of TF Rock’s leadership on the security
of the COP. LTC Ostlund had determined before the attack that Ranch
House’s proximity to a center of insurgent activity did not make up for
its remoteness and had planned to close the COP, moving its garrison to a
new site located next to the Waygal District Center at the village of Wanat,
only six miles (10 km) from Camp Blessing. The attack accelerated these
plans. Because of difficulties in coordinating the establishment of a new
COP at Wanat, TF Rock now planned on moving the Ranch House garrison
to Bella until the Wanat post could be created, in which case Wanat would
replace both Bella and Ranch House. Myer planned to expand Bella into
a platoon-sized outpost. With the additional troops, the garrison could
expand its patrolling and its interaction with the local population. COP
Ranch House was evacuated on 2 October 2007. The members of the 1st
Platoon moved to Camp Blessing for a brief rest and then joined the rest
of the platoon at Bella.
In a later interview Phillips felt that the fight would have been a lot
less desperate if the Afghans had not abandoned the ASG post:
if the ASG and the ANA were holding their ground, we already
had a QRF plan established in the event we took major contact
on the FOB. I would have grabbed me two or three dudes. They
weren’t in that big of a firefight. We could have pushed up there
and reestablished and helped them out. That wasn’t the case
because they ran within the first five minutes of the fight. They
brought the enemy right to my front door. Within 15 to 20 meters,
I’m trying to fight off 60 dudes.
The Americans at the Ranch House outpost were conducting an
ongoing counterinsurgency operation that required the unit to operate
in the midst of an area that had historically been a hotbed of insurgent
activity. As such the half platoon had to maintain a defensible base camp
that provided it an ideal location from which to interface with the local
population while conducting various non-combat activities in overall
support of counterinsurgency objectives. Even when the unit’s QRF plan
dissolved, Phillips and the other NCOs at the outpost displayed initiative
and verve in their reactions to the attack, fully understanding this mission,
how the defense was expected to work, and what was necessary to prevent
disaster. With the NCO leadership directing the actions of the squads and
sections, 1LT Ferrara was free to maintain contact with his superiors and
direct fire support activities.

191
The Army recognized the valor of the Ranch House garrison. Phillips
was awarded the Distinguished Military Cross. Ferrara and Baldwin
received the Silver Star. Seven soldiers were awarded the Bronze Star
Medal with V Device for their actions, with an additional five receiving
the Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM) for valor. Thirteen members
of the garrison were awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Combat
Medic Badge or Combat Action Badge, indicating the attack was their
initiation into combat. During the action 11 paratroopers were wounded or
injured out of a garrison of 22, a 50 percent casualty rate that dramatically
demonstrates the intensity of the combat at the Ranch House.
1LT Ferrara Briefs MG Rodriguez on Ranch House Fight.
US Army photo.
After the attack, stand-to became standard procedure in C Company.
This came in particularly handy a year later in the 13 July 2007 insurgent
attack on a new COP built at Wanat, about ten miles southwest of Aranas.
There the members of C Company’s 2d Platoon were alert and on stand-to
at dawn when the enemy attacked. Phillips, Dzwik and Chavez repeated
their heroics in this later fight. However, several of the Ranch House
defenders, including 1LT Ferrara, were no longer alive by the time of
the Wanat attack. On 9 November 2007, Ferrara, Langevin, and four
other Soldiers were killed in an ambush while returning to Bella from a
shura. During the ambush, RTO and Ranch House veteran Kyle White

192
distinguished himself and was nominated for the Medal of Honor. SGT
Begaye, who worked radios during the Ranch House fight, was awarded a
Silver Star for his actions in the fight.
The August 2007 Ranch House fight was similar yet another major
attack on an outpost in October 2009. COP Keating located near Kamdesh,
about 20 miles northeast of Aranas, occurred on 3 October 2009. In both
cases, the outposts were projected to be abandoned soon. And similarly,
the Afghan-manned section of the perimeter collapsed, resulting in
close-in fighting. Both attacking and defending forces at Keating were
larger than at the Ranch House. While the fighting was equally fierce,
eight Americans were killed at Keating, one indication of how the war in
northeastern Afghanistan had intensified since 2007.
For Further Reading
James Christ. The Dirty First at Aranas. Chandler, AZ: Battlefield
Publishing, 2011.
Combat Studies Institute staff. Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan,2008.
Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010.
Sebastian Junger. War. New York: Twelve, 2010.
David Kilcullen. The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the
Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Jake Tapper. The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor. New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 2012.

193
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Ranch House case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. The company
and platoon were cohesive. Although it had only arrived in Afghanistan
several months earlier, the members of the units had trained together in
preparation for the deployment. The platoon leader and squad leaders had
led their units since the start of the rotation. The unit was small enough
that all the participants knew each other well. The soldiers trusted their
NCOs, particularly SSG Phillips
2. Create Shared Understanding. The unit at the Ranch House outpost
was conducting an ongoing counterinsurgency operation that required the
unit to operate in the midst of an area that had historically been a hotbed
of insurgent activity. As such the half platoon had to maintain a defensible
base camp that provided it an ideal location from which to interface with
the local population while conducting various non-combat activities in
overall support of counterinsurgency objectives. All the members of the
garrison understood the mission, the defensive set up, and the plan for
a QRF if the COP was attacked. Further, they were able to respond to
relatively general instructions when the Afghan-manned section of the
perimeter collapsed. The unit had previously rehearsed quick reaction
drills and fighting from secondary and supplemental positions. These
preparations became important during the action.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. The unit at Ranch House was
executing an ongoing mission as part of a counterinsurgency campaign. As
such the commander’s intent was to ensure that the outpost could sustain
itself in order to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Aranas
area. All members of the garrison had a clear understanding of this and
responded, once under attack, accordingly.
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Initiative was most apparent at
the platoon and squad leader levels. The company commander allowed
the platoon leader to direct indirect fires and close air support based on

194
his understanding of the situation while he focused on ensuring those
resources were available and that reinforcements were being marshaled.
The NCOs at each post and, in particular SSG Phillips, did not have to be
given detailed instructions in response to the enemy attack.
5. Use Mission Orders. During the action the platoon leader did not
issue detailed instructions to his subordinate leaders, instead giving them
general instructions while he focused on provided necessary external
support. By the same token, the battalion and company level commanders
did not give detailed instructions to the defenders during the action, instead
focusing their efforts on ensuring fire support assets were available and
expedited and that reinforcements were promptly dispatched.
6. Accept Prudent Risk. This principle is the one most apparent in the
Ranch House battle. The battalion and company commander had to accept
a certain amount of risk based on the extended area their units had to cover
and the need to place troops among the local population in rugged terrain.
However this risk was prudent because fire support assets were able to
range the outpost and a quick reaction force system had been put in place
to provide responsive reinforcements to the outpost. During the action this
was demonstrated by the almost instant availability of distant mortar and
artillery fires. While these were hampered by the proximity of the enemy,
this gap was filled by the 60-mm mortar at the outpost and the mutually
supporting small arms fires of the defenders. While there was a time lag
in the arrival of close air support, predicated on the limited number of air
assets in the theater, the A-10s arrived at the exact right time to break the
back of the enemy assault, reinforcing the level of acceptable risk taken by
the chain of command.

195
Operation NASHVILLE
Breaking the Taliban’s Stranglehold in Kandahar, 2010
Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.
In July 2010, GEN David Petraeus, the commander of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, designated the 2d
Brigade Combat Team (2d BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as
the ISAF main effort. Commanded by COL Arthur Kandarian, the brigade
was tasked to conduct offensive operations in Kandahar Province’s Zhari
District, the birthplace of the Taliban. Since 2006, when a Canadian-led
task force defeated a large concentration of Taliban fighters preparing to
attack the nearby city of Kandahar, the Taliban had reasserted control over
Zhari. The insurgent group had assassinated key tribal elders, established
a shadow government including a de facto “supreme court,” and tortured
political prisoners. The Taliban also had a stranglehold over commerce.
On Highway 1, Zhari’s major thoroughfare connecting Helmand Province
to the west with the city of Kandahar to the east, the Taliban set up illegal
checkpoints to collect exorbitant tolls. Drivers who refused to pay were
swiftly assaulted. By 2010, with a growing insurgency on its western
doorsteps, the second largest city in Afghanistan suffered from political
instability and economic stagnation.
To break the insurgency’s iron grip on Highway 1, COL Kandarian
planned a series of coordinated operations south of the highway. The plan,
christened Operation DRAGON STRIKE, involved his brigade’s two
maneuver battalions (1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment [1-502 IN] and
2d Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment [2-502 IN]) and its Reconnaissance,
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron (1st Squadron, 75th
Cavalry Regiment [1-75 CAV]) clearing the insurgent sanctuary south of
Highway 1 in Zhari. In July, the ISAF’s Regional Command-South (RC-
South) bolstered Kandarian’s combat power by assigning LTC Bryan
Denny’s 3d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (3-2 SCR) to the
brigade.
Kandarian expected his subordinate commanders to take bold action,
exercise initiative, and accept reasonable risks. His intent was to “defeat
the insurgency in Zhari … in order to secure the people, ensure Afghan
FOM [freedom of movement] on Highway 1, and improve governance
and development.” During his brigade’s rigorous pre-deployment

196
training regimen, Kandarian emphasized decentralized leadership based
on initiative. According to 2-502 IN commander LTC Peter Benchoff,
Kandarian’s command philosophy was akin to drawing a circle on a map,
announcing task and purpose, and letting his subordinate commanders
achieve the intent without slavishly following a dictated plan. The brigade
commander trusted his subordinate commanders to design schemes
of maneuver tailored to their tactical environments and unforeseen
contingencies within the limits of his intent.
Benchoff’s 2-502 IN served as the main effort for DRAGON STRIKE.
Encompassing the western third of Zhari District, the battalion’s area of
operations (AO) included “the most volatile and kinetic area in southern
Afghanistan.” The AO’s naturally defensible terrain favored insurgents.
Eight-foot tall earthen grape rows, marijuana and poppy fields, tree-lined
irrigation canals, pomegranate orchards, and a plethora of two-story mud
huts scattered in the fields facilitated insurgent cover and concealment
south of Highway 1. MAJ Curt Rowland, the 2-502 IN operations
officer (S3), likened the irrigation canals to “World War I, trench style
type defenses.” Running parallel to Highway 1, the canals enabled the
insurgents to move laterally on an east-west axis, using covered positions
to fire 82 millimeter recoilless rifles at highway traffic. In addition, the
Taliban prepared extensive improvised explosive device (IED) belts on
every north-south route connecting to Highway 1, making those routes
– and indeed the entire Zhari district – a tangled maze of minefields and
ambush sites.
In mid-September, Benchoff planned his battalion’s first offensive to
clear Objective NASHVILLE, a kilometer-wide strip south of Highway
1 near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Howz-e-Madad. By establishing
a foothold south of the highway, the battalion would restore commerce
and occupy the violence-plagued villages of Baluchan and Pulchakhan,
meeting two key tasks in COL Kandarian’s intent. Benchoff’s 22
September mission statement called for clearing “the vicinity of Objective
NASHVILLE beginning on 25 Sep 10 in order to hold, creating freedom of
movement along Highway 1 … and safeguarding the people immediately
south of the Highway.” Benchoff instructed his subordinate commanders
at all costs to avoid inflicting civilian casualties (CIVCAS) which would
alienate the villagers living south of the highway.
Benchoff selected CPT David Yu’s Bravo Company as the main effort
of what was now known as Operation NASHVILLE (see Map). Yu’s
company would air assault into the village of Baluchan at night, search
compounds of interest, meet village elders, and collect the biometric

197
data of Afghan military age males (MAM). Two kilometers to the west,
two platoons from CPT David Forsha’s Alpha Company (1LT Thomas
Meyer’s 1st Platoon and 1LT Barrett Rife’s 2d Platoon) would attack to
the east of Pulchakhan, searching compounds and establishing temporary
strong points (SPs). To the east of Bravo Company, two platoons from
CPT Timothy Price’s Delta Company (1LT Kyle Snook’s 1st Platoon and
1LT Sayre Payne’s 2d Platoon) and a company of Royal engineers from the
United Kingdom’s 1st Armored Engineering Squadron would build a new
road (Route TENNESSEE) from SP Spin Pir on Highway 1 southwest to
an unoccupied Afghan compound a kilometer southeast of FOB Howz-e-
Madad. Benchoff intended to insert CPT William Faucher’s scout platoon
into that compound, designated as Outpost (OP) Dusty, by helicopter.
The battalion commander believed that constructing TENNESSEE would
divert insurgents away from Baluchan, isolate them to the north, and allow
Price’s element to bypass the impassable north-south routes.
Map. Scheme of Maneuver – Operation NASHVILLE.
On the verge of the operation, Benchoff was confident that his
company commanders and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) shared
an understanding of the operation’s purpose, potential problems, and the
environment south of Highway 1. The extensive combat experience of
his subordinate commanders and their collective understanding of his and
CSM Troy Henderson’s tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP)
constituted the basis of his confidence. Benchoff described the battalion
TACSOP, which was understood all the way down to the team leader level,

198
as his “commander’s intent for the close infantry fight.” Zhari’s restrictive
terrain put a premium on flexible, aggressive small unit leadership and
decentralized command and control. “In difficult terrain where you have
isolated units,” said Benchoff, “you’ve got to have that leadership with the
drive and motivation and understanding of the intent and the desire to seek
out opportunities to make success.”
NASHVILLE commenced on the night of 26 September. CPT Yu’s
Bravo Company was inserted by air just to the northwest of Baluchan.
During the next two days, the company searched compounds suspected of
IED production, held shuras [meetings] with village elders, and entered
the biometric data of Afghan MAM into a digital database. Remarkably,
insurgent resistance was negligible. CPT Forsha’s two Alpha Company
platoons also faced little enemy contact as they advanced to the east.
As Alpha and Bravo Companies moved towards their objectives,
CPT Faucher’s scout platoon was inserted at OP Dusty before sunrise.
The scout platoon consisted of three reconnaissance teams of five or six
soldiers and a sniper section divided into three teams of three Soldiers
(a spotter, a sniper, and a security man). A seven-man Afghan National
Army (ANA) reconnaissance element accompanied the scouts. Faucher’s
soldiers used C4 demolition charges to clear the compound of IEDs and
set up a defensive perimeter. Encircled by a four-meter high mud wall, the
elevated compound offered a panoramic view of the surrounding terrain
and nearby roads.
At OP Dusty, a kilometer to the east of Baluchan, the scout platoon
encountered significant enemy contact. From positions concealed in
Zhari’s maze of tree-lined irrigation canals, grape rows, and abandoned
mud compounds, the insurgents initiated eight daytime firefights with
machine gun bursts and rocket propelled grenade (RPGs) volleys. Faucher
countered by radioing for multiple Apache attack helicopter gun runs, two
dozen 120 mm mortar fire missions, and 13 155 mm artillery fire missions.
Air Force F-16s also employed three Guided Bomb Unit (GBU), 38 Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), and five GBU 12s, all within 300
meters of the OP. On the next day, Faucher’s scouts faced almost continual
enemy pressure in the form of small arms and rocket fire. While the
attack helicopter support and indirect fire support made the risk Benchoff
accepted in sending the scout platoon into OP DUSTY reasonable, the
insurgents maintained their intensity.
As the scouts faced the threat at OP Dusty, CPT Price’s team departed
SP Spin Pir just north of Highway 1 before sunrise. In the vanguard were

199
the Royal engineers, followed in order by 2d and 1st Platoons. The Royal
engineers used two 62,500-kilogram Trojan Armored Vehicles (AVRE) to
construct Route TENNESSEE through the dense terrain. As the AVREs
smashed through the foliage, the enemy opened fire on Price’s soldiers
with machine guns and RPGs. The fire, as well as the dense terrain, slowed
the movement toward OP DUSTY. To keep up the advance, Price’s team
called for several attack helicopter gun runs. “The way I saw my role was
to keep [the insurgents] pinned down,” explained 1LT Payne. The platoon
leader worked feverishly to “pinpoint exactly those muzzle flash[es] …
[and relay them] to the aviation assets, to the helicopters and they [were]
my maneuver element because they can sweep across the objective.” As
the sun went down, Price’s team halted and established a defensive position
at the first irrigation canal 500 meters south of SP Spin Pir. The Americans
had sustained just a single casualty, 1LT Snook had triggered a pressure
plate IED that ripped off one of his feet. He was medically evacuated.
Price’s Soldiers in contact along Route TENNESSEE.
Photo Courtesy of SGT Brandon Haggerton.
The enemy’s stubborn resistance along Route TENNESSEE and at
OP Dusty surprised LTC Benchoff. Initially, he anticipated that Baluchan
would see the heaviest fighting but he now realized that Price needed
reinforcing. Benchoff therefore attached a section of M1128 Mobile Gun

200
System (MGS) Strykers from 4th Platoon, Hawk Company, 3-2 SCR
(4/H/3-2 SCR) to support Price. The 4/H/3-2 SCR section had been held
in reserve at FOB Howz-e-Madad. Armed with 105-millimeter cannons,
each MGS carried 18 rounds and could apply overwhelming precision fires
to support infantry. Knowing that Price had served as a Stryker platoon
leader during a previous combat tour in Iraq, Benchoff gave him freedom
of action in employing the two MGSs.
When the MGS section arrived, Price briefed his plan. He explained
that the movement of the Royal engineers and his two infantry platoons
slowed to a crawl as insurgents massed fires on the exposed column.
Price directed the MGS commanders to fire canister round volleys into
the wood lines where insurgents were perched. Packed with nearly 1,000
ball bearings that fanned out in a shotgun-like pattern, the canister rounds
were deadly effective against personnel targets. The presence of the MGS
section had an immediate effect on the pace of the column’s advance.
SGT Brandon Haggerton’s M1128 MGS fires in support of Price’s Soldiers.
Photo Courtesy of SGT Brandon Haggerton.
As the movement’s tempo increased, Price faced a critical command
decision. According to the Delta Company commander, the situation
of CPT Faucher’s scout platoon at OP DUSTY had “escalated and they
basically became pinned down.” The enemy was inching closer and closer

201
to the scouts with each successive assault. Unless the Taliban fighters
surrounding OP Dusty were defeated, Price recognized that the battalion’s
mission to clear Objective NASHVILLE would be seriously delayed.
Weighing his options, Price chose a bold solution. He decided to
conduct a hasty attack down Route TENNESSEE toward OP DUSTY.
The MGS section would move flanking either side of Price’s command
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), trapping
or killing the insurgents in the 300 meters separating the OP and Price’s
forces. The two infantry platoons would maintain their current positions
during the attack. As the assault began, Faucher relayed the location
of six large insurgent positions located in compounds encircling the
OP. Unfortunately, the dense vegetation negated the MGS’s thermal
imaging targeting, preventing the MGS commanders from pinpointing
exact insurgent locations. In response, Price ordered his crew to fire the
M-ATV’s .50 caliber machine gun to mark the insurgent firing positions.
He then ordered the MGS commanders to advance and fire on the marked
locations in a dramatic show of force.
The two MGSs attacked towards the compounds, unleashing a barrage
of High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) and High Explosive Plastic (HEP)
rounds. The MGS crews then methodically moved from compound to
compound, blasting holes through doors and mud walls at point blank range.
The assault ended only when the MGSs ran out of ammunition. Enemy
resistance then evaporated. Inside of the compounds, Price’s soldiers later
discovered fresh blood splatter and trails, indicating the fate of dozens
of Taliban fighters. “The arrival of the MGS on scene in the vicinity of
OP Dusty completely ended the engagement and resulted in the enemy
withdrawing from [Obective NASHVILLE],” Price explained. The bold
decision paid off. NASHVILLE culminated with the 2d BCT establishing
a foothold south of Highway 1 that it maintained and expanded throughout
the remainder of the deployment.
According to LTC Benchoff, Operation NASHVILLE sharply
reduced violence on Highway 1 near FOB Howz-e-Madad. NASHVILLE
was just one of dozens of operations launched as part of DRAGON
STRIKE but its success struck a major tactical and symbolic blow to
the Taliban especially because of the area’s proximity to Taliban leader
Mullah Omar’s home village of Sangsar a couple of kilometers to the
south. Indeed, by mid-October, Taliban commanders complained to New
York Times correspondents that the brigade’s deliberate combined arms
attack south of Highway 1 had “routed” their fighters and loosened the
insurgency’s stranglehold on Highway 1, depriving the insurgency

202
of critical funding. Tactical victories do not always produce strategic
success, but NASHVILLE showed that small combined arms teams, led
by empowered leaders eager to take advantage of battlefield opportunities,
could defeat determined adversaries in difficult terrain.
For Further Reading
Anthony E. Carlson, and Matt M. Matthews. The Battle for Kandahar:
The US Army in Operation DRAGON STRIKE, 2009-2010. Ft.
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, forthcoming.
Carl Forsberg. “Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010
Hamkari Campaign.” Afghanistan Report 6. Institute for the Study of
War, December 2010.
Kevin M. Hymel. “Trapping the Taliban at OP Dusty: A Scout Platoon
in Zhari District.” In Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in
Afghanistan, 157-78. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2012.

203
The Six Principles of Mission Command
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
2. Create Shared Understanding
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
5. Use Mission Orders
6. Accept Prudent Risk
Mission Command in the Operation NASHVILLE case
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust. The majority of LTC
Benchoff’s subordinate leaders were experienced combat veterans. For
thirteen months prior to deployment, the battalion’s company commanders,
platoon leaders, and NCOs trained together using Benchoff’s and CSM
Henderson’s TACSOP as a guide. COL Kandarian praised how the
TACSOP fostered small unit cohesiveness and mutual trust: “[Benchoff
and Henderson] had a standard operating procedure that they trained
and taught which is called ‘How We Fight,’ and it was very focused on
empowering fire team leaders, squad leaders. It wasn’t just an SOP sitting
on a shelf, it was an SOP that was known and understood down through
team leader level.”
2. Create Shared Understanding. Both the brigade and battalion
commanders clearly articulated their intents, objectives, and key tasks to
subordinate commanders and leaders. They conveyed that the brigade’s
overall objective was to reduce insurgent attacks on Highway 1 by clearing
and holding a kilometer-wide swath of territory south of the highway.
Moreover, Kandarian and Benchoff cultivated a collective understanding
that civilian casualties were to be avoided at all costs because they
jeopardized mission success, a consideration that CPT Price weighed
before launching the hasty attack down Route TENNESSEE.
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. Kandarian and Benchoff
made subordinate commanders aware of their intent by writing general
commander’s intent statements that succinctly described each operation’s
overall purpose, tasks, and desired outcomes. The overriding purpose
of Operation DRAGON STRIKE was to “ensure Afghan freedom of
movement on Highway 1” in order to improve commerce and governance.
Trusting the judgment of their subordinates, the commanders did not
micromanage tactical fights and maximized opportunities for small unit
leaders to act independently and seek out opportunities for success.

204
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. The restrictive, dense terrain south
of Highway 1 led to decentralized command and control as small units
were often isolated from one another. Small unit commanders were forced
to exercise independent judgment during ambiguous and urgent situations
and quickly adapt to changing tactical circumstances. An example was
CPT Price’s decision to launch a hasty “thunder run” in order to relieve the
scout platoon and destroy insurgent positions near OP Dusty. Even more
significantly, CPT Price exercised disciplined initiative by ensuring that
the MGS section did not inflict a single civilian casualty. Killing civilians
would have jeopardized the battalion’s ability to improve local governance,
security, and earn the trust of Afghans living south of Highway 1.
5. Use Mission Orders. Benchoff’s NASHVILLE mission order
was broad; it entrusted subordinate units with responsibility for decision
making at the point of action. Intensive pre-deployment training and a
low turnover in key leaders reinforced mutual trust between the battalion
commander and his subordinates. “Mission command is great, but it can’t
be a bumper sticker,” Benchoff explained. “It’s got to be deeply embedded
in the culture of a unit—otherwise it doesn’t work.”
6. Accept Prudent Risk. The decision to use air assaults and cut new
roads was calculated to avoid the heavily mined north-to-south routes,
to surprise insurgents, and to make the enemy “fight in two directions.”
These operations did include inherent risks due to insurgents’ linear
freedom of movement and knowledge of how to use the dense terrain to
their advantage. Nevertheless, the reward—avoiding heavy IED casualties
and vertically enveloping insurgents—was worth the risk. Benchoff also
mitigated the risk to his Soldiers attacking down Route TENNESSEE by
attaching 2-502 IN’s only M1128 MGS section to CPT Price. Although
the high density of IEDs and presence of Taliban dismounts made the
decision risky, Benchoff believed that the tactical significance of seizing
NASHVILLE’s southern perimeter outweighed the MGS’s deliberate
exposure to potential injury. The destroying of enemy positions outside of
OP Dusty and the disruption of insurgent command and control validated
Benchoff’s prudent risk taking.

205
About the Contributors
Richard V. Barbuto, Ph.D.
Professor Richard V. Barbuto is a retired armor officer. He is currently
serving as the deputy director of the Department of Military History at the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Dr. Barbuto writes and
lectures extensively on the U.S. Army in the War of 1812.
Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.
Anthony E. Carlson holds a Ph.D. in History from the University
of Oklahoma. He currently serves as an historian on the Research and
Publications Team at the Combat Studies Institute and an adjunct Assistant
Professor of History for the US Army Command and General Staff
College. His publications include works on Progressive Era US water
and flood control policy, public works, and the antebellum Army Corps of
Topographical Engineers. He is also the coauthor of a forthcoming book
on the US Army’s “surge” in southern Afghanistan, 2010-11.
Mark T. Gerges, Ph.D.
Dr. Mark T. Gerges is an associate professor of military history at the
US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. A
retired armor lieutenant colonel, he has taught at the United States Military
Academy at West Point before obtaining his Ph.D. from the Institute on
Napoleon and the French Revolution at Florida State University. He has
published papers on British cavalry doctrine, the cavalry under the Duke
of Wellington in the Peninsula War, and is working on a manuscript on the
command and control of the mounted arm under Wellington.
Kendall D. Gott
Kendall D. Gott retired from 20 years with the US Army as a Military
Intelligence officer, and his combat experience consists of the Persian Gulf
War and Operation Desert Fox. A native of Peoria, Illinois, Mr. Gott,
received his BA in history from Western Illinois University, and a Masters
of Military Art and Science from the US Army Command and General
Staff College. Prior to returning to Leavenworth, Kansas he was an adjunct
professor of history at Augusta State University and the Georgia Military
College. He has authored a number of publications, has appeared on the
Battle of Mine Creek episode on the History Channel, and is featured on
the Fort Donelson film for the National Park Service. He also appeared
on C-Span discussing the 150th anniversary of that battle. Ken joined
the staff of the US Army Combat Studies Institute, at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas in October 2002, where he is now the Senior Historian.

206
Colonel Thomas E. Hanson, Ph.D.
Colonel Hanson served three tours in Iraq and commanded the 2d
Battalion 353d Infantry Regiment at Fort Polk, Louisiana from 2009-
2011. He is a graduate of the US Army Officer Candidate School and
holds a Ph.D. in history from The Ohio State University.
Gregory S. Hospodor, Ph.D.
Dr. Gregory S. Hospodor is an associate professor in the Department
of Military History at the United States Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the College
of William & Mary, the University of Mississippi, and Louisiana State
University, where he completed a dissertation on the Mexican War, 1846-
1848. Since joining the CGSC faculty in 2008, Greg has served as, among
other things, author of the Clausewitz and Jomini lessons in the College’s
military history curriculum, assistant director of the Department’s staff
ride program, and staff group advisor. The Department of Military History
named him its Teacher of the Year for 2011.
Kevin M. Hymel
Kevin M. Hymel holds an MA in History from Villanova University.
He is the author of Patton’s Photographs: War As He Saw It and coauthor
of Patton: Legendary World War II Commander, with Martin Blumenson.
Before serving on the Afghan Study Team at the Combat Studies Institute,
he worked for a number of military and military history magazines as a
researcher, editor and writer.
John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.
Dr. John T. Kuehn is a Professor of Military History at the US Army
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He retired
after 23 years as a naval aviator with the rank of commander in 2004. He
was awarded his Ph.D. in History in 2007 by Kansas State University. He
is also a distinguished graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with
a degree in Systems Engineering. He has published numerous articles,
reviews, editorials, and two books—Agents of Innovation (Naval Institute
Press, 2008) and Eyewitness Pacific Theater (with Dennis Giangreco,
2008). He was recently awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for
Military History in 2011 for “The US Navy General Board and Naval
Arms Limitation: 1922-1937.” He is also an adjunct professor for the
Naval War College Fleet Seminar Program and with the MA in Military
History (MMH) and MA in History Programs at Norwich University,
earning the MMH Faculty Member of the Year Award in 2010-2011.

207
John J. McGrath
John J. McGrath has worked for the US Army Combat Studies Institute
(CSI) as an Army historian since December 2002. He also served as an
Army historian for over four year at the US Army Center of Military
History from 1998 to 2002. He has worked for or served in the United
States Army since 1978. Mr. McGrath worked full-time for the Army
Reserve in Massachusetts for 15 years, both as an active duty reservist and
as a civilian military technician. While in the former capacity in 1991 he
served in Saudi Arabia with the 22d Support Command during Operation
DESERT STORM as the command historian. He has a BA from Boston
College, an MA from the University of Massachusetts at Boston, and is
a PhD history candidate at Kansas State University. Mr. McGrath is the
author of numerous articles and military history publications, including
Theater Logistics in the Gulf War, published by the Army Materiel
Command in 1994, and seven books published by the CSI Press, the
most recent being 2010’s Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008. He
also has contributed to several anthologies produced and published by CSI
and has been the general editor of two collected works, the most recent
being Between the Rivers: Combat Action in Iraq, 2003-2005, published
in 2012.
Nicholas A. Murray, D.Phil.
Dr. Nicholas Murray is an associate professor in the Department
of Military History at the US Army Command and Staff College. His
book “The Rocky Road to the Great War” (Potomac Books) is due out
in 2013, along with an edited book. “Pacification: the Lesser Known
French campaigns (CSI). He recently published ‘Officer Education: What
Lessons Does the French Defeat in 1871 Have for the US Army Today?’ in
the Small Wars Journal. The author’s current research focus is on the use
of decision games and Tactical Exercises without Troops to teach decision
making to officers.
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.
Donald P. Wright is the chief of the Research and Publications Team at
the Combat Studies Institute (CSI)and holds a Ph.D. in History from Tulane
University. Along with editing a number of works on contemporary US
Army operations, Wright co-authored “On Point II: Transition to the New
Campaign, The US Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–
January 2005” and “A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001 – September 2005.”

Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Visit our website at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp

Cover start

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site

(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

https://armypubs.army.mil/

https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard

*ADP 6-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes ADP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0 i

Army Doctrine Publication

No. 6-0
Headquarters

Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 31 July 2019

Mission Command:
Command and Control of Army Forces

Contents

Page

PREFACE…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. iii

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………….. vii

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION TO MISSION COMMAND …………………………………………………… 1-1
The Nature of Operations ……………………………………………………………………………… 1-1
Unified Land Operations ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-2
Mission Command ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-3
Principles of Mission Command …………………………………………………………………….. 1-6
The Role of Subordinates in Mission Command …………………………………………….. 1-14
Command and Control ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-16
The Command and Control Warfighting Function …………………………………………… 1-19
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-21

Chapter 2

COMMAND…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1
Nature of Command …………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-1
Elements of Command …………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1
The Role of Commanders in Operations ……………………………………………………….. 2-12
Guides to Effective Command ……………………………………………………………………… 2-16
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2-24

Chapter 3

CONTROL ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3-1
Nature of Control …………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-1
Elements of Control ……………………………………………………………………………………… 3-3
Control Measures ………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-10
Guides to Effective Control ………………………………………………………………………….. 3-14
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3-17

Chapter 4

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM …………………………………………………… 4-1
Command and Control System Defined ………………………………………………………….. 4-1
Organizing for Command and Control …………………………………………………………… 4-13
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4-15

SOURCE NOTES …………………………………………………………………….. Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY …………………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1

REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………. References-1

Preface

ii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

INDEX ………………………………………………………………………………………………… Index-1

Figures

Introductory figure-1. Logic map

………………………………………………………………………………………….. x

Figure 1-1. Levels of control ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-6

Figure 1-2. Combat power model …………………………………………………………………………………… 1-20

Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding ………………………………………………………………………………… 2-4

Figure 2-2. The operations process ………………………………………………………………………………… 2-13

Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process …………………………………………….. 2-14

Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization …………………………………………………………………………… 2-15

Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement …………………………………………………………………………….. 2-19

Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control ……………………………………………………………………………. 3-4

Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation

………………………………………………………………. 3-12

Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations ………………………………………………………………………….. 3-13

Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system ………………………………………………… 4-1

Tables

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms ………………………………………………. ix

Table 3-1. Operational variables ………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-5

Table 3-2. Mission variables ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-6

Vignettes

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik …………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-4

Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864 ……… 1-9

Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1-13

Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command …………………………………………………………………….. 1-15

Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army ……………………………………………….. 2-2

Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam………………………………………….. 2-8

Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement …………………… 2-18

Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik …………………………………………………………………….. 3-2

Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War …………………………………………………………….. 3-10

Control in Austerlitz ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3-11

file:///C:/Users/michael.lance.waller/Desktop/ADPs/ADP%206-0/ADP%206-0_18%20JULY%202019 x%23_Toc14334047

file:///C:/Users/michael.lance.waller/Desktop/ADPs/ADP%206-0/ADP%206-0_18%20JULY%202019 x%23_Toc14334049

file:///C:/Users/michael.lance.waller/Desktop/ADPs/ADP%206-0/ADP%206-0_18%20JULY%202019 x%23_Toc14334050

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 iii

Preface

ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, provides a discussion of the

fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting

function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of

command

and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission

accomplishment.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in ADP 6-0, readers should understand the nature of operations and

the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0, Operations. Army leadership attributes

and competencies are vital to exercising command and control, and readers should also be familiar with the

fundamentals of leadership in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, and FM 6-22, Leader Development. The Army

Ethic guides decisions and actions while exercising command and control, and readers must understand the

ideas in ADP 6-22. As the operations process is the framework for exercising command and control, readers
must also understand the fundamentals of the operations process established in ADP 5-0, The Operations

Process.

The doctrine in ADP 6-0 forms the foundation for command and control

tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For an explanation of these tactics and procedures, see FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and

Operations. For an explanation of the techniques associated with command and control, see ATP 6-0.5,

Command Post Organization and Operations, as well as other supporting techniques publications.

The principal audience for ADP 6-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. Mission command

demands more from subordinates at all levels, and understanding and practicing the mission command

principles during operations and garrison activities are imperative for all members of the Army Profession.

The Army historically fights with joint and multinational partners as part of a coalition, and ADP 6-0 is

nested with joint and multinational doctrine. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint

capabilities to conduct operations, or serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters, should also

refer to applicable doctrine concerning command and control of joint or multinational forces.

ADP 6-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreement 2199, Command and

Control of Allied Land Forces.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their

Soldiers operate in accordance with the Army Ethic, the law of war, and the rules of engagement. (See

FM 27-10 for a discussion of the law of war.)

ADP 6-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with

an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in

the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent

publication follows the definition.

ADP 6-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 6-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence. Send comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 6-0),

300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to

usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 v

Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source

Notes lists other sources of quotations and photographs.

Excerpts from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael E.

Howard. Copyright © 1976, renewed 2004 by Princeton University Press.

Quotes reprinted courtesy B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. Copyright © 1974 by Signet

Printing. Copyright © renewed 1991 by Meridian.

Excerpts from War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton

Walters, Ruth Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by M

G

George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by

permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in

Burma and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © 1956 by Viscount William Slim. Copyright ©

renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press.

Quote courtesy Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We

Are the Mighty, 8 April 2016. Online

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

Quote courtesy Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United

Kingdom:

Alden Press, 1953.

Excerpts from Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956

by Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956 The Curtis Publishing Company. Reprinted by

permission of Andesite Press, 2017.

Quote courtesy Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Copyright © 1999.

Quote courtesy Field Marshall Carver, cited in ADP AC 71940, Land Operations. Copyright © 2017

by British Ministry of Defence Crown.

Excerpts from William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History. Copyright © 1959 by Field-Marshal Sir

William Slim. Reprinted 1962 by Orion Publishing Group.

Excerpts from William M. Connor, “Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement

of the Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military

Experience. Edited by Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer

Academic/Plenum Press.

Quote courtesy Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant,

Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2. Edited by William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely.

Copyright © 1990 by Literary Classics of the United States.

Quote courtesy Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men. Edited by Harold Lamb. Copyright © 1927

by Harold Lamb. Reprinted, New York: Doubleday, 1956. All rights reserved.

Quote courtesy Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Copyright © 1953

by B. H. Liddell Hart.

Excerpts from Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France. Copyright ©

1990 by Robert A. Doughty.

Quote courtesy Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal

Tukhachevskii. Copyright © 1987 Brassey’s Defence.

Quote courtesy George S. Patton, Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S.

Army 02605 1885 – 1945. Edited by Charles M. Province. Copyright © 2002 by the George

S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society. All rights reserved.

http://freerepublic.com/focus/fchat/3535576/posts?page=12

Acknowledgements

vi ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Quote reprinted courtesy Erin Johnson, “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at Symposium,” The

Daily Universe, 21 October 2001. Online https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-

speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/.

Quote courtesy Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, “Address to Canadian Junior War Staff Course,

24 April 1941.” Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-

defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-

lineages/reports.html.

https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/

Schwarzkopf speaks of leadership at symposium

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 vii

Introduction

This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned

since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things—the warfighting function, the

system, and a philosophy—created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control,

but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among

leadership

cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities.

Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command,

which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military

operations.

Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on

mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and

multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control.

Command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over

assigned and attached forces—is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military

function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for

command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to

integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment. Military operations are

inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants.

Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy

forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that

empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

The nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command.

Mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik (literally, mission-type

tactics). Auftragstaktik was a result of Prussian military reforms following the defeat of the Prussian army

by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1809. Reformers such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von

Gneisenau, and Helmuth von Moltke sought to develop an approach for planning campaigns and

commanding large armies over extended battlefields. At the heart of the debate was a realization that

subordinate commanders in the field often had a better understanding of what was happening during a battle

than the general staff, and they were more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities

if they were allowed to make decisions based on this knowledge. Subordinate commanders needed the

authority to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the

plan. After decades of debate, professionalization of the army, practical application during the

Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Russian War of 1870,

Auftragstaktik was codified in the 1888 German Drill Regulation.

In Auftragstaktik, commanders issue subordinate commanders a clearly defined goal, the resources to

accomplish the goal, and a time frame to accomplish the goal. Subordinate commanders are then given the

freedom to plan and execute their mission within the higher commander’s intent. During execution,

Auftragstaktik demanded a bias for action within the commander’s intent, and it required leaders to adapt to

the situation as they personally saw it, even if their decisions violated previous guidance or directives. To

operate effectively under this style of command requires a common approach to operations and subordinates

who are competent in their profession and trained in independent decision making.

Aspects of mission command, including commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, mission orders, and

mutual trust, have long been part of U.S. Army culture. The most successful U.S. Army commanders have

employed elements of mission command since the 18th century. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign

of 1864 and Sherman’s supporting plan are models of clear commander’s intent, mission orders, and

understanding based on mutual trust. (See the vignette on page 1-9.) When addressing operations orders, the

Army’s 1905 Field Service Regulation contained the following passage that served as an early discussion of

mission orders:

Introduction

viii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

An order should not trespass on the province of the subordinate. It should contain

everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more.

When the transmission of orders involves a considerable period of time, during which the

situation may change, detailed instructions are to be avoided. The same rule holds when

orders may have to be carried out under circumstances which the originator of the order

cannot completely forecast; in such cases letters of guidance is more appropriate. It should

lay stress upon the object to be attained, and leave open the means to be employed.

Eisenhower’s general plan and intent for the 1944 invasion of Europe and defeat of Nazi Germany is an

example of mission command that guided Allied forces as they fought their way from Normandy to the Rhine

and beyond. A more recent example is the 3rd Infantry Division’s march to Baghdad in 2003 and the

subsequent “thunder runs” that showed the world that the Iraqi regime was defeated. Retired General David

Perkins (a brigade commander during this operation) writes, “These thunder runs were successful because

the corps and division-level commanders established clear intent in their orders and trusted their

subordinates’ judgment and abilities to exercise disciplined initiative in response to a fluid, complex problem,

underwriting the risks that they took.”

Mission command requires tactically and technically competent commanders, staffs, and subordinates

operating in an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding. It requires building effective teams

and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to take risks and exercise disciplined

initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders,

commanders focus their subordinates on the purpose of an operation rather than on the details of how to

perform assigned tasks. This allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action in the context of a

particular situation. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary

conditions for success by allocating resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

Commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At every echelon of command,

commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting function—the related tasks and a system

that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. Commanders execute

command and control through their staffs and subordinate leaders.

This publication provides fundamental principles on mission command, command and control, and the

command and control warfighting function. Key updates and changes to this version of ADP 6-0 include—

 Combined information from ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 into a single document.

 Command and control reintroduced into Army doctrine.

 An expanded discussion of command and control and its relationship to

mission command.

 Revised mission command principles.

 Command and control system reintroduced, along with new tasks, and an updated system

description.

 Expanded discussion of the command and control system.

ADP 6-0 contains 4 chapters:

Chapter 1 provides an overview of mission command, command, and control. It describes the nature of

operations and the Army’s operational concept, and how it is enabled by the mission command. It then

discusses the function of command and control, and how commanders create conditions for mission

command to flourish.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

Chapter 2 defines and describes command. It describes the nature of command, provides the elements of

command, describes the role of the commander in operations, and offers guides to effective command.

Chapter 3 defines and describes control and its relationship to command. It discusses the elements of control

and guides to effective control. Finally, this chapter discusses the importance of knowledge management and

information management as they relate to control.

Chapter 4 discusses the command and control system that performs the functions necessary to exercise

command and control. This includes a discussion of the people, processes, networks, and command posts

Introduction

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 ix

that are components of the command and control system. It also discusses command post design and

organization considerations.

Introductory table-1 lists modified terms and acronyms. The introductory figure-1 on page x illustrates the

ADP 6-0 logic map.

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms

Term or Acronym Remarks

art of command No longer defines term.

authority No longer defines term.

civil considerations ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the
definition.

command and control Adopts the joint definition.

command and control system New Army definition.

commander’s visualization ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

common operational picture Modifies the definition.

data New definition.

essential element of friendly information ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the
definition.

information New definition.

information protection No longer defines term.

information system No longer defines term.

knowledge New term and definition.

key tasks ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

mission command New Army definition.

mission command system Rescinds term.

mission command warfighting function Rescinds term.

prudent risk Rescinds term.

relevant information New term.

science of control No longer defines term.

situational understanding ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

understanding New term and definition.

Introduction

x ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Introductory figure-1. Logic map

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Introduction to Mission

Command

The situations that confront a commander in war are of infinite variety. In spite of the most

careful planning and anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are

common occurrences in battle. A commander must school himself to regard these events

as commonplace and not permit them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

This chapter sets the context for understanding mission command and command and

control by describing the nature of operations and summarizing the Army’s operational

concept. It defines and describes mission command as the Army’s approach to

command and control that enables unified land operations. Then it defines and

describes command and control, their relationship to each other, and their elements.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting
function.

THE NATURE OF OPERATION

S

1-1. Military operations fall along a competition continuum that spans cooperation to war. Between these
extremes, societies maintain relationships. These relationships include economic competition, political or

ideological tension, and at times armed conflict. Violent power struggles in failed states, along with the

emergence of major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea seeking to gain strategic

positions of advantage, present challenges to the joint force. Army forces must be prepared to meet these

challenges across the range of military operations during periods of competition and war.

1-2. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and
operations in scope and purpose against the backdrop of the competition continuum. The potential range of

military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, up

through large-scale combat operations in war. Whether countering terrorism as part of a limited contingency

operation, or defeating a peer threat in large-scale ground combat, the nature of conflict is constant. Military

operations are—

 Human endeavors.

 Conducted in dynamic and uncertain

environments.

 Designed to achieve a political purpose.

HUMAN ENDEAVOR

1-3. War is a human endeavor—a clash of wills characterized by the threat or application of force and
violence, often fought among populations. It is not a mechanical process that can be precisely controlled by

machines, calculations, or processes. Nor is it conducted in carefully controlled and predictable

environments. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. It is both a contest of wills and a

contest of intellect between two or more sides in conflict, with each trying to alter the behavior of the other

side. During operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas among the actors

involved, and the variable perceptions of public opinion both inside and outside of an area of operations. As

friendly forces seek to impose their will on enemy forces, the enemy forces resist and seek to impose their

will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs among civilian groups whose own desires influence and

are influenced by military operations. All sides act, react, learn, and adapt. Appreciating these relationships

is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations.

Chapter 1

1-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

DYNAMIC AND UNCERTAIN

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is

based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty….The commander must work

in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive power cannot always

fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-4. War, especially land combat, is inherently dynamic and uncertain. The complexity of friendly and
enemy organizations, unique combinations of terrain and weather, and the dynamic interaction among all

participants create uncertainty. Chance and friction further increase the potential for chaos and uncertainty

during operations. Chance pertains to unexpected events or changes beyond the control of friendly forces,

while friction describes the obstacles that make the execution of even simple tasks difficult. Both are always

present for all sides during combat.

1-5. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale ground combat exacerbates the dynamic and
uncertain nature of war, delaying or making precise cause-and effect determinations difficult. The unintended

effects of operations often cannot be anticipated and may not be readily apparent. War is inherently chaotic,

demanding an approach to the command and control of operations that does not attempt to impose perfect

order, but rather makes allowances for uncertainty created by chance and friction.

DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL PURPOSE

[T]he role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the

resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of

the war— the goal defined by fundamental policy.

B.H. Liddell-Hart

1-6. All U.S. military operations share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve specific objectives that
support attainment of the overall political purpose of the operation. Objective—directing every military

operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal—is a principle of war. In large-scale ground

combat, the purpose of operations may be to destroy the enemy’s capabilities and will to fight. The purpose

of operations short of large-scale combat may be more nuanced and difficult to define, and they may require

support to achieve multiple objectives. These operations frequently involve setting conditions that improve

positions of relative advantage compared to that of a specific adversary and contribute to achieving strategic

aims in an operational area without large-scale ground combat. In either case, all operations are designed to

achieve the political purpose set by national authorities.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-7. The Army operational concept for conducting operations as part of a joint team is unified land
operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense

support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict,

prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). The goal of

unified land operations is to achieve the joint force commander’s end state by applying landpower as part of

unified action. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of unified land operations.)

1-8. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained
land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. During the conduct of

unified land operations, Army forces support the joint force through four strategic roles:

 Shape operational environments.

 Prevent conflict.

 Prevail during large-scale ground combat.

 Consolidate gains.

1-9. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Army forces assist in

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-3

shaping an operational environment by providing trained and ready forces to geographic combatant

commanders in support of their combatant commander’s campaign plans. Shaping activities include security

cooperation, military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. The

theater army and subordinate Army forces assist the geographic combatant commander in building partner

capacity and capability and promoting stability across an area of responsibility. Army operations to shape are

continuous throughout a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility and occur before, during,

and after a specific joint operation. If operations to shape are successful, they may prevent conflict and negate

the requirement to conduct large-scale ground combat operations.

1-10. Army operations to prevent conflict are designed to deter undesirable actions by an adversary through
the positioning of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. Army forces may have a

significant role in the execution of directed flexible deterrent options or flexible response options.

Additionally, Army prevent activities may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other pre-deployment

activities; initial deployment into a theater, including echeloning command posts; and development of

intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the joint force

commander.

1-11. While the Army may conduct combat operations at various levels across the range of military
operations, Army forces must be manned, equipped, and trained for large-scale ground combat. During

large-scale ground combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground

forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break

an opponent’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to

achieve national objectives.

1-12. Operations to consolidate gains include activities to make enduring any temporary operational success
and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.

Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. In some instances, Army

forces will be in charge of integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other

situations, Army forces will be in support. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation,

consolidating gains becomes the focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded.

(See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of how Army forces shape operational environments, prevent conflict,

conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.)

MISSION

COMMAN

D

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with

their ingenuity.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

1-13. Army operations doctrine emphasizes shattering an enemy force’s ability and will to resist, and
destroying the coherence of enemy operations. Army forces accomplish these things by controlling the

nature, scope, and tempo of an operation and striking simultaneously throughout the area of operations to

control, neutralize, and destroy enemy forces and other objectives. The Army’s

command and control

doctrine supports its operations doctrine. It balances coordination, personal leadership, and tactical flexibility.

It stresses rapid decision making and execution, including rapid response to changing situations. It

emphasizes mutual trust and shared understanding among superiors and subordinates.

1-14. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate
decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports

the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and

exploiting the

initiative.

1-15. The mission command approach to command and control is based on the Army’s view that war is
inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change

rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation. No single person is ever sufficiently informed

to make every important decision, nor can a single person keep up with the number of decisions that need to

be made during combat. Subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of what is happening during

a battle, and are more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities if allowed to make

Chapter 1

1-4 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the initial plan in order

to achieve their commander’s intent. Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, a route may

become impassable, or units could consume supplies at unexpected rates. Friction and unforeseeable

combinations of variables impose uncertainty in all operations and require an approach to command and

control that does not attempt to impose perfect order, but rather accepts uncertainty and makes allowances

for unpredictability.

1-16. Mission command helps commanders capitalize on subordinate ingenuity, innovation, and decision
making to achieve the commander’s intent when conditions change or current orders are no longer relevant.

It requires subordinates who seek opportunities and commanders who accept risk for subordinates trying to

meet their intent. Subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation help

manage uncertainty and enable necessary tempo at each echelon during operations. Employing the mission

command approach during all garrison activities and training events is essential to creating the cultural

foundation for its employment in high-risk environments.

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik

Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) was appointed chief of the Prussian general staff in
1857. One of the important concepts he promulgated was Auftragstaktik (literally,
“mission tactics”), a command method stressing decentralized initiative within an
overall strategic design. Moltke understood that, as war progressed, its uncertainties
diminished the value of any detailed planning that might have been done beforehand.
He believed that, beyond calculating the initial mobilization and concentration of forces,
“…no plan of operations extends with any degree of certainty beyond the first
encounter with the main enemy force.” He believed that, throughout a campaign,
commanders had to make decisions based on a fluid, constantly evolving situation. For
Moltke, each major encounter had consequences that created a new situation, which
became the basis for new measures. Auftragstaktik encouraged commanders to be
flexible and react immediately to changes in the situation as they developed. It replaced
detailed planning with delegation of decision-making authority to subordinate
commanders within the context of the higher commander’s intent. Moltke realized that
tactical decisions had to be made on the spot; therefore, great care was taken to
encourage initiative by commanders at all levels.

Moltke believed that commanders should issue only the most essential orders. These
would provide only general instructions outlining the principal objective and specific
missions. Tactical details were left to subordinates. For Moltke, “the advantage which
a commander thinks he can attain through continued personal intervention is largely
illusory. By engaging in it he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose
effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he
can no longer fulfill the whole of them.”

Moltke’s thoughts, codified in the 1888 German field regulation, were imbued into the
culture of the Germany Army.

SUBORDINATE DECISION MAKING

1-17. Successful commanders anticipate future events by developing branches and sequels instead of
focusing on details better handled by subordinates during current operations. The higher the echelon, the

more time commanders should devote to future operations and the broader the guidance provided to

subordinates. Subordinates empowered to make decisions during operations unburden higher commanders

from issues that distract from necessary broader perspective and focus on critical issues. Mission command

allows those commanders with the best situational understanding to make rapid decisions without waiting

for higher echelon commanders to assess the situation and issue orders.

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-5

1-18. Commanders delegate appropriate authority to deputies, subordinate commanders, and staff members
based upon a judgment of their capabilities and experience. Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act

for their commander in specified areas. Delegating decision-making authority reduces the number of

decisions made at the higher echelons and reduces response time at lower echelons. In addition to determining

the amount of decision-making authority they will delegate, commanders also identify decisions that are their

sole responsibility and cannot be delegated to

subordinates.

1-19. When delegating authority to subordinates, commanders strive to set the necessary conditions for
success. They do this by assessing and managing risk. Taking risk is inherent at all levels of command.

Commanders and staffs assess hazards and recommend controls to help manage risk, rather than forcing

unnecessary risk decisions on subordinates. Risk, including ethical risk, should be identified and mitigated

by the higher level commander to the greatest extent possible. Two ways of managing risk are by managing

the number of tasks assigned to subordinates and by providing the appropriate resources to accomplish those

tasks. These resources include information, forces, materiel, and time.

1-20. While commanders can delegate authority, they cannot delegate responsibility. Subordinates are
accountable to their commanders for the use of delegated authority, but commanders remain solely

responsible and accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

DECENTRALIZED EXECUTIO

N

1-21. Decentralized execution is the delegation of decision-making authority to subordinates, so they may
make and implement decisions and adjust their assigned tasks in fluid and rapidly changing situations.

Subordinate decisions should be ethically based and within the framework of their higher commander’s

intent. Decentralized execution is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the

operational initiative

during operations in environments where conditions rapidly change and uncertainty is the norm. Rapidly

changing situations and uncertainty are inherent in operations where commanders seek to establish a tempo

and intensity that enemy forces cannot match.

1-22. Decentralized execution requires disseminating information to the lowest possible level so
subordinates can make informed decisions based on a shared understanding of both the situation and their

commander’s intent. This empowers subordinates operating in rapidly changing conditions to exercise

disciplined initiative within their commander’s intent. Generally, the more dynamic the circumstances, the

greater the need for initiative to make decisions at lower levels. It is the duty of subordinates to exercise

initiative to achieve their commander’s intent. It is the commander’s responsibility to issue appropriate intent

and ensure subordinates are prepared in terms of education, training, and experience to exercise initiative.

1-23. The commander’s intent provides a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an
overarching framework. It provides guidance within which individuals may exercise initiative to accomplish

the desired end state. Understanding the commander’s intent two echelons up further enhances

unity of effort

while providing the basis for decentralized decision making and execution throughout the depth of a

formation. Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise initiative

effectively in unexpected situations. Under the mission command approach to command and control,

subordinates have both responsibility and authority to fulfill the

commander’s intent.

LEVELS OF CONTRO

L

1-24. Determining the appropriate level of control, including delegating decisions and determining how
much decentralized execution to employ, is part of the art of command. The level and application of control

is constantly evolving and must be continuously assessed and adjusted to ensure the level of control is

appropriate to the situation. Commanders should allow subordinates the greatest freedom of action

commensurate with the level of acceptable risk in a particular situation. The mission variables (mission,

enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) influence

how much control to impose on subordinates. Other considerations include—

 Enemy disposition and capabilities.

 Level of synchronization and integration required.

 Higher echelon headquarters constraints.

 Level of risk.

Chapter 1

1-6 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

 Level of legal and ethical ambiguity.

 Rules of engagement.

 Level of unit cohesion.

 Level of training.

 Level of trust.

 Level of shared

understanding.

(See figure 1-1 for a sample of the considerations for determining the appropriate level of control.)

1-25. Different operations and phases of operations may require tighter or more relaxed control over
subordinate elements than other phases. Operations that require the close synchronization of multiple units,

or the integration of effects in a limited amount of time, may require more detailed coordination, and be

controlled in a more centralized manner. Examples of this include combined arms breaches, air assaults, and

wet gap crossings. Conversely, operations that do not require the close coordination of multiple units, such

as a movement to contact or a pursuit, offer many opportunities to exercise initiative. These opportunities

may be lost if too much emphasis is placed on detailed synchronization. Even in a highly controlled operation,

subordinates must still exercise initiative to address unexpected problems and achieve their commander’s

intent when existing orders no longer make sense in the context of execution.

Figure 1-1. Levels of control

PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND

1-26. Mission command requires competent forces and an environment of mutual trust and shared
understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires effective teams and a command

climate in which subordinates are required to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s

intent. Commanders issue mission orders that focus on the purpose of an operation and essential coordination

measures rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks, giving subordinates the latitude to

accomplish those tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. This minimizes the number of decisions a

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-7

single commander makes and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks.

Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by

allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks. Successful mission command is

enabled by the principles of—

 Competence.

 Mutual trust.

 Shared understanding.

 Commander’s intent.

 Mission orders.

 Disciplined initiative.

 Risk acceptance.

COMPETENC

E

1-27. Tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates, and teams are the basis of effective
mission command. An organization’s ability to operate using mission command relates directly to the

competence of its Soldiers. Commanders and subordinates achieve the level of competence to perform

assigned tasks to standard through training, education, assignment experience, and professional development.

Commanders continually assess the competence of their subordinates and their organizations. This

assessment informs the degree of trust commanders have in their subordinates’ ability to execute mission

orders in a decentralized fashion at acceptable levels of risk.

1-28. Training and education that occurs in both schools and units provides commanders and subordinates
the experiences that allow them to achieve professional competence. Repetitive, realistic, and challenging

training creates common experiences that develop the teamwork, trust, and shared understanding that

commanders need to exercise mission command and forces need to achieve unity of effort. (See ADP 7-0 for

doctrine on individual and collective training.)

1-29. Leaders supplement institutional and organizational training and education with continuous
self-development. Self-development is particularly important for the skills that rely on the art of command,

which is further developed by reading and studying the art of war. These skills can also be developed through

coursework, simulations and experience. (See chapter 2 for discussion on the art of command.)

MUTUAL TRUS

T

1-30. Mutual trust is shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that they can be
relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks. There are few shortcuts to gaining the trust

of others. Trust is given by leaders and subordinates, and built over time based on common shared

experiences. It is the result of upholding the Army values, exercising leadership consistent with Army

leadership principles, and most effectively instilled by the leader’s personal example.

1-31. Mutual trust is essential to successful mission command, and it must flow throughout the chain of
command. Subordinates are more willing to exercise initiative when they believe their commander trusts

them. They will also be more willing to exercise initiative if they believe their commander will accept and

support the outcome of their decisions. Likewise, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates who

have demonstrated tactical and technical competency and whose judgment they trust.

1-32. At the lowest tactical levels the ability to trust subordinate formations to execute their collective tasks
and battle drills is essential. Building that trust is critical to rapid decision making in high pressure situations;

commanders should be focused more on the problem to be solved when giving guidance than the methods

that their subordinates might use. Subordinates must trust that commanders will employ mission orders to

the maximum extent possible once they have demonstrated the attributes and competencies expected.

1-33. Commanders must also trust their colleagues who are commanding adjacent and supporting forces,
and they must earn their trust as well. When a commander exercises initiative, trust gives other commanders

the same level of confidence to synchronize their actions with those of that commander. Such actions

synchronize operations without requiring detailed instructions from higher echelons. Once established and

Chapter 1

1-8 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

sustained, trust allows each echelon to focus on operations as a whole instead of on the actions of individual

subordinates.

1-34. Trust is based on personal qualities, such as professional competence, character, and commitment.
Soldiers must see values in action before such actions become a basis for trust. Trust is built through shared

experiences and training deliberately developed by commanders or through the conduct of operations. During

shared experiences, two-way communication and interaction among the commander, subordinates, and

Soldiers reinforces trust. Soldiers expect to see members of the chain of command accomplishing the mission

while taking care of their welfare and leading by example through shared hardships and danger.

1-35. Trust is also a product of a common background, education, understanding of doctrine, and a common
language for operations. In some situations, trust may be based solely on a common understanding of an

approach to operations. This understanding creates a basic level of trust that, until proven otherwise, new

team members or adjacent units will conduct operations to a common standard. During large-scale ground

combat operations where task organizations are likely to change rapidly and often, commanders and staffs

must assume a basic level of trust regarding the level of competence among new teams.

SHARED UNDERSTANDING

1-36. A critical challenge for commanders, staffs, and unified action partners is creating shared
understanding of an operational environment, an operation’s purpose, problems, and approaches to solving

problems. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental

organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and

integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0). Shared understanding of the situation, along with the

flow of information to the lowest possible level, forms the basis for unity of effort and subordinates’ initiative.

Effective decentralized execution is not possible without shared understanding.

1-37. Shared understanding starts with the Army’s doctrine and professional military education that instills
a common approach to the conduct of operations, a common professional language, and a common

understanding of the principles of mission command. Army professionals understand the most current Army

doctrine to ensure a minimum level of shared understanding for the conduct of operations. It is this shared

understanding that allows even hastily task-organized units to operate effectively.

1-38. Commanders and staffs actively create shared understanding throughout the operations process
(planning, preparation, execution, and assessment). They collaboratively frame an operational environment

and its problems, and then they visualize approaches to solving those problems.

1-39. Collaboration is more than coordination. It is multiple people and organizations working together
towards a common goal by sharing knowledge and building consensus. It requires dialogue that involves the

candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of

disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified

action partners collaborate by sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to understand

situations and make decisions.

1-40. Through collaboration, commanders create a learning environment that allows participants to think
critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without fear of reproach.

Effective collaboration requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, exchange of ideas. Participants

must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight. This includes sharing

ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders listen to novel ideas

and counterarguments. Effective collaboration is not possible unless commanders enable it.

1-41. Commanders establish a culture of collaboration in their organization. They recognize that they do not
know everything, and they recognize that they may have something to learn from even the most junior

subordinate. Commanders establish a command climate by their personal example, coaching, counseling,

and mentoring where collaboration routinely occurs throughout their organization. Successful commanders

invest the time and effort to visit with Soldiers, subordinate leaders, and unified action partners to understand

their issues and concerns. Through such interactions, subordinates and partners gain insight into their

commander’s leadership style and expectations.

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-9

1-42. Shared understanding both supports and derives from trust. However, like trust, it requires time to
establish, and commanders cannot assume shared understanding. Shared understanding is perishable, and

commanders and their subordinates must adequately communicate to maintain shared understanding of the

situation, problems, and potential solutions. Commanders can develop shared understanding in their

organizations through training and by creating an environment of collaboration and dialogue.

1-43. An important source of shared understanding is open and clear communications between leaders and
Soldiers. Commanders can also aid shared understanding by exhibiting a demeanor and personal mannerisms

that reinforce, or at least do not contradict, their spoken message. Units develop the ability to communicate

through familiarity, trust, a shared philosophy, and experiences. Sharing a common perception of military

problems also leads to shared understanding.

1-44. There is a hierarchical component of shared understanding. At each echelon of command, commanders
will have a slightly different understanding of the situation. Having a common perception of military

problems does not imply any requirement to come to identical solutions; under mission command,

understanding what outcome to achieve is more important than agreement on how to achieve it. Activities

that can lead to shared understanding include collaboration among commanders and staffs, professional

development meetings, terrain walks, and professional discussions.

Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s
Orders to Sherman, 1864

In a letter to MG William T. Sherman, dated 4 April 1864, LTG Ulysses S. Grant outlined
his 1864 campaign plan. LTG Grant described MG Sherman’s role by writing, “It is my
design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring
campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common
centre.… You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and to get into
the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can
against their War resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign,
but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to
execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of
operation.”

MG Sherman responded to LTG Grant immediately in a letter dated 10 April 1864. He
sent LTG Grant, as requested, his specific plan of operations, demonstrating that he
understood LTG Grant’s intent:

“…That we are now all to act in a common plan, converging on a common center, looks
like enlightened war…. I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan, in
which I am to Knock Joe [Confederate GEN Joseph E.] Johnston, and do as much
damage to the resources of the enemy as possible….I would ever bear in mind that
Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot, in any event, send any part
of his command against you or [Union MG Nathaniel P.] Banks.”

