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3820 #3 chap5-6

read chap 5- do assignments 3

PAD

820

Module

read chapters

–

book attached

the followin

3 assignments are based on this

EXTBOOK CHAPTERS 5

–

6: Lindell, M

K., Prater, C., & Perry, R. W. (1st

edt)

INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMEN

Wiley Pathways Publishin

Professor

will place in Turnitin therefore do not place just make sure no plagiarism

. All articles can only

be used

time

Assignment 1

-Module 3

Discussion

Part

1. Locate and summarize an article related to concepts of this module’s submission box assignment(s)

and POST ON THE DISCUSSION BOARD. Discuss your article in relation to the reading (in 100 words) and

cite the source of your article using APA format. (Thi

s article is NOT required to be a scholarly article

however you must provide the article’s citation.)

Assignment #2 Module

essay

PLACE ALL ANSWERS IN THIS ASSIGNMENT ON ONE WORD DOCUMENT

ONLY, IDENTIFYING EACH

ACCORDINGLY.

After reading Chapter Five prepare a 200 word response to the below.

List and discuss the elements involved in establishing the emergency management program.

After reading Chapter Six prepare a 200 word response to the below.

List and discuss the elements involved for the emergency manager in assessing risk.

Assignment #3

Module 3

Research Assignment

Research Assignment: Using th

is school library

https://www.fsw.edu/l

ibrary/

locate one scholarly

article that analyzes innovative methods of response for typical and atypical public safety emergencies.

For this article prepare a summary paper as follows:

Page One Article Title: List the article publication information using APA s

tyle for reference list citations,

“e.g. Smith, N (2005). Information technology in the public sector. Technology and Public

Administration Journal, 12(3), 125

–

136.”

Page Two Summary (100 words): List the article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology and

evidence, its

logic or argument, and summarizes its conclusions.

Page Three Evaluation (100 words): Using the article you summarized for Week Two, critique the

article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology, evidence, logic, and conclusions from your pers

pective on

the problem. Be constructively critical, suggesting how the research could be better or more useful. Be

sure to cite other scholarly articles, by way of comparison and contrast, in support of your critique

PAD3820 Module
3

read chapters
5
–
6

book attached
the following 3 assignments are based on this

TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS 5
–
6: Lindell, M. K., Prater, C., & Perry, R. W. (1st
edt)
.

INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMEN
T
.

Wiley Pathways Publishin
g

Professor

will place in Turnitin therefore do not place just make sure no plagiarism
. All articles can only
be used 1 time

Assignment 1
–
Module
3

Discussion
Part

1. Locate and summarize an article related to concepts of this module’s submission box assignment(s)
and POST ON THE DISCUSSION BOARD. Discuss your article in relation to the reading (in 100 words) and
cite the source of your article using APA format. (Thi
s article is NOT required to be a scholarly article
however you must provide the article’s citation.)

Assignment #2 Module
3

essay

PLACE ALL ANSWERS IN THIS ASSIGNMENT ON ONE WORD DOCUMENT

ONLY, IDENTIFYING EACH
ACCORDINGLY.

After reading Chapter Five prepare a 200 word response to the below.

List and discuss the elements involved in establishing the emergency management program.

After reading Chapter Six prepare a 200 word response to the below.

List and discuss the elements involved for the emergency manager in assessing risk.

Assignment #3
Module
3

Research Assignment

Research Assignment: Using th
is school library
https://www.fsw.edu/l
ibrary/

locate one scholarly
article that analyzes innovative methods of response for typical and atypical public safety emergencies.

For this article prepare a summary paper as follows:

Page One Article Title: List the article publication information using APA s
tyle for reference list citations,
“e.g. Smith, N (2005). Information technology in the public sector. Technology and Public
Administration Journal, 12(3), 125
–
136.”

Page Two Summary (100 words): List the article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology and

evidence, its
logic or argument, and summarizes its conclusions.

Page Three Evaluation (100 words): Using the article you summarized for Week Two, critique the
article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology, evidence, logic, and conclusions from your pers
pective on
the problem. Be constructively critical, suggesting how the research could be better or more useful. Be
sure to cite other scholarly articles, by way of comparison and contrast, in support of your critique

PAD3820 Module 3 read chapters 5-6 book attached the following 3 assignments are based on this

TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS 5-6: Lindell, M. K., Prater, C., & Perry, R. W. (1st

edt). INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. Wiley Pathways Publishing

Professor will place in Turnitin therefore do not place just make sure no plagiarism. All articles can only

be used 1 time

Assignment 1-Module 3 Discussion Part 1

cite the source of your article using APA format. (This article is NOT required to be a scholarly article

however you must provide the article’s citation.)

Assignment #2 Module 3 essay

PLACE ALL ANSWERS IN THIS ASSIGNMENT ON ONE WORD DOCUMENT ONLY, IDENTIFYING EACH

ACCORDINGLY.

After reading Chapter Five prepare a 200 word response to the below.

List and discuss the elements involved in establishing the emergency management program.

After reading Chapter Six prepare a 200 word response to the below.

List and discuss the elements involved for the emergency manager in assessing risk.

Assignment #3 Module 3 Research Assignment

Research Assignment: Using this school library

https://www.fsw.edu/library/

locate one scholarly

article that analyzes innovative methods of response for typical and atypical public safety emergencies.

For this article prepare a summary paper as follows:

Page One Article Title: List the article publication information using APA style for reference list citations,

“e.g. Smith, N (2005). Information technology in the public sector. Technology and Public

Administration Journal, 12(3), 125-136.”

Page Two Summary (100 words): List the article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology and evidence, its

logic or argument, and summarizes its conclusions.

Page Three Evaluation (100 words): Using the article you summarized for Week Two, critique the

article’s thesis (or hypotheses), methodology, evidence, logic, and conclusions from your perspective on

the problem. Be constructively critical, suggesting how the research could be better or more useful. Be

sure to cite other scholarly articles, by way of comparison and contrast, in support of your critique

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
Concepts and Strategies
for Effective Programs
Second edition
LUCIEN G. CANTON, CEM

This edition first published 2020
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in
any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law.
Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/
permissions.
The right of Lucien G. Canton to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
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In view of ongoing research, equipment modifications, changes in governmental regulations, and the constant flow of
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understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained
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damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data
Names: Canton, Lucien G., author.
Title: Emergency management : concepts and strategies foreffective programs /
Lucien G. Canton, CEM.
Description: Second edition. | Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2020. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2018061423 (print) | LCCN 2019003431 (ebook) | ISBN
9781119560456 (Adobe PDF) | ISBN 9781119560470 (ePub) | ISBN 9781119066859
(hardcover)
Subjects: LCSH: Emergency management–United States–Planning. | Emergency
management–United States–Evaluation.
Classification: LCC HV551.3 (ebook) | LCC HV551.3 .C36 2020 (print) | DDC
363.340973–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018061423

Cover design: Wiley
Cover image: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Arnold Genthe Collection: Negatives and
Transparencies, LC-USZ62-128020
Set in 12/14pts TimesNewRomanMTStd by SPi Global, Chennai, India
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For
David Fowler
1944–2001
Newsman, colleague, mentor and friend,
But, always, a true San Franciscan
And for
Roy Kite
1928–2015
and
Ken Chin
1936–2012
Good friends and colleagues, who taught me that service to others requires integrity,
commitment, and the courage to take risks.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XIII
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION XV
INTRODUCTION XVII
1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT 1
Why Study History? 2
Lessons From History 5
The Advent of Disaster Legislation 14
The Growth of Disaster Bureaucracy 22
From Military to Civilian Leadership 23
Civil Defense and Disaster Relief Merge 27
Conclusion 32
2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE
STRATEGY 33
The Origins of National Planning 34
September 11 and The Impact of Homeland Security 36
The Marginalization of Emergency Management 36
Capabilities‐based Planning Replaces All‐Hazards Planning 39
The Pendulum Swings Back: Hurricane Katrina 43
A Failed Response? 43
Degraded Capabilities and Confused Planning 45
Reform and New Planning Concepts 47
Conclusion 49
CONTENTS

viii CONTENTS
3 SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT THEORY 51
Social Science as an Emergency Management Tool 51
Social Science Evolves Emergency Management Theory 52
Emergencies, Disasters, and Catastrophes 54
Disaster Mythology 65
Organizational Response 69
Conclusion 71
4 THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING
PARADIGMS 73
Conflicting Roles 74
The Emergency Manager as Program Manager 78
Toward Professionalization 84
Emergency Management as a Field 84
Emergency Management as a Discipline 88
Emergency Management as a Profession 89
Conclusion 90
5 ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 93
Program Administration 94
Developing a Governance Structure 94
The Administrative Plan 99
Strategic Planning 99
Formulating Vision 101
Establishing Goals and Objectives 106
Developing the Strategic Plan 108
Enabling Authorities and Legislation 109
Grant Requirements 111
Best Practices 112
Program Elements 113
Resource Management 113
Training 115
Finance 116

CONTENTS ix
Program Evaluation 118
Quantitative Assessment Tools 118
Qualitative Assessment Tools 119
Exercise Programs 120
Actual Incidents 123
Corrective Action Program 124
Conclusion 125
6 ASSESSING RISK 127
The Nature of Risk 128
Risk Assessment Methodologies 129
Hazard Identification 133
Hazard Analysis 140
Simple Matrix Analysis 140
Indicators and Numerical Ranking 143
THIRA and Context Analysis 148
Intuition 149
Impact Analysis 150
Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 150
Adaptive Business Continuity 154
Continuity of Government/Continuity of Operations 155
Federal Guidance 155
Critical Functions and Process Analysis 158
Conclusion 160
7 DEVELOPING STRATEGY 163
A New Look at an Old Model 164
Risk Management Strategy 166
Mitigation Strategy 168
Recovery Strategy 173
Response Strategy 180
Preparedness Strategy 185
Using Strategy to Guide Planning 187
Conclusion 189

x CONTENTS
8 PLANNING CONCEPTS 191
Plans Versus Planning 191
The Planning Continuum 197
Planning Methodologies 201
Planning Assumptions 201
Scenario‐Based Planning 202
Functional Planning 205
Capabilities‐Based Planning 207
Effective Planning 208
Simplicity in Planning 209
Operational Phases 210
All‐Hazards Planning 212
Decentralized Execution 212
Putting the Pieces Together 214
General Planning Principles 215
Conclusion 217
9 PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 219
Establish a Planning Structure 219
Use a Meeting Facilitation Process 222
Meeting Agenda 225
Conducting the Meeting 226
The Meeting Memorandum 227
Develop an Action Plan and Set Deadlines 229
Managing Multiple Projects 230
Annual Work Plans 230
Graphic Planning Tools 231
Facilitate Decision‐Making 232
Use Common Plan Formats 234
Determining Plan Content 236
Use Graphic Tools 238
Use Exercises to Test Concepts 242
Keep it Simple 244
Conclusion 245

CONTENTS xi
10 COORDINATING RESPONSE 247
Operational Response 247
Incident Management Systems 251
Unified and Area Commands 256
Multiagency Coordination Systems 258
Emergency Operations Centers 264
Communications and Interoperability 269
Information Processing 272
Mutual Aid 273
Resource Management and Logistics 274
The Joint Information Center 276
Conclusion 278
11 LEADING IN CRISIS 279
Principles of Emergency Management 280
Program Leadership 282
Building a Leadership Team 282
Establishing Relationships 284
Making Decisions 285
Operational Leadership 286
The Effects of Crisis 286
Barriers to Decision‐Making 287
Crisis Decision‐Making 289
Conclusion 291
12 CRISIS MANAGEMENT 293
Barriers to Crisis Management 294
Disengagement and Inexperience 294
Common Leadership Problems 295
Appropriate Roles for Senior Officials 297
Crisis Management 299
Identifying the Crisis 299
Isolating the Crisis 300

xii CONTENTS
Preparing for Crisis Management 301
Hurricane Katrina: Crisis Management Failure 302
Increasing Organizational Effectiveness 304
Crisis Communications 305
Strategic Recovery Issues 307
Catastrophic Events 312
Conclusion 315
CONCLUSION 317
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321
INDEX 327

Preparedness is the ultimate confidence builder.
—Vince Lombardi
Shortly after the publication of the first edition of this book, I accepted an invitation from
Dr. Wayne Blanchard at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to give a short
presentation on the book at the annual Emergency Management Higher Education Program
conference in Emmitsburg, Maryland. I was stunned to find myself on stage at a plenary
session with Dr. Claire Rubin on one side and Dr. Russell Dynes on the other. The contribu-
tions of these two individuals to the discipline of emergency management are almost legendary,
and to find that my book was considered worthy of being included in a discussion of their new
works was humbling and, frankly, a bit frightening.
Anyone who has authored a book knows that authors are very aware of the shortcomings of
their books. There are things you wish you had included, things you wish you had said differ-
ently, and things you just got plain wrong. I am no different, and I still cringe when I read parts
of the first edition. Consequently, when the opportunity arose to revise my book for a second
edition, I jumped at the chance.
Maybe, I should have tested the water before jumping in.
Emergency management is based on the concept of continuous improvement. This makes it
a very dynamic field that is constantly evolving. Each disaster, and there have been many since
my book was first published in 2007, presents us with new challenges and new solutions. We
learn from our experiences and revise our strategies. This dynamic change is reflected in evolv-
ing national strategies, strategies that I am gratified to see incorporate some of the concepts I
espoused in the first edition of this book.
There have been significant changes in the academic world as well, as emergency management
has come into its own as an academic discipline. With the increase in higher education pro-
grams and the number of doctoral candidates, we have seen the emergence of academic jour-
nals devoted to emergency management and an increase in the volume of research on emergency
management issues. Much of this work is being done by a new generation of researchers who
are dedicated to this new discipline of emergency management.
Perhaps one of the most significant advances has been the emergence of an accepted defini-
tion of emergency management and of the Principles or Emergency Management. One of the
major problems in emergency management has been a lack of identity. We still have a long way
to go in defining who we are and what we do, but the Principles of Emergency Management
project is a major milestone in that journey.
What has not changed, though, is the need for emergency managers to move beyond their
traditional role as a response technician to that of a manager with responsibility for formu-
lating program strategy and serving as an advisor to senior officials. The range of threats we
face is increasing, particularly in cybersecurity. The rise of social media has drastically changed
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

xiv PREFACE TO THE SECOOD EDITIOO
how we communicate warnings. The 24‐hour news cycle has had a major impact on our media
relations. Oo single individual or small team can handle the diversity of problems we must con-
front. Oow, more than ever, emergency management must be an enterprise‐wide program, and
the emergency manager must be forward thinking and capable of seeing beyond just issues of
response.
As I said in the preface to the first edition, no book is the sole product of the author, and I
have leaned heavily on the work of many others. To my many friends in the academic community,
thank you for your enthusiastic reception of my book and your many thoughtful suggestions
for improving it. Without your work, this book would not exist. Thank you also to my col-
leagues and friends in the emergency management community; many of the ideas and concepts
in this book came from you and your willingness to share your wisdom. One of the privileges I
have enjoyed since the publication of the first edition was the numerous invitations to teach at
universities in the United States and in Ireland. To all those students who let me try out new
ideas and concepts on them and challenged me to learn more about my profession, thank you.
The future is yours and you are up to the challenge.
Very special thanks go to the staff at John Wiley and Sons. This book took much longer than
it should have, and throughout it, all my editors were encouraging and understanding. Their
patience with this project was greatly appreciated.
And, as always, I am grateful for the love and support of my wife, Doreen. I am constantly
amazed at her patience and willingness to put up with crazy ideas.

An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come.
—Victor Hugo
This is not the book I planned to write. When I first started this project in 2004, my original
plan was to base the book on material I had developed for a course on emergency planning and
management that I had taught for the University of California at Long Beach and to incorpo-
rate new information I had gained by teaching seminars on the Oational Preparedness Standard
for Oew York University’s IOTERCEP program. It was to have been a very conventional book,
focused on the tactical issues so dear to us old dinosaurs in emergency management.
Hurricane Katrina changed all that. As my colleagues and I wrestled with the issues of cat-
astrophic response, I began to question a lot of our traditional approaches to disaster response.
An article by Dr. E.L. Quarantelli on the qualitative differences between catastrophe and
disaster added fuel to the flames and sent me back to the social science literature. A comment
during a presentation at the 2005 International Association of Emergency Managers conference
provided the catalyst that made all the disparate elements come together.
This book approaches emergency management from a different perspective than the tradi-
tional four phases of emergency management. It does not have the equally traditional listing of
hazards and impacts. It does not even give a lot of detail about response. There are plenty of
excellent books already available that deal with these topics. Instead, I have focused on the
development of emergency management programs and attempted to position these programs
within local government in a way that contributes to community goals by helping to manage
community risk. The idea of emergency management as an enterprise‐wide program forms, I
believe, the core of the Oational Preparedness Standard, OFPA 1600, and its derivative, the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program Standard. This concept also demands a
change in the role of the emergency manager from that of a technical expert who is responsible
for everything vaguely related to disasters to that of a program manager who coordinates the
community’s management of risk.
This is a very different perspective from the way we have traditionally viewed emergency
managers. However, the best emergency managers have either already adapted to this concept
or are on their way to doing so. More importantly, an entirely new generation of future
emergency managers is emerging from our educational institutions, potential leaders who are
trained in this new paradigm. The real issue for our profession will be gaining the acceptance
of elected officials and the public for this new role and overcoming the roadblocks created by
the well‐meaning but out‐of‐touch Department of Homeland Security.
The ideas in this book are likely to be controversial and, I hope, spark discussion among my
colleagues. There is no single best way to respond to disasters – by virtue of the need for inno-
vation and creative problem‐solving during response, there really cannot be. However, we can
define a common set of criteria that positions us for success. It is this belief that has caused
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

xvi PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITIOO
a number of my colleagues to expend considerable efforts to develop OFPA 1600 and the
EMAP Standard. Therefore, although some of my ideas may be controversial, they are
grounded in this common set of criteria and in a considerable body of social science research.
I had hoped initially to write a book that would be applicable to both the public and private
sectors. However, I began to realize that there are, in fact, qualitative differences between the
two sectors that make such a task extremely difficult. The principles are the same, but there are
enough subtle nuances that would have made the book cumbersome. Wherever I could, I have
tried to focus on concepts and principles; therefore, it is my hope that this book may be of some
value to my colleagues in the private sector.
I have had to make similar decisions in some of the titles I selected. Over the last few years,
there have been many new players getting involved in disaster response. We are seeing a conver-
gence of disciplines that will have a profound impact on our professions in the future. Risk
managers, security managers, business continuity managers, and so many others are lending
important new skills to our programs. Therefore, although I have focused this book on public
sector emergency managers, it is my hope that there will be applicability to the other disciplines
that are involved with disaster response. Each of these disciplines has a specialized body of
knowledge that makes us experts in our field, but there is a commonality among disciplines
when we start discussing emergency preparedness and response.
It has been said that no book is the sole product of the author and how true that is! The two
most humbling things I know are teaching a course or writing a book about your profession. It
forces you to confront how little you really know and how much better others have expressed
the ideas you are groping toward. Thomas Edison once said that, “If I have seen farther than
others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants.” Many of those giants are listed in
the bibliography.
I am an emergency management dinosaur. I came to the profession with previous experience
in private security and the military at a time when you learned your craft from your mentors
and your colleagues. It was years before I discovered that everything that I had learned the hard
way had already been written about by social scientists such as Russell Dynes and E.L.
Quarantelli. The advantage to coming to their work late in my career is that I know they are
right – their work corresponds to the lessons I have learned in over 30 years of dealing with
crisis. Therefore, to all those social scientists that are building the knowledge base so critical to
our profession, at least one emergency manager has heard you and appreciates your hard work.
For the rest, there are friends and colleagues around the world who have taught me my craft
and had a part, however unknowing, in the writing of this book. I am always amazed at the
generosity of my fellow emergency managers and their willingness to help in any and all cir-
cumstances. If I have learned anything in this business, it has been because of you. You know
who you are.
A final thank you goes, as always, to my wife Doreen, who suffered through multiple reread-
ing’s of the initial manuscript and encouraged me to keep plugging away. For over 20 years, she
has been my moral compass and best friend.

INTRODUCTION
“I cannot imagine any condition which would cause a ship to founder. I cannot conceive of any
vital disaster happening to this vessel. Modern ship building has gone beyond that.”
—Captain Edward John Smith, Commander, HMS Titanic
When on Friday, 24 February 2006, the White House issued a report entitled, The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, one salty emergency manager observed “It
ain’t a lesson learned until you correct it and prove it works. Until then, it’s just an observa-
tion.” The White House report was just one of several released around the same time, all saying
essentially the same thing: as a nation, the United States is not prepared to deal with catastrophe.
How is this possible? The United States has been in the emergency management business for
over 50 years. There are volumes of social science reports on human behavior in disaster. There
are detailed records on historical disasters that have occurred in the past 300 years and geolog-
ical records going back to prehistory. Millions have been spent on building the capacity to
respond. Since September 11 there has been an even bigger push to strengthen and enhance
emergency response capabilities. And yet, in the biggest test in US history, the system failed at
all levels of government.
Despite vows to improve things, little has changed. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 highlighted
weaknesses in key infrastructure. The multiple disasters in 2017 severely taxed the United
State’s ability to respond, particularly on the island of Puerto Rico. These are not, unfortu-
nately, isolated cases. Every disaster seems to generate a list of failures couched as “lessons
learned,” along with pledges to improve the system. Few of those pledges are ever implemented.
Yet, like Captain Smith, citizens in the United States believe that a sophisticated system of
response is in place to protect them from the unthinkable. There is an expectation that, no
matter what the event, government will be there to provide immediate and effective relief.
To a certain extent, emergency management in the United States is a victim of its own suc-
cess. Response is extremely fast compared to other countries, and there is a culture of profes-
sionalism among first responders that makes them second to none. However, this has led to the
expectation that disaster response is a government responsibility, not a collective one, and there
are increased demands for more immediate and detailed services. This is a demand that has
obvious limits, as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina.
Government officials at all levels go out of their way to reinforce these public expectations.
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation, Michael Chertoff, at the time Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, encouraged people to be prepared, saying “…you cannot
count on help coming in the first 24 or even 48 hours of a catastrophe … people who are pre-
pared with that kind of planning do much better if they have to wait 24–48 hours than people
who don’t do that planning.” Secretary Chertoff seemed unaware that he had just shortened
the normal recommendation of preparing for a minimum of 72 hours by 24–48 hours and
further encouraged the public’s expectation of immediate response.

xviii INTRODUCTION
It is unheard of for an elected official to admit the truth. Disasters, by definition, overwhelm
available local resources. You can never be fully prepared; there is not enough money or political
will to fund all the requirements for mitigation and preparedness planning that would ensure
full readiness. Preparedness is a balancing act, with most politicians betting that a disaster will
not happen on their watch and that the public will not discover the thin veneer that passes for
preparedness. Jurisdictions are unprepared, and it is extremely unlikely that they will ever reach
the level of preparedness that the public believes already exists. The bar has been set too high
to be supported by local, state, or federal government without a major shift of priorities.
However, as one reads after‐action reports and “lessons learned,” one begins to sense com-
monalities. It is seldom the initial life‐saving response that is criticized. Police, fire, and
emergency medical personnel usually get high marks for their efforts in a crisis. Witness the
praise deservedly heaped on the US Coast Guard for its rescue of 33 000 victims during
Hurricane Katrina (an operation so successful that Secretary Chertoff believed that only Coast
Guard admirals were qualified to serve as Principal Federal Officials). Instead, criticism seems
to fall into two areas. The first is related to traditional victim services such as sheltering or evac-
uation. Criticism of victim services usually reflects inadequacy of service or confusion in the
delivery of services brought on by poor coordination among relief agencies. Indeed, some
social scientists suggest that the biggest problem in disasters is not the impact of the event on
the victims but the lack of coordination among multiple responding agencies. This confusion
and lack of coordination can impede the delivery of services.
The second major area of criticism relates to long‐term issues. This is usually characterized
by conflicts over reconstruction policies. Again, one notes concerns over confusion in the pro-
cess. There is a lack of coordination and public participation that leads to delays in the
rebuilding of a community and the restoration of its economic base. It is during this recovery
period that one generally sees the emergence of finger‐pointing and an increase in underlying
social tension. There is usually a conflict between citizens who want to rebuild quickly and
return the community to the way it was and officials who push for improved structures or social
re‐engineering.
Again, one must ask the question “Why?” Why, in a system that has almost 70 years of expe-
rience in countless disasters, that has national guidelines, that has millions in government fund-
ing, and that has reams of textbooks and social science reports, why is it that the system seems
to fail more than it works, and why do those failures always seem to be in the same areas? Can
the United States do better?
The fact that these failures seem to occur in almost every disaster and in almost always the
same areas would seem to suggest that there is something wrong with the system. Social science
suggests some of the reasons. Emergency management issues do not generally engage local
officials. In many jurisdictions, the responsibility for developing emergency response capacity
rests with a single individual and is usually an additional duty. Emergency planning is viewed
as a task centered on the development of a paper plan, and there is no real linkage between
emergency management and community goals and vision. Worse, emergency plans incorporate
assumptions based on disaster myths that do not reflect the reality of human behavior in
disasters.
This book suggests that the United States can do better by changing the nature of emergency
management and traditional response. It is time for a different approach, one that is supported
by social science and by new national standards for emergency management programs. This
approach is based on the concept that emergency management is a distributed process, one that
must be collectively performed by the community. This suggests that emergency management
must be integrated with other community goals and, as such, must be perceived as adding value
to the community. This added value is achieved by helping the community manage overall risk.
The community‐wide approach also holds implications for the emergency manager. Instead of

INTRODUCTION xix
being a technical expert on emergency operations, the emergency manager becomes a program
manager whose job is to facilitate the development of a community strategy for managing risk
and to oversee the enterprise‐wide implementation of that strategy. This focus on strategy
allows all the various components of the community to work together to achieve a common
vision of resilience.
The first four chapters of this book focus on the three pillars on which successful emergency
management is based: an understanding of history, knowledge of social science research, and
technical expertise in emergency management operations. The chapters also provide insight as
how emergency management has evolved and suggest reasons why the current method of
response planning does not work as well as it should.
Chapter 1 briefly looks at the historical underpinnings of emergency management up to the
1950s. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of a national strategy for disaster response and a
disaster bureaucracy. Chapter 3 traces the emergence of emergency management theory
through the work of social scientists. Chapter 4 considers the changing role of the emergency
manager.
Chapter 5 discusses establishing and administering the emergency management program.
Traditionally, emergency management “programs” have been a collection of activities with
only vague relation to each other, primarily driven by federal grants. Chapter 5 provides a
mechanism for addressing program governance and oversight and for linking program ele-
ments through a strategic plan.
Chapter 6 considers the analysis of risk as the basis for strategy development. It considers
both the traditional macro view of hazard identification and analysis as well as the micro view
required for continuity planning.
Chapter 7 covers strategy development, a major weakness in many emergency management
programs. The focus is not so much on individual strategies as it is on the interface between the
strategies. It is this conceptual basis that helps build the flexibility needed in disaster response.
Chapters 8 and 9 focus planning and on the development of the various plans needed within
the emergency management program. The chapters are more concerned with the planning pro-
cess than with specific plans and with operational planning issues rather than field operations.
Chapter 8 discusses planning concepts, whereas Chapter 9 suggests methodologies to translate
these concepts into actual plans.
Chapter 10 considers issues related to operational response. It discusses the pros and cons of
incident management systems and suggests a coordination methodology that may prove more
effective than traditional command and control structures.
Chapter 11 looks at leadership, both in the day‐to‐day administration of the emergency
management program and during response to a crisis. The chapter draws a distinction between
the leadership styles demanded by each and looks at models that might assist in increasing the
effectiveness of leadership during a crisis.
Chapter 12 focuses on the roles and responsibilities of senior officials in the management of
strategic response. It suggests that the normal involvement of the senior officials in the
emergency operations center may be counterproductive and suggests new ways of managing
disasters using crisis management principles.
Together, the chapters make a case for a change in how emergency management programs
are integrated into communities and in the role of the emergency manager. These changes are
consistent with the direction of the National Preparedness Standard and the current guidance
provided by the Department of Homeland Security and are supported by social science
research. It is hoped that they might point toward a more effective system of disaster response.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition.
Lucien G. Canton.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc.
1
Chapter 1
What experience and history teaches us is that people and governments have never
learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.
—Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Since the dawn of time, humankind has had the need to deal with crises of all
types. For much of history, this response was personal and intimate, and the
victim did not always survive the encounter. As people grouped together for the
common good, the idea of some sort of collective response to crisis gradually
evolved. As governments came into being, this idea became an expectation that
it was part of the responsibility of government to provide protection and
assistance in times of crisis. From this expectation came the discipline of
emergency management, the mechanism by which government discharges this
perceived obligation.
Emergency management rests on three pillars as follows: a knowledge of his-
tory, an understanding of human nature expressed in the social sciences, and
specialized technical expertise in crisis management. History tells us what hap-
pened, suggesting what events could occur again, and provides examples of
how others have dealt with crisis. Social science suggests why people react to
crisis in certain ways and why some methods of crisis management succeed and
others fail. The technical expertise demanded of the emergency manager
addresses how crisis is managed, both in the immediate response, but more
importantly, in the development of strategies to reduce risk and build community
resilience. This chapter and the one that follows consider the first leg of the
tripod on which emergency management rests, that of historical perspective.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES:
THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
WHY STUDY HISTORY?
In a posting to the email list service for the International Association for
Emergency Managers, a veteran emergency manager asked the question:
“Given our advances in technology, what can we possibly learn from past disas-
ters?” His query was prompted by a student’s request for information on bio-
terrorism response and the suggestion by several members that the student
examine historical disasters, particularly the Flu Pandemic of 1918 (Figure 1.1).
The emergency manager asked the question as to how an early twentieth‐
century response using limited technology could have relevance for a practi-
tioner in the twenty‐first century, where mass communication is almost
instantaneous and modern methods of treatment and diagnosis are so much
further advanced. It is a reasonable question.
A slightly different way of phrasing the question is “Does the study of the
history of disasters have any relevance for emergency managers?” The answer
is a resounding, “Yes!”
It is common to look at an institution, process, or system and assume that it
sprang into existence as the result of conscious decision‐making. In other
words, there is an assumption that the end result is what was intended all along.
In reality, institutions tend to develop and evolve over time and are influenced
by a variety of factors. The result is almost always an imperfect system that is
Figure 1.1 Emergency hospital during the 1918 influenza pandemic, Camp Funston, Kansas.
Source: Courtesy of U.S. Army Photo.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 3
a result of compromises between an ideal state and political and economic real-
ities, many of which shift over time. Understanding how an institution devel-
oped can tell a lot about why it operates the way it does and the likelihood of
its changing or adapting to future conditions.
The study of historical disasters offers a number of benefits to the emergency
manager:
• Historical Disasters Suggest What Could Happen in a Community. In con-
ducting a hazard analysis, many planners are driven by the immediate past
or by disasters that had a major impact on the community. For example,
emergency planners in San Francisco are heavily influenced by the memory
of the 1906 earthquake and fires and by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.
On the other hand, New Yorkers plan almost exclusively for terrorist
attack, a legacy of the 11 September 2001 tragedy. Few San Franciscans
are aware that hazards such as tsunamis and tornadoes have occurred in
the history of their city or that an outbreak of the plague occurred in the
early 1900s. Likewise, many New Yorkers would be surprised to find that a
fault line runs under Manhattan Island.
• Historical Disasters Identify Hazards That are Foreseeable. Emergency
planners are expected to identify and plan for hazards that could have an
impact on the community. Events that are foreseeable are of particular
concern as the question is always asked after the event “Why didn’t we plan
for this?” Prior to 11 September 2001, would anyone have thought that an
airplane could be used to attack a building? Possibly not, but the possi-
bility of an airplane flying into a building was foreseeable. On 28 July 1945,
a military bomber whose pilot was disoriented by fog and drizzle crashed
into the Empire State Building, igniting a major fire and forcing the evac-
uation of 1500 people. This historical incident did in fact influence building
design throughout the United States. These design parameters helped pre-
vent the immediate collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and
allowed the safe evacuation of thousands of occupants.
• Historical Disasters Provide Long‐range Views of Potential Hazards. By
nature, people tend to focus on the near term and on incidents that are part
of institutional memory. However, a brief review of the historical record,
particularly those events involving geological hazards, can give one pause.
Prior to the 1990s, few remembered the series of earthquakes that shook
New Madrid, Missouri, in 1811–1812. Yet these were among the largest
earthquakes in history, changed the course of the Mississippi River,
destroyed almost 150 000 acres of forest, and were felt throughout most of
the United States. The overall impact was low because of the sparse
population of the region at the time. The probability of a similar earth-
quake is estimated at 90% by 2040 and would result in great loss of life and
billions in damages.

4 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
• Historical Disasters Provide Examples of the Social Impacts of Disasters.
When most people think of disaster, they think in terms of immediate needs
and the response to the consequences of the event. An emergency manager,
however, must be concerned with the long‐range impact of the event and the
need to restore the community to some semblance of normalcy. By studying
the long‐range impact of historical disasters, it may be possible to make rea-
sonable assumptions as to what might occur. While the Black Death of the
1300s is remembered for its toll on human lives, it had a profound impact on
the economics and social contracts of the Middle Ages, leading ultimately to
increased wages, better living conditions, and the end of the feudal system.
In his book, Krakatoa: The Day the World Exploded: August 27, 1883, author
Simon Winchester suggested that the eruption of Krakatoa exacerbated
anti‐Dutch sentiment and contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism
in the Eastern Pacific.
• Historical Disasters Provide Examples of Cascading Events. Cascading
events are disasters in which an initial incident creates a ripple effect that
triggers additional disasters or expands to encompass areas that would
otherwise be unaffected by the incident. Such an event was the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake in Japan that spawned a tsunami and lead to a meltdown at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The historical record is replete
with many other such events. In April 1815, Mount Tambora, an island
east of Java, exploded, spewing an estimated 1.7 million tons of ash and
debris into the atmosphere and casting a blanket of ash over 1 million
square miles. The lighter ash formed a barrier at an altitude of some
25 miles that reflected sunlight back into space, resulting in a cold wave in
1816 that sparked world‐wide crop failure and famine. A similar record of
unseasonable cold and famine found in Dark Age chronicles has also been
associated with a volcanic event in the Pacific.
• Historical Disasters are Focusing Events. Social scientist Thomas Birkland
(1994) defined a focusing event as an unexpected event of such consequence
that it causes the public and elite decision‐makers to recognize a potential
policy failure. A focusing event is a combination of factors that frequently
result in significant changes to public policy. For example the Triangle
Waist Factory fire in New York on 25 March 1911 was not particularly
significant as a fire. The fire lasted less than 20 minutes and only affected
the three top floors of a 10‐story building. However, poor safety practices
led to the deaths of 146 workers, most of whom were young immigrant
women, making the fire the deadliest industrial disaster in the city’s his-
tory. It occurred at a time when the women’s labor movement was at a high
point and well organized, drawing the attention of Tammany Hall politi-
cians who were seeking to remain in power. The result was the passage of
some 38 new laws that significantly improved safety and working condi-
tions in New York State.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 5
LESSONS FROM HISTORY
The gift shop at Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s Emergency
Management Institute in Emmitsburg, Maryland, used to offer a T‐shirt with
a cartoon of Noah’s Ark and the caption “The Original Emergency Manager.”
One can certainly make a case for this: Noah conducted a hazard analysis based
on a reliable weather forecast and the potential for catastrophic loss of life and
developed and implemented plans to mitigate the effects of the coming calamity
(selection of the animals) and to respond to it (the construction of the ark). At
the onset of the event, he implemented his plan, conducted a preplanned evac-
uation, and managed a sustained shelter and feeding operation for 40 days and
40 nights. At the end of the incident, he implemented a recovery plan by
releasing his animals and re‐establishing a community.
Whether or not Noah is the original emergency manager, there is no question
that as long as there have been disasters, people have attempted to avoid them
and deal with the consequences. One could make the argument that primitive
attempts to touch and influence the Divine through sacrifice and ritual are in
fact an early form of mitigation, an attempt to avoid disaster or reduce its
impact by placating some outside force. The myths and legends that predate
recorded history contain many examples of attempts to stave off or prepare for
catastrophe, many of which may have been inspired by actual historical inci-
dents. Stories of a great flood are common to all cultures, and variations on the
story of Noah can be found in the Sumerian tales of Gilgamesh, in the Indian
stories of Vishnu, and even in the Popul Vuh of the Mayans. Ancient texts also
contain examples of more prosaic attempts to mitigate catastrophe: The Book
of Genesis tells of Joseph’s stockpiling of grain against the predicted years of
famine in Egypt.
These early legends of catastrophe are more than just simple stories. In many
cases, archeological evidence suggests that they might in fact be records of
actual historical disasters. Geologists Walter Pitman and William Ryan in their
book, Noah’s Flood: The New Scientific Discoveries about the Event That
Changed History, theorize that Noah’s flood may recall an event in 5600 BCE
that led to the formation of the Black Sea. According to the theory, the sudden
formation of the Bosporus Strait caused the Mediterranean Sea to flood into
an existing freshwater lake at the rate of 10 cubic miles of water per day (about
two hundred times the rate of Niagara Falls), creating what is now known as
the Black Sea. Plato’s writings on Atlantis in 350 BCE, although generally
regarded as myth, may in fact be related to the volcanic destruction of the
island of Thera c. 1628 BCE that may have hastened the end of the Minoan
civilization in the Aegean.
Not all ancient disasters are accessible only as myths. Historians of all ages have
evinced an interest in disaster, and those of the Classical Age were no different.
Many of their accounts are factual records based on firsthand observation.

6 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Thucydides provides a vivid description of the plague that struck Athens in 430–
428 BCE and presaged the end of the Golden Age of Greece. Thucydides’ record
is of particular interest as he contracted and survived the plague.
Perhaps the most gripping eyewitness account of catastrophe is Pliny the
Elder’s description of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and the destruction of
Pompeii and Herculaneum in 62 BCE (Figure 1.2). While a minor footnote in
history now, modern scientists have estimated that the eruption of Mount
Vesuvius released thermal energy equivalent to 100 000 times that of the atomic
bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. The consummate naturalist,
Pliny chose to leave a safe vantage point in Misenum and move closer to Pompeii
to make more detailed observations from the deck of a small galley. He recorded
his observations moment by moment until he collapsed and died, most likely
from a heart attack brought on by overexertion.
Accounts of catastrophe such as those of Thucydides and Pliny offer more
than just historical interest. In many cases, they contain detailed observations
of the onset and effects of the event. These accounts also chronicle the reaction
of people affected by disaster and allow one to draw conclusions about human
nature. The reaction of people to catastrophe in the past is not significantly
different from those in the present time.
Figure 1.2 Mount Vesuvius from space. Source: Courtesy of National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 7
As one considers the historical record, it is also possible to identify precur-
sors to modern emergency management concepts. Over time, one begins to
note the demand by people that their governments provide them with protec-
tion against potential disasters, leading to striking parallels to current emergency
management concepts and methods. This suggests that there may be a certain
commonality in how humans respond to crisis. This gives rise to the specula-
tion that there may be certain default mechanisms for crisis response that are
both natural and comfortable. If so, the closer emergency plans resemble this
mechanism, the more effective they are likely to be.
Elements of emergency management make their appearance early in recorded
history. In response to public demand that something be done about the fires
that frequently plagued Rome, the Emperor Augustus established a brigade of
vigiles in 6 CE who served as firefighters and night watchmen. The brigade
consisted of seven cohorts of 560 men each, with each cohort responsible for
two of Rome’s 14 districts. A special detail of 320 vigiles was drawn from the
Roman cohorts and rotated to the ports of Ostia and Portus every four months.
The vigiles were stationed in seven major barracks and 14 watchtowers and
performed nightly patrols to ensure the safe use of fires and lamps. In addition
to the expected hooks, axes, ladders, rope, and buckets, equipment included
high‐pressure water pumps capable of reaching to a height of 60–100 ft. Each
cohort also had four physicians and the Roman equivalent of a chaplain, the
victimarius, assigned to it. The parallels to modern firefighting organizations
are striking.
In the plague that struck Europe in 1348 (Figure 1.3), one can see reflections
of modern fears of bioterrorism or pandemics, such as severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) or Asian bird flu or Ebola, and of modern emergency
management practices. The arrival of the disease was stunningly swift: within
three years, anywhere from 25% to 50% of Europe’s population had been killed.
Major cities such as Florence, Venice, Hamburg, and Bremen lost at least 60%
of their populations. Paris lost 50 000 people, half of its population. Many of
the problems and solutions found in the plague record are reminiscent of those
faced by twenty‐first century responders. To deal with the vast number of sick
people, makeshift hospitals, usually run by the clergy or volunteers, were
established. These hospitals would have looked remarkably similar to the tem-
porary hospitals of 1918 shown in Figure 1.1. The large number of dead almost
immediately overwhelmed the churches that normally disposed of remains
through burial in consecrated ground, forcing the use of mass graves and cre-
mation, techniques that are still used in disasters despite the fact that such
practices are unnecessary and create severe problems for the victims’ families.
Cremation and mass burial continue to be used for the same reasons they were
used in the Middle Ages: fear of contagion and a misunderstanding of the
health hazards posed by mass fatalities.

8 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The Black Death forced a reexamination of traditional medical practices.
Up to this point, many treatments were based on biblical cures and traditional
remedies. The almost universal failure of these remedies resulted in their
replacement by techniques based on observed results. In some cases, observa-
tion supported traditional methods. For example, the frequent misdiagnosis of
the plague as leprosy led to the imposition of a biblically mandated 40‐day
quarantine. Despite this misdiagnosis, physicians noted that quarantining those
ill with plague helped to protect others. The success of this practice led in turn
to harsh quarantine restrictions in several areas. The city of Pistoia ceased all
imports of wool and linen and barred citizens who had visited plague‐ridden
towns from reentering the city. In other locations, such as Milan, houses where
the plague appeared were sealed up, with both the dead and living inside. Other
jurisdictions used fire to burn out the contagion. These measures did result in
slowing the spread of the disease.
The outbreak of SARS (Figure 1.4) in 2003 forced a reexamination of the
use of quarantine as a method for preventing the spread of contagion. The epi-
demic began in November 2002 and came to public attention in February 2003.
In April, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued an advisory recom-
mending only essential travel to Toronto, Canada, based on the number of
cases there and concerns over the potential spread of the disease to other coun-
tries. However, only one confirmed case of SARS was “exported” from Canada,
and new cases were all from among medical personnel who had treated SARS
Figure 1.3 The Dance of Death by Michael Wolgemut (1434–1519) was inspired by the Black
Death and was a common theme in medieval art.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 9
patients and who were subjected to severe quarantine restrictions. Nevertheless,
the WHO persisted in prompting similar advisories from other countries that
resulted in a severe blow to tourism in Canada. In the reaction of the WHO,
one hears echoes from Pistoia.
The relationship between disaster and attempts to prevent its reoccurrence
or reduce its impact is one that repeats itself throughout history. The Great
Fire of London in 1666 (Figure 1.5) offers another example of this relation-
ship. Started by a careless baker who had failed to douse his oven fire at night,
On 21 February, a Chinese doctor who had treated as yet
undiagnosed SARS patients in Guangdong Province checked
into the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong. Within 24 hours,
12 people who stayed in the same hotel became infected
with SARS and took the disease with them to Singapore, Hong
Kong, Vietnam, Ireland, Canada, and the United States,
infecting directly or indirectly more than 350 people. Eventually,
the World Health Organization estimated that more than 4000
cases worldwide could be traced to this “superspreader.”
Hong Kong
Special
Administrative
Region
195 casesVietnam
58 cases
Canada
29 cases
United States
1 case
Ireland
1 case
Singapore
71 cases
800 Kilometers
Source: Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC).
Flow of SARS
0
0 800 Miles
Figure 1.4 The spread of SARS virus as of 28 March 2003, about a month after the initial
outbreak in February. Source: Library of Congress Geography and Map Division.

10 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
the fire burned for five days and destroyed some 436 acres, most within the City
of London. Eighty‐seven churches and 13 200 houses, about 90% of the city’s
houses, were destroyed and between 100 000 to 200 000 people were left home-
less. Oddly, only six fatalities are recorded, although there is anecdotal evidence
that the initial toll was much higher and increased over time as survivors suc-
cumbed to disease and starvation. (Inaccurate casualty figures are common in
historical accounts: until 2005, the official death toll for the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake and fire was only 478. Research by historian Gladys Hansen con-
vinced the board of supervisors to amend the official count in 2005 to over
3400. The original number had been deliberately distorted for political
reasons.)
Following the fire, houses were rebuilt from brick and stone instead of wood
and thatch to reduce the risk of fire. Insurance companies were chartered to
provide both insurance indemnification and, in some cases, firefighting com-
panies that would attempt to rescue insured properties. A water main system of
hollowed tree trunks was laid under city streets to provide water to firefighters,
who would dig down to the main and drill a hole to access the water. (The
wooden plug used to seal the hole is the origin of the term “fireplug” still in use
today.)
These examples of historical disasters demonstrate a number of key points.
First, they emphasize that while catastrophic events often seem sudden and
unexpected, in many cases, they are at least foreseeable. This unwillingness to
see the possibility of catastrophe and to instead treat foreseeable disasters as
“Acts of God” is a common theme throughout history. The refusal of the Lord
Mayor to deal with London’s fire risk in 1666 is echoed again in the failure of
San Francisco’s Mayor Schmitz to act on the warnings of his fire chief prior to
Figure 1.5 London, as it appeared from Bankside, Southwark, during the Great Fire – From a
print by Nicolaes Visscher. Source: Robert Chambers, Book of Days, 1864.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 11
the earthquake and fires in 1906. The potential for failure of the New Orleans
levee system was well known prior to Hurricane Katrina, but little was done to
prevent it.
A study of historical disaster shows another disturbing trend: the practice of
preparing to deal with the last catastrophe instead of considering all possible
hazards. The Great Plague of London had begun in 1664 and reached its peak
in 1665, killing 68 596 (this is the official figure, but it is highly likely the total
exceeded 100 000). The primary concern of the citizens of London, despite
warnings and predictions of destruction by fire that included a letter of con-
cern from King Charles II to the Lord Mayor, was plague, not fire. One sees the
same pattern in the focus on nuclear war planning in the civil defense era that
resulted in inadequate response during Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane
Andrew in 1992. The overwhelming emphasis on terrorism prevention and
response after September 11 at the expense of all‐hazards planning and the
resulting debacle during Hurricane Katrina is yet another example.
A subtler lesson, however, is how quickly good emergency management
practices can deteriorate. London had a firefighting capability similar to that
established by Augustus in Rome in the first century. However, when the legions
withdrew in 451 CE, the system was allowed to fall into disuse. William the
Conqueror had established a law in the eleventh century requiring that all fires
be put out at night to reduce the danger from fire (called couvre‐feu or “cover
fire” from which we derive the modern term “curfew”), but this was not well
enforced in 1666. Building codes that dated from the twelfth century requiring
party walls to be built of stone were likewise unheeded.
There are similar parallels to San Francisco in 1906. The city had suffered
from several major fires throughout its brief history and had established a series
of underground cisterns to provide firefighters with emergency water sources, the
first being built in 1852. By 1866, a system of some 50 cisterns was in place across
the city. The last cistern was built in 1872, at which time the city had 64 cisterns
with a capacity of 3 million gallons. The advent of volunteer fire departments
and the development of steam pumps made the system obsolete in the public
mind, and cisterns were routinely used to dispose of rubbish or were destroyed
during construction. By 1906, only 23 cisterns were still listed as active, the rest
being considered “lost.” Pleas by fire chiefs for funding for the system, including
Dennis Sullivan in 1905, went unheeded, with catastrophic results.
History also holds the lessons of those who got it right. The first “modern”
disaster is considered to be the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. The earthquake
and the tsunami that followed were the eighteenth‐century equivalent of the
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004 or the Tohoku earthquake and
tsunami in 2011. The response by the Marquis of Pombal was effective because
it was based on a long‐range strategy that incorporated reconstruction,
economic incentives for growth, and mitigation against future disasters (see
Case Study 1.1).

12 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDY 1.1: THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE
OF 1755 – COORDINATED DISASTER RESPONSE
At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of 1 November 1755, Lisbon, Portugal, was struck by an
earthquake estimated to be close to 9.0 on the Richter scale that lasted anywhere from three
to six minutes. The temblor spawned a tsunami that struck the city in three waves shortly after
the earthquake. Cooking fires and candles in the debris sparked a series of fires that burned
for five days. About 85% of Lisbon’s buildings were destroyed, and as many as 90 000
citizens, roughly one‐third of the city’s population, are thought to have been killed. In all, the
earthquake and tsunamis claimed between 60 000 to 100 000 lives worldwide, and the
shockwaves were felt as far away as Finland and North Africa.
Case Figure 1.1 Lisbon, Portugal was virtually destroyed on 1 November 1755 by an earthquake,
tsunami, and fire. From a copper engraving dated 1755. Source: Courtesy of the National
Information Service for Earthquake Engineering (NISEE), University of California, Berkeley.
The response to the Lisbon earthquake is the first example of a coordinated
government relief effort. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, later the first Marquis of Pombal,
took charge by order of the King and directed the chief justice to appoint 12 district leaders
with emergency powers. Gallows were erected to deter looters, and at least 34 such looters
were executed. Pombal ordered the Portuguese army to surround the city to prevent workers
from leaving and to provide transportation for the delivery of food from outside the city. Food
prices were controlled to prevent gouging. Fishing was encouraged, and taxes were
suspended for fish sold in the impacted area. Workers were then pressed into service in
debris clearance and body recovery. Contrary to the customs of the time, Pombal directed the
disposal of remains by mass burial at sea.
(continued on next page)

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 13
The Lisbon earthquake is also significant because it marks the beginning of
a change of attitude toward the nature of disaster itself. For much of recorded
history, disasters have been viewed as “Acts of God.” Viewed this way, disasters
are beyond control and nothing can be done to prevent them from happening.
However, the Lisbon earthquake occurred in the middle of the Age of
Enlightenment, at a time when reason was valued over traditional beliefs. In
this context, there was an attempt to define disasters in scientific terms and to
view them as “Acts of Nature,” implying that disasters could be both explained
and affected by human action.
It is also interesting to note that one of the reasons Lisbon’s recovery was so
effective was that it fit in with the long‐term vision of the community. The
Marquis of Pombal had been working for years to make Portugal a significant
world power. The earthquake afforded an opportunity for advancing his vision
through a program of modernization during reconstruction. This integration
of community vision into reconstruction is a precursor of what in now known
as holistic disaster recovery.
The study of historical disasters is also a study of the record of progress in
public protection. Tragically, it sometimes takes a catastrophe for people and
government to make the social changes necessary for effective mitigation and
response. As was noted, the Great Fire of London spurred the development of
improved fire prevention methods and led to the growth of fire insurance. San
Francisco today has a system of cisterns that are regularly maintained. Smaller
events likewise played a role: the explosion at Port Chicago of a fully loaded
As the situation came under control, Pombal turned to reconstruction. Almost
immediately, he ordered military engineers to draw up new plans for a redesigned city. He
ordered a survey of property rights and claims and passed legislation to prevent evictions and
to control rents. Debris was sorted to salvage building materials. Most importantly, Pombal
had scholars study the effects of earthquakes on building design and incorporated the results
during reconstruction, creating the first seismically protected structures in the world and
giving birth to the science of seismology.
Pombal’s response to the Lisbon earthquake is significant because he used an
approach that not only addressed immediate issues but also looked toward the future. It was
not enough, for example to feed the hungry; by using economic incentives in suspending the
tax on fish, he encouraged the development of a new industry and potential tax base. Pombal
had a clear vision; prior to the earthquake, he had been dedicated to modernizing Portugal
and increasing its influence throughout the world. He viewed the earthquake as a mere delay
in achieving that goal and focused his efforts on restoring the city of Lisbon as quickly as
possible. He used the opportunity presented by the earthquake to build a better, safer city.
Recommended Reading
Shrady, N. (2008). The Last Day: Wrath, Ruin, and Reason in the Great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755.
New York, NY: Viking.
(continued from previous page)

14 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Liberty ship on 17 July 1944 and the subsequent mutiny by black sailors that
followed led to integration of the US Navy.
Not all disasters lead to progress. Following the Texas City disaster on 16
April 1947, the survivors sued the US government for negligence in preventing
the explosion of two ships loaded with ammonium nitrate bound for farmers in
Europe (see Case Study 1.2). The case was the first class action lawsuit against
the US government and went all the way to the Supreme Court. Although a
lower court had found for the plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court determined that the government was not liable for negligent
planning decisions on the part of subordinate agencies, thus establishing a pre-
sumption of limited governmental liability that continues to this day.
THE ADVENT OF DISASTER LEGISLATION
As one studies the history of disaster, one soon notices a trend over time for
governments to become increasingly involved in emergency management.
Hence, one sees rulers such as Augustus and William I establishing rudimen-
CASE STUDY 1.2: THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER
1947 – GOVERNMENT NEGLIGENCE
Shortly before 8:00 a.m. on 16 April 1947, in the port of Texas City, Texas, a fire was
discovered in the hold of the Grandcamp, a former mothballed Liberty Ship that had been
provided by the United States government to assist in Europe’s reconstruction. The vessel
was loaded with 7700 tons of ammonium nitrate, along with small arms ammunition and other
goods, and was loading in Texas City because the Port of Houston did not allow the loading
of such dangerous cargo.
Efforts to extinguish the fire were ineffective, in part because the French captain did not
want to ruin his cargo by dousing it with water. Instead, he ordered the hatches closed and
covered with tarpaulin, turned off the ventilators, and turned on the steam system. It was only
when the heat forced the crew off the ship that the fire department was finally notified.
At approximately 9:12 a.m., the Grandcamp exploded, hurling huge metal fragments,
some weighing several tons, which sparked numerous fires as they ripped through buildings
and oil storage tanks in nearby refineries. The blast was said to have knocked people off their
feet in Galveston, 10 miles away, and shattered windows in Houston, 40 miles away. The
shockwave was felt in Louisiana, some 250 miles away.
Moored at the adjoining slip to the Grandcamp was another Liberty Ship, the
Grandflyer, loaded with 900 tons of ammonium nitrate and 1800 tons of sulfur. The explosion
on the Grandcamp set this ship ablaze, forcing the crew to evacuate after an hour of
firefighting. The Grandflyer exploded at about midnight, adding to the carnage.
The Texas City explosion is considered the worst industrial disaster in US history. The
official death toll was 581, with an additional 113 missing, and over 5000 injured. Over 500
homes were destroyed, displacing some 2000 people. Damage was estimated at over
$600 million (in 1947 dollars).
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 15
(continued from previous page)
Case Figure 1.2 Aerial view of the Monsanto plant, refinery structures, and port after the 1947
Texas City Disaster, photograph, 16 April 1947. Source: Courtesy of University of North Texas
Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, crediting Moore Memorial Public Library.
The explosion spawned hundreds of lawsuits against the federal government. Many of
these were consolidated in a class action suit, Elizabeth Dalehite, et al. v. United States. On
13 April 1950, the district court found for the plaintiffs, citing numerous acts of omission and
commission on the part of 168 government agencies that resulted in the explosions. The Fifth
US Circuit Court reversed the decision on the basis that the district court had no jurisdiction
to find the government as a whole liable for the negligence of subordinate agencies. The
Federal Tort Claims Act, the legislation under which the suit was brought exempts “failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty,” and the court found that all the acts of
commission or omission were discretionary in nature. The Supreme Court, in a four to three
opinion, affirmed the ruling in 1953.
The decision in Elizabeth Dalehite, et al. v. United States is significant because it
affirmed the protections of government agencies against personal responsibility. There was
no question that the government was negligent. Justice Robert Jackson noted this in his
minority opinion, “…the disaster was caused by forces set in motion by the government,
completely controlled or controllable by it. Its causative factors were far beyond the
knowledge or control of the victims.” However, the fear was that a victory for the plaintiffs
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16 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
tary fire codes and committing public resources to enforce them. Following the
Black Death, towns in Italy in the 1350s started to implement initiatives aimed
at controlling public sanitation. In London following the Great Fire, the
government issued charters to insurance companies to support fire suppression
efforts. However, these measures were based almost exclusively on a disaster
that had occurred or were specific to a regularly occurring hazard. While gov-
ernments acknowledged their responsibility to act during a crisis, they tradi-
tionally did little to either mitigate potential effects or to build the capacity to
respond. Instead, they tended to be driven by focusing events.
In these days of perceived entitlement to disaster relief from the government,
it is startling to many to find that this was neither the intentional consequence
of legislative decision‐making nor even necessarily an easy choice for legisla-
tors. In fact, the opposite is true. From the earliest disaster legislation in 1790
to well into the twentieth century, there was considerable disagreement in
Congress over what constituted appropriate disaster relief or, indeed, if such
relief was even constitutional.
The first involvement of the US government in disaster relief occurred in
June 1790 in response to a petition from one Thomas Jenkins and Company
(Figure 1.6). Jenkins had lost a cargo of hemp, linen, cotton duck, and molasses
as a result of a fire on the vessel transporting his cargo and was asking for a
remission of customs duties in the amount $167. Congress approved his request.
A more significant instance of disaster relief was the response to a fire in
Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1802 that destroyed a significant portion of
the town’s business district. Portsmouth at the time was the only major deep‐
water anchorage between Portland, Maine, and Boston and was the center of
US shipbuilding, making it essential to the region’s economy. In 1803, Congress
authorized an additional year to pay off bonds owed to the local customs house
to help ease the financial burden on town merchants (Figure 1.7). Similar mea-
sures were passed for Norfolk, Virginia, in 1804, Portsmouth in 1807
(Portsmouth actually suffered four “Great Fires” between 1802 and 1845) and
New York in 1836.
would paralyze government and open the door for many more lawsuits of a similar nature.
The need to protect the government’s ability to act, to exercise “discretion,” was paramount.
Justice Stanley Reed alluded to this in his majority opinion, “Congress exercised care to
protect the government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected governmental
functions.”
Recommended Reading
Minutaglio, B. (2003). City On Fire: The Forgotten Disaster that Devastated a Town and Ignited a
Landmark Legal Battle. New York: Harper Collins.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 17
The two cases of Thomas Jenkins and Company and Portsmouth, NH high-
light the two different approaches taken by Congress to provide relief in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The initial method of seeking
Figure 1.6 An Act for the Relief of Thomas Jenkins and Company – The first disaster
legislation in the US, passed by Congress in 1790. Source: Library of Congress.

18 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
assistance was by a private bill for the relief of specific individuals. The person
affected by the disaster personally petitioned Congress for relief and Congress
determined whether or not to provide relief on the basis of the facts and the
precedent it might set. The alternative was for relief to be requested by elected
officials on behalf of a community. However, such relief was limited to the
delaying or remitting debts owed to the government.
The fledgling US government was small with limited resources and so had
no interest in providing immediate disaster relief. Furthermore, there were no
provisions in the Constitution providing for this duty, and hence, it was deemed
the responsibility of the states. Coupled with the prevailing attitude of self‐reli-
ance, this meant that the government focused on limited economic stimulus.
This was the case following the Great New York Fire of 1835. Occurring in
the dead of winter, the fire burned out over 50 acres in the center of the city,
destroying the stock exchange, warehouses, the post office, and banks. The fire
lasted almost 24 hours and is considered the worst fire in an English‐speaking
country since the Great Fire of London. Among the many firms forced into
bankruptcy were a number of fire insurance firms, making the economic impact
of the hazard considerably greater.
Figure 1.7 An Act for The Relief of Sufferers of Fire in The Town of Portsmouth – The first
disaster legislation aimed at the local level, passed by Congress in 1803. Source: Library
of Congress.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 19
In the aftermath of the fire, the Mayor of New York City petitioned the fed-
eral government for relief. In response, Congress provided relief similar to that
provided to Portsmouth in 1803. The relief bill authorized the Collector of the
Port of New York to, at his discretion, extend the time of payment on bonds
for customs duties for up to five years and to provide for installment payments
if needed. Note again that the disaster relief provided by Congress was only
economic relief intended to serve as a stimulus to reconstruction.
A notable exception to the adjustment of taxes as disaster relief occurred
following the New Madrid earthquakes of 1811–1812. In 1815, Congress
passed a bill allowing landowners who had suffered damage during the earth-
quakes to relocate onto public land in the Missouri Territory, with title to their
New Madrid holdings passing to the federal government. While possibly being
the first example of the use of relocation as mitigation in the United States, the
measure was largely unsuccessful, generating considerable corruption and
fraudulent transfers. As late as 1827, Congress was receiving complaints about
the actions of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The land patents
that had been issued to disaster victims had been resold many times, and in
some cases, multiple lots had been issued to the same person, contrary to law.
The Commissioner, under an opinion from the Attorney General, was refusing
to honor the patents, and the State of Missouri was petitioning for relief for the
claimants. (See American State Papers, House of Representatives, 19th
Congress, 2nd Session, Public Lands: Volume 4, pp. 881–885).
One interesting side note to the New Madrid relief was an attempt during
debate to amend the bill to also provide relief to victims of a windstorm occur-
ring in Washington DC in August 1814. The bill would have allowed victims to
purchase public land in the area specified for the New Madrid victims at the
rate of $2 per acre (Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 13th
Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 1072–1073). The amendment did not pass, but it was
indicative of interest in obtaining public lands at reduced rates and indicated a
willingness on the part of some legislators to use disaster relief for political
purposes.
Beginning in 1794, Congress also began passing general relief bills aimed at
assisting statutorily defined classes of claimants. One of the first of these bills
was intended to provide relief for those affected by the Whiskey Rebellion and
is representative of this type of relief. Congress established a fund that was
administered by a commissioner appointed by the Executive Branch and who
had broad powers in determining how compensation was awarded. A similar
approach would be used in providing compensation to the victims of the War
of 1812 and to the victims of the September 11 attacks. Although private bills
continued to be used for a time, by 1822, most relief was provided through gen-
eral relief bills.
The use of general relief bills was not without controversy. On the morning
of 18 January 1827, a fire broke out in Alexandria, VA, destroying 40 structures

20 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
and causing considerable suffering. Alexandria at the time was a part of the
District of Columbia. Congress appropriated $20 000 for distribution to “indi-
gent sufferers” by the mayor and city council.
The legislation to provide assistance to the Alexandria fire victims sparked
considerable debate in Congress. Supporters of the measure argued for relief
on the basis of humanitarian need and the fact that no constitutional provision
prohibited such aid. In addition, supporters pointed out that Alexandria would
have enjoyed the support of the State of Virginia, but since it was part of the
District of Columbia, no such assistance would be forthcoming. The only
source of appeal was to Congress.
Opponents of the bill argued that such legislation was “improper and inexpe-
dient.” They pointed out that the suffering of victims was mitigated by insurance,
and there was every expectation that they would “experience the same extension
of sympathy and assistance which had been given to other places, when over-
taken by similar disasters, by individual contribution” (Register of Debates,
Senate, 19th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 68–71). Significantly, they also cited pre-
cedent: Congress had given no such aid to similar disasters such as a fire in Maine
in 1826 that had burned some 50 square miles and destroyed houses, barns, and
fields. A chief concern was that such relief would in fact establish a precedent
that would require Congress to provide relief for future disasters.
The use of precedent as an argument for or against disaster relief is impor-
tant. Many legislators were lawyers and used precedent as a guide to making
decisions. Although the Alexandria fire relief did not immediately open the
floodgates of direct federal assistance in disasters, it did establish a precedent
that the provision of relief was not unconstitutional as held by some of the
bill’s opponents (an argument that would reoccur into the early twentieth
century) and that Congress had the authority to provide such relief.
This authority for Congress to provide relief was further amplified in a
dramatic way during the Civil War as Congress sought to provide assistance to
former slaves through the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands (also known as the Freedmen’s Bureau) (Figure 1.8). The Freedmen’s
Bureau was formed in March 1865 toward the close of the Civil War to control
refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands in the rebel states during the
remainder of the war and for one year afterward. Administrative oversight of
the Bureau was provided by the War Department. The intent behind the legis-
lation was to deal with large numbers of runaway or abandoned slaves that
were hampering military operations by providing immediate relief and then
resettling them on abandoned lands.
From the beginning, the Bureau was not particularly popular. Because the
law permitted relief to “refugees,” the Bureau was criticized for providing
assistance to disloyal Southerners masquerading as refugees while the southern
press claimed that federal aid was causing black laborers not to seek work
(Dauber 2005).

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 21
The winter of 1865–1866 was particularly harsh, and the resulting flooding
raised the specter of mass starvation in the South. The Freedman’s Bureau
continued to provide relief to both refugees and freedmen despite orders lim-
iting relief to those in cases of “extreme suffering.” With the Bureau’s mandate
about to expire (the Civil War had ended in April 1865), Congress began
consideration of a bill to extend the Bureau for two more years.
The proponents of the bill, mainly moderate Republicans, pointed out the
suffering that was taking place across the South, and the need for federal
assistance was readily apparent. Indeed, they proposed that the Freedman’s
Bureau be extended indefinitely and expanded to encompass the whole country.
In addition to citing precedents for government aid (although not specifically
disaster relief), the Republicans postulated the argument that the freedmen
were innocent victims of slavery and emancipation and therefore deserving of
assistance.
Democrats countered with the argument that such aid was unconstitutional.
The original mission of the Freedman’s Bureau had been authorized under the
War Powers granted to Congress under the Constitution but with the war over,
there was now no constitutional justification for federal relief. The responsi-
bility to provide for the destitute had always been a state responsibility and not
that of the federal government. To counter the arguments about the “inno-
cence” of the freedmen, the Democrats used stereotypical racial imagery to
portray the freedmen as victims of their own inherent moral vices.
Figure 1.8 The Freedmen’s Bureau evolved from a wartime source of labor to a major relief
operation immediately following the Civil War. From an engraving by Alfred R. Waud,
1828–1891. Source: Library of Congress.

22 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The extension bill was passed on 9 February 1866 and was immediately
vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Attempts to override the veto also failed.
A second, more moderate, bill was introduced and passed over the President’s
veto on 16 July 1866. In addition to the arguments about the innocence of vic-
tims, this time the Republicans also argued the precedent of previous disaster
relief acts. In 1867, Congress extended the eligibility for relief under the Bureau
to all white southerners, regardless of whether or not they had supported the
war.
The Freedman’s Bureau is a significant turning point for disaster relief policy
for the United States on several levels. First, it established a precedent that the
government had the authority to provide disaster relief. Arguments that such
relief was not provided for in the Constitution and were a state responsibility
were glossed over or set aside by “humanitarian concerns.” Future disaster vic-
tims could point to the Freedman’s Bureau as precedent where relief was given
to blacks and previously disloyal whites and ask, “Don’t we deserve help, too?”
The debate over the Freedman’s Bureau also established a less obvious pre-
cedent: what Michelle Landis Dauber calls “moral blamelessness” (Chong
2002). Moral blamelessness considers disaster victims to be innocent, that is
they are not responsible for their condition. To a certain extent, this is similar
to the old idea that a disaster was an “Act of God.” By portraying refugees and
freedmen as victims of slavery and emancipation, the Republicans moved the
debate on relief from one of need to one of moral standing. Innocent victims
are deserving of assistance while those who caused their situation are not.
It is important to note that disaster relief legislation was not typical and did
not represent a commitment by Congress to provide such relief in all cases.
Disaster relief legislation was in all cases reactionary and limited. In many
cases, Congress was motivated to act not by the disaster itself but through lob-
bying by disaster victims. This was the case in 1836 following the Great Fire in
New York. This reactive approach to disaster relief continued for over 50 years,
with some 128 pieces of legislation enacted between 1803 and 1950.
The ultimate responsibility for relief, however, rested with the local jurisdic-
tion. For example following the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood in 1889, relief
and reconstruction were funded by almost $4 million in private donations and
a 10% state tax on alcohol. (The tax is still in effect and was raised to 18% in
1968. The $200 million in annual revenues it generates now goes to the general
fund, not flood victims.)
THE GROWTH OF DISASTER BUREAUCRACY
As the twentieth century opened, a new trend in disaster relief policy began to
develop: the growth of a government bureaucracy intended to administer
disaster relief. This trend consisted of several components, principally the

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 23
transition from military to civilian leadership in disaster relief operations, the
emergence of a Civil Defense bureaucracy, and legislation providing for disaster
relief funding.
From Military to Civilian Leadership
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disaster relief was delivered
through two very disparate mechanisms: the US Army and through a series of
special commissioners. For most of that period, the US Army was the federal
government’s primary agent for disaster relief. In many cases, Congressional
funding to purchase and deliver relief supplies was given to the War Department
rather than directly to disaster victims. In 1908, for example Congress appro-
priated $250 000 for disaster relief following a series of tornadoes in the
southern United States. The funds were provided to the War Department,
which used it for supplies and medical assistance. In 1912, some $1 240 000 was
appropriated to reimburse costs incurred by the Army for relief operations in
response to flooding along the Mississippi (Foster 1983).
The Army’s role evolved from simple expediency: there was no one else to do
the job. The United States at the time lacked any organization, civilian or
government, capable of dealing with disaster. With its hierarchical structure,
stockpiles of supplies, and established logistics system, the Army, by default,
was responsible for dealing with floods, earthquakes, fires, and other natural
disasters both at in the United States and abroad. In addition, Congress on
occasion asked the War Department to provide assessments of disasters that
were used to determine the appropriateness and extent of any required relief.
On those occasions where Congress provided direct relief, the implementing
legislation also provided for the establishment of a commissioner with broad
powers to determine eligibility for relief. This was the case, for example in the New
Madrid earthquake relief in 1815, where a Commissioner of the General Land
Office oversaw the distribution of land grants. It was also the case in the victim
compensation following the War of 1812 and, indeed, was the same mechanism
used to manage victim compensation following September 11 (Dauber 2013).
The use of civilian commissioners has always been problematical.
Commissioners were granted broad powers but little guidance on how to deter-
mine eligibility for disaster relief. In many cases, the commissioners tended to
take a broader interpretation of need than originally intended by Congress. The
was the case, for example in the compensation for the War of 1812. The legisla-
tion was intended originally to compensate those whose homes and possessions
were damaged as the result of their use or comandeerment by federal troops.
This rapidly expanded to include any person who had suffered damage in the
war. As has been discussed, the Freedman’s Bureau also expanded beyond the
original intent of handling freed slaves during the Civil War to provide relief to
destitute Southerners for several years following the war.

24 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
However, the role of commissioners was primarily administrative in nature
and limited to economic compensation. It was not until the formation of the
American Red Cross in 1881 that an organization began to emerge that could
provide direct relief to disaster victims.
Similar to many organizations, the initial purpose of the American Red
Cross was very different from what eventually evolved. The International Red
Cross was formed originally to serve those wounded on the battlefield. At the
time Clara Barton was organizing the American Red Cross, the horrors of the
Civil War were very fresh, and Americans held the view that such a war could
not be allowed to happen again. Coupled with the innovations in the Army
Medical Department, this meant that the original idea behind the Red Cross
was difficult to sell to the American public. However, by advocating the use of
the Red Cross for other purposes, such as disaster relief, Barton was able to
gain the support of President James Garfield and his successor, Chester A.
Arthur. So successful was this approach that the International Red Cross
amended the Treaty of Geneva (the international agreement that established
the Red Cross) following a speech by Barton at the third International
Conference in 1884 to include disaster relief as a mission of the organization,
now known as the “American Amendment.”
The American Red Cross encountered a literal “baptism by fire.” Founded
on 21 May 1881, the Red Cross had its first disaster operation in September of
that year in the Great Thumb Fire in Michigan (named for the thumb‐shaped
area affected by the fire. See Figure 1.9). The cause of the fire is not known, but
the area had been suffering from drought for some time, temperatures were
high, and the winds were of hurricane force. The fire burned over a million
acres, causing an estimated $2 347 000 in damages (in 1881 dollars) and killing
almost 300 people. The Red Cross responded with money, clothes, and
household items.
The initial Red Cross response to the Great Thumb Fire was followed by
major relief work in the Johnstown flood of 1889 and the Galveston hurricane
of 1900, in addition to service in the Spanish American War in 1898. In 1900,
the American Red Cross received its first congressional charter (a second
charter was granted in 1905) that among other purposes, directed the Red Cross
to “carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and
to apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire,
floods, and other great national calamities.” This charter began a unique rela-
tionship between the US government and the American Red Cross that con-
tinues to this day.
It was inevitable that the US Army and the American Red Cross would come
into conflict. Having two organizations with responsibility for relief made this
inevitable. Although the two organizations worked well in the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake and fire, the first use of the Red Cross under its charter,
there was tension between them. Part of this was caused by the Army not

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 25
having any specific statutory authority for disaster relief and the subsequent
reluctance on the part of army officers to surrender military property to a
civilian organization. Added to this were pressures created by the military’s pri-
mary mission of war fighting. During World War I, for example the Red Cross
and the US Public Health Service primarily handled the response to the flu
pandemic in 1918 because military resources were unavailable.
This conflict came to a head in 1925. Congress had traditionally provided
reimbursement to the War Department for disaster relief expenditures, but
beginning in 1920 following an operation in West Point, Georgia, Congress
began either delaying or refusing reimbursement. In 1925 John Barton Payne,
president of the Red Cross, formally complained to the Secretary of War about
the lack of support he was receiving from local commanders, stating that they
recognized neither the supremacy of the Red Cross nor their own authority to
assist the Red Cross in providing relief. Payne suggested a revision to the Army
regulations to correct this problem. The War Department refused and tensions
between the two organizations increased (Foster 1983).
Figure 1.9 The Great Thumb Fire in Michigan in 1881 was a literal “baptism by fire” for
the newly formed American Red Cross. Source: State of Michigan Department of
Natural Resources.

26 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
A significant change in civil–military relations occurred in 1927 when
President Calvin Coolidge appointed Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
to oversee disaster relief to extensive flooding along the Mississippi River, plac-
ing responsibility for disaster relief in the hands of civilian authority for the
first time (see Case Study 1.3). This shift to civilian leadership of disaster relief
CASE STUDY 1.3: THE MISSISSIPPI FLOODS 1927 – COORDINATED
RESPONSE UNDER CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP
The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 has been called the most destructive river flood in US
history, inundating over 27 000 square miles to a depth of up to 30 ft. An unusually wet
summer in 1926 has swollen the river’s tributaries and rains continued through the winter. By
spring, the Mississippi River was beginning to overtop the levees. In all, the river would break
through in 145 different places, but the most disastrous break was at Mounds Landing on 21
April. Here, the river flowed through at twice the volume of Niagara Falls.
Case Figure 1.3 The beginning of the levee breach at Mounds Landing, Mississippi,
21 April 1927. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency.
Faced with a disaster of such magnitude, President Calvin Coolidge decided that a
coordinated response was necessary. He selected Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to
chair a cabinet committee consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Treasury, and
Agriculture that would cooperate with the Red Cross in providing relief.
Hoover was not without experience. In August 1914, he had led 500 volunteers in
helping to evacuate and provide relief services to 120 000 American citizens fleeing the war in
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 27
operations continued through the 1920s and 1930s. In 1938, the US Army
issued Army Regulation 500‐60, formally acknowledging the Red Cross as the
primary relief agency for United States. AR 500‐60 also affirmed both the
Army’s support role and the Army’s autonomy. The Red Cross would oversee
relief operations but would have no authority over the military.
Civil Defense and Disaster Relief Merge
The advent of war in 1916 led to the United States Army Appropriation Act of
1917 that established an embryonic civil defense structure consisting of the
Council of National Defense (CND) and a network of state and local councils.
These councils would languish both during and after World War I, but as hos-
tilities grew in the late 1930s, the councils were resurrected and the CND was
linked to a new Office of Emergency Management created in 1939 by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1941, President Roosevelt abolished the CND and
created an Office of Civil Defense (OCD) within the Office of Emergency
Planning. President Harry Truman, in turn, abolished the OCD following the
cessation of hostilities in 1945.
Following the dissolution of the OCD in 1945, the government commissioned
a number of studies on civil defense that urged evacuation planning and shelter
construction to protect the civilian population from the nuclear threat of the
Europe. He spent the next two years as chair of the Commission for Relief in Belgium
administering the distribution of relief supplies to war victims. In 1917, he was appointed to
head the Food Administration overseeing food reserves in the United States. After the war
ended, Hoover headed the American Relief Administration providing relief supplies to Europe.
Hoover’s wartime experience had led him to believe that centralization was the key to a
successful relief operation. He created an on‐scene organization that consisted of the cabinet
committee, the American Red Cross, and local officials to coordinate relief activities. In a
departure from the past, Hoover stressed the use of local over military resources. For
example, a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation funded the establishment of health units
throughout the affected area.
Hoover’s actions gained him a reputation as a humanitarian, revived his flagging
political career, and carried him into the White House. More importantly, his approach
demonstrated the importance of coordinated response and public–private partnership and led
eventually to the creation of the position of Federal Coordinating Officer with responsibility for
on‐scene coordination of federal disaster relief. It also marked the first time that civilian
officials had taken charge of disaster relief rather than the US Army, starting a trend that
would eventually become an established practice.
Recommended Reading
Barry, J.M. (1997). Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
(continued from previous page)

28 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Cold War. In 1948, President Truman created an Office of Civil Defense
Planning, and in 1949, he temporarily assigned civil defense responsibility to
the National Security Resources Board before finally creating the Federal Civil
Defense Administration (FCDA) in December 1949.
The piecemeal approach to dealing with disasters was to change significantly
in 1950 when two important pieces of legislation laid the foundation for modern
emergency management in the United States. The Federal Disaster Act of 1950
established the federal government’s role in domestic disaster relief, whereas
the Civil Defense Act of 1950 established a federal, state, and local framework
for preparedness. It is important to note that, at this point, the two functions of
relief and preparedness were not viewed as components of a system but rather
as two separate functions. For almost 40 years, the two functions would develop
along separate lines.
The Federal Disaster Act of 1950 had its genesis in the need for an ongoing
authority to respond to disaster. Between 1803 and 1950, Congress had enacted
128 separate acts to provide relief after local disasters and larger catastrophic
events. The process was cumbersome and meant that most local disasters did
not receive federal aid. The Federal Disaster Act provided for a continuing
authority for the federal government to provide assistance without returning to
congress for separate legislation for each disaster.
Unfortunately, Congress continued its reactive approach to disasters.
Programs were created or expanded by legislation passed in reaction to
significant events, creating a confusing fragmentation in relief programs. Many
of the programs and structures now considered an integral part of federal
relief, such as the Federal Coordinating Officer and the Public and Individual
Assistance Programs, were created in this manner. An attempt was made to
reduce this fragmentation with the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 and again in
1974 with the passage of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Assistance
Act (the Disaster Assistance Act of 1974). The Stafford Act also included, for
the first time, the provision for federal assistance for disaster preparedness and
warning programs.
The Civil Defense Act of 1950 defined the role of local government in disaster
preparedness. The act had its genesis in the growing fear of nuclear war and the
beginning of the Cold War. The Soviets had detonated a nuclear bomb in 1949,
and in 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Consequently, the primary focus
of the act was on national security. The Civil Defense Act of 1950 stated that the
principal responsibility for civil defense rested with state and local government
and gave authority to the FCDA to provide guidance and resources to assist in
this process. One of the key results of the Civil Defense Act was the creation of a
network of government‐funded nuclear war planners at the state and local levels.
Almost immediately, the federal government’s emphasis on national security
met with resistance. State and local governments were more concerned with
natural disasters that occurred with some regularity and viewed nuclear war

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 29
planning as the responsibility of the federal government. The act was eventu-
ally amended in 1958, in response to state and local government complaints, to
provide for joint responsibility for civil defense among all levels of government.
This conflict in priorities led eventually to an insistence by state and local gov-
ernments on the use of resources provided under the Civil Defense Act for
planning for all hazards, not just nuclear war. The act was amended in 1976 to
allow the use of civil defense resources for disaster relief and recovery from
natural disasters (referred to as the Dual Use Doctrine) and again in 1981 to
allow dual use of government‐provided resources for preparedness.
Along the way, responsibility for civil defense shifted through a confusing array
of offices that migrated from the Office of the President to the Department of
Defense and back to the White House. A similar process was taking place with the
responsibility for disaster relief, and the congressional approach of reacting to the
needs of current disasters resulted in a wide range of relief programs scattered
throughout various departments and agencies. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter
consolidated these scattered programs and merged the functions of preparedness
and response into a single agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The result was almost immediate chaos. The new agency was composed of
programs transferred from a variety of other agencies, each with a staff with its
own corporate culture and with separate funding sources and congressional
oversight committees. For the first year, staff continued to operate out of sep-
arate offices scattered around Washington D.C., and it would be over 10 years
before the agency became truly effective. Nevertheless, for the first time, the
functions of preparedness and disaster relief were the responsibility of a single
agency. This consolidation of function received a boost in 1988 with a major
amendment to the Stafford Act that effectively merged the Civil Defense Act
and the Disaster Relief Act. For the first time, the United States placed respon-
sibility for preparedness and relief operations in a single agency with a single
legislative authority.
The formation of FEMA did more than consolidate various federal relief
and preparedness programs. The Civil Defense Act had spawned a network of
civil defense offices in each state and in many counties and local jurisdictions.
Initially, these positions were funded at a 50% match and were limited to work
on national security projects such as shelter surveys and crisis relocation
planning. As the Dual Use Doctrine became more acceptable to the federal
government, many of these planners began to focus on planning for and
responding to natural disasters. FEMA became a source of policy guidance
and a perceived repository of expertise. Through its grant requirements and the
establishment of a national training center, FEMA also had the potential to
standardize emergency management training and doctrine across the United
States.
Nowhere was this leadership role more apparent than in the tenure of James
Lee Witt as director from 1993 to 2001. Up until Director Witt’s nomination by

30 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
President Bill Clinton, FEMA had been led by a succession of political appoin-
tees with limited experience in emergency management. Witt was the first
director to have served as head of a state emergency management agency.
Shortly after his arrival, Witt issued a set of goals and a strategic plan for the
agency, the first time this had ever been done in FEMA. His principal goal was
not to increase response capacity but instead “to make mitigation the corner-
stone of emergency management.” Witt practiced what he preached, lobbying
for increased postdisaster mitigation funds under the Stafford Act and ulti-
mately for predisaster funding of mitigation projects. This emphasis sent a
clear message to the emergency management community: emergency
management is not just about response.
A major impetus behind the formation of FEMA was a 1978 report from the
National Governors’ Association concluding a study of emergency management
policies and practices in the United States. The report cited the fragmentation
of operations, the lack of connection to state policy, and the lack of an
integrated national policy or strategy. The report went on to espouse a new
concept called comprehensive emergency management that took an all‐hazards
approach to dealing with risk and emphasized interagency cooperation. The
report also delineated a four‐phase model of emergency management,
combining preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation into an interre-
lated process (Figure 1.10).
Comprehensive emergency management rapidly became the basis of a
national strategy for emergency management and was quickly adopted by the
newly created FEMA. The model was broad enough to encompass both the
national security requirements of the federal government and the natural
hazard concerns of local government. This broad scope meant that emergency
planners now had to consider all the potential hazards facing a jurisdiction and
Disaster
R
es
p
o
n
se
Re
co
very Mitigation
P
reparedness
Figure 1.10 Comprehensive Emergency Management Model. Source: Federal Emergency
Management Agency.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 31
not just specific planning requirements such as crisis relocation planning. As
emergency planners became more educated across a broad spectrum of sub-
jects, a specialized body of technical knowledge related to the practice of
emergency management began to emerge.
The embryonic profession of emergency management took a major step for-
ward when the National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management
(NCCEM) (now the International Association of Emergency Managers
[IAEM]) established the Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) designation in
1990. The CEM designation established a baseline of knowledge and experi-
ence for members of the profession. The CEM program will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 4.
In 1991, NCCEM, FEMA, and the National Emergency Managers
Association (NEMA) helped to establish a disaster management committee to
develop standards for emergency management programs. The work of the
committee was released under the auspices of the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) first as a recommended practice and then, in 2000, as an
American National Standard, NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency
Management and Business Continuity Programs. NFPA 1600 initially received
little attention in the emergency management community. Following the events
of September 11, there was an increased demand for standards to guide
emergency management programs, and the 9‐11 Commission Report recom-
mended the adoption of NFPA 1600 as the National Preparedness Standard.
In October 2009, the Department of Homeland Security adopted three stan-
dards, including NFPA 1600 as part of its Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness
Program. The current versions of these standards are
• ASIS International SPC.1‐2009, Organizational Resilience: Security,
Preparedness and Continuity Management Systems – Requirements with
Guidance for Use Standards
• ISO 22301:2012: Societal security – Business continuity management
systems
• NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity/Continuity of Operations Program, 2016 edition
Within the emergency management community, NFPA 1600 was used as the
basis for the development of a program to assess jurisdictional emergency
management programs. This program, the Emergency Management Accreditation
Program (EMAP), was a joint project of FEMA, IAEM, and NEMA to adapt
the general NFPA 1600 standard specifically to state and local government pro-
grams. The candidate jurisdiction performs a self‐assessment against the EMAP
Standard, and the results are peer reviewed by an assessment team of emergency
managers. The assessment team provides input to an accreditation committee
that makes the final determination on accreditation.

32 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
While NFPA 1600 and the EMAP Standard are voluntary, they are making
progress toward being generally accepted in the emergency management
community. This was greatly assisted by FEMA’s contracting with the EMAP
Commission to develop a baseline assessment of state programs in 2005 under
the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program
(NEMB‐CAP) and the recommendation in the Homeland Security Grant
Guidance that states move toward adoption of the EMAP Standard. The federal
fiscal year 2006 guidance for the Emergency Management Performance Grant
required that states use the EMAP Standard and the results of NEMB‐CAP as a
basis for developing work plans and performance evaluations.
CONCLUSION
Over the years, emergency management evolved from what was essentially a
personal responsibility to become a perceived responsibility of government. In
the United States, this led to the development of a disaster bureaucracy based
on the Comprehensive Emergency Management model. Despite conflicts over
the role of the state versus the federal government, this bureaucracy has grown
to encompass a relatively unified approach under the direction of FEMA and
the development of doctrine and a plethora of disaster assistance programs.
Although the system seemed solid, though, it was still evolving, and response
to major disasters would bring major changes to disaster policy and force a
rethinking of disaster response.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition.
Lucien G. Canton.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc.
33
Chapter 2
But I warn my colleagues that we will fail in our efforts to protect the homeland if
we do not take additional steps to avoid a trade‐off between protecting ourselves
against terrorist attacks and preparing for and responding to natural disasters.
—Congressman David Price, North Carolina
One of the key trends in emergency management in the United States has been
the increasing role of the federal government in disaster response. As with so
much in emergency management, this was not always the case. There was little
interest and no statutory requirement for any national‐level planning until the
1980s. Indeed, even after the formation of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), there was resistance to formal planning for natural hazards.
However, changing public expectations have led to an increased response role
for the government and brought about an evolution in assistance programs that
borders on entitlement.
This shift in policy has been largely the result of what sociologists term
focusing events, “key events that cause members of the public as well as elite
decision‐makers to become aware of a potential policy failure (Birkland 1994).”
While it is probably fair to say that almost all changes to disaster policy are the
result of failures in the most recent disaster, disaster response policy has been
shaped by the experiences of the government in responding to major disasters
over the past 25 years.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD
A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY

34 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL PLANNING
There were early attempts at national planning with the promulgation of the
National Plan for Emergency Preparedness in 1964. However, the plan was
specific to national defense and was not even considered for update until 1977.
It was the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 that led to the first true
national response plan (NRP): Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic
Earthquake, promulgated in 1987. The plan was based on a regional plan devel-
oped by a subcommittee of the Regional Steering Committee chaired by FEMA
Region IX and represented a consensus of federal agencies on how response to
a catastrophic earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area should be coordi-
nated. The plan incorporated a new organizational structure that coordinated
response by function, a concept later known as the Emergency Support
Function (ESF) concept.
Two things are worth noting about the earthquake plan. The first is that
there was no preexisting template for an operational plan that would be imple-
mented by multiple federal agencies. The National Plan for Emergency
Preparedness was a strategic plan that laid out broad responsibilities for federal
agencies and focused principally on nuclear war. Although the concept of
functional planning had been around for some time and was used in the
National Plan for Emergency Preparedness, this was the first real attempt to
apply the concept to an operational plan. Second, the plan called for a decen-
tralized response; primary agencies had the authority to implement their
assignments under the plan and to task supporting agencies directly without
waiting for approval from the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).
In one of the many ironies that seem to occur regularly in emergency
planning, Region IX held an exercise to test the plan in the summer of 1989,
just months before the Loma Prieta earthquake struck Northern California.
The plan was not fully implemented during the response to the earthquake,
however. Although agencies were organized under the ESF concept, they were
not given the authority to obligate funds from the Disaster Relief Fund, and
the FCO dispensed with the ESF structure a week into the response as the
operations focused more on recovery (McDonnell 1993).
Another trend that has had an impact on emergency planning is the
continuing tension between natural hazard response and national security
response. Even after the formation of FEMA, there was a belief that there was
a need for separate plans for each and for the creation of a National Security
Emergency Plan. The confusion and fragmented planning eventually led to the
realization of the need for a single, all‐hazards plan, the Federal Response Plan
(FRP), issued in May 1992. The FRP was based on the Plan for Federal
Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake and incorporated the ESF concept.
However, the original concept of decentralized execution was eliminated in
favor of coordination by FEMA. With the withholding of the authority to

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 35
obligate funds and to directly task supporting agencies, primary agencies
evolved into agency representatives at the Disaster Field Office rather than the
independent functions originally envisioned in the Plan for Federal Response to
a Catastrophic Earthquake.
The FRP represented a major shift in emergency planning strategy for the
federal government. Prior to this, the government focus had always been on
event‐specific planning. This is understandable as many plans were formulated
by individual agencies to discharge statutory responsibilities. Even the FRP
was developed in response to a mandate in the 1988 Stafford Act revisions to
the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. The FRP was intended to, as much as possible,
standardize how the federal government responded to disasters.
The FRP was completed in May 1992 and was in the process of being printed
and distributed when Hurricane Andrew struck Florida in August. At the time,
Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive hurricane in the US history, killing
65 people and causing some $26 billion (in 1992 dollars) in damages. The cate-
gory 5 hurricane had winds up to 165 mph, and spawned some 28 tornadoes
along the Gulf Coast. With no time for training and lacking documentation, it
is unclear how well the FRP was actually implemented during the response
although there is anecdotal evidence that several of the core concepts, including
the functional approach worked well. Nevertheless, the federal response was
criticized as slow and overly bureaucratic.
The perceived failure of federal response efforts in Hurricane Andrew
sparked major changes at FEMA. Prior to Andrew, FEMA had viewed its role
as that of a “third responder” that essentially provided funding for recovery.
The demand by the public for immediate federal assistance appeared to take
the agency by surprise. The idea of predeploying resources in anticipation of a
disaster was a completely new concept, one that FEMA did not believe it had
the authority to do under the Stafford Act. Andrew forced a major rethinking
of federal response strategy and FEMA’s role in immediate response.
As one of the major corrective actions following Andrew, FEMA convened
a FRP Task Force consisting of more than 300 department and agency repre-
sentatives to review and revise the FRP in preparation for the 1993–1994 hur-
ricane season. The work of the task force considerably strengthened the FRP,
and the plan began to serve as a model for state plans. FEMA would eventually
create three national teams consisting of seasoned staff drawn from the FEMA
Regions, and headquarters who could respond on short notice in anticipation
of or in response to major disasters.
Despite its success, the FRP did pose a problem when it was used as a model
for state and local plans. There was growing interest in adapting the Incident
Command System (ICS) developed in the 1970s as a mechanism for
coordinating multiagency response to wildfires in California to disaster
response operations, and the system was already in use by a few federal and
local agencies. A small working group from FEMA Regions IX and X had

36 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
already adapted many key Planning Section concepts to Disaster Field Office
activities following Hurricane Iniki, and their work had been integrated into
the revised FRP. There was an attempt by FEMA to merge the basic ICS
structure with the ESFs, but this was an uneasy compromise that really did not
work effectively (see Figure 2.1).
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPACT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
The Marginalization of Emergency Management
For many, the attacks of 11 September 2001 are considered the genesis of the
concept of Homeland Security. The US concern over terrorism began that day
and required new approaches and new mechanisms of national security. Over
50 years of emergency management experience and research were ignored, dis-
missed with the common phrase “the world has changed.”
Operations
Section
Operations
Support Branch
Infrastructure
Branch
Emergency
Services Branch
ESF 4
Firefighting
ESF 8
Public Health
Medical
ESF 10
HAZMAT
ESF 3
Public Works
ESF 12
Energy
VOLAG
Coordinator
Individual
Assistance
Donations
ESF 2
Communications
ESF 7
Resource
Support
ESF 1
Transportation
ESF 6
Mass Care
ESF 9
Urban Search &
Rescue
Public
Assistance
Human Services
Branch
ESF 11
Food
Figure 2.1 An example of FEMA’s attempt to marry the ESF concept to the Incident
Command System. Although it worked in the Disaster Field Office, it generated
considerable confusion at the local government level.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 37
To emergency managers, however, the truth was somewhat different. Few
outside the emergency management community noticed that in February 2001,
the Stafford Act was amended to include terrorism and other catastrophic
events in the definition of major disaster. Even fewer members of the public, in
March 2001, noticed the introduction of HR1158 that sought to establish a
National Homeland Security Agency or HR1292 that required the development
of a Homeland Security strategy.
The inclusion of terrorism in the Stafford Act is significant in that it allows the
provisions of the Stafford Act to be used in response to such events. The Stafford
Act is very specific, and invoking it sometimes requires feats of bureaucratic leg-
erdemain. In the aftermath of the riot following the acquittal of the officers
involved in the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles in 1992, FEMA technically
responded to the destruction caused by fires rather than to the riot itself. The
Stafford Act at the time covered fires but excluded civil disturbances.
Before September 2001, national security had always been of concern to
emergency managers, both because of their roots in the Civil Defense program
and because national security issues are considered in the all‐hazards strategy
of comprehensive emergency management. Emergency planners had worked
on nuclear war planning and had been involved in terrorism planning, most
notably in the development of the Metropolitan Medical Response System fos-
tered by the Nunn‐Lugar‐Domenici legislation of 1996. Emergency planners
had also helped to develop a field operating structure, the ICS, that could be
used to coordinate the response activities of multiple agencies and had helped
to formulate the FRP that was used to coordinate overall federal response to
disasters.
Yet, suddenly, everything was “new,” and the emphasis on terrorism, coupled
with a large influx of federal funds, brought new players to the game, many of
whom had little or no knowledge of comprehensive emergency management.
Terrorism response was viewed as primarily a law enforcement function, and
much of the initial funding was devoted to building a response capacity for first
responders. In many jurisdictions, emergency managers were sidelined by new
Homeland Security offices, and there was growing concern that emergency
management grants, on which many emergency management offices depended,
would be reduced or eliminated.
Part of this marginalization stemmed from a decision by James Lee Witt in
1997 to distance FEMA from terrorism planning in favor of mitigation by
turning down the opportunity to start what would become the Office of
Domestic Preparedness (ODP). Witt’s rational was that the proposed program
was narrow in scope (i.e. aimed primarily at the law enforcement community)
and would draw agency resources from FEMA’s priority of creating community
resilience through mitigation. ODP was placed in the Department of Justice
and, over time, built a strong constituency among law enforcement officials. In

38 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
the bureaucratic infighting during the formation of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), ODP acquired FEMA’s grant programs, stripping
staff, and funding from the ailing agency.
FEMA even began to lose credibility among emergency planners at the fed-
eral level. Stripped of its cabinet rank, the agency was not even tasked to revise
the FRP that had been one of its major accomplishments. Instead of tweaking
the proven plan, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge sought a completely
new approach and tasked the Transportation Security Administration to
develop the new NRP that was used in Hurricane Katrina. The result of this
marginalization was that many experienced FEMA staff left the agency to take
jobs in state or local government or in the private sector. The combination of
this flight of expertise and an unproven national plan was a recipe for disaster
in Hurricane Katrina.
The adverse impact of Homeland Security was not felt solely at the national
level; it caused considerable disruption with local emergency management
offices. In viewing the lessons of September 11, federal officials focused on
initial response rather than on the full range of social, political, and economic
impacts of the event. This in turn led to an emphasis that was effectively tac-
tical in nature rather than strategic.
Consider, for example, the issue of interoperability. Homeland Security plan-
ners responded to the failure of communications at Ground Zero by looking at
technological solutions: if everyone operated on the same radio system, the
problem would be solved. However, even a cursory reading of after‐action
reports from the incident reveals that the problem was not solely technological
in nature; New York fire and police personnel traditionally did not communi-
cate with each other because of a mutual animosity that had nothing to do with
technology. Furthermore, New York did not use an incident management
system and had no centralized capability to manage the incident. This is in
stark contrast to the scene at the Pentagon where responders from Arlington
County immediately established a unified command, implemented a mutual
aid communications plan, and coordinated the response of multiple local, state,
and federal agencies. Interoperability, in the tactical sense, equals radio sys-
tems, but strategic interoperability means the ability of disparate organizations
to operate together under a common set of objectives.
This same confusion over goals was evident in the initial Homeland Security
grants. Funding was provided primarily for the purchase of protective equip-
ment for local responders. However, no funding was available for training per-
sonnel in how to use the equipment. Worse, no funds were provided for the
planning that would have determined needs and leveraged existing capabilities.
Providing individual protective equipment is tactical in nature. A strategic
approach would have considered the poor state of existing capability and look
for ways to increase overall capacity.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 39
The Council on Foreign Relations 2003 report on the use of Homeland
Security grants, Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously
Unprepared, noted that basic capabilities to respond to structural collapse,
detect hazardous materials, or identify biological agents were at extremely low
levels and had not been significantly enhanced by the grant programs. The
Council report also noted that it was difficult to determine critical needs
because there were no standards that represented a minimum acceptable level
of capability. Barred from using grant funds for enhancing current capability,
jurisdictions had no way to measure the difference between existing and desired
capability, and so funds were often used to purchase equipment that would, in
the long run, prove to be unnecessary.
Capabilities‐based Planning Replaces All‐Hazards Planning
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)‐5, Management of Domestic
Incidents, issued in February 2003 by President George W. Bush marked
another major change of direction for emergency planning at the national level.
HSPD 5 called for the development of a National Incident Management
System (NIMS) and laid out expectations for what elements should comprise
the system.
Homeland Security’s focus on low‐level tactical operations resulted in a com-
mitment to command and control methodologies that reflected in the NIMS
issued in March 2004. While NIMS is based in part on the highly regarded
Incident Command System, ICS is primarily a field operating system that is
used by hierarchical paramilitary organizations. In other words, it works for
fire, police, and emergency medical services. While NIMS attempted to address
other components such as preparedness, communications, and resource
management, ICS became the focal point for much of the government’s
planning, reflecting the DHS continued emphasis on tactical operations. Fully
48% of the 2008 edition of NIMS was devoted to ICS, compared with 8% for
preparedness, 5% for communications, and 6% for resource management.
The ICS is a highly effective system for managing incident response at the
tactical level. However, there is no empirical evidence that it is effective in
managing large‐scale disasters or even larger catastrophes such as Hurricane
Katrina. NIMS failed to take into account the qualitative differences
that emerge as one approaches the crises of increasing complexity that must
be managed by nonhierarchical organizations. The methodology used for
coordinating response as opposed to commanding response is the Multi‐
Agency Coordination System (MACS). The initial 152‐page NIMS guidance
document devoted less than three pages to MACS. A revision in 2008 corrected
this problem by including a substantial section on MACS in the chapter on
command and management. However, the 2017 “refreshed” NIMS guidance

40 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
defines MACS solely as a policy group and devotes just slightly over one page
to the concept.
The “down in the weeds” mind‐set of DHS was further demonstrated in the
shift to capabilities‐based planning. The DHS capabilities‐based planning
model began with the development of 15 National Planning Scenarios primarily
focused on terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosive attacks (see Figure 2.2), shifting back to the event‐specific planning
that occurred prior to the FRP. Furthermore, the list included only two natural
hazards, a major earthquake and major hurricane. Flooding, the most common
disaster in the United States, was not included. Given catastrophic events such
as the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and the Midwest Floods of 1993, the
omission is glaring.
The National Planning Scenarios were used to develop a Universal Task List
that provided a comprehensive menu of some 16 000 tasks that could facilitate
to the National Planning Scenarios. Besides its value as an operational tool, the
Universal Task List provided a common terminology and reference system and
could be used as the basis for training and exercise objectives. The tasks included
pertained to all levels of government with no one level being able to perform all
tasks. Planners selected the tasks that apply to their level of planning (i.e. fed-
eral, state, or local government) and identified critical tasks that must be per-
formed for operational success. Some 300 tasks in the Universal Task List were
designated as critical to operational success. A critical task was defined by DHS
as one that must be performed during a major event to prevent reoccurrence,
1. Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device
2. Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax
3. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza
4. Biological Attack – Plague
5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent
6. Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals
7. Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent
8. Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion
9. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake
10 Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane
11. Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices
12. Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices
13. Biological Attack – Food Contamination
14. Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)
15. Cyber Attack
Figure 2.2 The National Planning Scenarios. Source: The Homeland Security Council 2004.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 41
reduce loss of life or serious injuries, or mitigate significant property damage,
or is essential to the success of a homeland security mission.
The final document in the capabilities‐based planning model was the Target
Capabilities List (TCL) (Figure 2.3). This list identified 37 core capabilities that
DHS considered essential for performing the critical tasks identified in the
Universal Task List. The expectation was that these core capabilities would be
developed and maintained, in varying degrees, by each level of government.
The core capabilities include performance measures, making the TCL a poten-
tial tool for assessing performance. Here again, however, the emphasis was tac-
tical: the TCL covered chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
attacks in detail but devoted less than 20 of its 509 pages to the critical tasks
that are the primary concerns of local government: damage assessment, resto-
ration of lifelines, and community and economic recovery.
The TCL was also illustrative of a fascination with military systems that
imbued much of Homeland Security planning. This is not surprising as much
of emergency planning is based on military planning, a holdover from FEMA’s
Cold War mission that saw the retired military used as planners. The TCL was
most likely based on a concept such as the Army Training and Evaluation
Program (ARTEP). In the ARTEP, military functions were broken down to
tasks to be performed at each level of command. This included task books for
each individual soldier that described in detail how to perform specific functions.
These task lists are then used to assess the individual or unit’s ability to perform
the critical functions. However, systems that work well in the military, which has
a standard basis of training, are rigidly hierarchical, are relatively homogenous,
Figure 2.3 The planning components of the National Incident Management System.

42 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
and do not always work well when applied to government and private sector
agencies. The complexity of civilian disaster response with its competing spe-
cial interest groups and multiple layers of coordination requires a cooperative
rather than a hierarchical approach. The critical collective tasks required of
civilian disaster responders do not lend themselves as readily to a checklist
format as do military tasks.
The planning system developed to support NIMS and the National
Preparedness Goal was an attempt to move beyond just planning at the federal
level and to develop a cohesive system that could be applied to all levels of
government. There were issues with the system, however, that reflected DHS
biases. The most glaring flaw has been already mentioned; with the over-
whelming emphasis on terrorism, it was unclear whether all the tasks and capa-
bilities needed for a true multihazard approach had in fact been identified.
Furthermore, with over 1600 items in the Universal Task List and with the TCL
numbering over 170 pages, accessing the information in the documents was not
easy, and developing plans based on the system was cumbersome. Despite the
length and complexity, the documents were extremely generic and provided
little real guidance to planners.
Another concern was the lack of correlation between the DHS model and
existing standards such as Emergency Management Accreditation Program
(EMAP) and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 and accepted
best practices such as CPG 101 Developing and Maintaining Emergency
Operations Plans. The DHS model recognized four mission areas: prevent, pro-
tect, respond, and recover, a departure from the four‐phase Comprehensive
Emergency Management model that formed the basis for most emergency
management plans and programs in the United States. Although the TCL iden-
tified capabilities for postdisaster mitigation and economic recovery, it did not
scratch the surface of complex recovery issues. This made the program too easy
to dismiss as “just another terrorism plan” and generated resistance to its
implementation at the local level. Because grant funding drove compliance
with the TCL, there were concerns that local emergency management offices
would focus solely on the TCL capabilities and neglect the critical functions of
mitigation, continuity, and recovery because they are not required by the TCL.
There were similar problems in the use of the TCL as an assessment tool.
DHS expressed concerns that EMAP did not assess capability and hence was
not useful as a measure of performance. This is an “apples and oranges”
argument. NFPA 1600, the standard that formed the basis of EMAP, was
established to assess programs against a common set of criteria. It encourages
capacity development by defining program outputs but was never intended to
include specific measurements for assessing capability. Since the EMAP
program is voluntary, encouragement by the federal government for jurisdic-
tions to adopt the standard is essential to its success. There was concern that
DHS was adopting an “either‐or” mindset that could lead to the abandonment

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 43
of EMAP. In reality, EMAP and NFPA 1600 provided the strategic context for
planning, whereas the assessment of capability envisioned for the TCL could
have provided a useful tool for program evaluation. The two together would
have been a powerful combination for improving crisis response.
Finally, the DHS model represented precisely the type of detailed planning
that social science suggests does not work well in coordinating disaster response.
In this approach, one finds the type of mind‐set and narrowness of vision
warned off by Weick and Suttcliffe (2015). Inherent in the DHS model are the
assumptions that the next event will most likely be a terrorist attack, that it will
require strong, centralized command and control, and that if all the target
capabilities are achieved, success in response is assured. There is no provision
in this type of model for the improvisation and creative problem‐solving that
characterizes successful disaster management.
This blind spot in Homeland Security was unfortunate. NIMS represented a
major step forward for emergency management. A common operating system
enhances interoperability and makes the provision of mutual aid considerably
simpler. The ICS principles included in NIMS are proven in both the emergency
response and business communities. The TCL was a step toward providing the
standards and metrics called for in the Council on Foreign Relations study. There
is also no question that at least some of the Homeland Security grant funds were
put to good use to enhance local capacity to respond to multiple events. However,
the single‐minded focus on terrorism response, as reflected in the guidance
documents and grant requirements issued by DHS, represented a significant step
backward from the concept of comprehensive emergency management.
THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK: HURRICANE KATRINA
A Failed Response?
There is no doubt that Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 represented a major
turning point for emergency management in the United States at least on a par
with September 11. Katrina demonstrated, with uncompromising harshness,
how far the level of preparedness in the United States had been allowed to
decay since September 11, despite the billions in funding provided through
Homeland Security programs under the theory that “if you’re prepared for ter-
rorism, you’re prepared for anything.” The fact is that first responders were not
equipped to cope with large‐scale disasters and catastrophe. For crises of these
proportions, there must be a community‐level response supported by state and
federal resources. Coordination and not command become paramount, and it
is the nonparamilitary agencies such as public health and public works and
voluntary agencies such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army that must work
together to restore the community.

44 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
However, it is too easy to blame the failures in Hurricane Katrina solely on
the failure of government. The dynamics of a catastrophe are too complex.
Instead, it is useful to ask, “By what standards have we decided that government
failed?” Catastrophes and disasters by nature stretch response capabilities.
They are overwhelming. They are always confusing and frequently mishandled.
Mistakes are made, some of which turn out to be major. New research into the
1906 earthquake and fires in San Francisco, for example suggests that much of
the fire damage could have been prevented if responders had not decided to use
explosives to create firebreaks. The use of black powder as a blasting agent by
untrained responders actually spread the fire.
There were certainly some successes in Katrina. The 80% evacuation rate of
the New Orleans area is a higher percentage than usually expected in evacua-
tions, despite the refusal of the mayor to order a mandatory evacuation until
less than 24 hours before the predicted landfall. The National Guard had a
significant presence in the area within three days instead of the five required in
Hurricane Andrew. By 1 September 2005, 20 000 Guardsmen were deployed in
Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida. By the same date, FEMA had deployed
1800 specialized personnel such as National Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams and Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USAR). The Coast Guard
deployed 4000 Coast Guardsmen and rescued close to 2000 people. The US
Department of Agriculture delivered 80 000 pounds of food to support shelter
and feeding operations. This was supplemented by 13.4 million liters of water
shipped by the Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT had also shipped
10 000 tarps, 3.4 million pounds of ice, and 144 generators to the affected area.
The Red Cross was caring for nearly 46 000 evacuees in over 230 shelters.
Leaving aside the question of adequacy, the response to Hurricane Katrina
represents the largest and most extensive relief operation in US history.
At the sites of the operation’s biggest failures, the New Orleans Superdome
(Figure 2.4) and the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, conditions were, by
all accounts, horrific. But the violence and antisocial behavior described in
early reports could not be substantiated. Ten bodies were recovered from the
Superdome and four from the convention center, only one of whom was con-
sidered to have died under suspicious circumstances. While numerous people
claimed knowledge of rapes and murders, officials could find no one who had
actually witnessed the crime, and no victims came forward. Furthermore, if
one considers that Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans on Monday, 29
August, and the Superdome and convention center were evacuated by Friday,
1 September, then one could argue that the response was close to the 72 hours
that disaster officials maintain is the minimum time one can expect to be
without services following a disaster event.
This is not to suggest that the response to Katrina should be considered ade-
quate or that the deplorable conditions at the Superdome and convention
center could, under any circumstances, be thought justified or acceptable.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 45
Rather, it points out how public expectations can color the perceived success or
failure of response operations. A more aggressive response to the Superdome
and convention center issues might have been sufficient to completely reverse
public opinion of the Hurricane Katrina response as a failure.
Degraded Capabilities and Confused Planning
The perceived failure of the government response to Hurricane Katrina can be
directly attributed to the DHS emphasis on terrorism at the expense of all‐
hazards planning. In 2001, the Bush administration had reorganized FEMA to
refocus its efforts on terrorism and civil defense. However, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 transferred terrorism‐related preparedness to the DHS
Border and Transportation Directorate. In 2005, comprehensive emergency
management functions were split between FEMA and a new DHS Preparedness
Directorate, with FEMA having responsibility for response, mitigation, and
recovery. The one preparedness function retained by FEMA was responsibility
for Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government planning. This
gradual transfer of responsibilities to other agencies made it questionable
whether FEMA could perform its mission (assigned under the HSA) of leading
a national program on comprehensive emergency management.
FEMA also suffered from a lack of a champion at the highest level. President
Bush’s appointee as FEMA director was not only unqualified for the job but
also viewed FEMA in a negative light, considering it nothing more than an enti-
tlement program that generated unrealistic demands on the federal government
Figure 2.4 The Superdome in New Orleans showing damage to the roof caused by Hurricane
Katrina. Photo Credit: Jocelyn Augustino, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

46 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
(US Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs 2006).
The result was that even before being subsumed into DHS, FEMA was being
redefined in a way that considerably weakened the agency’s authority and
influence.
The marginalization of FEMA led to lowered morale within the agency with
predictable results. As has been mentioned, the agency underwent a consider-
able “brain drain” beginning in 2001 that saw the exodus of seasoned emergency
management professionals to positions in state and local government and the
private sector. Coupled with reduced funding under DHS, FEMA suffered
from personnel shortages. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, this shortage was
15–20% and even higher in some critical areas.
This loss of expertise was further exacerbated by Secretary Ridge’s decision
to have the Transportation Security Administration revise the FRP. The new
version of the plan, the NRP, was released in December 2004 and immediately
came under fire from local emergency managers. The principal criticism was
that the NRP was rushed to completion and that local emergency managers
had not had sufficient opportunity to provide input. The plan was felt to be
overly complicated and bureaucratic, too focused on federal operations, and
did not clarify roles and responsibilities. However, lost in the criticism was the
fact that where the FRP was intended solely for federal agencies, the NRP
introduced a new paradigm by attempting to create a plan that incorporated all
levels of government.
The NRP also introduced several concepts that would create confusion dur-
ing Hurricane Katrina. One example was creation of the designation “Incident
of National Significance.” This designation had no legislative basis and seemed
an attempt to give the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to activate
federal resources in a crisis. However, it was unclear what was the difference
between the existing presidential declaration of disaster under the Stafford Act
(a decision delegated to the Director of FEMA) and the new declaration of an
Incident of National Significance by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
During Hurricane Katrina, the President issued a declaration of disaster on
29 August for the states affected by the storm. The Secretary of Homeland
Security did not issue a declaration of an Incident of National Significance
until 30 August, some 36 hours after landfall. It is unclear what difference, if
any, this delay had on the overall response.
Similar confusion arose over the roles of the Federal Coordinating Officer
(FCO), a position authorized by the Stafford Act, and the Principal Federal
Official (PFO), a position created under the NRP. According to the NRP, the
PFO was intended to represent the Secretary on the ground but not to have an
operational role. However, the assignment of the director of FEMA to this
position conflicted with the operational role the director had performed in
previous disasters working in concert with the FCO. The result was a conflict
between the FEMA director and the Secretary and confusion over operational

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 47
control. This was exacerbated when the FEMA Director was replaced as PFO
by the Coast Guard Chief of Staff who formed a separate command that made
operational decisions without working through the Joint Field Office. A similar
problem was created by the Department of Defense component, Joint Task
Force Katrina, which also made operational decisions in response to state and
local requests without coordination with the JFO. This situation was partly
resolved only when the PFO was also appointed as the FCO.
The response to Hurricane Katrina provoked considerable discussion over
the continued existence of FEMA and whether it should be retained in DHS.
The question was settled with the passage of the Post‐Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA). Among the many provisions
of the Act was a sweeping reorganization of FEMA. PKEMRA reorganized
FEMA to include the Preparedness Directorate, thus restoring FEMA’s respon-
sibility for comprehensive emergency management planning. Furthermore, the
agency was granted enhanced autonomy with the agency head being designated
as an Administrator rather than as an Under Secretary, with the authority to
report directly to the President in times of crisis.
REFORM AND NEW PLANNING CONCEPTS
In May 2006, DHS issued a change to the NRP intended to incorporate the
lessons learned from the failure of the plan in Hurricane Katrina. The changes
did target some of the problems that had created confusion such as requiring
the DOD Joint Task Force Commander to be collocated at the Joint Field
Office and integrating ESFs into the Joint Field Office rather than as stand‐
alone entities. However, the change kept in place the PFO, although it allowed
for the PFO to also hold the position of FCO in incidents not related to terror-
ism. While the changes did provide some improvement, it did not address the
overemphasis on federal operations and the heavily bureaucratic tone of the
original plan.
In response to continued criticism of the NRP, DHS coordinated a major
revision to the NRP and reissued it in January 2008 as the National Response
Framework. The new title reflected the intent of the plan to provide overall
principles, roles, and structures for a national, all‐hazards approach to disas-
ters. The Framework was still linked to the National Planning Scenarios, the
Universal Task List, and the TCL via the National Preparedness Guidelines
(September 2007) and retained the role of the PFO, although it did attempt to
provide more clarity as to what this position entailed. In essence, it served as a
basic plan and was to be supplemented by a series of annexes for ESFs, support,
and incidents and partner guides intended for state and local governments.
As was the case for the NRP, DHS was criticized for failing to involve state
and local stakeholders in the revision process. A Government Accountability

48 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Office report issued in June 2008 found that while DHS did involve stake-
holders in identifying key revision issues and developing a first draft, it then
departed from its work plan and conducted a closed, internal federal review of
the draft rather than releasing it for comment. This deviation was the result of
the DHS belief that the document required further modification before release.
The draft was released for review in September 2007. Furthermore, PKEMRA
had required the formation of a National Advisory Council for the FEMA
Administrator by December 2006 to give nonfederal stakeholders a voice in the
revision process. The membership of the Council was not released until June
2007, and their comments on the draft were not submitted until December, one
month before the release of the Framework.
In April 2011, President Barak Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8
National Preparedness directing the development of a national preparedness
goal and system. The National Preparedness Goal, released in September 2011,
marked a major shift in thinking from the Comprehensive Emergency
Management model. In addition to including the prevention and protection
missions espoused by DHS, the Goal eliminated preparedness on the theory
that preparedness was the desired end state rather than an in individual mission.
The National Preparedness Goal identified a series of core capabilities consid-
ered essential for executing each mission, reflecting the DHS continued commit-
ment to capabilities‐based planning. However, unlike the core capabilities in the
TCL that focused on tactical capabilities, these core capabilities were extremely
broad and more operationally based. An accompanying document, the National
Preparedness System, released in November 2011, identified six components
(Figure 2.5) intended to provide consistency in decision‐making and resource
allocation and to measure progress toward meeting the core capabilities.
As a part of this initiative, the National Response Framework was revised in
2013 and again in 2016. These revisions moved national planning away from
the focus on detailed tactical planning that had hampered national planning to
a more principles‐based approach. The revisions:
• Identified four priorities for response operations: to save lives, protect
property and the environment, stabilize the incident, and provide for basic
human needs.
• Identified five guiding principles that were fundamental to successful
response operations (Figure 2.6).
• Replaced the National Planning Scenarios in favor of broad categories of
risks identified by the Strategic National Risk Assessment.
• Replaced the Universal Task List and TCL with simplified core capabilities
and critical tasks focused on each mission area.
• Eliminated the declaration of an incident of national significance.
• Eliminated the confusing Principal Federal Officer position.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 49
Unlike previous plans that had tried to combine concepts of operations with
actual operations planning, the revised Framework recognized the difference.
Annexes for ESFs, support functions, and specific incidents are separate compo-
nents of the National Preparedness System, as are specific federal operational
plans for mitigation, response, and recovery. More importantly, the National
Response Framework was not an end in itself but merely one component of the
National Preparedness System. It was followed by the release of frameworks for
each of the other mission areas (prevention, protection, mitigation, and recovery).
CONCLUSION
Similar to the growth of the disaster bureaucracy noted in the previous chapter,
national planning guidance has evolved over time and is still very much a work
Reviewing
and Updating
Validating
Capabilities
Planning to
Deliver
Capabilities
Building and
Sustaining
Capabilities
Estimating
Capability
Requirements
Identifying
and
Assessing
Risk
Figure 2.5 The six components of the National Preparedness System. Source: Department of
Homeland Security 2011.
1. Engaged Partnership
2. Tiered Response
3. Scalable, Flexible, And Adaptable Operational Capabilities
4. Unity Of Effort Through Unified Command
5. Readiness To Act
Figure 2.6 The five guiding principles that support the National Response Framework. Source:
Department of Homeland Security 2016.

50 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
in progress. In retrospect, there have been several paradigm shifts concurrent
with the change of presidential administrations. These shifts have largely been
influenced by focusing events, disasters that produced policy intended to
address perceived failures in response. The Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989
highlighted the need for a national plan to address catastrophic earthquakes
and led to the development of the FRP.
The criticism leveled at the federal government following Hurricanes Hugo
and Andrew in 1992 sparked major changes to the FRP based on new policies
that provided for a more immediate response by federal agencies, to include the
prepositioning of federal resources near anticipated disaster areas. Prior to
Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, FEMA was viewed as a third‐tier responder.
The agency generally arrived on scene a week or two after a disaster and handed
out checks to assist with reconstruction. The public perception of failure in
Hugo and Andrew significantly changed FEMA’s role to that of more immediate
response. FEMA suddenly found itself with coordination responsibility for
direct federal response. This, in turn, forced changes to the Stafford Act author-
ities and agency procedures and led ultimately to the development of the FRP.
A change of administration in 2001 followed almost immediately by the
attacks of September 11 caused a major revision of policy and a shift from
functional planning to capability‐based planning. Part of this change was a
recognition of the role played by state and local governments in response and
the need for integration through a common operating system. However, the
establishment of the DHS and the administration’s focus on terrorism to the
exclusion of all hazards meant that the very people who would have to use this
common system at state and local levels were often not involved in the planning.
The result was a NRP that had very little credibility with local emergency man-
agers and the confused response to Hurricane Katrina.
This was unfortunate because many of the concepts contained in the NRP
had merit, particularly the attempt to synchronize response activities at all
levels of government. These concepts were incorporated into the National
Response Framework that formed the basis of the National Preparedness System
developed under the Obama administration. In contrast to the initial attempts
of the government to provide detailed instructions to local planners, the
Frameworks offer broad guidance that can be adapted to local conditions.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition.
Lucien G. Canton.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc.
51
Chapter 3
By questioning taken‐for‐granted assumptions about disasters and introducing
new theoretical perspectives that sensitize researchers to features of the social
order and processes that were previously overlooked, recent scholarship promises
to transform the field of disaster studies.
—Kathleen Tierney, et al.
Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States
The historical study of disasters provides a fertile source of information for
emergency managers. However, this information is often anecdotal and incom-
plete. A great deal of study is required to identify trends and draw conclusions
that are useful in emergency planning. To meet this need, emergency managers
must turn to the discipline of social science.
Social science is the study of human society and of individual relationships
in, and to, society. Where history tells what occurred, social scientists attempt
to determine why something happened. From this, it is possible to predict what
is likely to occur in the future and to base emergency planning on realistic pos-
sibilities rather than on the many myths and unchallenged assumptions that are
common to emergency planning.
SOCIAL SCIENCE AS AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TOOL
For too many emergency managers, social science is an overlooked tool. In
fairness, there are reasons for this. Academics tend to write for other academics,
sometimes making their work difficult to read for the layperson. Researchers
tend to focus on empirical studies that can be very limited in scope and not
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS
OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY

52 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
directly relevant to emergency managers. Few researchers are interested in
describing the broad conclusions that might be useful for emergency planners.
Pure research is favored over applied science. Researchers are viewed as “ivory
tower academics” with no practical experience in emergency response opera-
tions and therefore lacking in credibility. This attitude completely ignores a
discipline that is constantly evolving and increasing in utility and that is building
the theoretical knowledge base necessary for emergency management’s evolu-
tion as a profession.
Part of this problem lies with the emergency management community itself.
As was noted in Chapter 1, the discipline of emergency management evolved
from the civil defense programs of the 1950s. This evolution put a premium on
previous military or emergency services experience, disciplines that have little
connection with academic studies related to emergency management. Many
emergency managers are retired from these services and are not even aware of
the vast body of social science literature available to them.
As a consequence, one finds a disconnect between the expectations in
emergency plans and what actually occurs in disasters as documented through
social science research. To a great extent, emergency plans are based on false
assumptions, such as the need for strong centralization and hierarchical
authority to overcome social disruption and panic. These assumptions will be
discussed later in this chapter.
Social Science Evolves Emergency Management Theory
Similar to the discipline of emergency management itself, social science research
into disasters began in the early 1950s during the Cold War. The US government
sponsored research with the goal of anticipating how people would react in a
nuclear attack by using disasters as a type of “natural laboratory.” The first large‐
scale studies were conducted by the University of Chicago’s National Opinion
Research Center between 1950 and 1954. Interestingly, these studies were sparked
by an actual occurrence – a hazardous material incident involving sulfur dioxide
fumes in Donora, Pennsylvania, in October 1948. Military officers sent to study
the incident hoped to draw conclusions about civilian behavior in a poison gas
attack. Instead, they were puzzled when they observed unaffected people mim-
icking the symptoms of the victims (what is now known as the worried‐well syn-
drome) and sought an explanation for the phenomena through further study.
Other studies followed, most notably the work of the Disaster Research Group
of the National Academy of Sciences in the mid‐1950s.
While the initial intent of this research was to study individual reaction to
wartime situations, a major lesson learned was the need to study the reaction of
organizations. While the research did not produce many results that were par-
ticularly relevant to wartime needs, it did suggest that many of the common
assumptions about individual and group behavior under crisis were false.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 53
An interesting phenomenon of this initial research is the way sociologists
co‐opted purely military projects to explore human reaction to crisis outside
the scope of warfare. The work of the Disaster Research Group is a case in
point. Despite being established to study disasters caused by enemy action, the
day‐to‐day work was dominated by sociologists, resulting in a basic research
orientation rather than one of applied science. In other words, the results of the
studies provided valuable information for the overall understanding of disas-
ters but provided few practical applications that could be applied to wartime
issues.
Of significant interest to the emergency management community was the
establishment of the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at Ohio State University
in 1963. A proposal by Ohio State’s Sociology Department to study organiza-
tions under stress came at the same time that the Office of Civil Defense was
both concerned over civilian behavior in war (the Cuban Missile Crisis had
occurred in October 1962 and the Cold War was heating up) and had the fund-
ing to support research. The original proposal was expanded at the request of
the Office of Civil Defense, and the DRC was established. Moved to the
University of Delaware in 1985, the DRC conducts field and survey research
into community‐wide crises and serves as a repository for materials collected
by other agencies and researchers. Its library of over 50 000 items and series of
over 400 books, monographs, and reports are available to agencies involved in
emergency management, as well as to researchers.
A counterpart to the DRC is the Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder, founded in 1976
and now known as the Natural Hazards Center (NHC). Although its mission
is similar to that of the DRC (i.e. to serve as a clearinghouse of knowledge on
the social science and policy aspects of disasters), the NHC focuses primarily
on natural hazards and mitigation. In addition to a library and publication
series, the NHC publishes a bimonthly newsletter for developers and users of
hazard information and a bimonthly periodical dealing with current disaster
issues. The NHC also has a quick response program funded by the National
Science Foundation that funds social science research to capture perishable
information in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.
The evolution of social science research into disasters has special signifi-
cance for the emergency manager on several levels. Social science research
offers insights into the nature of disasters, but, more importantly, addresses the
issues of public expectation. Public expectation is both a key driver behind the
evolution of emergency management and an indicator of success. Understanding
how people react to crisis and what methodologies are most likely to work is
critical for an emergency manager.
On another level, emergency management is evolving as a profession. One of
the hallmarks of a profession is a specialized and theoretical body of knowledge.
For much of its history, the emergency management discipline has considered

54 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
this specialized body of knowledge to be the skills related to emergency
response, such as the ability to establish shelters or to conduct evacuations.
However, this is the knowledge required of a technician, not a professional,
and in many cases, these actions can be, or are, performed primarily by other
disciplines. The theoretical knowledge that forms the basis of emergency
management lies not in these technical skills but in social science research and
a deeper understanding of the nature of disaster and the reaction of people
and organizations to crisis.
EMERGENCIES, DISASTERS, AND CATASTROPHES
What, exactly, constitutes a disaster? Over the years, the word “disaster” has
come to mean many things to many people. In most cases, it is used as a generic
term for “something bad has happened,” but surely in a book that deals with
emergency management, one can be more precise. The task is not as simple as
one might think. The first question that arises is “Whose definition should be
used?” There is the definition from Merriam‐Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,
eleventh edition, which is used by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
1600 to define “ordinarily accepted meaning” of words used in the standard.
There are the definitions provided by various agencies, such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and there are definitions used under
various pieces of legislation such as the Stafford Act. Each of these definitions
has been formulated for a specific purpose and has a slightly different meaning.
Social science researchers have argued that disasters are social constructs.
That is, they are defined by the nature of their impact on social systems. An
event occurring where there is no population does not usually rise to the level
of a disaster unless it produces cascading effects that have an impact on society.
There is also evidence to suggest that disasters are a manifestation of vulnera-
bilities in modern society, an argument that certainly correlates well with the
concept of risk discussed in a later chapter. One must also consider that, as
society grows more complex, conflicts between human activity and natural
processes may have unintended consequences.
Defining what is meant by disaster is not just an academic exercise; it is a
reflection of how society deals with the consequences of crisis. As environ-
mental historian Ted Steinberg notes in Acts of God: The Unnatural History of
Natural Disaster in America (2000), the assumption that disasters are random
events beyond the control of society has been used as an excuse for a lack of
mitigation efforts and for failure to plan on the part of government and the
public. If one accepts, however, that disasters are a direct result of the vulnera-
bility of society to specific events, most of which are foreseeable, then it follows
that realistic steps can be taken to reduce vulnerability and to prepare for the
consequences of disaster.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 55
What truly complicates the issue of defining disaster, however, is that the
impacts of disasters are ultimately relative. That is, they are functions of the
nature of the disaster itself, the vulnerability of the population affected, and
the resources available to those who must deal with the consequences. A five‐
alarm fire in a major metropolitan area may be treated as a routine occurrence;
the same fire in a rural setting may involve a multicounty mutual aid response.
Disasters are also a function of public perception of risk. The threat of rotating
power outages in California in 2001 had little impact on public safety, but
public concern elevated it to the level of a crisis.
Another definitional issue is that the term “disaster” may be too generic to
distinguish between an event that causes significant damage and loss of life at
the local level, such as a winter flood, and large‐scale events with national
impact, such as Hurricane Katrina. This suggests that there may be a need for
a “hierarchy of disasters” to differentiate between the magnitude of events.
This begs the question, “Is this difference merely one of scale?” That is, as the
magnitude of events increases are the differences only quantitative (e.g. a
disaster can be responded to in the same way in which day‐to‐day emergencies
are dealt with) or are there qualitative differences as well?
The work of social scientists, particularly that of Dr. E. L. Quarantelli, sug-
gests that there are, in fact, both quantitative and qualitative differences bet-
ween disasters and day‐to‐day response. This supports the idea that there are
distinct escalating levels of crisis that can be fitted into a hierarchical
structure.
The first level of this hierarchy consists of those events that occur frequently
and can be dealt with internally by a community. Such events are generally
referred to as “emergencies.” Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 Developing
and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans defines an emergency as, “Any
incident, whether natural or human‐caused, that requires responsive action to
protect life or property.” This should not be confused, however, with the defini-
tion of an emergency in the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act defines an emergency
for the purpose of federal relief as
Any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President,
Federal assistance is needed to supplement State, tribal, and local efforts and
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety,
or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United
States.
In actual practice, federal declarations of emergency are rare and limited to
specific categories of federal assistance.
If one defines an emergency as something that can be handled at the local
level, the next step up would logically be those events that exceeds those
resources. CPG 101 defines a disaster as
An occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human‐
caused incident that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths, and/or

56 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
multiple injuries. As used in this Guide, a “large‐scale disaster” is one that
exceeds the response capability of the local jurisdiction and requires state,
and potentially Federal, involvement.
The Stafford Act is more specific and introduces a modifier in the term
“major disaster.”
“Major disaster” means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane,
tornado, storm, high water, wind driven (sic) water, tidal wave, tsunami,
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought)
or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United
States, which in the determination of the President, causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under
this act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, tribal
governments, and local governments and disaster relief organizations in alle-
viating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
The definition in CPG 101 suggests that disasters are high‐impact events that
exceed local and state response resources, while the Stafford Act defines disas-
ters solely based on impact, as determined by the President. These definitions
seem to imply that the difference between emergencies and disasters is one of
degree and not qualitative. That is, the difference between a major automobile
accident (emergency) and September 11 (major disaster) is the number of casu-
alties and responding resources. However, when one considers the complexity
of response to larger events, the assumption that disasters differ from emer-
gencies only in scale seems counterintuitive.
One of the initial research issues considered by social scientists was this
question of the difference between emergencies and disasters. Researchers, most
notably Dr. E. L. Quarantelli, have identified at least five qualitative differences:
1. Converging Organizations: Emergencies are normally handled by
community resources or, at most, local mutual aid. Disasters involve mul-
tiple organizations from the public and private sectors that the local
community may not have worked with before. Consequently, organiza-
tions will need to be able to quickly form working relationships with dif-
ferent groups.
2. Loss of Autonomy: Disasters result in the formation of operating struc-
tures that may take precedence over normal ones. They also make use of
emergency authorities that supersede property rights such as comman-
deering private resources or demolishing damaged structures. These
emergency authorities are usually not operative in day‐to‐day
emergencies.
3. Changes to Performance Standards: in disasters, protocols that would
normally govern response are superseded (e.g. speed of response is altered,
triage of patients is established, and limited equipment is dispatched).

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 57
This means that the level of service that citizens are used to receiving will
be severely degraded. For example, despite the expectations raised by
Hurricane Katrina, 911 dispatch centers are not considered a disaster
response mechanism. While the communication component remains vital,
the ability to receive calls and to dispatch services may be nonexistent
owing to damage to the telephone system and the full commitment of
response resources to other tasks.
4. Closer Public–Private Interface: Disasters require the use of all available
community resources, and the lines between public and private resources
may become blurred. This is particularly true in the area of logistics,
where private sector companies are much better equipped to deliver and
track critical resources. Furthermore, the bulk of the critical infrastruc-
ture in the United States is owned and operated by the private sector,
making the private sector an essential player in restoration of services.
5. Response to Impact on the Organization: In day‐to‐day emergencies, the
normal mechanism of government is not generally heavily affected. In a
major disaster, however, local government must provide response to citi-
zens while dealing with the impact of the event on its own operations.
Continuity plans become the key to restoring public services, and the
implementation of such plans may produce conflict with response plans
if the two are not properly coordinated.
As one views these distinctions, it is obvious that local emergencies and
major disasters are different both quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies
that the command and control methodology, operational techniques, and tac-
tics used in normal day‐to‐day operations are insufficient for dealing with
major disasters and that organizations must do additional planning beyond
that necessary for emergency response. It also implies that there may be a sec-
ond hierarchical model at work in crisis, one that focuses on how emergencies
and disasters are managed.
While CPG 101 and the Stafford Act only define emergencies and disasters,
not all disasters are equal. Most of them tend to be fairly localized events and
relatively limited in scope while others have widespread effects. Using only the
single term “disaster,” how does one compare the scale of the tsunami that
struck the Indian Ocean in 2004 with that which struck Crescent City, California
in 1964 (see Figure 3.1)? Are there no differences between the Loma Prieta
earthquake in 1989 and the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906?
Clearly, there is the need for a more descriptive term to distinguish these “super‐
disasters” from major disasters.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the term “catastrophe” emerged as
the term to describe a major disaster with widespread consequences, despite
the use of the word in the Stafford Act to define emergencies and disasters.