COMMANDER’S INTENT

I suppose dozens of operation orders have gone out in my name, but I never, throughout

the war, actually wrote one myself. I always had someone who could do that better than

I

could. One part of the order I did, however, draft myself—the intention. It is usually the

shortest of all paragraphs, but it is always the most important, because it states—or it

should—just what the commander intends to achieve. It is the one overriding expression of

will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in

the army must be dominated. It should, therefore, be worded by the commander, himself.

Field Marshall William Joseph Slim

Chapter 1

1-10 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

1-45. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate

and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even

when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). The higher echelon commander’s intent provides the

basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each commander’s intent nests within the commander’s intent

two levels up. During planning, the initial commander’s intent drives course of action development. During

execution, the commander’s intent establishes the limits within which a subordinate may

exercise initiative.

1-46. The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. Commanders
convey their intent in a format they determine most suitable to the situation. It may include the operation’s

purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation,

the commander’s intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it describes the broader

purpose of the unit’s operation in relationship to the higher commander’s intent and concept of

operations.

Doing this allows subordinates to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and,

most importantly, why the mission is being conducted. If it is longer than a brief paragraph it is probably too

long.

1-47. Key tasks are those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired
end state. Key tasks are not specified tasks for any subordinate unit; however, they may be sources of implied

tasks. During execution—when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no

longer fits the situation—subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired

end state. Examples of key tasks include terrain the force must control or an effect the force must have on

the enemy. Commanders include the purpose of each associated key task to facilitate subordinate decision

making and disciplined initiative.

1-48. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation
ends. Commanders may describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly

force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. A clearly defined

end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners.

1-49. The commander’s intent becomes the basis on which staffs and subordinate leaders develop plans and
orders. A well-crafted commander’s intent conveys a clear image of an operation’s purpose and desired end

state. The commander’s intent provides a focus for subordinates to coordinate their separate efforts.

Commanders personally prepare their commander’s intent. When possible, they deliver it in person.

Face-to-face delivery ensures shared understanding of what the commander wants by allowing immediate

clarification of specific points. Individuals can then exercise initiative within the overarching guidance

provided in the commander’s intent.

1-50. Commanders write and communicate their commander’s intent to describe the boundaries within
which subordinates may exercise initiative while maintaining unity of effort. A clear and succinct

commander’s intent that lower-level leaders can remember and understand, even without an order, is key to

maintaining unity of effort. Soldiers two echelons down should easily remember and clearly understand the

commander’s intent. Commanders collaborate with subordinates to ensure they understand the commander’s

intent. Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise disciplined

initiative in unexpected situations.

1-51. Mission command requires that subordinates use their judgment and initiative to make decisions that
further their higher commander’s intent. Subordinates use the commander’s intent, together with the mission

statement and concept of the operation,

to accomplish the mission.

Empowered with trust, shared

understanding, and commander’s intent, they can develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively in uncertain

conditions.

MISSION ORDERS

An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate. It should contain

everything that the subordinate must know to carry out his mission, but nothing more… An

order must be simple and understandable, being framed to suit the intelligence and

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-11

understanding of the recipient. Above all, it must be adapted to the circumstances under

which it will be received and executed.

FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations (1939)

1-52. An order is a communication—verbal, written, or signaled—that conveys instructions from superiors
to subordinates. The five-paragraph format (situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and

signal) is the standard for issuing Army orders. Army commanders issue orders to give guidance, assign

tasks, allocate resources, and delegate authority.

1-53. Mission command requires commanders to issue mission orders. Mission orders are directives that
emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. Mission orders

enable subordinates to understand the situation, their commander’s mission and intent, and their own tasks.

Subordinate commanders decide how to accomplish their own mission. The commander’s intent and concept

of operations set guidelines that provide unity of effort while allowing subordinate commanders to exercise

initiative in planning, preparing, and executing their operations.

1-54. A mission order is not a separate type of order; rather, it is a technique for writing orders that allows
subordinates maximum freedom of action in accomplishing missions. Mission orders should succinctly state

the mission, task organization, commander’s intent and concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, and

minimum essential coordinating instructions. Tasks to subordinate units include all the standard elements

(who, what, when, where, and why) with particular emphasis on the purpose (why).

1-55. Mission orders should focus on the essential tasks a subordinate is to accomplish and not an extended
list of every task a unit may be required to accomplish. It should never repeat items that are part of the

standard operating procedures or are commonly understood by the force. Mission orders should not contain

directives to a subordinate that dictate how a task is to be accomplished. That is the province of the

subordinate.

1-56. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail in the context of a particular situation; they are neither
so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level

of detail is situationally dependent. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate

elements than other phases require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require

precise synchronization. Its ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order

contains only the specific information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the

decisive time and place while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible.

Commanders

rely on subordinates’ initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of

operations.

1-57. Graphics that accompany mission orders should be drawn in a manner that allows maximum flexibility
during execution. They should provide enough control for those activities requiring synchronization, but they

should avoid constraining subordinates’ freedom of action within their areas of operation. Ideally graphics

provide enough references such as checkpoints and phase lines for subordinate leaders to use them as a basis

of shared understanding when deviation from the base order becomes necessary. Inherently flexible graphics

and mission orders together create conditions for initiative and rapid decision making.

1-58. Using mission orders does not mean commanders do not supervise subordinates during operations.
Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use of delegated authority, but commanders remain

solely responsible and accountable for the actions over which subordinates exercise delegated authority.

Thus, commanders have the responsibility to check on their subordinates and provide directions and guidance

as required to focus their activities. Commanders should emphasize mission orders during training when

actual consequences are low, allowing subordinates to develop their own solutions to problems, and

intervening only when necessary to avoid a serious problem. This is valuable both for subordinates to gain

experience in problem solving and confidence in exercising initiative and for commanders to develop an

understanding of the capabilities of subordinates.

DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE

Every individual from the highest commander to the lowest private must always remember

that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error

Chapter 1

1-12 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

of judgment in the action taken. The criterion by which a commander judges the soundness

of his own decision is whether it will further the intentions of the higher commander.

FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations (1941)

1-59. Disciplined initiative refers to the duty individual subordinates have to exercise initiative within the
constraints of the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state. Simply put, disciplined initiative is

when subordinates have the discipline to follow their orders and adhere to the plan until they realize their

orders and the plan are no longer suitable for the situation in which they find themselves. This may occur

because the enemy does something unforeseen, there is a new or more serious threat, or a golden opportunity

emerges that offers a greater chance of success than the original course of action. The subordinate leader then

takes action on their own initiative to adjust to the new situation and achieve their commander’s intent,

reporting to the commander about the new situation when able to do so.

1-60. Leaders and subordinates who exercise disciplined initiative create opportunity by taking action to
develop a situation without asking for further guidance. Commanders rely on subordinates to act to meet their

intent, not simply adhere to a plan that is no longer working. A subordinate’s initiative may be the starting

point for seizing, retaining, and exploiting the operational initiative by forcing an enemy to respond to

friendly action.

1-61. Operational initiative is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation (ADP 3-0).
Under mission command, subordinates are required, not just permitted, to exercise disciplined initiative in

the absence of orders, when current orders no longer apply, or when an opportunity or threat presents itself.

The collective effect of multiple subordinates exercising disciplined initiative over time sets the conditions

for friendly forces to seize the operational initiative in chaotic and ambiguous situations.

1-62. The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative. It gives
subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous situations because they know the mission’s

purpose and desired end state. They can, on their own responsibility, take actions that they think will best

accomplish the mission when communication with higher echelons is intermittent or decisions must be made

immediately.

1-63. When exercising initiative, neither commanders nor subordinates are independent actors. Subordinates
consider at least two factors when deciding when to exercise initiative:

 Whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of desynchronizing the overall operation.

 Whether the action will further the higher commander’s intent.

1-64. The main consideration in exercising initiative is the urgency of the situation. If time permits,
subordinates attempt to communicate their new situation and recommended course of action to their

commander. When subordinates communicate their intentions to their commander, their commander can

assess the implications for the overall force, and for other operations, and set in motion supporting actions.

However, subordinates must depart from their orders when they are unable to contact their commander or

when there is a limited amount of time to seize a fleeting opportunity. If doubt exists about whether to contact

their commander or depart from orders and act to seize a fleeting opportunity, subordinates should act, if they

can do so within their commander’s intent.

1-65. Fostering a command climate that encourages initiative requires commanders to accept risk and
underwrite the good faith mistakes of subordinates in training, before the unit is committed to combat.

Commanders set conditions for subordinates to learn and gain the experience they need to operate on their

own. Subordinates learn to trust that they have the authority and responsibility to act, knowing their

commander will back their decisions. Because mutual trust and shared understanding constitute the

foundation of subordinate initiative, commanders train subordinates to act within the commander’s intent in

uncertain situations.

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-13

Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily

When paratroopers assaulted Sicily during the night of July 9-10, 1943, they suffered
some of the worst weather that could affect that kind of a mission. The men were
supposed to conduct two airborne assaults and form a buffer zone ahead of the 7th
Army’s amphibious assault on the island, but winds of up to 40 knots blew them far
from their intended drop zones.

The 3,400 paratroopers in the assault took heavy losses before a single pair of boots
even touched the ground. But what happened next would become airborne legend. It
became the story of the “The little groups of paratroopers.” The little groups of
paratroopers did not find cover or spend hours trying to regroup. They rucked up
wherever they were and immediately began attacking everything nearby that
happened to look like it belonged to the German or Italian militaries. They tore down
communications lines, demolished enemy infrastructure, set up both random and
planned roadblocks, ambushed Axis forces, and attacked enemy positions. A group of
16 German pillboxes that controlled key roads was neutralized despite the attacking
force having only a fraction of their planned strength. This mischief had a profound
effect on the defenders. The Axis forces assumed that the paratroopers were attacking
in strength at each spot where a paratrooper assault was reported. So, while many
little groups of paratroopers had only a few men, German estimates reported much
stronger formations. The worst reports stated that there were 10 times as many
attackers as were actually present. German commanders were hard-pressed to rally
against what seemed to be an overwhelming attack. Some conducted limited
counterattacks at what turned out to be ghosts while others remained in defensive
positions or, thinking they were overrun, surrendered to American forces that were a
fraction of their size.

The operation was a success, thanks in large part to the actions of little groups of
paratroopers acting on their own initiative across the island until they could find a unit
to form up with. Axis forces began withdrawing from the island on July 25 and Lt. Gen.
George S. Patton took Messina, the last major city on Sicily, on August 17.

RISK ACCEPTANCE

Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity will do a thousand times more damage in

war than audacity.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-66. In general terms, risk is the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss. Because
risk is part of every operation, it cannot be avoided. Commanders analyze risk in collaboration with

subordinates to help determine what level of risk exists and how to mitigate it. When considering how much

risk to accept with a course of action, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against

the perceived benefit. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and

anticipated cost. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting and

managing risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission.

1-67. The greatest opportunity may come from the course of action with the most risk. An example of this
would be committing significant forces to a potentially costly frontal attack to fix the bulk of enemy forces

in place to set the conditions for their envelopment by other forces. Another would be taking a difficult but

unexpected route in order to achieve surprise.

1-68. While each situation is different, commanders avoid undue caution or commitment of resources to
guard against every perceived threat. An unrealistic expectation of avoiding all risk is detrimental to mission

Chapter 1

1-14 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

accomplishment. Waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization may increase risk or close a window

of opportunity. Mission command requires that commanders and subordinates manage accepted risk, exercise

initiative, and act decisively, even when the outcome is uncertain.

1-69. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision
in which the commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome.

Therefore, commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as

many hazards as possible, and then accept risk to accomplish the mission.

THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATES IN MISSION COMMAND

1-70. The mission command approach to command and control requires active participation by personnel of
all ranks and duty positions. Subordinate officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers all have important

roles in the exercise of mission command. During operations, subordinates are delegated authority, typically

through orders and standard operating procedures, to make decisions within their commander’s intent.

Commanders expect subordinates to exercise this authority to further the commander’s intent when changes

in the situation render orders irrelevant, or when communications are lost with higher echelon headquarters.

1-71. Because mission command decentralizes decision-making authority and grants subordinates
significant freedom of action, it demands more of subordinates at all levels. Commanders must train and

educate subordinates so they demonstrate good judgment when exercising initiative. Subordinates must be

competent in their respective fields, and they must be confident they will have the commander’s support to

make

and implement decisions.

They must embrace opportunities to assume responsibility for achieving the

commander’s intent.

1-72. Subordinates do not wait for a breakdown in communications or a crisis situation to learn how to act
within the commander’s intent. Subordinates look for every opportunity to demonstrate and exercise

initiative. To the greatest extent possible, they report what they intend to do and then execute unless their

commander specifically denies them permission.

1-73. As subordinates realize their commander will support sound decisions, their trust increases, and they
become more willing to exercise initiative. As commanders see subordinates perform in uncertain situations,

they gain trust in their subordinates’ judgment and ability.

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-15

Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command

On the morning of 8 October 1918, Soldiers of the 82nd Division began an attack to
sever the German supply network in the Argonne Forest. Among the men in this push
was CPL Alvin York, a squad leader in the 328th Infantry Regiment.

Initially, the American attack seemed to go well as forward-deployed Germans
seemingly retreated in the face of superior numbers. However, this was a ruse, as the
Germans were falling back into prepared positions. Once the Americans were in the
middle of the kill zone, the Germans opened fire. This was quickly followed by German
artillery ripping gaping holes in the American line.

Among the first to fall was CPL York’s platoon leader, LT Kirby Stewart, and as the
casualties mounted, the American attack quickly foundered. With LT Stewart dead,
SGT Harry Parsons assumed command of CPL York’s platoon. After surveying the
situation, he ordered SGT Bernard Early, CPL York, CPL Murray Savage, and CPL
William Cutting to advance with their squads to a defile to the south. From here, SGT
Parsons surmised that they just might be able to get behind the German lines and
eliminate the machine guns that were holding up the advance.

After dodging German fire, SGT Early led his 16 men to the defilade, then up a cut in
the valley that led behind the German positions. They slowly worked their way around
the German infantry and subsequently surprised and captured some 70 German
soldiers, which included the battalion commander. While the Americans tried to line up
their prisoners, a machine-gun crew on a nearby hill yelled to the captured Germans
to take cover and then opened fire. The blast of bullets killed six Americans and
wounded three. CPL York was the highest ranking Soldier not hit, and he took charge
of the remaining seven men.

With the surviving Americans and German prisoners clinging to the ground, CPL York
seized the initiative. He charged up the hill, outflanked the German machine gun and
an infantry platoon, killing 19. Seeing a large group of German reinforcements arriving
from further up the hill, CPL York decided to go back to his men. As he trotted down
the hill, he was spotted by a German officer who ordered a bayonet charge to kill the
American. Seeing a platoon of Germans charging, CPL York slid on his side, pulled
out his 1911 Colt automatic pistol, and began picking off enemy soldiers from back to
front. Seeing this, the German battalion commander, who had been captured earlier,
slowly got up off of the ground and approached CPL York. Standing behind CPL York,
he cautiously yelled above the din, “English?” CPL York replied, “American!” In
exasperation, the German commander answered, “Good Lord! If you won’t shoot
anymore, I will make them give up.

CPL York and his men quickly organized their prisoners, which now numbered 100,
into a formation and began marching them out of the forest. During the march back to
the American lines, the Americans ended up walking into another group of Germans.
CPL York shrewdly secured their surrender as well, and in the end he came out with
132 prisoners. This saved his unit from destruction, thwarted a German counterattack,
and allowed the 82nd Division to achieve its objective. For his heroism, CPL York was
promoted to sergeant, awarded the Medal of Honor, and would go down in history as
America’s most celebrated hero of the First World War.

Chapter 1

1-16 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

COMMAND AND CONTROL

If intercommunication between events in front and ideas behind are not maintained, then

two battles will be fought—a mythical headquarters battle and an actual front-line one, in

which case the real enemy is to be found in our own headquarters.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller

1-74. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control. Command and control is the
exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in

the accomplishment of mission (JP 1). Command and control (also known as C2) is fundamental to the art

and science of warfare. No single activity in operations is more important than command

and control.

Command and control by itself will not secure an objective, destroy an enemy target, or deliver supplies. Yet

none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve

maximum effect, without effective command and control. It is through command and control that the

countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction. The goal of command and

control is mission accomplishment.

1-75. The focal point of command and control is the commander. Commanders assess situations, make
decisions, and direct action. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation to instill the will to win.

Commanders seek to understand the situation, visualize an end state and operational approach, and describe

that end state and operational approach in their commander’s intent and planning guidance. During execution,

commanders direct the actions of subordinates and adjust operations based on changes to the situation and

feedback from subordinate units, external organizations, and their staffs.

1-76. The Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations
process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during

operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). Commanders, supported by their

staffs, employ the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand,

visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and

assess military operations. (See chapter 2 for more information on the role of the commander. See ADP 5-0

for details on conducting the operations process.)

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-77. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides with commanders and includes the authority
and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing,

directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of missions. It also includes

responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Command emphasizes a

commander’s lawful assignment of authority and the responsibility that accompanies that authority.

1-78. Effective command is impossible without control. Control is inherent in command and includes
collecting, processing, displaying, storing and disseminating relevant information. Commanders, supported

by their staffs, control operations by receiving and communicating information to build shared understanding

and to direct, coordinate, and synchronize the actions of subordinate units. Commander’s intent, orders,

control measures, and standard operating procedures all assist with the control of operations. Determining

the appropriate level of control in a particular situation is a critical command responsibility.

1-79. Command and control is not a one-way, top-down process. In application, command and control is
multidirectional, with feedback from lower echelons, from higher echelons, laterally, and from sources

outside the chain of command. It includes the reciprocal flow of information between commanders, staffs,

subordinates, and other organizations in an area of operations as they work to achieve shared understanding

and adjust to continuously changing circumstances in an operational environment.

Command

I believe firmly in a “personal” command, i.e. that a commander should never attempt to

control an operation or a battle by remaining at his H.Q. or be content to keep touch with

his subordinates by cable, [radio], or other means of communication. He must as far as

possible see the ground for himself to confirm or correct his impressions of the map; his

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-17

subordinate commanders to discuss their plans and ideas with them; and the troops to

judge of their needs and their morale.

Field-Marshall Earl Wavell

1-80. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates
by virtue of rank or assignment (JP 1). Command is personal—an individual person commands, not an

organization or a headquarters. Command is considered more art than science, because it incorporates

intangible elements that require judgment in application. The key elements of command are—

 Authority.

 Responsibility.

 Decision

making.

 Leadership.

1-81. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates,
including the authority to assign tasks and the responsibility for their successful completion. Authority

derives from two sources: official authority and personal authority. Official authority is a function of rank

and position and is bestowed by law and regulation. This authority to enforce orders by law is one of the key

elements of command and distinguishes military commanders from other leaders and managers. Personal

authority is a function of personal influence and derives from factors such as experience, reputation, skill,

character, and personal example. It is bestowed by the other members of the organization. Official authority

provides the power to act, but it is rarely enough for success on its own; the most effective commanders also

possess a high degree of personal authority.

1-82. With authority comes responsibility. Commanders are legally and ethically responsible for their
decisions and for the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates. Commanders may delegate

authority, but delegation does not absolve commanders of their responsibility to the higher echelon

commander. Commanders are always accountable for what happens or fails to happen in their command.

1-83. Commanders exercise their authority through decision making and leadership. Decision making refers
to selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission, and includes making

adjustments to plans during the execution of an operation. Decision making includes knowing whether to

decide or not, then when and what to decide, and finally, understanding the consequences. Commanders use

understanding, visualization, description, and direction to make and communicate their decisions.

Commanders rely on their education, experience, knowledge, and judgment in applying authority as they

decide (plan how to achieve the end state) and lead (direct their forces during preparation and execution), all

while assessing progress.

1-84. Leadership refers to influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while
operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. It is the unifying and multiplying element

of combat power. Commanders lead through a combination of personal example, persuasion, and

compulsion. Commanders employ leadership to translate decisions into effective action by forces.

Control

1-85. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in
accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders exercise control over all forces in their area of

operations, aided by their command and control system. Staffs aid the commander in exercising control by

supporting the commander’s decision making; assisting subordinate commanders, staffs and units; and

keeping units and organizations outside the headquarters informed.

1-86. Control is more science than art because it relies on objectivity, empirical methods, and analysis.
Control demands commanders and staffs understand those aspects of operations that they can analyze and

measure. These include the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations and

systems. Control also requires a realistic appreciation for time and distance factors and the time required to

initiate and complete certain actions. Units are bound by factors such as movement rates, supply

consumption, weapons effects, and ethical and legal considerations.

Chapter 1

1-18 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

1-87. The proper application of control incorporates some level of art, since commanders must use judgment
with regard to the abilities of subordinates and the likelihood that friction is part of every operation. The key

elements of control are—

 Direction.

 Feedback.

 Information.

 Communication.

1-88. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, direct the actions of their subordinates within their commander’s
intent, the unit’s mission, and the concept of operations. Commanders provide direction and communicate

information, usually in plans and orders that provide subordinate forces their tasks and instruct them how to

cooperate within a broader concept of operations. In the process, they receive feedback from subordinate s

and supporting forces that allows commanders to update their visualization and modify plans. This feedback

creates a reciprocal flow of information that leads to a shared understanding among all participants.

1-89. Central to providing direction and receiving feedback is information. The amount of information that
is available makes managing information and turning it into effective decisions and actions critical to success

during operations. Commanders and staffs employ knowledge management techniques to add clarity to

information, speed its dissemination, and support situational understanding and decision making. (See

chapter 3 for more information on knowledge management and information management)

1-90. Commanders and staffs disseminate information among people, elements, and places. Communication
is more than mere transmission of information. It is an activity that allows commanders, subordinates, and

unified action partners to create shared understanding that supports action. It is a means to exercise control

over forces. Communication links information to decisions and decisions to action. Communication among

the parts of a command enables their coordinated action. Effective commanders understand the importance

of using multiple means of communication to ensure shared understanding. They use multidirectional

communication and suitable means of collaboration to ensure clear understanding of the commander’s intent.

They also anticipate those times when communication is likely to be intermittent, and they adjust their level

of control accordingly.

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-91. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two
or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). Multinational

operations are driven by common agreement among the participating alliance or coalition partners. While

each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations

bring value to an operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to the

operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that

most operations will be multinational operations and plan accordingly.

1-92. Multinational operations present unique command and control challenges. These include cultural and
language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of

information and intelligence, and rules of engagement. Establishing standard operating procedures and

liaison with multinational partners is critical to effective command and control. When commanding and

controlling forces within a multinational training or operational setting, Army commanders should be familiar

with and employ multinational doctrine and standards ratified by the United States. For example, Allied

Tactical Publication 3.2.2 applies to Army forces during the conduct of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

operations. (See FM 3-16 for a detailed discussion on multinational operations.)

DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

1-93. While Army commanders are primarily concerned with command and control in the land domain,
command and control occurs in all domains across the range of military operations. Through command and

control, Army forces converge effects from all domains (land, air, maritime, space, cyberspace), as well as

the information environment and the electromagnetic spectrum, to accomplish missions. Each domain has a

unique set of characteristics that influences how capabilities are synchronized and converged throughout an

operation. Convergence is the continuous integration of capabilities from multiple domains, the

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-19

electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment, to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. In

order to effectively converge effects from all domains, Army forces must understand the authorities,

processes, procedures, and time it takes to receive and assess effects from other domains and for Army forces

to create effects in those domains.

1-94. Army forces have effectively integrated capabilities and synchronized actions in the land, air, and
maritime domains for decades, and the authorities, processes, and procedures are well established. However,

the military application of technologies to the space and cyberspace domains, as well as the information

environment and the electromagnetic spectrum, require special consideration in planning to converge effects

within or across domains. Liaisons can assist commanders with integrating capabilities resident in domains

other than land. (See chapter 4 for a discussion on liaisons.)

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

1-95. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders
use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). Warfighting functions are the physical means

that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by higher level

commanders. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common

critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons.

1-96. Operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil
authorities operations require the continuous generation and application of combat power. Combat power is

the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can

apply at one time (ADP 3-0). Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that

are integrated and synchronized with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained

operations.

1-97. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and
maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The elements facilitate Army forces accessing

joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting

functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and

information. Leadership is a multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Information enables

commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about the application of combat power and achieve

definitive results.

1-98. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable
commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of

the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of

combat power (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, information and

leadership) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The

command and control

warfighting function

consists of the command and control warfighting function tasks and the command and control system, as

depicted in figure 1-2 on page 1-20.

Chapter 1

1-20 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Figure 1-2. Combat power model

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS

1-99. The command and control warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other
elements of combat power to accomplish missions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous

processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force through the mission command

warfighting function. These tasks are—

 Command forces (described in chapter 2).

 Control operations (described in chapter 3).

 Drive the operations process (described in chapter 2).

 Establish the command and control system (described in chapter 4).

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTE

M

1-100. Commanders need support to effectively exercise command and control. At every echelon of
command, each commander establishes a command and control system—the arrangement of people,

processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations. The command

and control system supports the commander’s decision making, disseminates the commander’s decisions to

subordinates, and facilitates controlling forces. Commanders employ their command and control system to

enable the people and formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. All the

equipment and procedures exist to achieve this end. Commanders organize the four components of their

command and control system to support decision making and facilitate communication. The most important

of these components is people. (See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the command and control system.)

People

1-101. A commander’s command and control system is based on people. The human aspects of operations
remain paramount regardless of the technology associated with the system. Therefore, commanders base their

command and control systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and processes. Trained

personnel are essential to an effective command and control system. Technology cannot support command

and control without them.

Processes

1-102. Commanders establish and use processes and procedures to organize activities within their
headquarters and throughout the force. A process is a series of actions or steps taken to achieve a specific

Introduction to Mission Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-21

end, such as

the military decision-making process. In addition to the major activities of the operations process,

commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the

operations process. The integrating processes are—

 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (described in ATP 2-01.3).

 Information collection (described in FM 3-55).

 Targeting (described in ATP 3-60).

 Risk management (described in ATP 5-19).

 Knowledge management (See ATP 6-01.1)

1-103. Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks
(CJCSM 5120.01). Procedures govern actions within the command and control system to make it more

effective and efficient. For example, standard operating procedures often provide detailed unit instructions

on how to configure common operational picture (COP) displays. Adhering to processes and

procedures

minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation as commanders frequently make rapid decisions to

meet operational requirements.

1-104. Processes and procedures can increase organizational competence, for example, by improving a
staff’s efficiency or by increasing the tempo. Processes and procedures can be especially useful in improving

the coordination of Soldiers who must cooperate to accomplish repetitive tasks, such as those needed for the

internal functioning of a command post. Units avoid applying procedures blindly to the wrong tasks or the

wrong situations, which can lead to ineffective, even counterproductive, performance.

Networks

1-105. Generally, a network is a grouping of things that are interconnected for a purpose. Networks enable
commanders to communicate information and control forces. Networks enable successful operations.

Commanders determine their information requirements and focus their staffs and organizations on using

networks to meet these requirements. These capabilities relieve staffs from handling routine data, and they

enable extensive information sharing, collaborative planning, execution, and assessment that promote shared

understanding. Each network consists of—

 End-user applications.

 Information services and data.

 Network transport and management.

Command Posts

1-106. Command posts provide a physical location for the other three components of a command and
control system (people, processes, and networks). Command posts vary in size, complexity and focus.

Command posts may be comprised of vehicles, containers, and tents, or located in buildings. Commanders

systematically arrange platforms, operation centers, signal nodes, and support equipment in ways best suited

for a particular operational environment. (See FM 6-0 and ATP 6-0.5 for more information on command

posts.)

CONCLUSION

1-107. Command and control is fundamental to all operations. Mission command—the Army’s approach
to command and control—underpins how the U.S. Army fights. Mission command concentrates on the

objective of an operation, not on every task necessary to achieve it. Mission command emphasizes timely

decision making, understanding of the higher commander’s intent, and the clear responsibility of

subordinates to exercise initiative within that intent to achieve the desired end state. Mission command relies

on decentralized execution and subordinate initiative within the commander’s intent to provide unity of effort.

1-108. The fundamental basis of mission command is tactically and technically competent commanders and
subordinates with a shared understanding of purpose who can be trusted to make ethical and effective

decisions in the absence of further guidance. This allows commanders to focus on their intent, and it allows

staffs to generate the mission orders essential to decentralized execution. Subordinates are empowered to

decide when to adapt their assigned tasks to achieve the overall purpose of an operation. This requires

Chapter 1

1-22 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

commanders to accept risk on their subordinates’ behalf and subordinates to assume responsibility for the

initiative necessary for success.

1-109. In practice, mission command tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Plans, orders, and
graphics should be as simple and concise as possible, designed for maximum flexibility during execution. By

decentralizing decision-making authority, mission command increases tempo and improves subordinates’

abilities to act quickly in fluid and chaotic situations.

1-110. Commanders cannot exercise command and control alone except in the simplest and smallest of
units. Even at the lowest level, commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At

every echelon of command, each commander has a command and control system. Commanders arrange

people, processes, and networks into command posts to best facilitate their exercise of authority and direction

to accomplish the mission.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-1

Chapter 2

Command

When you are commanding, leading [soldiers] under conditions where physical exhaustion and

privations must be ignored, where the lives of [soldiers] may be sacrificed, then, the efficiency of

your leadership will depend only to a minor degree on your tactical ability. It will primarily be

determined by your character, your reputation, not much for courage—which will be accepted as a

matter of course—but by the previous reputation you have established for fairness, for that high

minded patriotic purpose, that quality of unswerving determination to carry through any military

task assigned to you.

General of the Army George C. Marshall
Speaking to officer candidates in September 1941

This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature and elements of command. It then

describes the role of the commander in operations. The chapter concludes with a

discussion of guides to effective command.

NATURE OF COMMAND

Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates
by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using

available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling

military forces for the accomplishment of missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale,

and discipline of assigned personnel.

Command is personal. In Army regulations and doctrine, an individual is given the authority to
command, not an institution or group. The legal and ethical responsibilities of a commander exceed those of

any other leader of similar rank who is serving in a staff position. The commander alone is responsible for

what the command does or fails to do.

Command is more art than science because it requires judgment and depends on actions only human
beings can perform. The art of command comprises the creative and skillful exercise of authority through

timely decision making and leadership. Commanders constantly use judgment gained from experience and

training to delegate authority, make decisions, determine the appropriate degree of control, and allocate

resources. Proficiency in the art of command stems from years of schooling, self-development, introspection,

and operational and training experiences. It also requires a deep understanding of the science of war.

The basic techniques of command do not change between echelons. However, direct leadership within
a command decreases as the level of command increases, and applying organizational leadership as described

in ADP 6-22 becomes more relevant. Officers prepare for higher command by developing and exercising

their skills when commanding at lower levels.

ELEMENTS OF COMMAND

The elements of command are authority, responsibility, decision making, and leadership. The
definition of command refers explicitly to authority. With authority comes the responsibility to carry forward

an assigned task to a successful conclusion. Commanders exercise their authority by making decisions and

leading their command in implementation of those decisions. Successful commanders develop skill in each

element through maturity, experience, and education.

Chapter 2

2-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

AUTHORITY

Authority is the right and power to judge, act, or command. Legal authority to enforce orders under
the law is a key aspect of command and distinguishes military commanders from staff officers, and civilian

leaders. Commanders understand that operations affect and are affected by human interactions. As such, they

seek to establish personal authority. A commander’s personal authority reinforces that commander’s legal

authority. Personal authority ultimately arises from the actions of commanders and the resulting trust and

confidence generated by these actions. Commanders earn respect and trust by upholding laws, adhering to

the Army ethic, applying Army leadership principles, and demonstrating tactical and technical expertise.

Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army

After secretly crossing the Yalu River in mid-October 1950, the Chinese 13th Army
Group launched its first offensive against United Nations forces on 25 October. By the
end of November, the 13th Army Group had pushed most of the Eighth U.S. Army out
of northwest Korea. By mid-December, the Eighth Army had retreated south of the 38th
Parallel. To add to the United Nations forces’ troubles, the Eighth Army commander,
GEN Walton Walker, was killed in a jeep accident on 23 December.

Back in Virginia while visiting friends before Christmas, then Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, GEN Matthew Ridgway, recalls the phone call he received from the Army
Chief of Staff, GEN Joe Collins. “Matt, “he said, “I’m sorry to tell you that Johnny Walker
has been killed in a jeep accident in Korea. I want you to get your things together and
get out there just as soon as you can.”

In his book, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, GEN Ridgway describes
his initial thoughts on assuming command of the Eighth Army:

“Quickly I ran over in my mind all that I knew of the situation. As Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, the map of Korea had become as familiar to me as the lines in my hand.
I knew our strength, and our weakness. I knew personally all the top commanders in
Eighth Army, except General Oliver Smith of the 1st Marine Division, and from what I
knew of him, I knew I could depend on him implicitly.

Armed with this background knowledge, what should I do? Quickly, a pattern of action
took place in my mind. First, of course, I would report to General MacArthur, and
receive from him his estimate of the situation and broad general directives concerning
operations. Next, I would assume command—and this, I knew, must be done in one
simple, brief, sincere statement which would convey to Eighth Army my supreme
confidence that it could turn and face and fight and defeat the Chinese horde that had
sprung so suddenly from beyond the Yalu. Once this was done, I would meet with
Eighth Army staff and get from them their appraisal of the situation. After that, I would
call on every commander in his battle area, look into his face and the faces of his men,
and form my own opinion of his firmness and resolution—or the lack thereof. Once
these things were done, then I could begin to plan, could make the big decision whether
to stand and hold, or to attack.”

Under GEN Ridgway’s leadership, the Chinese offensive was slowed and finally
brought to a halt at the battles of Chipyong-ni and Wonju. He then led his troops in
Operation Thunderbolt, a counter-offensive in early 1951.

Commanders may delegate authority to subordinates to accomplish a mission or assist in fulfilling their
responsibilities. This includes delegating authority to members of their staffs. Delegation allows subordinates

to decide and act for their commander, or in their commander’s name, in specified areas. When delegating

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-3

authority, commanders still remain accountable to their superiors for mission accomplishment, for the lives

and care of their Soldiers, and for effectively using Army resources. Therefore, commanders use judgment

in determining how much authority to delegate.

RESPONSIBILITY

Commanders are legally and ethically accountable for the decisions they make or do not make, and for
the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates. Commanders may delegate authority, but

they still retain overall accountability for the actions of their commands.

Command responsibilities include mission accomplishment; the health, welfare, morale, and
discipline of Soldiers; and the use and maintenance of resources. In most cases, these responsibilities do not

conflict; however, the responsibility for mission accomplishment sometimes conflicts with the responsibility

for Soldiers or the stewardship of resources. The importance of the mission informs commanders how much

risk to Soldiers and equipment to accept. When there is conflict among the three, mission accomplishment

comes before Soldiers, and Soldiers come before concerns for resources. Commanders try to keep such

conflicts to an absolute minimum.

DECISION MAKING

The commander must permit freedom of action to his subordinates insofar that this does

not endanger the whole scheme. He must not surrender to them those decisions for which

he alone is responsible.

German Field Service Regulation, Truppen Fuhrung (1935)

Decision making involves applying both the art and science of war. Many aspects of military
operations—movement rates, fuels consumption, weapons effects—can be reduced to numbers, calculations,

and tables. They belong to the science of war and are important to understanding what is possible with the

resources available. Other aspects—the impact of leadership, complexity of operations, and uncertainty about

the enemy—belong to the art of war. Successful commanders focus the most attention on those aspects

belonging to the art of war.

For Army forces, decision making focuses on selecting a course of action that is most favorable to
accomplishing the mission. Decision making can be deliberate, using the military decision-making process

and a full staff, or decision making can be done very quickly by the commander alone. A commander’s

decisions ultimately guide the actions of the force.

Decision making requires knowing if, when, and what to decide as well as understanding the
consequences of that decision. Critical to decision making is the ability to make decisions without perfect

information, knowing when enough information allows acceptable decisions, and the willingness to act on

imperfect information. Striking the balance between acting now with imperfect information and acting later

with better information is essential to the art of command.

Understanding

Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available
information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational

understanding throughout an operation. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and

judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission

variables. Situational understanding allows commanders to make effective decisions and regulate the actions

of their force with plans appropriate for the situation. It enables commanders and staffs to assess operations

accurately. Commanders and staffs continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work

through periods of reduced understanding as a situation evolves. Effective commanders accept that

uncertainty can never be eliminated, and they train their staffs and subordinates to function in uncertain

environments.

Knowledge management and information management assist commanders with progressively adding
meaning at each level of processing and analyzing to help build and maintain their situational understanding.

Knowledge management and information management are interrelated activities that support commanders’

Chapter 2

2-4 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

decision making. There are four levels of meaning. From the lowest level to the highest level, they include

data, information, knowledge, and understanding. At the lowest level, processing transforms data into

information. Analysis then refines information into knowledge. Commanders and staffs then apply judgment

to transform knowledge into understanding. Commanders and staffs continue a progressive development of

learning, as organizations and individuals assign meaning and value at each level. (See figure 2-1.)

Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding

In the context of decision making, data consists of unprocessed observations detected by a
collector of any kind (human, mechanical, or electronic). In typical organizations, data often flows to

command posts from subordinate units. Subordinate units push data to inform higher headquarters of events

that facilitate situational understanding. Data can be quantified, stored, and organized in files and databases;

however, data only becomes useful when processed into information.

In the context of decision making, information is data that has been organized and processed in
order to provide context for further analysis. The amount of information that is available makes managing

information and using it to make effective decisions critical to success during operations. Commanders and

staffs apply experience and judgment to information to gain shared understanding of events and conditions

in which they make decisions during operations. Effective command and control requires further developing

information into knowledge so commanders can achieve understanding

In the context of decision making, knowledge is information that has been analyzed and evaluated
for operational implications. It is also comprehension gained through study, experience, practice, and

human interaction that provides the basis for expertise and skilled judgment. Staffs work to improve and

share tacit and explicit knowledge.

Tacit knowledge resides in an individual’s mind. It is the purview of individuals, not technology. All
individuals have a unique, personal store of knowledge gained from experience, training, and other people.

This knowledge includes an appreciation for nuances, subtleties, and work-arounds. Intuition, mental agility,

effective responses to crises, and the ability to adapt are forms of tacit knowledge. Leaders use tacit

knowledge, their own and that of their subordinates, to solve complex problems and make decisions.

Explicit knowledge consists of information that can be organized, applied, and transferred using digital
(such as computer files) or non-digital (such as paper) means. Explicit knowledge lends itself to rules, limits,

and precise meanings. Examples of explicit knowledge include doctrinal publications, orders, and databases.

Explicit knowledge is primarily used to support situational awareness and shared understanding as it applies

to decision making.

In the context of decision making, understanding is knowledge that has been synthesized and had
judgment applied to comprehend the situation’s inner relationships, enable decision making, and drive

action. Understanding is judgment applied to knowledge in the context of a particular situation.

Understanding is knowing enough about the situation to change it by applying action. Judgment is based on

experience, expertise, and intuition. Ideally, true understanding should be the basis for decisions. However,

uncertainty and time preclude achieving perfect understanding

before deciding and acting.

(See chapter 3 for

more information on knowledge management and information management.)

Critical and Creative Thinking

Commanders and staffs apply critical and creative thinking, including ethical reasoning, to decision
making. Critical thinking examines a problem in depth from multiple points of view. It determines whether

adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true based on a given inference or argument. Critical

thinkers apply judgment about what to believe or what to do in response to facts, experience, or arguments.

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-5

Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways using imagination, insight, and different
ideas. Leaders often face unfamiliar problems or old problems requiring new solutions. Even situations that

appear familiar require creative solutions, since an enemy force will adapt to past friendly approaches.

Leaders look at different options to solve problems using lessons from similar circumstances in the past, as

well as innovative approaches that come from new ideas. Creatively combining old and new ideas can create

difficult dilemmas for an enemy force.

Commanders choose a decision-making approach based on the situation. There are generally two
approaches to making decisions: analytic and intuitive. In certain situations, commanders may take a more

deliberate approach, using systematic analysis. In other situations, commanders may rely heavily on intuition.

Effective commanders consider their experience, their staff’s experience, and the time and information

available when considering their decision-making approach.

Analytic Decision Making

Analytic decision making generates several alternative solutions, compares those solutions to a set of
criteria, and selects the best course of action. It aims to produce the optimal solution by comparing options.

It emphasizes analytic reasoning guided by experience, and commanders use it when time is available. This

approach offers several advantages. Analytic decision making—

 Is methodical and allows the breakdown of tasks into recognizable elements.

 Ensures commanders consider, analyze, and evaluate relevant factors and employ techniques such

as war-gaming.

 Provides a systematic approach when a decision involves processing large amounts of information.

 Helps resolve conflicts among courses of action.

 Gives inexperienced personnel a logically structured approach.

Analytic decision making presents some disadvantages. It is often time-consuming, relies on large
amounts of information, and requires clearly established evaluation criteria. While it is methodical, changes

in conditions may require a complete reevaluation, which could delay decisions. When using this approach,

commanders weigh the need for analysis against time considerations. Analytic decision making is not

appropriate for all situations, especially during execution, when forces must adapt to rapidly changing

situations. (An example of analytic decision making is the military decision-making process found in

FM 6-0.)

Intuitive Decision Making

Intuition depends on the use of experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the

dynamics of the situation. Because patterns can be subtle, people often cannot describe

what they noticed, or how they judged a situation as typical or atypical.

Gary Klein, Sources of Power

Intuitive decision making is reaching a conclusion in a way that is not expressly known by the decision
maker. It normally involves pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education,

intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. Intuitive decision making—

 Focuses on assessment of the situation more than on comparing multiple options.

 Usually results in a decision for an acceptable course of action instead of the optimal course of

action derived from an analytical approach.

 May be more effective when time is short.

 Relies on a commander’s experience and ability to recognize the key elements and implications

of a particular problem or situation.

 Tends to focus on the larger picture more than on individual components.

Intuitive decision making is faster than analytic decision making, but it requires an adequate level of
experience to recognize an acceptable course of action. There is a difference between sound intuition and

uninformed assumptions. When using intuitive decision making, leaders should be aware of their own biases

and the differences between their current operational environment and those they experienced in the past.

Chapter 2

2-6 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

By emphasizing experienced judgment over deliberate analysis, commanders increase tempo and
retain flexibility to deal with uncertainty. The intuitive approach is consistent with the fact that there are no

perfect solutions to battlefield problems. Even when making intuitive decisions, commanders may have time

available to employ more analytic techniques. Time permitting, commanders use their staffs to validate

intuitive decisions to ensure they are feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

In practice, the two approaches are rarely mutually exclusive. When time is not critical, commanders
use an analytical approach or incorporate analysis into their intuitive decisions. Commanders blend intuitive

and analytic decision making to help them remain objective and make timely, effective decisions.

Commanders avoid making decisions purely by intuition and incorporate analysis into their intuitive

decisions. Commanders seek as much analysis as possible within the time available. In situations requiring

immediate decisions, this analysis may be no more than the commander’s own rapid mental development,

analysis, and selection of a course of action—which may appear completely intuitive. Combining both

approaches best accounts for the many factors that affect decisions. An example of an approach that combines

analytic and intuitive decision making is the rapid decision-making and synchronization process found in

FM 6-0.

Judgment

Despite the years of thought and oceans of ink which have been devoted to the elucidation

of war its secrets still remain shrouded in mystery….War is an art and as such is not

susceptible of explanation by fixed formulae. Yet from the earliest time there has been an

unending effort to subject its complex and emotional structure to dissection, to enunciate

rules for its waging, to make tangible its intangibility.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

Commanders make decisions using judgment acquired from experience, training, and study.
Experience contributes to judgment by providing a basis for rapidly identifying practical courses of actions

and dismissing impractical ones. Commanders use judgment to assess information, situations, or

circumstances shrewdly and draw feasible conclusions. Skilled judgment helps commanders form sound

opinions and make sensible decisions.

Judgment is required for selecting the critical time and place to act. Commanders act by assigning
missions, prioritizing, managing risk, allocating resources, and leading. Thorough knowledge of the science

of war, a strong ethical sense, and an understanding of enemy and friendly capabilities form the basis of the

judgment commanders require.

Judgment becomes more refined as commanders become more experienced. Increasing their
knowledge, developing their intellect, and gaining experience allow commanders to develop the greater

judgment required for increased responsibilities. In addition to decision-making, commanders apply their

judgment to—

 Identify, accept, and mitigate risk.

 Delegate authority.

 Prioritize resources.

 Direct the staff.

Identify, Mitigate, and Accept Risk

Commanders use judgment when identifying risk by deciding how much risk to accept, mitigating risk
where possible, and managing the risk they must accept. They accept risk when seizing opportunities. They

reduce risk with foresight and planning, while regularly examining any assumptions associated with previous

risk-related decisions.

Consideration of risk begins during planning as commanders and staffs assess risk, including ethical
risk, for each course of action and propose control measures. They collaborate and integrate input from

subordinates, staff, and unified action partners. They determine how to mitigate identified risks. This includes

delegating management of certain risks to subordinate commanders who in turn develop appropriate

mitigation measures. Commanders then allocate the resources they deem appropriate to mitigate risks.

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-7

Commanders must continuously assess how risk may be accumulating over time as operations
progress, both at their own echelon as well as for their subordinates. Changes in the nature of an operation,

the number and types of tasks assigned, available combat power, or changes in the threat may all change the

level of risk subordinates must mitigate and accept. A series of discrete decisions about seemingly unrelated

issues can, over time, potentially change the level of risk in ways that are not readily apparent to a

commander. However, this cumulative risk may be understood by one or more subordinates directly impacted

by changing conditions or new decisions. It is therefore critical that commanders clearly communicate risk

concerns to higher and lower echelons to ensure shared understanding and informed decision making.

Assumptions initially made during planning may change or compound over time, raising the level of
risk. Risks that were acceptable in one context and based on one set of assumptions may be untenable when

the context of the operation changes. In some instances, the situation may change to the point that a

commander needs to take action to adjust the level of risk subordinate commanders are required to take when

the perceived benefit no longer outweighs the likely cost. For example, a unit performing in an economy of

force role with a particular task organization may be directed to detach additional units to support other efforts

to the point where it can no longer effectively accomplish its mission. The higher level commander is unlikely

to have sufficient situational awareness to understand precisely when the threshold of acceptable risk for

mission accomplishment has been crossed without a continuous dialogue with that subordinate commander.

It is as much the responsibility of the subordinate to keep higher echelons informed as it is the responsibility

of the higher level commander to seek risk analysis from the subordinate.

Inculcating risk acceptance goes hand in hand with creating an environment where subordinates are
not only encouraged to take risks, but also one where mistakes are tolerated. Commanders realize that

subordinates may not accomplish all tasks initially and that errors may occur. Commanders train subordinates

to act within the commander’s intent in uncertain situations. Commanders give subordinates the latitude to

make mistakes and learn.

During training, commanders might allow subordinates to execute an excessively risky tactical
decision, keeping the safety of Soldiers in mind, as a teaching point. They then instruct subordinates afterward

on how to determine a more appropriate level of tactical risk. This sort of coaching helps commanders gain

trust in their subordinates’ judgment and initiative, and it builds subordinates’ trust in

their commander.

During operations, commanders may need to intervene when a subordinate accepts tactical risk that exceeds

the benefits expected.

Chapter 2

2-8 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam

At 0230, 7 June 1966, a battalion of the 24th NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Regiment
attacked an artillery firebase manned by elements of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne
Division, beginning the battle of Dak To. While the forces at the firebase defeated this
attack, two battalions of the 101st Airborne were lifted in by helicopters to envelop the
24th NVA Regiment in the Dak To area. One battalion, 1/327th, attacked north up Dak
Tan Kan valley, while the other, 2/502d, attacked toward the south. The 1/327th
encountered the NVA first and fixed them. The 2/502d established a blocking position
initially but then began a sweep south to link up with 1/327th.

The 2/502d used its famous “checkerboard” technique in its advance, breaking down
into small units, with squad-size patrols searching designated areas into which the
battalion had divided its area of operations. This technique covered ground, but the
squads were too weak to face stiff opposition. Company commanders had to assess
indicators, decide when they indicated the presence of heavy enemy forces, and
assemble their companies for action. As C Company advanced on 12 June, its
commander, CPT William Carpenter Jr., sensed those indicators and concentrated his
company, but it was surrounded and in danger of being overrun by an estimated NV

A

battalion. As he spoke to his battalion commander, LTC Hank Emerson (“the
Gunfighter”), the sounds of the screaming, charging enemy could be heard over the
radio. CPT Carpenter reportedly called for an air strike “right on top of us.” The only air
support available was armed with napalm; when it hit, it broke the enemy attack and
saved the company. A day later, another company linked up with C Company, and
they continued the mission. The battle of Dak To was a staggering defeat for the NVA.
CPT Carpenter’s action can be considered a necessary risk. The survival of his force
was at stake. The NVA would have destroyed C Company before another company
could relieve it.

CPT Carpenter later stated privately that he realized the survival of his company was
at stake, but that he did not actually call the air strike directly in on his position. Instead,
he told the forward air controller to use the smoke marking his company’s position as
the aiming point for the air strike. He knew that using conventional air strike techniques
and safe distances would not defeat the enemy. He also reasoned that the napalm
would “splash” forward of his position, causing more enemy than friendly casualties.
The air strike did just that. Thus, CPT Carpenter exercised judgment based on
experience. CPT Carpenter believed he was taking a high risk from the standpoint of
troop safety. But he accepted that risk, made a decision, and acted. His actions saved
his company and contributed to a major NVA defeat. CPT Carpenter and his first
sergeant, 1SG Walter Sabaulaski, received the Distinguished Service Cross for their
heroism.

Delegate Authority

If it is necessary for a commander to interfere constantly with a subordinate, one or the

other should be relieved.

Field Marshal Richard Michael Carver

Commanders use judgment to determine how much authority to delegate to subordinates and how
much they are able to decentralize execution. Commanders delegate authority and set the level of their

personal oversight of delegated tasks based on their assessment of the skill and experience of their

subordinates. When delegating authority to subordinates, commanders do everything in their power to set

conditions for their success. Commanders allocate sufficient resources to their subordinates so their

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-9

subordinates can accomplish their missions. Resources include people, units, services, supplies, equipment,

networks, information, and time. Commanders allocate resources through task organization and established

priorities of support.

Under the mission command approach, delegated authority is proportional to the extent of
commanders’ trust in the abilities of their subordinates. Commanders delegate authority and set the level of

their personal involvement in delegated tasks based on their assessment of the competence and experience of

their subordinates. Ideally, once commanders delegate authority, they supervise to the minimum level

required to ensure subordinates’ and mission success.

Commanders delegate authority verbally, in writing through plans, orders, or standard operating
procedures, or by both methods. Examples of delegated authority are authority over an area of expertise or

technical specialty, a geographic area, or specific kinds of actions. Commanders may limit delegated

authority in time, or they may use an enduring approach. Commanders should ensure members of the

command, especially the staff and subordinate commanders, understand to whom and what authorities have

been delegated. Delegation not only applies to subordinate commanders but also to members of the staff.

Prioritize Resources

Commanders allocate resources to accomplish the mission. Allocating resources requires judgment
because resources can be limited. Considerations for prioritizing resources include how to—

 Effectively accomplish the mission.

 Protect the lives of Soldiers.

 Apply the principles of mass and economy of force.

 Posture their force for subsequent operations.

The primary consideration for allocating resources is how their use contributes to effective mission
accomplishment. Commanders do not determine how to accomplish a mission based on conserving resources

or giving all subordinates an equal share; they allocate resources efficiently to ensure effectiveness. The

objective—to accomplish the mission—guides every element of operations. A plan that does not accomplish

the mission, regardless of how well it conserves resources, is not effective.

The next priority is to protect the lives of Soldiers. Commanders determine how to protect the lives of
Soldiers before considering how to conserve material resources. They use material resources generously to

save lives. If there are different but equally effective ways to accomplish the mission, a commander considers

ways which use fewer resources.

The third aspect of resource allocation is based on two of the principles of war—mass and economy
of force. The principle of mass means that commanders always weight the main effort with the greatest

possible combat power to overwhelm an enemy force and ensure mission accomplishment. Economy of force

refers to allocating the minimum essential combat power to all supporting efforts. Supporting efforts typically

receive fewer resources than the main effort. Commanders must accept risk in supporting efforts in order to

weight the main effort.

Commanders determine the amount of combat power essential to each task and allocate sufficient
resources to accomplish it. When allocating resources, commanders consider the cost to the force and the

effects of the current operation on the ability to execute follow-on operations. If subordinates believe they

have not received adequate resources, or believe accomplishing their mission would produce an unacceptable

cost to the force, they inform their commander. The commander then decides whether to accept risk, allocate

more resources, or change the plan.

The fourth aspect of applying judgment to resource allocation concerns posturing the force for
subsequent operations. Commanders balance immediate mission accomplishment with resource

requirements for subsequent operations. Commanders accomplish their missions at the least cost to the force,

so they do not impair its ability to conduct follow-on operations. They visualize short-term and long-term

effects of their resource use and determine priorities. At lower echelons, commanders focus more on the

immediate operation—the short term. At progressively higher echelons, commanders give more

consideration to long-term operations.

Chapter 2

2-10 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Direct the Staff

Commanders rely on and expect initiative from the staff as much as from subordinate commanders.
Delegating authority allows commanders to use their time for the more creative aspects of command (the

art). Commanders delegate authority and set the level of their personal involvement in staff activities based

on their assessment of the skill and experience of their subordinates. This assessment requires skilled

judgment.

Within their headquarters, commanders exercise their judgment to determine when to intervene and
participate personally in staff operations, as opposed to letting their staffs operate on their own based on

guidance. Commanders cannot do everything themselves or make every decision; such participation does not

give staffs the experience mission command requires. However, commanders cannot simply approve staff

products produced without their input. Commanders participate in staff work where it is necessary to guide

their staffs. They use their situational understanding and commander’s visualization to provide guidance from

which their staffs produce plans and orders. In deciding when and where to interact with subordinates, the

key is for commanders to determine where they can best use their limited time to greatest effect—where their

personal intervention will pay the greatest dividend.

LEADERSHI

P

As each man’s strengths gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the

whole gradually comes to rest on the commander’s will alone. The ardor of his spirit must

rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope.

Carl von Clausewitz

Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to
accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Leadership involves taking responsibility

for decisions, being loyal to subordinates, inspiring and directing assigned forces and resources toward a

purposeful end, establishing a team climate that engenders success, demonstrating moral and physical

courage in the face of adversity, and providing the vision that both focuses and anticipates the future course

of events. Leadership requires the attributes and competencies that describe what leaders are expected to be.

(See ADP 6-22 for more information on Army leadership.)

Professional competence, personality, and the will of strong commanders represent a significant part
of any unit’s combat power. While leadership requirements differ with unit size and type, all leaders must

demonstrate character and ethical standards. Leaders must know and understand their subordinates. They

must act with courage and conviction in battle. Leaders build trust and teamwork. During operations they

know where to be to make decisions or to influence the action by their personal presence.

Commanders recognize that military operations take a toll on the moral, physical, and mental stamina
of the people making up their formations. They understand that experience, interpersonal relationships, and

the environment influence the people conducting operations. Leaders account for these factors when

motivating people to accomplish tasks in the face of danger and hardship. Setting a good personal example

is critical to effective leadership.

Commanders are both leaders and followers. Being a responsible subordinate is part of being a good
leader. Responsible subordinates support the chain of command and ensure their command supports the larger

organization and its purpose. Successful commanders recognize the responsibilities they and their

subordinates have to the next higher echelon and the larger formation overall.

Commanders know the status of their forces. Command sergeants major, first sergeants, and platoon
sergeants play vital roles in providing commanders awareness about the morale and physical condition of

their Soldiers. Commanders need to know when circumstances may prevent friendly forces from performing

to their full potential. For example, a subordinate unit may have recently received inexperienced

replacements, may have lost cohesion due to leader casualties, or may be extremely fatigued due to an

extended period of operations.

Commanders press the fight tenaciously and aggressively. They accept risks and push Soldiers to the
limits of their endurance for as long as possible to retain the operational initiative. They act aggressively to

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-11

exploit fleeting opportunities. Effective commanders recognize when to push Soldiers to their limits and

when to let them rest to prevent individual and collective collapse. Even the most successful combat actions

can render units incapable of further operations.

Leadership is an important component of mitigating the effects of stress. Stress is an integral part of
military service in general and in combat operations in particular. Leaders must learn to mitigate stress for

their subordinates and cope with it themselves. (See ATP 6-22.5 for more information on combat and

operational stress control). Two aspects of leadership that are unique to command are command presence

and the location of the commander.

Command Presence

Command presence is the influence commanders have on those around them through their personal
demeanor, appearance, and conduct. It requires contact with others, both physically and through voice

command and control systems. Commanders use their presence to gather and share information and assess

operations through personal interaction with subordinates. Establishing command presence makes the

commander’s knowledge and experience available to subordinates and provides encouragement. It allows

commanders to assess intangibles like morale, and provide direct feedback on subordinate performance.

Commanders employing the mission command approach ask questions without second-guessing their

subordinate’s performance unless absolutely necessary. Skilled commanders communicate tactical and

technical knowledge that goes beyond plans and procedures. Command presence establishes a background

for all plans and procedures so that subordinates can understand how and when to adapt them to achieve the

commander’s intent. Commanders can establish command presence in a variety of ways, including—

 Being seen and heard.

 Sharing risk and hardship.

 Setting a good personal example.

 Ensuring their commander’s intent is widely understood.

 Providing clear face-to-face commander’s guidance.

 Backbriefs and rehearsals.

Directly engaging subordinates and staffs allows commanders to motivate, build trust and confidence,
exchange information, and assess the human aspects of operations. It allows commanders to assess the morale

and stamina of subordinate units. Commanders use their presence to overcome uncertainty and chaos and

maintain the focus of their forces. They communicate in a variety of ways, adjusting their communication

style to fit the situation and the audience. They communicate both formally and informally, through

questions, discussions, conversations, and other direct or indirect communication. Commanders position

themselves where they can best command without losing the ability to respond to changing situations.

Location of the Commander

One of the most valuable qualities of a commander is a flair for putting himself in the right

place at the vital time.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

Commanders command from their personal location. One of the fundamental dilemmas facing all
commanders is where to position themselves during operations. As far as conditions allow, commanders

should be forward where they can be seen and heard to best influence the decisive operation or main effort.

Commanding forward allows commanders to assess the state of operations face to face with their subordinates

and achieve shared understanding. It allows them to gather as much information as possible about actual

combat conditions when making decisions. However, commanding forward does not mean taking over a

subordinate’s responsibilities.

Commanders consider their position in relation to the forces they command and the mission. Their
location can have important consequences, not only for the command but also for executing operations. The

command and control system helps commanders position themselves forward without losing access to the

information and analysis available from their command posts.

Chapter 2

2-12 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

At the lowest levels, commanders lead by personal example, acquire much information themselves,
decide personally, and communicate face to face with those they direct. Typically, they position themselves

well forward to directly influence the decisive operation. However, even at these levels, commanders cannot

always command their whole unit directly.

In larger tactical- and operational-level commands, command posts are normally the focus of
information flow and planning. However, commanders cannot always visualize the battlefield to direct and

synchronize operations from command posts. Commanders often assess the situation up front, face to face

with subordinate commanders and their units. Commanders employ their command and control system so

they can position themselves wherever they can best command without losing the situational understanding

that enables them respond to opportunities and changing circumstances. The command and control system

allows commanders to obtain the information they need to assess operations and risks, and make necessary

adjustments, from anywhere in an area of operations.

Commanders realize that they might not always be where the critical action is occurring. This
probability reinforces the necessity of training subordinates to operate using the mission command approach.

Commanders can then rely on subordinates to restore or exploit the situation without their presence or

personal intervention.

Where a commander is located can bring the leadership element of combat power directly to an
operation, especially when that location allows for personal presence and the ability to directly observe events

and see things that might not be conveyed by the command and control system. Being physically present can

allow a commander to assess a much broader set of indicators of the unit’s condition. Commanders gain

firsthand appreciation for the human aspects of a situation that can rarely be gained any other way. Equally

important, commanders can actually see terrain and weather conditions which might not be clearly explained

by maps or whether reports. They can avoid the delays and distortions that occur as information travels down

and up the chain of command. Finally, by their presence, commanders direct emphasis to critical spots and

focus efforts on them. Some of the factors that influence a commander’s location include—

 The need to understand the situation.

 The need to make decisions.

 The need to communicate.

 The need to motivate subordinates.

The commander’s forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger and hardship. It also
allows commanders to appraise for themselves a subordinate unit’s condition, including its leaders’ and

Soldiers’ morale. Forward presence allows commanders to sense the human aspects of conflict, particularly

when fear and fatigue reduce effectiveness.

Commanders cannot let the perceived advantages of improved information technology compromise
their obligation to personally lead by example. Face-to-face discussions and forward presence allow

commanders to see things that may not be conveyed by the command and control system.

THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS IN OPERATIONS

Commanders must remember that the issuance of an order, or the devising of a plan, is

only about five per cent of the responsibility of command. The other ninety-five percent is

to insure, by personal observation, or through the interposing of staff officers, that the

order is carried out.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

Commanders are the central figures in command and control. Commanders, assisted by their staffs,
integrate numerous processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force as they exercise

command and control. Throughout operations, commanders balance their time between leading their staffs

through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders

and leaders.

The Army’s framework for exercising command and control is the operations process—the major
command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-13

continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). Commanders use the operations process to drive the

conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational

environment and the operation’s end state; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess

operations as shown in figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2. The

operations process

The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances
demand. Planning, preparing, and executing do not always have distinct start and end points. Planning is a

continuous activity within the process. While preparing for one operation, or during its execution, units are

refining the current plan or planning for future operations. Preparation always overlaps with planning, and it

continues throughout execution for some subordinate units. Assessing surrounds and permeates the other

three activities as commanders and staffs judge progress toward accomplishing tasks and achieving

objectives. Subordinate echelons or units within the same command may be in different stages of the

operations process at any given time. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the operations process and

the commander’s role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.)

Commanders, staffs, and subordinate units employ the operations process to integrate and synchronize
the warfighting functions across multiple domains and synchronize forces to accomplish missions. This

includes integrating numerous processes such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the military

decision-making process, and the targeting process within the headquarters and with higher echelon,

subordinate, supporting, and supported units. The unit’s battle rhythm integrates and synchronizes the various

processes and activities that occur within the operations process.

Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While staffs perform
essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process

through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations as shown in

figure 2-3 on page 2-14. Accurate and timely running estimates maintained by staffs assist commanders in

understanding the situation and making decisions throughout the operations process.

Chapter 2

2-14 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process

UNDERSTAND

An operational environment encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, space, and
cyberspace domains as well as the information environment, the electromagnetic spectrum, and other factors.

Understanding an operational environment and associated problems is fundamental to establishing a

situation’s context and visualizing operations. The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, and

cyberspace domains and the information environment requires a cross-domain understanding of an

operational environment. While understanding the land domain is essential, commanders consider the

influence of other domains and the information environment on land operations. They also consider how land

power can influence operations in the other domains. For example, commanders consider how friendly and

enemy air and missile defense capabilities influence operations in the air domain. Included within these areas

are the enemy, friendly, and neutral actors who are relevant to a specific operation.