58 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
FEMA‐funded development of courses and materials related to catastrophic
planning, and “Posture and build capability for catastrophic disasters” was one
of five priorities in its 2014–2018 strategic plan.
This begs the question, though, “If there is a qualitative difference between
emergency and disaster, are there differences between disaster and catastrophe?”
This question was raised by the Government Accounting Office following
Hurricane Andrew in 1993 and has been studied for some time by a small group
of social scientists. Dr. E.L. Quarantelli has identified five ways in which a
catastrophe is qualitatively different from a disaster:
1. Impact on Built Structures: Catastrophes are characterized by heavy
destruction to most or all a community’s housing stock, creating a crisis
in sheltering resources. In contrast, most major disasters leave a large
percentage of the community’s housing stock available, allowing dis-
placed persons to stay with friends, relatives, or volunteers. The extensive
damage generated by a catastrophe may result in a scattering of the
population, either through voluntary travel or through government relo-
cation. A large portion of the New Orleans population was relocated to
host communities following Hurricane Katrina; a similar relocation of
population was seen after the San Francisco earthquake in 1906.
Figure 3.1 Damage in Anchorage, Alaska, following the earthquake on 28 March 1964.
Measuring an astonishing 9.2 Richter, the earthquake killed 131, caused an estimated
$300 million in damage and spawned a tsunami that killed 12 people and caused $15 million
in damage to Crescent City, CA. Photo Credit: United States Army.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 59
2. Impact on Local Officials: The normal assumption in disasters is that the
local government is in charge and is in a position to coordinate relief
efforts. In catastrophes, local government is disrupted either by virtue of
officials being victims or by destruction to operating facilities and com-
munications systems. This implies that the usual system of local
government requesting resources may not operate in catastrophic events
and that catastrophic planning at the state level should include mecha-
nisms to push resources to affected jurisdictions (see Case Study 3.1).
3. Impact on Assistance From Local Communities: The most immediate
source of assistance in a major disaster is from other communities that
have not suffered from the event. In a catastrophe, large areas are affected,
and local communities cannot assist each other. In addition, convergent
resources such as federal assistance must be spread among many commu-
nities rather than focused on a single community as in most major disas-
ters. This competition for resources was apparent in Hurricane Katrina
where the bulk of the attention was given to New Orleans at the expense
of other jurisdictions that may have had greater need.
4. Impact on Community Functions: Catastrophic events interrupt not only
the infrastructure of the affected community but also social facilities such
as schools and churches to a much greater degree than a major disaster,
significantly delaying the return to normalcy.
5. Impact on Political Processes: Because of the physical damage and the
disruption of social structures, catastrophes bring to the forefront political
issues that are generally overlooked during normal times. As an example,
Hurricane Katrina raised issues of corruption in local government and
racial stratification in New Orleans.
Quarantelli’s work suggests that there is indeed a hierarchy of crisis that must
be acknowledged in emergency planning and that there are both quantitative
and qualitative differences between emergencies, major disasters, and catastro-
phes. The National Response Plan acknowledged this by defining catastrophic
events as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting
the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or
government functions.” This is similar to the Stafford Act disaster in that it
defines catastrophic events by the nature of the impact, essentially a quantitative
rather than a qualitative measure.
Establishing a hierarchy of disaster that recognizes catastrophic events as dif-
ferent from disasters is not to say that emergencies or major disasters are insig-
nificant events; victims do not care what level an event is considered by
bureaucrats, only about its impact on them. Nor is it intended to suggest that
mechanisms used to prepare and respond to emergencies and major disasters do

60 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDY 3.1: HURRICANE KATRINA 2005 – FAILURE
OF EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS
An inviolate premise of federal disaster response is that the local government retains control
of the disaster and that federal and state resources are deployed at the request of local
government and used in support of local efforts. However, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated
that this paradigm changes in catastrophe and that other levels of government must be
proactive when local government cannot meet its responsibilities.
The emergency plan for New Orleans relied heavily on the continuation of basic
telephone service with cell phone and satellite phone systems as backups. On 27 August
2005, the chief technology officer (CTO) in New Orleans decided to establish a command
post at the Hyatt Hotel, located close to city hall because it was better served by power and
food than the designated city emergency operations center (EOC). The mayor and several
key city officials, including the chief of police, moved into the fourth‐floor conference rooms
and prepared to conduct operations from that location.
Hurricane Katrina was one of the most powerful storms recorded in the Atlantic and
struck New Orleans on 29 August as an extremely strong category three hurricane with
sustained winds of 125 mph. The powerful winds tore off part of one side of the Hyatt, and the
storm surge breached the levee that protected the city from Lake Pontchartrain and the
Mississippi River. Within hours, the Hyatt was surrounded by water.
Case Figure 3.1 Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf of Mexico on 28 August 2005. Source: US
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
At the Hyatt, phone service failed almost immediately because of widespread power
outages and water damage to the hotel’s telephone switch. The cell phone system also failed
(continued on next page)

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 61
not have utility in a catastrophe. What this hierarchy suggests is that there are
significant differences among these events that must be taken into consideration
when planning for crisis.
This raises again the issue alluded to earlier about a hierarchy for responding
to various levels of crisis. If there is a difference between levels of crisis, is there
a difference in response as well? Common sense would suggest that there is and
when one considers operational models from both the public and private sector,
there certainly seems to be. Crisis response falls into three rough categories:
1. Tactical: Tactical response consists of the systems and resources needed
to respond directly to the impacts of an event. These systems and resources
include what are normally considered first responders (i.e. police, fire, and
emergency medical personnel) and manage response at the field level.
2. Operational: Operational or field response manages the overall response
to the event by coordinating the activities of multiple responding agencies,
anticipating resource needs, and coordinating public information.
3. Strategic: Strategic response manages the crisis by examining long‐range
implications of the event, determining long‐term goals and objectives,
and establishing priorities that will guide operational response.
because of extensive damage to the cell sites. When attempts were made to use the satellite
phones, the city team found that the batteries would not hold a charge, a common occurrence
when batteries are not maintained and replaced on a regular basis. The police radio system
was functioning at limited capacity because of a generator failure at the main transmission site.
The team was reduced to using messengers to gather information and transmit instructions.
On the evening of 29 August, the team managed to establish communications with the
outside world via a voice‐over‐IP connection on a single laptop. To expand the system, the
CTO, the chief of police, and several aides drove to a nearby Office Depot and seized the
equipment that was needed, including the store’s computer server that was wrenched out of
its brackets by the chief of police. By the evening of Wednesday, 30 August, the system was
operational, and the mayor was communicating with the president.
The problems faced by the mayor and his team were mirrored at the EOC. Located on
the ninth floor of City Hall, the EOC also depended on basic telephone service and
experienced similar problems with cell and satellite phones. In addition, the EOC lost power
shortly after the storm because its emergency generator ran out of fuel.
The failure of local government communications in New Orleans had a direct impact on
the provision of relief. The failure of local communications meant that information about the
impacts of the storm and subsequent flooding was difficult to obtain. By isolating himself from
the city’s EOC, the mayor was in no position to give an accurate assessment of the damage
or prioritize requests for resources. Absent of this information, state and federal responders
were forced to rely on other, less‐reliable sources of information.
Recommended Reading
Rhoads, C. (2005). Cut off: At center of crisis, city officials faced struggle to keep in touch. Wall Street Journal.
(continued from previous page)

62 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
In any disaster, there are three levels of activity taking place: a long‐range
planning process that sets strategic goals, an intermediate level that translates
strategic goals into the deployment of resources, and a field component level
that achieves results. These three levels correlate very well with the operational
levels found within the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in
Figure 3.2 and in the three‐tiered gold, silver, and bronze incident management
system used by the City of London (see Figure 3.3).
This response hierarchy also correlates very well with the crisis hierarchy
discussed previously. Emergencies are generally dealt with at the tactical level.
In the response of a community to a major disaster, the focus is primarily on
operational response. Response to catastrophes is managed at the strategic level
because of the scale of the event and the long‐term impact to the nation.
Corresponding to each level of response is an increasing need for flexibility and
creativity in the response. It is relatively easy to identify needs and resources at
the tactical level. Indeed, this is done every day across the country. As one con-
siders operational and strategic planning, the variables begin to increase and
not all situations can be foreseen, necessitating a system that is flexible enough
to create response mechanisms on the fly and able to use resources creatively.
One of the results of Hurricane Katrina was an increased level of awareness
of the potential for catastrophic events. The Department of Homeland Security
launched a major assessment of local and state plans and required significant
planning activities to be performed by local governments. However, to require
“catastrophic planning” at the local government level shows a lack of a holistic
view of emergency management. By definition, local government is fully
JFO
Coordination
Group
Interagency
Incident
Management
Group
EOCs/multiagency
coordination
centers
Incident
command
Multiagency
coordination entity
Joint Field
Office
State
Emergency
Ops Center
Local
Emergency
Ops Center
Regional
Response
Coordination
Center
Homeland
Security
Operations
Center
Incident
command
post
Incident
command
post
Incident
command
post
Area
command
Figure 3.2 NIMS Framework from the National Response Plan 2004 demonstrating
the three operational levels present in disaster response.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 63
involved at the level of disaster; there are no additional resources available that
have not already been committed. If one considers Quarantelli’s qualitative dif-
ferences between disaster and catastrophe, local government may have even less
capability in catastrophic events than what exists in disasters. This means that,
almost immediately, much of the responsibility for operational response may
shift to the state. This suggests that the principal planning agent for catastrophe
should be the state and that local planning should be focused on building the
capacity to survive by enhancing continuity planning. Figure 3.4 is an attempt
to combine the levels of crisis and response and the incident management
methodology of the National Incident Management System into a single model.
The response hierarchy is also operative within each level of crisis as well.
For example, at the local government level, tactical response is used to manage
emergencies. During a major disaster, this tactical response is still occurring,
although, as noted, there will be changes to autonomy and performance stan-
dards. At the community level, a local EOC is activated to manage operational
response, and a crisis management team of senior officials is formed to con-
sider long‐range strategic issues (see Figure 3.5).
The defining of the various levels of crisis is not just an academic exercise;
it is an essential first step in understanding the nature of disaster. This under-
standing is necessary to ensure that plans are effective and appropriate to the
needs of the community. Among other things, it determines the level at which
a plan is written. This determines planning assumptions, level of detail, and
6.2 Gold, Silver, and Bronze
6.2.1 “Gold” , “Silver”, and “Bronze” are titles of functions adopted by each of the emergency
services and are role related not rank related. These functions are equivalent to those
described as “strategic”, “tactical”, and “operational” in other documents about emergency
procedures. In summary, the roles of each can be described as:
6.3 Gold (strategic)
6.3.1 Gold is the commander in overall charge of each service, responsible for formulating the
strategy for the incident. Each Gold has overall command of the resources of their own
organisation, but delegates tactical decisions to their respective Silver(s).
6.3.2 At the outset of the incident, Gold will determine the strategy and record a strategy
statement. This will need to be monitored and subject to ongoing review.
6.4 Silver (tactical)
6.4.1 Silver will attend the scene, take charge, and be responsible for formulating the tactics to
be adopted by their service to achieve the strategy set by Gold. Silver should not become
personally involved with activities close to the incident, but remain detached.
6.5 Bronze (operational)
6.5.1 Bronze will control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a
geographical sector or specific role and implement the tactics defined by Silver.
Figure 3.3 The London Incident Management System makes use of the three operational
levels. Source: Major Incident Procedure Manual, London Emergency Liaison Panel 2004.

64 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
resources required. More importantly, an understanding of the dynamics of a
disaster leads one inevitably to the conclusion that, as disasters become larger,
the need for innovation increases, and plans become starting points for
response, not end points in themselves. At the tactical level, standard operating
procedures and protocols can be used to manage the crisis. As one approaches
the level of a catastrophe, plans may need to be modified or discarded, and
new operational structures and procedures may evolve. Pre‐event planning,
however, can help stimulate this process and provide a base on which to
operate.
Emergency
…results in
extraordinary levels of
mass casualties,
damage, or disruption
severely affecting the
population,
infrastructure,
environment, economy,
national morale, and/or
government functions
Level of
crisis
Definition
Principal
level of
response
Response
methodology
Principal
agent
Major
disaster
Catastrophic
event
Local
Local/state
State/federalStrategic
Tactical
Operational
Crisis
management
Incident
command
system
Multiagency
coordination
system
A dangerous event that
normally can be
managed at the local
level
…causes damage of
sufficient severity and
magnitude to warrant
major disaster
assistance under (the
Stafford Act) …
Figure 3.4 Crisis hierarchy model.
Strategic
Crisis management
Policy
Group
Operational
Multiagency
coordination system
Emergency
Operations
Center
Tactical
Incident command
system
Area
command
Incident
command
post
Incident
command
post
Incident
command
post
Figure 3.5 The three operational levels as used in local response.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 65
DISASTER MYTHOLOGY
Understanding the qualitative difference between emergencies and disasters
and between disasters and catastrophes is a major first step in the development
of realistic emergency planning. Another critical step is to understand what
actually happens in disasters as opposed to what people believe will happen.
Popular “disaster” movies, unsubstantiated media stories, and “conventional
wisdom” have given rise to many myths about how people and organizations
react to crisis. Chief among these has been an assumption of antisocial behavior
following the impact of an event. People are generally considered prone to
panic and are expected to revert to a more savage, self‐centered nature, leading
to a breakdown of social order and criminal activity, particularly looting.
Research shows, however, that people almost consistently act just the opposite.
People affected by a crisis generally become focused on loved ones and neigh-
bors and become extremely creative in dealing with the problems generated by
a disaster. Almost 90% of disaster victims are rescued by private individuals,
not by public agencies. Panic is usually limited to situations where there is an
immediate, overwhelming threat to life in a confined area and is usually of
short duration.
This myth of antisocial behavior was demonstrated during Hurricane
Katrina. Despite extensive media reports of looting, an investigation by sociol-
ogists from the University of Delaware showed only 237 actual arrests for loot-
ing, which, when compared to the normal crime rate, represented a decrease in
crime from predisaster conditions, a situation consistent with previous research.
Interviewees stated that prosocial behavior (e.g. sharing of supplies, helping
neighbors) was more prevalent than antisocial behavior and suggested that
many involved in what looting did occur were those likely to commit crimes
predisaster. There was also some suggestion that some looting may have been
the product of social inequality resulting in behavior normally seen in civil dis-
turbances. While comparison with the crime rate does present problems owing
to the difficulty of keeping records in a disaster and the discretion given to
police in determining looting versus appropriation, nevertheless it does seem as
if media reports of looting were exaggerated.
Another significant myth is the impact of disasters on mental health. It is
commonly believed that people are shocked into passivity, severely trauma-
tized, and unable to care for themselves. Similar to the myth of antisocial
behavior, there are numerous popular press accounts of people walking around
like zombies following a disaster. This has led to a concern over the mental
health of disaster victims and a significant commitment of resources toward
mental health counseling. However, while disasters certainly produce short‐
term psychological reactions such as sleeplessness, loss of appetite, irritability,
and anxiety, researchers have found that disasters rarely produce any new psy-
choses or mental illness. These psychological reactions tend to be short‐lived

66 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
and rarely result in behavioral dysfunction. Among a small number of victims,
the disaster experience even seems to create a more favorable self‐conception
and strengthens social ties. In short, studies have shown no significant difference
between prediaster and postdisaster frequencies of mental health and
psychological problems.
Numerous myths abound about organizational behavior as well, and many
of them are extensions of the ones related to individual behavior. It is assumed
that since workers are traumatized, organizations will be unable to function,
leading to an inability to make decisions. The result of this paralysis is a dete-
rioration of authority and social chaos. Again, research demonstrates that
people and organizations begin to focus almost immediately on dealing with
the consequences of the disaster and moving toward normalcy. On the morn-
ing of the San Francisco earthquake in 1906, A.P. Giannini rescued the assets
of his small Bank of Italy (later the Bank of America) from the fire and within
two days had established a temporary office in a private home and was giving
out loans. Similarly, the day following the dropping of the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, survivors from 12 banks met together and resumed services.
The danger of believing in these myths is that they can influence the
development of unrealistic plans and lead to bad decisions during a time of
crisis. It is not unusual to find, after a disaster, that authorities had prior
knowledge of the onset of the event but withheld warnings to “avoid a public
panic.” These myths can also force the deployment of resources for the wrong
purpose. During the San Francisco earthquake and fire, military troops were
deployed, not to perform search and rescue or assist in evacuation or firefight-
ing, but to prevent looting and other lawlessness, threats that never material-
ized (see Figure 3.6). A similar situation occurred in Hurricane Katrina where
troops were deployed not to deliver relief supplies but to “reestablish law and
order.” The real issue at the bottom of most of these myths is the assumption
that people are not to be trusted in disaster and must be dealt with firmly.
This is not to say that antisocial behavior does not occur during disasters.
There are certainly those within any society that will take advantage of a dis-
ruption of social order. For example, there are reports that ATMs were broken
into during the confusion on September 11 and that some minor incidents of
looting occurred in San Francisco during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.
The issue is whether such behavior is widespread or isolated to a segment of the
population that was predisposed to antisocial behavior prior to the disaster.
A further modifier is the nature of the event itself. Where the crisis is itself a
breakdown of the social order, such as in the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles
in 1991, one can expect to see wide scale looting and destruction of property. The
looting that occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo in St. Croix in 1989
was most likely the product of social inequality rather than the hurricane. In such
events, people are heavily motivated by rage, opportunity, and peer pressure,
much more so than by personal gain.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 67
A frequent myth that comes up in dealing with response is the issue of com-
munication failure. The inability of responding organizations to communicate
with each other is frequently cited in after action reports. This failure is usually
attributed to the use of multiple communication technologies that prevent inter-
operability. However, blaming technology for communication failure frequently
ignores the fact that the organizations themselves were not communicating.
Figure 3.6 The official proclamation issued by Mayor Eugene Schmitz following the
earthquake in San Francisco in 1906. Fear of widespread looting caused him to issue the
controversial order and to divert police and military resources from relief efforts.
Source: Courtesy of the Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco.

68 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Most failures that emerge from disasters are not technological in nature but
rather reflect the inability of organizations to expand their internal communica-
tion structure to reflect the needs of disaster response. This failure is manifested
in an inability to rapidly collect and collate information about the disaster and
to communicate it with those involved in the response and the public. As crisis
communication expert Art Botterell states in his Second Law of Emergency
Management, “The problem is at the input,” not in the technology.
Another common assumption by emergency planners is that disasters are
random and affect all citizens similarly. As was noted earlier, though, disasters
are a product of vulnerability, and factors such as socioeconomic class may
determine how segments of a community are affected by a disaster. When
sociological factors are brought into play, one can begin to understand adverse
reactions to seemingly reasonable government requests. When dealing with
evacuation, for example, research has demonstrated that people fail to evacuate
not by choice but because of personal circumstances such as concern over lost
wages, lack of resources, or illness. A study by the University of New Orleans
in 2004, a year before Hurricane Katrina, estimated that at least 100 000 resi-
dents of New Orleans had no means to evacuate during a hurricane because of
a lack of economic resources.
Not all disaster myths are a result of a misunderstanding of human behavior
in disaster. Many are based on information that is inaccurate but so ingrained
in popular belief that it is difficult to counter. An example of this is the persis-
tent belief that large numbers of cadavers create health hazards following a
disaster. The result has been a push to quickly dispose of the dead through
mass burial or cremation. Little or no consideration is given to the identification
of the remains or to the cultural or religious beliefs of family members. As with
most myths, this has led to a misapplication of resources that could have been
used for other purposes and has increased the suffering of survivors. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1989, concerns over con-
tagion led to the use of scarce fuel resources for mass cremation. Following the
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, over a thousand bodies were bulldozed into a
common grave in the town of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, before they could be
identified.
Human remains do not create a significant health problem after disasters
except under very specific circumstances (e.g. potential contamination of water
sources). As body temperature falls, bacteria and viruses die quickly, prevent-
ing their transmission through vermin. Since most disaster victims are killed by
trauma, there is no risk of “spontaneous” outbreaks of infectious diseases. The
same is true of animal corpses as well. What this suggests is that the recovery
and disposal of remains is not a priority for emergency responders. Furthermore,
there is time to collect and identify remains and provide for disposal consistent
with community values.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 69
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE
Social scientists have also assessed the response of organizations in disasters,
with very interesting results. What researchers have found is that the primary
source of problems in the response phase of a disaster is not the victims but the
organizations attempting to help them. It is the inability of responding organi-
zations to realize the qualitative differences between emergencies and disasters,
particularly in the area of interorganizational coordination, which leads to
problems. A misunderstanding of what can be expected to occur in disasters
leads to an overwhelming response from outside the affected area that outstrips
the ability of local organizations to control it. It also leads to a reliance on
insular decision‐making by professionals rather than the shared problem‐ solving
that proves most effective in crisis.
Part of the reason for this is what Dr. Thomas Drabek calls the “paradox of
disaster.” The paradox is that those most likely to respond to the initial onset
of a disaster are those with the least experience in disaster response. A local
jurisdiction may be affected by a single major disaster within a generation,
meaning that there are few within the community with actual operational expe-
rience. State governments respond to multiple jurisdictions and so have a larger
pool of experienced staff. Federal agencies such as FEMA have considerably
more experience in dealing with disasters based on the frequency of response,
although as Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated, such experience is perish-
able, and the lessons learned from previous disasters are not always the right
ones. Nevertheless, the simple fact is that most jurisdictions have limited expe-
rience in managing major disasters and are not prepared to expand normal
operations to encompass the qualitative changes needed to do so.
Compounding this problem is the use of a military‐style model of response
based on many of the myths related to disasters. The early civil defense pro-
grams were very much oriented toward nuclear war. Consequently, many of the
planners hired to meet the requirements of the program were retired military
personnel. Not surprisingly, these planners used the military planning tech-
niques and assumptions with which they were familiar. The military model thus
became imbedded in emergency planning and its influence continues to this day.
This is not to say that this planning model has been ineffective or wrong. It
is particularly effective at the field level. (Despite vehement denials by its devel-
opers, the Incident Command System (ICS) is very much based on the military
staff system.) However, the system falls short of the needs of local government
because it assumes that chaos will result from a disaster and that only a strong
central authority (a command system) can guarantee success. Such models fail
to take into consideration the fact that, unlike the military, local response is
neither monolithic nor hierarchical. That is, where the military is characterized
by a distinct chain of command and established control mechanisms, local

70 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
response is comprised of a combination of agencies, many with their own
authorities and jurisdictional concerns. Where the military can effectively
employ a command and control mechanism, local government response is
characterized by the need for cooperation and coordination.
As Dr. Russell Dynes points out in his landmark paper “Community
Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies” (1994),
the military model assumes that pre‐emergency social organizations will col-
lapse and that individuals will be incapable of effective personal action.
Consequently, all decision‐making must be centralized, and a new social orga-
nization must be created to compensate for the panic and breakdown of social
order that follows a disaster. Furthermore, the military model assumes that
disasters are easily identified, allowing activation of the new organization to
deal with the crisis. In actual practice, many disasters develop over time and
may be difficult to recognize in their early stages. Dr. Dynes notes that there is
a tendency to normalize events, that is to see them as routine, and to only rec-
ognize the clues and precursors to an event in hindsight.
Crisis communications consultant Art Botterell’s First Law of Emergency
Management is “Stress makes you stupid.” This implies that, at times of crisis,
individuals tend to operate at a level that is not conducive to complex opera-
tions. It is human nature to fall back on behavior that has proven effective in
the past and represents a certain level of comfort. One can extend this to a
desire to operate under the leaders and social organizations with which they are
familiar. The problem with artificial constructs such as NIMS and ICS is that
they are attempts to create and impose a new organizational structure at the
very time that individuals are seeking simplicity. If training is inadequate, as it
always is, the resulting chaos can significantly hamper response. Botterell’s
Third Law is “No matter who you train, someone else will show up.”
When one examines current emergency plans, the embedded assumptions of
the military model become apparent. For example, there is a reluctance to trust
conventional means of communication with the public and to control information
through official releases. There is a distrust of independent actions by volun-
teers or emergent groups, resulting in these groups having little involvement in
decision‐making during the crisis. There is at least a nominal expectation that
personnel and organizations responding to the event will recognize and submit
to a central authority. The military system is a closed system that has as its base
assumptions an expectation of chaos during disasters and a distrust of the
ability of individuals to make intelligent decisions about their own welfare.
As one begins to identify the underlying assumptions of the military model,
it becomes apparent that they are based on disaster mythology rather than real-
istic assumptions about behavior in disasters. Planning based on disaster
research assumes the need for coordination, not command, and for decision‐
making that is decentralized and inclusive. Disasters create confusion and dis-
organization, but not social chaos. People seek continuity in disasters. That is

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY 71
they look to predisaster social structures and seek to expand or extend these
structures rather than create new ones. In simpler terms, people do what they
are used to doing. Consequently, effective emergency plans must integrate these
existing social structures. Dynes suggests that emergency planning be couched
in terms of mutual problem‐solving rather than as an attempt to hold social
units together through the imposition of authority. In other words, replace
command and control with coordination and cooperation.
A final concept that seems obvious but is often overlooked is the difference
between planning for a disaster and managing a disaster. Planning puts in place
the resources needed for response. It focuses on the principles that will guide
response and potential tactics that can be used. Planning is the development of
a strategy for how the community will deal with crisis. Disaster management is
the implementation of that strategy at the time of the crisis. It is impossible to
predict how that implementation will be accomplished, the decisions that will
be made, the resources that will be used, etc., as managing involves selecting the
best approach based on the nature of the crisis. How well the community
responds to crisis will depend on how well the planning was accomplished and
the range of options available to disaster managers.
CONCLUSION
The implications of social science research are that, for many communities,
emergency plans are based on invalid assumptions about the nature of disaster.
The basic assumption for most plans is that disaster victims will need to be
handled firmly and that the community must manage disasters by using a hier-
archical organization and response mechanisms similar to the ones that exist in
day‐to‐day operations. The result is an inability to cope with the changes in
operating capabilities demanded by disaster and a failure to have in place an
organization with the flexibility to react to the changing demands of opera-
tional response. Disasters, more than anything else, require creativity and
improvisation. Paramount is the ability to rapidly assess the situation and for-
mulate a plan of action that uses available resources in the most effective
manner. The goal of the emergency management program must be to lay the
groundwork necessary to ensure that the community can respond creatively
and appropriately to disaster.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition.
Lucien G. Canton.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc.
73
Chapter 4
The single most significant societal change that has most altered community
preparedness has been the increased professionalization of local emergency
managers.
—Thomas E. Drabek, Major Themes in Disaster Preparedness and Response
Research
The development of a disaster bureaucracy and the emergence of national
disaster relief policies created a need for people to fill the roles created by this
new paradigm. By default, this role became associated with the civil defense
planners funded by the federal government who were largely retired military
personnel. The result was an initial bias toward detailed response planning that
did not align well with the national emphasis on comprehensive emergency
management. This was further complicated by the emergence of a growing
body of specialized knowledge and theory on emergency management, largely
as the result of social science research. The result has been confusion over the
evolving role of the emergency manager.
Complicating this has been a disagreement over what precisely is the role of
the emergency manager. For many, that role continues to be focused almost
solely on response, suggesting that emergency management is merely a disci
pline focusing on operational issues. For those espousing comprehensive
emergency management, the role is seen as much more strategic and that
emergency management is an emerging profession.
In examining the role of the emergency manager, one is presented with a
dichotomy. On the one hand, there is a body of research, training materials
from the premier emergency management agency, higher education curricula,
and professional certifications that all point to a strategic role for the emergency
THE EMERGENCY MANAGER:
EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING
PARADIGMS

74 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
manager. On the other, 50 years of actual experience and the disregard of key
officials combine to limit the emergency manager’s functions to the operational
arena. While it is easy to trace a historical and sociological basis for this conflict,
the real problem lies in a fundamental misunderstanding of the organizational
context of emergency management itself.
CONFLICTING ROLES
Chapters 1 and 2 traced the evolution of emergency management programs
from the early days of civil defense to the present. In this historical survey, one
can see the evolution of these programs from a focus on nuclear war planning
to the full spectrum of responsibilities inherent in comprehensive emergency
management. However, although one can trace the maturation of emergency
management programs, defining the role of the emergency manager is more
problematic. Many organizations and social scientists have attempted to define
this role, but the simple fact is that there are significant differences across
the United States in the duties and responsibilities of emergency managers.
One must turn once again to history to understand why this is so. In the civil
defense era, the emphasis was on national security, and emergency planners
were expected to focus on issues such as crisis relocation planning and fallout
shelter capacity development. Since many of these positions were part time or
offered low pay, they tended to attract military retirees. As time went on and
the dual‐use doctrine allowed the use of civil defense personnel for planning for
natural hazards, emergency management emerged as a “second career” for
retirees from the military and public emergency services, primarily the fire dis
cipline. These retirees tended to be very tactically oriented and focused on the
issues inherent in planning for an effective response.
A result of this focus on tactics was the emergence of a planning model based
on military plans and focused primarily on response. Emergency managers
tended to be very plan‐centric and the development of multiple contingency
plans or a single plan with annexes, appendices, tabs, etc. became an end in
itself. These plans were targeted to response issues: establishing shelters, identi
fying evacuation routes, providing for mass feeding, etc. In short, local disaster
plans looked very similar to military plans and, since most were written in a
vacuum (most military plans are written by planners, not by a group of stake
holders), they tended to be largely ignored by the community at large.
The federal government helped to foster this attitude by emphasizing prod
uct development as a measure of program success. Emergency management
grant programs required the completion and submission of specific plans that
were assessed against a template. For example, Federal Emergency Manage
ment Agency (FEMA’s) Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 1‐8 Guide for the
Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans provided guidance

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 75
for the development of emergency plans required under federal grant programs.
It had a companion document, CPG 1‐8A Guide for the Review of State and
Local Emergency Operations Plans, which contained a crosswalk used to deter
mine if the jurisdiction’s plan included all the elements required by CPG 1‐8.
This crosswalk was required to be submitted with the plan to assist in evalu
ating its acceptability.
The introduction of the comprehensive emergency management concept
in 1978 created an immediate conflict with the status quo. Comprehensive
emergency management is a strategic concept, not a tactical one, and assumes
the existence of a jurisdiction‐wide emergency management program. Emer
gency planners, having carved out a niche preparing for disaster response,
lacked the knowledge base, and, in most cases, the authority to implement such
a strategic program.
What emerges from this conflict is a paradigm in which emergency managers
are the “experts” in the four phases of the emergency management cycle from
the strategic perspective but tend to specialize almost exclusively in response
planning. The reason for this is twofold. Response planning is complex and
requires a continuous effort. It can easily take up all available staff resources in
an emergency management office. Second, it requires the detailed tactical
planning that has been the hallmark of traditional emergency management. It
is necessary work that coincides with a high level of comfort for emergency
planners.
This emphasis on preparedness planning is understandable when one con
siders the actual role of the emergency manager in the other three phases of the
emergency management cycle. Mitigation may be the “cornerstone of emergency
management” as James Lee Witt claimed, but it is very definitely strategic in
nature. Effective mitigation requires full community commitment, as will be
seen in a later chapter, and involves program elements such as land‐use planning,
risk analysis, and public administration. These disciplines are specialized and
well outside the experience of the typical emergency manager.
In a crisis, emergency managers rarely direct actual response operations.
Although there are exceptions, management of a crisis usually falls to a senior
elected official or to the lead emergency services agency. In this respect, the role
of the emergency manager has been likened to that of a producer of a play: the
emergency manager must make sure all the resources are assembled and that
the players have been rehearsed, but he or she is not the lead actor. The analogy
is an appropriate one.
Like mitigation, recovery tends to be strategic, although there is a large
response component in short‐term recovery (e.g. debris clearance). Not sur
prisingly, any recovery planning that takes place is usually focused on these
short‐term considerations. Traditionally, emergency managers have dealt with
the immediate impacts of the event, and the restoration of critical services,
along with initiating claims for federal reimbursement of disaster costs. Few

76 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
jurisdictions have developed long‐term recovery plans that consider opportu
nities for improving the quality of life and hazard reduction.
Social science offers evidence of another drawback to expansion of the role of
the emergency manager. Numerous studies have demonstrated a low interest in
emergency management by many states and communities and have documented
an indifference or resistance to emergency management on the part of public offi
cials. Public officials tend to have a limited knowledge of emergency management
and view it primarily as a response function and, consequently, the province of
first responders. This attitude is evident in the location of the emergency
management function in most local governments. For the most part, the emergency
management function is an additional duty assigned to another agency, such as
the county sheriff or the fire department. It is rare to find an emergency manager
in the office of the chief elected official with the type of access one would expect
for a policy advisor. This placement of the emergency management function rein
forces the impression that it is a tactical rather than a strategic office.
Lacking a formal definition of their role, emergency managers came to be
defined by the functions of the position and the skill sets required to accom
plish these functions. For years, the list of core functions in Figure 4.1 was
equated with the role of the emergency manager and was even included in
FEMA distance‐learning courses intended for new emergency managers. To a
certain extent, this was encouraged by other course materials that correctly
identified mitigation as the primary responsibility of other agencies and defined
the role of the emergency manager as “motivator, coordinator, and monitor”
and “conscience of the community” but provide little additional detail. Like
wise, the section on recovery was limited to short‐term recovery, with only a
brief mention that postdisaster mitigation is “one of your most important roles
in the recovery phase.”
Mobilizing emergency personnel and resources
Warning the public
Taking protective action
Caring for vicitims
Assessing the damage
Restoring essential public services
Informing the public
Record-keeping
Planning for recovery
Coordinating emergency management activities
Basic preparedness functions
Figure 4.1 Basic preparedness functions – this list of functions has for years been incorrectly
identified as the major responsibilities of the emergency manager.

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 77
However, if one goes back to the source material on which the list was based,
the first edition of Emergency Management: Principles and Practices for Local
Government, the authors used the list to describe broad functions that are
needed in disaster planning. Their discussion focused on the process of pre
paredness using a general approach, with no specific mention of the emergency
manager. Therefore, although one can certainly infer that the emergency man
ager should have substantive knowledge of these planning functions, there was
no basis for limiting the emergency manager to these functions or for making
the emergency manager directly responsible for them.
It is easy to confuse the technical knowledge required of the emergency man
ager with the tasks that are required under the emergency management program.
Yet if one examines the functions of the emergency management program
closely, specialists in other disciplines perform many of these functions or have
the responsibility to see that they are accomplished. In other words, although
emergency managers are expected to have a basic knowledge of the functions
of the emergency management program, one must, in many cases, look outside
the emergency management organization to find the specialized knowledge
needed to implement specific functions.
If the emergency manager role was truly defined by the functions of the
emergency management program, particularly those related to response, then
one would expect to see technical experts emerging as successful emergency
managers. However, the research done by social scientists does not bear
this out. In his benchmark 1987 study, The Professional Emergency Manager,
Dr. Thomas Drabek studied the characteristics of 12 successful emergency
managers and compared them to a random sample of 50 other directors from
across the country. Drabek’s results were classified in three major categories:
1. Professionalism: Successful emergency managers had established them
selves in their jurisdiction as key players through a combination of per
ceived expertise and contributions to overall jurisdictional goals.
2. Individual Qualities: Successful emergency managers shared many key
traits such as communications skills, organizational ability, human rela
tions skills, and control under stress. The study participants also pos
sessed traits based on their experience that were unique to each director.
3. Emergency Management Activities: Successful emergency managers were
committed to comprehensive emergency management, taking a broader
view of their jobs than just preparedness.
The importance of Drabek’s study lies in the realization that, while technical
competence in the functions of the emergency management program was
certainly a factor in developing professionalism, what mattered most was the
perceived competence of the emergency manager as a manager and contributor

78 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
to the jurisdiction he or she served. Dr. Robert Schneider in his paper, A Strategic
Overview of the “New” Emergency Management, emphasized the importance
of the emergency manager assisting in the creation of public value. In other
words, to be taken seriously by elected officials, the emergency manager must
be seen as contributing to larger public issues. This suggests that the role of the
emergency manager is no longer that of a technocrat with highly specialized
skills in emergency response but is rather that of an administrator with respon
sibility for overseeing the development of an enterprise‐wide emergency
management program.
THE EMERGENCY MANAGER AS PROGRAM MANAGER
Surprisingly, it was not until 2007 that a definition of emergency management
was generally agreed upon. The definition came as a product of a working
group convened at the Emergency Management Institute to develop a set of
principles for emergency management (see Figure 4.2). The working group
felt that it could not develop a set of principles without a working definition
of emergency management and suggested that emergency management be
defined as “the managerial function charged with creating the framework
within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with
disasters.” This definition was subsequently adopted by all major emergency
management organizations in the United States such as FEMA, the
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), the National
Association of Emergency Managers (NEMA), and the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA).
The definition is important as it recognizes emergency management as a
managerial function and positions the emergency manager as the manager
of a program intended to build community capacity to deal with disasters. It
articulates a strategic role in risk reduction and demonstrates the value of
the emergency manager to the community. In addition, it differentiates the
emergency manager from the first responder community by identifying a
unique role for the emergency manager as program manager with a specialized
set of skills distinct from those required of first responders.
To understand the uniqueness of this role, one must understand the context
of emergency management itself. The single most important concept for
emergency managers, and the most neglected, is that emergency management is
a distributed process, not a discrete function. In attempting to define the
emergency manager by the functions of the emergency management program,
jurisdictions routinely attempt to make these functions the responsibility of a
single person or office – a discrete function. No matter how well versed techni
cally, no single person or small group can implement all the functions of an
emergency management program. Instead, these functions must be distributed

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 79
throughout the organization to those entities with the capability and the respon
sibility to perform them.
Once the concept of emergency management as a distributed process is
understood, the rather indistinct role of the emergency manager becomes much
Figure 4.2 The adoption of an accepted definition of emergency management and guiding
principles was a major step toward the professionalization of emergency management.

80 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Planning Organizing Directing
Controlling
Figure 4.3 Sequential management functions.
more focused. An emergency manager is, first and foremost, a program man
ager. He or she has the responsibility for developing a strategy to guide the
emergency management program and for providing oversight to ensure that the
goals and objectives of that strategy are being met. This involves coordinating
activities, evaluating progress, and providing technical expertise.
By acknowledging this role as program manager, it is possible to make use
of the vast array of research and organizational models dealing with manage
ment. The National Management Association recognizes four core functions
of management: planning, organizing, directing, and controlling (Figure 4.3).
These functions are sequential and build on each other. If the emergency man
ager was truly a manager, then one would expect to see these core functions
contained within his or her responsibilities, and this is indeed the case:
1. Planning focuses on two areas: determining objectives and developing
the strategies to accomplish them. This is strategic planning, not the
development of emergency plans and procedures. NFPA 1600 and the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard
require the development of a strategic plan that defines vision, mission,
goals, objectives, and milestones for the emergency management program.
2. Organizing defines the responsibilities and relationships of members of
the organization to ensure each plays an appropriate role in achieving
objectives. Emergency managers do this both at the level of the emergency
operations plan that establishes functional responsibilities and opera
tional relationships and at the level of the emergency management
program when assigning responsibility for program elements within the
strategic plan.
3. Directing does not refer to giving orders but rather to making sure that
assigned tasks are accomplished. This involves activities such as resolv
ing conflicts, providing motivation, and evaluating performance. From
the emergency management program perspective, this is accomplished
through the assignment of projects to other groups in the organization
and following up on project timelines.

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 81
4. Controlling refers to a system of reporting, analysis, and corrective action
that keeps the organizational strategy on track. This is reflected in the
NFPA 1600 and EMAP requirements to assess emergency management
program plans, procedures, and capabilities and to track corrective action.
This emphasis on management becomes even more evident if one looks at
the emergency management program not as a discrete and separate program
but as one that must ultimately add value to the community. Traditionally, the
four‐phase comprehensive emergency management model of mitigation, pre
paredness, response, and recovery has defined emergency management with the
goal being the protection of life, property, and the environment. However, one
must ask why these laudable goals and a model that has stood the test of time
do not resonate with elected officials. The answer is that emergency management
has always been viewed as something outside day‐to‐day government and, at
best, a necessary drain on resources that could be used elsewhere.
To change perceptions, it is necessary to ask what value the emergency
management program adds to a jurisdiction. If emergency management is
devoted solely to responding to emergencies and disasters, it exists only as a
methodology for dealing with unexpected contingencies. In essence, it is the
jurisdictional equivalent of a fire extinguisher – a necessary expense that no
one expects to use. If, on the other hand, one truly accepts the concepts of com
prehensive emergency management, particularly the concept of all‐hazards
planning, then emergency management can be viewed as the mechanism by
which a jurisdiction or organization manages risk.
Viewing emergency management in terms of community risk management
has enormous implications. The management of risk requires a detailed hazard
analysis to identify risks and the development of a strategy that determines the
mix of methodologies, such as avoidance, retention, transference, and mitiga
tion, which the organization will use to manage those risks. For those risks
that are retained or cannot be fully mitigated, the organization must build a
capacity to deal with the potential impact of the risk. This clearly requires a
multidisciplinary approach that must be coordinated by a generalist with
a strong knowledge of emergency planning concepts. In a world of specialists,
the emergency manager is the consummate generalist who must master a broad
range of knowledge to facilitate the development and implementation of an
organizational strategy for managing potential risks associated with identified
hazards.
The acceptance of the emergency manager as a generalist does not imply
that technical expertise is unnecessary. In fact, Drabek’s study reinforces the
need for a strong conceptual knowledge base. It merely suggests that the
technical skills such as the ability to coordinate an emergency plan or conduct
an exercise are core skills, not the totality of the emergency manager’s art.
Technical planning skills represent basic entry‐level competencies that form the

82 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Laws and authorities
Threat and hazard analysis
Planning
Operations and procedures
Communication and population warning
Direction and control
Resource management
Hazard mitigation
Logistics and facilities
Training
Exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions
Public education and information
Finance and administration
Emergency management program functions
Figure 4.4 Emergency management program elements. Source: IS 230 Fundamentals of
Emergency Management.
foundation of emergency management. However, emergency managers must
move from technical specialization to strategic thinking. The entry‐level coor
dinator knows how to develop the organization’s emergency plan; the manager
facilitates emergency planning for the organization. The coordinator develops
an exercise; the manager oversees exercise programs.
With the role of the emergency manager defined as a program manager with
responsibility for supporting the jurisdiction’s management of risk, it is pos
sible to suggest core competences for the position beyond the basic skill set
expected of an entry‐level coordinator. Not surprisingly, these core compe
tencies look very similar to those expected of any manager: communication
(both written and oral), project management, organizational behavior, strategic
planning, analytical methods, public policy, historical context, and social sci
ence research. This definition also implies that the emergency manager’s
technical knowledge will now emphasize strategic concepts rather than being
solely task oriented.
The definition of the emergency manager as an administrator rather than a
technician seems reasonable but is the concept supportable? The current
version of FEMA’s independent study course, IS230 Fundamentals of Emer
gency Management, certainly makes the case for a programmatic approach to
emergency management by defining functions for the emergency management
program rather than for the individual emergency manager (Figure 4.4).
IS 230 is one course in a Professional Development Series (Figure 4.5) that
includes both technical and managerial courses. Another source supporting
an enterprise‐wide emergency management program is a document from the

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 83
Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI), Characteristics of Effective Emergency
Management Organizational Structures. This document does for emergency
management programs what Drabek’s study did for emergency managers: it
identifies 20 characteristics shared by successful emergency management
organizations (Figure 4.6). The document was not an actual study but was a
IS-120.a An Introduction to Exercises
IS-230.d Fundamentals of Emergency Management
IS-235.b Emergency Planning
IS-240.b Leadership and Influence
IS-241.b Decision Making and Problem Solving
IS-242.b Effective Communication
IS-244.b Developing and Managing Volunteers
Professional development series
Figure 4.5 FEMA professional development series curriculum.
Characteristics of successful organizations
Roles of elected officials defined
Strong and definitive lines of communications
Similar routine/disaster organizational Structures
Emergency management procedures are as close to routine operational procedures as possible
Good interpersonal relationships
Emergency management planning is an ongoing activity
All hazard approach
Disaster prevention and mitigation
Motivation provided for involvement in the emergency management program
Citizen involvement
Strong coordination among participating agencies
Public/private cooperation
Multiple use of resources
Public information function clearly defined
Ongoing monitoring for potential disasters
Internal alerting procedures
Ability to alert the public maximized
Active intergovernmental coordination
Ability to maintain comprehensive records during a disaster
Eligibility for state and federal subsidies considered
Figure 4.6 Organizational characteristics. Source: Characteristics of Effective Emergency
Management Organizational Structures, Public Entity Risk institute (2001).

84 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
self‐assessment tool based on research conducted by the City/County
Management Association in the late 1970s.
In reviewing the PERI list in Figure 4.6, one sees a correlation with the functional
lists developed by FEMA, used in NFPA 1600, and the EMAP Standard. The list
also contains elements of the comprehensive emergency management program:
all‐hazards approach, partnership, and integrated emergency operations struc
tures. These documents ultimately are saying the same thing: a successful
emergency management program requires an enterprise‐wide strategy. This
emphasis on jurisdictional programs rather than discrete functions is the core of
the EMAP Standard. EMAP assessors are specifically trained to look at the
implementation of the emergency management program throughout the jurisdic
tion and to view the emergency manager as a program manager rather than the
principal executive agent.
TOWARD PROFESSIONALIZATION
In tracing the evolution of the role of the emergency manager from nuclear war
planner to that of program manager, it is clear that emergency management
has been emerging as something unique, if not necessarily easily identifiable.
This has led to considerable discussion around the question, “What is emer
gency management?” The terms “field, discipline,” and “profession” have all
been applied to emergency management, often interchangeably despite being
distinctly different from each other. As is in so much related to emergency
management, there is no one accepted label for emergency management.
In a paper, titled Field, discipline and profession: Understanding three major
labels of emergency management, Urby and McEntire attempted to clarify the
difference among these three labels by suggesting a progression of field, disci
pline, and profession, where field focuses on the practitioners, discipline on
academics, and profession on specific characteristics. Although these three
terms may be thought of as progressive, this is a matter for debate, especially as
emergency management has components of each.
Emergency Management as a Field
Urby and McEntire identify four characteristics that define a field:
1. A body of technical knowledge
2. Standards of conduct
3. A professional practice or minimal professional qualifications and
experience
4. Occupational groups

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 85
Although one can argue that emergency management does demonstrate
these four characteristics, it is largely by chance and not the result of a holistic
design. For example, the body of technical knowledge includes tasks that
support response planning but also social science research on disasters, research
that is largely unknown to many emergency managers.
Technical Knowledge
With the growth of a disaster bureaucracy, there has been a concurrent
growth in the complexity of the technical knowledge required by an emergency
manager. This increased complexity has been evident in both the evolution
of accepted and mandated best practices, principally encouraged through
government grant programs, and a growing body of research related to
emergency management theory and practice.
As was noted in the previous chapter, the establishment of FEMA, the
passage of disaster legislation, particularly the Stafford Act, and the adoption
of the comprehensive emergency management model established a framework
for emergency management in the United States. This framework is far from
static and is constantly being revised with each new administration. This is a
double‐edged sword. On the one hand, it reinforces the cycle of continuous
improvement that characterizes modern emergency management. On the other
hand, constantly changing guidance means that local emergency managers are
trapped in a never‐ending cycle of revisions rather than making forward
progress in their programs.
With the development of a framework for emergency management has also
come a commitment to technical standards. Principal among these has been
the adoption of NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and
Business Continuity Programs as the National Preparedness Standard. NFPA
1600 represents the first real attempt to establish a generally accepted standard
for emergency management programs and to promote common definitions for
emergency management terms. Significantly, NFPA 1600 takes a holistic view
of emergency management programs and promotes the use of an enterprise‐
wide approach to managing risk. Intimate knowledge of the standard and an
understanding of the requirements for compliance form an important part of
the technical expertise required of emergency managers.
NFPA 1600 represents a broad, overarching standard for emergency manage
ment and continuity programs. These broad standards were further refined
through the creation of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program, a
peer‐reviewed assessment of a jurisdiction’s program. EMAP, similar to NFPA
1600 on which it was originally based, interprets emergency management in the
broadest terms; the assessment encompasses all the departments and agencies
in a jurisdiction having responsibility for emergency management functions
and is not just an assessment of the local emergency management office.

86 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
In addition to programmatic standards such as EMAP and NFPA 1600,
there has been a growth in specific technical standards as well. For example, the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) had developed standards
for the development, management, and operation of emergency operations
centers.
Standards of Conduct
While emergency management has standards related to programs, what is
lacking is a code of ethics, acceptance of which is required of all emergency
managers, and a process for sanctioning those who commit ethical violations.
One of the primary organizations devoted to professional emergency
management, the International Association of Emergency Managers, offers three
separate documents related to standards of conduct: the IAEM Code of Ethics
and Professional Conduct, the Certified Emergency Manager (CEM®) Code of
Ethics, and the Professional Code of Conduct of the CEM/Associate Emergency
Manager (AEM) (CEM and AEM refer to certification programs administered
by IAEM that are discussed below), but these technically apply only to those who
are members of the association and/or hold or are seeking certification.
Although the documents have some language in common, they are not the
same. The IAEM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct is a lengthy docu
ment that appears to govern the conduct of members and is more a list of rules,
some of them questionable, than a code of conduct. The CEM Code of Ethics
and the Professional Code of Conduct of the CEM/AEM are much shorter
and more useful but are also limited to only candidates and holders of the
CEM/AEM certification.
Qualifications
One of the most notable failings in emergency management is the lack of an
accepted set of qualifications to guide the hiring and job performance of prac
titioners. What is missing is an over‐arching framework that describes what
emergency managers are expected to do, a document that identifies core com
petencies while recognizing differences in job assignments. Such a model does
exist in the New Zealand Civil Defence Emergency Management Competency
Framework (Figure 4.7). The Framework identifies eight key areas in which
emergency managers must be competent. Each area is composed of several
core competencies with suggested indicators for demonstrating competence
and competency levels. The Framework identifies the relevance of competencies
to specific job titles and the minimum level of competency required. Although
the Framework is designed for New Zealand, it could be adapted to the United
States with a bit of effort. A working group of IAEM, USA, recommended
interim adoption of the framework as an international model with the under
standing that each branch of the association could modify to meet national
requirements. Unfortunately, apart from the State of California, there has

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 87
been little interest in doing so, primarily because of the “not invented here”
syndrome.
In the absence of a framework, one other option would be to at least recog
nize that emergency management is not monolithic; that is the duties of
emergency managers vary based on many factors. To expect the same level of
competency from a part‐time planner in a rural county as that of a large staff
in a major metropolitan area is unrealistic, but this is precisely what federal
grant guidelines seem to require.
Such a recognition could lead to the creation of a job progression, something
also lacking in emergency management. The emergency management job
market is highly competitive, with few entry‐level positions. One example of
such a progression would be the following:
1. Planner: an entry‐level position with responsibility solely for developing
and coordinating emergency plans.
2. Coordinator: a mid‐level position responsible for overseeing elements of
an emergency management program.
3. Manager: a senior‐level position requiring certification, with responsi
bility for program management and serving as a strategic advisor to senior
officials.
IAEM administers the only recognized international certification program
for emergency managers, the Certified Emergency Manager Program.
Figure 4.7 The New Zealand Civil Defence Emergency Management Competency Framework
is an excellent model for developing a competency framework for emergency managers.

88 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The CEM certification requires that a candidate meets requirements in the
areas of experience, education, and contribution to the emergency management
profession. Significantly, the experience category only requires three years of
actual experience, while half the education requirement must be in general
management subjects, supporting the idea that an emergency manager is first
and foremost a manager. The candidate must also demonstrate knowledge of
comprehensive emergency management through an essay and complete an
examination that includes questions on general management in addition to
emergency manage ment program functions.
IAEM also offers an AEM certification that requires that candidates meet
the same requirements of the CEM certification except for a baccalaureate
degree. The implication is that the critical thinking required to obtain a bac
calaureate degree is a key component of higher‐level emergency management.
It also suggests that emergency management as a profession may be under
going a shift toward a two‐tiered system that differentiates between those with
technical expertise in core competencies (Emergency Coordinators) and those
with executive skills (Emergency Managers).
There is some disagreement as to what the CEM certification represents. The
process for obtaining certification is extremely stringent; the program has
limited acceptance among some experienced practitioners and is not well
known outside the emergency management community. Because there are
relatively few CEMs, it is difficult to make it a requirement of employment
without significantly narrowing the field of potential candidates. There is also
disagreement over whether the CEM certification is intended as a minimum,
entry‐level certification or represents a level of expertise and experience
expected of senior practitioners. Nevertheless, the CEM represents an impor
tant step for the development of emergency management as a profession, and
it is to be expected that the certification will evolve and adapt to the needs of
the emergency management community.
Occupational Groups
Emergency managers have two professional associations, the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), which consists primarily of
individual practitioners from the local government and private sectors, and the
NEMA, which is made up of state directors and high‐level government offi
cials. The two organizations work closely together, and many practitioners
belong to both.
Emergency Management as a Discipline
The emphasis on strategic and managerial thinking is being reinforced in
the training of the next generation of emergency managers. In a speech
at the Emergency Management Higher Education Conference in early 2004,

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 89
Dr. Wayne Blanchard, CEM, the Director of FEMA’s Higher Education
Project, noted that collegiate emergency management programs had grown
from 95 to 113 since 2003, and 101 additional programs were under develop
ment. As of 2018, the Higher Education Project website listed over 200
programs leading to associate, bachelor, and master’s degrees in emergency
management, with additional listings for certificate programs, concentra
tions, and stand‐alone courses. Significantly, nine institutions offered doc
toral programs in emergency management.
Part of the reason for this growth and for a certain amount of cohesiveness
within the curricula offered is the work done by the FEMA Higher Education
Project. The Higher Education Program website serves as a clearinghouse for
information and support to academic programs. For example, the website offers
a compilation of syllabi from many institutions, downloadable courses and
textbooks, and research materials. In addition, the project hosts an annual
conference to allow for the exchange of ideas and the development of relation
ships within the academic community.
Another positive development has been the emergence of academic
journals devoted to emergency management, such as the Journal of Emergency
Management and the online Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. In the past, it has been difficult to locate research relevant to
emergency management because these papers were scattered in many other
academic journals.
Emergency Management as a Profession
A common discussion among emergency managers is whether an emergency
manager is a professional or a technical specialist. As long as emergency man
agers are classed as technocrats and limited to dealing with response issues
only, there is no question that emergency management will remain a field rather
than a profession. However, if one accepts that the emergency manager’s role
is to add value to the community by coordinating a program that assists in
managing community risk, then the dynamic changes.
While there are no standard definitions of what constitutes a profession,
there are commonalities among professions. In The Professions, Carr‐Saunders
and Wilson wrote that professions differed from other occupational groups by
being comprised of experts who apply specialized knowledge to different areas.
Professions are further characterized by formal educational systems and rig
orous training and the meeting of basic, and demonstration of competence
(examination) prior to entry to the field.
Traditionally, emergency managers have held that the list of common
functions in Figure 4.1 constituted a specialized body of knowledge. However,
most, if not all, of these functions are performed by other organizations.
If, however, emergency managers are something more than just technical

90 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
specialists, one can make the case that specialized knowledge for emergency
managers consists of social science research, a knowledge of historical disas
ters, and technical knowledge related to the standards, policies, laws, and
regulations related to emergency management.
Although emergency management has emerged as a viable academic disci
pline, it is unusual to see a degree in emergency management listed as a require
ment for a position. Indeed, many graduates migrate to research or the private
sector because of the fierce competition for emergency management jobs.
Although this is changing slowly, the lack of any formal education in emergency
management does not present a barrier to being hired as an emergency
manager.
Other commonalities among professions include the existence of a pro
fessional association and a code of ethics. As was previously noted, IAEM and
NEMA fulfill this function, and IAEM does require its members to adhere to
a code of ethics.
Carr‐Saunders and Wilson note that a profession is characterized by the
requirement for examination and demonstration of competence before entry to
the profession. This requirement for certification or licensing creates a barrier
to entry to unqualified individuals. The CEM/AEM programs administered by
IAEM present a good starting point but do not prevent the hiring of unquali
fied individuals as emergency managers. There is simply no demand for
certification when hiring emergency managers, and positions can be, and often
are, filled by anyone. Although some jobs are beginning to list “CEM preferred”
in their qualifications, the certification remains largely unknown to most hiring
bodies. In the absence of the competency framework discussed previously, most
hiring bodies have no idea of what qualifications they should be looking for in
a candidate.
Part of the problem is a resistance on the part of some practitioners to the
idea of a barrier to entry to emergency management. Since many practitioners
came to emergency management as a second career, they believe that their
years of experience trump the need for any certification. This has been exacer
bated by the CEM program’s requirement for a bachelor’s degree, which many
practitioners without degrees feel is unnecessary. Consequently, two major
requirements for professionalization, formal education and certification, lack
wide spread support in the emergency management community.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has traced the dichotomy between the historical role of the
emergency manager as a response specialist and technician and the evolving
role of manager of the emergency management program. It has offered a defi
nition of the emergency management program as the mechanism by which

THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS 91
a community manages risk and suggested that such a definition offers a means
of integration with community or organizational goals. In this context, the
emergency manager can be defined as the manager responsible for the strategic
development and implementation of the emergency management program, a
definition that implies a generalist rather than a specialist role and emphasizes
managerial concepts over technical skills.
Emergency management stands at crossroads, particularly given the advent
of Homeland Security, which has created competition for the lead responsi
bility for coordinating disaster preparedness despite a very narrow strategic
definition focused on terrorism. Social scientists agree that emergency manage
ment is evolving as a profession, and a new crop of well‐trained, young
emergency managers are entering the profession. However, the perception of
value added to an organization or a community will ultimately be the deciding
factor. Ultimately, the profession will need to distinguish between those who
are competent in the basic technical skills needed to coordinate components of
an emergency management program and those with the strategic managerial
skills necessary to administer a program that supports risk management.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition.
Lucien G. Canton.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc.
93
Chapter 5
We need emergency programs because they will demonstrate what WILL happen,
with whom, when, where, and how fast. Programs will discuss relationships with
other parties, and their interdependent roles. In essence, it is not about “what‐if,”
it is about “what‐is.”
—Danish Ahmed, author and personal development speaker
The previous chapter made the case for the emergency manager as manager of
a program that assists the community in managing risk. This is a major change
in thinking for many jurisdictions where the emergency manager is directly
responsible for tasks associated with the program. This shift of perspective also
has implications for the emergency management program. It suggests that the
program should no longer be viewed as the responsibility of a single individual
or office but rather as an enterprise‐wide program. This places responsibility
for the program with the chief elected official and his or her management team,
with the emergency manager providing oversight to the program.
For most jurisdictions, there is no formal emergency management program.
What passes for a program is usually a collection of tasks and responsibilities
that have been assigned over time to the emergency manager. There has been no
attempt to define expectations for the program or determine how the program
can add value to the community. This chapter considers a process for establish-
ing a formal emergency management program.
ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

94 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
Developing a Governance Structure
As has been discussed, emergency management programs evolved over time
from a narrowly defined civil defense perspective to an all‐hazards approach
based on the comprehensive emergency management model. This growth has
been through a gradual accretion of duties dictated by increased federal regu-
lation and changing national perceptions of risk. The result has been an almost
complete lack of standardization across the United States, and in most juris-
dictions, programs that are little more than a conglomeration of federal grant
requirements, nonfunded mandates, and “other duties as assigned.”
Establishing a modern emergency management program may require reas-
sessing current activities and starting over again in the policy equivalent of
zero‐based budgeting. If an emergency management program is to have stra-
tegic value to the community, the process of establishing it must itself be a stra-
tegic process. Formally, establishing the program means to develop and
document the appropriate authorities and guidance needed to administer
an enterprise‐wide emergency management program. National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 1600 and the Emergency Management Accreditation
Program (EMAP) Standard identify four major components for establishing
and managing the emergency management program:
1. Program Coordinator – The community must appoint a person respon-
sible for administering the program and keeping it current. This does not
mean that the program coordinator necessarily is responsible for all
program deliverables. Rather, the program coordinator helps to craft
strategy and provides oversight to the program.
2. Program Committee – An emergency management program is collabora-
tive and involves the participation of stakeholders who provide input to
the program and/or assist in its coordination. This group of stakeholders
provides input or assistance to the program and provides expertise,
knowledge, and resources to support the program.
3. Program Administration – To be effective, the emergency management
program must have appropriate authority, strategy, and budget. Similar
to any managerial program, it must identify goals and objectives and have
supporting documentation.
4. Program Evaluation – The program must have a mechanism to measure
the success of the program against agreed‐upon performance objectives.
This allows senior decision‐makers to determine the progress of the
program and allows for identifying and fixing problem areas.
A necessary first step in establishing an emergency management program is
the development of an effective organizational framework. NFPA 1600 and

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 95
EMAP require appointment of a program coordinator and the establishment
of an advisory committee of stakeholders that provides input or assists in
coordination of the program. This advisory committee may consist of a single
committee or multiple committees. However, beyond this, the standards pro-
vide no further details.
Like everything else in emergency management, the titles, responsibilities,
and authorities of the program coordinator vary from community to community.
In some communities, the program coordinator reports directly to the senior
executive officer, such as the mayor. In others, he or she is part of a larger entity
and reports through a department head, such as the sheriff or chief administrative
officer. Generally, the further the program coordinator is removed from the
chief executive officer, the less effective the emergency management program.
The program coordinator is most effective when he or she provides strategic
planning and oversight and is viewed as key staff to the senior official.
The decision as to where to place responsibility for emergency management
program coordination is not a simple one. In most communities, the emergency
manager lacks sufficient political clout to effect positive change on their own.
Placement within the chief executive’s office can offset this to some extent but
may limit the resources available for program management. On the other hand,
placement in an established department such as the county sheriff or an
administrative department may provide access to more resources but may result
in the program being viewed as that department’s program with whatever
political baggage goes along with that identification. Regardless of where the
emergency management coordinator is placed, the program must have an iden-
tity separate from partisan issues and be viewed as an enterprise‐wide program.
The program coordinator, therefore, must be viewed as a neutral party and
have sufficient access to high‐level management to be able to resolve conflicts
within the program.
The standards require the formation of an advisory committee that provides
for input from stakeholders and assists in the coordination of the emergency
management program. The composition and duties of the advisory committee
are at the discretion of the community. In some jurisdictions, the role of the
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) required under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III has been expanded to
provide oversight to the emergency management program. In others, a separate
committee, such as the local disaster councils found in California, fulfills this
role. The standards also allow for the use of multiple committees to oversee the
program, such as a combination of an LEPC and local Citizen’s Corps Council.
The composition of the advisory committee reflects the inclusiveness of the
emergency management program. Where the committee consists primarily of the
“Big Three” agencies (police, fire, and emergency medical services [EMS]), work
products will typically reflect an emphasis on response. Where membership is
broadened to include other agencies, including voluntary agencies and private sec-
tor organizations, the emphasis shifts to a more balanced implementation of the

96 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Work Groups
Stakeholder
Committee
Steering
Committee
Policy
Committee
Figure 5.1 Advisory committee organization.
four phases of the comprehensive emergency management model. The advisory
committee can fulfill two very important roles in the program. First, the advisory
committee provides program oversight from a broad, multidisciplinary perspec-
tive. This helps to ensure that the emergency management program addresses the
needs of the community. For example, membership on the advisory committee of
advocates for special needs of population helps to ensure that these needs are con-
sidered in the development of a program strategy. Second, the advisory committee
can provide resources not normally available to the emergency manager. A senior
representative of a department can commit funding and personnel resources to
support program strategy. Similarly, a private sector representative may be able to
obtain donations of funds or resources to accomplish projects.
An advisory committee that is truly representative of the community can be
very unwieldy, and meeting facilitators know that the more the participants in
a meeting, the harder it is to make a decision. For this reason, thought should
be given as to how to be as inclusive as possible in representation but at the
same time avoid slowing progress. One way of approaching this problem is to
distinguish between those on the committee that have actual decision‐making
authority and those who have a stakeholder interest. Figure 5.1 shows a model
that uses this approach. Program oversight and decision‐making are ultimately
vested in a policy committee of senior department heads or elected officials.
A steering committee is selected from among the stakeholders and meets fre-
quently to monitor progress and to develop the agenda for the next group
meeting. The larger group would meet less frequently to review and comment
on projects done by the workgroups. Completed projects are then submitted for

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 97
approval to the policy committee. The advantage of this model is that it allows
for broad inclusion of stakeholders in both program oversight and project
implementation while retaining the ability for quick decision‐making.
Figure 5.2 is a variation on this system in support of a regional government
association determining Homeland Security grant priorities. Discipline‐specific
and independent committees and associations represent their members and
stakeholders as part of a central coordinating committee. The central coordinating
committee in turn serves as a policy committee to the board of directors of a
regional council.
Another useful organizational model for the emergency management
program is the model used by the Firefighting Resources of Southern California
Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) program. The model con-
sists of five components:
1. A board of directors responsible for policy and oversight, usually consist-
ing of agency directors;
2. A coordinator who provides administrative management and is respon-
sible to the board;
3. An operations team of senior agency operations personnel that imple-
ments board decisions and makes recommendations to the board;
Hospitals
Mental
health
Public
health
Medical
Reserve CorpsCitizen
readiness
Plans
Policy
Law
enforcement
First
responders
Training
and exercise
GIS
Pass/MEIS
Tew
Emergency
communications
HOAFC
Heart of America Fire Chiefs
Established 1981
PSC Board
Public Safety Communications
Regional 9-1-1 System
Established 1983
Regional
interoperability
RAPIO
Regional Association of
Public Information Officers
Established 2000
MOHAKCA
Metropolitian Official Health
Agencies of the Kansas City Area
Established mid 1980s
MEMC
Metropolitian Emergency
Managers Committee
Established late 1970s
Mid-AMERICA LEPC
Local Emergency Planning Committee
Established 1987
MARCER
Mid-America Regional Council
Emergency Rescue Committee
Established 1972
RHSCC
Regional Homeland Security
Coordinating Committee
Established 2001
Figure 5.2 The Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Committee for the Kansas City
metropolitan area is an example of distinguishing between stakeholders and decision‐makers.