Part of understanding an operational environment includes identifying and understanding problems. In
the context of operations, an operational problem is a discrepancy between the current state of an operational

environment and the desired end state. An operational problem includes those issues that impede commanders

from accomplishing missions, achieving objectives, and attaining the desired end state.

Commanders collaborate with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners to build a
shared understanding of their operational environment and associated problems. Planning, intelligence

preparation of the battlefield, and running estimates help commanders develop an initial understanding of

their operational environment. Commanders direct reconnaissance and develop the situation to improve their

understanding. Commanders circulate within the area of operations as often as possible, collaborating with

subordinate commanders and speaking with Soldiers. Using personal observations and inputs from others

(including running estimates from their staffs), commanders improve their understanding of their operational

environment throughout the operations process. Ideally, perfect understanding should be the basis for

decisions. However, commanders realize that uncertainty and time preclude achieving perfect understanding

before deciding and acting.

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-15

VISUALIZE

As commanders begin to understand their operational environment, they start visualizing a desired end
state and potential solutions to solve or manage identified problems. Collectively, this is known as

commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining

a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end

state. Figure 2-4 depicts activities associated with developing the commander’s visualization.

In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the
current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s

end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad

description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission

(JP 5-0).

Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization

DESCRIBE

Commanders describe their visualization to their staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate
shared understanding and purpose throughout the force. During planning, commanders ensure subordinate

commanders understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During

execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and

directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the original operation order. Commanders describe their

visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as circumstances require. Commanders describe

their visualization in terms of—

 Commander’s intent.

 Planning guidance, including an operational approach.

 Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

 Essential elements of friendly information.

DIRECT

Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Commanders
make decisions and direct action based on their situational understanding maintained by continuous

assessment. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

 Preparing and approving plans and orders.

 Establishing command and support relationships.

 Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task organization.

 Positioning units to maximize combat power.

 Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure supervision.

 Allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats.

 Committing the reserve as required.

Chapter 2

2-16 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

LEAD

Commanders lead by example and personal presence. Leadership inspires subordinates to accomplish
things that they otherwise might not. Where a commander locates within an area of operations is an important

consideration for effective mission command. Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction,

and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers. There is no standard pattern or simple

prescription; different commanders lead differently. Commanders balance their time among command posts

and staffs, subordinate commanders, forces, and other organizations to make the greatest contribution to

success. (See ADP 6-22 for a detailed discussion of leadership)

ASSESS

Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine
how an operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to

changing circumstances. Commanders incorporate the assessments of their staffs, subordinate commanders,

and unified action partners into their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment,

commanders adjust their visualization and modify plans to adapt the force to changing circumstances.

A commander’s focus on understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, or assessing
throughout operations varies during different operations process activities. For example, during planning

commanders focus more on understanding, visualizing, and describing. During execution, commanders often

focus more on directing, leading, and assessing—while improving their understanding and modifying their

visualization as needed. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion on assessing operations.)

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE COMMAND

There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of

the several subordinates…. [I]f they are reluctant (afraid) to act because they are

accustomed to detailed orders… if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and

to act for themselves … we shall be in sorry case when the time of “active operations”

arrives.

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King

The guides to effective command help commanders fulfill the fundamental responsibilities of
command. A commander’s use of these guides must fit the situation, the commander’s personality, and the

capability and understanding of subordinates. Command cannot be scripted. These guides apply at all levels

of command. Mission command provides a common baseline for command during operations and garrison

activities. These guides aid commanders in effectively exercising command and inculcating mission

command:

 Create a positive command climate.

 Ensure unity of effort.

 Train subordinates on command and control and the application of mission command.

 Make timely and effective decisions and act.

CREATE A POSITIVE COMMAND CLIMATE

Morale is a state of mind. It is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men

to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that

makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves.

Field Marshall Sir William Slim

Commanders create their organization’s tone—the characteristic atmosphere in which people work.
This is known as the command climate. It is directly attributable to the leader’s values, skills, and actions. A

positive climate facilitates team building, encourages initiative, and fosters collaboration, mutual trust, and

shared understanding. Commanders shape the climate of their organization, no matter what the size.

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-17

Successful commanders recognize that all subordinates contribute to mission accomplishment. They
establish clear and realistic goals and communicate their goals openly. Commanders establish and maintain

open, candid communication between subordinate leaders. They encourage subordinates to bring creative

and innovative ideas to the forefront. They also seek feedback from subordinates. The result is a command

climate that encourages initiative.

A positive command climate instills a sense of trust within units. It facilitates a strong sense of
discipline, comradeship, self-respect, and morale. It helps Soldiers develop a desire to do their fair share and

to help in the event of need. In turn, Soldiers know their leaders will guard them from unnecessary risk.

In a positive command climate, the expectation is that everyone lives by and upholds the moral
principles of the Army Ethic. The Army Ethic must be espoused, supported, practiced, and respected. Mission

command depends on a command climate that encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to take the

initiative. Commanders create a positive command climate by—

 Accepting subordinates’ risk taking and errors.

 Building mutual trust and shared understanding.

 Communicating with subordinates.

 Building teams.

(See AR 600-20, ADP 6-22, and FM 6-22 for more information on creating a positive command climate.)

Accept Subordinates’ Risk Taking and Errors

Judgment comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgment.

General Omar N. Bradley

Exercising initiative requires a command climate that promotes risk taking. Commanders inculcate the
willingness to accept risk into their commands through leading by example and accepting subordinates’ risk

taking. They accept risk during training and operations. They assess the judgment of their subordinates’ risk

taking, either at the time of decision, if time permits, or during after action reviews.

Commanders allow subordinates to accept risk. In training, commanders might allow subordinates to
execute an excessively risky decision, as long as it does not endanger lives, as a teaching point. This training

helps commanders gain trust in their subordinates’ judgment and initiative and builds subordinates’ trust in

their commander.

Inculcating risk acceptance among subordinates requires that commanders accept risk themselves.
Subordinates will not always succeed, particularly when inexperienced. However, with risk acceptance in the

command climate, subordinates learn, gaining the experience required to operate on their own. In addition,

subordinates learn to trust their commander to give them authority to act, knowing their commander will

back their decisions.

Commanders do not underwrite subordinate mistakes when a subordinate operates outside of the
commander’s intent or displays poor judgment that endangers life or mission accomplishment. Nor do

commanders tolerate a subordinate who repeatedly makes the same mistakes, does not learn, or violates the

Army Ethic. Discriminating between which mistakes to underwrite as teaching points and which mistakes

are unacceptable in a military leader is part of the art of command.

Build Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding

Mutual trust and shared understanding are critical to subordinates’ exercise of initiative. Mutual trust
and shared understanding of the commander’s intent frees commanders to move about the battlefield.

Commanders know their subordinates understand the desired end state, and subordinates know their

commander will support their decisions. Additionally, this command climate allows commanders to operate,

knowing subordinates will accurately and promptly report both positive and negative information. Mutual

trust and shared understanding are critical to the tempo of large-scale combat operations.

Chapter 2

2-18 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr
Encirclement

First Army’s VII Corps, under MG J. Lawton Collins, entered action in Europe on 6
June 1944. MG Collins’ staff served with him almost uninterruptedly before and through
the campaign. This familiarity helped ensure that MG Collins’ subordinates would
understand and carry through his intent in issuing and executing their own orders. MG
Collins’ command techniques supported subordinates’ exercise of initiative. He
discussed his principal decisions, important enemy dispositions, and principal terrain
features with major subordinate commanders. If he could not assemble these
commanders, he visited them individually as time permitted, with priority given to the
commander of the decisive operation. During operations, he visited major subordinate
units to obtain information on enemy reactions and major difficulties encountered,
again giving priority to units conducting the decisive operation. His general and special
staff officers visited other units to report critical matters to the corps chief of staff. Upon
returning to headquarters, MG Collins met with his staff to review the day’s events and
the changes he had directed. After that, his G-3 prepared and distributed a daily
operations memorandum confirming MG Collins’ oral instructions and adding any other
information or instructions developed during the staff meeting. During the European
campaign, VII Corps issued only 20 field orders, an average of two per month, to direct
operations.

For the Ruhr encirclement, First Army’s mission was to break out from its Rhine River
bridgehead at Remagen, link up with Third Army in the Hanau-Giessen area, and join
Ninth Army of 21st Army Group near Kassel-Paderborn. The attack began on 25 March
1945, with VII Corps attacking and passing through the enemy’s main defensive
positions. By this time, GA Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force, had decided to isolate the Ruhr from north and south by
encirclement, the junction point being the Kassel-Paderborn area. On 26 March, VII
Corps took Altenkirchen and, on 27 March, crossed the Dill River. First Army assigned
VII Corps as the decisive operation for the linkup with Ninth Army at Paderborn. MG
Collins had only 3d Armored Division and 104th Infantry Division available, and the
objective was more than 100 kilometers away. Nevertheless, 3d Armored Division,
commanded by MG Maurice Rose, was directed to reach Paderborn in one day, and
MG Rose, in turn, assigned his subordinates decisive and shaping operations to
accomplish that mission. The decisive operation halted 25 kilometers short of
Paderborn at 2200 on 29 March. The next day MG Rose was killed in action. As the
Germans strongly defended Paderborn, 3d Armored Division’s lead elements were
held 10 kilometers from the town. The corps received intelligence of German
counterattack forces building around Winterberg, southwest of Paderborn. To counter
this, 104th Infantry Division took the road junctions of Hallenberg, Medebach, and
Brilon. First Army ordered III and V Corps to shield VII Corps from any attacks from
outside the ring.

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-19

As the situation developed, MG Collins adapted the corps plan to his situational
understanding, while remaining within the framework of the higher echelon
commander’s intent. By 31 March, German attacks against 104th Infantry Division,
increasing German resistance around Paderborn, 3d Armored Division’s
reorganization necessitated by MG Rose’s death, and preparation of a coordinated
attack against Paderborn required MG Collins to contact the Ninth Army commander
and suggest a change in the linkup point. They agreed on the village of Lippstadt,
halfway between Paderborn and the lead elements of 2d Armored Division (the
right-flank division of Ninth Army). The linkup was effected on 1 April, closing the Ruhr
pocket. MG Collins personally led a task force from 3d Armored Division, overcoming
weak resistance in its push west, linking up with elements of 2d Armored Division at
1530 at Lippstadt. Later that day, VII Corps successfully overcame the German
defenses at Paderborn. The encirclement trapped Army Group B, including Field
Marshal Model, 5th Panzer and 15th Armies, and parts of 1st Parachute Army, along
with seven corps, 19 divisions, and antiaircraft and local defense troops—a total of
nearly 350,000 soldiers. The reduction of the Ruhr pocket would take another two
weeks. (See figure 2-5.)

Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement

Chapter 2

2-20 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

The Ruhr had been selected as an objective even before the Allies landed in Europe.
All major commanders appear to have understood this. However, 12th Army Group
only gave the actual orders for the encirclement in late March 1945, when the success
of First Army’s breakout had become clear. The actual linkup was eventually effected
between VII Corps and Ninth Army, principally on MG Collins’ understanding of the
higher echelon commander’s intent and initiative by his subordinates. He practiced a
technique similar to mission orders, giving only one or two immediate objectives to
each major subordinate command and a distant objective toward which to proceed,
without specific instructions. This gave his subordinates freedom to act and exercise
initiative, while still providing essential elements needed for coordination among the
subunits. Knowing the overall commander’s intent enabled commanders on both sides
of the encirclement to direct efforts toward its fulfillment. When lack of lateral
communications hindered coordination, subordinates took the initiative to accomplish
the mission and fulfill the commander’s intent as they understood it. At 3d Armored
Division, subordinates’ understanding of the corps’ commander’s intent allowed
operations to resume the day after Rose was killed. When the original objective,
achieving a linkup at Paderborn, could no longer be accomplished, MG Collins
proposed an alternative linkup point. Finally, with elements of his corps defending at
Winterberg, attacking at Paderborn, and moving to Lippstadt, MG Collins positioned
himself with the task force from 3d Armored Division to make the decisive operation
that day for his corps, First Army, and 12th Army Group.

Communicate with Subordinates

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were

beyond his control…. [He] made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around

him to approach him even with information.

General Ulysses S. Grant

Communicating with subordinates contributes to the shared understanding fundamental to mission
command. Effective commanders take positive steps to encourage, rather than impede, communications

among and with their subordinates and staff. Candor and the free exchange of ideas contribute to trust.

Commanders make themselves available and accessible for communications and open to new information.

They create a climate where collaboration routinely occurs throughout their organization through personal

example, coaching, and mentorship.

Successful commanders invest the time and effort to visit and engage with Soldiers, subordinate
leaders, and unified action partners to understand their issues and concerns. Through these interactions,

subordinates and partners gain insight into the commander’s leadership style and concerns.

Build Teams

Army organizations rely on effective teams to complete tasks, achieve objectives, and accomplish
missions. The ability to build and maintain effective teams throughout military operations is an essential skill

for all Army commanders, staffs, and leaders.

Army team building is a continuous process of enabling a group of people to reach their goals and
improve effectiveness through leadership and various exercises, activities and techniques (FM 6-22). The

goal of Army team building is to improve the quality of the team and how it works together to accomplish

the mission. Using doctrinal terms and symbols is one method of fostering teamwork. Often, the only basis

for trust and teamwork in situations that require rapid task organization is a common language and approach

to operations. Training and rehearsals also provide opportunities to foster teamwork. Teambuilding is

essential to achieving the effective teams required of mission command. (See ATP 6-22.6 for more

information on teams and teamwork.)

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-21

Building an effective team is challenging, but the positive benefits of teamwork in an effective team
are well worth the effort and time it takes. These benefits enhance the performance of the team, improve the

skills of the individual team members, and build important relationships with unified action partners.

Commanders must foster teamwork among task-organized units. Commanders initiate team building,
both inside and outside their organizations, as early as possible, and they maintain it throughout operations.

Commanders must trust and earn the trust of their unified action partners and key leaders within the

operational area. Overcoming differences in cultures, mandates, and organizational capabilities is key to

building mutual trust with unified action partners and key leaders.

Commanders use interpersonal relationships to build teams within their own organizations and with
unified action partners. Uniting all the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in operations requires

collaborative and cooperative efforts that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military

forces typically demand unity of command, a challenge for building teams with unified action partners is to

forge unity of effort—coordination and cooperation toward common objectives. (See JP 3-08 for more

information on teambuilding with unified action partners.)

ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants
are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified

action (JP 1). Establishing a culture of collaboration provides and enhances unity of effort. The commander’s

intent provides the unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an overarching framework.

Unity of command is one of the principles of war and the preferred method for achieving unity of
effort. Commanders always adhere to unity of command when task-organizing Army forces. Under unity of

command, every mission falls within the authority and responsibility of a single, responsible commander.

Unity of command requires that two commanders may not exercise the same command relationship over the

same force at any one time.

Unity of command may not be possible in some operations that include unified action partners. When
unity of command is not possible, commanders must achieve unity of effort through cooperation and

coordination to build trust among all elements of the force—even if they are not part of the same command

structure.

The commander’s intent provides guidance within which subordinates are expected to exercise
initiative to accomplish overall goals. Understanding the commander’s intent two echelons up further

enhances unity of effort while providing the basis for decentralized decision making and execution.

Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are more likely to exercise disciplined initiative in

unexpected situations. Under mission command, subordinates have an absolute responsibility to fulfill the

commander’s intent.

TRAIN SUBORDINATES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE APPLICATION OF MISSION

COMMAND

Commanders develop a basic level of control within their organizations when they create a culture
that embraces mission command at every level. The time spent inculcating mission command into training,

education, and problem solving prior to operations saves time and simplifies command and control during

operations. Commanders cannot expect subordinates to respond effectively to a mission command approach

once operations commence if they have not developed subordinates comfortable in its use beforehand.

Leaders have an obligation to ensure that their subordinates are capable of performing their assigned
tasks to Army standards under a variety of circumstances. Leaders generally provide more direction or

guidance and control until they are satisfied that subordinates understand tasks, conditions, and standards and

can operate within the commander’s intent. Increased confidence in the ability of subordinates generally

leads to more latitude in the way that subordinates are given to complete their assigned missions, since

commanders can trust that the subordinates understand the purpose of what they are being told to do.

Chapter 2

2-22 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

The ability to provide general guidance oriented on the purpose of a mission saves time during
execution for both commanders and subordinates and maximizes flexibility should conditions change or

communication become intermittent. It also minimizes the chances that subordinates will waste resources on

tasks no longer relevant to the purpose of a particular operation. The effort put into developing subordinate

leaders and their teams saves critical time in combat and allows commanders to assume more tactical risk

when the situation is unclear and communication is intermittent.

Effective mission command requires well-developed subordinates capable of decentralized
execution of missions and tasks. Training must create common, repetitive, shared experiences that build trust

and allow commands to acquire competence in shared understanding. Trained teams are able to communicate

explicitly and implicitly, conduct decentralized operations, and achieve unity of effort in uncertain situations.

Noncommissioned officers are key enablers of mission command, and they must be trained in the
mission command principles to effectively support their commander and lead their Soldiers.

Noncommissioned officers are required to exercise disciplined initiative to make decisions and take actions

to further their commander’s intent. They must actively work to understand the commander’s intent two

levels up and relay that intent to their Soldiers. They train to develop mutual trust and shared understanding

with their commanders and their Soldiers.

Noncommissioned officers enforce standards and discipline and develop their subordinates as they
build teams. They are trained to operate under mission orders and decide for themselves how best to achieve

their commander’s intent. With information available to all levels of command and increasing dispersion on

the battlefield, noncommissioned officers must be comfortable in exercising initiative to make decisions and

act.

As part of training subordinates in command and control and mission command, commanders must
prepare their subordinates for positions of increased responsibility. To this end, they promote leader qualities

and assess subordinates’ potential for future appointments to command and staff positions.

Promote Leader Qualities

Commanders promote leader qualities by developing them in themselves and in their subordinates
at least two echelons down. These qualities are described in the Army leadership requirements model. This

model describes the attributes and competencies required of Army leaders. But qualities alone do not make

successful commanders. Successful commanders develop a balance among those qualities. The fact that an

officer has been appointed a commander does not automatically endow that commander with these qualities.

Rather, all officers develop them to prepare for command. In general, the higher the echelon of command,

the wider the scope of qualities required. In addition, the emphasis on and among the qualities changes with

the echelon of command. (See ADP 6-22 for more information on the Army leadership requirements model.)

All commanders emphasize the Warrior Ethos. The Warrior Ethos is a set of principles by which
every Soldier lives, and it states—

 I will always place the mission first.

 I will never accept defeat.

 I will never quit.

 I will never leave a fallen comrade behind.

The Warrior Ethos is perishable, so commanders continually affirm, develop, and sustain it.

Developing it demands inculcating self-discipline in the commander, subordinates, and the command. It

requires tough, realistic training that develops the resiliency needed to endure extremes of weather, physical

exertion, and lack of sleep and food. Commanders develop the will, determination, and the confidence that

they, their subordinates, and their formations will accomplish all missions regardless of conditions.

Training and education can develop much of the knowledge and many of the skills commanders
require. In particular, training devices, simulations, and exercises can enhance clarity of thought and

judgment, including decision making. Developing leader qualities and practicing leadership skills is

necessary for subordinates to decide and act effectively during operations.

Command

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-23

Assess Subordinates

No man is more valiant than Yessoutai; no one has rarer gifts. But, as the longest marches

do not tire him, as he feels neither hunger nor thirst, he believes that his officers and

soldiers do not suffer from such things. That is why he is not fitted for high command.

Genghis Khan

Once appointed, commanders assume the role of coach and mentor to their subordinates. They study
the personalities and characteristics of their subordinate commanders. Some need significant direction; others

work best with little or no guidance. Some tire easily and require encouragement and moral support. Others,

perhaps uninspired in peace, excel in conflict and war. Matching talent to tasks is an important function of

command. Commanders judge Soldiers so they can appoint the right subordinates to the right positions at the

right times. Assessing individuals and handling them to the best effect applies to staffs as well as subordinate

commanders. Commanders also assess subordinates by giving them experiences and opportunities to grow

through assignments that challenge their abilities. Recognizing subordinates’ strengths and limits is vital to

effectively exercising command.

One of a commander’s most important duties is evaluating subordinates to identify talent—potential
future candidates for senior appointments to command and staff positions. To assess the command qualities

of subordinates objectively, commanders place individuals in circumstances where they must make decisions

and live with the consequences. In these situations, subordinates must know their commander has enough

confidence in them to permit honest mistakes. Training gives commanders opportunities to assess

subordinates on the qualities commanders should possess. In particular, assessing subordinates should

confirm whether they exhibit the necessary balance of intelligence, professionalism, and common sense

required to carry the added responsibilities that go with promotion.

An important aspect of assessing subordinates is determining the extent to which they are both
willing and able to apply the mission command approach to the command and control of their units. Since

commanders evaluate two echelons down during training and leader development, and observe subordinate

leader behavior one and two echelons down during training and operations, under both garrison and field

conditions, they have multiple opportunities for assessing internalization of the mission command approach.

(See FM 6-22 for further discussion on assessing subordinates.)

MAKE TIMELY DECISIONS AND ACT

I have found again and again that in encounter actions, the day goes to the side that is the

first to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits developments

usually comes off second best.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Timely decisions and actions are essential for effective command and control. Commanders who
demonstrate the agility to consistently make appropriate decisions faster than their opponents have a

significant advantage. By the time the slower commander decides and acts, the faster one has already changed

the situation, rendering the slower commander’s actions irrelevant. With such an advantage, the faster

commander can dictate the tempo and maintain the operational initiative.

A mission command approach makes it easier for commanders to make timely decisions that exploit
opportunities because they spend less time focused on subordinates’ tasks. Effective commanders—

 Take the enemy situation, capabilities, and reaction times into account when making decisions.

 Consider the impact of their decisions—the cause and effect.

 Make decisions quickly—even with incomplete information.

 Adopt a satisfactory course of action with acceptable risk as quickly as possible.

 Delegate decision making authority to the lowest echelon possible to obtain faster decisions during

operations.

 Support decentralized execution by maintaining shared understanding with subordinates and

frequently with adjacent commanders.

Chapter 2

2-24 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Commanders change and combine intuitive and analytical decision making techniques as the
situation requires. Because uncertainty and the tempo of large-scale combat operations drive most decisions,

commanders emphasize intuitive decision making and develop their subordinates accordingly. However,

when time is available and depending on the operational context of a situation, commanders and staffs use

the military decision-making process or Army design methodology during planning.

Commanders can alter planning to fit time-constrained circumstances. In time-constrained
conditions, commanders assess the situation, update their commander’s visualization, and direct their staffs

to perform those activities needed to support the required decisions. Streamlined processes permit

commanders and staffs to shorten the time needed to issue orders when the situation changes. To an outsider,

it may appear that experienced commanders and staffs omit key steps. In reality, they use existing products

or perform steps mentally. Commanders ensure their staffs are trained on all Army decision-making

methodologies. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on the Army decision-making process.)

Commanders and staffs constantly assess where an operation is in relation to the end state and make
adjustments to accomplish the mission and posture the force for future operations. The commander’s

visualization and the staffs’ running estimates are the primary assessment tools. Keeping running estimates

current is essential to ensuring commanders are aware of feasible options. Staffs continuously replace

outdated facts and assumptions in their running estimate with new information. They perform analysis and

form new, or revise existing, conclusions and recommendations. The commander’s visualization identifies

decisions commanders expect to make and focuses their staffs’ running estimates. Up-to-date running

estimates provide the recommendations commanders need to make timely decisions during execution. (See

FM 6-0 for more information on running estimates.)

CONCLUSION

Good morale and a sense of unity in a command cannot be improvised; they must be

thoroughly planned and systematically promoted. They are born of just and fair treatment,

a constant concern for the soldier’s welfare, thorough training in basic duties,

comradeship among men and pride in self, organization, and country. The establishment

and maintenance of good morale are incumbent upon every command and are marks of

good leadership.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

The role of commanders is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout execution,
and continually assess and adjust operations to achieve their intent. Commanders drive the operations

process. They understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations in complex, dynamic

environments. Throughout operations, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action

partners collaborate actively, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand

situations and make decisions. Commanders encourage disciplined initiative through mission orders and a

climate of mutual trust and shared understanding. Guided by their experience, knowledge, education,

intelligence, and intuition, commanders apply leadership to translate decisions into action. Commanders

synchronize forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions.

Ultimately, command reflects everything a commander understands about the nature of war,
warfighting doctrine, training, leadership, organizations, materiel, and soldiers. It is how commanders

organize their forces, structure operations, and direct the synchronized effects of organic and allocated assets

toward their visualized end state. Command is built on training and shared understanding by all Soldiers

within a command about how it operates. It is the expression of the commander’s professional competence

and leadership style, and the translation of the commander’s vision to the command. However, command

alone is not sufficient to translate that vision and to assure mission accomplishment; control, the subject of

chapter 3, is also necessary.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-1

Chapter 3

Control

The test of control is the ability of a leader to obtain the desired result from his command.

Infantry in Battle, 1939

This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of control and its elements. It next

addresses the various types of control measures. The chapter concludes with a

discussion of guides for effective control.

NATURE OF CONTROL

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties

accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has

experienced war.…Friction…makes the apparently easy so difficult.

Carl von Clausewitz

3-1. Within command and control, control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to
accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders exercise control to direct

and adjust operations as conditions dictate. Unlike aspects of command, which remain relatively similar

among echelons, control functions increase in complexity at each higher echelon. Control extends over the

entire force and may include control of the airspace over an area of operations below the coordinating altitude.

(See FM 3-52 for more discussion of airspace control).

3-2. Control allows commanders to monitor and receive feedback regarding the situation during operations.
Based on this information, commanders can modify their visualization and direct changes to an operation as

necessary. In the broadest terms, control helps commanders answer two questions:

 What is the actual situation compared with the desired end state?

 Are adjustments to the plan necessary to reconcile the situation with the desired end state?

3-3. Control, as contrasted with command, is more science than art. As such, it relies on objectivity, facts,
empirical methods, and analysis. The science of control supports the art of command. Commanders and staffs

use the science of control to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate.

Units are bound by such factors as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, rules of engagement,

and other legal considerations. Commanders and staffs strive to understand aspects of operations they can

analyze and measure, such as the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations.

3-4. Control requires a realistic appreciation of time and distance factors, including the time required to
initiate, complete and assess directed actions. There is art in anticipating likely points of friction and factors

beyond subordinate control that invariably lead to delays during execution. The higher the echelon and the

larger a formation, the longer it takes to complete assigned tasks, which in turn requires an earlier decision

to achieve a desired effect or end state. The planning necessary to facilitate adequate control should always

incorporate time tolerances that account for the friction inherent in operations.

3-5. Commanders, aided by staffs, use control to regulate forces and the functions of subordinate and
supporting units. Staffs give commanders their greatest support in providing control. However, for control to

be effective, commanders must actively participate in exercising it.

3-6. One of mission command’s strengths is that it provides a measure of self-regulation during the conduct
of operations. Under mission command, control tends to be decentralized and flexible whenever possible in

the context of operations. Orders and plans rely on subordinates’ abilities to coordinate among themselves to

create shared understanding and synchronize operations. By delegating decision-making authority to

Chapter 3

3-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

facilitate decentralized execution, mission command increases tempo by improving a subordinate’s ability to

act in rapidly changing situations. As a result, the mission command approach to command and control is

inherently less vulnerable to disrupted communications.

Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik

German tactical successes throughout the early years of WWII are often touted as a
prime example of an unfettered mission command style with few considerations of
control. In practice this was not actually true. The German emphasis on
decentralization and initiative came from their tradition of Auftragstaktik, or
mission-oriented tactics. It was a military culture that relied on subordinate
commanders and junior leaders to recognize the overall intent of a mission, and take
necessary actions to ensure the mission intent was met even if actions appeared to
countermand prior guidance and orders. The German campaign against France in May
of 1940 is a case study of positive and negative applications of the German army’s
approach to command and control. In 46 days, the German army routed Allied forces
and established control of the whole of Western Europe. This happened in part
because of the weaknesses of their adversaries, particularly the French.

French doctrine emphasized control by senior level commanders to enable “methodical
battle.” It required carefully planned and synchronized employment of fires and
maneuver forces, and essentially relied upon a centralized, deliberate approach at
every echelon. Such an approach assumed excellent communications, good
situational awareness, and a similarly deliberate approach by the enemy. Methodical
battle was ill-suited for situations requiring rapid decision making and initiative at all
echelons, situations that occurred repeatedly between 10 and 20 May 1940.

While Auftragstaktik ensured tactical commanders had the flexibility to adjust their
plans as necessary, there were negative repercussions associated with the
undisciplined use of initiative beyond the constraints of the commander’s intent.
Because some subordinate German commanders felt unduly restricted by their
assigned routes, they failed to direct the proper march discipline for their difficult
movement through the Ardennes. This disregard for movement plans threatened to
disrupt complex march tables essential to moving large forces through the restrictive
terrain of the Ardennes Forest. There was little room for initiative under such
conditions, unless it was exercised in support of the plan as devised. Any deviation
from the plan would have second and third order effects throughout the column. On
the morning of the second day of the campaign, von Kleist sent out a message to his
subordinate commanders that said the problems encountered during the move through
Luxembourg were caused primarily by independent decisions being made by lower
level leaders, and if conditions worsened offenders would be punished with the death
penalty.

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-3

The German XIX Corps commander, GEN Heinz Guderian, repeatedly clashed with
his superior, GEN Von Kleist, commander of the Panzer Gruppe, with regard to the
movements and orientation of his corps. He achieved significant positive results during
the first week of the operations, even as he argued with his commander and disobeyed
or ignored multiple directives intended to reduce risk to the overall operation. At the
end of the first week of fighting, GEN Guderian offered his resignation during a
disagreement about the necessity for a short tactical pause after crossing the Meuse.
To his surprise, GEN von Kleist accepted it, an indicator that even in the German Army
challenging the constraints of a higher commander’s intent had consequences. If GEN
Guderian had not been so difficult during the initial phases of the operation where
control was critical to its overall success, he may have enjoyed greater support at the
critical point where initiative and risk taking would contribute more to achieve
operational and strategic level success.
Effective application of the mission command approach requires judgment in
establishing the degree of control required in a particular situation. Once German
forces were engaged in close combat with French forces along the Meuse River, the
focus was to cross as rapidly as possible, which meant that subordinate commanders
were expected to demonstrate initiative continuously and lead from the front.
Circumstances were much different than they were on the approach march. Balance
between obedience and initiative must be struck in every unique context, and
effectively achieving that balance is central to mission command.

ELEMENTS OF CONTROL

3-7. Commanders use control to direct and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces to meet their intent.
They communicate information and receive feedback from subordinates to achieve greater shared

understanding of the situation. This allows commanders to update their visualization with respect to the

current situation, the end state or their operational approach, and adjust operations to reflect those

changes.

The elements of control are—

 Direction.

 Feedback.

 Information.

 Communication.

3-8. Command and control, specifically control, is not a one-way activity in which commanders direct while
subordinates comply with orders. In application, command and control is multidirectional, with feedback and

influence from sources below, above, laterally, as well as outside the chain of command, as shown in figure

3-1 on page 3-4. It includes the reciprocal flow of information between commanders, staffs, subordinate

forces and other external organizations as they seek shared understanding, adjust operations as necessary,

and achieve objectives. This occurs in an environment where an enemy force is seeking to disrupt the friendly

force’s ability to effectively command and control its forces.

Chapter 3

3-4 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control

DIRECTION

3-9. A key element of control is direction. To direct means to communicate information related to a decision
that initiates and governs actions of subordinate and supporting units. Commanders, through their command

and control system, direct subordinates by establishing objectives, assigning tasks, and providing instruction

on how forces will cooperate to accomplish the mission.

3-10. The primary means for communicating direction include plans and orders. Mission orders (a technique
for developing plans and orders) focus subordinates on what to do and why to do it without prescribing

exactly how to do it. (See chapter 1 for more information on mission orders.) Other key tools for providing

direction include execution matrices, the decision support template, and control measures. Control measures

are directives to subordinate units that assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and control

operations. Commanders establish control measures to aid cooperation among forces while minimizing

restrictions on freedom of action as much as possible. (See paragraphs 3-40 to 3-45 for a detailed discussion

of control measures.)

FEEDBAC

K

3-11. Feedback is information commanders receive during operations. Commanders use feedback to
compare the actual situation with the plan and then decide if the plan requires any changes or adjustments.

Feedback takes many forms, including information, knowledge, experience, and wisdom. Feedback comes

from many sources: subordinates, higher headquarters, or adjacent, supporting, and supported forces. It

arrives continuously: before, during, or after operations. Feedback helps commanders and subordinates gain

shared understanding. For feedback to be effective, it should identify any differences between the desired

end state and the current situation. New information that conflicts with the expectations established during

planning requires commanders and staffs to validate those expectations or revise them to reflect reality. This

contributes to an accurate understanding that allows commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond

to developing situations, modify plans, or reallocate resources.

3-12. Feedback should not flow only from lower to higher headquarters; it should also flow from higher to
lower headquarters. Normally information from higher echelons to lower echelon headquarters consists of

information to adjust the subordinates’ resources, plans, or missions. Multidirectional information flow

produces shared understanding between higher commanders and subordinate forces that supports exercise of

mission command.

3-13. Effective commanders seek feedback from subordinates who are comfortable providing both positive
and negative reports. Commanders whose command climates make subordinates reluctant to share bad news

are likely to be poorly informed and operate from faulty assumptions that put operations at risk.

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-5

INFORMATION

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false; and most are

uncertain.…reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on.

Carl von Clausewitz

3-14. Operations produce large amounts of information. While much of this information may be important
to the staff or the conduct of operations, it may not be relevant information for the commander. Relevant

information is all information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command

and control. Relevant information provides the basis for creating and maintaining the COP, and it is the

basis for achieving situational understanding. Relevant information also facilitates a commander’s decision

making and the ability to provide timely orders and guidance.

3-15. Commanders assess information in the context of a particular situation. For example, in some
situations, information that is somewhat incomplete or imprecise may be better than no information at all,

especially when time for execution is limited. However, effective commanders take action with their staffs

and subordinates to reduce the likelihood of receiving inaccurate, late, or unreliable information, which is of

no value when making decisions. They do this by setting expectations, conducting training, and providing

education.

3-16. Staffs provide commanders and subordinates information relevant to their

operational environment

and the progress of operations. They use operational variables (political, military, economic, social,

information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—known as PMESII-PT) and mission variables

(mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations—

known as METT-TC) as major subject categories to group relevant information. (See FM 6-0 for discussion

of the operational and mission variables.)

Operational Variables

3-17. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated
operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment,

and time (known as PMESII-PT). The operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive

understanding of an operational environment. Table 3-1 provides a brief description of each variable.

Table 3-1. Operational variables

Variable Description

Political Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—
formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers

Military Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly,
and neutral) in a given operational environment

Economic Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and
consuming resources

Social Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment
and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members

Information Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations,
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information

Infrastructure Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning
of a community or society

Physical
environment

Includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate and weather in
the area of operations

Time Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an
operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by
various actors in the operational environment

Chapter 3

3-6 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Mission Variables

3-18. Mission variables describe characteristics of the area of operations, focusing on how they might affect
a mission. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables into the mission variables ensures Army

leaders consider the best available relevant information about conditions that pertain to the mission. Using

the operational variables as a source of relevant information for the mission variables allows commanders to

refine their situational understanding of their operational environment and to visualize, describe, direct, lead

and assess operations. Table 3-2 provides a brief description of each of the mission variables. (See FM 6-0

for detailed discussion of the operational and mission variables.)

Table 3-2. Mission variables

Variable Description

Mission Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their impact on
mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that
clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It is always the first
variable commanders consider during decision making. A mission statement
contains the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the operation.

Enemy The second variable to consider is the enemy’s dispositions (including organization,
strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

Terrain and
weather

Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each other’s
impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and
mountains) and manmade features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges).
Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain expressed in
the memory aid OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key
and decisive terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment. The military aspects of
weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity.

Troops and
support available

This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available
friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and support available
from joint, host nation, and unified action partners. They also include support from
civilians and contractors employed by military organizations, such as the Defense
Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.

Time available Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks
and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and maneuver
units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.

Civil
considerations

Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian
institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations,
and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military
operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the

memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and
events.

3-19. Commanders determine information requirements and set information priorities. They avoid
requesting excessive amounts of information, which may reduce the staffs’ chances of finding what is

actually important in a particular situation. The quest for information is time consuming; commanders who

demand complete information place unreasonable burdens upon subordinates. Subordinates pressured to

worry over every detail rarely have the desire to exercise initiative. At worst, excessive information demands

corrupt the trust required for a mission command approach. Commanders describe the relevant information

they need to inform decision making by establishing CCIRs.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

It is in the minds of commanders that the issue of battle is really decided.

B.H. Liddell Hart

3-20. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). Commanders designate an

information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the operation. CCIRs

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-7

help to bring clarity to large volumes of information. Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders

limit the number of CCIRs to focus the efforts of limited collection assets. The fewer the CCIRs, the easier

it is for staffs to remember, recognize, and act on each one. CCIRs should change with the situation over

time. Commanders add and delete them throughout an operation based on the information needed for specific

decisions. Once approved, a CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements and

friendly force information requirements.

3-21. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need
to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-01). Priority intelligence

requirements identify the information about an enemy force and other aspects of the operational environment

that a commander considers most important to the plan or decisions. Intelligence about civil considerations

may be as critical as intelligence about enemy forces. Intelligence officers manage priority intelligence

requirements for commanders as part of the intelligence process.

3-22. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements

identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces

that the commander considers most important to the plan or decisions. In coordination with staffs, the

operations officers manage friendly force information requirements for commanders.

3-23. Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly
information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that,

if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation

and therefore should be protected from enemy

detection.

Although essential elements of friendly

information are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. Essential elements of friendly information establish

elements of information to protect rather than ones to collect. Their identification is the first step in the

operations security process and central to the protection of information.

3-24. Commanders cannot recognize all their information requirements. There is information that results
from an extraordinary event, an unseen opportunity, or a new threat. This is exceptional information—

specific and immediately vital information that directly affects the success of the current operation. It may

directly affect mission accomplishment or survival of the force, and usually reveals the need for a decision.

It would have been a CCIR if it had been foreseen. Therefore, it is treated as a CCIR and is reported to the

commander immediately. Identifying exceptional information requires initiative from subordinate

commanders and staffs, shared understanding of the situation, and a thorough understanding of the

commander’s intent. It also requires professional judgment; if there is doubt it is better to report.

3-25. Commanders can neither make decisions nor act to implement them without information. The amount
of information available makes managing information and turning it into effective decisions and actions

critical to success during operations. Since effective command and control depends on getting relevant

information to the right person at the right time, knowledge management, information management, and

foreign disclosure are crucial to command and control.

Knowledge Management

He who wars walks in a mist through which the keenest eye cannot always discern the right

path.

Sir William Napier

3-26. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared
understanding, learning, and decision making. Knowledge flow refers to the ease of movement of

knowledge within and among organizations. Knowledge must flow to be useful. The purpose of knowledge

management is to align people, processes, and tools within the organizational structure and culture to achieve

shared understanding. This alignment improves collaboration and interaction between leaders and

subordinates. Knowledge management leads to better decisions and increases flexibility, integration, and

synchronization. Sound knowledge management practices include—

 Collaboration among personnel at different locations.

 Rapid knowledge transfer between units and individuals.

Chapter 3

3-8 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

3-27. Knowledge management provides the methods and means to efficiently share knowledge and distribute
relevant information where and when it is needed. Knowledge management organizes, applies, collects,

codifies, and exchanges information between people. It seeks to align people and processes with appropriate

tools to help units learn, adapt, and improve mission performance.

3-28. Knowledge management is supported by four tasks that bring an organization closer to situational and
shared understanding. The four knowledge management tasks are creating knowledge, organizing

knowledge, applying knowledge, and transferring knowledge. (See ATP 6-01.1 for more information on

knowledge management.) Two important aspects of knowledge management are information management

and foreign disclosure.

3-29. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect,
process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products.

Information management supports, underpins, and enables knowledge management. The two are linked to

facilitate understanding and decision making. Information management is a technical discipline that involves

the planning, storing, manipulating, and controlling of information throughout its life cycle in support of the

commander and staff. Information management employs both staff management and processes to make

information available to the right person at the right time. Information management provides a structure so

commanders and staffs can process and communicate relevant information and make decisions. Effective

information management contributes to the knowledge management tasks of knowledge creation and

supports shared understanding for all unit members.

3-30. Generally, information management relates to the tasks of collection, processing, display, storage,
distribution, and protection of data and information. In contrast, knowledge management uses information to

create, organize, apply, and transfer knowledge to support achieving understanding, making decisions, and

ultimately taking effective action.

3-31. Information management provides the timely and protected distribution of relevant information to
commanders and staff elements. It supports and is a component of knowledge management. (See FM 6-0.2

for a discussion of information management.)

3-32. Foreign disclosure is a critical part of interoperability with multinational partners. Conducting
operations with unified action partners affects the way the force collects and disseminates information. The

disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified information to foreign representatives is governed by

policy and regulations. Keeping as much information unclassified as possible improves interoperability,

operational effectiveness, and trust.

3-33. Determining what information or intelligence may be disclosed is based on the policies, directives, and
laws that govern national disclosure policy and the release of classified information. While conducting

operations, commanders and staffs ensure they know other nations’ positions on intelligence sharing and

ensure that intelligence is shared to the degree possible, especially if required for mission accomplishment

and force protection. Early information sharing during planning ensures that unified action partner

requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander’s intent, and the force uses procedures

supportable by other nations. (See AR 380-10 for more discussions on foreign disclosure.)

COMMUNICATION

3-34. Commanders and staffs disseminate and share information among people, elements, and places.
Communication is more than the simple transmission of information. It is a means to exercise control over

forces. Communication links information to decisions and decisions to action. Communication among the

parts of a command supports their coordinated action. Effective commanders do not take communication for

granted. They use multidirectional communication and suitable communication media to achieve objectives.

Commanders choose appropriate times, places, and means to communicate. They use face-to-face talks,

written and verbal orders, estimates and plans, published memos, electronic mail, and other methods of

communication appropriate for a particular situation.

3-35. Communication has an importance far beyond exchanging information. Commanders and staffs
continuously communicate to learn, exchange ideas, and create sustained shared understanding. Information

needs to flow up and down the chain of command as well as laterally to adjacent units and organizations.

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-9

Separate from the quality or meaning of information exchanged, communication strengthens bonds within a

command. It is an important factor in building trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding.

3-36. Humans communicate verbally by what they say and in their manner of speaking. They also
communicate nonverbally with gestures and body language. Commanders pay attention to verbal and

nonverbal feedback to ascertain the effectiveness of their communication and the manner in which it is

received. Commanders should conduct face-to-face talks with their subordinates to ensure subordinates fully

understand them. This does not mean they do not keep records of information communicated or follow-up

with written documentation. Records are important as a means of affirming understanding and for later study

and critique. Records support understanding over time, whereas memory may distort or even omit elements

of the information required or passed.

3-37. In many cases, commanders are tempted to rely too much on written communications; especially email.
Email messages, written papers, briefs, and directives do not have the same impact as oral orders,

consultations, and briefings. Staffs possess the ability to produce vast amounts of documents; however, just

because the capability exists does not mean it should be used. Quality communication is superior to quantity

for enabling a mission command approach to command and control.

3-38. Commanders should assume that communications will be disrupted during operations. Commanders’
intent and orders should be written in a way that enables achieving objectives when communication is

intermittent and situational awareness is problematic. Mission orders and application of the mission

command approach to command and control mitigates the need for continuous communication.

Channels

3-39. Information normally moves throughout a force along various transmission paths or channels.
Commanders and staffs transfer information horizontally and vertically. Structure, in the form of command

and support relationships, establishes channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the

right information passes promptly to the right people. Commanders and staffs communicate through three

channels—command, staff, and technical:

 Command channels are direct chain-of-command transmission paths. Commanders and authorized

staff officers use command channels for command-related activities.

 Staff channels are staff-to-staff transmission paths between headquarters and are used for

control-related activities. Staff channels transmit planning information, status reports, controlling

instructions, and other information to support mission command. The intelligence and sustainment

networks are examples of staff channels.

 Technical channels are the transmission paths between two technically similar units, offices, or

staff sections that perform a technical function requiring special expertise or control the

performance of technical functions. Technical channels are typically used to control performance

of technical functions. They are not used for conducting operations or supporting another unit’s

mission. An example is network operations. The activities for the operation, management, and

control of communications transport is routinely performed by network operations control centers.

3-40. Crosstalk between subordinate commanders can transfer information and lead to decision making
without the higher echelon commander becoming involved, except to affirm, either positively or through

silence, the decisions or agreements of subordinates. However, commanders must train their subordinates to

crosstalk, so they can quickly and competently exchange information, create shared understanding, and make

and implement decisions.

Chapter 3

3-10 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War

On the morning of 17 January 1991, the day after the start of U.S. Central Command’s
major air operations against Iraq, the VII Corps Commander, LTG Frederick M. Franks
Jr., was with the 1st Infantry Division as it honed tank and Bradley gunnery skills in the
desert of Saudi Arabia. While there, he received a spot report from BG John Landry,
corps chief of staff, over FM radio: “55 Iraqi tanks have crossed the Kuwaiti Border,
heading southwest toward Hafir al-Batin and are engaging Egyptian coalition forces in
what may be the beginnings of an Iraqi preemptive strike.”

Within seconds, COL Johnnie Hitt, commander of the corps’ 11th Aviation
Brigade, entered the net indicating he had monitored the report and alerted two Apache
battalions that could respond in 30 minutes if necessary. At the same time, COL Don
Holder, commander of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the corps unit closest to
the reported enemy force, called to notify LTG Franks that he had issued orders for 1st
Squadron to send a unit forward to recon and make contact with enemy forces. Those
were the immediate and correct actions taken by commanders as a result of
eavesdropping on the command net and having the confidence to act—confidence
developed through training, teamwork, and trust among the key players of the VII
Corps team.

Structure

3-41. Organizational structure helps commanders communicate information and exercise control. Structure
refers to a defined organization that establishes relationships, information flow, and guides interactions

among elements. It also includes procedures for coordinating among an organization’s groups and activities.

Commanders establish control with a defined organization. Structure is both internal (such as a command

post) and external (such as command and support relationships among subordinate forces). (See ATP 6-0.5

for information on organizing Army command post operations and FM 3-0 for information on command and

support relationships.) The most basic organization in control is a hierarchy. In military terms, this

relationship is between the commander and staff, and subordinate forces.

CONTROL MEASURES

3-42. Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control
operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures

provide control without requiring detailed explanations. Control measures help commanders direct actions

by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate unit actions from impeding one another.

They foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily restricting freedom of action.

3-43. Control measures may be detailed (such as an operation order) or simple (such as a checkpoint).
Control measures include, but are not limited to—

 Plans and orders.

 Laws and regulations.

 Unit standard operating procedures.

3-44. Some control measures are graphic. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and
displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. Graphic control measures are always prescriptive.

They include symbols for boundaries, fire support coordination measures, some airspace control measures,

air defense areas, and minefields. Commanders establish them to regulate maneuver, movement, airspace

use, fires, and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures should relate to easily

identifiable natural or man-made terrain features. (See ADP 1-02 for illustrations of graphic control measures

and rules for their use.)

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-11

3-45. Control measures are established under a commander’s authority; however, commanders may
authorize staff officers and subordinate leaders to establish them. Commanders may use control measures for

several purposes: to assign responsibilities, require synchronization between forces, impose restrictions, or

establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action. Certain control measures belong to the commander alone,

and may not be delegated. These include the commanders’ intent, unit mission statement, planning guidance,

and CCIRs and essential elements of friendly information.

3-46. Good control measures foster freedom of action, decision making, initiative, and reporting during
operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher echelon commander’s

intent. They also consider the mission, terrain, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. Effectively

employing control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand their purposes and ramifications,

including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of action and initiative. Each

measure should have a specific purpose: mass the effects of combat power, synchronize subordinate forces’

operations, minimize the possibility of fratricide, or comply with the law of armed conflict.

3-47. The most important control measure is the boundary. Boundaries define the area of operations assigned
to a commander. Commanders have full freedom of action to conduct operations within the boundaries of

their area of operations unless the order establishing the area of operations includes constraints.

Control in Austerlitz
Napoleon’s La Grande Armée of 1805 had spent two years training along the coast of
the English Channel to invade England. On 3 September 1805, after the Third
Coalition formed, Napoleon moved that army against the first opposing force that
presented itself. His desired end state was to defeat it before the rest of the coalition
forces could join the campaign. Napoleon marched east with 200,000 men. He
defeated an Austrian army at Ulm in Bavaria by 20 October 1805 and pursued an
approaching Russian army down the Danube River toward Vienna.
On 23 November, he halted his pursuit east of Brunn (present-day Brno, Czech
Republic) near the village of Austerlitz, 700 miles from the Channel coast.

The Russian army had joined another Austrian army to form a force that numbered
85,000 to Napoleon’s 53,000. Napoleon decided to entice the coalition force to attack
him before others could reinforce it. He displayed his weakness in numbers, which he
let the coalition commanders see, and withdrew his main body from the Pratzen
Heights, key terrain in the area he had selected for battle. The coalition force occupied
that terrain on 30 November and prepared for battle. Napoleon had two corps moving
to reinforce his main body, increasing its strength to 73,000 before the battle: one
joined him on 1 December; the other, with 50 hours to march 80 miles from Vienna,
would not arrive until the day of the battle. (See figure 3-2 on page 3-12.)

Chapter 3

3-12 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Napoleon planned to show weakness on his right flank, which was held by a single
division. This display would encourage the coalition commanders to attack there. He
would hold on his left flank and attack the coalition center, where the coalition had
taken forces to carry out its attack on his right. With his forces attacking in the center,
Napoleon could either roll up the coalition forces attacking to his left, or more decisively
envelop those attacking his right. Key to this was the timely (for him), unexpected (for
the coalition) arrival of the corps from Vienna (under Marshal Davout). It reinforced his
right as the coalition attack began.

The attack against Napoleon’s right began at 0600 on 2 December and had intensified
by 0700. A coalition attack against his left also threatened but had not yet commenced.
Davout’s lead forces reinforced the French right by 0700, and the fight there continued
for the next two hours; a French force of 10,600 occupied a coalition force of nearly
50,000. By 0800, Napoleon, from his command post, could directly observe most of
the coalition force moving against his right. The Pratzen Heights, key terrain that he
had given up to entice the coalition commanders to give battle, was now uncovered.
By 0830, Napoleon had also received reports about the tenacious, successful fight of
his right and that his left was still secure.

Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-13

Hidden from coalition view but within striking distance of the key terrain were two
French divisions, 16,000 men and 16 guns, under command of “the finest maneuverer
in Europe,” Marshal Soult. Through the initial fight, Soult chafed to commence his
attack, but Napoleon restrained him. At 0845, Napoleon turned to Soult and asked,
“How long will it take you to move your divisions to the top of Pratzen Heights?” “Less
than 20 minutes, sire,” Soult answered. “Very well, we’ll wait another quarter of an
hour,” decided Napoleon. By then, Napoleon knew that a coalition force had begun
attacking his left. At 0900, Napoleon turned to Soult and directed him to attack: “One
sharp blow and the war’s over.” By 0930, Soult had taken the Pratzen Heights and was
well on the way to securing it.

The French left now also attacked the coalition right with coordinated infantry and
cavalry actions under Marshals Lannes and Murat. By noon, this French shaping
operation drove the coalition right back four miles, making it unable to move against
the decisive operation on the Pratzen. Stationing himself in the center,
Napoleon remained informed of events on both flanks but did not direct subordinate
actions. Napoleon’s situational understanding and ability to regulate his forces were
enhanced by a semaphore (signal flag) station at his command post and relay stations
throughout the area of operations. (See figure 3-3.)

Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations

Chapter 3

3-14 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Soult’s assault of the Pratzen only began the struggle in the center. The Russian
commander, Marshal Kutuzov, recognized the danger and recalled forces from
attacking the French right to counter Soult’s attack. The battle against this
counterattack began about 1000 and continued through 1100. By noon, Napoleon had
moved his command post and his reserve up to the Pratzen. The Russian Imperial
Guard mounted another counterattack against the center at 1300, but the
well-positioned French reserves, in coordination with Soult’s forces, defeated them by
1400 after much hard fighting.

This left Napoleon with the initiative to envelop either coalition wing. Napoleon had an
accurate’ situational understanding. He knew the coalition right could neither intervene
against him nor support the coalition center. He was also aware that nearly half of the
coalition force still engaged the French right, with a lake to their south. Accordingly, he
directed his center to wheel south (to its right), taking the coalition left in the rear and
destroying it. He left one corps in the center to secure the Pratzen Heights and his rear,
while Soult’s corps and Napoleon’s Imperial Guard executed the envelopment to the
south. By 1430, the coalition commander in the south recognized the peril to his force
and directed its retreat. About half escaped the encirclement by 1500. Some of the
encircled coalition forces attempted to escape over the frozen lake to the south, but
French artillery fired at the ice, breaking it and cutting off that avenue, while drowning
over 200 men. By 1500, the coalition right wing began to retreat as well, and by 1630,
as dark fell, all firing stopped. The coalition army was destroyed, with over one-third of
its force lost.

Napoleon’s ability to employ the necessary level of control was major factor in this
victory. It allowed him to move his Army across Europe and regulate his forces’
execution of a complex scheme of maneuver while decisively engaged with an
adaptive opponent. The timeliness of Napoleon’s decisions, which were the result of
significant preparations and thought, rendered his enemies’ reactions progressively
more irrelevant as the battle went on.

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE CONTROL

…avoid taking “firm control” or a “tight rein” over the battle…these measures are likely

to hold back the offensive during a penetration or pursuit and thus damage their chances

of success.

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy

3-48. The guides to effective control govern how commanders use the elements of control to accomplish
missions. Effective control enables a command to adapt to change. Because of feedback, control is cyclic

and continuous, not a series of discrete actions. It is a process of dynamic, interactive cooperation. Control

begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The guides to effective control are—

 Allow subordinates maximum freedom of decision and action.

 Create, maintain, and disseminate the COP.

 Use common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms.

 Encourage flexibility and adaptability.

ALLOW SUBORDINATES MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF DECISION AND ACTION

3-49. Effective commanders impose minimum constraints on subordinates to enable freedom of action while
meeting the overall intent. They exercise the control necessary to effect coordination and synchronization

among subordinate and supporting forces. Commanders monitor this coordination and allocate available

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-15

resources or shift priorities to support the actions of subordinate commanders. Allowing subordinates

maximum freedom of action requires a mission command approach.

3-50. In most instances, lower echelon commanders have the clearest understanding of their own situations.
They are generally better suited than higher echelon commanders to develop those situations. Even t wo or

more subordinate commanders working together may solve a problem better and faster than the higher

echelon commander. This type of coordination, involving direct communication among subordinate

commanders, is critical for effective decentralized execution. Commanders emphasize lateral coordination at

every opportunity.

3-51. Commanders should avoid establishing excessive limits on their subordinates’ freedom of action.
These limits may come in the form of overly detailed orders that inhibit initiative and force subordinates to

refer large numbers of decisions to their higher headquarters. Excessive detail may be a result of emphasizing

process or procedure rather than an outcome—directing things already addressed in doctrine or standard

operating procedures.

3-52. Commanders limit information requests to that which is critical to decision making. Excessive requests
for information may burden subordinates with reporting and distract them from executing their operation.

They can also affect the requesting unit, because it must process the responses. One cause of excessive

requests is the search for perfect situational understanding. Another stems from poor information

management. No one can predict all information requirements before operations begin; however,

commanders and staffs must balance new information requirements against the impact that finding and

providing that information will have on subordinates’ operations. Excessive or redundant reporting can create

unnecessary stress or fatigue for subordinate units. This situation may result in subordinates failing to respond

to an important request and depriving the higher commander of critical information needed to make decisions.

3-53. Commanders consider these items when deciding how to exercise control:

 Limit control measures to those necessary to effect essential coordination.

 Limit information requirements to the minimum needed to exercise command and control.

 Give subordinates as much leeway for initiative as possible.

CREATE, MAINTAIN AND DISSEMINATE THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

3-54. The COP is key to achieving and maintaining situational understanding. The common operational

picture is a display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s

requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.

Although the COP is ideally a single display, it may include more than one display and information in other

forms, such as graphical representations or written reports.

3-55. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and helps commanders at all echelons achieve shared
situational understanding. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to visualize the effects of

their decisions on other elements of the force and the overall operation. Mission command allows

subordinates to use the COP in conjunction with the commander’s intent to guide their exercise of disciplined

initiative.

3-56. Commanders achieve situational understanding by applying judgment to the COP. Relevant
information provides the basis for constructing the COP, and primarily consists of information which the

staff provides through analysis and evaluation. Data and information from all echelons and shared among

users create the COP. Some sources of this information include reports, running estimates, and information

provided by liaison officers.

3-57. Maintaining an accurate COP is difficult for many reasons: delayed or inaccurate friendly and
intelligence reporting, terrain data availability, and a constantly changing operational environment that

change circumstances, often in unforeseen ways. Fog and friction often degrade the accuracy of the COP, or

render all or part of it incorrect do to latency, enemy deception plans, or incorrect reporting. Staffs, based on

guidance from the commander, must work to rapidly and accurately portray the meaning and the necessary

level of information which help the commander maintain situational understanding and update his

visualization. Staffs should only display information that is relevant to the commander’s decision-making,

and avoid overloading their commander with unnecessary details.

Chapter 3

3-16 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

3-58. Units continually refine the COP during operations based on information they receive. By collaborating
and sharing relevant information and tailoring it to their needs, separate echelons create their own COPs that

show what their commanders need to know, as the situation requires.

3-59. Command posts draw on a common set of relevant information within a shared database to create a
digital COP. When a digital COP is not possible due to the operational environment or network interruptions,

command posts employ an analog COP. Creation of a COP is done manually with physical maps and overlays

that require training to employ effectively. The use of overlays or gathering subordinates around a commo n

map or graphic are examples of applying the COP concept in an analog command post.

3-60. Maintaining a COP between units within any organization is a challenge. Maintaining a COP between
different countries in a multinational environment is more of a challenge. The difficulty level varies based

on language differences and technical compatibility of systems. Often unified action partners will not have

the technical capability or compatible systems to create and share a digital COP. Commander’s must

recognize and plan for this possibility.

USE DOCTRINALLY CORRECT TERMS AND GRAPHICS

A doctrine of war consists first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject;

second, in a common way of handling it.

Ferdinand Foch; Precepts, 1919

3-61. Language used when communicating should be simple, clear, and easily understood. An understanding
of common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms contributes to the simplicity and clarity essential to

mutual understanding and shortens the amount of explicit communication needed to convey or explain an

order or plan. Doctrinal terms and graphics enable shared understanding by communicating in a commonly

understood way. However, there are situations where staffs may need to create nonstandard graphics or

modify existing graphics to portray the environment, an adaptive opponent, or other elements. They should

do this only when standard graphics are unsuitable, and they must ensure that subordinates and adjacent units

understand nonstandard terms and graphics.

3-62. Doctrine clearly distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive information. Most doctrine is
descriptive; it must be applied with judgment in the context of a particular situation. Unthinking adherence

to every aspect of doctrine in inappropriate situations is not congruent with a mission command approach.

There are some reasons that Army forces must apply some aspects of doctrine prescriptively—done without

deviation. Prescriptive doctrine derives from the need to—

 Adhere to the Army Ethic, laws of war, national law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and

often Army regulations.

 Precisely use terms, symbols, and the language of the profession to ensure a common

understanding.

 Adhere to control measures to ensure coordination, ensure synchronization, and prevent fratricide.

 Use report, message, and order formats to ensure information is reported rapidly, accurately, and

in a commonly understood manner.

ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY

3-63. Control allows organizations to respond to change, whether due to threat or friendly actions, or
environmental conditions. The mission command approach provides flexibility and adaptability, allowing

subordinates to recognize and respond effectively to emerging conditions and to correct for the effects of fog

and friction. Control informed by a mission command approach provides information that allows

commanders to base their decisions and actions on the results of friendly and opponent actions, rather than

rigid adherence to the plan. Commanders seek to build flexibility and adaptability into their plans.

3-64. Control supports flexibility and adaptability in two ways. First, it identifies the need to change the plan.
It does this through anticipating or forecasting possible opponent actions and by identifying unexpected

variances—opportunities or threats—from the plan. This occurs throughout the operations process. Second,

control helps commanders develop and implement options to respond to these changes in a timely manner.

Flexibility and adaptability provided by the appropriate level of control reduces an opposing force’s available

Control

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-17

options while maintaining or expanding friendly options. Effective control provides for timely action before

opposing forces can accomplish their objectives, allowing for the modification of plans as the situation

changes.

3-65. Instead of rigidly adhering to the plan, control focuses on information about emerging conditions. The
mission command approach to control provides flexibility by—

 Allowing friendly forces to rapidly change their tasks, their task organization, or their plan in

response to changing circumstances.

 Producing information about options to respond to changing conditions.

 Communicating the commander’s decisions quickly and accurately.

 Providing for rapid reframing when the plan changes during execution.

 Allowing collaborative planning and execution to respond to the progress of operations.

CONCLUSION

3-66. Control is essential to the ability of commanders to counter the effects of enemy action, fog, and friction
during operations, and it allows commanders to turn decisions into effective action. Knowledge management

supports control by providing structure to communications and transforming information into knowledge in

support of situational understanding and decision making. Commanders exercise control through the

operations process and the command and control system discussed in chapter 4.

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-1

Chapter 4

The Command and Control System

Staff systems and mechanical communications are valuable, but above and beyond them

must be the commander; not as a disembodied brain linked to his men by lines of wire and

waves of ether; but as a living presence, an all pervading visible personality…

General George S. Patton, Jr

This chapter expands on the command and control system that performs the functions

necessary to exercise command and control. First, it defines the command and control

system and its purpose. It then describes the individual components of the command

and control system, followed by a discussion of organizing for command and control.

Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of design considerations when

establishing a command and control system.

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM DEFINED

4-1. Commanders cannot exercise command and control alone. Even at the lowest levels, commanders need
support to exercise command and control. At every echelon of command, each commander has a command

and control system to provide that support. The command and control system is the arrangement of people,

processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders

to conduct operations.

4-2. The command and control system consists of all the resources used to support command and control
and enhances the commander’s ability to conduct operations. Commanders organize a command and control

system to—

 Support the commander’s decision making.

 Collect, create, and maintain relevant information and prepare products to support the

commander’s and leaders’ understanding and visualization.

 Prepare and communicate directives.

4-3. To provide these three overlapping functions, commanders must effectively locate, design, and
organize the four components of their command and control system (depicted in figure 4-1): people,

processes, networks, and command

posts.

Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system

PEOPLE

4-4. The most important component of the command and control system is people—those who assist
commanders and exercise control on their behalf. An effective command and control system accounts for the

Chapter 4

4-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

characteristics and limits of human nature. Simultaneously, it exploits and enhances uniquely human skills.

People dedicated to the command and control system include commanders, seconds in command, command

sergeants major, staffs, and liaison officers.

Commanders

4-5. Where the commander locates within the area of operations, and at what time, are important
considerations for effective command and control. No standard pattern or simple prescription exists for

command presence; different commanders lead differently. Commanders balance their time among the

command post and staff, subordinate commanders, forces, and other organizations to make the greatest

contribution to success. (See chapter 2 for more discussion on the location of the commander.)