98 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
4. A task force comprised of supervisory level operations officers who pro-
vide analysis and staff support; and
5. Specialist groups that perform technical staff work within their area of
expertise.
The FIRESCOPE model offers several advantages. Planning is accomplished
by the people who will use the plan. Since membership is open to all organiza-
tions with responsibilities under the plan, there is a synergy that takes place as
expert knowledge, and specialized planning resources are made available. Similar
to the previous model, it allows work to be accomplished by those who are tech-
nically competent, allows for broad oversight, and retains the capacity for effec-
tive decision‐making. The FIRESCOPE model also meshes very well with the
requirements of NFPA 1600 and EMAP. Figure 5.3 is an example of how one
jurisdiction adapted the FIRESCOPE planning model for its emergency
management program.
No matter what model is used, the advisory committee is a critical resource
in gaining commitment to the emergency management program. It provides
for both program oversight and program resources. It allows broad‐based
community involvement in the emergency management program. However, as
will be discussed in another chapter, one must always remember that the advi-
sory committee is used for emergency planning and may not necessarily be
operative in managing emergencies. It is a strategic construct and not an oper-
ational one.
Disaster Council
(Board of Directors)
Director of Emergency
Services
(Program Coordinator)
Emergency Operations
Planning Task Force
(Operations Team)
Shelter Planning Work
Group
(Task Force)
Communications
Working Group
(Specialist Group)
Figure 5.3 FIRESCOPE planning model adapted to a local jurisdiction.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 99
The Administrative Plan
NFPA 1600 and the EMAP Standard require that an emergency management
program be institutionalized and documented. Although it is possible to dem-
onstrate institutionalization through a variety of separate documents, the most
effective way to do this is through an administrative plan for the program. An
administrative plan establishes the policies and procedures for managing internal
processes. In other words, it lays out the basics of the program: its purpose, con-
cepts, and responsibilities. In the absence of an administrative plan, it is difficult
to demonstrate the existence of a comprehensive emergency management
program as opposed to a mere collection of projects and initiatives.
The administrative plan should clearly define the emergency management
program. For example, it should define the operating structure of the group
and the roles of the different elements. Does the program committee make
policy or recommend policy? Who are the voting members? How are decisions
made? Who has the final decision‐making authority? The administrative plan
may address the following:
• Authority and scope
• Vision and mission statements
• Membership
• Organization/operating structure
• Relationships
• Decision‐making
• Funding sources
• Meetings
• Communications
• Program evaluation
In the context of the emergency management program, the administrative plan
is an extremely powerful tool. If it is written solely for the local emergency
management office, it is relatively meaningless. If, however, it is an organizational
document supported by senior management, it can be used to garner support from
other organizational elements. It provides for the assignment of responsibility for
specific program elements to other parts of the organization and fosters agreement
on common goals for the program. More importantly, it provides continuity
through the frequent changes in leadership common in most organizations.
STRATEGIC PLANNING
Where the administrative plan establishes the operating framework and overall
goals for the emergency management program, the multiyear strategic plan

100 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
provides a long‐range strategy for achieving program goals. Where the
administrative plan assigns functional responsibility for program elements, the
strategic plan details how this responsibility will be fulfilled.
In Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices Peter Drucker defines stra-
tegic planning as the following:
…the continuous process of making present entrepreneurial (risk taking)
decisions systematically and with the greatest knowledge of their futurity;
organizing systematically the efforts needed to carry out those decisions; and
measuring the results of these decisions against the expectations through
organized, systematic feedback.
One can simplify this statement to define strategic planning as a process of
systematically:
• Making decisions
• Organizing efforts to carry out those decisions
• Measuring the results
These key elements of the strategic plan are directly related to the manage-
rial functions of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling discussed in
Chapter 4. Planning in the context of management is about making decisions
about objectives and strategies for accomplishing them. Organizing and direct-
ing put in place the resources needed to achieve objectives and to manage their
application. Controlling measures results. The process is cyclical and represents
a commitment to continuous improvement.
The strategic plan is how the organization’s strategy gets implemented through
identifying goals and objectives and fixing responsibilities for achieving them.
The content of the plan is based on a process that considers the community’s
risk, the strategies it will use to manage risk, and the resources needed to imple-
ment these strategies. The strategic plan includes the following components:
• Vision and mission statements
• Multiyear program goals
• Multiyear program objectives
• Annual program goals
• Annual program objectives
• Budget forecasts
While there are no standard formats for administrative or strategic plans, a
useful way of organizing these documents is by the stability of the content.
Generally, the administrative plan elements tend to stay stable for several years,
whereas the elements of the strategic plan are reviewed and updated annually.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 101
The strategic plan normally covers a period of three to five years, with provi-
sions for annual review and update (an annual review is suggested by NFPA
1600). If the vision changes, the strategic planning process may need to be
implemented to develop a new strategic plan.
Developing the strategic plan is a complex process that involves many differ-
ent aspects. This chapter will discuss the components of the plan and suggest
some baseline data that should be considered in developing the plan. The next
two chapters will discuss risk assessment and the development of strategy, two
elements that form the core of the strategic plan.
Formulating Vision
As part of program administration, NFPA 1600 and EMAP require the docu-
mentation of executive policy to include vision and mission statements. These
policies define the intent of the program and establish the program as a legiti-
mate part of the organization. The formulation of executive policy is in fact the
culmination of a strategic planning process that asks questions such as “What
is our purpose?” and “Whom do we serve?” This strategic planning process is
often overlooked, and terms such as “vision statement,” “mission statement,”
and “goals and objectives” are frequently confused or misused. When properly
accomplished, strategic planning affords an opportunity for the emergency
manager to build a solid foundation for the emergency management program.
The question “What is our purpose” is not as simple as it sounds. It is too
simplistic to merely parrot, as most programs do, the phrase “to save lives and
to protect property and the environment.” This question forces one to confront
the issue discussed in the previous chapter, “What value does the emergency
management program add to our community?” If this value is limited to pro-
tection only, it tends to have limited resonance with senior managers and poli-
ticians. If, on the other hand, the program provides value through the strategic
reduction of risk or through efficiencies in the capacity to deal with risk, then
the program is taken more seriously. The purpose of the emergency management
program must be carefully thought out and clearly phrased to demonstrate the
strategic importance of the program to the achievement of the parent commu-
nity’s goals.
The question of “Whom do we serve?” is also problematic. Ultimately, it is
the citizens of a jurisdiction who will benefit from an effective emergency
management program, but does the program really serve those ultimate benefi-
ciaries directly? The emergency management program most directly serves the
community itself as an entity. That is, the program is intended to help manage
risk by coordinating the efforts of those subgroups with responsibility for
program elements to produce a synergistic reduction in risk or an increase in
the capacity to respond. This implies that the true customers of the emergency

102 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
management program are the organizational entities that it serves: elected offi-
cials, department heads, and senior executives.
As the emergency manager assesses the program, the answers to these and
similar questions become critical. Accurately identifying core functions and
clients means that the remaining components of the strategic planning process
(i.e. goals and objectives) become more focused and lead to a more efficient
program and better use of limited resources. Peter Drucker illustrates this point
in his classic work, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, and Practices, using a
case study from AT&T’s early days.
Based on analysis of AT&T’s business from 1905 to 1915, Theodore Vail
answered the question “What is our business?” with the response “Our
business is service.” Vail had grasped several issues that went beyond just the
provision of a telephone system. He noted that a natural monopoly such as
AT&T was subject to nationalization and that only strong public support
could counter this. By correctly identifying the public perception of value‐
added as service and not the telephone system itself, Vail set the strategic
vision for AT&T for the next 50 years. It is also interesting to note that Vail
was fired from AT&T in the late 1890s for asking that same question, “What
is our business?” He was rehired 10 years later when the government was con-
sidering nationalizing AT&T, largely because it was floundering due to a lack
of a unifying vision.
The importance of this internal and external analysis to the rest of the pro-
cess cannot be overstated. This becomes obvious as one considers the rest of
the strategic planning process shown in Figure 5.4:
Vision defines
mission
Plan Act
Mission drives
strategy
Strategy
identifies goals
Goals determine
objectives
Objectives
determine action
Mission achieves
vision
Strategy
fulfills mission
Goals implement
strategy
Objectives
achieve goals
Action meets
objectives
Action
Objectives
Goals
Strategy
Mission
Vision
Figure 5.4 Strategic planning model.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 103
• The vision statement is developed through internal and external analysis
and answers the question “Where do we want to be?” Executing the orga-
nization’s mission fulfills this vision.
• A mission statement that answers the question “What do we do?” is derived
from the vision statement. This mission is executed by implementing a
strategy.
• The strategy is a long‐term plan for executing the mission that answers the
question “How do we get from where we are to where we want to be?” The
strategy is implemented by achieving strategic goals.
• Goals are broad guidelines used to assist in long‐range planning and in
measuring progress. They answer the question “How do we measure our
progress?” and are achieved by meeting objectives.
• Objectives are the key results that must be met to achieve goals. Key results
are produced by action. This answers the question “How do we get it
done?”
• Action is the result of the strategic planning process. It is required to
accomplish objectives and ultimately leads to the achievement of the orga-
nization’s vision.
A way of understanding this process is to consider an analogy with the mili-
tary planning system (see Case Study 5.1). Although the analogy is not exact,
it is close enough to understand the dynamics at work. In preparing for battle,
a commander articulates a concept for the campaign (a vision). Major subor-
dinate commands interpret their responsibilities under that concept (mission)
and develop a plan (strategy) to achieve it. Within that plan are major tasks
that must be accomplished and, ultimately, specific assignments to subordinate
units (goals and objectives).
Understanding the strategic planning model is critical to overall program
management. Each link in the model is codependent and must be understood
in context. This context is crucial, and a single element cannot be divorced
from the model and considered separately. Many organizations spend countless
hours arguing over every syllable in a vision statement without grasping that it
is not only the statement that is important but rather also the entire strategic
planning process that ultimately defines organizational success.
Figure 5.5 provides an example of a vision and a mission statement from
California’s FIRESCOPE program. Note that the vision statement is a brief
and clear statement that encapsulates the organization’s definition of success,
whereas the mission statement explains succinctly the steps that are being taken
to achieve the organization’s vision. Compare this with the mission and vision
statement of a public safety dispatch agency in a large city shown in Figure 5.6.
Note the very broad scope of the vision compared to the very narrowly defined
mission. There is an obvious disconnect between the organization’s desire to be

104 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDY 5.1: OPERATION MARKET GARDEN,
SEPTEMBER 1944 – THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
Operation Market Garden was a bold plan to break the stalemate along the northern
European front and bring World War II to a quick close by striking at Germany’s industrial
heart. The plan was ultimately unsuccessful in achieving its goals because of an intelligence
failure to detect the second SS Panzer Corps, which had been sent to Arnhem to rest and
refit.
The planning related to Operation Market Garden in World War II presents a good
example of the strategic planning process. Note how each element within the process works
to achieve the previous element and how all elements ultimately relate to the strategic vision.
Case Figure 5.1 The 82nd Airborne Division drops near Grave, Netherlands, during
Operation Market Garden. Photo Credit: National Archives.
The Vision
Destroy German armed forces in the field and force the surrender of Germany.
The Mission
Seize a crossing across the Rhine River and invade the Ruhr, Germany’s key industrial
region.
The Strategy
Use two separate but coordinated assaults to seize a bridgehead across the Rhine River. Use
airborne troops to seize intermediate bridges and a final bridge across the Rhine, and then
follow‐up with a ground assault to consolidate territory gained and position resources for an
assault across the Rhine.
(continued on next page)

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 105
an international model and its mission of linking customers and emergency
services. Rather than serving the vision, the mission is more a statement of
organizational values. Execution of this mission will not necessarily result in
achievement of the vision. Furthermore, it is unclear how this vision will add
value to the community it serves. Vision and mission statements are not just
The Goals
1. Capture and hold strategic bridges along the route using airborne troops.
2. Break through the German front line with ground forces.
3. Capture and hold a bridge across the Rhine River.
The Objectives
1. Eindhoven Bridges – US 101st Airborne Division
2. Nijmegen Bridges – US 82nd Airborne Division
3. Arnhem Bridge – British 1st Airborne Division
4. Ground Assault – British XXX Corps
Recommended Reading
Ryan, C. (1974). A Bridge Too Far. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Vision
The FlRESCOPE vision is to lead in the development and enhancement of Fire Service partnerships in
California and nationwide by promoting the use of common all risk management systems for planned
and unplanned events through the innovative use of technology.
Mission statement
The Mission of FlRESCOPE is to (1) provide professional recommendations and technical assistance
to the Director of OES (Office of Emergency Services) and the OES Fire and Rescue Branch on the
following program elements:
•Statewide Fire and Rescue Cooperative Agreement (Mutual Aid) Plan.
•Statewide Fire and Rescue Cooperative Agreement (Mutual Aid) System.
•Mutual Aid Use and Application.
•OES Fire and Rescue Branch staffing needs
•Policies and Programs.
•Apparatus and Equipment programs.
And (2) maintain a system known as the FIRESCOPE”Decision Process” to continue statewide
operation. development, and maintenance of the following FIRESCOPE developed Incident Command
System (ICS) and MultiAgency Coordination System (MACS) components:
•Improved methods for coordinating multiagency firefighting resources during major incidents.
•Improved methods for forecasting fire behavior and assessing fire, weather and terrain conditions on an incident
•Standard terminology for improving incident management.
•Improved multiagency training on FIRESCOPE developed components and products.
•Common mapping systems.
•Improved incident information management.
•Regional operational coordination centers for regional multiagency coordination.
Figure 5.5 FIRESCOPE vision and mission statements.
(continued from previous page)

106 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
lofty sounding statements but must be carefully linked through the strategic
planning process.
It is also worth noting that visions and missions can change over time.
Generally, a vision is stable, with a life expectancy of anywhere from 5 to
30 years. The AT&T vision noted earlier worked for 50 years. Mission state-
ments are also stable, usually lasting between three to five years. Multiyear
strategies are generally written for five‐year periods but are usually adjusted
annually to account for changing goals and objectives.
Establishing Goals and Objectives
The strategic plan establishes the long‐term goals that the community wishes to
achieve and the process by which this will be accomplished. In other words, the
plan establishes what the community expects to accomplish over a specific period
and who has the responsibility for making this happen. In its simplest form, it is
a collection of goals and objectives. However, the strategic planning process is the
glue that binds these elements together. A strategic plan is not just a collection of
disparate goals; it identifies how these goals are achieved to meet the communi-
ty’s definition of success. Each strategic goal must contribute to mission accom-
plishment and ultimately to the achievement of the community’s vision.
The terms “goals” and “objectives” are sometimes confusing in that the terms
are essentially synonymous. In fact, many management texts refer to general
objectives and performance objectives rather than to goals and objectives. Goals
or general objectives are broad guidelines to assist in planning. Objectives or
performance objectives are specific and measurable. In other words, a goal is a
broad strategic statement of what the community wants to accomplish, whereas
the objectives explain how that goal will be achieved tactically. Objectives are
further broken down into specific work assignments or tasks.
Goals in the strategic plan do not drive the emergency management program
but are instead driven by the program. The strategic plan is the outgrowth of
the strategic planning process; it is the mechanism by which disparate elements
of the program are tied together to ensure that they are working toward a
common vision. This allows for coordination by the emergency manager while
Vision statement
The vision of the XXXX Communications Department is to be the international model recognized for
leadership, professionalism and innovation in 911 public safety communications.
Mission statement
We, the members of the XXXXX Communications Department are committed to excellence in public
safety, providing the linkage between the residents and visitors of XXXXX ‘s diverse city and its
emergency services resources. We take pride in dedicating ourselves to professionalism and public
service.
Figure 5.6 Public safety dispatch agency vision and mission statements.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 107
at the same time allowing decentralized planning by other agencies. Goals
reflect what the community has collectively decided to do and begin translating
strategy into actual accomplishments.
Indicators such as legislative requirements and best practices provide a gen-
eral direction for the strategic plan. These are factors that must be considered
as one develops concepts and ideas for community response. The strategic plan
is a description of how the various components of the emergency management
program will be implemented and is, in effect, the result of many separate strat-
egies. For example, if one’s strategy is to coordinate all phases of a response
(emergency response, continuity, recovery, etc.) from a single emergency opera-
tions center (EOC), then the plan might include goals related to capital projects
and staff development.
Because they are so broad, defining goals is generally easy for most commu-
nities, particularly if the appropriate work has been done on the vision and
mission statements. However, developing performance objectives involves a
realistic appraisal of available resources and a willingness to resolve conflicts
through prioritization and compromise. The development of performance
objectives presents an opportunity for defining roles and responsibilities for
various elements of the program. This is the chance for the emergency manager
to develop support for program goals and to foster involvement and support
from organizational elements. This process requires agreement from organiza-
tional elements that they will (i) accept lead responsibility for a specific program
task and (ii) commit appropriate staff resources to accomplish assigned
objectives.
The secret to defining objectives is to keep them realistic and measurable.
The National Management Association suggests several key elements that can
be used in defining objectives: consistency with vision, goals, and policies; sim-
plicity; measurability and attainability (Figure 5.7). To conform to these ele-
ments, an objective should have the following components:
Evaluating performance objectives
✓ Does it support the organization’s mission?
✓ Will it help attain one or more general objectives?
✓ Does it conform to the organization’s policies?
✓ Is it measurable?
✓ Is it simple and easily understood?
✓ Can one person be made responsible for it?
✓ Is it challenging but attainable?
Figure 5.7 Checklist for evaluating performance objectives. Source: The NMA Handbook for
Managers, National Management Association, 1987.

108 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
• A description of the objective that includes the desired end state (i.e. how
you will know that the objective has been met).
• Metrics to measure performance toward meeting the objective and deter-
mine success.
• Assignment of responsibility for achieving the objective. Wherever pos-
sible, this should be a single agency or individual so that the responsibility
does not become diffused. It is better to assign it to the lead agency that
chairs a task force, for example, than to the task force as a whole. The lead
agency can be held directly accountable where the task force generally
cannot.
• A timeline and milestones to assist in measuring progress. Open‐ended
objectives are seldom achieved because it is too easy to defer the project.
Long‐term projects that do not have reporting milestones tend to be
ignored or deferred in favor of more pressing issues.
• Budgetary data that estimate the resources needed to achieve the objective.
This can be hard costs, such as the purchasing of equipment, or soft costs,
such as internal personnel costs. Without a cost estimate, it is not possible
to determine whether the objective is realistic and achievable. To be realistic
and achievable means that decision‐makers understand the resources that
will be required to achieve the objective and are willing to provide them.
• Proposed source of funding. If the objective does not include a description
of how the costs associated with it will be met, it is not achievable. Objectives
without funding are too easily deferred based on “there’s no money for
that.” In this age of tight municipal budgets, part of defining an objective
is determining how it will be funded.
To be effective, the goals and objectives must ultimately be translated into action
through incorporation into the annual work plans and budget submissions of
subordinate agencies. Figure 5.8 shows the interrelationship between the strategic
plan and other administrative documents. This integration into work plans and
budget is the reason that broad‐based participation in developing program plans
and strong support from senior executives are critical to the success of the program.
Because a strategic plan is a multiyear plan, objectives can be long‐term, with sup-
porting tasks forming part of an annual work plan. This allows for long‐range
planning and incorporation of projects into lengthy budget cycles, as well as
providing for program continuity during changes of administration.
Developing the Strategic Plan
As one goes through the strategic planning process, an important starting point
is the question “What should we be doing?” This question is ultimately at the
heart of the strategic planning process. It implies an identification of potential

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 109
problems and produces the strategy that will be used to solve them. To answer
this question requires a two‐part process. In the first part, one must identify
what it is that the community is mandated by law to do. The second part of the
process builds on this base to determine what “should” be done based on public
expectation and best practices from a variety of disciplines.
Enabling Authorities and Legislation
A key starting point in developing the strategic plan is the enabling authority for
the program. This authority establishes the program and outlines the duties and
authorities of the program coordinator. From this legislation or policy state-
ment, one should be able to derive the specifics of the emergency management
organization’s mission and have some idea of the intent behind the law, policy,
or regulation.
Unfortunately, many such authorities in the public sector were developed
during the civil defense era and are extremely outdated. Such authorities may
be vague or scattered through various statutes. Enabling authorities have rarely
been updated to include modern concepts such as hazard analysis, mitigation,
and recovery planning and frequently limit themselves to the preparedness and
response functions of classic civil defense. Consequently, the emergency man-
ager may find that the authorities provided by law do not actually match the
duties that have accreted to the office over the years. In some cases, this could
Administrative plan
“The lead agency for hazard mitigation plan development is the city planning department. Funding for
developing and sustaining such a plan will be included in the annual department budget.”
Reduce risk
vulnerability
through a multi
hazard mitigation
program
Conduct natural hazards
vulnerability assessment
75 FTE $15, 375 $52, 739
Assess
vulnerability to
natural hazards
Develop
mitigation plan
Year 1
Year 2
Planning
Planning
$50K
$30K
Department
Budget
HMGP
Strategic plan
Department budget
Goal
Project Staffing Admin costs Budget request
Objective
Estimated
completion
Lead agency Est. cost Funding source
Figure 5.8 Implementing program plans. Note the relationship between the functional
responsibility in the administrative plan, performance objectives in the strategic plan,
and the department budget.

110 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
severely limit the scope of the program or define authorities so broadly that the
emergency manager is overwhelmed by duties that cannot be delegated to other
agencies.
In developing overall program strategy, therefore, it may be necessary to
perform a legislative update of the enabling authority for public sector
agencies or to use it simply as a starting point and not allow it to limit
the scope of the program. It is also important to realize that legislation must
be updated periodically. In addition, taking the strategic view requires that
the emergency management program be able to comment on, support, ini-
tiate, or oppose emergency management–related legislation with potential
impact on the program or jurisdiction. Consequently, NFPA 1600 and EMAP
require a documented strategy addressing this need for legislative and
regulatory revisions.
There are also tasks that the community may be required to accomplish by
law. As one reviews these requirements, it is well to keep in mind the hierarchy
of laws and the authority from which a requirement is derived. Statutory
requirements begin with the passage of a law by a legislative body. This law
may be given a name based on the purpose or the originators and may have
both a long name and a short name. The law is then incorporated into the
legislative entity’s statutes. In some cases, the law has sufficient detail for imple-
mentation, but in many cases, a series of regulations is developed to implement
the provisions of the act. Based on these regulations or codes, the agency
charged with implementing the act may develop procedures and guidelines for
accomplishing the purposes of the act. It is important to note that the act and
the regulations have the force of law, but in most cases, there is some latitude
for negotiation with agency regulations and guidelines.
Complicating things even further is the authority of an elected official to
issue executive orders to quickly implement new policies. For example, many
Homeland Security offices across the nation were established through executive
order rather than through legislation, leading to confusion over their roles and
authorities in relation to organizations established by statute.
For the public sector, there are several key authorities that form the basis of
the emergency management program. Some of the main ones are as follows:
• The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.The
Stafford Act is the legislative descendent of the Civil Defense Act of 1950
and the Federal Disaster Act of 1950. It includes the federal government’s
authorities for disaster relief and recovery and establishes grant programs
for mitigation and preparedness.
• Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. DMA 2000 is an amendment to the
Stafford Act that requires the development of a hazard mitigation plan by
states as a prerequisite for receiving postdisaster mitigation funds.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 111
• 44 Code of Federal Regulations. 44 CFR contains the implementing instruc-
tions for the Stafford Act. It defines Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA’s) policies, restrictions, and procedures for administering
grants and programs.
• Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III. SARA
Title III is a 1986 amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER‐CLA) of 1980. It estab-
lishes requirements for federal, state and local governments, Indian tribes,
and industry regarding emergency planning and “Community Right‐to‐
Know” reporting on hazardous and toxic chemicals.
• 40 Code of Federal Regulations. 40 CFR deals with environmental
protection. It contains implementing regulations for SARA Title III.
• Post‐Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act – PKEMRA addresses
many of the issues found in Hurricane Katrina by establishing policy for
accommodating individuals with disabilities.
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 National Preparedness. HSPD
8 describes a unified national approach to preparedness. It the basis for
several key elements of national preparedness: The National Preparedness
Goal, the National Preparedness System, and the Whole Community
Initiative.
Added to this federal legislation are numerous state and local laws and regu-
lations. Much of this legislation is out of sync with current practice and may
refer to archaic laws or organizations that no longer exist. Frequently, these
references find their way into program documents such as the emergency oper-
ations plan, resulting in the potential for confusion during times of crisis. It
may also create a situation where the community does not have the legislative
authority needed to accomplish disaster tasks such as mandatory evacuation
or medical quarantine. This situation highlights yet again the importance of a
process for revising existing statutes. It also demonstrates why the emergency
management program must be broad based: few emergency managers are
lawyers; having access to the community’s legal and legislative teams is
critical.
Grant Requirements
Another source of input for the strategic plan are the performance plans
required under a variety of emergency management and Homeland Security
grants. Grant applications require development of a proposal in which the
jurisdiction commits to developing certain work products and/or performing
certain activities within a specific time. Since these work plans will require the
use of jurisdictional resources and may, as in the case of the Homeland Security

112 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Grant Program, involve multiple agencies, they should be included in the
strategic plan. Including grant performance plans in the strategic plan also
ensures that these plans are coordinated with the rest of the emergency
management program. This results in more effective use of the grant funds by
leveraging them to address multiple hazards in addition to terrorism.
The challenge of grants and the reason why their inclusion in the strategic
plan is essential is that there is no single source or method of distribution for
federal funds. Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
made great strides in this direction, multiple funding streams through various
agencies are still the norm. Consequently, to maximize the use of these grants
and coordinate their required activities across departmental lines, it is critical
that the jurisdiction have a cohesive strategy that encompasses these grant
requirements and identifies potential uses for future grants.
Best Practices
Legislative requirements specify only the bare minimum for an emergency
management program. They answer the question “What must we do?” However,
effective emergency management programs must also consider the question
“What should we do?” To round out the program and to ultimately achieve the
organization’s mission, one must turn to best practices from multiple disci-
plines and incorporate them into the strategic plan.
“Best practices” are those practices that have become so standard and
accepted within a given industry that failure to include them in a program
would be considered negligent, even if their inclusion is not required by law.
For example, laws do not mandate many of the components of emergency
planning such as the comprehensive emergency management model and the
components of an emergency plan. These practices are based on training
courses and guidance documents developed by FEMA. A jurisdiction that
does not consider the four phases of the CEM model in its planning or
failed to have an emergency plan would be considered negligent in any
investigation following a disaster. Such negligence could well represent a
significant liability exposure for the jurisdiction.
Best practices may also include forecasting future needs based on current
industry practices. The issue of accreditation is an example of this principle.
The National Preparedness Standard is voluntary, as is EMAP. However, as
was noted earlier, FEMA funded a baseline EMAP assessment for each state
and required that states use the EMAP Standard as a baseline in developing
their performance plans. It does not take any great leap of logic to infer that
conformance with EMAP may one day become a requirement for federal grant
funds, making accreditation a potential long‐range strategic goal.
The EMAP Standard represents an accepted standard that can be used to
impartially assess the emergency management program. The results of an initial
baseline assessment can be used to identify shortfalls in the existing program

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 113
that can then in turn be addressed in the strategic plan. A periodic reassessment
can then be used to measure progress. The EMAP Standard is a de facto best
practice for emergency management.
The use of best practices has been encouraged in other disciplines for years,
usually through the auspices of a national organization. For example, associa-
tions like the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the International
Association of Chiefs of Police have contributed greatly to defining accepted
standards of performance for public safety services. Private sector organiza-
tions such as the American Society for Industrial Security, International, and
the Disaster Recovery Institute, International have done the same for the
private security and business continuity disciplines. Best practices and industry
standards offer a wealth of ideas for strategic goals that are achievable and
measurable.
PROGRAM ELEMENTS
The purpose of the emergency management program is to coordinate enterprise‐
wide planning related to program goals and strategies. As has been noted, the
mechanism for this coordination is the strategic plan. Although a good portion
of this plan will be devoted to preparedness issues, there are three key elements
that should be put in place to support planning efforts: resource management,
training, and finance. These functions have implications for the strategic plan.
Resource Management
An important part of the strategic plan is the identification of resource
management objectives. This is not the same as logistics, which will be dis-
cussed in a later chapter, but is instead the strategic process by which the juris-
diction addresses potential resource shortfalls. This process begins with an
analysis of the resources required to implement the strategies developed for
dealing with specific hazards. For example, if the jurisdiction has a strategy
that requires sheltering 10 000 citizens, one can estimate the personnel, equip-
ment, training, facilities, and costs associated with meeting this requirement.
The jurisdiction next conducts a survey to determine what resources currently
exist and identifies shortfalls between what is on hand and what is needed. The
jurisdiction then determines a strategy for meeting these shortfalls through
stockpiling resources, conducting training, or developing contracts or mutual
aid agreements. This strategy is then translated into objectives that are incorpo-
rated into the strategic plan.
A second component of resources management is the ability to locate needed
resources at the time of crisis. The normal assumption for many programs is
that this means that the program coordinator must maintain a master list of all

114 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
available resources. Given the limited resources available to most emergency
management offices, it is unlikely that such a list can be assembled or main-
tained with any accuracy. However, if one uses the paradigm that the emergency
manager is the coordinator of an enterprise‐wide program, then the issue is no
longer how the emergency manager can maintain such a list, but instead a
question of how the jurisdiction manages its resources.
Once one grasps that it is the jurisdiction that must manage resources, it
becomes acceptable for departments and agencies to maintain their own
resource inventories, and it becomes the responsibility of the emergency man-
ager to determine how these inventories can be made accessible during a crisis.
This makes sense when one considers how resources are managed daily. Heavy
equipment, such as cranes and bulldozers, is expensive and does not sit idle. If
they are private sector resources, then they may move in and out of the jurisdic-
tion in response to customer requirements. Maintaining a list of type and loca-
tion at the emergency management office would be labor intensive to the point
of impossibility. However, the owners of that equipment know exactly where
each item is at all times. The focus of the emergency management program
should not be on the development of resource inventories but on establishing a
process for accessing existing inventories.
This highlights one of the advantages of viewing the emergency manager as
coordinator rather than executive agent. It allows the use of existing systems
and resources to accomplish program objectives. There is no need to invent a
new system for logistics for use in disasters. One examines the existing organi-
zational system, identifies issues that would hinder operational response, and
develops strategies to remove those roadblocks.
A potential source for filling resource shortfalls is through mutual aid
agreements. Mutual aid resources can be made available from other jurisdic-
tions under preexisting agreements. These agreements resolve issues that can
hinder response such as insurance coverage, payment for services, etc. Although
mutual aid is usually given without charge, many jurisdictions are rethinking
this policy to allow for reimbursement under federal disaster assistance pro-
grams. For example, some jurisdictions will provide resources at cost for the
first 12 hours, then bill the receiving jurisdiction for the full cost of services
after the 12‐hour trigger is reached.
Unfortunately, many jurisdictions view mutual aid as primarily law enforce-
ment or firefighting resources because these are the resources most likely to be
used on a regular basis. Few states have adopted a master mutual aid agreement
that allows for the free exchange of any resource among signatories to the
agreement, such as social service workers or public works staff. Even fewer have
begun a process to manage these types of mutual aid resources through a coordi-
nated process. This means that for much of the country, there are limited author-
ities for sharing resources and no formal mechanisms to locate and dispatch them.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 115
Mutual aid occurs at the state level under the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC). Although there have been concerns raised that
EMAC is administered through an independent organization and not through
the mechanism of national plans, there is evidence from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita that suggests that the system works well.
The concept of a national mutual aid system leads to the need for precision
in requesting resources. This is a lesson that FIRESCOPE planners learned the
hard way, and it led to a system of resource typing for fire equipment. To under-
stand the importance of resource typing, consider the situation faced by fire-
fighters in a major wildland fire. There is clearly a need for additional apparatus;
therefore, the chief on scene asks for a fire engine. However, fire engines come
in various sizes. They can also be deployed with a crew or without a crew. In
some jurisdictions, a crew consists of five firefighters, in others it may be four.
How does the chief ensure that he or she gets what is needed? Resource typing
allows the chief to formulate a precise request for the resources required.
Resource typing is, as one might expect, a complex task. Putting it in per-
spective, however, resource typing is important for requesting discipline‐specific
personnel or equipment. It is not so critical for other operational requirements.
There are times when being too specific can have a negative impact on response.
On one FEMA operation in the Pacific, an inexperienced deputy regional
director specified a particular type of aircraft to be used for delivery of relief
supplies. The delivery was delayed several days while the specific type of aircraft
was located and made available by the US Air Force. It was later discovered
that the Coast Guard had two smaller aircraft that could have made the delivery
immediately. By specifying the method of delivery rather than the requirement
for cargo capacity, the deputy regional director limited the options of the trans-
portation section and delayed the operation.
Training
When one considers training under the emergency management program, it is
important to remember that this does not refer to all training that is done by
the jurisdiction but rather the training needed to support the program. Similar
to the resource inventory, this means that the emergency manager does not
need to track all emergency management–related training directly but should
have a process to access existing records as needed and for developing specific
training related to plans and strategies, such as training on incident management
software.
The identification of training objectives begins with a needs assessment.
A good starting point is to consider any regulatory requirement. For example,
the Homeland Security Grant Program has specific requirements related to
training on the National Incident Management System. Acquisition of protective

116 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
equipment, such as protective masks or hazardous materials (HAZMAT) suits,
triggers Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) training
requirements. Mandated training may also include the requirement for periodic
refresher training or recertification.
The real core of the assessment is an examination of plans and strategies and
a determination of the skills required to implement them. The scope of such
training is related to the role the individual will play in response to crisis. The
curricula for the Incident Command System are good examples of the relation-
ship of scope to responsibility. Courses range from an entry‐level awareness
course that can be taken by all personnel to a course specific to those with
high‐level responsibilities in an incident.
The purpose of the needs assessment is to identify the type, scope, frequency,
and target audience of training needed to support the emergency management
program. However, this does not mean that the program coordinator has
responsibility for conducting the identified training. In most jurisdictions, there
are internal resources available. Departments routinely conduct training and
maintain appropriate records. The responsibility of the emergency manager is
to develop a process for leveraging these existing resources to support the
program. This allows for as much training as possible to be institutionalized
within the existing system and allows the emergency manager to focus on the
gap between existing resources and identified need.
In closing this gap, the emergency manager is not so concerned with the
training itself as he or she is with institutionalizing it. This means that instead
of teaching the class directly, the emergency manager should consider alterna-
tives such as contracting for a train‐the‐trainer course to build a cadre of
instructors or considering a partnership or contract with the local community
college. Options such as these provide a long‐term benefit and help to nor-
malize training within the community.
The same is true of training administration. Instead of developing a system
for maintaining records, the emergency manager should consider the following:
(i) What information do I need to access to ensure training has been done and
(ii) Who is already maintaining or could maintain this information? It is much
easier to compile summary data than it is to maintain individual records.
The process of identifying and fulfilling training needs should lead to a series
of objectives that identify what training will be given, who will be involved, and
who will provide the instruction. This process should also provide for an estimate
of costs and the identification of potential funding sources. These objectives are
then incorporated in the strategic plan to coordinate decentralized training.
Finance
Government is very practiced at developing initiatives that are essentially
unfunded mandates. This means that an initiative is held up as a lofty goal, but

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 117
those charged with implementing the initiative must do so within the con-
straints of normal budget and staffing levels. In actual practice, this means that
such plans are limited in their implementation to those things the jurisdiction
would have accomplished anyway or to those things that it is forced to do by
public or legislative pressure. This is particularly true in the emergency
management discipline where program budgets are usually small, and many of
the major tasks to be accomplished must be funded through separate agency
operating budgets. If these agencies are not committed to supporting the
emergency management program, these tasks may not be accomplished owing
to competition for funding with the agencies’ internal priorities.
An important part of strategic planning is determining how the entity will
pay for components of its emergency management program. In general, tasks
without an identified budget source will not be accomplished. These funds may
be from an external source such as a federal grant or corporate donation or
may come from a commitment to use existing or redirected funds from an
internal budget. Budgeting within the context of the strategic plan offers sev-
eral advantages:
• It documents the commitment of a department to use internal funds in a
budget cycle for a specific task.
• It provides a strategy for the use of present and future grants.
• It identifies shortfalls in future budget projections, providing time to iden-
tify alternative funding.
• It documents actual levels of funding for the entire emergency management
program instead of just for the emergency management office, demon-
strating the jurisdiction’ commitment to the program.
The budget component of the strategic plan is by nature very broad and rep-
resents an estimate rather than actual costs. Actual costs would be determined
as part of the normal budget development cycle. It is also subject to adjustment
as goals and objectives are modified or as priorities change. Nevertheless, add-
ing a budget component to performance objectives goes a long way to ensuring
that the objectives are in fact achievable and provide long‐range continuity for
the emergency management program.
Budgeting for program support is not the only financial challenge for the
emergency management program. Planners must also consider what emergency
procedures must be in place to respond to crisis. These procedures must address
two main concerns. The first is how to streamline the purchase of goods and
services. Most jurisdictions use a complex system for contracting to prevent
fraud and ensure all procedural requirements are met. In a crisis, goods and
services must be purchased immediately, and normal contracting requirements
are usually waived when emergency authorities are invoked. However, if the

118 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
financial services staff are not familiar with these emergency authorities and
have not planned for their use, considerable delays can ensue. During Hurricane
Katrina, the establishment of a base camp to support mutual aid firefighters
was delayed because it took several weeks to find an official from New Orleans
who could authorize the costs, even though FEMA had committed to reim-
burse any expenditures.
A second major concern is the tracking of costs associated with the response.
Many of these costs are recoverable through federal relief programs and/or
insurance, but having acceptable documentation is critical. Establishing appro-
priate accounts and tracking codes should be done before a crisis so that costs
can begin to be accumulated immediately.
The resolution of these financial issues would be difficult for the emergency
manager acting alone. However, in an enterprise approach, financial services
staff can be brought into the process. As planners identify needed authorities
or processes, the financial services staff can identify what changes to author-
ities would be required to meet these needs or can suggest other approaches if
necessary.
PROGRAM EVALUATION
Program evaluation is an ongoing process that involves a regular review of the
accomplishment of strategic plan objectives, maintenance of program elements
against an established standard, and a formal corrective action program to
address deficiencies identified in program reviews and exercises and operations.
This program should be formally established, centrally administered, and doc-
umented in the administrative plan. With any program, sooner or later, one
must ask the question “How well are we doing?” In more prosaic terms, this
question could also be asked “What are we getting for all the money we are
spending on this program?” Similar to anything else in emergency management,
the question of program effectiveness can be measured on several levels.
Quantitative Assessment Tools
Quantitative assessment tools are those that measure the program against
specific criteria such as preidentified metrics or a standard such as EMAP.
They usually are objective (either you met the required criteria, or you did not)
and lend themselves well to a checklist format, making them easy to use. Such
tools are useful in determining conformance with standards or compliance
with legislative requirements and can generate easily understood summary
reports.
The strategic plan represents an important quantitative tool for evaluating
the program. The objectives in the strategic plan are performance measures

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 119
that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the strategic goals agreed to by
the community. If crafted properly, each objective has a metric that determines
when the objective has been achieved (e.g. a product developed, training deliv-
ered, and equipment purchased), making it easy to determine if the objective
has been achieved, in whole or in part, or whether it has not been achieved.
Part of the annual review of the strategy should be a summary for senior
management of how well annual goals were met. This allows the emergency
program manager to present concrete evidence to oversight groups that progress
is being made toward achieving the organizational vision and to justify costs
associated with the program.
Another important tool for assessing the emergency management program is
the EMAP Standard. As has been noted, a baseline assessment against the
standard can be an important part of developing the strategic plan. Periodic
reassessments against the standard can demonstrate progress or identify new
problem areas. Such a reassessment program has an added advantage. EMAP
accreditation is valid for a period of five years after which the jurisdiction must
seek reaccreditation. If documentation is not maintained during the accredita-
tion period, then reaccreditation is extremely labor intensive. It is therefore in
the best interests of an entity to establish a program to periodically verify con-
formance with the EMAP Standard. The results can be incorporated into the
corrective action program or the strategic plan as appropriate.
Quantitative assessments are particularly useful at the operational level,
where tasks are more easily defined. This was the theory behind the development
of the DHS Target Capabilities List. This list identified 36 capabilities that
DHS considers essential for performing the critical tasks identified in the
Universal Task List. The expectation is that these capabilities should be devel-
oped and maintained, in varying degrees, by each level of government. The
capabilities included performance measures, making the Target Capabilities
List a potential tool for assessing performance.
In a paper titled “Measuring Prevention,” Glen Woodbury, a graduate of the
Naval Postgraduate School’s Homeland Security Program, suggests one way in
which capabilities could be translated into performance measures. Woodbury
suggests a simple scale that measures program outputs and provides a method-
ology for assessing progress in achieving desired outcomes (Figure 5.9). The
simplicity of the Woodbury Scale makes it exceedingly adaptable to a variety
of program elements.
Qualitative Assessment Tools
Qualitative tools are subjective and attempt to assess the emergency management
program through actual performance. Where a quantitative tool might ask
“Do you have a plan, and does it address functions 1–11?” the qualitative tool
seeks to answer the question “How well does your plan work?” Evaluating the

120 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
program from a qualitative perspective is difficult but gives a better indication
of the program’ capabilities than does a quantitative assessment. The two most
common qualitative tools used by emergency managers are the exercise and
after‐action reports of actual incidents.
Exercise Programs
A major measure of an emergency management program’s capacity to respond
to crisis is the performance of program elements under the stress of a simulated
crisis. Exercises offer several benefits to the emergency management program
for the following:
• Training in roles and responsibilities in a risk‐free environment
• Assessing and improving performance
• Demonstrating the resolve of the jurisdiction to prepare for crisis
• Improving interagency coordination and communications
• Identifying resource shortfalls.
To be effective, however, exercises must be part of a comprehensive exercise
plan that tests all components of the emergency management program over
time. This means that exercises must be considered in multiyear cycles and not
as individual events. Ideally, exercises build on each other by increasing in com-
plexity, scope, and scale. The exercise plan, by virtue of its multiyear cycle, is
part of the strategic planning process, and objectives related to the program
form part of the strategic plan.
In addition to considering exercises as separate activities, another common
problem is the identification of the exercise with a hazard. For example, a juris-
diction will begin planning for an exercise by deciding that the exercise will be
based on terrorism or an earthquake. The problem with such an approach is
that it focuses the exercise on the hazard rather than on evaluation of the
emergency management program. In the initial stages of exercise planning, the
Woodbury Scale
0 = No effort or system underway or no recognition of the need
1 = Recognition of the need but no effort or resources to accomplish the output
2 = Initial efforts and resources underway to achieve the output
3 = Moderate progress toward accomplishing the output
4 = Sustained efforts underway and output near to fulfillment
5 = Output achieved and resources devoted to sustain effort
Figure 5.9 The Woodbury Scale. Source: “Measuring Prevention,” Glen Woodbury 2005.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 121
hazard that triggers the exercise is irrelevant. The preferred approach is to first
identify exercise objectives that are consistent with the multiyear exercise
program and the strategic goals of the community.
Exercise objectives are the true focus of the exercise. They define what it is
the exercise is supposed to assess and provide a metric against which the suc-
cess of the exercise can be measured. Examples of such objectives might be to
test the performance of new communication systems or to identify revisions for
EOC procedures. It is also not uncommon for subordinate agencies to develop
their own internal objectives, such as testing the interface between the EOC
and the department operations center. However, overall exercise objectives
should be limited to a small number to keep the scope manageable.
Once exercise objectives are established, it is then appropriate to determine
the scenario for the exercise. The exercise planners then have the option of
selecting a suitable scenario, or if a particular scenario is required (for example
by a grant requirement), then that scenario can be tailored to produce the con-
ditions needed to assess the objectives. Although there are qualitative and
quantitative differences among scenarios, for many objectives, these may be
incidental. For example, if the objective is to test evacuation plans, one may
select a terrorist chemical attack, a large HAZMAT release, a hurricane, or a
conflagration as the initiating agent. Although variables such as time to onset
or overall population risk may vary, the requirement to evacuate does not
change.
Exercise design is best accomplished by creating a team with representation
from the agencies that will be participating. This ensures that issues relevant to
those organizations are considered in the planning. A product of the exercise
design team is the exercise plan, a document that contains the administrative
information relative to the exercise: objectives, timeframes, work assignments,
location, etc. The plan should also include copies of any other materials produced
such as player guides, facilitator manuals, etc. Many exercises do not go well
because these administrative details have not been planned and documented.
There are considerable resources available for developing exercises. Among
the best of these the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
(HSEEP) and the FEMA exercise design courses. The FEMA courses are avail-
able both as instructor‐based courses and online through the Emergency
Management Institute.
Exercises are divided into two broad classes: discussion‐based and operations‐
based. Discussion‐based exercises are those that focus on policy‐based issues.
They provide for guided discussions among participants without the stress of
actual operations. They are excellent for focusing on processes and interagency
issues and make good starting points for the multiyear exercise program.
The most common discussion‐based exercise is the tabletop exercise.
Tabletops are extremely versatile and can be tailored to almost any timeframe

122 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
or budget. A tabletop exercise focusing on a single objective can be done in as
little as 10 minutes. A complex multiagency tabletop can take several days. One
emergency manager in California has even devised a five‐minute tabletop for
use at the opening of regular jurisdictional staff meetings. The key to successful
tabletop exercises is to remember that they are guided discussions. This means
they must have clearly defined exercise objectives, make use of a facilitator, and
be built around specific questions. It is not sufficient to provide a scenario and
say “What do you do?” Instead, each part of the exercise should be designed to
elicit discussion on issues relevant to the exercise objectives.
Discussion‐based exercises are excellent tools whose frequent use can help
identify poor planning assumptions and eliminate misunderstandings. However,
the true measure of response capacity is the operations‐based exercise.
Operations‐based exercises tend to focus on tactical and operational issues by
placing the participants under stress. The exercise attempts to approximate as
closely as possible the conditions under which the system being assessed must
function.
Operations‐based exercises consist of three levels:
• Drills focus on a single specific function or operation, usually performed at
the tactical level. An example might be an exercise that tests the ability of
the police bomb disposal squad to work in Level A hazard suits.
• Functional exercises test multiple functions or interdependent functions.
These are normally conducted at the operational level and focus on
coordination issues. An example would be an EOC exercise that tests the
interface between the EOC and department operations centers during a
simulated hurricane. All elements outside the EOC or the player location
are simulated. Functional exercises require a moderate level of resources
and around six months of planning.
• Full‐scale exercises are complex operations and designed to test many dif-
ferent functions in real‐time. Field resources are deployed, and multiple
levels of response are activated. Full‐scale exercises require a considerable
commitment of resources and require at least a year of planning. However,
they are the best method for testing a jurisdiction’s emergency management
capacity.
The success of an exercise ultimately rests on the evaluation process that is
used. This process should capture issues in two areas: conduct of the exercise
and performance of the participants. The first area relates to the administrative
component of the exercise such as how well the exercise met its objectives. This
information is used to improve the design of future exercises. Performance issues
pertain to problems observed in performing tasks or functions or issues with
plans and policies. This information is used to make changes within the
emergency management program and may have an impact on the strategic plan.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 123
The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program provides an eight‐
step methodology for assessing exercises:
1. Plan and organize the evaluation.
2. Observe the exercise and collect data.
3. Analyze data.
4. Develop a draft after‐action report.
5. Conduct an exercise debrief meeting.
6. Identify improvements to be implemented.
7. Finalize the after‐action report.
8. Track implementation.
Exercise evaluation should be a formal process that involves input by all par-
ticipants. For operations‐based exercises, expert evaluators are used to observe
the exercise play and note things that go poorly or well. Participants should
also be asked to make note of any problems they encounter during exercise
play. Immediately after the exercise, it is useful to conduct a quick debrief to
capture ideas while they are still fresh in people’s minds. This “hot wash” should
be conducted by a skilled facilitator who seeks to identify what went well and
what could be improved without fixing blame. Some jurisdictions use a ques-
tionnaire at the same time to capture ideas and numerical scores for the con-
duct of the exercise. Questionnaires sent home with participants, however, have
a low rate of return.
Data from evaluators and from the after action debrief are analyzed and rec-
ommendations developed. Once this information has been compiled, it is use-
ful to conduct a formal exercise debriefing with key officials to validate the
findings and refine the recommendations. The expected outcome from the
debriefing is a list of accepted recommendations and specific actions that will
be taken. This information is then captured in an after‐action report and
provided to the corrective action program for tracking.
Actual Incidents
Another form of assessment of capacity is performance during actual events.
Real events offer the best indicator of jurisdictional capacity to respond to
crisis. Failure to implement plans or the failures of plans during implementa-
tion are all key indicators that there may be the need for additional training or
planning. It is important to have a method for capturing what went well and
what could be improved during actual operations.
The process for capturing and analyzing data from an actual event is like that
used in exercises: a quick debrief, analysis of reports and data, a formal debrief-
ing, and the issuance of an after‐action report containing recommendations and
specific actions to be taken. However, since these are real events, there may be

124 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
other factors that limit the availability of data. For example there may be legal
concerns over the findings of the after‐action report and their impact on poten-
tial litigation. Departments may consider the review of a response as an internal
matter and be unwilling to share data. Although after‐action reports generally do
not apportion blame but merely seek to identify opportunities for improvement,
there may be concerns that a negative finding may lead to disciplinary action.
Consequently, the process for collecting and assessing information on real inci-
dents needs to be a formal, documented process agreed to by all stakeholders.
Corrective Action Program
During the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment
Program (NEMB‐CAP), the effort by DHS to assess states against the EMAP
Standard, only one‐third of the states surveyed had corrective action programs.
This highlights a major failing of emergency management programs across the
country. It is not uncommon to find the same deficiencies reflected in after‐
action reports over and over with nothing every being done about them. Many
emergency management programs do not have a documented system for
tracking the implementation of corrective actions.
Once potential problems are identified through exercises, assessments against
the EMAP Standard, or actual incidents, there should be a vetting process to
determine whether the problem was the result of a unique set of circumstances
or whether it requires a systemic change. If the problem is systemic, the task
group that is reviewing the problem (e.g. the exercise evaluation committee)
should develop recommendations like performance objectives: statement of the
problem, action agent, timeline and milestones, associated costs, and source of
funding.
NFPA 1600 provides an eight‐step process that is useful in dealing with cor-
rective action needs identified in actual events and correlates well with the
HSEEP model for exercises:
1. Develop a problem statement that states the problem and identifies its impact.
2. Review the past history of corrective action issues from previous evalua-
tions and identify possible solutions to the problem.
3. Select a corrective action strategy and prioritize the actions to be taken.
4. Provide authority and resources to the individual assigned to implemen-
tation so that the designated change can be accomplished.
5. Identify the resources required to implement the strategy.
6. Check on the progress of completing the corrective action.
7. Forward problems that need to be resolved by higher authorities to the
level of authority that can resolve the problem.
8. Test the solution through exercising once the problem is solved.

ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 125
The real issue is not the identification of problems or even determining cor-
rective action. The real issue is tracking the implementation of the corrective
action. This means developing a system that holds the action agents account-
able for progress. Some recommendations may be appropriate for integration
into the strategic plan and can be tracked through the annual review process.
For others, it may be necessary to create a tickler file or database. However,
these methods are ineffective unless they generate regular reports that are used
as management tools by senior executives. Examples of these are a quarterly
report provided to department heads, a monthly report provided to the advi-
sory group, or an annual report provided to the senior elected official.
Ultimately, the corrective action program must close the loop in a process that
begins with assessment and ends with substantive improvements to the
emergency management program.
CONCLUSION
An effective emergency management program is not a collection of various ini-
tiatives conducted under a variety of authorities and funded through disparate
funding streams. It is a cohesive program that takes advantages of disparate
elements to produce a synergistic reduction of risk and an increased capacity to
respond. Program cohesiveness is developed and maintained through a stra-
tegic planning process that is inclusive and collaborative and fits the work of
many agencies operating under separate authorities into a manageable frame-
work. The program is documented through an administrative plan that pro-
vides governance and a multiyear strategic plan that lays out measurable
performance objectives.
This chapter has also made the case for a change in the way emergency man-
agers interact with local government. The old paradigm that held the emergency
manager accountable for all issues related to crisis response is a recipe for failure.
Instead, the proper role of the emergency manager is as an administrator with
responsibility for coordinating the disparate elements of an enterprise‐wide
program that assists in the management of risk. In this context, the most impor-
tant document produced by the emergency manager is not the emergency oper-
ations plan but the strategic plan that coordinates the actions of multiple
agencies and groups toward a unified vision of community resilience.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition.
Lucien G. Canton.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc.
127
Chapter 6
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly, one begins to
twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
—Sherlock Holmes
From A Scandal in Bohemia by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (1891)
Risk assessment is the foundation of the emergency management program. A
properly conducted risk assessment allows program elements to be based on a
realistic appraisal of the types of risks a community is likely to face. It allows
the identification of scenarios based on realistic assumptions and provides jus
tification for the commitment of program resources. It highlights opportunities
for mitigation. It is the first step in the problem‐solving model: a realistic defi
nition of the problem.
In assessing risk, it is important to use a structured process to ensure that no
potential threat to the community is overlooked. It is not uncommon for one to
assume that the only serious hazards are the obvious risks that “everyone”
knows about. It is also common to see crisis planning driven by what is known
among emergency managers as the “flavor of the month”: the threat that is cur
rently the focus of the media and/or the public. The single biggest problem in
risk assessment, however, is the common mistake of assuming that the hazard
is the risk. A hazard is a dangerous event or circumstance that has the potential
to cause an emergency or disaster. The hazard itself may not necessarily pre
sent a risk to a community. It is the vulnerability of the community to the haz
ard’s impact and the probability of that hazard occurring that creates risk. Risk
assessment is the analysis of these three factors: impact, probability, and vul
nerability, at both the macro and micro levels.
ASSESSING RISK

128 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
THE NATURE OF RISK
Risk is very much similar to the ancient Chinese strategy game Go. It is said
that one can learn the rules of Go in a matter of minutes, but learning the
strategy of the game can take a lifetime. Risk is also a simple concept in its
most basic form but becomes more complex the more one learns about it.
In understanding risk, one must keep in mind two key points. The first is that
risk is a future concept. That is, it makes assumptions about something that
might happen in the future. Consequently, risk is not fixed, and it can vary as
conditions change. Neither is risk a predictor of what will happen; it is an
estimate of what could occur. For this reason, risk is couched in terms of prob
abilities rather than absolutes. The basic formula for risk is generally accepted
as the factor of the probability of an event occurring and the estimate of the
impact of the event.
The second key point is that risk is relative. The impact of an event is not
solely a function of the severity of the event. It must also consider the vulner
ability of the community to that severity. An event of similar magnitude occur
ring in two different communities can have vastly different effects. Even within
the same community, the impact of an event is not uniform. For example, in
his study of the 1995 Chicago heat wave, sociologist Eric Klinenberg found
that neighborhoods with similar economic characteristics had widely different
death rates as the result of varying degrees of social isolation. Following
the 1998 Loma Prieta earthquake, the Marina District of San Francisco
required months of major reconstruction while the rest of the city was largely
unaffected.
It is this concept of vulnerability that gives risk its complexity. Although the
severity of the event is important, it is the vulnerability of the population
to that severity that determines the significance of the event. However, there is
as yet no standard measurement of community vulnerability. In Measuring
Vulnerability to Natural Hazards, editor Jorn Birkman highlights this problem,
pointing to the lack of common terminology, goals, and indicators to measure
gaps and coping capacity. From the perspective of emergency management,
complex analyses would be useful, but in their absence, one must rely on the
identification of functional needs. Identifying segments of the community with
mobility issues or language barriers, for example, allows for including those
needs in emergency plans.
The subjectivity inherent in vulnerability means that risk is not solely
objective. Risk assessment does attempt to look at risk objectively using histor
ical data and probabilities. However, not all hazards are obliging enough to
provide the data needed for true objectivity, and the assessment of the risks
posed by those hazards through the construction of scenarios or using evalua
tion of experts becomes more subjective.

ASSESSING RISK 129
Further complicating risk assessment is the concept of perceived risk.
Decisions about risk management are not always influenced by actual risk but
are often driven by emotional and irrational fear of hazards that are unknown
or viewed as catastrophic or uncontrollable. Witness, for example the over
whelming fear of terrorism generated after September 11. Despite the objective
evidence that the risk is small, fear of attack has continued and led to the expen
diture of uncounted billions and questionable government policies.
Risk assessment is only relevant if it leads to decisions about what to do
about a particular risk. This is the process known as risk management and is
the major contribution of the emergency manager to the community. Risk
management involves the formulation of strategies aimed at eliminating or
reducing the negative effects or their consequences of potential events. This
involves the commitment of limited resources; therefore, decisions regarding
these strategies must weigh costs versus benefits the potential unintended
consequences involved. Figure 6.1 suggests a conceptual framework for the
management of risk.
RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
The key to a successful risk assessment is the use of a systematic approach.
Although the commitment to all‐hazards planning suggests a need to consider
all potential threats, this does not mean that each of them must be planned for
equally. Instead, the goal of all‐hazards planning is to develop plans that
address response‐generated needs and can be used in a wide range of disasters.
Risk assessment identifies those hazards that can be addressed with these plans
and those that require special plans based on agent‐generated needs.
Traditional risk assessment can be thought off as a cone that encompasses
all potential hazards and gradually narrows to identify critical planning require
ments. This cone is comprised of three basic elements:
• Hazard Identification. The process of identifying all the hazards that could
potentially affect the community.
• Hazard Analysis. Considering each hazard in the context of community
vulnerability to prioritize those with the greatest potential impact.
• Impact Analysis. Determining the impacts of high‐risk hazards on the
community both in terms of infrastructure and population.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced a new
risk assessment methodology in CPG 201 Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment Guide. Known as THIRA, this methodology is intended to
link risk assessment to an identification of capabilities needed to respond to an

130 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
identified risk and the resources needed to meet those capability targets
(Figure 6.2). THIRA uses a four‐step process:
• Identify the Threats and Hazards of Concern. Based on a combination of
experience, forecasting, subject‐matter expertise, and other available
resources, identify a list of the threats and hazards of primary concern to
the community.
• Give the Threats and Hazards Context. Describe the threats and hazards of
concern, showing how they may affect the community.
• Public precept ions
• Risk communication
• Expert/lay person
differences
• Statistical data
• Building scenarios
• Information provision
• Incentives
• Regulation
• Standards
• Compensation
• Insurance
• Liability
• Impact on society
• Impact on interested parties
Modeling of risks
Risk management strategies
Evaluation of strategies
Risk perceptionRisk assessment
Figure 6.1 Conceptual framework for assessing and managing extreme events.
Source: Risk Analysis for Extreme Events: Economic Incentives for Reducing Future Losses.
Kunreuther et al. (2004).

ASSESSING RISK 131
• Establish Capability Targets. Assess each threat and hazard in context to
develop a specific capability target for each core capability identified in the
National Preparedness Goal. The capability target defines success for the
capability.
• Apply the Results. For each core capability, estimate the resources required
to achieve the capability targets using community assets and mutual aid,
while also considering preparedness activities, including mitigation oppor
tunities (CPG 102, p. 1).
Comparing THIRA with the traditional approach, one finds a consistency
in the need to identify and analyze threats and to identify the impact of those
threats on the community. THIRA goes further by linking this analysis to
resource identification. The process is sound, although potentially cumber
some because of its reliance on standardization through core capabilities.
Another tool that has gained some popularity is a military tool known as
CARVER. Originally developed by Special Operations Forces to assess poten
tial targets, CARVER uses a scale of 1–10 to rate targets on six factors
(Figure 6.3):
• Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a
significant impact on military, political, or economic operations.
• Accessibility. A target is accessible when an operational element can reach
the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish its
mission.
• Recuperability. A target’s recuperability is measured in the time it will take
to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target.
• Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if the operational element has the
means and expertise to successfully attack the target.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Give threats
and hazards
context
Establish
capability
targets
Apply the
results
List of
threats/
hazards
Resources
requirements
Capability
target
statements
Context
descriptions
for threats/
hazards
Identify threats
and hazards
of concern
Figure 6.2 The THIRA process. Source: CPG 201 Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment Guide.

Immediate halt in
output, production,
or service; target
cannot function
without it
Criticality
C
ri
te
ri
a
Accessibility Recuperability Vulnerability Effect Recognizability
9–10
7–8
5–6
3–4
1–2
Easily accessible,
standoff weapons
can be employed
Replacement,
repair, or
substitution requires
1 month or more
Replacement,
repair, or
substitution requires
1 week to 1 month
Vulnerable to long-
range laser target
designation, small
arms �re, or charges
of5 pounds or less
Overwhelmingly
positive effects; no
signi�cant negative
effects
Clearly recognizable
under all conditions;
recognition requires
little or no training
Halt within 1day, or
66% curtailment in
output, production,
or service
Inside a perimeter
fence but outdoors
Vulnerable to light
antiarmor weapons
�re or charges of 5
to 10 pounds
Moderately positive
effects; few
signi�cant
negative effects
Easily recognizable
at small-arms range;
recognition requires
a small amount of
training
Halt within 1week,
or 33% curtailment
in output,
production,or
service
Inside a building but
on ground �oor
Replacement,
repair,or
substitution requires
72 hours to 1 week
Vulnerable to
medium antiarmor
weapons �re, bulk
charges of 10 to 30
pounds, or very
careful placement of
smaller charges
No signi�cant
effects; neutral
Difficult to recognize
at night or in bad
weather, might be
confused with other
targets; recognition
requires some
training
Difficult to recognize
at night or in bad
weather, might be
confused with other
targets; recognition
requires extensive
training
Halt within 10 days
or 10% curtailment
in output,
production, or
service
Inside a building but
on second �oor or in
basement; climbing
or lowering required
Replacement,
repair, or
substitution requires
24 to 72 hours
Vulnerable to heavy
antiarmor �re, bulk
charges of 30 to 50
pounds, or requires
special weapons
Moderately negative
effects; few
signi�cant
positive effects
No signi�cant effect
on output,
production, or
service
Not accessible or
inaccessible without
extreme difficulty
Same day
replacement, repair,
or substitution
Invulnerable to all
but the most
extreme targeting
measurs
Overwhelmingly
negative effects; no
signi�cant positive
effects
The target cannot
be recognized under
any conditions,
except by experts
Figure 6.3 Target analysis criteria used in the CARVER methodology developed by the US Special Forces. The
CARVER analysis can be useful when determining the vulnerability of individual targets. Source: Derived
from FM 34‐36: Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 1991.

ASSESSING RISK 133
• Effect. The effect of a target attack is a measure of possible military,
political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target
and beyond.
• Recognizability. A target’s recognizability is the degree to which it can be
recognized by an operational element and/or intelligence collection and
reconnaissance assets under varying conditions.
The criteria used to assess each factor can be tailored to the specific opera
tion. The total of the ratings help identify where the target is most vulnerable
and where resources can be most effectively applied to produce the desired out
come. Although not an emergency management tool, per se, CARVER can be
useful in conducting a vulnerability analysis of a single facility.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
One begins the assessment of risk by first determining what hazards may affect
the community, paying particular attention to the probability of the hazard
occurring and the potential impact on the community. Hazards tend to fall into
three broad categories:
• Natural hazards, which result from acts of nature, such as hurricanes, earth
quakes, tornadoes, animal disease outbreak, pandemics, or epidemics.
• Technological hazards, which result from accidents or the failures of sys
tems and structures, such as hazardous material spills or dam failures.
• Human‐caused incidents, which result from the intentional actions of an
adversary, such as a threatened or actual chemical attack, biological attack,
or cyber incident (CPG 120 p. 5–6).
In general, natural hazards tend to be more widespread in their effects,
whereas technological and human‐caused events tend to have more localized
impact. This becomes apparent when one contrasts Hurricane Katrina with
the attacks of September 11. One can certainly argue that September 11 had
wide ranging impacts on national and world policy and the economy that may
be difficult to quantify and may never be fully known. However, Katrina’s
economic loss estimate of $108 billion dwarfs the General Accounting Office’s
estimate of $27.2 billion in losses from September 11. Except for loss of life
(Katrina’s death toll was 1245 as compared to over 3000 lost in the World Trade
Center attack), Katrina exceeded the impact of the 2001 terrorist attacks in
every sense: geographical area affected, number of evacuees, public resources
committed to relief, displaced persons, cost of rebuilding, etc. The point is not
to diminish the horror of the New York attack but to point out that natural
hazards pose a significant threat and that to focus on a single hazard, as was

134 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
the tendency in the United States after September 11, may actually increase
one’s vulnerability to other threats.
However, technological hazards cannot be ignored either. Many of these
hazards are related to modern technological processes and are both more likely
to occur and to have a more rapid onset than natural hazards. Natural hazards
may be seasonal or may have slow onsets, but commonplace events such as fires
and hazardous material spills can occur without warning. These events may
lack the scale of a large natural event and may be very localized in scope, but
for many communities, such occurrences could well be catastrophic if they
are unexpected, and sufficient resources are not in place to deal with their
consequences.
The community also needs to consider threats that may not necessarily consti
tute an emergency in the public sector but could have a severe impact on private
businesses and the public. On 8 December 1998, an employee error caused a
blackout to more than 375 000 businesses and households on the San Francisco
Peninsula. For the emergency services, the event was largely an inconvenience;
there was an increased need for traffic control at critical intersections and calls
to free people trapped in elevators but no real public safety issues. Power was
restored within eight hours and the city of San Francisco recovered some
$1.1 million in lost revenues and response costs. For the private sector, however,
the outage resulted in major economic loss. The Pacific Gas and Electric
Company paid out $8.3 million to settle some 6600 private claims and was fined
$440 000 by the California Independent System Operator, the organization that
coordinates power resources in the state.
Power emergencies are examples of another type of hazard that should be
considered – those that produce cascading effects. Cascading events are the cat
alysts that spark new disasters or extend the effect of the disaster well beyond
the initially affected area. On 14 August 2003, parts of the eastern United States
and Canada suffered the worst blackout in the US history. The blackout was
caused when high voltage lines in Parma, Ohio, came into contact with over
grown trees, triggering a shutdown of the system to prevent a short circuit.
A combination of a computer bug that interfered with alarms and the high
consumer demand in the summer season resulted in a sequential shut down of
other systems throughout the region.
The blackout affected over 50 000 000 customers (Figure 6.4). Some areas
lost water pressure because pumps were inoperative, resulting in potential con
tamination to water systems and the issuance of boil‐water orders that lasted
for up to four days. Sewer systems failed, releasing raw sewage into waterways
and forcing the closing of ocean beaches. A chemical plant in Sarna, Canada,
accidentally released over 300 pounds of vinyl chloride into the St. Clair River.
Transportation systems, including airports, were closed. Gas stations could not
pump fuel, causing vehicles to be abandoned when they ran out of gas. Oil
refineries were shut down, sparking a rise in gasoline prices. Cellular phone

ASSESSING RISK 135
systems were inoperable. In some areas, the outages lasted until 16 August, and
full power was not restored to parts of Canada until 19 August.
The 2003 North America blackout is an example of how a minor event
(a high‐voltage line touching a tree) can produce a widespread problem that in
turn generates other problems, such as water contamination, sewage releases,
etc. This event points out the importance of the impact of an event rather than
the event itself. In assessing the risk of a cascading event, the planner should
not try to identify all the incidents that could lead to such an event but consider
how a widespread event could affect the community. The lesson from the
blackout is that a widespread power outage lasting several days is a potential
hazard to the community. The duration of the outage and the impact on the
community are variables that can be considered during an analysis of the
hazard.
Although it would seem to be a straightforward exercise, hazard identification
can be complex. There is a tendency to focus on obvious or recurring hazards
and to dismiss lesser hazards as unimportant. Often, decisions are made based
on incomplete or random information. There is also a tendency to be reactive
and to prepare for the last disaster. The result is that communities are frequently
surprised by events that were foreseeable but largely ignored because they did
not have the visibility of the “popular” hazards.
An example of this was the sudden emergence of the Y2K hysteria in 1999.
Computer programmers had known for years that computer systems recorded
Figure 6.4 The 2003 blackout shutdown public transportation and forced many New Yorkers
to walk home. Photo Credit: Eric Skiff www.glitchnyc.com.

136 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
dates using the last two digits of the year and that the year 2000 had the poten
tial for a massive failure of date‐dependent systems. Warnings were sounded in
the early 1990s, but few organizations made any attempt to take corrective
actions, partly because of the cost and partly because few took the problem
seriously. In 1999, the media picked up on the potential problem and generated
a wave of public hysteria. The public was presented with a steady diet of
doomsday scenarios that had aircraft falling from the skies, food distribution
systems disrupted, nuclear power plants exploding, and society collapsing into
anarchy. Even simple devices like microwaves would turn on the unsuspecting
homeowner because of its imbedded microchip. Organizations and govern
ments committed considerable funds to identify critical processes that might be
affected by the loss of computer systems and to install fixes to potential
problem. Yet the threat from the millennium bug was foreseeable and could
have been mitigated well before 1999.
Another frequently overlooked threat is the impact of repetitive events that
have a cumulative effect over time. An example of this is the series of rain
storms in California in 1998 resulting from the El Niño effect that caused wide
spread flooding. El Niño, or as it is more correctly called, the El Niño Southern
Oscillation, is a periodic disruption of the ocean‐atmosphere system in the
southern Pacific. A relaxing of the trade winds in the central and western
Pacific reduces the efficiency of the ocean cooling system, resulting in an
increase in the water temperature. One of the consequences of this warming
trend is an increase in the rainfall in the southern tier of the United States.
In 1997, the National Weather Service predicted significant rainfall from the
El Niño effect, and the State of California conducted a series of briefings and
workshops to help counties prepare for the storms. Resources were stockpiled,
and preventative measures put in place. Despite the best efforts of emergency
managers throughout the state, the series of storms proved catastrophic.
Individually, each of the storms would have had minimal impact on the state.
However, the almost continuous bands of rain saturated the ground, resulting
in increased runoff that produced flooding and mudslides throughout the state.
The cumulative effect resulted in a presidential declaration of disaster involving
41 of the state’s 58 counties (Figure 6.5). Nevertheless, the impact of the storms
might have been much worse had the state not acted on the information from
the National Weather Service.
Hazard identification should also include a consideration of the commercial
processes that take place within a community. Sometimes, these hazards are
obvious, but in many cases, they are so ingrained in the life of a community
that it is easy to overlook them as threats. On 15 January 1919, a 50‐foot‐tall
tank of molasses exploded in the North End Park area of Boston, as the result
of overfilling and fermentation brought on by an abrupt and unseasonable
increase in the temperature. The estimated 2.5 million gallons of molasses cre
ated a wave between 8 and 15 feet in height moving at 35 miles an hour, exerting

ASSESSING RISK 137
a force of over 2 tons per square foot. The wave killed 21 people and injured
150, and the cleanup took over six months (Figure 6.6).
In identifying hazards, it is important to consider all the threats that could
have an impact on the community. Many of these can later be eliminated or
given low priority in the analysis phase, but it is critical to make sure that
nothing has been missed. On the other hand, a healthy dose of common sense
is required. One can spend endless hours concocting scenarios and playing the
“what if ” game without ever completing the hazard identification. One should
keep in mind that the goal of hazard identification is to consider a sufficiently
broad range of threats to ensure that all potential impacts have been identified.
The emphasis is not so much on the type of hazard as it is on the impact of the
hazard. For example, an electrical outage can be caused by any number of haz
ards. What is important in hazard analysis is to determine as much as possible
the potential maximum duration and extent of an electrical outage that might
be experienced by a community.
Hazard identification has never been easier. Many of the potential threats
affecting specific areas of the United States have been identified, and the
Internet provides almost unlimited resources for research. Government agencies
such as the National Weather Service, the US Geologic Survey, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are good starting points for collect
ing data on potential hazards. FEMA manages programs such as the National
Figure 6.5 Cumulative rainstorms from El Niño produced widespread flooding
in California in 1997. Photo Credit: Robert A. Eplett/OES CA,
California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services.

138 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP), the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), and the National Dam Safety Program (NDSP)
that make data available, either via the Internet or at a nominal cost. There are
also many computer models available at little or no cost, such as FEMA’s
Hazards United States (HAZUS) loss estimation tool that offers models for
hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes.
Over the years, various pieces of legislation have broadened the rights of a
community to know the potential human‐caused threats that might affect it.
For example, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)
Title III and the Clean Air Act established reporting requirements for an exten
sive list of hazardous materials that can be accessed by the public. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has requirements
related to the posting of Material Safety Data Sheets in the workplace that
identify the types of chemicals used, their potentially harmful effects, and the
treatment for exposure. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adminis
ters a Toxic Release Inventory that tracks the release of toxic chemicals from
manufacturing companies by zip code and offers access to databases related to
environmental hazards.
In gathering data related to hazards, one must be careful to understand the
nature of the data being examined. It is a common practice in hazard anal
ysis to use information products developed for a special purpose to assist in
Figure 6.6 The Boston molasses disaster leveled several blocks of Boston in 1919.
Photo Credit: Leslie Jones, Boston Herald, 1919.

ASSESSING RISK 139
providing general information about the nature of a threat. However, these
data may have been assembled for a very specific purpose that may make the
information of limited value. The data from such sources may be useful for
approximating probabilities and determining scope but it is essential that the
original purpose of the data and its limitations be understood. However,
many planners make assumptions about information products and use them
for purposes for which they were never intended.
An example of this is the use of Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) to
develop emergency plans. To understand why this is a problem, one needs to
understand the original purpose behind the development of FIRMs. The most
common disaster in the United States is flooding. To assist in mitigating this
threat, the federal government created the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) to encourage the adoption of flood hazard reduction ordinances in
exchange for subsidized flood insurance. In exchange for adopting a model
flood ordinance, citizens of a participating community can purchase flood
insurance subsidized by the government. As a negative incentive, federally
insured mortgages required flood insurance in flood hazard zones, essentially
slowing growth in nonparticipating communities. The NFIP currently serves
over 5 million policyholders and has paid over $67 billion in claims.
The rates for flood insurance are based on FIRMs. FIRMs are used by
insurance agents to determine policy premiums and by banks to determine
the requirement for flood insurance when considering a federally insured
loan. The agent or banker determines the location of the structure in question
on the FIRM and determines the flood plain category, if any, in which
it falls.
FEMA is responsible for compiling, updating, and distributing FIRMs. This
involves maintaining nearly 100 000 separate map sheets for over 22 000 com
munities across the United States. The large scale of the maps (1 : 4800–1 : 24 000)
and the limited information on them (they contain only transportation net
works and waterways, not topographical features) make them uninformative
for any other use.
Estimating the base flood level that forms the core of the maps is a complex
undertaking. Base floods are determined by mathematical computations
involving frequency and risk. In theory, this involves the analysis of discharge
and velocity over a 100‐year period, data that may be unavailable or question
able. In addition, special analyses are required to factor in variables such as ice
jams, alluvial fans, dams and levees, and hurricanes. The complexity of the pro
cess means that maps are frequently out of date and inaccurate. This inaccu
racy results in local communities frequently challenging the maps. Changes
generated in this way can take up to a year to be reflected in a change to the
appropriate FIRM.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency among some planners to treat FIRMs as if
the data on them are complete and accurate and to use them for crisis planning,

140 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
such as determining evacuation routes. This demonstrates a lack of under
standing that a FIRM is merely a representation of a complex dynamic pro
cess, designed for a single, specific use – setting insurance rates. The FIRM was
never intended to be a topographical tool to assist in operational planning. It
lacks the important details that would be needed for such a purpose and is an
estimate rather than a precise measure of where floodwaters may go. As an
actuarial tool, FIRMs are essential for the implementation of the National
Flood Insurance Program. As a hazard assessment tool, they are merely an
indicator that the community is prone to flooding and should not be used for
emergency planning.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
Simple Matrix Analysis
Once potential hazards that could affect an organization have been identified,
the logical question follows “Which ones should I be concerned about?” The
answer can be found by analyzing the probability and impact of each disaster.
In a sense, though, this answer is not precisely the right one. The real issue, as
previously noted, is not the type of disaster, but the vulnerability of the
community to its consequences. In assessing risk, one tries to determine the
impacts of a range of hazards to arrive at a reasonable basis for developing a
risk management strategy.
“Impact” is a relative term based on the vulnerability of the community to
a specific hazard. In assessing impact, one considers the agent‐specific effects
of the hazard and the community’s resilience in the face of those effects. One
also factors in the risk tolerance of the community. For example, where com
munities confront the same hazard on a regular basis, there is a certain amount
of adaptation that may take place. An event that is viewed as a disaster to
other communities may be considered an inconvenience in such an adapted
community.
An example if the community of Inarajan on the island of Guam. Located
on the southern tip of the island, the community suffers from frequent typhoons.
The citizens have become used to taking protective measures and have insti
tuted mitigation measures that allow for quick restoration of infrastructure.
Consequently, a severe typhoon is viewed as an inconvenience rather than a
catastrophe. Similar attitudes can be found in communities on the mainland
United States that suffer frequent flooding. This community risk tolerance can
contribute to resilience but can also be a barrier to implementing mitigation
measures.
In the simplest form of hazard analysis, hazards can be analyzed by ranking
them using a simple four quadrant matrix (Figure 6.7) that considers frequency
versus impact. The problem with this type of simple analysis is that it is largely

ASSESSING RISK 141
qualitative rather than quantitative, making it ambiguous and unable to distin
guish among hazards falling in the same quadrant. However, it can be useful as
a first pass to eliminate hazards that do not pose a significant threat. It is impor
tant, however, to recognize which quadrants are important:
• Low Frequency, Low Impact. These hazards are of little concern because
they occur only rarely and can be dealt with easily.
• High Frequency, Low Impact. These tend to be routine hazards for which
the community is well prepared through frequent response.
• High Frequency, High Impact. These hazards pose a risk and should be
considered in planning, but the high frequency means the community
probably has experience in dealing with them and has strong response
mechanisms in place.
• Low Frequency, High Impact. These hazards most likely pose the greatest
risk to the community because the low frequency makes it unlikely the
community is prepared.
Risk analysis matrices can be more complex (Figure 6.8) and even plotted
as a graph to show relationships (Figure 6.9), but ultimately, they still suffer
from ambiguity. A slightly more sophisticated approach is to assign a
numerical value to each factor. For example, high = 3, medium = 2, and
low = 1. This allows the graph to be more precisely plotted. Figure 6.10 is an
example of what Steven Fink, author of Crisis Management: Planning for the
Inevitable, refers to as the crisis barometer. The crisis barometer determines
the relationship between probability and potential impact for a hazard using
a scale of 1–100% for probability and a scale of 1–10 for severity of impact.
High probability
Low impact
High probability
High impact
Low probability
Low impact
Low
L
o
w
High
H
ig
h
Impact
P
ro
b
a
b
ility
Low probability
High impact
Figure 6.7 Four quadrant hazard analysis matrix.

142 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
High
High
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Flood Terrorist
attack
Probability
Im
p
a
ct
Tsunami
Earthquake
Risk
HAZMAT
spill
Figure 6.9 Hazard analysis graph based on the matrix in Figure 6.8.
This relationship is then used as a polar coordinate on a graph to assign the
hazard to one of four zones of priority. The result is a visual representation
of the various risks facing a community and their relationship to each other.
This process combines the four‐quadrant matrix with a graph to provide a
better visual representation of community risk.
This simple ranking provides a quick way of grouping hazards and can be
useful in reducing the range of hazards that must be analyzed. For example, the
decision may be made to drop those hazards rated low probability and low
impact and to focus on the remainder with priority on those that have high
Earthquake
Hazard Probability of
occurrence
Potential
impact
Remarks
Tsunami
Terrorist attack
HAZMAT spill
Flood
High
Low
Low
Low
Low
High 70% probability
within 30 years
City Hall located
within run up zone
Three potential
targets on State list
No critical
infrastructure in
flood zones
High
Medium-high
Medium
Low
Figure 6.8 Hazard analysis matrix.

ASSESSING RISK 143
impact and high probability. However, it provides little detail on the specific
impact of the hazard on the community and should be considered only a
starting point in the analysis process.
The ranking of a hazard based on its impact is, to a certain extent, subjective
in that it is based on the community’s tolerance for risk. What may be an accept
able level of risk for one community may be catastrophic for another. It is
important, therefore, to agree up front on the specific definitions of terms to be
used in the analysis (e.g. what do we mean by low risk?). This process allows for
the inclusion of this subjective risk tolerance by defining acceptable levels of
risk in terms of the specific community. Once these definitions are in place,
hazards can be assessed with more objectivity using the agreed upon criteria to
produce more consistent results.
Indicators and Numerical Ranking
Figure 6.11 is an example of an impact analysis matrix that considers the
impact of an event on a community’s population, economic base, and ser
vice delivery. Note that each of these areas could be expanded based on
community needs and that the criteria for determining the level of impact
are not fixed but based on the community’s risk tolerance. The matrix also
considers the frequency and speed of onset of the hazard. The combination
of hazard information and potential impact is then used determine the level
of risk.
Tsunami
Terrorism
Earthquake
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Crisis impact
value
Gray zoneGreen zone
Low/low
Probability
factor
(%)
Amber zone
High/low
Red zone
High/high
Low/high
Flood
50403020100 60 70 80 90 100
HAZMAT
Figure 6.10 Crisis barometer. Based on a model by Steven Fink, Crisis Management: Planning
for the Inevitable using the data from Figure 6.8.