4-6. Command posts serve as the focus for information exchange, planning, and analysis. They provide
commanders direct access to the staff and allow them to communicate with superior, subordinate, and

supporting commanders. While at a command post, commanders provide vital face-to-face guidance to staff

members when developing plans and controlling operations. By moving to the locations of subordinates or

to critical points in an area of operations, commanders can better assess and influence the state of operations.

They can personally gauge the condition of their units and leaders and consult directly with subordinate

commanders performing critical tasks. By being forward, commanders can also motivate subordinates

through personal example.

Seconds in Command

4-7. At all levels, the second in command is the commander’s principal assistant. The second in command
may be a deputy commander, an assistant commander, or the executive officer. Commanders determine the

duties and responsibilities of their deputy and assistant commanders. These duties and responsibilities are

formally declared and outlined in a memorandum or standard operating procedure signed by the commander.

Usually, at company through brigade echelons, the executive officer is the second in command. In a theater

army, corps, or division, the deputy or assistant commander extends the commander’s span of control in areas

and functions that the commander designates

4-8. Deputy or assistant commanders normally do not have staffs. When they have specific responsibilities,
the headquarters staff assists them as their commander prescribes. Deputy or assistant commanders may give

orders to the staffs within the authority the commander delegates to them. They may go to the chief of staff

at any time for staff assistance. If a deputy or assistant commander needs to form a team for a specific purpose,

the commander may form one from headquarters elements or subordinate units, or make a subordinate unit’s

headquarters available.

4-9. In organizations with more than one deputy or assistant, the commander will designate which one is
the second in command. Delegating authority to the seconds in command reduces the burden on commanders

and allows them to focus on particular areas or concerns while their seconds in command concentrate on

others. Normally, commanders delegate authority to seconds in command to act in their name for specific

functions and responsibilities.

4-10. A second in command has important responsibilities in these circumstances:

 Temporary absence of the commander.

 Succession of command.

 Delegation of authority.

 Deputies of joint and multinational forces.

Temporary Absence of the Commander

4-11. Officers who are second in the chain of command may assume duties as delegated, either explicitly or
by standard operating procedures, when the commander is temporarily absent from the command post or

resting. Lack of sleep can impair judgment and creative thinking capabilities. A commander’s sleep plan

should include delegating authority to the second in command during selected times to give the commander

time to sleep. Commanders may also be absent from the command temporarily. In this case, the second in

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-3

command may assume command temporarily and make decisions that continue operations in accordance

with the commander’s intent and policies.

Succession of Command

When placed in command-take charge…

GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf

4-12. Commanders may be killed, wounded, medically incapacitated, or relieved of command. In these
situations, the second in command normally assumes command. At brigade and lower echelons, executive

officers normally assume command. At higher echelons, deputy or assistant commanders may not be senior

to subordinate unit commanders. In this case, the operations order specifies succession of command, and the

second in command exercises command until the designated successor assumes command. However,

commanders may designate a second in command who is junior to subordinate commanders as their successor

in command. (See AR 600-20 for regulatory guidance.)

4-13. Seconds in command must be able to assume command at any time. They must stay informed of the
situation. Commanders inform their second in command of any changes to their visualization or intent. The

chief of staff keeps the second in command informed of staff actions. Commanders continually train their

seconds in command for command at their level.

Delegation of Authority

4-14. Delegating authority to the second in command reduces the burden of commanders’ responsibilities
and allows them to focus on particular areas or concerns while their seconds in command concentrate on

others. Normally, commanders delegate authority to their seconds in command to act in their name for

specific fields of interest and responsibility. Doing this decentralizes decision making while allowing the

commander to keep overall command.

Deputies of Joint and Multinational Forces

4-15. When an Army headquarters serves as the headquarters of a joint or multinational force, appointing a
deputy commander from another service or a multinational partner is often appropriate. These deputy

commanders may also exercise command over forces of their Service or nation. They can serve as important

advisers to the Army commander. They can facilitate understanding among participating Service or national

forces. In this case, succession of command depends on joint and multinational doctrine, law, or international

agreement.

Command Sergeants Major

4-16. The command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer of the command at battalion and
higher levels. Command sergeants major carry out policies and enforce standards for the performance,

individual training, and conduct of enlisted Soldiers. They give advice and initiate recommendations to

commanders and staffs in matters pertaining to enlisted Soldiers. In operations, commanders employ their

command sergeant majors throughout the area of operations to extend command influence, assess morale of

the force, and assist during critical events. Company first sergeants and platoon sergeants perform similar

functions at company and platoon levels.

Staffs

A lazy commander, if he is brilliant, may succeed; but a lazy staff officer is a menace.

Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, Canadian Junior War Staff Course

4-17. Staffs support commanders in making and implementing decisions and in integrating and
synchronizing combat power. Effective staffs multiply a unit’s effectiveness. They provide timely and

relevant information and analysis, make estimates and recommendations, prepare plans and orders, assist in

controlling operations, and assess the progress of operations for the commander. Primary responsibilities of

any staffs are to—

Chapter 4

4-4 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

 Support the commander.

 Assist subordinate commanders, staffs, and units.

 Inform units and organizations outside the headquarters.

Support the Commander

4-18. Staffs support commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment;
making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make

recommendations and prepare plans and orders for their commander. Staff products consist of timely and

relevant information and analysis, such as that found in their running estimates. Staffs use knowledge

management to extract that information from the vast amount of available information. Staffs synthesize this

information and provide it to commanders in the form of running estimates to help commanders build and

maintain their situational understanding.

4-19. Staffs also prepare and disseminate information to subordinates for execution to assist commanders in
controlling operations. While commanders often personally disseminate their commander’s intent and

planning guidance, they rely on their staffs to communicate the majority of their guidance in the form of

plans and orders. Staffs must communicate their commander’s decisions, and the intentions behind them,

efficiently and effectively throughout the force.

4-20. Staffs support and advise their commander within their area of expertise. While commanders make
key decisions, they are not the only decision makers. Trained and trusted staff members, given decision

making authority based on the commander’s intent, free commanders from routine decisions. This enables

commanders to focus on key aspects of operations.

Assist Subordinate Commanders, Staffs, and Units

4-21. Effective staffs establish and maintain a high degree of coordination and cooperation with staffs of
higher echelon, lower echelon, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. Staffs help subordinate

headquarters understand the larger context of operations. They do this by first understanding their higher

echelon headquarters’ operations and commander’s intent, and nesting their own operations with their higher

headquarters. They then actively collaborate with subordinate commanders and staffs to facilitate a shared

understanding of the operational environment. Examples of staffs assisting subordinate units include

performing staff coordination, staff assistance visits, and staff inspections.

Inform Units and Organizations Outside the Headquarters

4-22. Staffs keep their units well informed. Staffs also keep adjacent, coalition, allied, and civilian
organizations informed with relevant information according to security classification and need to know.

Staffs have an obligation to establish working relationships with unit members. As soon as a staff receives

information and determines its relevancy, that staff passes that information to the appropriate headquarters.

The key is relevance, not volume. Masses of data inhibit mission command by distracting staffs from relevant

information. Effective knowledge management helps staffs identify the information commanders and staff

elements need, and its relative importance.

4-23. Information should reach recipients based on their need for it. Sending incomplete information sooner
is better than sending complete information too late to matter. When forwarding information, the sending

staff highlights key information for each recipient and clarifies the commander’s intent. Such highlighting

and clarification assists receivers in analyzing the content of the information received in order to determine

that information that may be of particular importance to the higher and subordinate commanders. The sending

staff may pass information directly, include its analysis, or add context to it. Common, distributed databases

can accelerate this function; however, they cannot replace the personal contact that adds perspective.

Common Staff Duties and Responsibilities

4-24. Staff members have specific duties and responsibilities associated with their area of expertise.
However, all staff sections share a common set of duties and responsibilities:

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-5

 Advising and informing their commander.

 Building and maintaining running estimates.

 Providing recommendations.

 Preparing plans, orders, and other staff writing.

 Assessing operations.

 Managing information within their area of expertise.

 Identifying and analyzing problems.

 Conducting staff assistance visits.

 Performing risk management.

 Performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

 Conducting staff inspections.

 Conducting staff research.

 Performing staff administrative procedures.

 Exercising staff supervision over their area of expertise.

Characteristics of Good Staff Members

4-25. Good staff members understand how to effectively communicate with their commander, and they can
discern what information is vital to their commander’s ability to command and control. They seek a shared

understanding of the operational environment with their commander and with the commanders of both higher

and subordinate headquarters. This shared understanding includes the commander’s visualization of the

operational approach, including the commander’s intent. Good staff members—

 Are competent. They are experts in doctrine and the processes and procedures associated with

their branch or functional area, as well as the operations process. They understand the duties of

other staff members enough to accomplish coordination both vertically and horizontally.

 Bring clarity. They are able to clearly articulate and effectively present information, orally, in

writing, and visually. They help simplify problems in complex operational environments by

explaining the meaning of information and not simply providing raw data to the commander.

 Exercise candor. They tell the commander what they believe, not what the commander wants to

hear. They are willing to tell the commander both good and bad news. Any staff work eventually

affects Soldiers, who execute staff officer recommendations approved by the commander. Staff

officers never forget their recommendations affect Soldiers.

 Exercise initiative. They anticipate requirements rather than waiting for instructions. They

anticipate what the commander needs to accomplish the mission and prepare answers to potential

questions before they are asked.

 Apply critical and creative thinking. As critical thinkers, staff members discern truth in

situations where direct observation is insufficient, impossible, or impractical. They determine

whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true, based on a given inference or

argument. As creative thinkers, staff members look at different options to solve problems. They

use proven approaches (drawing from previous similar circumstances) or innovative approaches

(coming up with completely new ideas). In both instances, staff members use creative thinking to

apply imagination and depart from the old way of doing things.

 Are adaptive. They recognize and adjust to changing conditions in the operational environment

with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. They rapidly adjust and continuously assess plans,

tactics, techniques, and procedures.

 Are flexible. They avoid becoming overwhelmed or frustrated by changing requirements and

priorities. Commanders may change their minds or redirect their commands after receiving

additional information or a new mission and may not inform their staffs of the reason for a change.

Staff members remain flexible and adjust to any changes. They set priorities when there are more

tasks to accomplish than time allows. They learn to manage multiple commitments

simultaneously.

Chapter 4

4-6 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

 Possess discipline and self-confidence. They understand that all staff work serves the

commander, even if the commander rejects the resulting recommendation. Staff members do not

give a “half effort” even if they think the commander will disagree with their recommendations.

Alternative and possibly unpopular ideas or points of view assist commanders in making the best

possible decisions.

 Are team players. They cooperate with other staff members within and outside their headquarters.

This practice contributes to effective collaboration and coordination.

Staff Relationships

4-26. Staff effectiveness depends in part on relationships of the staff with commanders and other staffs.
Collaboration aids in developing shared understanding and visualization among staffs at different echelons.

A staff acts on behalf of, and derives its authority from, its commander. Although commanders are the

principal decision makers, individual staff officers make decisions within their authority based on broad

guidance and unit standard operating procedures. Commanders insist on frank collaboration between

themselves and their staff officers. A staff gives honest, independent thoughts and recommendations, so

commanders can make the best possible decisions. Once their commander makes a decision, staff officers

support and implement the commander’s decision even if the decision differs from their recommendations.

4-27. Teamwork within a staff and between staffs produces the staff integration essential to synchronized
operations. A staff works efficiently with complete cooperation from all staff sections. A force operates

effectively in cooperation with all headquarters. Commanders and staffs foster this positive climate during

training and sustain it during operations. However, frequent personnel changes and augmentation to their

headquarters adds challenges to building and maintaining the team. While all staff sections have clearly

defined functional responsibilities, none can operate effectively in isolation. Therefore, coordination is

extremely important. Commanders ensure staff sections are properly equipped and manned. This allows

staffs to efficiently work within their headquarters and with their counterparts in other headquarters.

Commanders ensure staff integration through developing the unit’s battle rhythm, including synchronizing

various meetings, working groups, and boards.

4-28. The basis for staff organization depends on the mission, each staff’s broad areas of expertise, and
regulations and laws. While staffs at every echelon and type of unit are structured differently, all staffs share

some similarities. (See FM 6-0 for an expanded discussion of staffs.)

Liaison Officers

4-29. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other
agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Most commonly used for

establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison continuously enables direct, physical

communications between commands and with unified action partners. Commanders use liaison during

operations and normal daily activities to facilitate a shared understanding and purpose among organizations,

preserve freedom of action, and maintain flexibility. Liaison provides commanders with relevant information

and answers to operational questions, thus enhancing the commander’s situational understanding.

4-30. Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability to synchronize and converge all elements of
combat power into their concept of operation and scheme of maneuver. They include establishing and

maintaining physical contact and communications between elements of military forces and nonmilitary

agencies during operations. Liaison activities ensure—

 Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters.

 Coordination on tactical matters to achieve unity of effort.

 Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects.

 Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.

4-31. A liaison officer represents a commander or staff officer. Liaison officers transmit information directly,
bypassing headquarters and staff layers. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed liaison officer, either a

commissioned or a noncommissioned officer, is the key to effective liaison. Liaison officers must have the

commander’s full confidence and sufficient experience for the mission. At higher echelons, the complexity

of operations often requires more senior ranking liaison officers.

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-7

4-32. Based on the situation, commanders may receive or request liaison elements (individuals and teams)
to assist them with command and control. Liaison elements include but are not limited to—

 An air liaison officer.

 A naval gunfire liaison officer.

 An Army space support team.

 A psychological operations planner.

 An Army cyberspace operations support team.

 An Army field support team.

 A digital liaison detachment

 Liaisons to and from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units.

 Liaisons to and from unified action partners.

(See FM 6-0 for more discussion on liaison.)

Processes

4-33. Commanders establish and use systematic processes and procedures to organize the activities within
their headquarters and throughout the force. Processes are a series of actions directed to an end state, such as

the military decision-making process. In addition to the major activities of the operations process,
commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the
operations process. The integrating processes are—
 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (described in ATP 2-01.3).
 Information collection (described in FM 3-55).
 Targeting (described in ATP 3-60).
 Risk management (described in ATP 5-19).

 Knowledge management (described in chapter 3)

4-34. Procedures govern actions within the command and control system to make it more effective and
efficient. They allow for complex actions to take place without detailed guidance every time the procedure

is initiated. For example, standard operating procedures often provide detailed unit instructions on how to

configure COP displays. Adhering to processes and procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and

hesitation as commanders make frequent, rapid decisions to meet operational requirements.

4-35. Procedures can increase organizational competence by improving a staff’s efficiency or by increasing
the tempo. Procedures can be especially useful in improving the coordination of Soldiers who must cooperate

to accomplish repetitive tasks, such as the internal functioning of a command post.

4-36. Command and control procedures are designed for simplicity and speed: they should be simple enough
to perform quickly and smoothly under conditions of extreme stress. They should be efficient enough to

increase tempo. Streamlined staff-planning sequences are preferable to deliberate, elaborate ones.

4-37. Commanders establish procedures to streamline operations and written orders and help integrate new
Soldiers and attachments. Usually spelled out in unit standard operating procedures, procedures also help

commanders make decisions faster by providing relevant information in standard, easy-to-understand

formats. Procedures describe routine actions, thus eliminating repetitive decisions, such as, where to put

people in a command post, how to set up a command post, and march formations.

4-38. Procedures facilitate continuity of operations when leaders become unable to perform their duties.
Subordinates can step in and use procedures to continue to operate. When Soldiers are tired or stressed, their

decision making capability is degraded. Standard operating procedures help individuals and units continue

to accomplish many tasks because they are routine.

4-39. Procedures do not cover every possible situation. Units avoid applying procedures blindly to the wrong
tasks or the wrong situations, which can lead to ineffective, even counterproductive, performance.

Chapter 4

4-8 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Networks

4-40. Networks in the command and control system collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect
information worldwide. They enable the execution of command and control, and they support operations

through the wide dissemination of data and relevant information.

4-41. Networks enable commanders to communicate information and control forces whether mounted or
dismounted, and they are key enablers of successful operations. Commanders systematically establish

networks to connect people and allow sharing of information and resources. The Army’s primary network is

the Department of Defense information network-Army. This network consists of—

 End-user applications.

 Information services and data.

 Network transport and management.

End-User Applications

4-42. Commanders determine their information requirements and focus their staffs and organizations on
using the application layer to meet these requirements. End-user applications include automated information

systems, software, and user devices that allow users to display and disseminate information, and the policies

and procedures for their use. This includes telephones, tablets, laptops, software applications, and user

interfaces. End-user applications allow people to leverage the network’s capabilities.

4-43. End-user applications directly affect how commanders communicate and how their staffs collaborate.
They promote unity of effort by allowing commanders to view and understand their areas of operation,

communicate the commander’s intent, and disseminate relevant information. When operated by well-trained

personnel and used properly, these applications can give commanders an information advantage over

opponents by reducing the time required to make a decision, improving combined arms coordination, and

synchronizing the warfighting functions. Applications can simultaneously support current and future

operations as well as plans.

Information Services and Data

4-44. The primary purpose of information services and data is to facilitate timely and accurate decision
making and execution by processing and managing information. The services and data include all the

information services, servers, and data standards that collect, process, and store information. This includes

the servers, data storage and distribution, cloud and edge servers, and software and data standards that allow

the display of a COP as meaningful visual images that directly impart knowledge and increase understanding.

4-45. Information services and data include the information management processes that support knowledge
management. Information and knowledge management reduce the time and effort commanders spend

assimilating information and developing situational understanding. Information services and data support

shared situational understanding.

Network Transport and Management

4-46. Network transport is processes, equipment, and transmission media that provide connectivity and move
data between networking devices and facilities. Network transport is a system of systems including the

people, equipment, and facilities that provide end-to-end communications connectivity for network

components (FM 6-02). The primary purpose of network transport is to move data between networking

devices and facilities. Network transport devices include radios, Wi-Fi, microwave and satellite

communications, and cable and wire.

4-47. Network management equipment controls the movement of data around the battlefield. Network
management devices include switches, routers, and communications security equipment. Network

management also includes software designed to operate and secure all aspects of the network, including

end-user applications, information services, data, and network transport. This software is distinct from

end- user applications in that it provides functions to control and secure the network, rather than user services.

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-9

4-48. Successful commanders understand that networks may be degraded through threat or environmental
factors during operations. They develop methods and measures to mitigate the impact of degraded networks.

This mitigation may be through exploiting the potential of technology or through establishing trust, creating

shared understanding, or providing a clear intent using mission orders.

4-49. Effective commanders use technology to enable a mission command approach to command and
control, not to micromanage operations. Equipment that improves the ability to monitor the situation at lower

levels increases the temptation to directly control subordinates’ actions and thereby undermine mission

command. Moreover, such use tends to fix the higher echelon commander’s attention at too low a level.

Commanders who focus at too low a level risk losing sight of the larger overall picture. Consequently,

increased network capabilities bring the need for increased understanding and discipline. Just because

technology allows detailed supervision does not mean commanders should employ it in that manner.

Effective mission command requires senior commanders to give the on-scene commander freedom to

exercise initiative.

COMMAND POSTS

4-50. Effective command and control requires continuous, and often immediate, close coordination,
synchronization and information sharing across the staff. To promote this, commanders organize their staffs

and other components of the command and control system into command posts to assist them in effectively

conducting operations. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their

activities (FM 6-0). Often divided into echelons, each echelon of the headquarters is a command post

regardless of whether the commander is present or not. When necessary, commanders control operations

from other locations away from the command post. In all cases, the commander alone exercises command

when in a command post or elsewhere.

4-51. Command posts are facilities that include personnel, processes and procedures, and networks that assist
commanders in command and control. Commanders employ command posts to help control operations

through continuity, planning, coordination, and synchronizing of the warfighting functions. Commanders

organize their command posts flexibly to meet changing situations and requirements of different operations.

4-52. Command post functions directly relate to assisting commanders in understanding, visualizing,
describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations. Different types of command posts, such as the main

command post or the tactical command post, have specific functions by design. Functions common to all

command posts include—

 Conducting knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.

 Building and maintaining situational understanding.

 Controlling operations.

 Assessing operations.

 Coordinating with internal and external organizations.

 Performing command post administration.

Conducting Knowledge Management, Information Management, and Foreign Disclosure

4-53. When combined, knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure enable the
provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time and in a usable format. Knowledge

management, information management, and foreign disclosure facilitate understanding and decision making.

4-54. Commanders and unified action partners must receive combat information and intelligence products
in time and in an appropriate format to facilitate shared understanding and support decision making. Timely

dissemination of information is critical to the success of multinational operations. Dissemination is deliberate

and ensures consumers receive combat information and intelligence products to support operations.

Therefore, information should be shared to the maximum extent allowed by law, regulation, and

government-wide policy.

4-55. Developing and managing a unit’s battle rhythm is a key aspect of effective knowledge management.
A unit’s battle rhythm establishes various meetings, working groups, and planning teams to assist

commanders and staffs with integrating the warfighting functions, coordinating activities, and making

Chapter 4

4-10 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

effective decisions throughout the operations process. The battle rhythm arranges the sequence and timing of

reports, meetings, and briefings based on the commander’s preference, higher headquarters requirements,

and the type of operations. There is no standard battle rhythm for all units. Depending on echelon and type

of operations, commanders and staffs develop and adjust their battle rhythm based on the situation. Managed

by the chief of staff or executive officer, a unit’s battle rhythm facilitates decision making and routine

interactions among commanders, staffs, forces, and unified action partners. (See ATP 6-0.5 for techniques

on building a unit’s battle rhythm.)

Building and Maintaining Situational Understanding

4-56. Effective knowledge management and information management are essential to building and
maintaining situational understanding. Building and maintaining situational understanding helps in

establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality

decisions during execution. Command post activities that contribute to this include—

 Receiving information, including reports from subordinate units.

 Analyzing information.

 Generating, distributing, and sharing information and knowledge products, to including reports

required by higher headquarters.

 Conducting battle tracking.

 Conducting update and information briefings.

4-57. Running estimates and the COP are key products used for building and maintaining situational
understanding. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if

the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are

supportable (ADP 5-0). In their running estimates, each command post cell and staff section continuously

considers the effects of new information and they update—

 Facts.

 Assumptions.

 Friendly force status.

 Enemy activities and capabilities.

 Civil considerations.

 Conclusions and recommendations.

4-58. The staff uses its running estimates to advise the commander and make recommendations. Information
in running estimates also helps build the COP. Maintaining the COP within a command post and with other

command posts assists commanders and staffs in maintaining situational understanding and promoting a

shared understanding throughout the command.

Controlling Operations

4-59. Personnel within command posts assist commanders in controlling operations, including coordinating,
synchronizing, and integrating actions within their delegated authority. They also integrate and synchronize

resources in accordance with their commander’s priority of support. Staff members monitor and evaluate the

progress of operations and make or recommend adjustments to operations in accordance with their

commander’s intent. While all command posts assist commanders in controlling operations, different

command posts are assigned specific control responsibilities. For example, a brigade commander may

employ the brigade tactical command post to control battalion air assault operations.

Assessing Operations

4-60. Personnel within command posts continuously assess operations. Assessment is the determination of
the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0).

Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall

effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps commanders and staffs in

determining progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-11

also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine which

changes might affect the conduct of operations. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of assessment.)

Coordinating with Internal and External Organizations

4-61. Units do not operate in isolation. They synchronize their actions with those of others. Coordination is
essential to this synchronization. Personnel within command posts continuously coordinate with higher

echelon, lower echelon, adjacent, supporting, and supported units, and with unified action partners.

Coordination helps—

 Develop shared understanding.

 Ensure a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations.

 Inform an organization on issues so that it may adjust plans and actions as required.

 Avoid conflict and duplication of effort among units.

 Ensure synchronization of effects and efforts between supporting and supported units.

Performing Command Post Administration

4-62. Commanders staff, equip, and organize command posts to support 24-hour operations. As such,
command post personnel and equipment must be protected and sustained. This requires an effective standard

operating procedure and personnel trained on command post administration, including—

 Establishing the command post.

 Displacing the command post.

 Providing security.

 Maintaining continuity of operations.

 Executing sleep plans.

 Managing stress.

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-63. Command posts provide locations from which commanders, assisted by their staffs, command
operations and integrate and synchronize combat power to accomplish missions across the range of military

operations. Commanders organize the other components of the command and control system into command

posts based on mission requirements and the situation that will best assist them in exercising mission

command. Planning considerations for command post organization and employment can be categorized as—

 Those contributing to effectiveness.

 Those contributing to survivability.

In many cases, these factors work against each other and therefore neither can be optimized. Tradeoffs are

made to acceptably balance effectiveness and survivability.

Effectiveness

4-64. Command post personnel, equipment, and facilities are arranged to facilitate coordination, exchange
of information, and rapid decision making. A command post must effectively communicate with higher

echelon, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and supported units and have the ability to move as required.

Considerations for command post effectiveness include design layout, standardization, continuity, and

capacity.

Design Layout

4-65. Well-designed command posts integrate command and staff efforts. Within a command post, the
location of staffs are arranged to facilitate internal communication and coordination. This arrangement may

change over the course of operations as the situation changes. Other layout considerations include—

 The ease of information flow.

 User interface with communications systems.

Chapter 4

4-12 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

 The positioning of information displays for ease of use.

 The integrating of complementary information on maps and displays.

 Adequate workspace for the staff and commander.

 The ease of displacement (including setup, tear-down, and movement).

Standardization

4-66. Standardization increases the efficiency of command post operations. Commanders develop detailed
standard operating procedures for all aspects of command post operations, including command post layout,

battle drills, meeting requirements, and reporting procedures. Command post standard operating procedures

are enforced and revised throughout training. Doing this makes many command post activities routine.

Trained staffs are prepared to effectively execute drills and procedures in demanding, stressful times during

operations.

Continuity

4-67. Command posts must be manned, equipped, and organized to control operations without interruptions.
Commanders organize command posts in order to support continuous operations. To support continuous

operations, unit standard operating procedures address shift plans, rest plans, and procedures for loss of

communications with the unit commander, subordinates, or other command posts.

4-68. Maintaining continuity during displacement of a command post or catastrophic loss requires
designating alternate command posts and passing control between command posts. Continuity of command

requires commanders to designate seconds in command and inform them of all critical decisions. Primary

staff officers should also designate alternates.

Capacity

4-69. Command posts should be manned and organized to manage the information needed to operate
effectively. The capacity to plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess operations concerns both staffing

and the network, as does the ability to manage relevant information. Command post personnel must be trained

and have the requisite tactical and technical proficiency.

Survivability

4-70. Command post survivability is vital to mission success and is measured by the capabilities of the threat
in the context of the situation. Survivability may be obtained at the price of effectiveness. Depending on the

threat, command posts need to remain small and highly mobile—especially at lower echelons. Command

posts are easily acquired and targeted when they are concentrated. Considerations for command post

survivability include dispersion, size, redundancy, mobility, electronic and thermal signatures, and

camouflage and concealment. Additional measures include cover or shielding by terrain features or urban

structures. (See ATP 3-37.34 for more information on command post survivability.)

Dispersion

4-71. Dispersing command posts enhances the survivability of the commander’s command and control
system. Commanders place minimum resources forward and keep more elaborate facilities back. This makes

it harder for enemies to find and attack them. It also decreases support and security requirements forward.

Depending on the situation, commanders may leave personnel and equipment at home station to perform

detailed analysis and long-range planning for operations.

Size

4-72. A command post’s size affects its mobility and survivability. Large command posts can increase
capacity and ease face-to-face coordination. Their size, however, makes them vulnerable to multiple types of

acquisitions and attack. Smaller command posts are easier to protect, but they may lack capacity to control

operations effectively. The key to success is achieving the right balance.

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-13

Redundancy

4-73. Reducing command post size cuts signature and enhances mobility. However, some personnel and
equipment redundancy is required for continuous operations. In operations, personnel and equipment are lost

or fail under stress. Having the right amount of redundancy allows command posts to continue to operate

effectively when this happens.

Mobility

4-74. Command posts must deploy efficiently and move within the area of operations as the situation
requires. Command post mobility is important, especially at lower echelons during combat operations.

Lower-echelon command posts and those employed forward in the combat zone may need to move quickly

and often. Both small size and careful transportation planning facilitates rapid displacement of command

posts.

ORGANIZING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-75. How commanders organize a command and control system can complicate or simplify execution.
Organizational decisions establish the chain of command (command and support relationships) and task

organization. They can influence where commanders obtain information, whom they rely on for advice, and

how they supervise execution of their decisions. Organizational decisions affect the structure of the flow of

recommendations to commanders. In large part, the organization establishes formal communication channels

and determines how commanders distribute information throughout their forces.

4-76. Commands operate most efficiently and effectively when Soldiers consider themselves part of a team
or larger organization. Organization serves the important function of providing sources of group identity for

soldiers assigned to a command. A command operates most effectively when soldiers consider themselves

members of one or more groups characterized by high levels of loyalty, cooperation, morale, and

commitment. This supports mission command.

4-77. Information flows vertically within the chain of command, but the organization should not limit its
flow to the chain of command. Information also must flow laterally among adjacent, supported, and

supporting units. Information flows informally and unofficially—between individuals according to personal

relationships—as well as within formal channels. Informal channels provide important redundancy.

GUIDES TO ORGANIZING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-78. When organizing for command and control, commanders consider—

 The chain of command.

 Span of control.

 Unit integrity.

 Degraded environments.

The Chain of Command

4-79. The chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate
through which command is exercised (JP 1). The commander at each level responds to orders from a higher

commander and, in turn, issues orders to subordinates. In this way, the chain of command fixes responsibility

and sources of authority at each echelon while, at the same time, distributing them broadly throughout the

force. Each commander has designated authority and responsibility in a given area of operations or area of

responsibility. Command and support relationships specify the type and degree of authority one commander

has over another, and the type and degree of support one commander provides to another.

Command and Support Relationships

4-80. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for operations.
These relationships prescribe clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units.

Some forces are given command or support relationships that limit their commander’s authority to prescribe

Chapter 4

4-14 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship

allows commanders to establish clear responsibilities when organizing their forces. (See ADP 3-0 for more

information on command and support relationships.)

4-81. Commanders designate command and support relationships within their authority to weight the
decisive operation and support the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and

supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and contribute to achieving the commander’s

intent. Command and support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to subordinate units by

parent and gaining units.

Allocating Resources

4-82. Mission command requires commanders to have authority over or access to all resources required to
accomplish the mission. Accordingly, commanders organize resources as well as forces when making

organizational decisions. This resource organization may be implicit in the command and support

relationships established; however, it may differ partly or completely from them, as in establishing priorities

including fires, work, or sustainment. In any case, the resource organization must not violate unity of

command and should support unity of effort. Further, this organization or allocation of resources should have

minimum restrictions on their use, permitting subordinates to further reallocate or to employ them as the

tactical situation requires.

Span of Control

The average human brain finds its effective scope in handling three to six other brains.

General Sir Ian Hamilton

4-83. Organization should ensure reasonable span of control, which refers to the number of subordinates or
activities under the control of a single commander. A commander’s span of control should not exceed that

commander’s capability to command effectively. The optimal number of subordinates is situation-dependent.

The more fluid and fast-changing the situation, the fewer subordinate elements a commander can supervise

closely. Within this situation-dependent range, a greater number of subordinates allows greater flexibility,

and increases options and combinations. However, as the number increases, commanders, at some point, lose

the ability to consider each unit individually and begin to think of the units as a single, inflexible mass. At

this point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group elements into a smaller number of parts, creating

another echelon of command.

4-84. Narrowing the span of control—that is, lessening the number of immediate subordinates—deepens the
organization by adding layers of command. The more layers of command in an organization, the longer it

takes for information to move up or down the organization. Consequently, the organization may become

slower and less responsive. Conversely, an effort to increase tempo by eliminating echelons of command or

flattening an organization necessitates widening the span of control. Commanders balance width and depth,

so that the command and control organization fits the situation.