144 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Ideally, the community determines what vulnerabilities are important within
the context of its risk tolerance. However, NFPA 1600 requires that hazards at
a minimum be analyzed with respect to their impact on 13 key areas:
1. Health and safety of persons in the affected area
2. Health and safety of personnel responding to the incident
3. Security of information
4. Continuity of operations
5. Continuity of government
6. Property, facilities, assets, and critical infrastructure
7. Delivery of the entity’s services
8. Supply chain
9. Environment
10. Economic and financial conditions
11. Legislated, regulatory, and contractual obligations
12. Reputation of or confidence in the entity
13. Work and labor arrangements
These 13 areas represent a minimum standard and other areas important to
the community can be added. The criteria for determining whether an impact
is high, medium, or low should be defined for each factor based on the risk tol
erance of the community.
One area required by NFPA 1600 that is often not considered by most
communities during hazard analysis is the impact of a potential crisis on the
reputation of the affected community. This is clearly a subjective determina
tion, but a crisis that affects the reputation of an organization can have far
ranging consequences, for good or ill. Case Study 6.1 illustrates an exam ple from
Level Frequency
of
occurrence
>50% Multiple
deaths
>50%
<10% > $1 billion >1month >1 month
>2 weeks>2 weeks
1–2 weeks 1–2 weeks
<24 hours <24 hours $100 million–$1 billion $10–100 million <$10 million 25–50% 10–25% 25–50% 10–25% <10% Permanent disabilities Treatable injuries Treatable w/1st aid 6–12 hours 12–24 hours >24
hours
10–100%
within 10
years
1–10%
within 100
years
<1% within 100 years Minimal 100% within 1 year Catastrophic Critical Limited Negligible Speed of onset Casualties Property damage Economic loss Critical facilities shut down Essential services disrupted Population affected Hazard information Human impact Economic impact Service impact Figure 6.11 Impact analysis matrix. ASSESSING RISK 145 the private sector as to how appropriate response can enhance reputation. It also highlights the damaging effect of a poorly thought out response to crisis. CASE STUDY 6.1: TYLENOL 1982 AND PERRIER 1990 – REPUTATIONS AT RISK In 1982, the Johnson & Johnson Company faced a series of deaths traced to cyanide‐laced capsules of its pain reliever Tylenol. The company responded with a media campaign that made it clear that customer safety was the company’s primary concern. It immediately notified consumers of the threat, stopped advertising and development of the product, and recalled 31 million bottles of Tylenol capsules at a cost of more than $100 million. The company even went so far as to offer consumers who had already purchased Tylenol capsules the opportunity to exchange them for tablets at no cost. These actions were in stark contrast to the normal approach of other corporations of cost containment and self‐protection and reflected Johnson & Johnson’s corporate values that put the customer first. Johnson & Johnson won widespread praise for their response and, using a well‐crafted media campaign, rebuilt Tylenol’s reputation with consumers. Case Figure 6.1 Perrier’s poor handling of benzene contamination caused a 50% drop in sales and a major loss of market share. Photo Credit: Rodrigo Paredes from Rio de Janeiro, Brasil – Perrier, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=45257170. (continued on next page) 146 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The proactive approach of the Johnson & Johnson Company stands in stark contrast to how other companies have handled issues of product contamination. In 1990, regulators in North Carolina reported that they had found the carcinogen benzene in Perrier bottled water. Source Perrier initially offered various explanations for the contamination, finally stating that it had traced it to an isolated employee error that affected bottles sold in North America. The company recalled a small amount of product in the United States and Canada, amounting to some 70 million bottles of water (Perrier sales at the time were 1.2 billion bottles worldwide). A short time later, officials in Holland and Denmark reported finding similar benzene contamination in Perrier product in Europe, sparking a worldwide recall of the product. Source Perrier changed its explanation yet again. The company now claimed that benzene was a normal byproduct of carbon dioxide that was usually filtered out during the bottling process. It again blamed employees, this time claiming that they had not changed filters. Closely following this crisis was the disclosure the same year that Perrier artificially carbonated its water, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration forced it to remove the words “Naturally Sparkling” from its product. Prior to the benzene crisis, Source Perrier was the leading importer of bottled water in the United States, holding some 6% of the market share. By 1995, Perrier sales had dropped by 50%, and Perrier was no longer a key player in the US bottled water market. Recommended Reading Regester, M. (2008). Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations: A Casebook of Best Practice. Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page. The public sector is not immune to loss of reputation. Following Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Senator Ernest Hollings (D‐SC), in criticizing FEMA’s slow response to the hurricane, referred to the agency as “…the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses I have ever encountered in my life.” The image of Kate Dale, emergency director for Miami‐Dade County, demanding, “Where’s the cavalry?” during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 garnered national attention and tarnished the agency’s reputation even further. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 brought similar claims of federal incompetence and diminished the reputations of the mayor of New Orleans and the governor of Louisiana. In contrast, the state of Florida was widely praised for its aggressive handling of hurricane response in 2004 and 2005, and Mayor Rudi Giuliani built a successful career as a speaker and consultant because of his leadership during the September 11 attack on New York. Once there is agreement as to the definitions of impact, it is possible to con struct a profile for each hazard. Figure 6.12 is an example of a hazard profile developed by FEMA and used prior to the implementation of THIRA. In this example, the profile considers four criteria for measuring impact and four cri teria for probability. The preparation of a hazard profile allows for comparing and ranking potential threats in a relatively objective manner. But here again, community risk tolerance is the determining factor of how this ranking is done. (continued from previous page) ASSESSING RISK 147 For example, a relatively risk adverse community might choose to prioritize a threat that was rated critical or catastrophic in any category. Another might choose to set a minimum number of categories that must be rated critical or catastrophic to prioritize the threat. Still another approach is to weight certain categories over others, such as rating deaths more important than economic loss. Another methodology is the use of numerical ranking. Figure 6.13 shows a partial worksheet based on one developed by a major university for use in its business continuity program. Note that this example uses a numerical scale rather than defined criteria. The use of a scale is not as precise as using defined criteria as it requires a subjective decision on the part of the planner. It has also been suggested that the use of a scale, particularly one having an odd number of rankings, may result in the answers being skewed to the mid‐range of the choices. The example in Figure 6.13 also introduces the use of numerical weighting in assessing hazards. In this case, the use of the numerical scale provides a cumulative figure that can be used to rank the hazards. If one combines a Hazard Pro�le Worksheet Hazard: Potential magnitude (Percentage of the community that can be affected): Frequency of Occurrence: Seasonal Pattern Areas Likely to be Affected Most Probable Duration: Potential Speed of Onset (Probable amount of warning time): - Minimal (or no) warning. - 6 to 12 hours warning. - 12 to 24 hours warning. - More than 24 hours warning Existing Warning Systems: Does a Vulnerability Analysis Exist? Yes No Note that some hazards may pose such a limited threat to the community that additional analysis is not necessary. Catastrophic: More than 50% Critical: 25 to 50% Limited: 10 to 25% Negligible: Less than 10% •Highly likely: Near 100% probability in next year. •Likely: Between 10 and 100% probability in next year, or at least one chance in next 10 years. •Possible: Between 1 and 10% probability in next year, or at least one chance in next 100 years. •Unlikely: Less than 1% probability in next 100 years. Figure 6.12 Hazard profile worksheet. Source: FEMA. 148 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT numerical weighting with defined criteria, it is possible to further refine the analysis to conform with the community’s risk tolerance by providing extra weight to those factors the community considers more important. For example, loss of life might be given a higher factor than severe facility damage. The danger with using a numerical system, however, is that it can be per ceived as somehow more “precise” because of its use of numbers. This creates a tendency to focus on the highest ranking threat rather than on a range of threats. For most purposes, the use of numerical weighting does not offer much advantage over the use of defined criteria (which should consider the same subjective factors that the numerical system seeks to quantify). This is because hazard analysis is ultimately a subjective process. Hazard information based on estimates and projections is measured against vulnerability in the context of the community’s tolerance of risk. It is never more than an estimate, no matter how carefully or precisely done. This is why emergency planners should be more concerned about potential impacts than specific hazards. THIRA and Context Analysis THIRA uses a much different approach to hazard analysis. Step 2 in THIRA creates a context for each threat or hazard by considering the time, place, and conditions in which they might occur. This information is used to create a con text description Figure 6.14. This context description is basically a scenario that can be either a “worst case” or “most likely” scenario. It is also possible to construct multiple scenarios for the same hazards. The THIRA methodology is interesting in that it combines empirical information about the hazard with subjective assumptions about community Type of emergency Fire 2 3 5 4 4 1 19 17 17 15 7 7 1 1 1 1 34 4 4 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 33 4 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 Flooding Severe storm Terrorist attack Short term power outage Long Term power outage High High impact Low impact Weak resources Strong resourcesLow 5------------1 5--------------------------------------------1 5---------------------1 Probability Human impact Property impact Business impact Internal resources External resources Total Figure 6.13 Impact analysis worksheet using numerical weighting. ASSESSING RISK 149 vulnerability. It requires thoughtful analysis about how specific hazards could affect the community. However, the THIRA methodology assumes that the community has already identified which of the potential range of hazards affecting the community are the most important during the hazard iden tification phase. Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 suggests that this be done based on likelihood and significance but provides no specific method ology for analysis. Consequently, developing hazard profiles and ranking hazards and the THIRA context description should be viewed not as alterna tives but as complimen tary processes that work well together with the hazard profiles providing the empirical basis for analysis and the context description the subjective. Intuition To summarize, hazard analysis ranks the potential threats faced by a community by considering the relationship between probability and impact for each hazard. Threats found to have low probability and low impact can be elimi nated from further analysis, whereas a more detailed analysis is performed on the remaining hazards. One begins this analysis by defining the assessment criteria for each hazard. These criteria factor in the community’s risk toler ance for each hazard. The criteria are then used to create a hazard profile of the community’s risk. These profiles can then be further analyzed to identify high‐risk hazards, and context descriptions can further refine the impacts of these hazards. The result of the hazard analysis should be a realistic assessment of the potential impacts of various hazards on the community. Again, note the emphasis on the impact. It is impossible to say for certain what hazards will occur, but one can make a fairly accurate assessment of the impacts that an emergency management program will need to confront. Is it likely that key facilities will be destroyed? If not, are they likely to be isolated? What critical services are likely to be disrupted and for how long? Will key employees be able to get to work? Threat/hazard Earthquake Terrorism A magnitude 7.8 earthquake along the Mainline Fault occurring at approximately 2:00 p.m. on a weekday with ground shaking and damage expected in 19 counties, extending from Alpha County in the south to Tau County in the north, and into the Zeta Valley. A potential threat exists from a domestic group with a history of using small IEDs in furtherance of hate crimes. There are a number of large festivals planned during the summer at open air venues that focus on various ethnic and religious groups. These events draw on average 10 000 attendees daily. Context description Figure 6.14 Sample context descriptions. Source: CPG 201 Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide. 150 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT One final thought on the process of hazard analysis: one cannot discount the value of intuition. The process just described is reasonable and based on proven methodologies. Estimates of probability, which form the basis of this system, are the result of statistical estimations based on observed data. However, cata strophic events have probabilities that are far below those which are statistically observable. Consequently, the type of modeling that may work for disasters does not hold for larger scale events and one is forced to conclude that when dealing with catastrophic events of infrequent occurrence, probabilities must be discarded in favor of impacts. In other words, although the incidence of occurrence of an event may be extremely low, the impact can be so devastating that a jurisdiction must plan for it. This suggests that there must be a subjective determination made as to how credible a high‐impact event might be by con sidering the possible rather than the probable. Credibility is subjective, but there are tools on which the determination can be made. One can consider past events, either through the historical record or through scientific observations such as geological or meteorological records. One can also look at scientific projections or estimates. However, rather than precise models, one may be forced to rely on an ensemble of models that repre sent possibilities rather than projections. Finally, one can use a good dose of common sense. The catastrophe in New Orleans in 2005 was predictable and had been the subject of numerous articles and reports. A similar situation exists in the delta of the Sacramento River in California where an aging levee system threatens not only the local communities but also the water supply for southern California as well. IMPACT ANALYSIS Business Impact Analysis (BIA) Hazard identification and analysis provide a macro view of potential disasters. That is they provide qualitative assessments of the types of impacts the organi zation or community may face. They suggest an order of magnitude or scope and identify the services or infrastructure that might be disrupted or destroyed. However, this information does not address the impact of the hazards on individual agencies except in the broadest sense. For this micro view, one must turn to impact analysis or business impact analysis (BIA), as it is known in the private sector. Where hazard analysis looks at impacts on the community, impact analysis considers the effects of a hazard on specific organizations within the community. Impact analysis or BIA is the identification of the effect of risks on the orga nization as a business. BIA identifies those essential functions and processes that must be continued during crisis if the organization is to be able to function. ASSESSING RISK 151 Identifying these critical functions and giving them priority for planning and resource allocation allow for more focused and cost‐effective crisis planning. As such, it is pertinent to both the public and private sectors. The closest that the public sector has come to perform a BIA was the prepa ration for the Y2K crisis in 1999. For the first (and, unfortunately, probably the last) time, public agencies began to ask questions such as: • What are my essential functions and processes? • What critical processes are likely to be disrupted and for how long? • How will disruptions in the supply chain affect me? • What outside services do my critical processes depend on? • In the event of wide‐scale disruption, what processes should I restore first? Where the hazard analysis could be performed by a small number of planners, the BIA is an enterprise‐wide project and should be organized as such. The project team will require support from, and access to, senior executives and officials as well as supporting staff. The BIA project is normally organized into five phases: 1. Project planning 2. Data collection 3. Data analysis 4. Report presentation 5. Reanalysis Project planning establishes the scope and methodologies for the project. Scope is particularly critical in conducting a BIA. As in hazard analysis, there can be a tendency to overanalyze and to spend considerable time and resources without reaching any conclusions. In an initial BIA, one should focus on management‐level functions and critical interdependencies without trying to cover all subprocesses. For example, one can state that a process must be online within three days without describing all the subprocesses that must be per formed to reach this objective. These subprocesses can be addressed in later planning or subsequent analyses. Another critical part of project planning is the selection of a methodology for gathering data. Although it may seem possible to intuit critical functions and their codependencies, doing so assumes a complete and total knowledge of all processes. Just as in approaching hazard identification, there is a risk that a critical process may be ignored or overlooked. Therefore, the BIA must follow a structured process that allows for results based on facts and not just informed guesses. 152 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT In Business Continuity: Best Practices, Andrew Hiles identifies nine common methods for collecting data: 1. Critical Success Factor Analysis. This method involves identifying areas of the organization’s operations that must continue during crisis or have a significant impact on the success of the organization. For example, the ability to collect revenue or to provide specific services may be critical success factors. Once the critical success factors are identified, one then identifies the business processes that support them. 2. Key Performance Indicator Review. Key performance indicators are statistics used to measure success in achieving goals and objectives. Pro cesses that produce these measures are critical to the organization suc cessfully meeting these goals and objectives. 3. Process Flows. Charting process flows is a useful way of determining dependencies on other processes, such as supply chains. This method is particularly useful when coupled with another type of analysis known as failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). FMEA looks at a system and considers the effects on the system if one or more elements were to fail. 4. Outputs and Deliverables. This method works backward from expected outcomes to trace the processes needed to deliver those outcomes. Similar to the process flow method, it is useful for determining dependencies. A similar method is fault‐tree analysis, in which an undesirable event is iden tified rather than an expected outcome, and the potential causes of this undesirable event are identified. 5. Activity Categorization. In this method, processes are divided into three categories: core processes, support processes, and discretionary processes. This allows the broad prioritization of processes and allows for planning to be focused on processes important to the organization. 6. Document Review. This method relies on the review of key documents such as strategic plans, procedures and standards, insurance policies, con tracts, and technical documents to determine what the organization con siders important. This method seeks to identify factors that will help focus and prioritize planning such as key products, services, and customers and to quantify potential losses. 7. Questionnaires. A frequent method for collecting data is to develop a questionnaire that is distributed to key managers. Providing there is strong support from senior officials, this method can be useful in assembling an initial estimate of critical processes. However, it usually is not sufficient unless used in conjunction with other methods or as a starting point for interviews. ASSESSING RISK 153 8. Interviews. Interviews with key personnel and managers are important as both an initial instrument to collect data and as a reality check for assump tions and conclusions. However, they must be structured rather than free flowing. Interviews generally use a standardized list of questions that may mirror or expand on a previously distributed questionnaire. The use of this standard approach ensures that all interviewees are asked the same questions and reduces the risk that an important issue will be overlooked. 9. Workshops. Workshops capitalize on the synergy of the group environ ment. Workshops are useful for gathering input from multiple respon dents that might not otherwise be interviewed due to time or budget constraints. They can also be used to identify candidates for more in‐ depth interviews. Similar to all meetings, the workshop must be carefully facilitated to create a productive environment where participants are free to speak their minds, and the meeting focus is maintained. Using several of these methods of data collection, the planner can identify systems and processes that are essential to the organization’s business. The planner can also make some estimate of what the impact of the loss of these systems and processes might be. The impacts may be either quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative losses are those that can be measured or extrapolated based on the data. For example, one can estimate the loss of revenue generated from parking fines because traffic control officers are reassigned to emergency traffic control. Note that for the BIA, these figures do not have to be precise calculations – whether the loss is estimated at $1 million or precisely calculated at $999 527 per day is immaterial. Qualitative loss estimation is more subjective. It may not be possible to cal culate a precise figure for a projected loss, or such calculations may be too speculative to be useful. Yet there are still losses that will have a major impact on the organization and need to be considered in any assessment of risk. One example that has been previously discussed is the effect of crisis on reputation. Although it may be difficult to quantify the loss of reputation, one can cer tainly describe such a loss qualitatively. Loss of public confidence in its administration can have long‐range effects on the ability of a community to recover from a crisis. In conducting the BIA, one must consider not only the initial impact of an event but also its effects over time. There are two principal reasons for this. First, the longer an event continues, the more stress is placed on the organi zation as resources are expended and personnel become exhausted. The second reason is a corollary to the first: not all critical processes may need to be reinstated immediately. Consequently, the BIA seeks to determine not only critical processes but also a factor known as the recovery time objective 154 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (RTO). The RTO is the time between the loss of the process and when that loss begins to affect the organization (i.e. the longest time that the orga nization can afford to be without the system or process). This is sometimes referred to as the maximum acceptable outage (MAO). Determining this factor becomes crucial as one begins to construct a continuity plan as it will assist in determining which processes must be addressed first. Another key concept is recovery point objective (RPO). In its simplest form, RPO answers the question “How much data can I afford to lose?” The RPO is the maximum time in which recent data can be lost. Another way of looking at this concept is to think of it as the time between the last backup of data and the incident. For example, an organization that performs a daily backup could potentially lose 24 hours of data, whereas one that does a backup hourly would only lose 60 minutes. There is a cost associated with frequent or continuous backup; knowing which data are critical, and their RPO is a critical part of continuity planning. Analyzing the data accumulated during the BIA should lead to several key results. The analysis should yield: • An identification of systems and processes critical to the organization’s survival as an organization. • An estimate of the impact of losing critical systems and processes in qualitative and quantitative terms. • An understanding of the interdependencies among and between the differ ent core processes and the processes that support them. • An estimate of recovery time objectives for critical systems and processes. Adaptive Business Continuity Traditional continuity planning has its roots in the information technology world, much as emergency management derives from Civil Defense planning. The results of this origin can be seen in the emphasis in continuity planning on IT functions and detailed lists of actions to be taken. Many planners have felt that the process is overly convoluted, and the BIA attempts to identify too many variables. For example, the RTO for a function may vary depending on when in the fiscal year a disaster occurs. To counter these problems, David Lindstedt and Mark Armour proposed a radical revision of continuity planning in 2015 called Adaptive Business Continuity planning. At its core, Adaptive BC avoids strict methodology and instead emphasizes continuous improvement using a collaborative approach. The process makes use of “apertures” based on two constraints: loss (things, people, and location) and restrictions (time, cost, and scope) and prioritizes efforts based on the relative value of a function to the organization. ASSESSING RISK 155 Adaptive BC is based on 10 guiding principles: 1. Deliver Continuous Value: Planning should provide value to the organi zation while it is occurring rather than only at the end of the planning cycle. 2. Document Only for Mnemonics: Avoid excessive documentation that will not be used at the time of the crisis. 3. Employ Time as a Restriction, Not a Target: RTO is an inaccurate and meaningless measure due to shifting parameters; focus only on time restrictions that could produce threats to people, violation of laws and regulations, and/or failure to meet contractual obligations. 4. Engage at Many Levels Within the Organization: Focus not only on senior executives but also gain support from those most knowledgeable and responsible for carrying out processes. 5. Exercise for Improvement, Not for Testing: Use exercises to improve capability, not just to measure conformance with a plan. 6. Learn the Business: Focus on mission and culture, not strict methodology. 7. Measure and Benchmark: Measure the presence of resources, proce dures, and competencies rather than just accumulating data. 8. Obtain Incremental Direction from Leadership: Allow individual leaders to provide iterative direction. 9. Omit Risk Assessments and Business Impact Analyses: “Prepare for effects, not causes,” and trust that senior managers can identify critical services. 10. Prepare for Effects, Not Causes: This is, of course, the basis of all haz ards planning. Adaptive business continuity is a radical departure from traditional conti nuity planning, particularly in the elimination of the risk analysis and the BIA. However, its emphasis on collaborative planning and continuous improvement are identical to that of emergency management and has the potential for a closer alignment between emergency management and continuity planning. It is too early to tell whether Adaptive BC will gain acceptance with continuity planners, but it does offer some intriguing possibilities. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT/CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS Federal Guidance There is an unspoken assumption in most public‐sector response plans that departments and agencies will continue to function in support of the plan. This 156 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT may be the case in the short term where the issue is immediate life safety opera tions, but governments are ultimately businesses as well. They must accumulate and disburse revenue, meet contractual obligations, pay employees, and deliver services. Disasters disrupt this process for government in the same way it does for business. For example, a reduced inflow of tax revenue means curtailed ser vices at precisely the same time the community needs them the most. Following Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans was forced to lay off 3000 government workers, about half the work force. The same problem occurred following the San Francisco earthquake in 1906, creating problems in dealing with criminal activity during the reconstruction because of a reduced police force. Consequently, continuity of operations (COOP) and continuity of government (COG) planning are critical in enhancing a community’s capacity to respond to crisis. Although frequently lumped together, there is a distinction between the two. COG is intended to ensure the survival of government, whereas COOP ensures that individual executive departments and agencies continue to perform pri mary mission essential functions. In effect, COG is strategic in nature, whereas COOP is operational. In that both seek to preserve critical functions, COOP and business continuity are very similar. The concept of ensuring continuous government operations dates to at least 1982 with the issuance of National Security Decision Directive 55 Enduring National Leadership dated 14 September 1982. The most recent iteration, NSPD 51/HSPD 20 National Continuity Policy, issued on 4 May 2007, revised the previous process under which federal agencies were responsible for their individual plans to create a more structured and comprehensive system. The directive designated the assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism as the National Continuity Coordinator with responsibility for developing and implementing continuity policy for all executive depart ments and agencies and established a continuity policy coordination committee for day‐to‐day policy coordination. NSPD 5 and the National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan that was promulgated in August 2007 further defined national priorities and specific roles and responsibilities for federal agencies. The documents also identified three types of essential functions: 1. National Essential Functions (NEFs) are the eight functions the president and the Nation’s leadership will focus on to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency (see Figure 6.15). 2. Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) are agency mission essential functions (MEFs) that must be performed to support the performance of NEFs before, during, and after an emergency. 3. Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) are the agency‐level government functions that must be continued throughout, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal activities. ASSESSING RISK 157 To support the implementation of the National Continuity Policy, the Department of Homeland Security developed two Federal Continuity Direc tives, the most recent of which are FDC 1 Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program in 2012 and FDC 2 Federal Executive Branch Mission Essential Functions and Candidate Primary Mission Essential Functions Iden tification and Submission Process Requirements in 2013. These documents provide operational guidance in the development and implementation of con tinuity plans. While there are no specific requirements mandating that local governments do COOP planning, it is an implied task. FEMA has stated that “…the development and maintenance of a viable COOP plan and capability at each level of government/jurisdictional responsibility is critical to save lives and pro tect the public health and well‐being, protect property and preserve assets, maintain functionality, and maintain basic government operations and ser vices.” Furthermore, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) standard requires that each agency identified in a jurisdiction’s emergency plan have a COOP plan. NFPA 1600 also requires continuity planning and identifies 15 elements that must be included in a continuity plan: 1. Stakeholders that need to be notified. 2. Processes that must be maintained. 3. Roles and responsibilities of the individuals implementing the conti nuity strategies. 4. Procedures for activating the plan, including authority for plan activation. NEF 1: Ensuring the continued functioning of our form of government under the Constitution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of government National Essential Functions (NEFs) NEF 2: Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and maintaining the trust and con�dence of the American people NEF 3: Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests NEF 4: Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations NEF 5: Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests NEF 8: Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health, safety, and welfare needs of the United States NEF 7: Protecting and stabilizing the Nation’s economy and ensuring public con�dence in its �nancial systems NEF 6: Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences of an attack or other incident Figure 6.15 National Essential Functions. Source: CGC 2 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process. 158 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 5. Critical and time‐sensitive technology, application systems, and information. 6. Security of information. 7. Alternative work sites. 8. Workaround procedures. 9. Vital records. 10. Contact lists. 11. Required personnel. 12. Vendors and contractors supporting continuity. 13. Resources for continued operations. 14. Mutual aid or partnership agreements. 15. Activities to return critical and time‐sensitive processes to the original state. Recognizing the importance of COOP planning at the local level, DHS pro duced two Continuity Guidance Circulars (CGCs) that are the nonfederal counterparts to FDC 1 and FDC 2. CGC 1 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments (States, Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions) dated July 2013 establishes the elements of continuity planning while CGC 2 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process (States, Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions) dated October 2013 provides guidance, methodology, and check lists to identify, assess, and validate essential functions. Critical Functions and Process Analysis Performing a successful BIA depends on being able to identify essential functions (referred to a MEFs in the federal continuity guidance documents) and the processes upon which they depend. Essential functions are those functions that the organization must be able to perform during or in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. The idea is to prioritize these functions for the application of limited resources. The process for identifying essential functions is very similar to that used to prioritize hazards. One begins by identifying organizational functions and gradually eliminating those deemed nonessential. CGC 2 recommends a two‐ part process that considers whether the function is related to the organization’s crisis mission and then whether it is essential to that mission and recommends creation of a data sheet for each function (Figure 6.16) that is like the profile worksheet used in hazard identification. One area of misunderstanding that crops up repeatedly is that the term “non essential” does not mean a function is unimportant or redundant. The term is used strictly in terms of whether the function is needed in a crisis or its immediate ASSESSING RISK 159 aftermath or whether it can be delayed. The negative connotations of these terms sometimes cause conflict with managers who are concerned that their functions are considered “nonessential.” The challenge in the BIA is to avoid classifying too many functions as essential, thereby creating competition for resources at the time of crisis. For this reason, many continuity planners do not use the term “nonessential” and focus solely on RTO and dependencies in iden tifying critical functions. (Organization) MEF # Data Sheet Date Organization: (Organization name) (A short concise statement, in one sentence, of the funtion or action to be performed) Mission Essential Function (MEF): Descriptive Narrative: Impacts If Not Conduced: Recovery Time Objective: Parters/Interdependencies: Parters and Independencies: Process Details: (if appropriate)Telework Flexibilities: Other Comments: (Essential Supporting Activities that support the MEF can be captured here or in line 9 Process Details) Supported STTEF: (if applicable) (The descriptive narrative includes a detailed explanation of the mission, legal, or other requirement(s) to perform the mission, and deliverables provided by performing the mission. The narrative explains, for the non-expert, [avoid acronyms and technical jargon, if possible] what services or products are provided to a constituency, and who the constituency is. The focus would remain on those services provided during a disruption. If multiple services are provided, a list of services might be included. Essential supporting activities that facilitate accomplishing this mission may also be identi�ed to clarify what MEF involves.) (A brief description of the effects on the constituency if this mission is not performed. This discussion may be very helpful in justifying that the function must be recovered quickly following a disruption.) (A description of the time criticality for resuming performance of the mission. When must the mission be operational? Must the mission be performed without interruption? Must the mission be resumed within a speci�c number of hours after a disruption?) (The names of internal and external stakeholders necessary to perform the mission.) (A list of partners and interdependent organizations that support and/or ensure performance of the MEF. It should highlight the products or services delivered by the partners, the information shared or exchanged, and any other critical elements that facilitate performing the MEF.) (A detailed narrative or diagram that ties together all of the elements involved in the process of performing the MEF from start to �nish/beginning to end.) (The name of a functional representative for MEF or functional subject matter expert.) Point of Contact: Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 5 Line 6 Line 8 Line 9 Line 4 Figure 6.16 Mission Essential Function data sheet. Source: CGC 2 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process. 160 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Once essential functions have been identified, the next step is an analysis of the processes that support the essential functions. CGC 2 recommends a nine‐ step process for this analysis: 1. Identify the outcomes produced by the function. 2. Identify the products, information, and equipment required to perform the function. 3. Identify required leadership. 4. Identify required staff. 5. Identify communications and information technology requirements. 6. Identify needed facilities. 7. Identify resources and budgeting requirements. 8. Identify partners and dependencies. 9. Describe the overall process flow. CGC 2 suggests determining a risk value for each threat. In addition to threat characteristics and likelihood of occurrence, impact analysis considers two basic questions for each hazard: 1. How susceptible is the essential function to failure? 2. What is the impact if the essential function cannot be performed? The data from hazard and impact analysis can then be combined to produce the risk value for each threat. Figure 6.17 is a sample worksheet for calculating this risk value. CGC2 provides a series of value tables for determining proba bility, vulnerability, and impact. CONCLUSION Risk analysis is the foundation of emergency management programs, but there is an apparent disconnect between the guidance provided for continuity and THIRA. Federal continuity guidance is based on MEFs and is particularly focused on the eight NEFs. THIRA focuses on core capabilities and the development of capability targets. Yet both rely on the same starting points: hazard identification and analysis and vulnerability assessment. It is in this commonality that the issue becomes largely one of semantics. There is, of course, a difference between the two systems. Continuity is focused on business processes where THIRA is focused on response capability. However, if one considers core capabilities as essential functions, the process is the same in both cases, and the data gathered during that process can be used ASSESSING RISK 161 for multiple purposes. COOP and THIRA are not separate functions but are complimentary. Failure in COOP will adversely affect response; failure in response will have an impact on the ability of the organization to reconstitute its essential functions. Hazard identification, hazard analysis, and impact analysis are individual components of an overall assessment of risk for the community. However, they do not represent stand‐alone processes but are instead a continuum that pro gressively narrows a wide universe of potential hazards to focus on risks that are specific to the community. They represent a structured process aimed at gaining a realistic appraisal of those risks and an understanding of how those risks will affect the organization. The risk assessment is the problem definition that will ultimately drive the development of the emergency management program strategy and the development of crisis‐related plans. MEF Number and Statement: MEF Number and MEF Title Entry Number Input Threat or Hazard Input the Threat or Hazard characteristics and likely effects on the organization or region. It is important to provided sufficient data to help characterize the likehood of occurrence and evaluate the MEF vulnerability and impact. If a lot of data is available, consider attaching a seperate sheet. Input Numeric Value Input Numeric Value Input Numeric Value Sum of Columns 3+4+5 Threat Hazard Threat or Hazard Characteristics Threat or Hazard Likelihood (0−10) MEF Vulnerability (0−10) MEF Risk Value (0−30) MEF Failure Impact (0−10) Business Impact Analysis Worksheet: Threat and Hazard Analysis 2 3 4 5 61 1 2 3 4 Figure 6.17 Business impact analysis worksheet model template. Source: CGC 2 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process. Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. 163 Chapter 7 Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat. —Sun Tzu As was noted in the previous chapter, risk assessment is the basis of the emergency management program. Upon completion of a risk assessment, plan ners should have a fairly complete picture of community vulnerability to poten tial hazards. Risk assessment also helps to put hazards in perspective, allowing for policy decisions that prioritize the use of scarce resources and focus planning on those events that represent the greatest risk to the community. Basing emergency management policy on risk would seem to be common sense, but the record of government has not been particularly good in this area. Funding for emergency management through the Emergency Management Preparedness Grant has always used a fixed base amount for each state plus a small amount based on population. When funds are looked at on a per capita basis, there is a great inequity in the distribution of funds, with those states with the greatest risk actually receiving less per capita than smaller states. Furthermore, there is no basis for believing that population alone is a reason able indicator of potential risk. When one considers the much‐trumpeted war on terrorism, one is forced to conclude that this policy is also not based on an accurate assessment of risk. If one looks at terrorism from an actuarial perspective, the mortality rate from terrorism in 2001 was on a par with deaths from drowning (2978–3247). In con trast, 700 142 Americans died of heart disease that year, and the common flu kills about 36 000 a year. This is not meant to in anyway diminish the events of September 11 or to suggest that terrorism is not a threat. It merely points out that a community’s risk to terrorism is a product of its vulnerabilities, and the DEVELOPING STRATEGY 164 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT risk will vary from community to community, as it does with any hazard. Terrorism is not the principal risk in every jurisdiction in the United States. Basing emergency management policy on risk may require an adjustment for many jurisdictions. Most emergency management programs are the product of the Cold War, with their single focus on national preparedness, and additional responsibilities have accrued to them over the years without a basis in local policy. However, if the emergency management program is to be cohesive and consistent with community values and goals, it must be driven by strategies derived from policies based on risk. A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD MODEL One of the seminal events in the history of emergency management was the National Governors’ Association study in 1978 that introduced the compre hensive emergency management model (Figure 7.1). The model recognizes four phases of emergency management: 1. Mitigation: Efforts taken to eliminate or reduce the impacts of hazards. 2. Preparedness: Efforts to develop the capacity to respond to disasters. 3. Response: Actions taken to deal with the impact of a disaster. 4. Recovery: Actions taken to restore the community to normal. As was mentioned in a previous chapter, Presidential Policy Directive 8 intro duced a new paradigm that focused on building and sustaining core capabilities across five mission areas: 1. Prevention: Capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Disaster R es p o n se Re co very Mitigation P re paredness Figure 7.1 Comprehensive emergency management model. Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency. DEVELOPING STRATEGY 165 2. Protection: Capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and man‐made or natural disasters. 3. Mitigation: Capabilities necessary to reduce the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters. 4. Response: Capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred. 5. Recovery: Capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively, including, but not limited to, rebuilding infrastructure systems; providing adequate interim and long‐term housing for survivors; restoring health, social, and community services; promoting economic development; and restoring natural and cultural resources. These five mission areas expand and modify the original comprehensive emergency management model to reflect the new realities presented by terror ism. Prevention, the one mission area that is not all‐hazards related, seeks to develop the capability to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. The protection mission is a bit more complicated. Ostensibly, it develops the capability to protect against acts of terrorism and man‐made or natural disasters, capabilities that were previously included in the comprehen sive emergency model definition of mitigation. However, The National Preparedness Goal makes it clear that the focus of this mission area is still ter rorism, whereas mitigation is intended to limit the impact of events: Protection core capabilities are the product of diverse activities. These activ- ities include defense against WMD threats; defense of agriculture and food; critical infrastructure protection; protection of key leadership and events; border security; maritime security; transportation security; immigration security; and cybersecurity. From a policy perspective, if terrorism is viewed as just one of multitude of hazards that must be considered by a community during risk assessment, then it integrates well into an all‐hazards model. One assesses the risk, identifying potential targets and possible scenarios. One mitigates the risk through pro grams such as intelligence assessment (nonstructural mitigation) or through target hardening (structural mitigation). One prepares for potential scenarios by developing plans, training personnel, and acquiring equipment. One responds if the event occurs, and recovery can be done under a single jurisdic tional recovery plan. If, on the other hand, one sees terrorism as something outside the all‐hazards model, then one must engage in a planning process that is duplicative and runs the risk of being confusing at the time of the event. There is no question that the comprehensive emergency management model could have been applied to terrorism. This having been said, the success of the comprehensive emergency manage ment model has been mixed, and there are some problems with it. Because of the 166 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT way the emergency management evolved from the Civil Defense programs, the emphasis has always been on the preparedness and response phases. As was dis cussed in a previous chapter, the development of the CEM concept created prob lems for emergency managers who had been primarily tactical and operational planners. Strategic concepts such as mitigation were given lip service but were rarely adequately addressed in emergency management programs. The available data from the 2004 National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment (NEMB‐CAP) support this thesis. The study found only 26% of the surveyed states conformant for recovery planning, 23% con formant with mitigation planning, and 14% conformant for continuity planning. This is in stark contrast to the 51% conformance for response planning. These figures are not a reflection of the validity of the comprehensive emergency management model but rather suggest that emergency managers were not ade quately addressing the strategic concepts inherent in the model. This failure can be attributed in part to the evolution of the emergency management position discussed in a previous chapter. However, it may also be the result of fundamental misunderstandings about the model itself. Since the model is based on a cycle where the phases flow in a sequential and logical manner, this has been taken by many to suggest that this is how operations progress. One finds, for example, numerous state and local emergency opera tions plans that are organized by the four phases of the model and that attempt to clearly delineate what tasks occur in each phase. Although they do not incor porate the four phases, Homeland Security planning documents such as the Universal Task List and Target Capabilities List were organized in a similar fashion around the phases of prevention, protection, response, and recovery. In reality, plans are implemented virtually simultaneously with tasks related to response, continuity, recovery, and even mitigation being implemented at the same time. This suggests that using the comprehensive emergency management model as the basis for emergency operations planning has limited validity. If, however, one considers the model and the National Preparedness Goal as strategic con cepts, then the dynamics change. The focus now shifts to five interrelated strat egies for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery that together define the community’s response to crisis. The relationship among these strategies is a product of how the community manages risk. RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY Risk is managed in four basic ways. The organization can choose to simply avoid a risk by not taking an action that carries the potential for liability. The organization can transfer the risk through insurance. The organization can mitigate the risk through structural or nonstructural methods of risk reduction. DEVELOPING STRATEGY 167 Finally, the organization can choose to retain the risk by self‐insuring, ignoring the risk, or developing the capacity to respond to the impacts if the risk occurs. The combination of these four elements will vary from organization to organi zation depending on risk tolerance, vulnerability, and available resources. A good starting point for developing a risk management strategy is an insur ance review. Even where a community is self‐insured, there is usually some reli ance on risk transfer through third‐party insurance. In addition, there are costs associated with disasters that may not have been factored into the original loss estimation. In an age of tight budgets, self‐insured organizations tend to view self‐insurance as a statement of risk tolerance rather than actually creating cash reserves to cover extraordinary costs. This risk tolerance may be accept able for day‐to‐day emergencies but becomes intolerable in a major disaster where costs become excessive, and income streams are severely reduced. Where insurance coverage exists, the full extent of the coverage is not always understood, and many policyholders tend to make assumptions about what is covered and what is not. For example, does the policy covers full replacement of a demolished building or only the cost to the damaged portion? If repair of a damaged structure triggers a mandatory upgrade to an improved building code, is the added cost covered? If a facility is a crime scene, and access is prevented for several weeks, is the cost of alternate operating facilities recoverable? To the emergency manager, the insurance review is necessary for two reasons. First, recoverable expenses are critical to recovery and the restoration of the community to some semblance of normalcy. The major source of community recovery funding is the insurance industry. Second, at some point, insurance requirements and emergency plans will intersect. This means that considering actions from a claims perspective may have a bearing on response issues. For example, the training responders receive in documenting damage could be ori ented toward helping to fulfill both the need for initial damage assessment data and for capturing data for later insurance claims. A decision to clear an essential roadway of debris may create issues for homeowners with their insurance company; it is not uncommon for insurance carriers to reimburse the cost of clearing debris caused by the disaster but to refuse coverage for removing debris created during road clearance by the jurisdiction. Decisions to dispose of dam aged equipment or to demolish dangerous structures may create future issues during the claims process if the damage has not been fully documented in a manner considered sufficient by the insurance company. Insurance language can be confusing, as terms may have different meanings to insurance professionals and emergency managers. Everyday terms such as useable, debris, salvage, replace, and recover have very different and specific meanings in the insurance industry. Using such common terms in the wrong context may have an impact on the settlement of a claim. Consequently, an important addition to the emergency planning team is the community risk manager. 168 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT There would seem to be a natural alliance between the risk manager and the emergency manager. The risk manager seeks to protect the jurisdiction against preventable losses. The primary tool of the risk manager is the risk assessment, using much the same methodology of hazard identification and risk analysis employed by the emergency manager. Working together on joint assessments and mitigation planning offers considerable benefits to both sides. MITIGATION STRATEGY During the risk analysis, it is possible to identify opportunities that could either eliminate the organization’s vulnerability to a hazard or substantially reduce the impact of the hazard. These measures are referred to collectively as mitiga tion and are generally long‐term measures focused on reducing or eliminating the impacts of a hazard as opposed to enhancing the capacity to respond. As has been noted, the National Preparedness Goal parses mitigation into three separate mission areas: 1. Prevention: Avoiding or stopping a threatened or an actual act of terrorism. 2. Protection: Safeguarding people and assets against threats and hazards. 3. Mitigation: Lessening the impact of disasters. For the purposes of the following discussion, the protection and mitigation mission areas will be encompassed in the generic term “mitigation.” Prevention, which equates to the risk management strategy of avoidance, is primarily a law enforcement function and is only tangentially connected to emergency management. While one can make the argument that it is a form of mitigation intended to eliminate a specific risk, in actual practice most of the work of prevention is done outside the emergency management program. Nevertheless, emergency planners must be cognizant of the community’s pre vention strategy in that it has an impact on the risks addressed in emergency plans. Because it seeks to be proactive, mitigation offers the potential for significant savings both in the elimination or reduction of damages and in the reduction of response capacity. A 2005 study by the Multi‐Hazard Mitigation Council of the National Institute of Building Sciences found that every dollar invested in mitigation produced $4 in society savings and $3.65 in savings to the US Treasury. Mitigation can also have an impact on insurance premiums, which are risk based, and can result in significantly lowered costs. For these reasons, James Lee Witt, former Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), was frequently quoted as saying that “mitigation is the cornerstone of emergency management.” DEVELOPING STRATEGY 169 Yet mitigation plays only a limited role in most communities and is generally applied postdisaster to prevent losses if a similar event should occur. There are several reasons for this. Mitigation is a strategy and, as such, requires consideration from a strategic viewpoint. Most emergency planners have mainly operational expertise and lack both the skills and the organizational standing to influence strategic decisions. Furthermore, the development of mitigation strategies requires a different set of stakeholders than those involved in the development of emergency plans. Many of these disciplines are foreign to emergency planners and require specialized expertise. Finally, mitigation planning, even more so than emergency planning, requires the involvement of community and political leadership. Most jurisdictions have treated mitigation as they have other elements of the emergency management program – they have assigned it to a single department, such as the planning department, developed a document based on a template, and failed to provide any significant funding. The same is true of the federal government. Federal mitigation funding has traditionally been provided postdisaster under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program ( section 404 of the Stafford Act). This funding is a percentage of the total grants awarded by the federal government under a presidential declaration of disaster. During the Clinton administration, this percentage was increased to a high of 25%, but under the revisions to the Stafford Act promulgated by the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program was limited to 7.5%, providing the state has an approved standard mitigation plan. If the state has an enhanced mitigation plan, the president may increase this amount up to 20%. Realizing the postdisaster mitigation is the policy equivalent of locking the barn door after the horse has run away; DMA 2000 established an innovative predisaster mitigation program. Although limited in scope (grants were small and awarded competitively), the program acknowledged for the first time that predisaster mitigation should be preferred to postdisaster mitigation. Here again, although, government support has been lacking. Under the Bush administration, the program was cut from a high of $255 million in FY 2005 to $50 million in FY 2006. Funding in FY 2015 was even less at $30 million. There was an increase in funding in FY 2016 to $90 million with each state, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and federally recognized tribal governments, receiving $575 000 and the remaining grant funds (about $47.8 million) distributed competitively. Social science research indicates that for many jurisdictions, there is very lit tle correlation between objective risk, perceived risk, and mitigation efforts. Researchers found that communities were aware of potential hazards, but for a variety of reasons opted not to act. Mitigation is never simple and may gen erate resistance based on the perceived violation of property rights or hindering development. It may also have an impact on those of lower socioeconomic 170 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT status and be perceived as favoring the rich over the poor, as demonstrated in Case Study 7.1. There are also examples where communities have adapted to recurring events in such a way that mitigation is of little interest and would be considered disruptive to their society. In addition, the lack of leadership from the federal government, low priority given to mitigation by state and local gov ernments, and the absence of clear financial incentives for mitigation creates an environment that is not conducive to mitigation planning. One key point that emerges from the social science literature is the impor tance of a “champion” for mitigation. Even where disaster creates a window of opportunity, hazard reduction is unlikely to occur without the involvement of individuals or organizations prepared to push for the adoption of mitigation strategies. This suggests that it is possible for the emergency manager to create the impetus for mitigation. The key to developing this impetus is an understanding that mitigation is not simply a technological solution for loss reduction but is socially struc tured. This means that disasters are not the product of “Acts of God” outside human control but of the interaction of the hazard and the community’s vul nerability. Similar to vulnerability, mitigation is influenced by the community. In other words, the decision to mitigate and the strategies selected will be determined by the sociocultural factors of the community. The assumption that one need only provide an effective technical proposal for mitigation to occur is a false one. Even strategies that have been proven effective in other situations may fail to gain the acceptance of a community. Thus, proposed mitigation strategies must be understood within their social context and must be developed in a social environment that assists in their acceptance. In the words of Dr. Kathleen Tierney (1993a), “Mitigation strategies typically stand or fall on their political, economic, and sociocultural feasibility – not on their technical feasibility.” When seeking community support, one invariably runs up against the well‐ meaning person or organization that insists on the adoption of all potential mitigation measures. Although it has been demonstrated that not all mitigation measures will be acceptable, a further limiting factor is the issue of cost‐ effectiveness. There are those who feel that cost should not be an issue in hazard reduction, but the simple fact is that cost‐benefit analysis is an acceptable method of determining the appropriateness of mitigation measures. As was pointed out, if there is no perceived value to the mitigation measure, then it will not be acceptable to the community, particularly when mitigation resources are limited. Based on the social science research, it becomes apparent that the common approach of developing a mitigation plan in isolation to meet DMA 2000 requirements does little to ensure effective community hazard reduction. One can also begin to draw some conclusions about what will be necessary for suc cessful mitigation: DEVELOPING STRATEGY 171 CASE STUDY 7.1: ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MO – CONFLICTS IN MITIGATION St. Charles County, MO holds the record for repetitive claims under the National Flood Insurance Program. The county of 300 000 sits at the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and almost half the county is in a floodplain (see figure below). The risk of flooding has been exacerbated by farming that reduced available wetlands and by a federal levee program demanded by the farming community. There is also a local attitude that floods are natural and not subject to human intervention. Case Figure 7.1 St. Charles County, MO, flood prone areas. Source: St. Charles County government. The Midwest Floods of 1993 hit St. Charles hard. Over 2100 homes were condemned due to flood damage. Following the disaster, St. Charles County agreed to participate in the Missouri Buyout Program, a mitigation plan backed by FEMA to reduce risk by purchasing properties in high‐risk zones. From 1993 to 1995, the county used $5.78 million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funding from FEMA and $8.8 million from the Community Development Block Grant Program to acquire 1159 properties. The acquisition of these repetitive damage properties prevented losses in 1995, and damage in a 2002 flood was so insignificant that it did not warrant a presidential declaration of disaster, even though other counties in the area suffered considerable damage. FEMA rightly points to St. Charles County as a mitigation success story. However, there is a darker side to the story. Major development in the 1950s had seen the development of three major trailer parks and the construction of inexpensive housing in the main area of flooding. The advent of the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968 coupled (continued on next page) 172 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT • A champion, or champions, to spearhead the mitigation effort must be identified. While this can be the emergency manager, it is more likely that the emergency manager will serve as a catalyst to identify and motivate community organizations and politicians. • Mitigation measures must be cost‐effective and seen as adding value to the community. • Mitigation measures must be acceptable within the sociocultural and socioeconomic norms of the community. • Mitigation measures must be debated and adopted under an open process that stimulates public involvement and acceptance. The implication of these elements of success is that mitigation planning must be inclusive and broad based. This is supported by 44 Code of Federal Regulations Emergency Management Assistance, the document that contains the rules under which federal disaster assistance programs are administered. 44CFR requires that the planning process provide for public comment, involvement of neigh boring communities, businesses, and regulatory agencies, and the review and incorporation as appropriate of existing technical reports and studies. with the county’s unwillingness to strictly enforce its provisions encouraged those with low incomes to take advantage of the cheap housing. Since existing mobile home parks were the only housing allowed to be constructed below the 100‐year flood mark and still retain insurance coverage, most of these residents lived in mobile homes. Attempts in 1986 to make these mobile homes safer by elevating them above the 100‐year flood mark were bitterly resisted by both the county and the National Manufactured Housing Federation, as were requests by the residents to relax county zoning ordinances to allow relocation of the mobile home parks. When the Missouri Buyout Program was implemented, the burden of mitigation fell directly on the poor and disadvantaged. The owners of the mobile home parks were compensated for their land under the program. The renters, however, received nothing as mobile homes were considered personal property and not real estate. Plans to build a new subdivision of affordable housing collapsed after resistance from local residents. The only option for many people was to leave St. Charles. In one group of 2800 homeless families, 90% were estimated to have relocated to other counties. St. Charles County is an example of the complexity of mitigation. It shows how even well‐intentioned programs like the National Flood Insurance Program can have unanticipated results. It demonstrates that simply reducing risk is not always enough nor is it as easy as it would appear; there are always tradeoffs in any policy decision. Effective mitigation strategy must include not only risk reduction methodology but also consideration of the effects of implementing that methodology. Recommended Reading FEMA Region VII, Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (2002). Success Stories from the Missouri Buyout Program. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency. (continued from previous page) DEVELOPING STRATEGY 173 Mitigation strategy is ultimately aimed at reducing or eliminating the poten tial impacts of hazards. Although the Stafford Act addresses natural hazards, it would be imprudent for a jurisdiction to pursue a mitigation strategy that did not include provisions for human‐caused hazards as well. Such a multi‐hazard strategy is in keeping with the tenets of comprehensive emergency management and allows the community to leverage both Stafford Act and Homeland Security funds under a single comprehensive program of risk reduction. Policy‐makers should consider both predisaster and postdisaster mitigation strategies. Predisaster strategies can be further divided into actions that can be taken immediately at little or no cost and those that can be accomplished over time with anticipated or existing funding. Predisaster mitigation does not nec essarily have to be structural, and programs aimed at reducing nonstructural hazards (e.g. earthquake bracing, typhoon clips, etc.) can be relatively inexpen sive. Mitigation strategies can also have multiple uses: a public warning system could potentially be used during civic events. Mitigation strategy should also identify actions that can be implemented fol lowing a disaster as part of a holistic recovery strategy to improve community quality of life. Such strategies should be a logical extension of predisaster mit igation and include projects that are desirable but either lack funding or the political will to implement. RECOVERY STRATEGY Recovery is the transition from disaster response back to an acceptable state of normalcy. It would be wrong to say that recovery returns the community to normal for two reasons: 1. The widespread destruction and social disruption caused by major disas ters produce profound changes that prevent the community from fully returning to its predisaster condition; and 2. Disasters offer opportunities for changes in the community that can cre ate a new “normal.” Similar to mitigation, recovery planning is extremely a low priority for local governments. Part of the reason for this is the perception that recovery is “the last thing we do” and therefore accorded a lower priority than response planning. Part of this stems from a failure to understand potential recovery issues. Since recovery is the last phase in the comprehensive emergency management cycle, it seems strange to consider it before one discusses emergency response. However, recovery is not a single process but a series of complex processes, many occurring simultaneously. Without a strategy to serve as a guide, these processes can lead to conflicting priorities and extreme political 174 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT and social upheaval. Furthermore, without a well‐defined strategy, decisions made in the early phases of response foreclose options for recovery, severely limiting the options available to the community. Finally, the recovery period offers an opportunity to implement components of the mitigation strategy, and the two must be closely linked. Eugene Haas et al. (1977) identified four overlapping periods that occur in recovery: 1. An emergency period that covers the immediate aftermath of the event and is focused on coping with immediate losses. 2. A restoration period that covers from the end of the emergency period to the restoration of major services. 3. A replacement reconstruction period that results in the rebuilding of capital stock and the return of social and economic activities to predisaster levels. 4. A developmental reconstruction period that provides for major reconstruc tion and future growth. Similar to many of the previous disaster models discussed, these four periods should not be viewed as distinct. In actual practice, there is considerable overlap, and it is not uncommon for different segments of the community to be in dif ferent periods owing to differences in economic resources. Predisaster recovery planning can, to a certain extent, shorten the length of these periods and speed recovery. As one examines the four periods of recovery, it is possible to separate them into short‐term and long‐term activities. Short‐term activities that lead to the restoration of basic services are generally operational‐level activities, such as debris clearance and the repair of basic infrastructure. The focus is on the res toration of community services to near‐normal levels. A major component of this restoration is the use of federal disaster assistance programs for individual and public assistance. Short‐term recovery strategies should be oriented toward a detailed damage assessment (e.g. building inspections, structural assessments of bridges and roads) and establishing an interface with federal programs. Long‐term recovery, however, is strategic in nature because of its potential impact on the community’s future. Similar to mitigation, long‐term recovery strategy requires community acceptance to be effective. That this acceptance must be obtained before the disaster is obvious when one considers the potential barriers to developing and implementing a strategy postdisaster. In contrast to the altruism found during the response period, the recovery period is character ized by conflicting priorities, concern over perceived inequities in disaster relief, and a tendency to establish blame for inadequate response. The overwhelming community emphasis is on a rapid return to normalcy. This means that barriers DEVELOPING STRATEGY 175 to quick rebuilding, such as a public process to agree on mitigation methods, are considered unacceptable. Indeed, there is usually a push by the community for a relaxation of building codes and restrictions on development to spur recon struction, actions counterintuitive to increasing community resilience. Communities tend to want to replicate predisaster conditions; therefore, the focus of recovery tends to be on returning the community to the way things were before. One saw this dynamic at work in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. When the Bring Back New Orleans Commission released its initial recommendations in January 2006, it recommended a four‐month moratorium on rebuilding to determine what neighborhoods would have enough returning residents to warrant rebuilding. There was concern that some areas would be too thinly populated to be sustainable. The recommendations were immedi ately met by angry protests from citizens, condemnation by groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and attempts by permitting officials to subvert the plan by issuing special construction permits to anyone who asked for one. Despite the opportunity to reduce risk in those areas where flooding was the worst, returning residents demanded the rebuilding of their neighborhoods in hopes of reestablishing the communities that existed prior to the hurricane. Local government, seeking to avoid criticism for slow recovery, will generally accede to the community’s demands for quick action. The emphasis is on acquiring tools and techniques to quickly restore the status quo and expedite federal payments. The time required to form a recovery task force and to develop long‐range strategy is overwhelmed by the rapid pace of reconstruc tion. An example of this problem is given in Case Study 7.2 involving the after math of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire. In this case, a predisaster proposal for a new city layout was considered as a blueprint for reconstruction but ultimately rejected because of the speed of rebuilding. The paradox of recovery is that although the period immediately following the disaster is clearly not the time to begin development of a reconstruction plan, it is the time when the public is prepared to show an interest in recovery and miti gation issues. The first 30 days following a disaster is the critical window of opportunity to establish the mechanism for managing and guiding the recovery. The lesson is clear; recovery strategy development must be done before the disaster if one wishes to take advantage of this window of opportunity. Effective recovery planning requires four main components: 1. Formation of a broad‐based task force that represents the community as a whole. 2. Development of a strategy document that represents a community vision and consensus. 176 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY 7.2: SAN FRANCISCO 1906 – MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN RECOVERY The devastation of the earthquake and fires that occurred in San Francisco on 18 April 1906 was certainly on a massive scale: the area burned by the fire was twice that of Chicago Fire of 1871 and six times that of the Great Fire of London in 1666. Three quarters of the developed area of the city were destroyed along with much of the civic infrastructure. Over half the city’s population of 410 000 was displaced. Property loss was estimated at between $500 million and $1 billion (in 1906 dollars). The massive relief effort that followed the earthquake and fire lasted over three years. Case Figure 7.2 San Francisco Financial District following the earthquake and fire. Photo Credit: H.D. Chadwick 1906. Courtesy of the Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco. With the city virtually leveled, it was imperative that reconstruction begin immediately. By a strange twist of fate, San Francisco already had a plan for a complete reconstruction of the city, the Burnham Plan. As mayor, James Phelan had attended the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893 and been very impressed by the concepts of architect James Burnham. Phelan brought Burnham to San Francisco to develop a radical redesign of San Francisco. Based on the design of European capitals, Burnham’s plan envisioned broad boulevards, open spaces, and expansive parks. A grand civic center was to be located at Van Ness and Market Streets and nine broad boulevards would radiate outward, connected by concentric streets. Burnham’s plans were completed just a few days before the earthquake. Now, as chair of the powerful Finance Committee, Phelan pushed for adoption of the Burnham Plan. The Burnham Plan had several flaws. First, to accomplish the plan would require property owners to sell existing parcels and acquire new ones. This was particularly true in Chinatown, where there was a push to evict the entire Chinese population from prime real estate and relocate them to less desirable parts of town. Second, the Burnham Plan did not consider the economic (continued on next page) DEVELOPING STRATEGY 177 3. Development of an operational plan to cover short‐term recovery. 4. Passage of ordinances providing authorities for recovery activities. In forming the recovery task force, one must confront the issue of governance. Is the task force responsible solely for developing the recovery strategy or will it guide the process as well? If the latter, what is its relationship to the group handling response? If it is solely for planning, who will guide the recovery effort? The answers to these questions will help to determine the membership of the core group and help to identify additional stakeholders in the planning process. As has been mentioned, recovery involves multiple processes. It may be ben eficial to consider dividing the task force into smaller committees that focus on specific issues, such as the following: • Social Recovery. Issues that affect the community directly, such as the res toration of housing stock, the reopening of schools, resumption of social services, etc. base of the city: there was no provision for the commercial, industrial, and waterfront areas in the plan. Nevertheless, Phelan and his colleagues in the Association for the Improvement and Adornment of San Francisco pushed hard for the adoption of the Burnham Plan. Arrayed against Phelan and his powerful friends was the tendency of disaster victims to attempt to return as closely as possible to their former situation. As was noted in Chapter 3, disaster victims are resilient and will begin recovery on their own. In most cases, this return to normalcy involves replicating their previous situation. For this reason, postdisaster mitigation is difficult to implement. The citizens of San Francisco simply were not going to wait until the details of the Burnham Plan could be worked out. Phelan and his supporters attempted to pass a state constitutional amendment that would allow the city to acquire land to implement the Burnham Plan by trading property. The amendment was defeated in a statewide election. Opposition also came from the downtown business leaders who would not countenance any delay in rebuilding. The loss of city records, including property titles, meant that implementing the Burnham Plan could take some time. This lengthy delay would have an obvious detrimental effect on business resumption and on the tax base. Ultimately, private property rights won out over public good and the Burnham Plan was shelved. The Burnham Plan could have transformed the city of San Francisco into a grand city on the order of Paris or Berlin. Given time and political will, it is possible that the details of the plan could have been worked out and the plan implemented. However, in the aftermath of catastrophe, there was simply no time to identify the legal and social implications of the plan and to work out compromises. Furthermore, the plan did not enjoy the full support of the community. It was favored by the wealthy upper class but was deemed impractical by hardheaded businessmen. The Burnham Plan is a reminder that recovery planning, no matter how visionary, must be timely and supported by the community. Recommended Reading Fradkin, P. L. (2005). The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: How San Francisco nearly destroyed itself. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. (continued from previous page) 178 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT • Infrastructure Recovery. The physical restoration and reconstruction of community infrastructure (e.g. public works, civic buildings, and road construction). • Economic Recovery. Restoration of economic vitality by reestablishing businesses, attracting tourism, stimulating investment, etc. • Environmental Recovery. Issues related to control of cleanup of hazardous waste, landfill capacity, debris disposal, etc. The concept of forming committees dedicated to different aspects of recovery is not new. San Francisco organized a group of prominent citizens into the Committee of Fifty following the 1906 to oversee immediate recovery. A sim ilar system was used in the days following the explosion at Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1917. The National Disaster Recovery Framework identifies six Recovery Support Functions (RSF) that could also serve as a way of organizing a recovery task force: 1. Community planning and capacity building 2. Economic recovery 3. Health and social services recovery 4. Housing recovery 5. Infrastructure systems recovery 6. Natural and cultural resources The development of a strategic recovery plan presents the opportunity to go beyond the status quo and to seek advantages inherent in a crisis. The Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center has produced a blue print for what has been termed “holistic recovery,” where the focus is not on a return to predisaster conditions but on increasing community sustainability. “Sustainability” in this context means “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Holistic recovery is based on six principles of sustainability: 1. Maintain and, if possible, enhance quality of life. 2. Enhance local economic viability. 3. Promote social and intergenerational equity. 4. Maintain and, if possible, enhance the quality of the environment. 5. Incorporate disaster resilience and mitigation into decisions and actions. 6. Use a consensus‐building, participatory process when making decisions. The six principles of holistic recovery summarize the intent espoused but seldom achieved by emergency planners. They offer a methodology to not only DEVELOPING STRATEGY 179 deal with the immediate consequences of a disaster but also to use the disaster as a mechanism to increase resistance to future disasters. They also offer the opportunity to link recovery and mitigation strategies to overall community strategies, increasing the involvement of community groups and the potential for community acceptance. By emphasizing that recovery and mitigation strat egies are congruent with community goals, the emergency manager can demon strate clearly the value of the strategies. Once one knows the desired end state, intermediate steps are easily derived. To implement the strategy, there may be a need to craft recovery‐ specific legislation to institutionalize the planning process, establish the governance structure, and address specific planning issues. Figure 7.2 is a table of contents for a model ordinance that suggests some of the issues that might be considered. Passing an ordinance validates the work of the recovery task force and codifies the authorities that will be needed during recovery. Short‐term recovery is also informed by the strategy. Since long‐range recovery goals are known, responders can make decisions consistent with these goals and lay the foundation for later implementation of the full strategy. Thus, the operational recovery annex and the long‐range recovery plan become the implementing documents for the recovery strategy. Section 1. Authority Section 2. Purpose Section 3. Definitions Section 4. Recovery Organization 4.1 Powers and Duties 4.2 Recovery Task Force 4.3 Operations and Meetings 4.4 Succession 4.5 Organization 4.6 Relation to Emergency Management Organization Section 5. Recovery Plan 5.1 Recovery Plan Content 5.2 Coordination of Recovery Plan with FEMA and Other Agencies 5.3 Recovery Plan Adoption 5.4 Recovery Plan Implementation 5.5 Recovery Plan Training and Exercises 5.6 Recovery Plan Consultation with Citizens 5.7 Recovery Plan Amendments 5.8 Recovery Plan Coordination with Related (City, County) Plans Section 6. General Provisions 6.1 Powers and Procedures 6.2 Post-Disaster Operations 6.3 Coordination with FEMA and Other Agencies 6.4 Consultation with Citizens Section7. Temporary Regulations 7.1 Duration 7.2 Damage Assessment 7.3 Development Moratorium 7.4 Debris Clearance 7.5 One-Stop Center for Permit Expediting 7.6 Temporary Use Permits 7.7 Temporary Repair Permits 7.8 Deferral of Fees for Reconstruction Permits 7.9 Nonconforming Buildings and Uses Section 8. Demolition of Damaged Historic Buildings 8.1 Condemnation and Demolition 8.2 Notice of Condemnation 8.3 Request to FEMA to Demolish 8.4 Historic Building Demolitions Review Section 9. Temporary and Permanent Housing Section 10. Hazard Mitigation Program 10.1 Safety Element 10.2 Short-Term Action Program 10.3 Post-Disaster Actions 10.4 New Information Section 11. Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy 11.1 Functions 11.2 Review Section 12. Severability Figure 7.2 Model recovery and reconstruction ordinance. Source: Planning for Post‐Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction, American Planning Association. 180 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE STRATEGY If done properly, the hazard analysis develops a summary of the risks facing a community in terms of vulnerabilities and hazards. The mitigation strategy limits this field by either eliminating hazards or reducing their potential impact. The recovery strategy defines the end state – the point at which the community achieves an acceptable state of normalcy. Together these two strategies bracket and inform a third: the strategy that the community will use to respond to the immediate impact of the event, maintain continuity of function, and initiate short‐term recovery. Few communities develop a response strategy as opposed to an emergency plan. This is most likely because much response planning is done by rote. That is communities use templates for emergency plans such as that provided by Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 or one provided by a consultant or a soft ware program. There are valid reasons for using such an approach – it ensures compliance and conformance with federal guidelines and ensures that all criti cal areas are addressed. However, many of these planning guides are geared toward initial response and do not consider other plans that might be imple mented simultaneously. For example, CPG 101 does not address recovery, con tinuity of operations, or postdisaster mitigation. Emergency plans are by nature operational documents, not strategic ones. They tend to focus on short‐term issues related to response rather than on strategy and policy. This is their purpose, and the process involved in devel oping emergency plans can serve to raise issues of strategy and policy. However, the development and agreement on strategy beforehand simplifies the development of the various plans needed to respond to crisis. Divorcing plan development from the strategic planning process results in plans that are dis connected from each other and may lead to conflicts among the plans. It is at the strategic level that interrelationships among plans become clearest. As has been noted in previous chapters, response, continuity, and recovery do not occur sequentially. Separate plans are implemented simultaneously or within a very short time frame. If these plans are developed in a vacuum, this simultaneous implementation may result in conflicts over management of the crisis and a competition for scarce resources. It is critical, therefore, that con cepts for response be worked out prior to beginning to develop plans and that significant policy issues be addressed. A critical part of response strategy is the development of a governance struc ture and the fixing of responsibility for various response functions. Response involves the virtually simultaneous implementation of emergency, continuity, and recovery plans. A major strategic decision is whether these plans are coor dinated from a single operations center by a single management team or from separate operations centers headed by different managers. If the latter, how will conflicts be resolved? Who is the final arbitrating authority? Will there be DEVELOPING STRATEGY 181 a single incident action plan? If so, who develops it? Another issue of gover nance involves the transition of operational control. Immediate response is relatively short‐lived, and the jurisdiction moves very quickly into sustained operations, focusing on recovery issues. How will this transition be handled? At what point does the central point of coordination move from an emergency operations center (EOC) to something more long term? In addition to these types of governance issues, conflicts frequently arise because priorities are not defined. Life safety is always a priority in response, but as was noted in a previous chapter, one of the qualitative differences bet ween disasters and emergencies is a change in speed of response and in stan dards of care. Hence, the operational dynamic changes and while life safety is always paramount, there will be decisions made that will adversely affect vic tims, such as the use of triage for prioritizing treatment of the injured and the imposition of priorities for distribution of limited supplies. It is this changing dynamic that needs to be addressed as the response strategy is being developed. How much compromise is the community willing to tolerate to ensure its own survival? An example of this dynamic occurred during the 1989 Loma Prieta earth quake in San Francisco. The Marina District, an affluent area built on filled ground, was heavily damaged and suffered significant structural collapse. As a safety measure, authorities evacuated the area and prohibited reentry by the occupants. Plans were made to begin immediate demolition of unsafe struc tures. From the city’s perspective, the priority was life safety. The occupants, however, were horrified that they could not reenter and salvage their personal possessions before their homes were destroyed. Ultimately, the city authorities yielded to the demands of the community and allowed escorted reentry but for only 15 minutes per occupant. This solution, as would be expected, pleased no one. Identifying this need, developing a reentry strategy, and assigning respon sibility for planning and implementation could have minimized this conflict. The purpose of the response strategy is to articulate a concept for response, to identify potential policy issues that may arise during operations, and to fix responsibility for planning and implementation. One begins this process by determining the functions that will be required in a disaster. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Emergency Management Standard identifies some 30 separate areas for which planners should assign responsibility (Figure 7.3). At this stage, details are not important – the plan ners are seeking to develop a concept for each function and to identify the agencies that will do the detailed planning. As an example of this process, consider the function of evacuating the community. Evacuation is surprisingly difficult because such operations almost always involve a transfer of responsibility. When a community is evac uated, the evacuees become the concern of the other communities through which they must pass and of the community that will ultimately receive them. 182 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Even the evacuation of a single facility will have an impact on the surrounding area. Consequently, if the community’s strategy includes the need to partially or fully evacuate, then a considerable number of policy issues arise from that decision: • Will evacuation be full or partial? Traditionally, evacuation planning was based on natural hazards. The Cold War requirement for evacuation planning under the Crisis Relocation Program was strongly resisted by local governments as unnecessary. However, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly dirty bomb scenarios, has caused juris dictions to rethink their strategies. • Will spontaneous evacuation be supported? There are any number of con ditions that may cause people to self‐evacuate. Such self‐evacuation can create significant problems as the control measures and supporting infra structure that are in place during mandatory evacuations may not be pre sent. On the other hand, deploying these resources may draw scarce resources from other tasks. • Under what conditions will evacuation be mandated? Evacuation is costly and can expose evacuees to considerable risk. It is not a decision to be made lightly. Furthermore, as has been demonstrated in numerous hurri canes along the Gulf Coast and the East Coast, frequent evacuations lead to a certain complacency and unwillingness to evacuate. There is also evi 1. Administration and finance 2. Agriculture and natural resources 3. Alert and notification 4. Communications 5. Critical infrastructure and key resource restoration 6. Damage assessment 7. Debris management 8. Detection and monitoring 9. Direction, control, and coordination 10. Donation management 11. Emergency public information 12. Energy and utilities services 13. Fatality management and mortuary services 14. Firefighting/fire protection 15. Hazardous materials 16. Human services (including food, water and commodities distribution) 17. Incident and needs assessment 18. Information collection, analysis, and dissemination 19. Law enforcement 20. Mass care and sheltering 21. Mutual aid 22. Population protection (evacuation and shelter-in-place) 23. Private sector coordination 24. Public health and medical 25. Public works and engineering 26. Resource management and logistics 27. Search and rescue 28. Transportation systems and resources 29. Volunteer management 30. Warning Figure 7.3 Areas of responsibility in the Emergency Operations Plan. Source: Emergency Management Standard, Emergency Management Accreditation Program. DEVELOPING STRATEGY 183 dence of unwillingness on the part of officials to order evacuation, even when preidentified conditions have been met. • What authority does the leadership of the community have to order an evacuation? Can field personnel, such as a fire officer, order evacuation? Is evacuation mandatory and can citizens be forcibly removed? Can the media be restricted from entering the evacuated area? • How will barriers to evacuation be overcome? Hurricane Katrina demon strated that there are segments of the population that cannot or will not self‐evacuate. Many of these were people without the means to do so or people with disabilities that prevented them and their caregivers from leaving. Statistics indicate that this can be a substantial part of the population: the 2000 census indicated that between 21% and 25% of the population of New Orleans, Biloxi, and Mobile described themselves as disabled. In a Kaiser Foundation poll taken in Houston of people evacuated from New Orleans, 22% of respondents stated that they were physically unable to leave, and a further 23% stated that they had to care for someone unable to leave. Closely associated with evacuation planning is the need for sheltering. Many emergency plans treat sheltering as something that happens almost immedi ately. In actual practice, it may take several days to inspect, staff, and equip shelters to their full capacity. Congregate shelters are also a short‐term mea sure; the Red Cross expects that they will be maintained for no more than 30 days. They buy time for either the individual or the jurisdiction to find interim housing. Sheltering must therefore be viewed as a continuum ranging from immediate temporary shelters followed by transition to short‐term housing and eventually leading to permanent housing. A shelter strategy must address the following issues: • What constitutes an acceptable shelter? For example, one jurisdiction des ignates as official only those shelters that meet Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements but maintains a second list of shelters that do not currently meet the requirements but could be used with some modifica tions during a disaster. ⚬ Will persons with disabilities be housed at all shelters or will there be special shelters established to accommodate special needs? If so, what is the definition of “special needs” and will the shelter accommodate caregivers? ⚬ How long are shelters expected to be open? The Red Cross initially had responsibility for long‐term sheltering, but their policy is now to main tain shelters for about 30 days at which point FEMA is expected to assist in the transition to short‐term housing. ⚬ Will existing buildings be used for sheltering or will camps be established? 184 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ⚬ How will short‐term housing be provided? Will semi‐permanent camps be established as was done in San Francisco in 1906 and Kobe, Japan in 1995? Or will victims be removed from the disaster area and housed in hotels, as was done after Hurricane Katrina in 2005? This discussion so far has considered the emergency operations plan, familiar ground for emergency managers. However, the intent here is to consider strategy and to do that, one must stretch the definition of response to “those actions and activities that occur prior to, during, or in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.” This means that instead of the focus on traditional response functions that characterize emergency management planning, one must ask the question from a broad perspective. For example, planners must consider Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs) that must be met to sustain critical government functions. This means that response strategy must encompass not only the emergency operations plan but Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) as well. Furthermore, it must also consider the short‐term recovery planning developed as part of the recovery strategy. As was mentioned in a previous chapter, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produced two Continuity Guidance Circulars (CGCs) to assist commu nities in COOP planning. CGC 1 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments (States, Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions) establishes the elements of continuity planning while CGC 2 Continuity Guidance for Non‐Federal Governments: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process (States, Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions) dated October 2013 pro vides guidance, methodology, and checklists to identify, assess, and validate essential functions. CGC 1 establishes a goal of resumption of Primary Mission Essential Functions within 12 hours of an event. It also identifies the following elements that must be addressed in continuity planning: • Essential functions • Orders of succession • Continuity facilities • Continuity communications • Essential records management • Human resources • Test, training, and exercise programs • Devolution of control and direction • Reconstitution operations Many of the elements on the CGC1 list are already part of emergency management program and plans. More importantly, COOP aims at preserving the baseline capability necessary for tactical and operational response. Given the level of devastation in recent disasters, one can no longer just assume that DEVELOPING STRATEGY 185 government agencies will be able to fulfill their disaster missions in the absence of continuity plans. As continuity plans become more common, they will come to represent a source of competition for resources in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Consequently, continuity issues represent a factor that must be considered in developing a response strategy. The simultaneous implementation of strategies suggests that, instead of focusing on individual plans, planners should consider plans in a time‐based continuum and assess what activities occur immediately, in the short term and long range. Response strategy should work toward blending traditional response with recovery, continuity, and mitigation. This does not mean that all these strategies combine into a single plan. However, it does suggest that there should be a single unifying response strategy and that plans should be expanded beyond the limits of CPG 101 to encompass all immediate and short‐term activities. PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY The three strategies of mitigation, response, and recovery provide for a con tinuum of disaster response that defines a beginning point, a desired end state, and a process for linking the two. As these concepts are developed, planners should be gaining an understanding of potential shortcomings that would impede their implementation. The combined strategies delineate the capacity that will be needed for successful response in accordance with the community’s vision. The preparedness strategy is the mechanism by which the community builds its capacity to respond. Preparedness strategy focuses on three main components: operational planning, logistics management, and training. It defines the shortfall between current and desired capabilities for each compo nent and options for eliminating this shortfall. Operational planning consists of the plans and procedures necessary to support the community’s emergency management strategy. This includes the development of plans for emergency response, continuity, recovery, and mitiga tion, and the supporting plans, operating procedures, checklists, etc. needed to implement them. Logistics management looks at response from a resources perspective: what will be needed, what is currently on hand, and how will shortfalls be met? Based on the response strategy, it should be possible for planners to derive a list of resources required by the community and the timeframes during which they will be needed. The planners use this list to assess the resources on hand. This resource inventory accomplishes two things: it identifies shortfalls and develops a list or database that can be used to locate resources during response. Some emergency management offices go to considerable lengths to create massive single lists of disaster resources. However, maintaining a central list 186 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT can be labor intensive, and these types of lists tend to go out of date rapidly. This technique is fairly common, particularly where responsibility for the suc cess of a response operation rests with a single office. However, if one views the responsibility for successful response as an organizational, rather than an individual responsibility, then it is reasonable to approach resource management as an organizational function. This means that responsibility for maintaining inventory lists rests with those elements of the jurisdiction most likely to have a need for them. For example, the department of public works or the corporate engineering department would maintain a list of contractors with heavy lift capacity. Likewise, the department of public health would maintain a list of medical supplies or the names of contractors providing mental health services. Once resource shortfalls have been identified, the organization needs a strategy for how these resources will be obtained. One possibility is the use of mutual aid, which will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. A second source is the use of private or nonprofit resources. For example, the response strategy may have identified the need for sheltering several thousand people. For most jurisdictions, the Red Cross usually takes on this task; therefore, many of the resources needed for this task will be provided by that organization. The response strategy identified the need for sheltering and set the target population; the preparedness strategy identifies the resources needed and, through discussion with the Red Cross, what will be provided, and what must still be located. In addition, the preparedness strategy should now include a require ment for detailed shelter planning with the Red Cross and supporting agencies. Trained personnel are no less a resource than specialized equipment. As was noted in a previous chapter, many communities approach training in a piece‐ meal fashion rather than considering it in relation to overall strategy. Training should be geared to meeting the demands for capability that are generated by the community’s strategic vision. This helps to define the scope of the required training. Identifying training needs is similar to identifying resource needs: one considers the skills that will be needed to implement the strategies, conducts an inventory of available skills, and develops options for meeting the shortfall. Determining need also requires acknowledging that training is perishable. That is it must be reinforced or refreshed if skills are to be kept current. Training, much like response, has different levels that help define the scope of the training required. For most members of the organization, the only requirement is for awareness training that addresses potential risk and what is expected of the member (e.g. ICS100). There is a smaller subset of trainees who require training on skills needed to accomplish specific functions under the various operational plans. For example, the teams that staff the emergency operations center will require detailed instruction in their assigned functions, or a hazardous materials response team will need training on protective equip ment. Some of these requirements will be defined by law, some by common DEVELOPING STRATEGY 187 sense, and some by operational need. Finally, there is a small group who will need training to provide leadership during a crisis, e.g. branch, unit, and team leaders, incident commanders, EOC directors. USING STRATEGY TO GUIDE PLANNING As was discussed in a previous chapter, the strategic plan is the mechanism by which the community translates strategy into performance objectives. This translation is accomplished by developing a series of strategies based on the community’s risk and values and the baseline strategic information discussed in a previous chapter. This combination represents the ideal – a vision of how the community would like to build resilience to risks. The strategic planning pro cess ultimately produces a preparedness strategy that articulates the difference between that ideal and the current state of the emergency management program. From this preparedness strategy, one can then derive the performance objec tives in the strategic plan. This strategic planning model is illustrated in Figure 7.4. The following example illustrates how the process works: • As part of its hazard assessment, a jurisdiction identifies a portion of its population (10 000) that is at risk of being displaced by a potential flood. Mitigate Risk management strategy Multi-year strategic/annual performance plans Avoid Transfer Retain Recovery strategy Insurance strategy Prevention strategy Mitigation strategy Plans Training Equipment Preparedness strategy Response strategy Legislation Figure 7.4 Strategic planning model. 188 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT • Through its mitigation strategy, the jurisdiction determines to reduce the number of residences in the at‐risk area, to repair an aging levee, and limit construction in the flood‐prone area. This is expected to reduce the number of persons at risk from 10 000 to 7000. It also intends to buyout repetitive damage properties if a flood does occur using federal funding. Its strategy includes modifications to evacuation routes that will reduce the time needed to evacuate 7000 residents from eight hours to five hours. • In considering recovery strategy, the jurisdiction decides that it needs clearer legislative authority for emergency debris removal and better plans for reentry of residents after evacuation. The jurisdiction estimates that 1000 citizens will need to be permanently relocated. • As part of its response strategy, the jurisdiction determines that it will need to evacuate and shelter the 7000 at‐risk citizens using a combination of its own shelters and those of an adjoining jurisdiction. In its preparedness strategy, the jurisdiction determines that it has the capacity to shelter 4000 citizens and will need to transport 3000 citizens to the adjacent jurisdic tion. It will need to coordinate a sheltering plan with the adjacent jurisdic tion. It estimates that it will need interim housing for 3000 and long‐term housing for 1000. Training will be needed for 1000 shelter workers, and a public awareness campaign will be needed for the new evacuation measures. • In its strategic plan, the jurisdiction identifies the following work elements: ⚬ Propose new legislation for emergency debris removal authority. ⚬ Develop elements of the mitigation plan for evacuation routes and the buyout of destroyed property. ⚬ Develop a shelter plan and mutual aid agreement with the adjacent jurisdiction. ⚬ Develop an appendix to the emergency response plan’s shelter annex. ⚬ Develop an evacuation plan identifying routes and transportation assets. ⚬ Develop a reentry plan. ⚬ Develop a public awareness campaign for new evacuation control measures. ⚬ Conduct training for 1000 shelter workers in conjunction with the Red Cross. The intent of the process is to develop response concepts that are based on community vulnerabilities to identified hazards and that are consistent with community values. The process considers emergency management in its broad est perspective: a mechanism by which the community manages risk. To be effective, this mechanism must consider all the dynamics that take place during a disaster and must not be limited to traditional emergency response planning. DEVELOPING STRATEGY 189 It is the interrelationship among the four concepts of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery that makes the comprehensive emergency management model such a powerful strategic tool. CONCLUSION A fundamental flaw in emergency management programs is a failure to develop an overarching strategy that reflects the community’s values, priorities, and risk tolerance. Too often, program elements are incorporated based on the prior ities set by grants rather than an understanding of how those elements support an overall strategy. This means that the emergency management program is driven by outside influences rather than by community need – the very opposite of what all the standards and guidance say should be the case. To be effective, emergency management program decisions such as training development, pro curement, legislation, and even whether to accept grant funding must be driven by a cohesive strategy that truly addresses community need. Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. 191 Chapter 8 … I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable. —Dwight D. Eisenhower The previous chapters have placed considerable emphasis on strategy development as the precursor for developing emergency plans and on the development of a governance structure and program to support the planning process. The emergency management program creates the context in which effective planning can take place. However, strategy must be translated into practical applications that guide tactical and operational response. The ulti mate expression of strategy is the emergency operations plan (EOP). The EOP is not an end in itself. In fact, a plan‐centric emphasis has been the downfall of many emergency planners. Without the operational procedures and the logistical and financial structures to support them, EOPs are ineffec tive. Planning must be inclusive and consider all the elements needed for suc cessful response. This means going beyond the traditional view to accept that EOPs must encompass not only life‐safety response but continuity and recovery as well. This chapter looks at some of the concepts and methodologies that help translate strategy into effective emergency response plans. PLANS VERSUS PLANNING As noted in the beginning quotation from Dwight Eisenhower, a fundamental concept of emergency management is that there is a considerable difference between a plan and the act of planning. To many, a plan is a physical document developed to meet a requirement or need, either as the result of legislation or by public demand. It is a tangible object that is often the result of intense effort PLANNING CONCEPTS 192 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT and is frequently used as a measure of success for a program or as evidence of compliance with laws or regulations. However, a plan is never more than a snapshot of an organization’s intent at a specific point in time. Many plans are out of date almost as soon as they are published. Furthermore, if the written plan is the product of a consultant or single office rather than of a multidisciplinary task force, then the result may be what Erik Auf der Heide in Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination calls the “Paper Plan Syndrome.” The Paper Plan Syndrome refers to the use of a written plan to create the illusion of preparedness. The existence of a plan that meets requirements is accepted as evidence that the organization has the capability to deal with crisis. This is a frequent problem where plans are mandated for accreditation, or by law, and organizations produce plans for this purpose with limited concern for valid planning assumptions and follow‐on training and exercises. The results of the Paper Plan Syndrome can be devastating, as illustrated in the case study (Case Study 8.1) of the Alyeska Oil Spill Contingency Plan in place at the time of the Exxon Valdez disaster. CASE STUDY 8.1: THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 1989 – PAPER PLANS LEAD TO FAILURE We have adequate knowledge for dealing with oil spills and improvements in techniques and equipment are continuing to become available through worldwide research. The best equipment, materials, and expertise which will be made available as part of the oil spill contingency plan will make operations at Port Valdez and Prince William Sound the safest in the world… –L.R. Beyon, British Petroleum speaking for Alyeska in 1971 The State of Alaska requires oil facilities operating in the state to have an oil spill contingency plan that must be reviewed and approved every three years by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC). In March 1982, ADEC reviewed a plan that had been developed in 1980 by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company for potential spills in Prince William Sound. ADEC gave the plan a “conditional approval” because it felt that Alyeska’s assumption that the “maximum credible spill” of 74 000 barrels was unrealistic. Many tankers transiting Prince William Sound carried over a million barrels of oil, and ADEC believed that a 74 000‐barrel spill estimate was too low. Alyeska initially questioned ADEC’s jurisdiction over its operations, but by June, Alyeska revised its plan and claimed it could recover 100 000 barrels of spilled oil in 48 hours. In 1986, ADEC required recertification of the contingency plan and requested that the plan include provisions for a 200 000‐barrel spill. Alyeska submitted a plan with two scenarios: one for a 4000‐barrel spill that Alyeska believed was the most likely scenario and another for 200 000 barrels. The 4000‐barrel scenario assumed almost optimal conditions, with seas at less than 5 ft, 2 miles of visibility, and weather conditions being sunny or overcast with light (continued on next page) PLANNING CONCEPTS 193 rain and winds at eight knots. All organizations involved in response were to be notified immediately, booms would be in place within three hours, and an Arizona‐based dispersant contractor would be on scene and working within 9–17 hours. Cleanup was projected to last two months, and all but 100 barrels would be recovered or dispersed. Alyeska strongly objected to the inclusion of the second required scenario and stated in the plan that it believed such a scenario was highly unlikely, citing in part the fact that its ships were American registry and piloted by licensed masters or pilots. Nevertheless, it developed a plan for the 200 000‐barrel scenario to meet the requirement for certification. The plan assumed weather conditions identical or better than those in the 4000‐barrel scenario (winds were at five knots), that booms would be in place in five hours around the vessel and “immediately” around the shore, and that the only 10 000 barrels of oil would be unrecoverable. On 23 March 1989 at 12:04 a.m., the Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker with a cargo of 1.2 million barrels of oil, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, ripping open 8 of its 11 cargo tanks and 3 saltwater ballast tanks. The damaged tanker eventually released 260 000 barrels of oil into the sound. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were very similar to those anticipated in the scenario: a slight drizzle of rain mixed with snow, north winds at 10 knots and visibility 10 miles. Overall, the accident was an extremely close match to the scenario developed by Alyeska’s planners. Case Figure 8.1 The Exxon Valdez, three days after the vessel ran aground on Bligh Reef. Photo Credit: Office of Response and Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Alyeska’s response, however, was characterized by confusion and delays and soon demonstrated that the contingency plan was little more than a paper document. A contingency barge that state officials believed was loaded with containment equipment in accordance with the contingency plan was empty. Employees and contract laborers had (continued from previous page) 194 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The Alyeska Oil Spill Contingency Plan was based on a scenario that almost perfectly matched the conditions of the Exxon Valdez spill. However, the company had written the scenario under protest, did not believe the event could actually occur, and had made no effort to stockpile the resources that would have been needed to implement the plan. However, the existence of the plan created the illusion that the company was prepared to respond to an oil spill of to locate cleanup equipment in warehouses and load them aboard vessels before deploying. Rarely used equipment, such as deep‐water skimmers and booms, were buried under more frequently used heavy equipment. Some equipment could not be located; heavy ship’s fenders vital to offloading oil to another vessel were buried under snow. The barge finally left the terminal at 11:00 a.m., and the first booms were not deployed until sometime between noon and 5:00 p.m. Ironically, dispersants were ineffective because of the calm conditions at the site, but since the amount on hand was too little to deal with such a large spill, their effectiveness would have been limited in any event. Likewise, there were insufficient skimmers and booms on hand for the size of the spill. The resources necessary to implement the 200 000‐barrel spill contingency plan that might have limited the scope of the disaster had never been put in place. Eventually, the spill would have an impact on 1300 miles of shoreline and 40 000 people. Cleanup operations would involve 10 000 workers, 1000 boats, and 100 aircraft and cost Exxon an estimated $2.1 billion. Impact on wildlife was estimated at 250 000 seabirds, 2800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, up to 22 killer whales, and billions of salmon and herring eggs killed. Damage to the region’s tourism industry was estimated at $2.8 billion. Exxon eventually paid over $1.1 billion to settle criminal charges and civil suits with the United States and the State of Alaska. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report prepared for the president following the spill, commenting on plans at all levels, sums up many of the issues with Alyeska’s Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Prince William Sound: Exxon was not prepared for a spill of this magnitude – nor were Alyeska, the State of Alaska, or the federal government. It is clear that the planning for and response to the Exxon Valdez incident was unequal to the task. Contingency planning in the future needs to incorporate realistic worst‐case scenarios and to include adequate equipment and personnel to handle major spills. Adequate training in the techniques and limitations of oil spill removal is critical to the success of contingency planning. Organizational responsibilities must be clear, and personnel must be knowledgeable about their roles. Realistic exercises that fully test the response system must be undertaken regularly. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President (Executive Summary), Environmental Protection Agency, May 1989 Recommended Reading EPA National Response Team (1989). Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President. Washington DC: Environmental Protection Agency. Day, A. (2014). Red Light to Starboard: Recalling the Exxon Valdez Disaster. Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press. PLANNING CONCEPTS 195 200 000 barrels of oil, an illusion that was accepted by the State of Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) which approved the plan. Further complicating the issue of planning is the large variety of plans with similar sounding names and purposes: response plans, emergency plans, miti gation plans, business continuity plans, disaster plans, crisis management plans, etc. Although many of these plans are similar and are intended to coordinate an organization’s response to crisis, they each have a different emphasis and, in many cases, a different promulgating group within an organization. Because the names of the plans are not precise and lack a common definition, the plans may overlap authorities or give organizational groups multiple assignments. The result can be confusion and a tacit agreement to ignore the plans and do what seems right. This tendency to ignore plans is far from unusual. Since many plans are intended to be read by a program evaluator rather than by a user, plans tend to be bulky and wordy and are frequently organized in a way that makes information hard to find. This apparent disorganization is partially the result of the heavy influence of military planning on emergency management. Military plans are highly organized and the collection of annexes, appendices, tabs, etc. represent very detailed planning. However, this type of planning format was designed for strategic level plans and was never intended for use by troops in direct contact with the enemy. In a time of crisis, one is lucky if a responder even thinks to make use of the checklists contained in many plans. Following the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, Washington State University studied 26 communities affected by the event and found that the majority had not used an emergency plan, with many respondents stating that the plan they did have had not been applicable to their needs. A study of 29 mass casualty disasters conducted by E.L. Quarantelli in 1983 also found that written plans were implemented in only a small percentage of the cases studied. On September 11, District of Columbia police lacked an evacuation plan. The need for such a plan had been identified in July 2001, but the planning process was just underway when the attack on the Pentagon took place. Instead, the police cobbled together a response plan based on existing procedures and plans. A traffic plan devised for the Millennium was used to clear downtown intersec tions in about three hours. Recall procedures used during presidential inaugura tions were used to recall off‐duty officers. Crowd control was handled using procedures established for the civil disturbances that are common in Washington. The result was not elegant and not the optimum solution, but district police responded with some degree of effectiveness in the absence of a plan. There is evidence to suggest that plans may, to a certain extent, be counter productive. In Managing the Unexpected, researchers Karl Weick and Kathleen 196 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Sutcliffe found that the techniques used by many planners can foster a mind‐set that leaves planners vulnerable to the unexpected. Traditional planning uses stable and predictable contexts, giving the impression that a disaster will unfold in a predetermined manner. Plans can therefore influence the perception of the disaster by creating expectations that may not be based in reality. If an event does not fit the concepts of the plan, it may not be recognized as the first stage of a disaster. This is consistent with the natural human tendency to normalize occurrences and treat them as routine. People see what they want to see or what they have been conditioned to see. Plans can also have a limiting effect on response. Planners make assumptions about what is likely to occur and produce detailed contingency plans to meet those assumptions. There is a tendency to start twisting perceptions of the disaster to fit these contingencies; that is, to see what the plan says should be there, rather than making an unbiased assessment. This distortion also applies to an assessment of capability; to a certain extent, plans condition responders to think in certain patterns regarding how capabilities are used. Improvisation is not encouraged. Another concern is the expectation that following the established patterns in the plan will automatically lead to success. This may be true if the planners have foreseen every circumstance, but as the Exxon Valdez case study demon strates, even where the plan is consistent with the actual event, there are no guarantees of success. Disasters are characterized by the unexpected, creating new tasks, and bringing new players to the table. Emergency plans should there fore place a high premium on improvisation and creative problem‐solving. This is not to say that plans should not be written, but rather that the tradi tional plan‐centric approach is not effective. Plans are not an end product; they are merely one component of the emergency management program. Written plans do serve a purpose within the program. They document the measures that a community has put in place to deal with risk and can provide continuity in organizations where turnover is high. They represent a form of closure for the planning team, providing tangible proof that something is being accom plished. They can be valuable training tools and serve as standards to guide the development of other components of the program. However, the written plan is never as important as the process that is used to develop it. A plan that does not represent an organizational consensus is not kept reasonably up to date and is not used as the basis for training, and exercise is what Lee Clarke in Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster terms a “Fantasy Document” – a document that has no connection to the organization’s actual capabilities and is little more than a description of what the organization envisions happening after a disaster. It represents a desired outcome but does not necessarily guarantee that this outcome will be achieved. PLANNING CONCEPTS 197 Once one abandons the plan‐centric approach, it is possible to construct a planning process that is more effective and responsive to the needs of the community. Instead of providing the type of detailed command and control instructions that have been the hallmark of traditional plans, one can now focus on coordination. Effective plans facilitate creative problem‐solving. They establish an operating structure that can be expanded to include new actors, provide for supporting structures such as effective communications flow, and eliminate potential barriers to improvisation. They are a collection of tools and options that can be combined in new ways to meet the unique needs of each disaster. THE PLANNING CONTINUUM One of the common mistakes in emergency planning is to develop plans as dis crete stand‐alone documents. This is not surprising considering that many of the common plans that support the emergency management program often require different stakeholders and planning approaches. Examples include the following: • An emergency operations/response plan that assigns responsibilities for actions to be taken in an emergency. • A mitigation plan that establishes short‐ and long‐range actions to elimi nate or reduce the impact of hazards. • A recovery plan that develops priorities and strategies for restoring the organization’s services, programs, facilities, and infrastructure. • A continuity plan that identifies critical functions that must be maintained while the organization recovers from a crisis. These plans are frequently prepared by different organizational elements that do not always deal with each other on a day‐to‐day basis. For example response plans are normally the purview of the local Office of Emergency Services, whereas mitigation may be the province of the planning department. In a private company, business continuity planning may be a function of an information technology department, whereas risk management is part of the financial department. This separation of responsibility is further complicated by the overlap of responsibilities. Where, for instance, does continuity end and recovery begin? Does the emergency operations center have a function in recovery? Is mitigation a priority during response? These problems are generated because organizations tend to be plan‐centric. The focus is on the end product – the paper plan – and not on the overall pro cess. The planning process is stove‐piped by involving only those stakeholders 198 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT who traditionally were thought to be responsible for the specific planning issue. There is little emphasis given on creating a holistic approach that makes use of all the organization’s capabilities because there is little understanding of the distributive nature of emergency management discussed in previous chapters. The first step to approaching planning holistically is to accept that planning functions are not discrete units that can be placed in unique time frames. The comprehensive emergency management model discussed in previous chapters is intended to demonstrate the interrelated components of emergency manage ment and does not reflect actual progression over time. Plans, therefore, are not imple mented sequentially, but simultaneously. This means that they are interlinked in a continuum that begins before the event and extends into long‐term restoration (see Figure 8.1). Within this continuum, components of various plans are imple mented over time as necessary. This simultaneous implementation must be coordinated to ensure that the activities of one plan do not have an adverse impact on the activities of the other. For example, the need to demolish unsafe structures as soon as possible may prevent mitigation teams from assessing the performance of predisaster Restore critical infrastructure O p e ra tio n a l f lo w Time Restore infrastructure Hazard reduction Critical services restored Event Return to normalcy Rebuild infrastructure Long-term recovery Mitigation plan Mitigation plan Recovery plan Recovery plan Post disaster mitigation Mid-term recovery Business resumption Sustained response Normalize business functions Continuity plan Continuity plan Emergency response plan Emergency response plan Emergency response plan Strategic plan Long-term restorationMid-term restorationPre-event Immediate response Planning, training, exercising, acquire resources Protect lives limit damage Restore critical functions Operational coordination Short-term recovery Business continuity Life-safety response Pre-disaster mitigation Hazard reduction Preparedness Figure 8.1 Planning continuum – Multiple plans may be implemented simultaneously, creating confusion over priorities and competition for scarce resources. PLANNING CONCEPTS 199 mitigation measures. Similarly, the need to jump‐start the economic recovery of businesses may affect priorities for power restoration. Consequently, emer gency planners must consider the need for managing the simultaneous imple mentation of multiple plans. A useful concept in implementing holistic planning is the understanding of the progression of plan development. Viewing plans in a conceptual sequence helps to understand how they are interlinked. Plans follow a natural sequence based on the needs they address, much as Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Human Needs,” a basic management concept, addresses progressive human needs. Before a plan at a certain level can be truly effective, lower level plans must be in place to support it. For example mitigation plans can affect the anticipated level of response operations required in the EOP. Likewise, failing to plan for immediate life‐safety response makes continuity and recovery planning moot. Figure 8.2 shows a model of this “plan hierarchy.” As has been previously discussed, emergency planning is based on an assessment of the hazards facing the community. The community’s tolerance for risk determines the mix of strategies that will be used to manage risk, and these strategies ultimately produce a strategic plan that calls for the development of various other plans and supporting documents. Business resumptionContinuity of operations Predisaster Long-termShort-term Resilience Recovery plan Continuity plan Emergency operations plan Mitigation plan Strategic plan Sustained operationsImmediate response Postdisaster Figure 8.2 Plan hierarchy – Although not a direct analogy to Maslow’s Hierarchy, plans can be ranked in such a way that suggests that lower level plans must be addressed before higher level plans can be effective. 200 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Although response‐oriented emergency managers often overlook it, mitiga tion is of critical importance to the community. Mitigation is taking sustained actions to reduce or eliminate long‐term risk to people and property from haz ards and their effects. If mitigation is successful, the need for response and recovery actions are either eliminated or reduced, and the community can return to normalcy quicker with limited operational disruption and at a lower cost. Not all risks can be prevented, however, and there is always the potential for an unforeseen or low frequency event to occur. Consequently, the community needs to develop a capacity for immediate action in the event of an emergency. The first priority of any response is always life‐safety. For this reason, most EOPs deal with issues such as rescue, immediate medical attention, sheltering, and so forth. However, although personal survival is a priority, organizational survival must also be a priority. EOPs provide for the survival of individuals, whereas continuity plans provide for the survival of a business entity. For this reason, EOPs and continuity plans are generally implemented simultaneously. Both are intended to bridge the gap between the event’s occurrence and the transition to long‐term recovery operations. Immediate response plans, whether aimed at life safety or continuity, are intended to maintain the critical functions of the organization. They are designed to eliminate or reduce immediate threats to life safety and to enable the continuity of critical operations that allow the organization to perform essential functions. They provide a quick fix to immediate problems. Recovery plans address long‐range issues that have as their goal a return to normalcy for the organization. This period can be extremely lengthy and may involve stra tegic decisions regarding the future of the organization. Recovery represents an opportunity to make substantial changes in how the organization achieves its goals and developing a mechanism to identify these opportunities and guide decision‐making is a critical part of recovery planning. Understanding the relationship among the elements of the plan hierarchy is a critical part of emergency planning. If the previous elements have not been adequately addressed, then this will have a significant effect on higher levels: • If the hazard analysis is flawed, the community may not adequately pre pare for potential problems. • If the strategic plan has not been developed, plans may not be synchronous, and critical planning issues may not be addressed. • A poor or nonexistent mitigation plan means that the impact of the disaster will be greater on the community, increasing the demands on personnel and resources coordinated under the EOP. • Inadequate emergency plans result in chaos, limiting the community’s ability to manage response and drawing resources from continuity operations. PLANNING CONCEPTS 201 • Failing to plan for continuity means that recovery operations may be delayed or may have to be curtailed because the community is unable to raise sufficient capital for essential functions and rebuilding. • Recovery plans directly affect the speed and direction of reconstruction and may determine the survivability of the community. PLANNING METHODOLOGIES Planning Assumptions Frequently overlooked in planning is the collection of relevant data and the making of assumptions. Relevant information does not have to be the result of exhaustive research, but it should at least cover facts that bear directly on the plan. For example if one is developing an evacuation plan for a facility, it would be important to know the number of personnel who work at the facility, the number of visitors, and whether these numbers vary by time of day or by time of year. Information of this sort can be gleaned from many sources, such as historical data or academic studies. One can also make assumptions about the availability of response resources or about the time it will take to receive mutual aid assets. Planning assumptions are essential to developing any plan. No matter how much information is gathered, there is no prediction exactly which crisis will occur or about the exact nature of the crisis. Consequently, one must make assumptions on what is possible or likely to occur to define the scope of the plan. One of the lessons suggested by the Alyeska case study is that changing assumptions is not necessarily just a question of degree. This is reinforced by the research by E.L. Quarantelli and others that note qualitative differences between emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes. Each change in assumptions has the potential to change planning parameters substantially and not just by degree. Therefore, assumptions made in planning must be clearly identified and validated. Planning assumptions should be reality‐based. That is they should, as much as possible, reflect actual disaster experience and a realistic appraisal of the conditions under which the response will take place. For example the Association of Bay Area Governments in California has produced forecasts of the impacts of a major earthquake on regional transportation systems and housing stocks in the San Francisco Bay Area. These forecasts allow for realistic assumptions about the survivability of transportation infrastructure and about the potential for displaced populations. Similarly, models such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s Hazards US (HAZUS) modeling program can offer useful planning data, provided one is familiar with the limitations of such models. 202 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Not all assumptions based on past performance are relevant, however. The City of New Orleans based its communications plans on an assumption that the telephone system would continue to function in a disaster, an assumption that in retrospect seems completely out of touch with the realities of Hurricane Katrina. However, the system had worked in all previous disasters, and the planners considered the assumption valid. Previous actual experience had lulled them into a position where they ignored the experience of other Gulf Coast states and the projections of many researchers and government agencies. Planners need to guard against unspoken assumptions as well. These are assumptions that are considered self‐evident or are not even realized as being assumptions. There is an unspoken assumption in most plans, for example that the jurisdiction will survive with most of its ability to coordinate response intact. This is not necessarily an unreasonable assumption and could produce a solid baseline plan with alternate scenarios being addressed through exer cises. However, if the community has not given thought to continuity planning, this assumption may not be valid. Returning to the Alyeska case study, it was clear that assumptions were made about the equipment that was stockpiled at Valdez and its level of readiness. Regardless of how generally accepted they may be, underlying planning assumptions should be identified as part of the planning process. Scenario‐Based Planning The development of assumptions is part of a planning technique known as “scenario‐based planning” that forms the basis of many plans. Originally devel oped in the 1960s to analyze military strategies associated with thermonuclear war and epitomized by Herman Kahn’s book Thinking About the Unthinkable, scenario‐based planning was quickly adopted by the business community. Its success as a business‐planning tool was highlighted by the work of Pierre Wack, whose scenario planning system positioned Shell Oil to weather the oil crisis in 1973. It continues to be a mainstay in planning in both the public and private sectors. Scenario‐based planning requires the identification of predetermined ele ments that are virtually certain to occur, then coupling them with those ele ments that could possibly occur to craft potential scenarios of what might occur. The impact of each scenario and the associated response are then ana lyzed to determine potential strategies. For example many jurisdictions are sub ject to floods, and there is no question that a flood will occur at some point in the jurisdiction’s future. The task of the planners is to study available data and determine the various types of floods that may be faced by the jurisdiction, which type is most likely to occur, and the worst‐case flood. These scenarios can then be used to make decisions about response strategies and resource shortages. PLANNING CONCEPTS 203 Scenarios can be constructed and used in several ways: • Worst‐Case Scenario. During the hazard analysis, planners identify the event or events having the greatest impact on the community. The resources needed to respond to this event or events are then determined, and the emergency management program is geared toward reducing these shortfalls. • Most‐Likely Scenario. The worst‐case scenario for many communities is usually a catastrophic event. As Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated, this means that the ability of local government to centrally manage the event may be severely degraded or completely disrupted. Consequently, planners may opt to use a scenario or scenarios that are most likely to occur or that represent the maximum credible event with which the local government can cope. • Impact‐Based Scenario. Instead of focusing on a specific event, planners study the impacts of various hazards to construct a scenario based on the maximum impacts the community may face. For example power outages are to be expected during disaster. The length of the outage will vary based on the scenario. A planner developing an impact‐based scenario would select the maximum expected outage for use in the scenario. An impact‐ based scenario is a collection of assumptions based on the outcome of the hazard analysis to produce a generic worst‐case scenario based on impacts rather than hazards. Scenarios are particularly useful in helping to determine planning assump tions. Making assumptions is a balancing act. Conventional wisdom suggests that if one can deal with the worst‐case scenario, one should be able to deal with lesser events. However, selecting the worst‐case scenario may change the parameters of the plan by making the scope of the plan too large for a realistic response. This may actually deter planning, as the community may be unwilling to commit the necessary resources to deal with such a large‐scale event. This issue provides a dilemma for the emergency manager. As was noted in a previous chapter, catastrophic events and major disasters have such a low inci dence that it is difficult to gauge probability of occurrence. This suggests that if an event has occurred historically, no matter how remotely, it should be at least considered in planning. In other words, the careful analysis described in a previous chapter should not be considered an exact science but must be supple mented by good judgment. The probability of a major terrorist attack cannot be accurately calculated because of the low incidence, but the risk is real enough that emergency planners must consider it. However, some incidents, such as geologic upheavals of the past, are consid ered to be of such low incidence that they fall outside a community’s tolerance for risk. This means that the community considers the event so unlikely that it 204 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT is not prepared to expend resources to prepare for it. Consequently, the juris diction turns a blind eye to the possibility of the event occurring. This toler ance for risk must be factored in as one selects suitable planning scenarios. There are occasions where a worst‐case event is appropriate and necessary to demonstrate the need for more resources, but in many cases, the scenario selected will be the most likely one or the maximum‐credible event to which the jurisdiction can or is willing to respond. In selecting the most likely scenario, however, there is the potential to ignore less probable events with potentially high impact on the community, providing a false sense of security in the community’s ability to handle crisis. This is clearly illustrated in the Alyeska case study. The planners selected a best‐case scenario for the weather and sea conditions that was, in retrospect, completely unrealistic. A worst‐case scenario, with a vessel breaking up during a major storm, would have substantially changed the plan, as no containment of the spill would have been possible. However, the scenario that was selected contained conditions that were ideal from the planners’ perspective but were rare in Prince Edward Sound. Gathering historic information on weather and sea conditions might have allowed planners to make assumptions as to what conditions were most likely to occur, and this would have been a more reasonable basis for a plan. Scenarios are particularly useful in developing contingency plans for specific occurrences or for addressing agent‐generated needs. Contingency plans are usually developed for events that can be anticipated and have limited variables. They tend to be specific in nature and are primarily operationally oriented. An example of this type of plan is an evacuation plan associated with a flood inun dation zone below a dam. A community with multiple dam sites could prepare a contingency plan for each site providing predesignated routes and operating facilities (e.g. staging areas, shelter sites). Units responding to an inundation would operate under the overall jurisdictional plan and department plans and guidelines and would use the contingency plan to begin operations quickly. In essence, the contingency plan serves as an initial Incident Action Plan, saving time in a critical situation. In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted scenario‐ based planning through the introduction of a series of National Planning Scenarios (Figure 8.3) aimed at identifying the scope, magnitude, and com plexity of major events that could potentially affect the nation. However, the scenario list reflected the overwhelming DHS emphasis on terrorist attacks. Of the 15 scenarios, only two dealt with natural hazards: one for a major earth quake and one for a major hurricane. A third scenario was based on influenza pandemic. The remaining 12 scenarios were all terrorist attack scenarios, pri marily chemical and biological based. The problem with such an approach is that in place of a plan‐centric system, jurisdictions may evolve to a scenario‐centric one. There is a very real PLANNING CONCEPTS 205 possibility that jurisdictions will adopt the scenarios without regard to actual risk thereby using scarce resources to plan and prepare for events that are extremely unlikely to occur at the expense of planning for those that consti tute a very real risk to the community. Worse, jurisdictions may opt to plan for only the national scenarios while ignoring other potential risks. Scenario‐based planning is a powerful tool, but it has inherent problems. There are potentially unlimited scenarios for any community. Developing full plans for a variety of potential scenarios is a self‐limiting proposition because of the work involved in plan development and maintenance. Furthermore, if an event occurs that does not match a scenario, existing plans may not be suitable. There is a very real danger that the emphasis on specific scenarios may drive the types of behavior identified by Weick and Sutcliffe: creating unreal istic expectations of how disasters will unfold and creating an expectation that following the plan will automatically lead to success. For this reason, planners have moved over the years to multihazard functional plans. Functional Planning The drawbacks of scenario‐based planning can, to a certain extent, be offset using functional planning. Functional planning looks at those tasks the community must perform in a time of crisis and attempts to define commonal ities. In a sense, this negates the need for separate scenario plans by focusing on Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device Scenario 2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza Scenario 4: Biological Attack – Plague Scenario 5: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals Scenario 7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent Scenario 8: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion Scenario 9: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices Scenario 12: Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices Scenario 13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination Scenario 14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease) Scenario 15: Cyber Attack Figure 8.3 National planning scenarios – Note the emphasis on attack scenarios versus natural disasters. This highlights on of the problems with scenario‐based planning: selecting scenarios without hazard analysis can skew planning efforts. 206 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT response‐generated functions that will remain constant in most crises. It does not matter why sheltering is needed – the process for establishing and running shelters, for providing services, and for transitioning to temporary housing remain essentially the same. Locations, specific needs, and timing – these are variables that are agent‐specific and will require creativity in the implementa tion of the plan. However, the approach to sheltering, the resources, and the governance structure – all would remain constant despite the nature of the disaster. Functional planning is an attempt to construct an all‐hazards approach to emergency planning and has been the standard methodology used in the United States for many years. The core of functional planning is (i) the definition of the functions to be performed and (ii) the identification of an agency with responsibility for performing the function. This functional responsibility implies two areas of consideration for the agency. The most obvious is that they have responsibility for accomplishing the function during a crisis. However, if one supports the enterprise approach to emergency management, the agency also has responsibility for planning for that function’s accomplishment. This suggests that while the agency has respon sibility for making sure the function is performed, it does not necessarily need to do so alone. The agency may, in fact, draw upon the resources of the juris diction as needed, as long as its planning is centrally coordinated and does not represent a competition for resources. Consider the issue of evacuation as an example. Within this function are sev eral implied tasks: traffic control, route reconnaissance, establishment of fuel and rest stops, activation of reception centers, warning, public information, etc. Each of these tasks is performed by separate agencies and may be a function under the plan. The single lead agency cannot handle all these tasks on its own, so as it plans for evacuation, it must identify supporting agencies that can pro vide these services. The lead agency develops the plan with input from these supporting agencies and at the time of the crisis, coordinates the implementa tion of the plan. This plan is usually incorporated in the EOP as an annex and supported by individual agency plans and standard operating procedures. This functional approach forms the basis of the emergency support function (ESF) concept. The formal identification of lead and supporting agencies coupled with the identification of specific responsibilities makes the ESF concept a use ful planning tool (see Figure 8.4). The functional approach is not limited to EOPs. As one develops continuity and recovery plans, the same mechanism can be used to identify essential tasks and assign primary and supporting agencies to each. The success of this system depends on the support of the agency assigned to the task, and planning prod ucts should be integrated into the strategic plan as performance objectives. As has been noted, the precise list of functions used in preparing a functionally PLANNING CONCEPTS 207 based plan is the prerogative of the planners. There is no standardized list that is mandated for all plans, although Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 is considered a best practice and constitutes the minimum level acceptable for emergency response plans. What makes the functional plan effective, how ever, is not the list of functions but the assignment of those functions to specific action agents. This assignment of responsibility carries with it the mandate to develop plans and procedures related to the function and to provide leadership for that function during disaster. Functional planning correlates well with other areas of the emergency management program. It allows for the identification of those functions that will be needed during a crisis and for a comparison of these functions to existing capabilities. The gap between needed and required capabilities can then be addressed through the strategic planning process. Capabilities‐Based Planning Where scenario‐based planning is designed around potential hazards and functional‐based planning on the activities that will need to be performed in a crisis, capabilities‐based planning (also sometimes called task‐based planning) focuses on specific capabilities that will be needed in a crisis. In other words, it # 1 - T ra n sp o rt a tio n # 2 - C o m m u n ic a tio n s # 3 - P u b lic W o rk s a n d E n g in e e ri n g # 4 - F ir e fig h tin g # 5 - E m e rg e n cy M a n a g e m e n t # 6 - M a ss C a re , H o u si n g , a n d H u m a n S e rv ic e s # 7 - R e so u rc e S u p p o rt # 8 - P u b lic H e a lth a n d M e d ic a l S e rv ic e s # 9 - U rb a n S e a rc h a n d R e sc u e # 1 0 - O il a n d H a za rd o u s M a te ri a ls R e sp o n se # 1 1 - A g ri cu ltu re a n d N a tu ra l R e so u rc e s # 1 2 - E n e rg y # 1 3 - P u b lic S a fe ty a n d S e cu ri ty # 1 4 - L o n g -t e rm C o m m u n ity R e co ve ry a n d M iti g a tio n # 1 5 - E xt e rn a l A ff a ir s Agency USDA S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S SC/P S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S C S S S SS S S S S S S S S SP P/S S S S S S S S S C/P C/P C/P C/P C/P C/P C/P C/P P/S C/P C/P/S C/P/S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S P P P P S SS S S S S P S S S S S S S S S USDA/FS DOC DOD DOD/USAGE ED DOE HHS DHS DHS/EPR/FEMA DHS/IAIP/NCS DHS/USCG HUD DOI DOJ DOL Note: Unless a specific component of a department or agency is the ESF coordinator or a primary agency, it is not listed in this chart. Refer to the ESF Annexes for detailed support by each of these departments and agencies. C = ESF coordinator P = Primary agency S = Support agency Emergency Support Functions Figure 8.4 Matrix from the National Response Plan showing 15 emergency support functions and agency assignments. 208 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT answers the question, “What capabilities will I need to perform my assigned functions?” These capabilities include the following: • Personnel • Planning • Organization and leadership • Equipment and systems • Training • Exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions Capabilities‐based planning was the methodology used by the Department of Homeland Security in its national planning under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. DHS defined capabilities‐based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice.” It is an attempt to create an all‐hazards capability while at the same time making more effective use of federal grant funds. The DHS model was similar to the system that has been used very success fully by the military. The system broke complex scenarios into a series of collective tasks and identified the capabilities needed to meet the requirements of the given scenario. The model used a series of related documents to identify “target levels of capability,” that is the capabilities that will be needed, the level of government that will provide them, and the level to which they must be per formed. These target levels of capability could then be compared with existing capabilities to determine shortfalls that could be addressed through existing programs or by new ones funded under federal grants. To a certain extent, capabilities‐based planning combines elements of sce nario‐ and functional‐based planning and offers some advantages over using either method singly. The focus in capabilities‐based planning is on capacity development based on a realistic assessment of hazards, which is a basic goal of emergency management programs. Similar to functionally based planning, the capabilities based system seeks to build performance capacity, that is, the capacity to perform tasks required to meet operational objectives. Similar to scenario‐based planning, the capabilities‐based system uses projections of the most likely high‐impact events. EFFECTIVE PLANNING As has been mentioned, planning in the United States has evolved to be extremely plan‐centric. That is the existence of a plan that meets federal guidance is assumed to be evidence that a community has done the necessary PLANNING CONCEPTS 209 work to be able to respond to a crisis. This has been referred to as the “Paper Plan Syndrome” by Eric Auf der Heide (1989) and as “fantasy documents” by Lee Clarke (1999a). Such plans do little more than given the impression of pre paredness while masking significant gaps in readiness. This plan‐centric focus is coupled with a “one‐size fits all” mind‐set when it comes to planning methodology. Witness, for example the shift over the past decade from functional planning to that of capability‐based planning. The assumption is that the current paradigm is the only way to plan, and all planning is done in compliance with that paradigm. However, the planning methodol ogies are merely tools in a planners’ tool box, and each has its place in devel oping effective emergency plans. Simplicity in Planning One of the fundamental flaws in current plans is that they are written to meet the requirements of people other than the users of the plan. Plans are expected to go through a review process which may include local government, state agencies, and the federal government and are written accordingly. This means that they often contain information superfluous to the actual user. For example many plans include a detailed treatment of the Incident Command System, even though the users are expected to have been trained in the system. It is unlikely that even an untrained user will take the time to read this information during a crisis. However, information on the Incident Command System is included to demonstrate that the community is in fact using the system. Another problem is that plans written from the perspective of plan reviewers frequently include both operational and tactical elements. The level at which a plan is set has a direct bearing on how that plan is developed and written. Generally, the more specific a plan is, the lower the level at which it is intended to be used. Community‐wide plans tend to be operational in nature; they dis cuss overall concepts, provide planning guidance, and establish structures for assessment and decision‐making. Supporting plans are primarily tactical; they are narrow in scope and tell the users specific information about how to imple ment the plan. Plans at the full tactical level may be published as field operating guides and include checklists that distill the plans down to essential tasks. Figure 8.5 shows an example of how a jurisdictional plan may be supported by plans at different levels. In this example, a centrally developed jurisdictional shelter plan is implemented through a series of department plans, procedural documents, and checklists. An understanding of this concept of plan levels can prevent the inclusion of extraneous material in operational plans that provide too great a level of detail for the user. Likewise, it can help focus tactical level procedures by excluding unnecessary conceptual information while ensuring the necessary level of detail for the user. 210 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Operational Phases One of the major conceptual errors that have developed over time is the attempt to operationalize the comprehensive emergency management model. This has led to plans that are organized into the four phases of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Although the four‐phased model has been useful as a concept, it was never the intention of the National Governors’ Association that it reflects actual crisis operations. Instead, it was intended to reflect relationships among the various actors in a crisis, and the report includes several different examples of how the model could be applied (Figure 8.6). The problem with thinking of a crisis in terms of phases is that one begins to accept that plans will be implemented sequentially rather than concurrently. The result is that separate plans may be developed for each phase, with the potential to lead to conflicts over resources and operational control of the crisis. A more useful approach is to plan in terms of overlapping stages rather than discrete phases. An example of this is the work of Dr. Robert Chandler in crisis communications in which he identifies six overlapping stages in a crisis: 1. Warning: Increase the ability to respond effectively. 2. Risk Assessment: Assess risks, consequences, and damages. Emergency operations plan Provides overall concept, operating structure, and policies Annexes Provide information or additional detail for hazards or functions not included in the emergency operations plan • Direction and control • Evacuation • Communications • Mass care • Warning • Health and medical • Emergency public • Resource management information Supporting documents Supporting plans EOP and annexes Emergency response resource guide Fire department general orders Police event manual Hazardous materials response plan Public information officer handbook Weapons of mass destruction response plan Dam failure response plan Oil spill contingency plan Medical disaster plan Figure 8.5 Emergency plans consist of more than a single emergency operations plan. The basic concepts in the EOP must be supported by plans and procedures that implement those concepts. PLANNING CONCEPTS 211 3. Response: React to the emergency. 4. Management: Gauge and react to the progression of the crisis. 5. Resolution: Demobilize. 6. Recovery: Return to normal operations. Chandler’s model demonstrates several issues that are of concern to any planner. The first is that there is an initial period during which one attempts to determine what has happened and formulate a plan. The second is that because the stages overlap, you may be doing more than one thing at a time. For example just because you have begun to implement an action plan does not mean that you stop gathering information about the crisis. Similarly, recovery may begin before the crisis is fully resolved. M itigation L o n g -te rm Short-term Response Planning W a rn in g Private sector Local governme nt State governme nt Federal governme nt Re co ve ry Pr ep ar ed ne ss Attack Figure 8.6 One of several models of illustrating comprehensive emergency management in the National Governors Association report. This one deals with nuclear attack. 212 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT All‐Hazards Planning One of the misconceptions that influences planners is that the idea of all‐ hazards planning means planning for every eventuality that a community may face. The actual intent of all‐hazards planning is the development of plans that remain constant in any crisis, particularly unexpected ones. To understand how all‐ hazard planning works, one needs to return to the concept of response and agent‐generated needs discussed in a previous chapter. As was discussed, response‐generated needs are those functions required in any crisis, such as the need for emergency warning, sheltering, or emergency medical treatment. The application of those functions may adapt to meet the needs of the crisis, but the function is still present and implemented in a consistent manner. It is these response‐generated needs that form the basis of the all‐hazards plan. Because the all‐hazards plan deals with the assignment of responsibilities and lays out concepts for overall management of a crisis, it is an operational level plan. Consequently, an effective all‐hazard plan is one that adequately lays out the management framework for crisis without containing detailed implementation instructions more suited to tactical plans. However, considering only response‐generated needs is not sufficient to man age a crisis. Agent‐generated needs are those that will vary with the type of crisis encountered. Although response‐generated needs are best addressed through functional planning, agent‐generated needs fall into the area of contin gency planning and are usually addressed in separate plans or in annexes to the all‐hazards plan. These agent‐generated contingency plans make assumptions about the nature of the hazard creating the crisis and its potential impacts and then consider what changes will be required in the functions identified in the all‐hazards plan. They may also include detailed information, such as pre identified evacuation routes. Depending on the level of detail involved, contingency plans may be largely tactical in nature. Decentralized Execution Plan implementation is decentralized. Agencies may have autonomy in implementing their individual plans owing to the importance of immediate response or the possibility of communication failures. For example fire offi cers may institute an incident command structure to respond to an observed crisis. Continuity plans are implemented without central authority. Other organizations may have specific triggers to begin operations. Many community emergency response teams (CERTs) are organized to begin operations as soon as a specific event such as an earthquake occurs. It is also not unusual to see a transition in leadership over time as the need for specialized expertise changes. For example agencies responding to an explosion may initially be managed by the fire department because of their life‐safety responsibilities. Command can rapidly transition to the police to PLANNING CONCEPTS 213 coordinate the criminal investigation and then to public works for demolition and site cleanup. The tasks required of each agency are still being performed simultaneously, but overall coordination is handled by the agency best suited to do so at that point in the operation. The unifying factor in the response is the centrally developed operational plan, which would include an agreed upon incident management system. Various responses to the same incident may also be treated as separate oper ations by the agencies involved. Referring to Figure 8.7, the fire department responding to a large fire rescues victims and moves them to a staging area where they receive immediate medical treatment. Responsibility for the victims then passes to a Red Cross team that does an initial assessment of victim needs and provides emergency sheltering. As part of the sheltering operation, city services assess unmet needs, and the victims are enrolled in social programs as required. From the fire department’s perspective, the incident is the fire and their work in relation to sheltering is done once the victims have been staged and received medical attention. For the Red Cross, the incident is the shelter operation, with the fire scene assessment being an initial phase of the overall operation. To the city social services agency, the provision of relief is a relatively routine operation, with only the assessment and intake at the shelter requiring an unusual field deployment. The three separate autonomous responses consti tute a single coordinated community response to the fire. Shelter operations protocol (Response team) Emergency operations plan (Jurisdiction) Shelter annex (Jurisdiction) Operational level Tactical level Red Cross Shelter Operations Plan (Independent supporting agency) Dept. Human Services Response Plan (Lead agency) Fire Dept. General Orders (Initial responder) Dept. of Public Health Response Protocols (Supporting agency) Shelter operations checklist (Assigned officer) Shelter operations manual (Shelter team) Shelter operations SOP (Response team) Field Operations Guide (Incident commander) Figure 8.7 Synchronicity in planning: a centrally developed operational plan is used to coordinate the tactical plans of several agencies to achieve an agreed upon results. 214 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The development and implementation of multi‐level plans with decen tralized execution depends on coordinated, centralized planning. Centralized planning does not address all the specifics needed for low‐level plans nor does it mandate the level of detail required in those plans. These details are left to the subordinate groups responsible for developing tactical level plans. Centralized planning does not necessarily mean central approval either. Rather, it presupposes a common goal that ensures that all plans are written with the same purpose in mind, even as supporting plans also address the responsibilities of each planning group. Centralized planning articulates the overall end result that the organization hopes to achieve through its planning. This common goal or shared vision highlights the importance of the stra tegic planning model discussed in the previous chapter. To adequately manage centralized planning, it is absolutely critical that the community have clearly articulated strategies to guide the planning process. Issues related to concep tual approaches, policy, governance, and capabilities should have been raised and addressed as part of strategy development, allowing planners to focus on operational implementation of the strategies. Putting the Pieces Together As was previously noted, the varied types of planning and the various method ologies required to develop them can lead planners to think in very narrow terms and to assume that there is only one “best” methodology that should be used for planning. However, if one takes the broader view of looking at emergency planning as part of a system, one begins to realize that each concept and methodology has its place in the planning process. The basis of all‐hazards planning is understanding the difference bet ween response‐generated and agent‐generated needs. If one understands that response‐generated needs translate to functions that remain constant in most crises, then it becomes obvious that these are best addressed using a functional planning approach. Agent‐generated needs will change based on the type of event. This lends itself well to scenario‐based planning since it is possible to identify the variables likely to vary with the hazard encoun tered. The detailed identification of tasks inherent in capabilities‐based planning is a natural match for the development of supporting tactical plans. The concept of agent‐ versus response‐generated needs can be expanded to operational levels as well. Agent‐generated needs demand the coordinated approach found at the operational level, whereas response‐generated needs tend to be addressed at the tactical level if the requisite preplanning has been done. Figure 8.8 demonstrates this concept. PLANNING CONCEPTS 215 GENERAL PLANNING PRINCIPLES Over the past several chapters, this book has considered many concepts, prin ciples, and practices related to the development of emergency plans. Taken together, they constitute a comprehensive set of principles that can be used to assess and improve community disaster planning. These principles are not new; they are from the work of Dr. E.L. Quarantelli and were first articulated as early as 1991. These principles are as follows: 1. Focus on the Planning Process, Not the Plan: As was previously noted, a written plan reflects the intent of the community as to how it will deal with crisis; it is not an end in itself. Planning is about bringing community elements together under a shared vision, and the process of achieving this consensus is more important than the end product. 2. Recognize the Qualitative and Quantitative Differences Between Emer gencies, Disasters, and Catastrophes: As was discussed in a previous chapter, the differences between these three categories of crisis are significant and important to the scope of the plan. 3. Be Generic Rather Than Agent‐Specific: This principle is the heart of all‐hazards planning. It assumes a commonality of response to various crises that is independent of the triggering agent. 4. Avoid Development of a “Command and Control” Model: Authoritarian models based on military systems are not generally effective in disasters, despite the emphasis on the National Incident Management System. This is because such systems are based on a misunderstanding of how Operational Strategic Tactical Response- generated needs Agent- generated needs Scenario- based planning Capabilities- based planning Functional planning Figure 8.8 This model shows the relationships among agent‐ and response‐generated needs, operational levels, and planning methodologies. 216 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT people react in disasters and attempt to impose an artificial structure on behavior that is normal and predictable. Instead of direction, response models must focus on coordination. 5. Focus on General Principles Rather Than Specific Details: A common practice in plans is to become too detailed, to attempt to cover too much information. As was previously noted, plans should be written to the level at which they will be used. Plans are guidelines that should assist in the creative problem‐solving that characterizes successful response. 6. Base Plans on What is Likely to Happen: A common practice is to respond to the last disaster. The actions of the federal government since September 11 are a classic example of this tendency, with Hurricane Katrina serving as the case study of what can occur if one constantly looks behind rather than ahead. A realistic appraisal of potential haz ards is the foundation of all planning. 7. Integrate Plans Vertically and Horizontally: Planning must be an inclusive process. A characteristic of disasters is a convergence of responders from both the public and private sectors and from within and outside the community. The more these disparate elements are integrated into the planning process, the greater the chance for successful response. 8. Anticipate Problems and Suggest Solutions or Options: A characteristic of crisis is the need for creative problem‐solving. There is an old military maxim that states, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” The same is true during a crisis. Good planning should provide a mechanism for coordinating response and encourage appropriate actions by offering options and potential solutions that can be considered within the opera tional context of the crisis. 9. Use the Best Social Science Knowledge Possible: Chapter 3 discussed many of the common disaster myths and their negative influence on planning. It is startling how many emergency managers are unaware of information about the nature of disaster that has been available in social science research for years. By neglecting social science research, emergency managers are condemned to consistently repeat the same mistakes. 10. Recognize that There is a Difference Between Predisaster Planning and Planning Done During a Disaster: In a sense, all plans are strategic in that they represent what the community expects to happen and how the community expects to respond. However, once the disaster begins, plans are overcome by events, and creative problem‐solving must be used to respond to the realities of the situation. The process of developing plans prior to disaster and the process of planning during a disaster are sepa rate processes. PLANNING CONCEPTS 217 Quarantelli’s 10 principles of disaster planning represent a fusion of social science and accepted emergency management principles that create a standard for community planning. They also suggest why so many emergency plans seem to fail when implemented during crisis. Failure can usually be traced back to a violation of one of these principles. Of more concern is the implication that emergency planning in the United States has been skewed toward an ineffective model for over 50 years and that it is likely to get worse with the increased emphasis on terrorism. CONCLUSION Planning is the logical outgrowth of strategy development. It is the mecha nism used to translate strategic policies and concepts into practice and to identify the resources that will be needed to respond to crisis. However, it is the process of planning that is important rather than written plans. Once this is understood, the importance of engaging other groups in the process and the need to be inclusive becomes clear. An important concept is the idea that plans are not implemented sequentially and that the activation of multiple plans can lead to a competition for limited resources if they have not been synchronized through a coordinated process. This suggests that the compre hensive emergency management model is a strategic concept rather than a tactical one and that plans are better considered based on the time of imple mentation. Instead of considering sequential response, continuity, and recovery actions, one approaches holistic planning from the point of view of what tasks begin immediately, which are mid‐range actions, and which are long‐range. Under this approach, an EOP may include elements related to life‐safety, continuity, recovery, and postdisaster mitigation. Effective planning requires an understanding of the nature of disaster, the risks facing the community, and the availability of community resources. This helps to ensure that plans are based in reality and do not represent just wishful thinking on the part of the jurisdiction. To this end, it is important to use a structured process and to synchronize various plans to create a holistic community response. Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. 219 Chapter 9 The intelligence quotient of any meeting can be determined by starting with 100 and subtracting five points for each participant. —Scott Adams The previous chapter considered basic concepts that provide a context to plan development. But how does one make progress in developing plans? Plans, par- ticularly those involving multiple jurisdictions or agencies, seem to take forever to produce. There are endless meetings of well‐intentioned representatives and numerous draft plans and proposals, but final products seem elusive. This chapter looks at some of the techniques and methodologies that can be used to develop an effective plan. ESTABLISH A PLANNING STRUCTURE A critical first step in developing plans is to determine up front who are the stakeholders and what mechanism will be used to gain final approval for the plan. Stakeholders are those who have a vested interest in the plan, either through responsibility for implementing the plan or by being affected by the plan’s implementation. This could conceivably be a large group and, as Scott Adam’s humorous quote cautions, including too many players at a meeting can hamper progress. Consequently, it is necessary to determine which stakeholders play crucial roles in the plan as decision‐makers and implementers versus those stakeholders who do not have a direct role but whose needs and support must be considered in plan development. This allows the establishment of a planning structure that limits the number of final decision‐makers yet provides for the inclusion of all stakeholder concerns during plan development. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 220 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT As part of the process of identifying stakeholders, thought should be given to who will “own” the plan. Owning the plan means to accept responsibility for overseeing plan development and maintenance. Normally, this is the department or agency that has the lead in implementing the plan. However, this responsi- bility, especially where multiple departments or agencies are involved, is not always clear. Identifying this key agent becomes particularly important in plan maintenance. Plans are a snapshot of current thinking by the planning body, but the planning process continues past the publication of the plan. Over time, assumptions may change, authorities may shift, and lessons are learned through exercises and actual experience. These create the need to update the plan, either in whole or in part, and it is essential that someone be responsible for moni- toring changing circumstances and coordinating plan changes. Chapter 5 discussed the role of the advisory committee required under National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 and introduced the Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) planning model as one possible method for orga- nizing the emergency management program. In this model, the work of spe- cialist teams or interagency task forces was coordinated by an operations team and approved by the advisory committee. This approach has the advantage of having planning done by those who will be responsible for implementing the plan while still allowing for oversight of the products of the team. It incorpo- rates the deference to expertise that Weick and Suttcliffe note is one of the characteristics of high reliability organizations. Another model for planning is shown in Figure 9.1. This model uses a smaller steering committee to coordinate the work of various working groups Work Groups Stakeholder Committee Steering Committee Policy Committee Figure 9.1 Emergency planning model. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 221 drawn from the larger group of stakeholders. The steering committee meets frequently to monitor progress and to develop the agenda for the next group meeting. The larger group would meet less frequently to review and comment on projects done by the workgroups. Completed projects are then submitted for approval to the program advisory committee. Both the FIRESCOPE and steering committee models provide for the inclusion of stakeholders in the planning process, the assignment of work, and the final approval of the work products. This approval of work products is a critical step in planning. When tactical experts are primarily responsible for planning, there is a risk that the end prod- uct will be written to the tactical level. This means that the scope of the plan will be narrow, and it may not be fully integrated with stakeholder agencies that do not have direct tactical responsibilities. If the aim is to produce an opera- tional plan that will serve as a coordination mechanism for other plans, this could present a problem. Consequently, part of the governance structure for planning should include the provision for oversight of the end product, to include the circulation of draft documents to all stakeholders before final decisions are made. In establishing the planning governance structure, thought should be given as to how the group will make decisions. Conflicts can be decided in several ways. Two of the most common in a group setting are executive decision and majority vote. In the executive decision model, a senior manager agreed upon by the group is the final arbiter of any conflict within the group and his or her decision is considered final. In the majority vote model, members of the group who have voting privileges settle conflicts by voting with a simple majority or an agreed upon ratio (e.g. two‐thirds majority) deciding the outcome. The problem with these two common methods is that they constitute what psychologists call a win/lose scenario. In this transaction, someone has won (the side that the decision or vote favored), and someone has lost and is conse- quently unhappy. There can also be issues over who can vote. For example, are all representatives from a department allowed a vote or only one? Do private companies or volunteer groups have a vote? For these reasons, a more reason- able approach is to resolve conflict through developing a consensus. Consensus means that everyone in the group can live with the decision without feeling that they are surrendering anything significant. Consensus is achieved by a process of discussion to determine the elements of disagreement and to resolve them by either providing more detailed information on the issue or by finding a way of achieving the same result through a slightly different approach. A useful starting point is to focus on what the group already agrees upon before tackling the areas of conflict. This establishes a basis for cooperation and puts the points of conflict in context. Consensus can generally be achieved when group members can articulate their concerns. These concerns are frequently based on assumptions about other 222 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT group members’ positions or information that the group had not considered. Once the concerns are articulated and examined by the group, it is usually pos- sible to resolve points of conflict in a manner that allows the group to move on. The consensus process is not without its problems. It can allow a single neg- ative individual to block progress, and frequent compromises can dilute the effectiveness of the plan. It may also lead to ineffective compromises as partic- ipants seek to limit personal risk, resulting in mediocre work products or lack of rapid progress. For this reason, being clear about the rules that will govern the process and who are the decision‐makers is absolutely essential. USE A MEETING FACILITATION PROCESS Achieving consensus depends on creating a safe environment for free discussion of points of conflict and establishing a process that leads to resolution of those issues. To create this, environment and process require that meetings be care- fully structured to achieve desired outcomes. The meeting is an essential tool of the emergency planner. An effective plan requires the support of multiple stake- holders, and the best way of garnering that support is to involve stakeholders in the planning process. Consequently, at some point, these stakeholders must be brought together in a meeting. Unfortunately, most meetings tend to be unfocused and counterproductive. This is usually the result of differing expectations among attendees and a lack of agreement on the purpose of the meeting. Decisions made at the meeting are not captured for those who were not present, and there is seldom any follow‐up or action taken outside the meeting. In many cases, the meeting is viewed as an end in itself rather than part of a process that leads to the development of a work product. The result is a seemingly endless series of meetings that produce few results. To counteract this tendency for meetings to degenerate into nonproductive gatherings, use a formal process to facilitate the meeting. Such a process keeps the meeting focused and allows for assigning and tracking follow‐up actions to make sure that progress is in fact being made. Case Study 9.1 provides an example of how a facilitation process can produce dramatic changes in the effectiveness of a group or team. A meeting facilitation process has three core components: preparation, con- duct, and follow‐through (see Figure 9.2). Preparation includes things such as developing the agenda, arranging a meeting place, and developing ground rules. The actual conduct of the meeting requires the ability to keep the meet- ing focused and deal with any problems that might arise. The follow‐through, a component that is often neglected, provides for recording the results of the meeting as a historical record, information for absentees, and as a means of holding attendees accountable for decisions made at the meeting. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 223 CASE STUDY 9.1: HURRICANE INIKI, 1992 – MEETING FACILITATION IMPROVES RESPONSE On 11 September 1992, the eye of Hurricane Iniki passed over the Hawaiian island of Kauai, causing six deaths and over $3 billion in damages. Over 14 000 homes were damaged or destroyed, and electric power and telephone services were completely disrupted. Damage to cash crops such as sugar cane, papaya, and banana and to the local hotel industry caused severe economic hardship. It was the worst storm in recorded history to strike the Hawaiian Islands and, at the time, one of the costliest hurricanes in the US history. Case Figure 9.1 Hurricane Iniki struck the Hawaiian Islands on 11 September 1992. It was the worst storm in recorded history to strike the Islands and one of the costliest hurricanes in the US history. Photo Credit: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Almost before the storm had passed, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began deploying federal resources to assist in relief and recovery operations. Because of the extensive damage to Kauai, FEMA implemented the fledging Federal Response Plan, deploying over 20 federal agencies and the Red Cross. A management team from FEMA Region IX in San Francisco arrived on Oahu on 12 September and began operations from a temporary facility. The management team was immediately overwhelmed by the data being provided by the other agencies. Just reading and collating situation reports from federal and state agencies swamped the small plans unit. The operations section faired little better – so many resources were being deployed that daily operations meetings took several hours and resulted in a mass of data that had to be reviewed and collated. The Operations Chief was (continued on next page) 224 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT unable to give an acceptable daily briefing to senior management because of this volume of information, and critical issues were frequently overlooked. In desperation, the Plans Chief sought help from the US Forest Service personnel who had been deployed to deal with potential firefighting issues. The United States Forest Service (USFS) had deployed a trained incident management team that was not being used and provided personnel from their plans unit to assist the FEMA team. One of the first things that the USFS personnel recommended was the use of a facilitator at the daily planning meetings. They established an agenda that focused on unresolved critical issues rather than on a “brain dump” and formulated a set of ground rules to guide the meeting. The Operations Chief was initially skeptical, fearing that he would not have all the information he needed to coordinate activities. However, in a few days he began to realize that he was now fully aware of problem areas and could formulate action plans to deal with them. The meeting minutes formed the nucleus of his daily operations briefing to senior management, and he could present significant issues in a focused and efficient manner. Operations meetings went from three hours to a half‐ hour, and personnel left feeling much more comfortable with the progress of the operation. The use of a facilitated meeting process shortened the length of the meetings, made the time spent in meetings more productive, and focused staff on essential requirements. The results were so successful that FEMA adopted the USFS method as part of the standard operating procedures for FEMA plans units. Preparation Conduct Core meeting process Context Feedback Follow through ResultsIssues Figure 9.2 Meeting facilitation process based on a diagram by Interaction Associates © 1996. (continued from previous page) PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 225 Meeting Agenda A frequently overlooked meeting tool is the agenda (see Figure 9.3). The agenda is the mechanism that helps to form a common expectation for the meeting. It is derived through a process of determining what the issues are and how the meeting is expected to address them. This process determines what issues will be excluded, how issues will be presented, and how decisions will be made (e.g. consensus, majority vote, and executive decision). This allows attendees to make decisions about participation in the meeting. For example, an attendee may decide to bring a senior representative, subject‐matter expert, or appro- priate files and documents depending on the issues under discussion. In the worst case, an attendee may decide not to attend to deal with a higher priority. Although this may seem a problem at first, it is merely good time management. Wasting attendees’ time is a cardinal sin in meeting management. The agenda identifies the following: 1. The Type of Meeting: The type of meeting you are holding will determine attendance and the process you will use to facilitate the meeting. Meetings Strategic Planning Committee 8/16/20XX 1:00 PM to 2:00 PM Building 9 Meeting called by: Age nda Type of meeting: Facilitator: Order of Agenda Items Agenda Review Approve Administrative Plan Review proposed strategic goals and objectives Next Steps Meeting Review XXXX Committee Committee Committee XXXX 5 10 35 5 5 Present Discuss Decide Present Discuss Discuss Decide Discuss Persons Responsible Process Time Allocated Expected Outcomes: CCCC, Chair Decision making XXXX 1. Approve draft Administrative Plan 2. List of goals and objectives Figure 9.3 Sample agenda format. The agenda helps manage expectations for the meeting. 226 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT may be used to solve problems, present information, make decisions, or develop plans. Attendees need to understand what will be expected of them at the meeting. Trying to combine different types of meetings can be done, but it depends on careful transitions. Generally, it is better to stay with a single type of meeting. 2. Expected Outcomes for the Meeting: Effective meetings produce results. The expected outcome of the meeting should be clearly articulated so that every attendee has the same expectation. Knowing the expected outcome can have a bearing on the level of attendance. For example, if the expected outcome is to make a final decision on an issue, a senior official may elect to attend the meeting rather than sending a representative. 3. Topics to be Discussed: Knowing what topics will be discussed allows attendees to properly prepare for the meeting, either through conducting background research or by bringing appropriate materials. It also allows busy officials to determine whether the meeting is appropriate for them to attend. 4. Group Leader: Someone must accept responsibility for calling the meet- ing. The perceived importance of this group leader may also affect the level of the attendance. 5. Process for Each Agenda Item (Formal Presentation, Group Discussion, Decision, etc.): This item informs the attendee of what to expect for the topic to be discussed. This prevents misunderstandings about whether issues will be discussed or decided on and again helps the attendee make decisions about attendance and premeeting preparation. 6. Time Limits for Agenda Items: Effective meetings start and end on time. This is a key point: busy officials willing to commit time to a meeting must be assured that the meeting will not run over its scheduled limit. The way to manage this is to set time limits for each agenda item and stick to them. Attendees should know this in advance. 7. Meeting Information (e.g. Time, Date, and Location): Although it may seem obvious, an agenda should contain basic information regarding the meeting time, date, location, parking arrangements, etc. Conducting the Meeting The second core component of the meeting facilitation process is the conduct of the meeting itself. The facilitator is concerned about several key processes as follows: encouraging participation to the maximum extent possible, capturing key discussions and decisions, and keeping the meeting focused on the agenda PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 227 and expected outcomes. To accomplish this, the facilitator has several tools available: 1. The Agenda: The first action in every meeting should be to review and agree on the agenda. If necessary, the group can modify the agenda. However, once the agenda has been agreed upon, it should be followed, and any additional items or extended discussions should be placed on a future agenda. 2. Ground Rules: Although they may appear unnecessary, ground rules can prevent potential conflict and irritants. They establish a safe environment and limit interruptions. Examples of ground rule items include prohibi- tions on personal attacks, agreement to stick to time limits, and placing cell phones and pagers in vibrate mode. 3. Group Memory: A key role in the meeting is that of the recorder. However, just having someone taking notes does not always satisfy all meeting participants, particularly someone whose principal concern is not on the agenda. A flip chart or electronic projection system allows participants to see that an item or issue has been recorded using lan- guage that captures the essence of the discussion. It legitimizes partici- pants’ statements, provides accountability, and frees participants from note taking. The group memory also forms the basis of the minutes pre- pared after the meeting. A section of the group memory should be designated to record items that are unrelated to the agenda but that the group wishes to consider at a future meeting. This “parking lot” allows items to be captured for later consideration without compromising the agenda. 4. Action Plan: The action plan captures next steps for the group. It iden- tifies the action to be accomplished, the action agent, and the timeframe allotted for the action. This is an essential component to the meeting if progress is to be made. 5. Meeting Review: It is useful to conduct a brief review of the meeting as the last agenda item. This review focuses on what the participants liked about the meeting and what actions could be taken to improve future meetings. The Meeting Memorandum Oddly enough, very few groups produce a written record of what was accom- plished at a meeting. This is normally because of the time required to develop formal minutes or through some misguided notion that the minutes may be used against the group in litigation. Yet keeping a record and tracking progress 228 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT are critical to making meetings productive. It allows stakeholders who were not at the meeting to be kept apprised of key discussion points and decisions, and it allows the group to measure progress. By using a facilitation process, the task of producing a written record is not as onerous as producing formal minutes. This is because several key components of the written record are produced at the meeting and can be included as part of a meeting memorandum in lieu of formal minutes (see Figure 9.4). The basic components of the meeting memo- randum are as follows: 1. Agenda: The meeting agenda is included in the meeting memorandum to show the items under discussion. 2. Summary of Key Decisions – This summarizes any decisions made by the group in accordance with the agenda. 3. Group Memory: The group memory is recorded directly as written. 4. Unresolved Issues: These are issues that are potential agenda items for future meetings. They are drawn from the “parking lot.” Strategic Planning Committee 8/16/20XX 1:00 PM to 2:00 PM Building 9 Meeting called by: Meeting Memo Type of meeting: Facilitator: Present Invited This meeting memo is my interpretation of what happened at this meeting. If you would like to correct an error or make an addition, please contact XXXX. Signature What Happened and How: Decisions/Action Items: Action Items: Decisions Next Steps: Item Who When Expected Outcomes: Figure 9.4 Sample meeting memorandum. This document is quicker to produce than standard meeting minutes and provides all essential information about decisions made and actions assigned. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 229 5. Action Plan: The action plan is usually given as a table showing the action item, the action agent, and the target date for completion. 6. Meeting Review: Usually reflected in two columns: went well/could be improved. By using a meeting facilitation process, meetings become more productive, and participants can see progress being made toward the group’s objectives. The case study from Hurricane Iniki (see Case Study 9.1) demonstrates the simplicity and power of the meeting facilitation process. In this case, the sheer volume of information and the many unrelated activities that needed to be coordinated overwhelmed the federal responders until the implementation of a facilitated meeting process. DEVELOP AN ACTION PLAN AND SET DEADLINES Another frequent occurrence in planning is the establishment of an open‐ended task force or working group. In reaction to an occurrence or recognized need, a group of experts is brought together to “do something” about the problem. After an enthusiastic initial meeting, the group continues to meet without pro- ducing anything until it disintegrates from lack of interest. There is usually a fair bit of reluctance to join such groups initially and participants, even though supportive of the group’s purpose, will eventually come to view the meetings as a waste of valuable time and personnel resources. A simple way of approaching such a problem is to develop an action plan up front that defines the expected outcome and establishes milestones to be accomplished at each of a set number of meetings. Using this methodology, participants are asked to commit to a specified amount of time and develop a defined deliverable. The action plan can be modified if the group determines more time is needed. Since it is already agreed that the group will have a limited tenure, these time extensions should be manageable. Action plans are relatively simple in concept. However, a major stumbling block is gaining agreement on the deliverable. There is a tendency for group members to attempt to add pet projects, resulting in what the US military terms “mission creep.” It is critical, therefore, that the initial meeting be used to develop agreement on the scope of the project and the end product. Once these two issues are resolved, the group can identify tasks that will need to be accomplished to achieve the end state and can assign action agents to those tasks. The establishment of a project timeline also allows for management over- sight of the working group. The group leader can now be held accountable for meeting project milestones and can explain any lack of progress to senior man- agers who can assist in providing additional resources or removing stumbling blocks to achieving the project’s goal. 230 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Task 5.1 Coduct survey of existing shelters using contractor support Smith .2 .1 N/A 3/10 9/1 9/15 11/5 Jones Johnson .5 .2 Jones Director Jones 5.2 Convene shelter working group and develop revised plan 5.3 Conduct tabletop exercise to test revised plan 5.4 Submit revised plan to Advisory Committee for approval Updated shelter database $15 000 N/A N/A N/A Draft shelter operations plan Exercise after action report Revision approved Assigned To FTE Estimated Completion Measurement Budget Goal 5: Revise shelter operations plan Figure 9.5 Sample performance elements from a work plan. MANAGING MULTIPLE PROJECTS Although the development of action plans and project timelines help manage an individual project, emergency planners must manage many projects at the same time. These multiple demands make it difficult to focus on important tasks and can rapidly diffuse the effectiveness of an emergency management office. Projects are not completed, staff become exhausted and frustrated, and there is a general impression of lack of progress. The stress of overseeing an emergency management program can never be eliminated but can be lessened by organizing the office to allow efficient management of projects. Annual Work Plans The principal tool for managing multiple projects is the annual work plan. To a certain extent, the work plan fulfills a role analogous to the strategic plan. Where the strategic plan identifies goals, performance measures, and resources for the program, the work plan performs a similar task for the emergency management office and staff. Work plan elements are essentially individual performance objectives and are crafted in much the same way as those in the strategic plan: they identify the task, assign an action agent, establish dead- lines, provide a metric, and provide resources. Figure 9.5 shows an example of a work plan element. Note that it identifies a specific goal that is then broken into measurable tasks, each with an assigned action agent, a completion date, and an expected outcome. There is also an estimate of the time required for the project. In this case, the staff member, Jones, is the lead on the project and is expecting to spend over half of his or her available time on this project. This estimate becomes particularly impor- tant when one summarizes the total work to be performed by an individual. If PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 231 the total work assigned exceeds available hours, then tasks will need to be reprioritized or other resources such as additional staff, contractor support, or an overtime budget must be provided. This process keeps staff from being overloaded. Projects can also be prioritized within the work plan. A common method of ranking is as follows: • Priority 1: Must be accomplished. • Priority 2: Should be accomplished. • Priority 3: Would like accomplished. In actual practice, however, these priorities are not particularly effective. Priority 1 tasks are generally accomplished, priority 2 tasks may get partially accomplished, but priority 3 tasks are not even considered because of lack of time. Realistically estimating the time required for a project or task and pri- oritizing these based on available resources is a much more effective management tool. It also has the bonus of being defensible. One does not have to explain why tasks identified in the work plan as priority 2 or 3 were not accomplished. Another key element in the work plan is the measurement of success. If one expects the emergency management program to produce results, one should be able to identify the expected outcome in measurable terms. In this example, each performance objective has a tangible outcome (a database, a plan, or a report) or a specific verifiable action (advisory group approval that is docu- mented in meeting minutes). This measurement has two purposes: it allows the planner to understand the emergency manager’s expectation for the task, and it provides a metric for the manager to verify that the work has been accomplished. Similar to the strategic plan, the work plan is not a static document. Although prepared annually, it should be reviewed quarterly or semi‐annually and adjusted as necessary. Adjustments may be necessary because projects may be delayed, staff changes may occur, or new priorities may arise. The work plan is a tool to manage the activities of the emergency management staff; it is not intended to lock the emergency manager into a predetermined course of action. Graphic Planning Tools Another tool that may be useful in managing workflow is the use of graphic planning tools. These tools provide visual representations of the work plan and help to identify available time or critical paths. Although not generally used by emergency management offices, they do offer some useful advantages in managing staff time. 232 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The simplest graphic tool is the Gantt chart. Originally developed by Henry Gantt in 1910 to track manufacturing processes, the Gantt chart has developed into a standard management tool. The strength of the chart is that it tracks project initiation and completion over time and provides a visual representa- tion of project commitments. Figure 9.6 is an example of a Gantt chart devel- oped using the work plan elements from Figure 9.5. In this case, there is a timeline for the entire project and individual timelines for each task. The same process could be used to track an individual employee’s work assignments and, using an expanded calendar, factor in nonavailable time such as vacations, exer- cises, mandatory meetings, etc. Although a graphic tool such as the Gantt chart and its more complicated counterpart, the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) chart, can be extremely useful tools, they are not a substitute for the development of a structured work plan. Without the specific performance objectives delineated in the work plan to provide a basis for charting, graphic tools have only limited use in managing workflow. FACILITATE DECISION‐MAKING An emergency planner must be something of a psychologist in terms of under- standing human nature. Decision‐making is difficult for many people because of concerns about the impact on the decision‐maker if he or she makes the wrong call. This is usually the result of the decision‐maker feeling that he or she does not have sufficient information to make an informed decision. Similarly, many decision‐makers cannot articulate the outcome that they desire from a project beyond very general terms. Understanding this, the emergency planner can structure the planning process to overcome these two psychological barriers. A key to overcoming these barriers is to understand that senior officials make decisions based on trust in the process and the project leadership, not in Goal 5 Tasks 5.1 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 5.2 5.3 5.4 Figure 9.6 Sample of the use of a Gantt chart to display work plan information. This chart is derived from the performance objectives in Figure 9.5. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 233 a detailed reading of the end product. In other words, a senior official will rarely read an entire plan but will instead approve or disapprove it based on a briefing on the plan, the process used to develop it, and the results of reviews by trusted advisors. A plan that is the result of a collaborative multiagency project and approved by intermediate managers will most likely receive the approval of senior management. The senior official assumes that key personnel with expert qualifications have already reviewed and approved the plan and that approval by the senior official carries low risk. Once this process is understood, planning groups are better able to make decisions regarding the planning project. It is not uncommon for planning pro- jects to be delayed while awaiting decisions on policy issues that surfaced during planning. These issues are usually framed as a question, rather than as a recom- mendation. In essence, the planners are asking a senior official to make a decision for which the official has little or no knowledge or experience. The dynamic changes if planners realize that, as subject‐matter experts, their opinion carries weight with senior officials. Instead of asking at each step, “What do you want me to do?” The planners now can say, “Here’s my recommendation.” Planning is at its most effective when it is bottom‐driven in this way. A critical starting point in the planning process is to define expected out- comes and planning parameters that affect these outcomes. Although one would expect that the senior executive would define these, in actual practice it is common for the emergency planner, working with other managers and the planning group, to develop recommendations for consideration by executive management. There are policy‐level decisions that must be made before the rest of the planning process can continue. These policy decisions will form the basis of all future plans. Again, approaching senior management with a recommen- dation rather than a question simplifies the decision‐making process. The senior executive can approve or disapprove or request more information, but he or she does not have to synthesize ideas with too little information. A useful technique for obtaining a decision from a senior manager is what the military calls the decision paper. A decision paper lays out the thought processes behind a policy recommendation and its potential impact on the organization. Figure 9.7 shows a decision paper format used by the US Army. This format allows for a brief description of the reason why the decision is needed and shows how the recommendation was developed. It also provides an analysis of the impact of the decision (e.g. costs, personnel requirements) and provides an opportunity for review by affected stakeholders. The latter helps diffuse potential conflicts by allowing a stakeholder to disagree with the recom- mendation while providing an opportunity for the planner to rebut their dis- agreement. Using a formal mechanism such as the decision paper provides the senior executive with all relevant information needed to make a decision and significantly simplifies the process. A simple approval signature on the docu- ment is usually enough to implement the policy. 234 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Decision‐making within working groups can also be facilitated through a similar process. It is difficult for large groups to develop a work product while at a planning meeting; therefore, it is common for several individuals to develop draft products and present them to the group for comment. A quick way of jump‐starting a group is to prepare what the military calls a “straw man,” a draft prepared and distributed in advance of the meeting that will provoke discussion. The concept of the straw man is based on the theory that it is always easier to criticize an existing document than to synthesize a new one. Where time is important, collecting assumptions, proposals, and ideas into a draft can provide a working document, or, at the very least, generate discussion over points of contention. Similar to all components of a project, reviews of draft documents should have deadlines. This deadline can be a meeting to discuss the draft or a date by which comments must be submitted. Ideally, stakeholders should either com- ment or signify agreement in writing. Less desirable but also acceptable is to have a group agreement that if no comments are received from a stakeholder by the deadline, it is assumed that they concur with the draft. In fast‐paced situa- tions, it may be possible to use a deadline and a return receipt as proof that the stakeholder received the document and had an opportunity to review it, even if they chose not to comment. USE COMMON PLAN FORMATS For all the diversity among emergency management programs, there is a remarkable similarity in emergency plan formats. This has been the result of a misinterpretation of federal guidance on emergency planning and assumptions about mandatory requirements. 1. Problem – a brief statement of the problem that led to the policy recommendation 2. Recommendation – the policy recommendation 3. Background and Discussion – Facts relevant to the problem such as other solutions that were considered and their pros and cons 4. Resource Impact – Potential impact to the organization such as budget costs, redirection of resources, etc. 5. Coordination – Agreement or non-agreement by stakeholders who will be affected if the policy is implemented 6. Consideration of Non-concurrence – Rebuttal arguments to any non-agreement by stakeholders. Figure 9.7 Decision paper format. Providing a recommendation rather than a question helps senior executives make decisions quickly. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 235 FEMA’s first major foray into emergency planning guidance was Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 1‐8 Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans and its companion document CPG 1‐8A Guide for the Review of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans. CPG 1‐8 established a common format for emergency plans, and CPG 1‐8A was a crosswalk for eval- uating plans to make sure that all key components were included. As requirement for participation in the State and Local Emergency Management Assistance (EMA) grant program, state and local governments were required by 44CFR to “conform to the requirements for plan content” established in these documents. Despite the requirement for conformance and not compliance, emergency plans began to use the sample emergency operations plan shown in Chapter 6 of CPG 1‐8 as the basis for all planning. State and Local Guide (SLG) 101 Guide for All‐Hazard Emergency Operations Planning superseded CPG 1‐8 in 1996. SLG 101 did not make any significant changes to the emergency opera- tions plan format and was specific that the format was not mandatory (see Chapter 3 of SLG 101). Nevertheless, within a few years, it was difficult to find a jurisdiction that did not follow the SLG 101 sample format. When FEMA developed the Federal Response Plan, it chose a format that, while conformant with the principles of SLG 101, did not use the SLG 101 sample format. Instead, FEMA opted to emphasize the functional planning approach by grouping federal responders into a series of Emergency Support Functions (ESF), each with its own functional annex, and added a series of support annexes for those functions not assigned to an ESF. The plan also included an incident‐specific annex and included plan information and mainte- nance in a series of appendices. This same format was carried over into the National Response Plan (NRP). With the issuance of the National Response Plan, emergency operations plans underwent another revision as states scrambled to realign their plans to the one used by the NRP. This change took place under the misapprehension that the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiatives required that emergency plans align with the NRP. Not only is there no such requirement, but also CPG 101 Developing and Maintaining Operations Plans, which superseded SLG 101 in 2008, reaf- firmed that there was no mandatory format required for compliance with NIMS. This misunderstanding of conformance versus compliance is one of the rea- sons that the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard and NFPA 1600 do not include sample plans. There are concerns that any samples would quickly be adopted as requirements for demonstrating con- formance with the standards. Nevertheless, using common formats for various plans offers several advantages: • Information is easier to locate in a crisis if similar formats are followed. • Assessing plans for conformance with jurisdictional standards is easier. 236 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT • Using the same format as supporting agencies (e.g. state or federal) provides compatibility among plans and may eliminate confusion in a crisis. • Similarity creates a psychological sense of cohesiveness – multiple plans appear part of the same program. The point is that, despite pressures to use a format of one type or another, there is no requirement to do so. Some states have mandated the use of for- mats to ensure consistency and compatibility, but even most of these allow some latitude for local governments to develop plans appropriate for their communities. Consequently, planners should take advantage of this to make sure that plans are realistic and appropriate in terms of community values and available resources. If a plan does not work for the jurisdiction, it is unlikely to be used. Determining Plan Content The previous discussion suggests that, in developing an emergency operations plan, one should first consider the environment in which the plan is to function and what elements are appropriate for inclusion in the jurisdiction’s plans. CPG 101 identifies six factors that should be considered during the planning process: 1. Organization: Plans that are written to fulfill grant requirements are bulky and almost useless in a crisis. A plan designed for use is simple and organized so that critical information can be located quickly and intuitively. 2. Progression: Plan elements should flow logically. 3. Consistency: Plan elements should be formatted in the same way for ease of use, and various components should not disagree or conflict with each other. This is usually a problem between the base plan and supporting annexes and plans. 4. Adaptability: As has been noted, the greater the level of crisis, the more there is a need for innovation and creative thinking. Plans should serve as a toolbox of potential solutions and be capable of adapting to unantici- pated problems. 5. Compatibility: Plans should enhance coordination and exclusivity. This suggests that they should be coordinated with supporting agencies and plan stakeholders to make sure that there is congruence among various agency plans. 6. Inclusivity: Plans should address the needs of those most vulnerable to disaster: people with functional needs such as children, non‐English speakers, those with disabilities or access needs. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 237 With these success factors in mind, one should consider how the plan should be organized. Plans usually have three basic components (see Figure 9.8): • Base Plan. This element articulates the scope and overall concept of the plan. It also includes relevant policy and authorities and assigns responsi- bilities for carrying out specific actions during the crisis. It describes functional roles and responsibilities for various responding organizations and establishes lines of authority. • Functional Annexes. These provide detailed procedures that must be imple- mented to accomplish assigned functions and remain relatively consistent for most events. These annexes include both operational functions (e.g. building inspection) and supporting functions such as financial or logis- tics management. Functional annexes may also be supplemented by depart- a) Introductory Material Basic Plan (i) Promulgation Document/Signatures (ii) Approval and Implementation (iii) Record of Changes (iv) Record of Distribution (v) Table of Contents b) Purpose, Scope, Situation Overview, and Assumptions (i) Purpose (ii) Scope (iii) Situation Overview (a) Hazard Analysis Summary (b) Capability Assessment (c) Mitigation Overview (iv) Planning Assumptions c) Concept of Operations d) Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities e) Direction, Control, and Coordination f) Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination g) Communications h) Administration, Finance, and Logistics i) Plan Development and Maintenance j) Authorities and References Functional Annexes Hazard-, Threat-, or Incident- Speci�c Annexes (Note: This is not a complete list. Each jurisdiction’s core functions will vary.) a) Direction, Control, and Coordination b) Continuity of Government/Operations c) Communications d) Transportation e) Warning f) External Affairs/Emergency Public Information g) Population Protection h) Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services i) Public Health and Medical Services j) Resource Management k) CIKR Restoration l) Damage Assessment m) Fire�ghting n) Logistics Management and Resource Support o) Search and Rescue p) Oil and Hazardous Materials Response q) Agriculture and Natural Resources r) Energy s) Public Safety and Security t) Long-Term Community Recovery u) Financial Management v) Mutual Aid/Multi-Jurisdictional Coordination w) Private Sector Coordination x) Volunteer and Donations Management y) Worker Safety and Health z) Prevention and Protection a) Hurricane/Severe Storm b) Earthquake c) Tornado d) Flood/Dam Failure e) Hazardous Materials Incident f) Radiological Incident g) Biological Incident h) Terrorism Incident (Note: This is not complete list. Each jurisdiction’s annexes will vary based on their hazard analysis) 1 2 TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONAL EOP FORMAT 3 Figure 9.8 Emergency operations plan format. Source: SLG 101 Guide for All‐Hazard Emergency Operations Planning. 238 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT mental plans, standard operating procedures, and other supporting documents. Functional annexes generally address response–generated needs. • Incident or Hazard Specific Annexes. These are essentially contingency plans for specific events and provide supplemental information to the functional annexes. They may include separate plans that are incorporated by reference. Their focus is primarily on agent‐generated needs. There are elements that a jurisdiction must consider in developing a functional plan. How these elements are addressed in the plan and the degree of detail are the decisions of the planning group and should be based on the risk assessment and a realistic appraisal of resources. These decisions should also consider the operating level of the plan – tactical or operational – and the availability of supporting plans and documents. USE GRAPHIC TOOLS There is an adage that a picture is worth a thousand words. There is, in fact, a psychological basis for this. Although many people can read and comprehend a written description of a process, many others are visually oriented and are more likely to understand a graphical display of the same information. This is part of the reason a situation map, or status chart, proves so useful in an emergency operations center. In a time of crisis, simplicity is essential. Consideration should be given, therefore, to using simple graphical tools both in written plans and in actual operations. One problem that frequently occurs in planning is determining whether a process flows logically. A good way to ensure that this occurs is to graph the processes using a flowchart. Figure 9.9 shows an example of this technique. This flowchart was developed to analyze the process of how reports were developed in a plans unit in an emergency operations center. The flowchart identifies the personnel involved, the key processes they perform, and critical decision points. Flowcharting in this manner has several advantages: • It identifies potential conflicts or illogical sequences. Lines that cross or reverse direction generally signal a potential problem area that can be simplified. • It can highlight and eliminate redundancy or duplication. • It identifies dependencies both in terms of what is needed to accomplish the process and those elements that are relying on the successful comple- tion of the process. • The result is not only a useful planning tool but can also be included in the plan as a graphic. Graphic tools can also be used during operations to increase understanding of data through visual displays. Figure 9.10 is an example of a combination of PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 239 Information received Situation status unit Initial analysis Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Conflicts in data? Reports specialist Conflicts in data? Clerical specialist Clerical specialist Distribute report, file copies Final review Collate report Type report Review report Problems with report? Problems with report? Reports specialist Documentation branch chief Figure 9.9 Example of flow‐charting as a planning tool. This diagram traces the process for developing a situation report and identifies actors, specific actions, and key decisions. Note the logical progression and opportunity for quality control. FCO Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 97 Jan 98 Infrastructure Human services Mitigation Planning Logistics Finance/admin Public relations Training Liaison Projected staffing levels Figure 9.10 Graphic tools used to support planning. This is a graphic from a demobilization plan showing staff reductions over time. The top portion is a Gantt chart showing the length of time functions will continue to operate while the lower bar graph shows personnel reductions over time. 240 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Figure 9.11 The map produced by Dr. John Snow during the London cholera epidemic of 1954. By plotting clusters of cases based on extensive interviews with victims’ families, Snow traced the source of the outbreak to a single water pump. tools used to display information. The chart was developed as part of a demo- bilization plan and is a graphical display of how the operation will be reduced over time. The upper section is a Gantt chart (a graphical representation of the duration of tasks over time) that shows how long each section will be in opera- tion. The lower section uses a bar graph to show the reduction in staff over the same period. A third use of graphic tools is the analysis of quantitative information. The use of graphical analysis can be a powerful tool. In his book, Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative, statistician Edward Tufte dem- onstrates the power of graphical analysis through two gripping case studies pertinent to emergency managers. During a cholera epidemic in London in September 1854, Dr. John Snow traced the source of the outbreak to a single pump in Broad Street by plotting known deaths on a map and conducting intensive interviews with the surviving families (see Figure 9.11). Snow’s work not only resulted in the end of the epi- demic but it also confirmed the theory that cholera was spread by contami- PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 241 nated water. Snow is recognized as one of the fathers of the science of epidemiology. Tufte’s second case study describes the decision‐making that resulted in the loss of the space shuttle Challenger (see Figure 9.12). The explosion of the shuttle on 28 January 1986 was the result of two leaking O‐rings that had lost their resiliency because of low temperatures. Tragically, the shuttle engineers were aware of the potential problem but were unable to convince senior offi- cials to delay the launch. The engineers presented senior officials with 13 charts that contained sufficient data to demonstrate that launching at the expected temperatures carried the risk of O‐ring failure. However, the data were not linked, were confusing, and, ultimately, unconvincing. Tufte demonstrates how the same data, displayed on a single chart, could have had a much more pow- erful impact. Graphical tools offer the ability to provide vast amounts of information quickly and simply. Figure 9.13 shows an 1885 map graphic produced by Charles Joseph Minard that traces the destruction of Napoleon’s Grand Armèe during the Russian campaign in 1812–1813. Minard combined the effect of time, distance, temperature, and battles in a single graphic that evokes the incredible losses of the campaign. Although few emergency managers can match the genius of Minard, there is a modern equivalent: the geographic information system (GIS). Figure 9.12 The tragic loss of the space shuttle Challenger might have been avoided if vital engineering information had been displayed in a more understandable format. Photo Credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 242 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The true strength of GIS is that it can integrate disparate databases through common geospatial information and produce either list summaries or graphical outputs, most typically a map. Because GIS works in layers, it is possible to overlay data such as an electrical power grid or a sewer system on a base map to support an operational need. The system can also integrate aerial photo- graphs or orthographic maps to provide detailed damage assessment information (see Figure 9.14). For this reason, GIS products should be considered both in plan development and during operations. USE EXERCISES TO TEST CONCEPTS Chapter 5 discussed the use of exercises as a means for providing a qualitative measurement of program capabilities. Exercises can also be used during the development of plans to test concepts before they are finalized in the plan. This testing of concepts is particularly useful if the concept under consideration is a departure from how the jurisdiction has operated in the past or has some con- troversial aspects to it. Discussion‐based exercises, especially the tabletop exercise, are particularly useful in this regard. Tabletop exercises provide a low‐ stress, controlled environment to discuss plan implementation issues. Because it is a guided discussion, a skilled facilitator can maintain focus while allowing for wide‐ranging exploration of the issues. There are obvious advantages to testing concepts before including them in a plan: • Concepts get fully discussed, and issues can be identified and addressed before they become problems during plan implementation. Figure 9.13 Charles Joseph Minard’s 1995 map of Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, probably the finest statistical graphic ever produced. The strength of the army is indicated by the thickness of the line, and the bottom portion shows altitude and the temperature during the retreat from Moscow. PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 243 • Resource needs can be identified and included in the plan. • Key stakeholders who were not considered during initial discussions can be identified. • During the planning stages, people have less emotional investment in the concept and may be more willing to modify it. An example serves to illustrate this latter point. Upon assuming her duties, a new emergency manager read the recently published jurisdictional plan and realized that it included a concept that she knew, based on her experience, could not work in actual practice. She consulted privately with other colleagues to validate her assumptions and they concurred. The problem was that the group that had developed the plan was strongly invested in the plan and was unlikely to accept the recommendations of a newcomer, no matter how experienced. The planning group was a permanent committee with which the new manager would have to work during her tenure and she was understandably sensitive to their concerns. Instead of confronting the issue head on, the emergency man- ager crafted a series of tabletop and functional exercises to stress that portion Very low Very high Liquefaction susceptibility Liquefaction zone of required investigation Moderate Low High Figure 9.14 Composite of GIS products showing liquefaction zones and photographs of damages resulting from liquefaction during various earthquakes. Source: US Geological Survey. 244 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT of the plan. The results were as expected, and the group itself identified the need for a plan revision that eliminated the concept. No plan can be considered complete until it has been exercised. This is really the only way to ensure that the concepts are valid and that jurisdictional resources, particularly training, are sufficient to implement them. For this reason, it is prudent to conduct a functional exercise prior to finalizing the plan. There is nothing more embarrassing than making a great public fanfare about a new plan and then have that plan fail, either in an exercise or actual event. Testing during plan development increases confidence in the plan, vali- dates concepts, and helps avoid future embarrassments. KEEP IT SIMPLE Crisis communications consultant Art Botterell has developed four Laws of Emergency Management based on his experiences over the years at the state and federal response levels. His first and third laws are particularly relevant to planning. Botterell’s First Law of Emergency Management cautions, “Stress makes you stupid.” His third law reminds planners, “No matter whom you train, someone else will show up.” If one considers Boterell’s two laws along with the social science literature, particularly the University of Washington study on the use of emergency plans, one fact becomes painfully obvious: it is unlikely that an emergency plan will be read at the time of crisis. This reinforces the need for aggressive exercise pro- grams aimed at team building and developing familiarity with plans and planning concepts. However, since, as Botterell cautions, not everyone will attend training and exercises, it also suggests that plans should be simple and based on concepts that can guide creative problem‐solving rather than provide detailed instructions. Plans should be presented in a format that provides quick access to proposed solutions and options rather than detailed expositions of policy issues. This hearkens back to the discussion in a previous chapter of writing plans that are appropriate for the level at which they will be used. Although lengthy plans will most likely not be read, there are tools that can be extracted from the plan. Checklists have a good chance of at least being glanced at. Visual information that can be quickly assimilated such as maps and flowcharts can be useful. The best final check on a plan is to view it as if one is seeing it for the first time, has never been to an exercise, and has five minutes to learn their job before beginning work. One should ask, “Given these conditions, what information does that person need to know and can it be quickly extracted from the plan?” Simplicity in planning enhances the execution of the plan by focusing on results rather than process. This allows latitude for the type of creative problem‐ PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 245 solving required in disaster operations. General George Patton recommended “Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.” This implies that the focus of planning should be to provide a solid foundation of tactical and operational tools that can then be employed as the situation dictates. Plans should provide for carrying out generic tasks but should also have the flexibility to deal with unexpected situations and emergent organizations. CONCLUSION Viewing planning as a process does not mean that one cannot expect results and end products. It is precisely because it is a process that it requires direction and quality controls. These controls consist of a planning structure, a decision‐ making process, and mutually agreeable objectives and milestones. Planning is operationally oriented. That is, it represents what the community believes is likely to happen and how it will handle the generic tasks common to all disas- ters. Planning can also be tactically oriented as in the case of contingency planning, providing for initial support to field operations. Ultimately, planning is about bringing together stakeholders and sharing ideas, working out conflicts, and reinforcing strengths. It is as much about building relationships as it is about documenting policies and procedures. Consequently, planning lies at the center of the emergency management program. In considering the 2003 blackout, motivational speaker Danish Ahmed identified three important distinctions between plans and programs: • Plans are based on theory; programs are based on results. • Plans are dormant; programs are active. • Plans become obsolete; programs evolve. Ahmed’s insights hold cautions for the emergency manager. Communities that focus on plan development rather than program development are not likely to have all the supporting structures in place to make plans effective. Emergency plans are end products; emergency management programs are the process by which plans are developed, supported, and implemented. Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. 247 Chapter 10 A quick and overwhelming response is better than a well‐planned and thought out response. —Craig Fugate Former Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency The ultimate test of any strategy or plan is an actual event. Previous chapters have considered what social science studies suggest really occurs in disaster rather than what is commonly believed to happen and have considered methods for establishing the emergency management program and developing strategies and plans for mitigation, response, continuity, and recovery. This chapter looks at some of the issues associated with coordinating operational response. In coordinating operational response, as opposed to tactical response, it is well to keep in mind that disasters affect communities, not just government agencies. Ultimately, the response must involve the entire community, and coordination must address not only the immediate concerns such as rescue, sheltering, and medical services but must also consider continuity problems and long‐range issues related to mitigation and recovery. Response, in its larger sense, is not just about safeguarding lives, property, and the environment but is ultimately about restoring community viability. OPERATIONAL RESPONSE As has been discussed in previous chapters, there are several layers of community response that will be occurring simultaneously. There is the immediate tactical response that happens automatically and deals with the immediate needs of victims, primarily search and rescue and emergency medical operations. There are also strategic issues that must be addressed by senior government officials. COORDINATING RESPONSE 248 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Between the two lies operational response, the coordination of the organiza tions and resources responding to disaster. Where tactical response considers immediate needs, operational response must take a wider view and consider both what is occurring, but more impor tantly, what is likely to occur. The job of the disaster management team is to anticipate requirements in support of the tactical response and to deal with the qualitative effects of disaster: convergent organizations, loss of autonomy, dif ferent performance standards, closer public–private interface, and impacts on the community. This means that the disaster management team must insulate itself from becoming overly involved in the field operation. Operational response has two primary functions: the collection and analysis of information to assist decision‐making (situational awareness) and the management of resources in support of the field operation. All other activities of the disaster management team relate back to these two functions. Tactical response, to a certain extent, is predetermined. For example, a fire fighter knows that he or she will be required to fight fires, conduct search and rescue operations, and provide emergency medical services. They are trained for this and do it on a regular basis. At the operational level, the disaster management team is faced with nonroutine issues and must develop solutions in a limited time under crisis conditions. Operational response is characterized by emphasis on coordination and by creative problem‐solving. Craig Fugate, Director of Florida’s Division of Emergency Management during the 2004 hurricanes (see Figure 10.1) and later Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) dur ing the Obama administration, emphasized this. Fugate recommended that disaster management teams be aggressive in meeting the needs of disaster vic tims. In his words, teams should “use a sledgehammer” as it rarely pays to be subtle. Fugate maintained that it is better to have too many resources than not enough and that resources should be pushed to affected areas without waiting for requests. The longer one waits to gather facts, the harder it is to change the outcome, per Fugate. Chapter 8 considered 10 principles for disaster planning developed by Dr. E.L. Quarantelli. One of those principles is that there is a difference bet ween disaster preparedness planning and disaster management. Quarantelli has also developed 10 principles for disaster management that serve to guide operational response: 1. Recognize the Difference Between Agent and Response Generated Needs: There are needs that are driven by the type of hazard that created the disaster and others that are generated by the response itself. The former is dependent on the impact and nature of the hazard, such as the requirement for mass prophylaxis during a pandemic or biological attack. The latter is fairly constant from disaster to disaster. For example, COORDINATING RESPONSE 249 there is always a need to coordinate the activities of emergent groups or to order and transport critical resources. Agent‐generated needs will normally require a situational approach; they can be preplanned to a certain degree, but actual response will be situation dependent. Response‐ generated needs, on the other hand, can be preplanned as part of the community’s all hazards plan. 2. Carry Out Generic Functions in an Adequate Way: This is the essence of the functional approach to emergency planning discussed in Chapter 8. It is possible to identify response‐generated needs for specific functions such as evacuation or sheltering and to preplan generic responses for these functions. 3. Mobilize Personnel and Resources in an Effective Manner: As has been noted, a characteristic of disaster is the overwhelming amount of resources that are mobilized and made available to the affected community. The challenge is the effective deployment of those resources to where the need is greatest. An important part of disaster response is matching resources against need as quickly as possible. For this reason, resource management and logistics are essential, but often neglected, components of emergency plans. 4. Involve Proper Task Delegation and Division of Labor: An important part of coordination is the ability to identify and delegate tasks. Many Figure 10.1 Hurricane Charley makes landfall in the Florida Panhandle on 13 August 2004. This category 4 hurricane was part of series of hurricanes that battered Florida in the 2004–2005 hurricane season. Florida’s response to the storms is an example of emergency management at its best. Photo Credit: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 250 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT tasks can be preidentified and the responsibility assigned to an agency or department. However, at the time of a disaster, many new tasks emerge, and there must be a mechanism to delegate these tasks to specific action agents. 5. Allow the Adequate Processing of Information: Many organizations are not equipped to expand information collection, analysis, and dis semination beyond the systems used in normal day‐to‐day operations. There is a considerable amount of information both required and available after an event as more and more agencies become involved. Unfortunately, much of the information may be conflicting and there may be gaps in the data. Failure to manage information flows will degrade what is known as “situational awareness,” an understanding of the overall nature of the event, and lead to misapplication of resources or failures in response. 6. Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision‐making: Disasters create requirements for new, nontraditional tasks and conflicts between existing and emergent groups. This can lead to conflicts over who has the authority to make decisions or commit resources. An important part of operational response is facilitating the decision‐making pro cess. This process is a combination of useful information about the situation and available resources and an environment that fosters coop erative decision‐making. 7. Focus on the Development of Overall Organizational Coordination: The goal of operational response is not control but coordination. This is done by establishing an inclusive operating organization and facili tating identification of common objectives. Although agencies will operate independently and under their own authorities, the development of a coordinated action plan assures that these decentralized operations achieve tactical objectives. 8. Blend Emergent Aspects with Established Ones: Communities are resil ient, and new organizations will arise in the wake of a disaster. The disaster management organization must recognize these new organiza tions and incorporate their activities into the response. The tendency to ignore emergent groups, particularly those from the private sector, can eliminate potential resources and generate ill will as the operation moves toward recovery. 9. Provide the Mass Communication System with Appropriate Information: The principal mechanism for providing disaster information to the public is through the media. However, if the information provided is inaccurate or inadequate, then the credibility of the response organization will be diminished. An important function of the disaster management team is COORDINATING RESPONSE 251 making sure that the media is integrated into the response in an appro priate way. 10. Have a well‐functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC): It is the central coordination point for the response effort. If that point fails, centralized coordination dissolves into chaos. Quarantelli’s 10 principles reinforce the point made in previous chapters: disasters are not just about life safety response, but they are multiagency/ multijurisdictional events that must be managed through coordination, not command and control. The principles are not, per se, functions that must be included in an emergency plan but are instead common threads that run through all plans. They underscore the need to develop functional plans with clear assignment of responsibilities. They reinforce the need for preplanning. Most importantly, they stress the need to create mechanisms that allow for coordinated decision‐making and cooperative planning. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Small, specialized teams may be fully capable of dealing with day‐to‐day emer gencies. However, as more resources are committed to a crisis, there is a need to impose some sort of organizational structure to keep the response efficient. Disasters are characterized by an influx of agencies and organizations that may not work together on a regular basis, increasing the risk of confusion and ineffi cient application of resources. A system for coordinating and managing resources is essential, and, if no such system exists, one will eventually evolve over time. For public sector agencies, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), developed in 2004, mandated the use of the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS originated in Southern California in response to a series of wildfires in 1970 that burned over 600 000 acres and claimed 16 lives in only 13 days. The fires affected jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels simultaneously and highlighted the barriers preventing multiple responding agencies from working together. In 1971, Congress provided funding for the United States Forest Service to establish a working group to analyze the prob lems from the fire and to create a working solution. The working group, which would eventually become known as FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies), identified six major problem areas: 1. Lack of a Common Organization: The multiple agencies responding to the fires used different terminology and organizational structures, cre ating confusion. 252 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 2. Poor On‐scene and Interagency Communications: Radio systems and operating protocols were different, making information sharing among agencies almost impossible. 3. Inadequate Joint Planning: Agencies operated from autonomous command posts, with no joint planning for operations or logistics. 4. Lack of Valid and Timely Intelligence: No one was assigned responsi bility for intelligence collection and collation, and decisions were made based on incomplete, outdated, or inaccurate information. 5. Inadequate Resource Management: Vital equipment was lost or mis placed, there was no common system for ordering resources, and opera tions were overstaffed or understaffed. 