4-85. An effective organization enables the commander and subordinate commanders to command without
information overload. The commander establishes his span of control and organizes the command and control

system so as to be able to exercise command and control under all circumstances, including degraded

environments.

Unit Integrity

4-86. Mission command requires subordinate commands capable of operating in the absence of detailed
orders. Forming such task-organizations increases each commander’s freedom of action. Effective

commanders are flexible: they task-organize forces to suit the situation. This might include creating

nonstandard, temporary teams or task forces. However, commanders reconcile the need for organizational

flexibility with the requirement to create shared understanding and mutual trust. These characteristics result

from familiarity and stable working relationships.

4-87. One way to balance these demands is to observe unit integrity when organizing for command and
control. Commanders must take into account the impact on mission command when task-organizing forces.

The Command and Control System

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-15

Whenever possible, commanders should task-organize based on standing headquarters and habitually

associated elements. When this is not feasible and organizations are formed from a wide variety of units,

commanders must allow time for training and establishing functional working relationships and procedures.

4-88. Once a force is task-organized and committed, commanders do not change the task-organization during
operations unless the benefits clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Reorganizations cost time, momentum,

effort, and tempo. Commanders also consider logistical factors, as the time required to change

task-organization may counter any organizational advantages.

Degraded Environments

4-89. When organizing for command and control, commanders consider the impact of degraded
environments on the command and control system. The command and control system may be degraded as

the result of hostile actions to contest the use of space and the information environment or due to the lack of

resources to provide sufficient network coverage in an area of operations. The degradation may not be

technological. The use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives, or adverse

weather, may create physical conditions that cause interference in the electromagnetic spectrum and degrade

the command and control system. All of these may interfere with a commander’s ability to exercise command

and control.

4-90. In order to mitigate this risk and successfully conduct operations in degraded environments,
commanders cannot become over reliant on technological capabilities. Commanders ensure their personnel

are trained on analog and manual command and control processes and are comfortable operating in degraded

environments. Understanding the functions performed by automated systems is critical to understanding what

functions must be performed in an analog environment. Commanders ensure standard operating procedures

are in place that will help the command and control system maintain its ability to function. Personnel should

be trained and proficient in—

 Continuous operations.

 Maintaining the COP.

 Manual information sharing.

 Staff integration and crosstalk.

 Manual running estimates.

 Command post battle drills.

4-91. One way to deal with degraded communications is through primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (PACE) communication planning. A PACE plan establishes the primary, alternate, contingency,

and emergency methods of communications, typically from higher echelons to lower echelons. Establishing

a PACE plan requires care that an alternate or contingency method of communications does not rely on the

primary. The key to a good PACE plan is to establish redundancy so that communications are always

available. Most units will have two PACE plans: one for communications to higher echelon headquarters and

one for subordinate units. A PACE plan for a higher echelon headquarters will likely be established by that

headquarters. (See ATP 6-0.5 for more information on PACE planning.)

4-92. Ultimately, the doctrinal solution to operating in degraded environments is mission command. Even
under severely degraded conditions, Army forces continue to make decisions and act in the absence of orders,

when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities arise.

CONCLUSION

4-93. Commanders alone cannot exercise command and control. At each echelon of command, commanders
have a command and control system to provide support. That system is more than equipment; it consists of

all the resources available to commanders to help them exercise authority and direction. How commanders

organize, locate, and design their command and control systems directly affect their ability to conduct

operations. A properly designated commander and a well-designed command and control system provides

for continuity of command and control.

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Source Notes-1

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it

lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number.

viii “An order should…”: Field Service Regulation (obsolete) (Washington DC: Government

Printing Office, 1905), 29.

viii “These thunder runs…”: Lieutenant General David G. Perkins, “Mission Command:

Reflections from the Combined Arms Commander,” Army Magazine, Volume 62 (June

2012), 32.

1-1 “The situations that…”: FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (obsolete)

(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 24.

1-2 “War is the …”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 101–102.

1-2 “The role of …”: B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (Toronto, Canada: Meridian, 1991),

321-22.

1-3 “Never tell people …”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1947), 357.

1-4 Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik Adapted from Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke’s Military

Works, Vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I, “Operative Preparations for Battle,” trans. Harry Bell

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1916), 65–67.

1-9 Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman,

1864. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New York, NY: Charles L.

Webster & Company, 1885–1886). Online https://www.fulltextarchive.com/page/Personal-

Memoirs-of-U-S-Grant–Volume-Two9/. War of the Rebellion: Serial 059 Pages 0313–0315

Chapter XLIV. CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – UNION. (no date). Retrieved from

https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/059/0313.

1-9 “I suppose dozens of …”: William Slim, Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and

India, 1942–1945 (London: Casell, 1956; reprint New York, NY: Cooper Square Press,

2000), 210–211.

1-10 “An order should not …”: FM 100-5. Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations

(obsolete) (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 109.

1-11 “Every individual from the …”: FM 100-5. Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations

(obsolete) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 32.

1-13 Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily. Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of

Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We Are the Mighty. Posted on 8 April 2016.

Online http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

1-13 “Given the same …”: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 191.

1-15 Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command. Vignette adapted from Douglas V.

Mastriano, “Thunder in the Argonne! SGT Alvin York and Mission Command,” INFANTRY

(July–September 2015), 71–75.

1-16 “If intercommunication between …”: J. F. C. Fuller, Infantry in Battle (Washington, DC: The

Infantry Journal, Incorporated, 1939), 179.

1-16 “I believe firmly in …”: Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of

War (Oxford, United Kingdom: Alden Press, 1953), 127.

https://www.fulltextarchive.com/page/Personal-Memoirs-of-U-S-Grant–Volume-Two9/

https://www.fulltextarchive.com/page/Personal-Memoirs-of-U-S-Grant–Volume-Two9/

https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/059/0313

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12

Source Notes

Source Notes-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

2-1 “When you are…”: George C. Marshall: in Selected Speeches and Statements of General of

the Army George C. Marshall, ed. H.A. DeWeerd (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal,

1945), 176.

2-2 Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army. Matthew B. Ridgway,

Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York, NY: Harper, 1956; reprinted by

Andesite Press, 2017), 195-199.

2-3 “The commander must …”: Truppen Fuhrung: German Field Regulations, Volume 1, (1935),

paragraph 37.

2-5 “Intuition depends on…”: Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 33.

2-6 “Despite the years…”: General George S. Patton, “The Secret of Victory,” speech given on 26

March 1926. Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605

1885 – 1945. ed. Charles M. Province. San Diego, California: The George S. Patton, Jr.

Historical Society, 2002. Online http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext .

2-8 Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam. Based on John M.

Carland, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, The United

States Army in Vietnam, CMH Pub 91-5 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US

Army: GPO, 2000), 277–287.

2-8 “If it is necessary …”: Field Marshall Carver cited in ADP AC 71940, Land Operations

(Bristol, United Kingdom: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2017), 9-7.

2-10 “As each man’s…”: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 104.

2-11 “One of the…”: William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History (New York, NY: Orion Publishing

Group, 1962), 156.

2-12 “Commanders must remember…”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA:

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 357.

2-16 “There will be…”: Admiral E. J. King, CINCLANT Serial 053, 21 January 1941. Online

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-

053 ?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920.

2-16 “Morale is a state…”: William Joseph Slim, Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma

and India, 1942–1945 (London: Casell, 1956; reprint New York, NY: Cooper Square Press,

2000), 182.

2-17 “Judgment comes from experience…”: Simon Bolivar Buckner, as quoted by Omar N.

Bradley, “Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 07 Oct. 71,” Parameters 1

(3) (1972): 8.

2-18 Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement.

William M. Connor “Establishing Command Intent, a Case Study: The Encirclement of the

Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience,

ed.

Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press, 2000.

2-20 “General Meade was…”: Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs

of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2, ed. William S. McFeely and Mary Drake

McFeely (New York, NY: Library of America, 1990), 770.

2-23 “No man is …”: Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men, ed. Harold Lamb (New York, NY:

Robert McBride, 1927; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1956), 46.

2-23 “I have found again …”: Erwin Rommel. The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New

York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 7.

2-24 “Good morale and…”: FM 100-5, Operations (obsolete) (Washington, DC: Army Publishing

Directorate, 1941), 20–21.

3-1 “The test of …”: J.F.C. Fuller, as quoted in Infantry in Battle (Washington, DC: The Infantry

Journal, Incorporated, 1939; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General

Staff College: GPO, 1981), 169.

http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-053 ?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-053 ?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920

Source Notes

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Source Notes-3

3-1 “Everything in war ….”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 119 and 121.

3-2 Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik. Adapted from Robert A. Doughty, The

Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press,

Inc., 1990), 32–36.

3-5 “Many intelligence reports in….”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard

and P. Paret (Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 117.

3-6 “It is in ….” B. H. Liddell Hart cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, ed.

Robert D. Heinl Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1966), 61.

3-7 “He who wars walks …”: Sir William Napier cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval

Quotations, ed. Robert D. Heinl Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1966), 61.

3-10 Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War. Based on TRADOC Pam 525-100-1,

Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM

(obsolete) (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992), 28.

3-14 “…avoid taking….” paraphrased from Richard E. Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle:

The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii (London: Brassey’s Defence, 1987), 150.

3-16 “A doctrine of war …”: Ferdinand Foch cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations,

ed. Robert D. Heinl Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1966), 95.

4-1 “Staff systems and…”: General George S. Patton, Jr. “The Secret of Victory.” 1926 cited in

Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605 1885 – 1945.

ed. Charles M. Province. San Diego, California: The George S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society,

2002. Online http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext .

4-3 “When placed in…”: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf cited in Johnson, Erin. “Schwarzkopf

speaks of leadership at symposium.” The Daily Universe. 21 October 2001. Online

https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of leader at symposium/.

4-3 “A lazy commander…”: Address by Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, Canadian Junior War

Staff Course, 12 April 1941 (as related by Major C.P Stacey, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.).

Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-

history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-

1948/closing-exercises-canadian-junior-war-staff-course.html.

4-14 “The average human…”: General Sir Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (London,

United Kingdom: Edward Arnold & Co., 1921), 229.

http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext

https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of%20leader%20at%20symposium/

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-1948/closing-exercises-canadian-junior-war-staff-course.html

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-1948/closing-exercises-canadian-junior-war-staff-course.html

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-1948/closing-exercises-canadian-junior-war-staff-course.html

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Glossary-1

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and

joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the

proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms

is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1SG first sergeant

ADP Army doctrine publication

AR Army regulation

ATP Army techniques publication

C2 command and control

CCIR

commander’s critical information requirement

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

COP common operational picture

CPL corporal

CPT captain

DA Department of the Army

FM field manual

GA General of the Army

GEN general

JP joint publication

LTG lieutenant general

MG major general

NVA North Vietnamese Army

PACE primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency

SGT sergeant

U.S. United States

SECTION II – TERMS

Army team building

A continuous process of enabling a group of people to reach their goals and improve effectiveness

through leadership and various exercises, activities and techniques. (FM 6-22)

assessment

The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an

objective. (JP 3-0)

chain of command

The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is

exercised. (JP 1)

Glossary

Glossary-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

*civil considerations

The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the

civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military

operations.

combat power

(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or

formation can apply at one time. (ADP 3-0)

command

The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of

rank or assignment. (JP 1)

command and control

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and

attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1)

*command and control system

(Army) The arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders

to conduct operations.
command and control warfighting function

The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of

combat power. (ADP 3-0)

commander’s critical information requirement

An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely

decision making. (JP 3-0)

commander’s intent

A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that

supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting

commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the

operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

*commander’s visualization

The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and

envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state.

command post

A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. (FM 6-0)

*common operational picture

(Army) A display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s

requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.

*control

The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the

commander’s intent.

*control measure

A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions.

*data

In the context of decision making, unprocessed observations detected by a collector of any kind

(human, mechanical, or electronic).

*essential element of friendly information

A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise,

lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy

detection.

Glossary

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Glossary-3

friendly force information requirement

Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting

capabilities. (JP 3-0)

*graphic control measure

A symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions.

*information

In the context of decision making, data that has been organized and processed in order to provide

context for further analysis.

*information management

(Army) The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display,

disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products.

*key tasks

Those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state.

*knowledge

In the context of decision making, information that has been analyzed and evaluated for operational

implications.

*knowledge management

The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision

making.
leadership

The activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the

mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)

*mission command

(Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making

and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

*mission orders

Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.

multinational operations

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually

undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

network transport

A system of systems including the people, equipment, and facilities that provide end-to-end

communications connectivity for network components. (FM 6-02)

operational approach

A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the

mission. (JP 5-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational initiative

The setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation. (ADP 3-0)

operations process

The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing,

executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

Glossary

Glossary-4 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

priority intelligence requirement

An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other

aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-01)

procedures

Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. (CJCSM 5120.01)

*relevant information

All information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command and control.

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is

proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.

(ADP 5-0)

*situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships

among the operational and mission variables.

*understanding

In the context of decision making, knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to

comprehend the situation’s inner relationships, enable decision making, and drive action.

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private

sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of

operations. (ADP 3-0)

unified land operations

The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities

across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale

ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action. (ADP 3-0)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily

part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

warfighting function

A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish

missions and training objectives. (ADP 3-0)

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 References-1

References

All websites accessed on 17 July 2019.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 2019.

ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These publications are referenced in this publication.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/.

Most DOD publications are available at the Department of Defense Issuances Web site:

https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.

CJCSM 5120.01A. Joint Doctrine Development Process. 29 December 2014.

JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.

JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 July 2017.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Cooperation. 12 October 2016.

JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 1 March 2019.

JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 16 June 2017.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil/.

ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.

ADP 6-22. Army Leadership. 31 July 2019.

ADP 7-0. Training. 31 July 2019.

AR 380-10. Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. 14 July 2015.

AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. 6 November 2014.

ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 1 March 2019.

ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C. Survivability Operations. 16 April 2018.

ATP 3-60. Targeting. 7 May 2015.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

ATP 6-0.5. Command Post Organization and Operations. 1 March 2017.

ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.

ATP 6-22.5. A Leader’s Guide to Soldier Health and Fitness. 10 February 2016.

ATP 6-22.6. Army Team Building. 30 October 2015.

FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.

http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/

https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/

https://armypubs.army.mil/

References

References-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 8 April 2014.

FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016.

FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 22 January 2014.

FM 6-22. Leader Development. 30 June 2015.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OBSOLETE PUBLICATIONS

This section contains references to obsolete historical doctrine. The Archival and Special Collections

in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) on Fort Leavenworth in Kansas contains

copies. These publications are obsolete doctrine publications referenced for citations only.

Field Service Regulation (obsolete). Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1905.

FM 100-5. Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations. (obsolete) Washington DC: Government

Printing Office, 1939.

FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations (obsolete).Washington DC: Government Printing

Office, 1941.

TRADOC Pam 525-100-1, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE

and DESERT STORM (obsolete) Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. 15 December 2016.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N. “Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 7

October, 1971.” Parameters 1 (3) (1972): 8.

Carland, John M. Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966. Center of

Military History Publication 91-5, The United States Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC:

Center of Military History, U.S. Army: GPO, 2000.

Carver, Field Marshal Richard. ADP AC 71940, Land Operations. Bristol, United Kingdom: Land

Warfare Development Centre, 2017.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret. Boston, MA: Princeton

University Press, 2004.

Connor, William M. “Establishing Command Intent, a Case Study: The Encirclement of the Ruhr,

March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience, ed.

Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press, 2000.

Doughty, Robert A. The Breaking Point, Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. Hamden, CT: The Shoe

String Press INC, 1990.

Fuller, J.F. C. Infantry in Battle. Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal, Incorporated, 1939. Reprint,

Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1981.

Grant Ulysses S. Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant,

Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2, ed. William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely. New

York, NY: Library of America, 1990.

Hamilton, General Sir Ian. The Soul and Body of an Army. London, United Kingdom: Edward Arnold

& CO. 1921.

Heinl, Colonel Robert Debs Jr. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, MD: U.S.

Naval Institute, 1966.

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. CINCLANT Serial 053, 21 January 1941.

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-
053 ?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920.

Klein, Gary. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999.

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-053 ?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-053 ?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920

References

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 References-3

Lamb, Harold. ed. Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men. New York: Robert McBride, 1927; reprint,

New York: Doubleday, 1956.

Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy, 2d rev. ed. Toronto, Canada: Meridian, 1991.

Marshall, George C. Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall,

ed. H.A. DeWeerd. Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945.

Mastriano, Douglas V. “Thunder in the Argonne! SGT Alvin York and Mission Command,” Infantry.

Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School. July–September 2015.

Moltke, Helmuth von, Moltke’s Military Works, Vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I, “Operative Preparations

for Battle,” trans. Harry Bell, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1916.

Nye, Logan. “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We Are the

Mighty, 8 April 2016. http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

Patton, General George S. Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army

02605 1885 – 1945. ed. Charles M. Province. San Diego, California: The George S. Patton, Jr.

Historical Society, 2002. http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext .

Patton, General George S. War as I Knew It. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.

Perkins, Lieutenant General David G. “Mission Command: Reflections from the Combined Arms

Commander,” Army Magazine, Volume 62. June 2012. 32

Ridgway, Matthew B. Soldier: Memoirs of Matthew B Ridgway. New York, NY: Harper, 1956;

reprinted by Andesite Press, 2017.

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin. The Rommel Papers. ed. B.H. Liddell Hart. New York, NY: Harcourt,

Brace, 1953.

Schwarzkopf, General Norman H. quoted by Johnson, Erin. “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at

Symposium.” The Daily Universe. 21 October 2001.

Schwarzkopf speaks of leadership at symposium

Simonds, Commandant, Closing Exercises, Canadian Junior War Staff Course, CHHQ Report # 22.

London, England. 24 April 1941. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-

defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-

lineages/reports.html.

Simpkin, Richard E. and John Erickson. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii.

London: Brassey’s Defence, 1987, 150.

Slim, Field-Marshall Viscount William Joseph. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and

India, 1942–1945. London: Casell, 1956; reprint New York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 2000.

Slim, Field-Marshall Viscount William Joseph. Unofficial History. New York, NY: Orion Publishing

Group, 1962.

Truppen Fuhrung: German Field Regulations, Volume 1. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and

General Staff School Press. 1935.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll7/id/131.

Wavell Field-Marshal Earl, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United Kingdom:

Alden Press, 1953.

PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Website:

https://armypubs.army.mil/.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12

http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext

Schwarzkopf speaks of leadership at symposium

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports.html

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll7/id/131

https://armypubs.army.mil/

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

A

accept subordinates’ risk taking
and errors, 2-87–2-90

act, make timely decisions and,
2-117–2-121

adaptability, encourage, 3-63–
3-65

allocating resources, 4-82

allow subordinates maximum
freedom of decision and action,
3-49–3-53

analytic decision making, 2-24–
2-25

applications, end-user, 4-42–4-43

Army team building, defined, 2-95

Army’s primary mission, 1-8

assess, 2-80–2-81
subordinates, 2-114–2-116

assessing operations, 4-60

assist subordinate commanders,
staffs, and units, 4-21

authority, 2-6–2-7
delegate, 2-39–2-41
delegation of, 4-14

B

build mutual trust and shared
understanding, 2-91
teams, 2-94–2-98

building and maintaining
situational understanding,
4-56–4-58

C

capacity, 4-69

chain of command, defined, 4-79

channels, of communication,
3-39–3-40

characteristics of good staff
members, 4-25

combat power, defined, 1-96

command, 1-80–1-84, 2-1–2-123
defined, 1-80
elements of, 2-5

guides to effective, 2-82–2-121
nature of, 2-1–2-4
presence, 2-57–2-58
seconds in, 4-7–4-15
succession of, 4-12–4-13

command and control, 1-74–1-94
defined, 1-74
domain considerations, 1-93–

1-94
in multinational environments,

1-91–1-92
organizing for, 4-75–4-92
relationship between, 1-77–

1-90
train subordinates in, 2-103–

2-116
warfighting function,

command and control system,
4-1–4-93
command posts, 1-106
defined, 1-100, 4-1–4-74
networks in, 1-105
people in, 1-101
processes in, 1-102–1-104

command and control warfighting
function, defined, 1-98
tasks, 1-99

command and support
relationships, 4-80–4-81

command climate, create a
positive, 2-83–2-86

command post, defined, 4-50

command post administration,
performing, 4-62

command posts, 4-50–4-62
in command and control

system, 1-106
organization and employment

considerations, 4-63–4-74

command sergeants major, 4-16

commander, location of the, 2-59–
2-66
support the, 4-18–4-20
temporary absence of, 4-11

commander’s critical information
requirement, 3-20–3-25
defined, 3-20

commander’s intent, 1-45–1-51

defined, 1-45

commander’s visualization,
defined, 2-75

commanders, 4-5–4-6
role in operations, 2-67–2-81

common operational picture,
create, maintain and
disseminate the, 3-54–3-60
defined, 3-54

common staff duties and
responsibilities, 4-24

communicate with subordinates,
2-92–2-93

communication, 3-34–3-41
channels of, 3-39–3-40
structure of, 3-41

competence, 1-27–1-29

conducting, foreign disclosure,

4-53–4-55

information management,

4-53–4-55
knowledge management,

4-53–4-55

continuity, 4-67–4-68

control, 1-85–1-90
3-1–3-66
defined, 1-85
elements of, 3-7–3-41
guides to effective, 3-48–3-65
levels of, 1-24–1-25
nature of, 3-1–3-6
span of, 4-83–4-85

control measure, defined, 3-42

control measures, 3-42–3-47

controlling operations, 4-59

coordinating with internal and
external organizations, 4-61

create a positive command
climate, 2-83–2-86

create, maintain and disseminate
the common operational
picture, 3-54–3-60

critical and creative thinking,
2-21–2-23

cumulative risk, 2-35

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

Index-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

D

data, and information services ,
4-44–4-45
defined, 2-15

decentralized execution, 1-21–
1-23

decision making, 2-10–2-49
analytic, 2-24–2-25
intuitive, 2-26–2-29
subordinate, 1-17–1-20

degraded environments, 4-89–
4-92

delegate authority, 2-39–2-41

delegation of authority, 4-14

deputies of joint and multinational
forces, 4-15

describe, 2-77

design layout, 4-65

direct, 2-78
the staff, 2-48–2-49

direction, 3-9–3-10

disciplined initiative, 1-59–1-65

dispersion, 4-71

domain, command and control
considerations, 1-93–1-94

dynamic, nature, 1-4–1-5

E

effectiveness, 4-64–4-69

elements of command, 2-5
of control, 3-7–3-41

encourage, adaptability, 3-63–
3-65
flexibility, 3-63–3-65

end state, 1-48

end-user applications, 4-42–4-43

ensure unity of effort, 2-99–2-102

environments, degraded, 4-89–
4-92

essential element of friendly
information, 3-23

execution, decentralized, 1-21–
1-23

external organizations,
coordinating with, 4-61

F

feedback, 3-11–3-13

flexibility, encourage, 3-63–3-65

foreign disclosure, conducting,
4-53–4-55

friendly force information
requirement, defined, 3-22

G

good staff members,
characteristics of, 4-25

graphic control measure, defined,
3-44

graphics, use correct, 3-61–3-62

guides, to effective command,
2-82–2-121
to effective control, 3-48–3-65

guides to organizing for command
and control, 4-75–4-92

H

human endeavor, 1-3

I

identify, mitigate, and accept risk,
2-33–2-38

inform units and organizations
outside the headquarters, 4-22–
4-23

information, 3-14–3-33
defined, 2-16

information management,
conducting, 4-53–4-55
defined, 3-29

information services and data,
4-44–4-45

integrity, unit, 4-86–4-88

internal organizations,
coordinating with, 4-61

introduction to mission command,
1-1–1-110

intuitive decision making, 2-26–
2-29

J

joint forces, deputies of, 4-15

judgment, 2-30–2-49

K

key tasks, defined, 1-47

knowledge, defined, 2-17

knowledge management, 3-26–
3-33
conducting, 4-53–4-55
defined, 3-26

L

layout, design, 4-65

lead, 2-79

leader qualities, promote, 2-110–
2-113

leadership, 2-50–2-66
defined, 2-50

levels of control, 1-24–1-25

liaison officers, 4-29–4-32

location of the commander, 2-59–
2-66

M

make timely decisions and act,
2-117–2-121

mission, Army’s primary, 1-8

mission command, 1-13–1-25
defined, 1-14
introduction to, 1-1–1-110
principles of, 1-26–1-69
subordinates in , 1-70–1-73
train subordinates in the

application of, 2-103–2-116

mission orders, 1-52–1-58
defined, 1-53

mission variables, 3-18–3-19

mobility, 4-74

multinational environments,
command and control in, 1-91–
1-92

multinational forces, deputies of,
4-15

multinational operations, defined,
1-91

mutual trust, 1-30–1-35
build, 2-91

N

nature, dynamic, 1-4–1-5
of command, 2-1–2-4
of operations, 1-1–1-6
uncertain, 1-4–1-5
of control, 3-1–3-6

network transport, defined, 4-46
and management, 4-46–4-49

networks, 4-40–4-41
in command and control

system, 1-105

O

officers, liaison, 4-29–4-32

operational approach, defined,
2-76

operational environment, defined,
1-9

operational initiative, defined, 1-61

operational variables, 3-17

operations, assessing, 4-60
controlling, 4-59
nature of, 1-1–1-6
the role of commanders in, 2-

67–2-81
unified land, 1-7–1-12

Index
Entries are by paragraph number.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Index-3

operations process, defined, 2-68

organization and employment
considerations, command
posts, 4-63–4-74

organizing for command and
control, 4-75–4-92

P

people, in the command and
control system, 1-101
4-4–4-49

performing command post
administration, 4-62

political purpose, 1-6

presence, command, 2-57–2-58

principles of mission command,
1-26–1-69

prioritize resources, 2-42–2-47

priority intelligence requirement,
defined, 3-21

processes, in the command and
control system, 4-33–4-39
1-102–1-104

promote leader qualities, 2-110–
2-113

Q-R

redundancy, 4-73

relationship between command
and control, 1-77–1-90

relationships, command and
support, 4-80–4-81
staff, 4-26–4-28

relevant information, defined, 3-14

resources, allocating, 4-82
prioritize, 2-42–2-47

responsibility, 2-8–29

risk, identify, mitigate, and accept,
2-33–2-38
cumulative, 2-35

risk acceptance, 1-66–1-69

risk taking and errors, accept
subordinates’, 2-87–2-90

running estimate, defined, 4-57

S

seconds in command, 4-7–4-15

shared understanding, 1-36–1-44
build, 2-91

situational understanding, building
and maintaining, 4-56–4-58
defined, 2-13

size, command post, 4-72

span of control, 4-83–4-85

staff, direct the, 2-48–2-49

staff duties and responsibilities,
common, 4-24

staff relationships, 4-26–4-28

staffs, 4-17–4-28

standardization, 4-66

strategic roles, 1-8

structure, of communication, 3-41

subordinate commanders, staffs,
and units, assist, 4-21

subordinate decision making,
1-17–1-20

subordinates, accept risk taking
and errors, 2-87–2-90
allow maximum freedom,

3-49–3-53
assess, 2-114–2-116
communicate with, 2-92–2-93
in mission command, 1-70–

1-73

succession of command, 4-12–
4-13

support the commander, 4-18–
4-20

survivability, 4-70–4-74

system, command and control,
4-1–4-93

T

tasks, command and control
warfighting function, 1-99

teams, build, 2-94–2-98

temporary absence of the
commander, 4-11

terms, use correct, 3-61–3-62

train subordinates in command
and control and the application
of mission command, 2-103–
2-116

U

uncertain nature of war, 1-4–1-5

understand, 2-72–2-74

understanding, 2-13–2-20
defined, 2-20

unified action partners, defined,
1-36

unified land operations, 1-7–1-12
defined, 1-7

unit integrity, 4-86–4-88

unity of effort, defined, 2-102
ensure, 2-99–2-102

use correct, graphics, 3-61–3-62
terms, 3-61–3-62

V

variables, mission, 3-18–3-19
operational, 3-17

visualize, 2-75–2-76

W-X-Y-Z

warfighting function, command
and control, defined, 1-95

Warrior Ethos, 2-111–2-112

This page intentionally left blank.

ADP 6-0
31 July 9

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: istributed in

115907 ADP 6-0

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant

to the Secretary of the Army
1921303

PIN: 102806-000

• Cover

Contents
Figures
Tables
Vignettes
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction to Mission Command
The Nature of Operations
Human Endeavor
Dynamic and Uncertain
Designed to Achieve a Political Purpose
Unified Land Operations
Mission Command
Subordinate Decision Making
Decentralized Execution
Levels of Control
Principles of Mission Command
Competence
Mutual Trust
Shared Understanding
Commander’s Intent
Mission Orders
Disciplined Initiative
Risk Acceptance
The Role of Subordinates in Mission Command
Command and Control
Relationship Between Command And Control
Command
Control
Command and Control in Multinational Environments
Domain Command and Control Considerations
The Command and Control Warfighting Function
Command and Control Warfighting Function Tasks
Command and Control System
People
Processes
Networks
Command Posts

Conclusion

Chapter 2
Command
Nature of Command
Elements of Command
Authority
Responsibility
Decision Making
Understanding
Critical and Creative Thinking
Analytic Decision Making
Intuitive Decision Making
Judgment
Identify, Mitigate, and Accept Risk
Delegate Authority
Prioritize Resources
Direct the Staff

Leadership
Command Presence
Location of the Commander

The Role of Commanders in Operations
Understand
Visualize
Describe
Direct
Lead
Assess
Guides to Effective Command
Create a Positive Command Climate
Accept Subordinates’ Risk Taking and Errors
Build Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding
Communicate with Subordinates
Build Teams
Ensure Unity of Effort
Train Subordinates in Command and Control and the Application of Mission Command
Promote Leader Qualities
Assess Subordinates
Make Timely Decisions and Act
Conclusion

Chapter 3
Control
Nature of Control
Elements of Control
Direction
Feedback
Information
Operational Variables
Mission Variables
Commander’s Critical Information Requirement
Knowledge Management
Communication
Channels
Structure

Control Measures
Guides to Effective Control
Allow Subordinates Maximum Freedom of Decision and Action
Create, Maintain and Disseminate the Common Operational Picture
Use Doctrinally Correct Terms and Graphics
Encourage Flexibility and Adaptability
Conclusion

Chapter 4
The Command and Control System
Command and Control System Defined
People
Commanders
Seconds in Command
Temporary Absence of the Commander
Succession of Command
Delegation of Authority
Deputies of Joint and Multinational Forces
Command Sergeants Major
Staffs
Support the Commander
Assist Subordinate Commanders, Staffs, and Units
Inform Units and Organizations Outside the Headquarters
Common Staff Duties and Responsibilities
Characteristics of Good Staff Members
Staff Relationships
Liaison Officers
Processes
Networks
End-User Applications
Information Services and Data
Network Transport and Management

Command Posts
Conducting Knowledge Management, Information Management, and Foreign Disclosure
Building and Maintaining Situational Understanding
Controlling Operations
Assessing Operations
Coordinating with Internal and External Organizations
Performing Command Post Administration
Organization and Employment Considerations
Effectiveness
Design Layout
Standardization
Continuity
Capacity
Survivability
Dispersion
Size
Redundancy
Mobility

Organizing for Command and Control
Guides to Organizing for Command and Control
The Chain of Command
Command and Support Relationships
Allocating Resources
Span of Control
Unit Integrity
Degraded Environments

Conclusion
Source Notes
Glossary
Section I – Acronyms and Abbreviations
Section II – Terms
References
Required Publications
Related Publications
Joint and Department of Defense Publications
Army Publications
Obsolete Publications
Other Publications
Prescribed Forms
Referenced Forms
Index