6. Limited Prediction Capability: With the lack of intelligence, confusion in the deployment of resources, and nonexistent joint planning, it was impossible to predict future requirements such as the requirement for evacuation or the need for additional resources. It was clear from the analysis of the fires that there was a need for an incident management system that could integrate the activities of multiple responding agencies. The working group next developed design criteria for the system. The working group determined that the system must possess the following: • Be able to handle incidents involving single agencies up to those involving multiple agencies and jurisdictions. • Be able to expand from use in daily incidents to major emergencies. • Be usable in all emergencies, not just fires. • Be able to integrate new technologies as they are developed. • Have standardized terminology, organization, and procedures. • Integrate with existing agency procedures with minimal disruption. • Be simple to teach and maintain. It is important to understand the reasons behind ICS and what FIRESCOPE was trying to develop before one gets involved in the nuts and bolts of ICS. Too often, planners tend to focus on the field organization developed under ICS and assume that, because the organization is in place, ICS is being used. The intent of the FIRESCOPE planners was not to develop a field organization but an operating system. Most misapplications or failures of ICS can be traced to a lack of understanding of the underlying concepts and principles of the system. ICS is based on four important concepts: agency autonomy, unit integrity, functional clarity, and management by objectives. The FIRESCOPE planners were drawn from a wide range of federal, state, and local agencies, and they COORDINATING RESPONSE 253 understood the barriers that could create problems at an incident. Principal among these was the issue of jurisdictional autonomy and statutory responsi bility. Consequently, the system is designed in such a way that organizations with overlapping jurisdictions can still meet their legal and fiscal obligations while working as part of an ICS team. Similarly, the system is intended to ensure that personnel from the same agencies and disciplines continue to work together. It is a common misconcep tion that using ICS requires accepting orders from someone with little or no knowledge (e.g. a police officer directing a firefighter how to fight a fire) or that responding units will be broken up before being deployed. Unit integrity is maintained, and most responders receive orders through their existing chain of command. Functional clarity is the result of the functional approach to crisis discussed in Chapter 8. An individual or unit need to only focus on their assigned function, whereas other members of the organization handle supporting tasks. Because ICS uses common terminology, functional assignments are standardized and easily understood. Management by objectives is a business concept adapted for use in emergency management. First espoused by Peter Drucker in 1954 in his book, The Practice of Management, management by objectives is the development of specific, measurable objectives that are agreed to by members of the organization and then monitored to ensure they are achieved. This is the same system that was used in Chapter 5 in developing the strategic plan and was applied to the development of work plans in Chapter 9. In addition to management by objectives, ICS borrows other business con cepts, such as manageable span of control, and concepts from the military (e.g. unity of command). Figure 10.2 lists the management characteristics of ICS. These characteristics comprise the heart of ICS and are frequently overlooked. They form a system that establishes a robust operational framework for dealing with crisis. Furthermore, these principles are effective even where the field orga nization is not used, such as at the EOC. Figure 10.3 shows the ICS field organization developed under FIRESCOPE. Over the years, this model has been adapted and fine‐tuned by different organizations to meet their unique needs. For example, Figure 10.4 shows an adaptation of the ICS organization used in hospitals. There are also specific adaptations for law enforcement and for private industry. This infinite adapt ability of the ICS organization suggests several points. The first is that, con trary to the arguments that have been waged over the years, there is no “pure ICS” organization. The original FIRESCOPE model was designed specifically for large wildland fires involving multiple jurisdictions, but it was always intended to be modular and adaptable to changing circumstances. This is reinforced in NIMS, which specifically recognized the right of the Incident Commander “…to modify procedures or organizational structure to align as 254 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT necessary with the operating characteristics of their specific jurisdictions or to accomplish the mission in the context of a particular hazard scenario.” As long as the five key functions of command, planning, logistics, finance, and opera tions are addressed, the organization can be adapted as needed. The adaptability of the ICS field organization also suggests that, to a certain extent, it is irrelevant to the successful implementation of ICS. Under ICS, the incident commander is responsible for performing all functions that are not delegated. The modularity of the organization comes into being when the incident commander begins to apply the principle of span of control by dele gating functions. Similarly, success is determined not by having all boxes on the organization chart filled but by determining common objectives, managing resources effectively, and providing clear direction. It is a cardinal mistake to assume that using the ICS field organization is the equivalent of using the ICS just as it is a mistake to believe that because one is using ICS that one is using NIMS. Similar to ICS, NIMS has been subject to a lot of misunderstanding. Part of this is the result of the mistaken belief that one need only adopt ICS to be compliant. Similar to ICS, NIMS is a system that was established to support response operations. ICS, although it receives the bulk of the treatment in the NIMS document (65+ pages of 123 pages), is only a small element of a much larger system that includes many components that are integral to the emergency management program such as planning, training, and exercising. Compliance with NIMS, therefore, is generated not through the adoption of Common terminology Comprehensive resource management Information and intelligence management Integrated communications Manageable span of control Reliance on an Incident Action Plan Management by objectives Modular organization • Establishment and transfer of command • Chain of command and unity of command • Unified command • Unity of command • Predesignated incident locations and facilities • Deployment • Accountability Figure 10.2 Management characteristics of the Incident Command System. This is a slightly modified rendering of the list in the National Incident Management System. INCIDENT COMMANDER Public Information Officer Safety Officer Liaison Officer Planning Section Operations Section Staging Area(s) Air Operations Branch Branches Divisions and Groups Air Support Group Strike Teams Helibases Helicopter Coordinator Documentation Unit Demobilization Unit Technical Specialists Food Unit Cost Unit Medical Unit Situation Unit Resources Unit Supply Unit Time Unit Communications Unit Facilities Unit Comp/Claims Unit Procurement Unit Ground Support Unit Service Branch Support Branch Logistics Section Finance/Admin Section Helispots Single Resources Fixed Wing Bases Air Tanker(s)/ Fixed Wing Coordinator Task Forces Air Tactical Group Figure 10.3 The expanded ICS organization as developed under FIRESCOPE, 1994. 256 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT the ICS field organization but through an effective emergency management program. Unified and Area Commands As has been noted, one of the concepts behind ICS is agency autonomy: the recognition that agencies and jurisdictions have statutory responsibilities that cannot be surrendered to a crisis management organization. To deal with cir cumstances where jurisdictional authorities overlap, ICS incorporates a con cept called unified command. The term “unified command” has become extremely common, especially in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, but it is one of the most misunderstood and misused terms in ICS. Many officials use unified command to mean a group of senior officials or agency representatives gathered in a single operations center or command post. However, unified command is a process that allows all agencies with responsibility for an incident, either geographical or functional, to establish a common set of incident objectives and strategies without abdi cating agency authority, responsibility, or accountability. Incident Commander Public Information Officer Safety and Security Officer Liaison Officer Finance ChiefPlanning ChiefLogistics Chief Facility Unit Leader Sanitation Systems Officer Transportation Unit Leader Materials Supply Unit Leader Nutritional Supply Unit Leader Patient Information Officer Patient Tracking Officer Nursing Unit Leader Medical Staff Unit Leader Labor Pool Unit Leader Situation Status Unit Leader Time Unit Leader Cost Unit Leader Medical Staff Director In-patient Areas Supervisor Surgical Services Unit Leader Maternal Child Unit Leader Critical Care Unit Leader General Nursing Care Unit Leader Out-Patient Services Unit Leader Morgue Unit Leader Discharge Unit Leader Minor Treatment Unit Leader Delayed Treatment Unit Leader Immediate Treatment Unit Leader Triage Unit Leader Treatment Areas Supervisor Medical Care Director Ancillary Services Director Laboratory Unit Leader Radiology Unit Leader Pharmacy Unit Leader Cardiopulomonary Unit Leader Dependent Care Unit Leader Psychological Support Unit Leader Staff Support Unit Leader Human Services Director Operations Chief Procurement Unit Leader Claims Unit Leader Commuications Unit Leader Damage Assesment and Control Officer Figure 10.4 Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS), full activation. COORDINATING RESPONSE 257 Critical to the formation of a unified command is recognition of who has jurisdictional authority for the incident. The incident may affect multiple juris dictions, involve multiple agencies from the same jurisdiction, or have an impact on multiple jurisdictions or agencies. The key here is statutory responsibility; just because an agency provides resources to assist in responding to an incident does not automatically make them part of a unified command. Furthermore, although there may be multiple incident commanders, a unified command consists of the following: • A single, integrated incident organization. • Collocated (shared) facilities. • A single planning process and incident action plan. • Shared planning, logistical, and finance/administration operations. • Coordinated process for resource ordering. In other words, a unified command may have multiple commanders but will act and respond as a single organization using ICS principles. The two concepts of limiting leadership to only those with statutory responsibility and creating a single organization are the two most common failures under unified command. Where unified command describes the command relationship among agencies responding to an incident, an area command is established to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by a sepa rate ICS organization or a very large incident that involves multiple ICS orga nizations. An area command oversees management of the incident or incidents under its purview by as follows: • Setting overall incident‐related priorities. • Allocating critical resources based on priorities. • Ensuring that incidents are properly managed. • Ensuring that incident(s) objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with agency policy. It is important to note that an area command retains a direct command and control relationship with the other ICS organizations. The focus is on management of the incident and the resources related to the incident. In other words, an area command is still tactical in nature in that it focuses on the suc cessful resolution of the incident or incidents, not on long‐term impacts or potential needs. The decision to establish an area command is normally based on the ICS principle of manageable span of control and on the geographical dispersion of the incident or incidents. This decision is separate from the decision as to the command structure; an area command can be headed by a single area commander or by a unified area command. 258 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Multiagency Coordination Systems ICS has, to a certain extent, become a victim of its own success and is consid ered the solution to managing disasters at all levels. Thus, ICS is the basis of both NIMS and the National Planning Frameworks. There is no question that, as a tactical tool, ICS is extremely effective. However, there is no systematic empirical research on the effectiveness of ICS as a mechanism for coordinating disaster response and the failure of the National Response Plan in Hurricane Katrina raised questions about its use for this purpose. ICS has worked well for two main reasons. First, most responders operating under the system are from paramilitary organizations and are used to a hierarchical command and control system. Second, operations that have seen the successful use of ICS are predominantly single events or multiple events of the same type and required a response that was essentially tactical in nature. For example, the Pentagon attack on September 11 was successfully managed under ICS, as was the Oklahoma City bombing, once training was provided to local agencies. There are also examples of ICS overhead teams being successfully used to assist local governments in orga nizing operational response. Case Study 10.1 gives one such example from Hurricane Katrina. CASE STUDY 10.1: HURRICANE KATRINA 2005 – USING ICS PRINCIPLES TO COORDINATE DISASTER Jackson County, Mississippi is a small county located 68 miles east of New Orleans. Consisting of 727 square miles and with a population of 133 000, the county is largely rural, with most of the population concentrated in coastal communities. Hurricane Katrina damaged or destroyed over 29 000 residences and caused considerable infrastructure damage. With few resources to manage the disaster, the county requested help from the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, who in turn asked for help through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). In response to the EMAC request, California dispatched the East Bay Incident Management Team. An incident management team is a group of trained responders specializing in ICS, each with defined tasks or functional responsibilities. Teams are trained to address the key functions of operations, planning, logistics, and finance in the context of all risks. When the full team assembled in Jackson County on 15 September, they were faced with chaos. Public and private agencies were operating independently, there were control issues between the cities and the county, multiple points existed for ordering resources, and public safety infrastructure was severely damaged. Worse, many local government employees were themselves victims, and although some incident objectives had been identified, coordination was not being done with the agencies tasked to accomplish them. It was obvious that the county was still responding to the disaster. (continued on next page) COORDINATING RESPONSE 259 The team recognized that it would first need to change the current system from independent action to facilitated decision‐making and move from response operations to recovery. Once this was accomplished, the goal would then be to gradually change operations to local control. With this end in mind, the team began conducting facilitated strategy meetings focused on unified decision‐making and establishing country‐wide policy. Eventually, the team evolved an organizational structure that facilitated interagency coordination. Incident Commander Public Information Officer Liaison Officer Safety Officer Operations Logistics Planning Finance Medical Branch Debris Management Branch Humand Needs Branch Infrastructure Branch Military Branch Public Safety Branch Communications Branch County County Sheriff Mutual Aid Law Gautier Moss Point Pascagoula Ocean Springs Environmental City Police Fire/Rescue US Navy MCB 7 US Coast Guard US Navy National Guard Public Utilities Port Activity Building Inspector Damage Assessment Corps of Engineers Temporary Housing Donations Recovery Education System Corps of Engineers Public Waste EMB Public Health Hospital Group DMAT Pest Abatement Mental Health Volunteer Center Care and Feeding Case Figure 10.1 Initial operating structure developed for Jackson County, Mississippi by the Bay Area Incident Management Team following Hurricane Katrina. As part of its effort, the team also focused on creating a single point for ordering and tracking resources. One of the first problems the team identified was a bottleneck that prevented resource requests from being processed because of a single, overwhelmed official. As operations became smoother, the team integrated local players into the ICS organizations and trained them on functional tasks. Eventually, the team evolved a second structure to complete the transition to local control for recovery. (continued on next page) (continued from previous page) 260 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT As has been noted, disasters differ from emergencies both quantitatively and qualitatively. As the size of the event grows, more and more agencies are drawn into the response, and issues of continuity and recovery begin to compete for resources. At the same time, disruption of communications systems and normal operating structures make the type of hierarchical approach use by the ICS Civil Defense Director MEMA/FEMA Volunteers ARC/Red Cross City of Gautier City of Pascagoula City of Moss Point Jackson County Debris Removal Public Safety Human Needs Infrastructure City of Ocean Springs Debris Removal Public Safety Human Needs Infrastructure Debris Removal Public Safety Human Needs Infrastructure Debris Removal Public Safety Human Needs Infrastructure Debris Removal Public Safety Human Needs Infrastructure Case Figure 10.2 Final operating structure developed for Jackson County, Mississippi by the Bay Area Incident Management Team following Hurricane Katrina. Note the shift from an organization based on function to one based on geography. The success of the East Bay Incident Management Team in Jackson County was based on several factors. First, the team was cohesive, experienced, and well trained. They approached the problem with an agreed upon methodology and a clearly defined end‐state of transitioning operations to local control. However, rather than trying to impose a rigid organization on the county, the team used ICS principles to guide the evolution of an organizational structure that worked for the stakeholders. The organizational structure was effective because it was developed by the stakeholders and took into consideration the local political environment and existing relationships and processes. It was also flexible enough to accommodate emergent organizations and outside agencies. Recommended Reading Vesely, R. (2005). East Bay firefighters take reins of recovery. East Bay Times. https://www.eastbaytimes. com/2005/09/22/east-bay-firefighters-take-reins-of-recovery/ (22 September). (continued from previous page) COORDINATING RESPONSE 261 difficult to maintain. There is a need for the coordination of decentralized and possibly even independent actions rather than for direct operational control of the incident. Consequently, at the operational level, one uses a component of ICS called the multiagency coordination system (MACS) rather than the field organization shown in Figure 10.3. This point is one that frequently confuses planners, including those involved in developing the National Response Plan. One hears, for example, Michael Brown, former director of FEMA, responding to questions on the perceived failure of his agency in Hurricane Katrina, saying, “I was unable to form an area command.” This statement demonstrated a major flaw in the National Response Plan and a lack of a basic understanding of operational dynamics. Area command, as was discussed previously, is a tactical concept used to manage multiple incidents tasked to separate ICS organizations or to oversee a very large incident involving multiple ICS organizations. It is a command and control function. It is unlikely that Director Brown was giving orders to independent federal agencies or to the State of Louisiana. MACS, on the other hand, is a system for coordinating and supporting incident management activ ities. It does not attempt to manage field operations directly but is focused on establishing common objectives and removing barriers to successful response. The difference between MACS and the field organization of ICS is more than semantic. Under ICS, responding units come under the control of the incident commander or the unified command. Under MACS, the EOC director coordinates the activities of independent agencies, the public, and the political leadership of the jurisdiction but has no control over them. There is no attempt to direct the activity of independent agencies. Rather, MACS is used to make sure that the activities of those agencies are consistent with common incident objectives and that each agency is aware of what the other is doing. MACS has five main responsibilities: 1. Incident Priority Determination: A hard decision in any disaster is where to place priority for services. This decision should be based on an assessment of need and not driven by the media reports or the demands of politicians. These are not necessarily “either‐or” decisions – relief agencies need to agree on what must be accomplished in the short‐term to meet the needs of the victims, and this may involve compromise and improvisation. 2. Critical Resource Use Priorities: During the initial phases of a disaster, critical resources are scarce. As the operation progresses, resources begin to arrive but may still be in short supply for some time. Decisions must be made about how these scarce resources are distributed and who has pri ority for arriving resources. 3. Communications Systems Integration: Responding agencies frequently operate through multiple incompatible communication systems. However, 262 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT there are ways to work around some of these incompatibilities, and a joint communication plan goes a long way to resolving these issues. 4. Information Coordination: The coordination of information to the public through a single Joint Information Center (JIC) helps to build confidence in the response and diffuse potential problems. 5. Intergovernmental Decision Coordination: This is the main function of the MACS: the development of joint objectives and a common incident action plan that provides central coordination of decentralized field operations. Research supports the idea that the military‐type model espoused in the ICS field organization may not be possible in large‐scale events because of the mul tiple actors involved. Many of these responding organizations are not paramil itary and do not have a hierarchical structure. Others operate under their own authorities and, while willing to work cooperatively, will not surrender their autonomy to an Incident Commander. Furthermore, the use of such a system is based on unspoken assumptions that individuals and social structures are unable to cope with the event and that only those in authority can make decisions. This forces the creation of an artificial social structure and a closed system designed to overcome this breakdown of social order by imposing a mechanism for command and control. This system is based on many of the disaster myths discussed in Chapter 3. Researchers, most notably William Waugh, have raised concerns over the fact that ICS is based on management principles that are older than 40 years. More recent business practices put much less emphasis on top‐down direction and command‐and‐control mechanisms. There are concerns that imposing the use of ICS through NIMS may limit flexibility in response and limit the development of new, more effective models. In actual practice, communities are remarkably resilient and are capable of participating in response. Furthermore, in a disaster of any magnitude, there will be participation by agencies from all levels of government – federal, state, and local. Also, issues will be influenced by politics and public expectation as much as by operational need. Given the multiplicity of actors and the changing political and operational climate, oper ational response must be flexible, innovative, creative, and participative. Further confusing this issue is that MACS, being part of ICS, uses the same principles as the field components. Most crisis teams adopt the five basic functions of command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/ administration as their base operating organization, which means that the organization of a MACS looks very much like the field organization. Hence, there is a tendency to impose the same directive relationships that are vital in a field operation. However, at the MACS level, the units and branches used at the field level are generally replaced by functional groups, such as the COORDINATING RESPONSE 263 emergency support functions used by the federal government. Autonomous agencies and community groups are more likely to work together as part of a collaborative effort than under the direction of a branch chief or unit leader. MACS is a system, and similar to ICS and NIMS, this is sometimes lost in the discussion. As a system, it is not tied to a facility or methodology. MACS can be invoked through conference calls, occupy stand‐alone facilities such as conference rooms or offices, or be established at an EOC. It may consist of a single discipline such as the wildfire coordination groups used in California. The use of management by objectives as reflected in the incident action plan is a critical component of coordination in the MACS. As noted in the case study on Jackson County, teams trained in ICS have adapted the system to help coordinate response and recovery activities at the jurisdictional level. However, there are critical differences between the ICS field components and MACS: • MACS is not a command function; it is a coordination function. • MACS does not focus on operational response; it focuses on supporting operational response by anticipating and prioritizing requirements. • MACS is primarily oriented toward the development of strategies rather than on the development of short‐term action plans. • MACS operations generally do not provide direct services but are pri marily logistical in nature. That is MACS locates and provides the supplies and specialized teams used by the incident commander; it does not directly control those resources once they have passed to the incident commander. Recognizing that there is a difference between controlling response (i.e. the direct provision of relief services) and the coordination of response acknowl edges the qualitative differences between day‐to‐day response and disasters. Controlling response is tactical in nature and very focused on immediate and short‐term needs. Coordinating response requires looking at the big picture, anticipating future requirements, and delegating responsibility. This suggests that what is occurring in most EOCs may, in fact, add to confusion at the time of crisis. Most jurisdictions are organized along the lines of Figure 10.5 with an EOC staff of agency representatives receiving guidance from a policy group of key department heads. However, these same department heads are direct reports to the senior elected official and will either end up operating directly from the EOC as an impromptu unified command or will bypass the EOC because of their direct relationship. One can certainly make an argument for unified command at the EOC in the initial phases of the operation. However, tactical responders tend to neglect other critical response elements related to continuity and recovery in favor of an overwhelming commitment to life safety. Furthermore, there is usually little provision for integrating emergent or convergent organizations into 264 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT this traditional organization. Ultimately, departments answer to department heads who, in turn, answer to the chief elected official. The traditional EOC may add a layer of unwanted complexity during a crisis and end up marginalized. Using MACS can open this closed system to a certain extent by distinguish ing between coordination and command functions (Figure 10.6). Reporting relationships remain the same, and command and control are accomplished through the same mechanisms that drive day‐to‐day operations. The MACS as a coordinating body does not threaten these relationships and is not an artificial construct that heightens stress. The closer a response organization resembles the day‐to‐day operational organization, the more likely people are to respond effectively to crisis. Figure 10.7 summarizes the relationship among command and coordination organizations in ICS. Emergency Operations Centers It is important to distinguish between the EOC itself, which is a facility, and the management group that occupies it. Depending on the designation of this group, the nature of the EOC changes. An EOC occupied by an area command is part of the command function and deals directly with incident commanders. The same EOC occupied by the MAC Group coordinates the activities of agencies and jurisdictions; it does not direct the activities of incident com manders or unified commands. As was previously noted, for most jurisdictions, the crisis team at the EOC coordinates multiagency and multijurisdictional activities and does not provide direct command, making MACS particularly suited for use in the jurisdictional EOC. EOC Department EOC ICP ICP ICP Department EOC Department EOC Policy Group Figure 10.5 Typical community response organization. Note the conflict in command and control between the EOC and the senior officials in the policy group. COORDINATING RESPONSE 265 Senior Elected OfficialStrategic Operational Tactical MAC Group Department Heads Emergent Organizations Community Base Organizations Responding Agencies Department EOC Department EOC Department EOC ICPICPICP Figure 10.6 Community response organization distinguishing between command and control relationships and coordination under MACS. Incident Command • Management system used to direct all operations at the incident scene • The EOC is a facility used in varying ways at all levels of government and within private industry to provide coordination, direction and control during emergencies • The Incident Commander (IC) is located at an Incident Command Post (ICP) at the incident scene • Designated agency Incident Commanders work from a single ICP • Uses a common set of objectives and strategies • Uses a single Incident Action Plan • Can be established at a jurisdictional EOC or at a separate facility • Useful for regional situations • May be established at an EOC or at some location other than an ICP. • becomes Unified Area Command when incidents are multi- jurisdictional • Works directly with Incident Commanders • Interacts with agencies or jurisdictions, not with Incident Commanders • A MAC Group functions within the MACS • EOCs may house Area Command and MACS activities as determined by agency or jurisdiction policy • System used to coordinate resources and support between agencies or jurisdictions • Established as necessary to provide command authority and coordination for two or more incidents in close proximity • Application of ICS used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction Unified Command Area Command (Unified Area Command) Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Figure 10.7 Chart summarizing the command and coordination organizations under the Incident Command System. Note the distinction between direct command authority and coordination of supporting resources. Source: Based on training materials from the National Wildlife Coordinating Group. 266 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Crisis communications consultant Art Botterell has defined the EOC as the place “where uncomfortable officials meet in unfamiliar surroundings to play unaccustomed roles making unpopular decisions based on inadequate information in much too little time.” While a bit tongue in cheek, Botterell’s description points out some of the problems common to many government officials. They are usually uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the EOC and their roles because they have never attended an exercise. Lack of information and time limits usually are the result of a failure of the EOC staff to develop an adequate plans unit, a failing that seems to have created problems for all levels of response in Hurricane Katrina. The Emergency Management and Response‐ Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR‐ISAC) sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) suggests four critical design criteria for EOCs: 1. Location: For many years, the State of California’s EOC was located in a flood plain, an obvious drawback to an organization that had to respond to annual flooding. One also questions the decision of the city of New York prior to September 11 to place its EOC in a complex that had been the target of a previous terrorist attack. Both decisions may have been made for good reasons, some of them political, and some of them fiscal. However, in retrospect, locating a community’s principal response facility in a location that puts it at risk from the very crisis, it was built to counter seems questionable at best. 2. Redundancy: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 and the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard require the identification of alternate operating facilities. Redundancy also applies to critical systems, such as communications and electrical power. One major city’s EOC has two generators, the capacity to install a third in the future, a hook‐up for attaching a portable generator to the facility, and two separate commercial feeder lines. (Ironically, this same EOC lost all power one day due to a single noninterruptible power supply switch that was inadvertently turned off when a box fell on it. This embar rassment resulted in the switch being covered and the system redesigned to remove the single point of failure.) 3. Self‐sufficiency: There is every reason to believe that an EOC will be cutoff from outside assistance for several days. As was noted in a previous chapter, the EOC for the city of New Orleans ceased to function when it ran out of fuel for its generator. Fuel for generators was also an issue in many Bay Area cities during the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989. 4. Communication: Without the ability to gather information and dissem inate instructions, the EOC cannot function. Reliance on any one communications method, such as the standard telephone system or COORDINATING RESPONSE 267 computer‐based radios, creates a vulnerability that could prove fatal to the EOC’s mission. Parallel methods of communication are essential. One jurisdiction has even developed plans for using bicycle messenger services to supplement technology. In addition to the four design criteria suggested by EMR‐ISAC, Art Botterell suggests adoption of a common design language for EOCs and has identified five basic design types: 1. Boardroom: This layout consists of a single table or a horseshoe assem bly of tables where participants sit facing each other. Displays are nor mally positioned at one end. This layout emphasizes communicat ion and coordination and can be effective for small operations and policy groups. However, the design makes it difficult to continue work during briefings and usually does not provide enough working space for participants. 2. Mission Control: This design is technology‐oriented and uses large visual displays. Participants are usually seated in rows facing the displays and interactions are through a technological “knowledge‐base.” This layout is effective for technical tasks but tends to diffuse interaction among the participants. Face‐to‐face interaction usually takes place outside the main room rather than within it. 3. Marketplace: This layout consists of multiple stations organized around supporting functions. Specialists are grouped together by function, and coordination is accomplished by communicating among the functional groups. 4. Bull’s Eye: This layout creates a center table or tables with supporting staff occupying concentric circles around the central tables. This model emphasizes the importance of the key players as representatives of large agencies and facilitates staff consultation. However, it requires a consid erable amount of floor space and usually is not found in local EOCs. 5. Virtual: Internet connectivity is critical to an EOC. With Internet connec tivity, the EOC has access to information and communications. The Internet also affords the ability to conduct operations without all the players being physically collocated. Emergency management software allows for the instantaneous collection of incident data, resource tracking, and communications, and web‐based conferencing allows participation by stakeholders located outside the EOC. The decision on what layout or combination of layouts will be used in an EOC depends on a variety of factors, including available funding and floor space, expected occupancy, etc. However, there is one constant in EOC design. No matter how it is built, it will be too small. Most EOCs are not truly designed 268 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT with disasters in mind. The designers usually fail to take into account the large number of personnel and outside agencies that will converge on the facility. They also fail to consider emergent functions that will require more space. For example, most designers do not plan for media operations. They may allow for a briefing area and consider seats for one or two public information officers (PIOs), but they do not grasp the scope of a full Joint Information Center (JIC) that incorporates support staff and media representatives. The same holds true for operating requirements. The sheltering function can have representatives from a number of volunteer and public agencies, and coordination of a large sheltering operation can require hundreds of support staff. EOCs simply cannot be built large enough to accommodate all the necessary functions. This suggests two concepts. First, EOCs are coordination points where rep resentatives agree to objectives and commit resources based on a coordinated incident action plan. The EOC is not necessarily the place where all the work is accomplished. Therefore, the EOC planners must consider where all this addi tional work will take place and whether these satellite facilities meet the same requirements for survivability as the EOC. Second, in a large event, it may be necessary to view the EOC as the place where one initiates operations before relocating to a larger facility. New York’s experience after September 11 demonstrates this concept. The initial EOC was destroyed during the World Trade Center attacks, and the city had no plans for an alternate site. However, it had reserved a local pier for a large exercise and was able to occupy this site and establish a joint operations center with federal and state officials. A large event that results in an influx of outside personnel will rapidly overwhelm the local EOC and force relocation to a larger facility. The possibility of such relocation should be part of the planning for any EOC. The issue of relocation should also be considered when planning for alternate facilities. Most alternate sites are austere and lack the resources of the main EOC. Planning should consider whether these resources would be provided after the fact to the alternate facility or whether the alternate will provide tem porary workspace while a larger facility is established. When one considers the issue of relocating the EOC, the advantage of some type of virtual capability becomes apparent. Using Internet‐based software means that relocated staff need only have a computer and Internet access to reestablish operations rather than waiting for an entire support system to be put in place. It also means that switching to mobile command posts and back to fixed sites becomes relatively easy. The point is that thinking about what constitutes an EOC needs to be expanded beyond the traditional facility to encompass all the mechanisms and facilities used to coordinate disaster activ ities. Planners should concentrate on what needs to be accomplished rather than on where it needs to be accomplished. Understanding the tasks to be COORDINATING RESPONSE 269 accomplished, equipment requirements, and space needed provides the flexi bility to adapt quickly to alternate sites. One other planning parameter that is frequently overlooked for EOCs is the need to plan for sustained operations. Most EOCs are activated for only short periods of time, and few are ever open long enough to establish an operational rhythm. Officials can force themselves to keep going for a day or two to meet operational needs. Disasters are different; the EOC will be open for days, weeks, and even months, and there is a need to plan for shift changes and long‐range staffing. Studies on sleep deprivation suggest that there is a marked drop in efficiency after 12 hours on shift. Considering the level of stress generated in an EOC, forcing key staff to get adequate rest is essential. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTEROPERABILITY Crisis communications guru Art Botterell has, over the years, developed four laws of emergency management to explain what happens during emergency operations. His second law of emergency management states that “The problem is at the input.” This is Botterell’s way of pointing out that emergency planners often tend to view communication failures as technology problems when they are in fact caused by human factors. For example, failure to warn the public can frequently be traced back to an initial hesitation on the part of officials who seek more information before issuing a warning or who do not want to create “public panic.” When challenged after the fact, it is not uncommon for them to blame the lack of warning on a failure of the system rather than on the hesitation. To help explain why technology is so frequently made the scapegoat, Botterell has developed the model shown in Figure 10.8, which identifies four layers that comprise a communication system: 1. Organization: The structures, goals, objectives, and metrics that define the organization. 2. People: Human factors such as capabilities, training, attitudes, etc. Problems Change Organization People Procedure Technology Figure 10.8 Communications model showing the relationship between technological changes and the perception of problems. 270 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 3. Procedures: Patterns of interaction and problem‐solving. 4. Technology: The actual equipment and systems used to communicate. Problems, or the perception of problems, tend to propagate downward through the four layers: a system failure is usually blamed first on technology and not on the other layers of communications. This means that the usual way of “solving” the problem is to purchase new technology. However, change tends to propagate up through the stack. Technology changes faster than the other layers, driving a demand for new procedures, skills, and behaviors to take full advantage of the new technology. The emphasis on technological rather than organizational change creates a situation where organizations neither solve the problem nor take full advantage of new technologies. An example illustrates this point. A major city experienced a shooting inci dent in a high‐rise building that was poorly handled. Among the issues identi fied in the after‐action report was that information available to police dispatchers was not made available to officers on the scene and that the existing radio system did not operate well within the high‐rise building. To solve the problem, the city built a new dispatch center and purchased an advanced 800 MHz radio system. However, a closer reading of the after‐action report suggests that the problem was on‐scene coordination (ICS was not being used as was required under city policies) and inadequate dispatcher training for critical incidents. Neither of these two issues was addressed in the jurisdiction’s solution. Furthermore, the new 800 MHz radio system was configured to resemble the old system, and the procedures remained unchanged, completely negating the advantages of the new system. This example highlights the problems involved in interoperability. Follow ing September 11, there was a major push for making public safety radios compatible. There was no concurrent push, however, for training responders on the deployment of radio nets, the use of liaison officers, or the development of the joint communication plans available for years under ICS. It is unreal istic to expect that all responders to an incident will operate on the same frequency; therefore, one would expect at least some discussion of the use of radio nets such as that are used in the military and the radio amateur community on a regular basis. Furthermore, even where compatible systems exist, variations in organizational culture may preclude communications. For example, a controversial decision by the Secretary of Homeland Security allowed law enforcement to continue to use 10‐codes, despite a push by DHS as part of NIMS to promote the use of clear text in radio communications. Since there is no standard 10‐code in use in the United States and the system is only used by law enforcement, this raises a potential barrier to interopera bility in disasters. COORDINATING RESPONSE 271 If the issues related to interoperability are not technological but cultural, then it follows that these issues could be anticipated, planned for, and resolved. When a hijacked plane crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, responding units from Arlington County and surrounding areas had more than a compat ible 800 MHz radio system. They had a well‐thought out and exercised mutual aid communication plan that successfully coordinated their activities. The plan included provision for integrating outside agencies into the commu nication system. A major function in a crisis is the establishment of a joint communications plan that integrates existing and emergent organizations. A starting point for such a plan is completing a listing of the various systems in use, for example an ICS Form 205 (see Figure 10.9). Although this seems simple and intuitive, it is amazing how infrequently this is done. However, knowing what is available allows for integration either through technology or by something as simple as reprogramming radios. Alternative methods of communications such as cellular and satellite phones have their place within the plan and can be provided quickly by commercial vendors. Essentially, the 1. Incident Name: 2. Date/Time Prepared: INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205) 3. Operational Period: 4. Basic Radio Channel Use: 5. Special Instructions: 6. Prepared by (Communications Unit Leader): Name: Date/Time:IAP PageICS 205 Signature: Zone Grp. Ch # Function Assignment RX Freq N or W TX Freq N or W RX Tone/NAC TX Tone/NAC Mode (A, D, or M) Date From: Time From: Date: Time: Date To: Time To: Remarks Channel Name/Trunked Radio System Talkgroup Figure 10.9 ICS Form 205 Incident Radio Communications Plan. Although designed for radio use at the operational level, this form is a good starting point for developing a detailed tactical communications plan. 272 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT plan should answer the questions: who needs to talk with whom and for what purpose and how will this communication be accomplished? INFORMATION PROCESSING A major problem in disaster operations is information management. Day‐to‐ day systems for managing information cannot cope with the large influx of information generated by disaster activity, and the types of information nor mally collected may not meet the requirement for situational awareness in a crisis. Compounding this problem is that, although many other functions in a crisis mirror day‐to‐day jobs, there are few employees in local government who have the job of collecting, collating, and assessing information. This makes it difficult to recruit and train personnel for the plans unit. The result is that the functions of the plans unit are not adequately performed, with a concurrent impact on the flow of information within the crisis management group. An effective plans unit performs two critical functions. First, it collects and ana lyzes disaster information to assist in decision‐making, and second, it facili tates development of the incident action plan. It is important to keep in mind that information is collected for a purpose, not just because it is available. There is a tremendous amount of information available through a variety of sources and not all of it is necessary. Information is primarily collected to support decision‐making. This means that plans unit staff must have an idea of what is needed, how to obtain it, and what consti tutes a credible source. This last point is important in determining how con flicts in information will be handled. It will also be necessary to determine what sources will be considered “official.” For example is the count of deaths based on a summary of separate incident reports or based on a daily medical examiner’s report? Information collection requires a plan; a fact that is frequently overlooked by novice plans unit members. This information collection plan should address the type of information required, potential sources for the data, the method and frequency of collection, and responsibility for gathering the information. The plans unit should have the ability to task other elements of the EOC to provide information and to deploy information collection methodologies such as aerial reconnaissance and field observers. There should be provisions for both routine collection of information and for an expedited response to a specific request. Raw information is not useful until it has been processed. Processing means cross‐checking with other sources. For example, a sudden dramatic drop in shelter occupancy might mean that victims have found temporary housing or it could mean that not all shelters reported their numbers correctly. The information analyst needs to have a healthy dose of skepticism and to apply COORDINATING RESPONSE 273 common sense. Once information has been processed, it can be disseminated through visual displays, included in reports, or added to a database. Facilitating the action plan, the second main function of the plans unit, involves the establishment of a planning cycle that provides for input from the various agencies involved in the plan. An incident action plan is not as difficult to assemble as one might think if one uses the ICS system. Essentially, the lead ership sets objectives, each element prepares its own plan based on those objec tives, conflicts are resolved at a facilitated planning meeting, and the plans unit assembles the final document. The secret behind the process is the facilitated planning meeting, which focuses on conflicts and problems rather than an information exchange. By this point, this process should sound familiar. The incident action plan is based on management by objectives and uses the same process as the stra tegic plan and work plans discussed in previous chapters. The management team develops the performance objectives for the next operational period. An action agent is identified, usually through a cooperative process at the planning meeting. The objectives may also be broken down into smaller tasks based on the contributions of other agencies. For example, if the performance objective is to deliver X gallons of water within the next 24‐hour period to a specified location, this task may be given to the water department. However, the water department may also break it into smaller tasks that involve pur chasing bottled water, arranging for the loan of water trucks from the National Guard, and establishing a water distribution point using a federal water purification unit. MUTUAL AID By definition, a disaster overwhelms local resources. The generally accepted strategy for overcoming this shortage of resources is to seek assistance from other jurisdictions in the form of mutual aid. Mutual aid is a prearranged agreement, which may or may not have a financial component, for an outside agency to provide essential resources when local resources are inadequate to meet the needs of a disaster. Although the concept is simple, there is significant disparity in how the concept is applied across the country. At one end of the scale are states like California and Florida that have exten sive and robust mutual aid systems. California has a master mutual aid agreement signed by all counties that provides for the cost‐free provision of needed resources in an emergency and establishes safeguards to prevent a juris diction from being stripped of all its resources. California has separate mutual aid agreements for disciplines such as fire, law enforcement, and emergency managers that provide for financial reimbursement. Florida uses a system in which a jurisdiction queries a statewide system for resources and receives a list 274 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT of available resources and cost estimates. The jurisdiction then selects the most cost‐effective resource. At the other end of the spectrum are states that have little or no real mutual aid. In many cases, what little mutual aid is available is limited to fire services. Some states do not recognize the authority of peace officers outside their home county, and the sheriff of the requesting county must swear in mutual aid per sonnel before they can be deployed. The problem is particularly acute in states that have home rule, with the autonomy of multiple small jurisdictions making it difficult to implement a statewide system. Even where mutual aid systems exist, not all the details of reimbursement of costs, liability, and workman’s compensation have been worked out. A further consideration for mutual aid resources is the need to support them. Jurisdictions with limited experience in deploying mutual aid resources some times fail to plan for the type of sustained support needed in a major crisis. Mutual aid resources provided for routine emergencies are generally used for short periods and are dispatched enroute. This means they are dispatched directly to the scene and are essentially self‐sustained. In a major disaster, mutual aid resources are deployed for longer periods of time and must be supported. Initial deployment may be to a staging area where the resource is prepared for assignment to an incident (e.g. briefed, refueled, rested). For such long deployments, mutual aid resources will need to be housed and fed during rest periods, may need maintenance and fuel, or may need medical support. For this reason, although tactical elements may request and deploy mutual aid resources, there is an operational component to mutual aid and such deploy ments must be supported through the EOC. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS Disasters are ultimately about resources. This is not to diminish the importance of response. Rather it is an acknowledgement that jurisdictions are staffed to provide services at a level that meets daily needs. A disaster overwhelms local resources, including those in the public safety arena. The success or failure of operational response will depend largely on the ability of the jurisdiction to obtain and deploy outside resources. Yet resource management is a major point of failure in many crises. Why is this so? Aside from seeming intuitive, every major reference in emergency management – CPG 101, NFPA 1600, the EMAP Standard, NIMS, and the NRF – highlights the importance of resource management. Yet the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program (NEMB‐CAP) study found only a 17% conformance with the EMAP Standard for resource management and 29% conformance for the logistics standard. Furthermore, jurisdictions are frequently criticized during crisis for failing to COORDINATING RESPONSE 275 obtain or distribute essential resources such as food and water, as witnessed at the Superdome in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. Clearly something is not working. A very big part of the problem is that, for most jurisdictions, there is confu sion over the definition of resource management and an unrealistic expectation that normal procurement procedures will be sufficient to manage a crisis. In essence, the jurisdiction confuses procurement with logistics. Resource management in the context of NFPA 1600 is broad in scope. It refers to any resource that is needed to support overall emergency management program goals and objectives. The intent of the standard is to establish a base line, determine shortfalls, and develop plans for meeting those shortfalls such as through procurement or developing mutual aid agreements. In this context, a resource may be tangible, such as a piece of equipment or a specialized team, or it may be something intangible such as training or funding. Where resource management is a broad planning concept that addresses multiple types of resources, logistics is a very specific function. It is the process by which a jurisdiction obtains and distributes needed resources. This involves a complex network that allows for a requestor to order a resource, track its status until received, or know that it is unavailable. This implies many functions: • Accepting the request • Validating the request • Determining how the order will be filled • Placing the order • Tracking the order • Warehousing and transshipping • Receiving the order • Verifying delivery • Paying for the order • Tracking costs • Recovering durable property. Disaster logistics may require the establishment of new facilities such as warehouses and staging areas. It may require developing distribution points to provide goods directly to the user. For example, the State of Florida has an extensive distribution plan that moves goods through a series of ware houses, marshaling areas, and staging areas to points of distributions (PODs) established by the local jurisdiction. The plan specifies responsibilities for each level of government and describes the local requirement for developing POD sites. Logisticians may also find themselves dealing with requests that are not normally the task of local government, such as obtaining lodging for 276 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT incoming mutual aid personnel. The FEMA team during the Northridge earthquake had to find a circus tent within 24 hours to fulfill a commitment to local merchants. Procurement, the task that most local governments do well, is the ordering of goods or services through a contracting process. This is a very small com ponent of an overall logistics function. Unfortunately, the concern over pro tecting public funds from waste, fraud, and abuse makes most of these systems too cumbersome for use in a crisis. For this reason, most emergency author ities allow for waiving procurement requirements. However, the tracking systems that are part of this process are vital in recovering funds under insur ance or federal recovery programs, a fact that is frequently overlooked. Just because a jurisdiction faces a crisis does not mean that accountability can be disregarded. Clearly, attempting to develop an ad hoc logistics system at the time of crisis is not a good thing, but it has been done. On September 11, a Long Island police officer reported to New York under mutual aid and was given the assign ment of creating a logistics system from the ground up. The process was pain ful, to say the least, and it took several weeks to reach a reasonable degree of efficiency. If one elevates this to the level of catastrophe, it becomes obvious that attempting to create a logistics system without any preplanning is a recipe for failure. As part of this preplanning, it is important to involve existing procurement and financial staff. By tracing the logistics process from initial request to final accountability, it is possible to identify barriers, such as needed changes in procedures, and required authorities. The establishment of a base camp for firefighters provided under mutual aid was delayed for several weeks during Hurricane Katrina because no one had the authority to commit the funds at the required level, even though federal reimbursement was guaranteed. Again, a logistics program is not just about delivering goods and services but it also includes the financial accountability that is expected of local government. THE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER Crisis communications consultant Art Botterell has formulated a fourth law of emergency management that states: “Perception is reality.” This reflects the fact that an operation is not necessarily judged by what it does but rather by what it appears to have done. In every crisis, there is a defining moment. If that moment is handled well, the response to the crisis will be judged as successful. If handled poorly, there is no way to retrieve the damage to the community’s reputation. Consider the situation at the Superdome in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. Relief reached the victims in just over three days, consistent with the COORDINATING RESPONSE 277 standard emergency management guidance that all citizens be prepared to be self‐sufficient for three days in a disaster. There is also evidence to suggest that food and water were available at the Superdome, and media reports of violent crime and death have been found to be exaggerated or inaccurate. Yet the single most memorable image of the disaster is the line of victims chanting for help before television cameras. The failure of the federal government to pro vide immediate and overwhelming assistance to the site was a public relations disaster from which FEMA never recovered. The surprising thing about the Hurricane Katrina operation was how badly FEMA handled the media, as FEMA was the originator of the highly effective JIC concept. The JIC is a mechanism to maximize the use of public information resources, identify a single point of release for information, and provide the media with a source of reliable data and fact checking. An important consideration in selecting a lead PIO is that there is a consid erable difference between the day‐to‐day duties of a public affairs officer and the role of a crisis communicator. With media networks running continuous coverage of high‐visibility disasters, information demands in a crisis are much greater than normal, and there is no longer any concept of deadlines. News is immediate and requires constant refreshing. This means that there must be a close link between the JIC and the plans unit to ensure that information is timely and accurate and a streamlined process for deciding what information can be released and what must be withheld. The core of the JIC consists of the PIOs from all the agencies involved in the response operation. These PIOs meet to exchange information, resolve conflicts, and develop a “message.” The “mes sage” represents the official view of the JIC in terms of statistics and instruc tions to the public. This “message” can be released through all the normal media outlets, is disseminated to field PIOs, and is used as a script by staff manning a media phone bank or developing social media messages. Calls that cannot be answered from the script are transferred to the appropriate agency PIO. A fully functional JIC will normally have workspace for media representa tives and a permanent briefing room with an appropriate backdrop, such as visual displays or the phone bank staff. In essence, this is a set, and care must be taken to make sure staff realize that anything said or done on the set is accessible to the media. A full JIC will normally include the capacity to mon itor broadcasts to ensure that the media is putting out accurate information or to identify potential problem stories. It will also include the capability for arranging for press credentials, interviews, background footage, or any other media needs. The JIC represents a significant expenditure of space and resources. However, it is the single best way to deal with the large influx of media that will descend on a disaster scene. The JIC cannot control the news, but it can ensure access to accurate information. It maximizes the use of the PIOs, 278 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ensures that consistent information is being put out at all levels, and provides the press with access to decision‐makers. More importantly, it depicts the disaster management organizations as organized and proactive. CONCLUSION Operational response – the coordination of the resources involved in the disaster – provides the support needed to sustain the tactical response and to transition to long‐term operations. Successful response requires an under standing of the dynamics of disaster operations and the realities of community response, aggressiveness in providing victim services, and creativity and flexi bility in problem‐solving. Preplanning is essential, but ultimately it is the ability to think beyond the limits of the preplanning and to adapt to a changing envi ronment that will determine the success of the disaster response. Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. 279 Chapter 11 Leadership is the capacity to translate vision into reality. —Warren Bennis Founding Chairman, The Leadership Institute, University of Southern California Previous chapters discussed Dr. E.L. Quarantelli’s distinction between disaster preparedness planning and disaster management. Quarantelli suggested a parallel with the military’s distinction between strategy and tactics, with pre- paredness planning developing strategies that will be used during the response to a disaster, and disaster management responsible for overseeing the imple- mentation of those strategies. This distinction between preparation and action creates a significant leadership challenge to the emergency manager. Emergency managers must, of necessity, be strong leaders, but the leadership demands placed on the emergency manager as program manager and as coordinator of operational response vary considerably. Preparedness planning is task‐oriented and is dependent on the emergency manager’s ability to formulate and gain acceptance within a diverse group for a shared vision. The emergency manager usually has little or no authority over this diverse group and must engage in persuasive leadership to convince them to establish and meet objectives in furtherance of the shared vision. Success depends on a well‐structured program and strategic plan with control measures such as goals, objectives, milestones, and timelines. Decision‐making is also structured and adheres to standard models. Disaster management is more complex. Here, the ability to think beyond rigid operational structures or to apply resources in new ways is prized. Spontaneity and quick thinking are rewarded. Directive leadership, with the ability to rapidly assess a situation, anticipate requirements, and to formu- LEADING IN CRISIS 280 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT late and implement a plan of action is essential. However, this is complicated by the fact that, in many cases, the emergency manager is not in responsible charge and is instead an advisor to an executive or elected official. This requires that the emergency manager combine the ability of the directive leader to for- mulate effective action plans and the ability of the persuasive leader to create a shared vision. PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Chapter 4 noted that an accepted definition of emergency management was developed and adopted as part of the product of a working group convened by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop emergency management principles. The group, representing both the academic and practi- tioner communities was convened in 2007 at the Emergency Management Institute under the direction of Dr. Wayne Blanchard. After considering the problem, the working group felt that one could not develop guiding principles without a definition of the discipline and without knowing its vision and mission (Figure 11.1). The common thread that runs through the definition, vision, and mission is that emergency management is about more than just emergency planning. Its focus is community resilience through risk reduction and building the capacity to respond to crisis. Emergency managers achieve this by creating the context in which preparedness planning can be successful. This is a role consistent with the comprehensive emergency management model that has guided emergency management programs for decades and with standards like Emergency Definition Emergency management is the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters. Mission Emergency management protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters. Vision Emergency management seeks to promote safer, less vulnerable communities with the capacity to cope with hazards and disasters. Figure 11.1 Definition, vision, and mission statements for emergency management developed by the Principles of Emergency Management (POEM) working group. LEADING IN CRISIS 281 Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and NFPA 1600 that encourage an enterprise‐wide approach to preparedness. After agreeing on the definition, vision, and mission of emergency management, the group attempted to identify key elements that needed to be present in an emergency management program. These were elements that could make the difference between a successful program and an unsuccessful one. The group identified eight such elements (see Figure 11.2): 1. Comprehensive: This principle supports the “Whole Community” con- cept espoused by FEMA and a commitment to all‐hazards planning. 2. Progressive: Emergency managers should be forward‐thinking and open to new ideas. 3. Risk‐driven: As noted in Chapter 6, effective programs are risk‐based. 4. Integrated: Effective response is a function of how well all actors are included in the planning and the extent to which they share a common vision. 5. Collaborative: The success of crisis response frequently depends on the relationships developed long before the crisis occurs. 6. Coordinated: Successful emergency plans are synchronized rather than stove piped to avoid competition for resources. Principles 1. Comprehensive – Emergency managers consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders, and all impacts relevant to disasters. 2. Progressive – Emergency managers anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities. 3. Risk-driven – Emergency managers use sound risk management principles (hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources. 4. Integrated – Emergency managers ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of a community. 5. Collaborative – Emergency managers create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication. 6. Coordinated – Emergency managers synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to achieve a common purpose. 7. Flexible – Emergency managers use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges. 8. Professional – Emergency managers value a science and knowledge-based approach based on education, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship, and continuous improvement. Figure 11.2 Principles of Emergency Management developed by the POEM working group and adopted by emergency management agencies in the United States and Canada. 282 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 7. Flexible: Emergency managers must be adaptable and make use of creative problem‐solving in times of crisis. 8. Professional: Emergency management depends on continuous improve- ment, both in terms of the program and in the professional development and leadership of the emergency manager. Similar to the definition, vision, and mission statements, the emphasis of the principles is clearly on program management. The principles emphasize the need for collaboration and coordination and reinforce a commitment to all‐ hazards planning based on risk assessment. The principles also encourage creative problem‐solving and continuous improvement, both hallmarks of a successful program. Taken together, the definition, vision, and mission state- ments and the principles raise the expectation that an emergency manager must take a leadership role in achieving the goal of community resilience. PROGRAM LEADERSHIP Building a Leadership Team Emergency management teams are usually small, consisting of only a few coor- dinators and support staff. In some cases, the emergency manager is a single person or may be a part‐time employee or one for whom emergency management is an additional duty. Consequently, it is critical to develop the leadership skills not only of the emergency manager but of all members of the team. In their 30‐year study of leadership, researchers Kouzes and Posner (2012) measured nine demographic variables that could influence engagement, such as age, gender, country of origin, tenure, position, and so forth. Engagement was measured by considering variables such as team spirit, pride, feeling valued, and trust. The results were startling: all nine variables combined accounted for less than 1% of engagement. Instead, they found a direct correlation between improved leadership behaviors and increased engagement. For example, where leaders were clear on their leadership philosophy, constituent engagement increased by 40%. Leaders who demonstrated forward thinking and could articulate and engage constituents in a shared vision saw an increase in engage- ment of 25%. The impact of leadership behaviors is not limited to just those being led; they also have an impact on the leader’s effectiveness. In the aforementioned exam- ples, leaders who were clear on their leadership philosophy were themselves 25% more engaged, and those who could encourage a shared vision were 50% more effective. This last finding highlights the importance of the emergency manager’s role in developing a common vision for the emergency management program. LEADING IN CRISIS 283 Another important finding in the research is that certain behaviors are common to all effective leaders, regardless of their demographic situation. Kouzes and Posner postulated that if the frequency of those behaviors could be increased in an individual, then that person could become a more effective leader. Kouzes and Posner identified 30 common behaviors of effective leaders. They divided the behaviors into five broad practice areas, which they called The Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership®: 1. Model the Way. Although it is easy to consider this practice as simply, “lead by example,” Model the Way is a bit more complex. It relies on the leader being clear about his or her own values and aligning their actions with those values. It also requires affirming shared values within their team. 2. Inspire a Shared Vision In a survey by Kouses and Posner, 71% of the respondents cited “forward looking” as the key trait they desired in a leader. It is the distinguishing characteristic of a leader. But the ability to envision a path to a desired result is worthless unless a leader can con- vince others to share that vision. 3. Challenge the Process Effective leaders are risk takers. They must be pre- pared to challenge the status quo, to learn by experience, and to seek new and better ways of doing things. All of these are things that emergency managers do or should be doing on a routine basis; there is a reason that “flexibility” is one of the Principles of Emergency Management. 4. Enable Others to Act Emergency managers succeed or fail largely based on how well they build trust and develop collaborative relationships. This practice focuses on this relationship building and on strengthening others by allowing them freedom of action and encouraging professional development. 5. Encourage the Heart Another aspect of emergency management is the development of community spirit among the teams and agencies with which one works. A component of that development is the recognition of contributions to the shared vision. In simple terms, recognize and reward individuals for their contribution to the team. Kouzes and Posner used these principles and the supporting 30 behaviors to create a leadership improvement program called the Leadership Challenge®. The concept behind the Leadership Challenge program is that anyone can improve their leadership skills by increasing the frequency of their leadership behaviors. The program uses an initial 360° assessment to determine the fre- quency of existing behaviors and identify those that are demonstrated only infrequently. This information is used to develop an action plan for increasing the frequency of selected behaviors. 284 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Implementing a program such as the Leadership Challenge offers several advantages to the emergency management program: • It encourages the idea that anyone can develop as a leader. Leadership traits are considered inherent, whereas behaviors can be modified. Emergency management offices are small, and all members will sooner or later be called on to lead, whether within the program or in a crisis. The Leadership Challenge is specifically designed to raise the level of performance of all members of a team. • It provides accountability through benchmarking and periodically assess- ing progress. • It fosters team building by helping to clarify personal values and to affirm shared values. Shared values are important to creating a shared vision. • It encourages creativity by fostering an environment where the status quo can be challenged, and new approaches to problem‐solving are encouraged. Establishing Relationships Emergency management is ultimately about relationship building. One of the most important of the Principles of Emergency Management is collaboration, which requires that “Emergency managers create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.” This relies heavily on persuasive leadership rather than on a directive approach. Emergency managers need to articulate a shared vision that is accepted by organizations participating in the emergency management program and persuade the organi- zations to support that vision. In a paper titled Constructing Theory for Emergency Managers: A Principles‐ Based Approach presented at the 2008 FEMA Higher Education Conference, Dr. George Youngs suggested a new approach to implementing the Principles of Emergency Management. Youngs believed that the Principles could be advanced by the following: 1. Shifting the focus of the principles from individuals to relationships. 2. Recasting the principles as dimensions of relationship behavior. 3. Viewing the principles as examples of larger concepts or processes. In other words, rather than viewing the principles as imperatives (things that emergency managers must be or do), they should be considered as vari- ables or dimensions describing relationships. By doing so, emergency man- agers could access the considerable body of research on relationships done by social psychologists. LEADING IN CRISIS 285 Youngs specifically urged the adaption of Robert Cialdini’s Six Principles of Persuasion as a mechanism for influencing others to support the emergency management program. Cialdini’s book, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, focuses on principles used in marketing but by formulating them as a set of the- oretical statements, Youngs made them relevant to relationship building: 1. Reciprocity: If you do favors for others, others will be more likely to do favors for you. 2. Commitment: The more a person becomes publicly committed to a posi- tion, the more likely that person is to stay committed to the position. 3. Social Proof: The more people a person perceives to be engaged in a requested activity, the more likely that person is to accommodate the request. 4. Likeability: The more a person likes the source of a request, the more likely that person is to comply with the request. 5. Authority: The more legitimate authority a person is perceived to have, the more likely it is that others will comply with that person. 6. Scarcity: The scarcer a desired option is perceived to be, the more likely a person is to seek it out (Youngs 2009). Cialdini’s Six Principles of Persuasion are based on an understanding of human nature and how people can be influenced. Despite being based on advertising, they translate well to the emergency management program. For example, understanding that people are more likely to perform tasks to which they have publicly committed suggests that gaining agreement to performing program tasks can be reinforced through formal memoranda or by agreement at public committee meetings. Authority can be derived from having a senior executive or public official endorse the program in writing or issue memoranda directing participation by subordinates. Social proof is reflected in meeting attendance or the number of organizations involved with the program; the more people involved, the more others will feel the need to participate. Making Decisions Decision‐making within the emergency management program is usually done collaboratively using a standard problem‐solving model. In a certain sense, plans represent anticipated solutions to potential problems. Figure 11.3 shows two such problem‐solving models, one from the National Management Association and the other from the US Army. Note that the two models are almost identical, as business and the military have traditionally borrowed con- cepts from each other. The successful use of a similar model in both spheres suggests that problem‐solving should follow a logical and orderly progression. This progression does not seem to be intuitive, however, as many organizations 286 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT spend considerable time spinning their wheels in “planning meetings” without producing an outcome. The most underused step in the problem‐solving model is the most basic one: define the problem. Without a clear definition of what the problem is, it is easy to be distracted by tangential issues. For example, in response to a series of res- idential hotel fires, a major jurisdiction formed a task force to provide legisla- tors with recommendations on how to better mitigate fire hazards and how to stimulate reconstruction of damaged hotels. However, owing to poorly crafted enabling legislation, the scope of the task force was expanded to address tenant welfare. Issues such as visitation policies, elevator repairs, and family housing sidetracked the task force. Eventually, many members of the task force who were committed to the original mission felt they were being misused and began to miss meetings. Worse, since the task force also involved itself in response issues, an existing task force on sheltering chaired by the local emergency man- ager saw a significant drop in meeting attendance as members became confused as to the roles of the two task forces. This type of decision‐making is referred to as a “rational choice” model. In this model, decision‐makers analyze alternative solutions to the defined problem to determine the best course of action. This type of decision‐making allows for considerable input from stakeholders and can help decision‐makers arrive at a consensus. It also lends itself well to the development of the decision paper described in Chapter 9. The process can be slow, but it is methodical and logical. OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP The Effects of Crisis Leadership in a crisis is ultimately about decision‐making. Other critical steps, such as recognizing and isolating the crisis, prepare the leader to make decisions. Test possible solutions Evaluate alternatives Get relevant information Size up the situation Develop possible solutions Gather facts, make assumptions, determine scope Recognize and define the problem Analyze, compare possible solutions United States Army National Management Association Select the best solution Figure 11.3 Rational choice problem solving models – models used by the private sector and the military show remarkable congruence. While terminology varies slightly, the methodology and the outcome are the same. LEADING IN CRISIS 287 Implementing actions, such as the deployment of resources, are based on the decisions made by the leader. The pivotal point in any crisis is the making of the decision about how one will deal with the crisis. To understand why the demands on a leader change in a crisis, it is necessary to understand what happens to an individual in a disaster. In her study of disaster survivors, The Unthinkable, journalist Amanda Ripley identified three stages that a person goes through when confronted with disaster, which she calls the “survival arc”: 1. Denial: A unwillingness to accept that the disaster is occurring. 2. Deliberation: Deciding what action to take. 3. Decisive Moment: Selecting an option and putting it into action. Although Ripley was focusing on individual survival and why some people survive while others do not, the “survival arc” is relevant to any crisis leader. Ripley points out that the time spent in denial is a function of how one per- ceives risk and depends less on the reality of the danger than on one’s percep- tion of the danger. In other words, fear may lead to an emotional response rather than a rational one. The denial phase is also the time when one is most prone to the physiological changes brought on by stress. Among these are increased respiration and heart rate, auditory exclusion, and tunnel vision. These changes can inhibit the ability to think rationally and limit decision‐making capacity. The greater the crisis, the more extreme the reaction. Ripley sites a case from September 11 of a woman who did not remember that she was an assigned floor warden until some six months after the disaster. Once one moves through denial to deliberation, there are other barriers to effec- tive crisis response that must be overcome. Researchers such as Weick and Sutcliffe (2015) point to a tendency to normalize events, that is to see what one expects to see rather than what is occurring. This can lead to deliberately seeking out information that confirms the expectation while ignoring information that does not. Barriers to Decision‐Making Perhaps the best explanation of barriers to decision‐making can be found in the work of researchers Janis and Mann (1977). In their book, Decision Making, Janis and Mann described what they termed the “Conflict Model of Decision Making” (see Figure 11.4). The Conflict Model describes a series of five coping mechanisms based on three factors: (i) the level of risk if no action is taken, (ii) the chance of finding a better alternative, and (iii) the availability of time to gather and assess relevant information. Each of these coping mechanisms can create conditions that lead to bad decisions: 1. Unconflicted inertia reflects the tendency to do nothing. The decision is influenced by the answer to the question “Are there risks if I do nothing?” 288 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT If there are no perceived consequences for failing to act, then the ten- dency is for the decision‐maker to take no action. This is the default posi- tion for many crisis leaders and fosters a tendency to “wait and see” rather than to act. 2. Unconflicted change assumes that there are consequences for inaction and shifts attention to the potential risks associated with taking the most available action. If there are no risks or minimal risks associated with the action, then the tendency is to take the action without fully considering other options. In other words, decision‐makers pressed to “do something” default to the most obvious solution, which may not be the best option. 3. Defensive avoidance assumes there are consequences for inaction and for taking the most obvious action. The logical step is to seek alternatives. However, if the answer to the question, “Is it realistic to hope to find a better course of action?” is negative, the tendency is to stop searching for a viable option and to avoid cues that increase anxiety. This may be char- acterized by inattentiveness or passing the problem to someone else. 4. Hypervigilance assumes there are other potential actions available, but there is insufficient time to deliberate and decide on the best course of action. If this is the case, fear rises, increasing stress, and the tendency is to make snap judgments with limited analysis of the options. In its worst form, hypervigilance may result in panic. 5. Vigilance assumes an unbiased analysis of information and selection of the best course of action. This is the optimum coping mechanism and the desired state of decision‐making in a crisis. No Loss if no change Hi Risk if no change? Hi risk if change? Better solution? Time? NoNo Defensive avoidance Hypervigilance Incomplete planning Thorough planning Unconflicted change Unconflicted inertia Crisis No Vigilance Loss if change Information resources Time pressure Figure 11.4 Conflict Decision Model. Based on Decision Making by Janis and Mann (1977). LEADING IN CRISIS 289 Another way to look at this model is as a series of “traps” that can prevent effective decision‐making: Trap #1: Maintaining the Status Quo: As noted by Sutcliff and Weicke, leaders under stress frequently normalize events – they see what they expect to see. This makes it easy to miss cues or indicators of an escalating crisis or to acknowledge only information that confirms what the decision‐ maker expects to see. If there are no perceived consequences for doing nothing, there is no need to act. Trap #2: Taking the Easy Way Out: Assuming that there are consequences for inaction, the next consideration is whether there is a risk in acting. Generally, the action being considered is the most obvious one and little time is spent on analysis. If there is no perceived risk in taking the selected action, there is really no need to consider alternative courses of action. Trap #3: Procrastinating: When available courses of action all carry risks, the tendency is to search for a better solution. The trap here is that it if there is a perception that no low‐risk solutions are available, the decision‐maker may become fatalistic or apathetic, exhibit behaviors such as ignoring or selectively interpreting information, or attempt to pass the responsibility for decision‐making to someone else. Trap #4: Running Out the Clock: Hesitation is not uncommon among decision‐ makers in a crisis. Information is incomplete or contradictory, and there is usually little time to wait for better solutions. This is the fourth trap of decision‐making: continuing to seek for solutions rather than deciding on the best available alternative, even if it carries considerable risk. The common phrase for this is “analysis paralysis.” Under heavy time constraints, this can even lead to panic or the selection of extremely poor solutions. The conflict‐theory model emphasizes the need to avoid normalization and bias and to gather and assess information specific to the problem. As a per- ceived “outsider” without responsibility for decision‐making, the emergency manager is in a unique position to offer objective advice to a senior official. Because of their education and experience, the emergency manager should have a deeper understanding of the implications inherent in the available information and the ability to analyze potential courses of action. However, this role depends on the emergency manager having established themselves as a trusted advisor. Crisis Decision‐Making As noted in the aforementioned discussion on decision‐making in the emergency management program, managers are trained to use a rational 290 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT choice problem‐solving model that works extremely well day‐to‐day: define the problem, gather information on the problem, consider alternatives, decide on an alternative, and implement it. To a certain extent, this model mirrors the five stages of decision‐making identified by Janis and Mann in their research: 1. Appraising the challenge. 2. Surveying alternatives. 3. Weighing alternatives. 4. Deliberating about commitment. 5. Adhering despite negative feedback. The problem is that the rational choice model does not work well during a crisis. A crisis is characterized by ambiguity and conflicting information. There are usually severe time constraints and very high stakes. Using a structured decision‐making model may, in fact, lead to paralysis as the decision‐maker attempts to gather more information and keeps putting off making a final decision, as predicted in the Conflict Model of Decision Making. Couple a com- plex problem with inadequate time for analysis, add in the physiological changes induced by stress, and it becomes apparent why so many crisis managers make bad decisions. Crisis requires a more intuitive decision‐making process. Research into mili- tary and emergency services decision‐making by Gary Klein (2001) suggests that leaders reacting to a crisis rely on pattern recognition rather than a struc- tured decision‐making process. That is they unconsciously attempt to find a correlation between the current problem and their past experiences. Once a match is found, the decision‐maker runs a quick mental simulation to see if it fits the current situation, makes any necessary adjustments, and acts. This pro- cess happens extremely fast, and the decision‐maker may not even be conscious of it, often claiming that they acted on a hunch or a feeling. In his book, Sources of Power, Klein refers to this process as the recognition‐primed decision model. Using recognition‐primed decision‐making can be uncomfortable in that it relies on trusting intuition rather than consciously comparing alternatives. However, Klein argues that “Intuition depends on the use of experience to rec- ognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation.” In other words, the decision‐maker is not just going on feelings but on a subconscious level is reviewing past experience for patterns that match the current crisis. The significance of Klein’s research lies in his discovery that the experiences used in recognition‐primed decision‐making are not dependent solely on the direct experience of the decision‐maker but can be obtained by learning from the experience of others and by participation in simulations. Furthermore, with regard to direct experience, knowledge gained in one situation could be appli- cable to a different one as the focus is on patterns, not identical situations. LEADING IN CRISIS 291 This has implications for the emergency manager and the emergency management program. There are numerous case histories of organizations that have successfully survived crisis. There is even more literature on those that did not. Klein’s research suggests that reading accounts of other crises and the decisions made during them is almost as effective as gaining direct experience. Reading articles, reviewing case studies and after‐action reports, and viewing documentaries all can increase the patterns available for recall. Consider, for example the emphasis on the study of past campaigns in military schools. Simulations or exercises combine the best of both worlds. They can be based on hypothetical or actual scenarios found in after action reports or articles. In addition, they can provide direct experience to participants, allowing them to become familiar with the physiological changes brought on by stress. Even something as simple as a short discussion‐based exercise can provide additional pattern sets to decision‐makers. CONCLUSION As program managers, emergency managers must be strong leaders. However, the conflicting demands of preparedness planning and disaster management pose a potential problem. The persuasive leadership and rational choice decision‐ making used in preparedness planning is too slow in disaster management. The directive leadership and pattern recognition‐based decision‐making that are effective in disaster management are too unilateral and brusque for prepared- ness planning. However, when one considers that in both situations, the emergency man- ager’s success depends on his or her ability to establish a shared vision among actors over whom the emergency manager has no direct control, the difference between the two leadership demands becomes one of approach rather than one of conflicting philosophies. In both cases, success demands the ability to be forward looking, to grasp the “big picture,” and to articulate and build a con- sensus around a shared vision. Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. 293 Chapter 12 Expectations are often premeditated resentments. —Johnathan Bernstein Crisis Management Consultant Emergency managers tend to focus their efforts on operational planning. The early chapters of this book explored some of the reasons for this, primarily the origin of emergency management in the civil defense program. It is an area where emergency managers feel comfortable. However, successful disaster management requires a response on all three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It is a sad fact that the perceived success or failure of a response is not always determined by what is done, but by how well public expectations are met. When one compares immediate response to short‐ and long‐term recovery, it is obvious that response is only an initial stage of relatively short duration. Because it is an important stage, most emergency preparedness activities are focused on building response capacity. Nevertheless, recovery and reconstruc tion efforts ultimately determine the continued viability of a community and the length of time needed to return to some acceptable state of normalcy. It is in these two areas of public expectation and perception and recovery and reconstruction that strategic response becomes important. Unfortunately, most emergency plans do not address strategic response beyond the formation of a “policy group” or consideration of federal recovery programs. There is a failure to recognize the need for organizing for community recovery in the same way that response is organized. Preparedness efforts must include the establishment of plans and mechanisms for strategic response. Unlike tactical response, there are few emergency management sources for preparing for stra tegic response. However, there is a considerable body of literature on crisis management that has relevance to strategic disaster response. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 294 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BARRIERS TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT Disengagement and Inexperience Social science has demonstrated that community leadership is generally not fully engaged in emergency planning. This means that although senior officials may be supportive of the emergency management program, they are unlikely to commit the time necessary to provide direct leadership to the program or to participate in exercises or training. Yet these same officials are expected to pro vide leadership in a crisis. Unfortunately, most of this leadership translates into trying to direct response from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as opposed to focusing on strategic issues. Figure 12.1 summarizes the four Laws of Emergency Management formu lated by crisis communications consultant Art Botterell. Although other chap ters have made mention of these laws, it is in the role of senior officials that all four factors come into play. Key government officials are usually untrained in their roles. This creates misperceptions based on disaster mythology and cre ates stress, leading in many cases to hesitation in decision‐making. In Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable, Steven Fink discusses the impact of stress on decision‐making and points out that stress is both a nega tive and a positive. A certain amount of stress engages an individual. This, after all, is the biological origin of stress: to prepare an individual to deal with crisis either through aggression or by flight. Too much stress, however, reduces an individual’s ability to think clearly and proves the truth of Botterell’s first law: Stress makes you stupid. This emphasizes the need to prepare senior officials for decision‐making that goes beyond the usual tabletops related to response. Deciding on curfews and reentry of evacuated areas are well within the capacity of the planners at the EOC. Instead, one must consider how to prepare managers to cope with stress and to focus on long‐term issues. Based on this understanding, it is possible to derive three corollaries to Botterell’s Laws of Emergency Management that can assist officials during crisis: 1. Don’t Just Do Something; Stand There!: Most senior officials do not understand the pacing of operational‐level functions. There is a tendency Botterell’s Laws of Emergency Management 1. Stress makes you stupid 2. The problem is at the input 3. No matter who you train, someone else will show up 4. Expectation is reality Figure 12.1 Botterell’s Laws of Emergency Management. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 295 to feel the need to “do something” and a failure to realize that response is already taking place on the tactical level. The first step in any crisis is to pause and ask “What do we know?” Doing “something” immediately is not managing the crisis. Craig Fugate, former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator, when he was director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management once suggested “Take a deep breath and then your pulse. As long as you can do both, relax.” Relaxation techniques such as these can help reduce stress to manageable levels. 2. Don’t Try to Fix the World; Fix the Problem: General Dwight Eisen hower once said “The older I get, the more wisdom I find in the ancient rule of taking first things first, a process which often reduces the most complex human problem to a manageable proportion.” Disasters are, by definition, overwhelming. It is not possible to hit them head on and survive. Instead, the manager’s job is to assess the need and to prioritize response based on existing resources. Not everything needs to be fixed immediately. This concept lies at the heart of continuity planning and the development of recovery time objectives. It works for emergency operations as well. Food is not as important as water. Disposal of the dead is not as important as emergency medical services. Firefighting trumps debris clearance. This corollary speaks to both the reduction of stress and the acquisition of relevant data through limiting problems to manageable levels. 3. Truth, No Matter How Harsh, is a Planning Parameter: Accurate infor mation is the basis of good decisions. Senior officials can unwittingly create environments where subordinates become unwilling to reveal short comings or perceived failings. This is particularly true when the official has unrealistic expectations for the pace of operations. Yet the nature of disaster operations is that problems can be solved in a variety of uncon ventional ways. First, though, one must acknowledge that there is a problem. Another way of considering this is to “fix the problem; not the blame,” a concept alien to many US politicians. Having relevant data and, more importantly, confidence in the data can further reduce the stress associated with decision‐making. Common Leadership Problems Dr. E.L. Quarantelli identifies several common problems with decision‐making at the EOC. The first problem is the tendency of senior leaders to want to remain in the EOC for extended periods of time. Part of this is, of course, the unwillingness to delegate authority for a career‐breaking crisis to an ad hoc organization. This uncertainty is the direct result of not having participated in exercises or smaller emergencies and consequently having little trust in the 296 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Type I Established Old Regular Non Regular New S tr u ct u re Tasks Type II Extending Type III Expanding Type IV Emergent Figure 12.2 Typology of Organizational Adaptation in Crisis, also known as the DRC typology, based on work done at the Disaster Research Center. system. However, as was noted in a previous chapter, disaster operations require sustained operations. The longer an official goes without adequate rest, the closer he or she is to collapse. When this occurs, particularly if the executive has reserved all decision‐making authorities to himself or herself, the EOC may find itself without the authority necessary to continue vital operations such as purchasing relief supplies or approving mutual aid requests. One of the characteristics of a disaster is the creation of new tasks that are outside the normal day‐to‐day responsibilities of the jurisdictional organiza tion. Major policy issues may arise out of the need to assign responsibility for these tasks. Existing organizations may be reluctant to take on new tasks. There may be insufficient legal authority to accomplish the new tasks. There may be conflicts over jurisdictional issues. These are strategic issues that require an in‐depth understanding of community politics and group interactions that are the hallmarks of a good politician. They may also require the imposition of political will, emergency legislation, or a policy decision to ensure the integration of organizations and tasks. Disasters also result in the emergence of new or substantially changed orga nizations. Figure 12.2 is a model of group adaptation in disasters based on the work of Dr. Russell Dynes and others at the Disaster Research Center. The model considers changes to the structure of the organization and to the type of tasks performed. Type I organizations remain unchanged during disasters, keeping the same structure and performing the same tasks. Type II organiza tions keep the same organizational structure but take on additional tasks dur ing emergencies. Type III organizations increase in size and may change in structure during disaster but perform the same tasks normally performed pre disaster. Type IV organizations are newly formed groups that were not part of the predisaster community. Type IV organizations carry the most potential for creating problems if not appropriately integrated into the disaster management organization. They may CRISIS MANAGEMENT 297 be community‐based or external to the community and may be viewed with suspicion by established organizations. This is particularly true if the emergent organization is perceived as encroaching on the responsibilities of the established organizations or is viewed as a competitor for resources or funding. This situation is not uncommon among volunteer organizations. However, not all emergent groups represent the community, and providing official recogni tion to such groups may be inappropriate. Consequently, the decision to inte grate newly emerged groups into the disaster management organization may need to be made at the strategic or policy level. No area is more fraught with controversy than issues arising over jurisdic tion. Disasters have a way of straddling both geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. During crisis, these overlapping responsibilities and authorities represent a significant potential for conflict. However, there are mechanisms to help resolve these issues, such as the use of unified command, and senior officials should be quick to identify and diffuse such conflicts. Many of these issues have a political dimension and are related to public policy and so must be decided by the political leadership of the jurisdiction rather than by a response organization. Appropriate Roles for Senior Officials As one considers the decision‐making mechanisms needed in a disaster, it becomes apparent that the skill sets needed in disasters are different than that used in day‐to‐day activities. Executives are used to making decisions based on the known variables. A disaster, however, is characterized by uncertainty. Decision‐making based on trial and error becomes more the norm than decision‐making based on a systemic approach (i.e. one that replicates a method known to lead to a solution). This places a premium on collaboration and con sultation rather than direction and control. In other words, decisions are made by drawing on the expertise of many as opposed to being made solely on the knowledge of the leader. This changes the nature of the organization needed in disaster response from the mechanistic one used in day‐to‐day operations to one that researchers Burns and Stalker term “organic.” Organic organizations are characterized by the following: • Organizational structures that provide for task force approaches to the division of labor. • Task assignments that are not rigidly defined and adjustable based on the changing situation. • A communications structure that emphasizes the flow of information. • Emphasis on coordination rather than on command and control. 298 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT • Emphasis on self‐control and discretion rather than on system control. • Limited preoccupation with adhering to the chain of command. This concept of an organic organization speaks to the strengths of the mul tiagency coordination system. It reinforces the idea that the EOC operating structure should be based on multi‐agency coordination system (MACS) and not the incident command system (ICS) field organization and that the appro priate role for the EOC is one of coordination rather than command and control. If one accepts the idea that the EOC is a point of coordination and not of command, then it follows that the senior leadership of the community does not always have to be present in the EOC to direct operations. During the initial phase of a crisis, it is normal and appropriate for senior managers and department heads to meet at the EOC, receive a briefing on the crisis, and set policy. However, as the disaster progresses, the appropriate role for these key leaders is directing and controlling the field operations of their department, not overseeing activities in the EOC. Ideally, senior leaders will meet once or twice a day to approve incident action plans or to resolve policy issues and spend the rest of their time doing their jobs. This is not to suggest that senior officials and department heads have no role in disaster response. On the contrary, their roles are vital. However, the tradi tional model of response that absents a department head from their department at the most critical moment of their career is counterintuitive. This is precisely the time that departments need decisive leadership, and the presence of the department head is critical to the success of tactical response. Furthermore, once one delegates operational decisions to the disaster management team or MAC group, the level of decision‐making required of senior leaders drops dra matically. If the disaster management team has the authority needed to obtain and allocate resources (e.g. fiscal authority, authority to request mutual aid), there should be few operational decisions requiring the attention of senior department heads, freeing them to concentrate on directing their departments’ response. Allowing oneself to be distracted by tactical or operational issues is common, even among professionals. FEMA deployed its National Emergency Response Team to provide relief following a hurricane in the Caribbean. The initial ele ments landed on an unaffected island in another state, and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and key members of his staff went to the main affected island to coordinate with the local government. While there, the FCO became involved in assisting with the evacuation of tourists from the island, and it was two days before he was able to return to the staging area and direct deployment of his team, which, at this point, had grown to several hundred workers. Because he had been focused on tactical rather than strategic issues, CRISIS MANAGEMENT 299 the deployment was sporadic, and no work had been done to determine operating facilities, transportation, or lodging for the team. Because of the press of time, strategic options, such as splitting the team into a rear base and a forward team to reduce the competition for housing on the affected island, were not even considered. CRISIS MANAGEMENT Identifying the Crisis If senior executives are not managing response, just what do they do? The answer is that they manage the crisis, not the disaster. This is more than semantic double talk. The disaster is immediate: people must be rescued, shel ters must be established, and critical infrastructure must be restored. However, these are tactical and operational issues that will be sorted out one way or another. Eventually, enough resources will be mustered and deployed to solve these problems. The real crisis is the long‐term impact of the disaster on the community. For example, following the earthquake in Kobe, Japan, several large companies took the opportunity to relocate to Malaysia where labor costs were considerably cheaper. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the population in New Orleans dropped from 484 674 to fewer than 150 000. Obviously, the relocation of major employers and a reduction in population have a drastic impact on the tax base and the community’s ability to fund recovery projects. As counterintuitive as it may seem, the principal focus of the senior officials of the jurisdiction is not the immediate response problems but the identification of long‐term impacts and the establishment of a strategy to deal with those impacts. It is on public policy and political issues. It is on community resilience. Consequently, the first step in managing crisis is to properly identify the actual crisis. The crisis is not always obvious, and immediate needs are sometimes only the indicators that point to the actual crisis. The senior official needs to ask “What’s really going on here and what does it mean in the long‐term?” In many cases, the real crisis of a disaster is not only in meeting the immediate needs of the victims but also in preserving the economic viability of the community and funding long‐range reconstruction. Just as in hazard analysis, one must con sider impacts rather than the agent that caused them. Complicating this issue is the fact that it is not always apparent that a disaster is occurring. Social science suggests that people tend to “normalize” emergencies. That is they tend to view them within the context of day‐to‐day activities rather than recognizing that something unusual is occurring. This is part of the reason that public warning notices are not always issued in a timely fashion or why EOCs are not fully staffed in the face of potential crisis. 300 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Sometimes, the difference between emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes is slim: the breaching of the New Orleans levees transformed the nature of Hurricane Katrina; conflagration following the 1906 earthquake destroyed most of San Francisco. Recognizing that a crisis is occurring and taking steps to manage it are easy in concept, but difficult in execution. Isolating the Crisis Focusing on the strategic aspects of the disaster rather than the tactical and operational ones allows isolation of the crisis, another concept in crisis management. Isolating the crisis means focusing directly on the crisis and not being distracted by other issues. It is not possible to run the operational response, manage day‐to‐day functions, and deal with strategic issues all at once. This means that senior officials need to consider how much they will be involved in each and to whom they will delegate other responsibilities. This can, of course, change over time. Art Agnos, the mayor of San Francisco dur ing the Loma Prieta earthquake, was not particularly popular with the voters, but he enjoyed a surge of popularity when he devoted himself full time for several weeks to dealing with policy issues resulting from the earthquake. Similarly, after September 11, Mayor Rudi Giuliani of New York devoted himself full time to recovery issues and was widely praised for his very visible leadership during the crisis. There is a further reason for maintaining a strategic focus. Despite a per ceived history of “rugged individualism” and independence, Americans tend to play by the rules. Far from being a nation of risk takers, Americans do not generally reward initiative in public service. David Brown of the Washington Post suggests that this is the result of a litigious society that raises the specter of legal liability whenever risk is considered. A second factor is a fear of criticism and public humiliation from reporters always willing to find fault with government. However, social science research suggests that effective disaster response depends on innovation and creative ideas. Officials must be willing to adapt plans to changing situations and to use resources in unexpected ways. For example, during Hurricane Iniki, urban search and rescue teams, which were comprised primarily of firefighters, were used to evaluate the fire load created by vegetation killed by the storm and to clear sites particularly prone to fire. Since there was no requirement for their primary mission, the teams used their skills in a way that was not preplanned to address an immediate threat. The inherent conflict between a tendency to follow the rules and the need for inno vation could potentially be resolved though the vision, influence, and political will of senior government officials. Identifying and isolating the crisis are two important first steps toward managing the crisis. They remove distractions and allow a focus on the real CRISIS MANAGEMENT 301 issues. However, at some point, senior officials must take decisive action to manage the crisis. There is a very real danger that issues will be overstudied and no action taken, what crisis management consultant Steven Fink calls “analysis paralysis.” Similar to tactical and operational response, strategic response requires aggressiveness and a certain amount of risk taking. As General George S. Patton was fond of saying “A good plan executed today is better than a per fect plan executed at some indefinite point in the future.” Preparing for Crisis Management Core membership in a crisis action team should be preplanned. At a minimum, the team should consist of the chief elected or administrative official, legal counsel, lead PIO, chief financial officer, and key department and agency heads. This core membership can be augmented at the time of crisis as needed. It is important to remember that although many in this core group may have operational authority, the focus of the crisis management team is on long‐term issues of public policy, not the ongoing response operation. This does not pre clude the team from providing appropriate oversight and quality control of the response (indeed, they would be negligent if they did not), but the resolution of any issues should be delegated to the appropriate tactical or operational orga nizations. If the crisis management team bypasses these organizations and begins to issue instructions directly to operational units, then these tactical and operational organizations become marginalized and coordination breaks down. It should be obvious by now that trying to develop strategic response on the fly is difficult at best. Ideally, many of the issues and potential solutions or options could be identified during the development of recovery and mitigation strategies and incorporated into long‐range plans. Issues of the types discussed previously lend themselves very well to tabletop exercises. In fact, this is the preferred mechanism for training crisis management teams. As has been noted, the pacing of response varies from level to level. Tactical response is characterized by the need for immediate and urgent action. Operational response requires a step back from the tactical response and a focus on supporting requirements and resource allocation. The pacing for strategic response is even slower. Consequently, tying the crisis management team or policy group into a functional or full‐scale exercise is not always the best way to train crisis managers. There is just too much temptation to get involved in tactical and operational response, as true policy issues are not necessarily immediate issues and may be slow to emerge in the initial stages of the crisis. One advantage to recognizing the three levels of response is that the model plays to the strengths of those that implement them. Front line departments are used to dealing with the immediacy of emergencies. They know the resources 302 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT available, the qualifications of their team, and the types of issues that will arise. Personnel at the EOC require training to overcome a tactically oriented mind‐ set but generally can carryover knowledge from their tactical experience that enhances their value as coordinators. Likewise, strategic response plays to the strengths of local officials. Elected officials are keenly aware of the need to build public consensus and of the types of issues that resonate with the public. They understand how to provide policy direction and how to craft legislation. They understand how to deal with other levels of government and high‐ ranking officials. Given these strengths, it is amazing how many officials feel the need to become involved directly in tactical and operational response, an area for which few are really suited. By doing so, they fail to isolate the crisis and set them selves up for failure. The role of senior officials is to identify long‐range issues, set goals, craft strategies to achieve those goals, and establish the policies needed to implement the strategies. Training for senior officials should emphasize this role and consider tactical response only in the context of oversight and quality control. Hurricane Katrina: Crisis Management Failure Hurricane Katrina provided a powerful case study of how failure to identify and isolate a crisis can have tragic results. One of the points of initial con fusion was the newly formulated Homeland Security designation of “Incident of National Significance.” Although President Bush had declared a state of disaster under the Stafford Act and FEMA had deployed the National Emer gency Response Teams prior to landfall, Secretary Chertoff was criticized for not declaring an “Incident of National Significance,” which would have invoked certain authorities under the National Response Plan. Prior to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, however, a declaration of disaster under the Stafford Act provided all the necessary authority needed for the FCO to manage the activities of the federal agencies responding under the Federal Response Plan. Further complicating the situation was the decision to appoint a Principal Federal Official as called for in the National Response Plan and to appoint Michael Brown to the position, despite his never having been trained as a PFO. The PFO’s role was ambiguous under the National Response Plan, with no real authority or staff support. The National Response Plan added a layer of bureaucracy and reduced the ability of the FCOs to deal with operational response. Brown immediately involved himself in operational rather than strategic issues and became the focal point for all that was going wrong with the federal response. (There is a suggestion that the FCO may also have become too involved in tactical response. Emails suggest that he was directly coordinating CRISIS MANAGEMENT 303 the flow of relief supplies from other states rather than delegating this to his operations section.) This severely reduced his ability to effectively manage the overall crisis by drawing him almost exclusively into the operational issues sur rounding the response in New Orleans. If one considers this situation from a crisis management perspective, one must ask “What is the real crisis here?” The crisis was not the flooding of New Orleans or the stranding of disaster victims at the Superdome. The real crisis was the lack of coordination in the federal response. The situation in New Orleans was merely a symptom of the crisis, and focusing on the single symptom ignored the situation in the other states affected by Katrina. Many commu nities were in even worse condition than New Orleans. Assuming that, as PFO, he had authority to deal with the coordination issue, Brown could have considered setting specific priorities, such as dealing imme diately with the Superdome issue, and delegated their implementation to the FCO and his Emergency Response Team, who were trained and equipped to deal with operational issues. His concern should have been to see that the FCO had the needed resources, redirecting them from other operations if necessary, and then to focus on improving overall federal response. He could not do this and directly manage the situation in New Orleans. In crisis management terms, Brown failed to isolate the crisis. It is, of course, easy to second guess decisions made during a crisis. However, the point is that, allowing oneself to be drawn into operational and tactical issues, no matter how pressing, sacrifices one’s ability to react strategically. This is not to say that the operational and tactical issues are not important; an overwhelming response to the Superdome crisis might have changed the public impression of the federal response in Katrina. However, this type of response should have been within the capabilities of the opera tional staff at the Joint Field Office and should not have required Brown’s personal intervention. If it did, fixing the problem at the JFO would have been the appropriate focus of his efforts, not the delivery of relief services to New Orleans. There were other problem areas that could have been addressed by focusing on strategic issues. FEMA came under considerable criticism for its use of no‐ bid contracts to support reconstruction and immediate recovery. The policy decision as to how contractor support would be used could have been antici pated in the early days of the catastrophe and resolved before the first contracts were let. Similarly, the decision to scatter Katrina refugees across the country led to concerns over how long the federal government would fund living expenses. Although expedient at the time, it had a long‐term effect on New Orleans when a large percentage of the evacuees chose to make new lives for themselves in their new locations and did not return. Again, these are strategic issues that could have been anticipated and addressed before they reached the level of a crisis. 304 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Increasing Organizational Effectiveness Effective crisis management can be enhanced by organizational change as well, something that could potentially be encouraged by emergency managers with direct access to key officials. Weicke and Sutcliffe identified five common char acteristics of “high reliability organizations,” such as aircraft carriers and nuclear power plants, where failure carries extreme consequences. These orga nizations all shared the following characteristics: 1. Preoccupation with Failure: Identification of problems or mistakes was rewarded rather than punished. This sensitized the employees to the slightest errors that could have potential long‐range consequences. If one looks at this in the emergency management context, reacting to potential crisis by activating the EOC or deploying resources would be viewed as proactive rather than overreactive. However, if no crisis occurs, emergency managers are frequently accused of overreacting and wasting time and resources. 2. Reluctance to Simplify: A major way of simplifying things is to make assumptions. However, assumptions can alter expectations and distort perceptions of what is happening. The lesson for emergency managers is to base programs on hard information such as social science or hazard studies rather than on general assumptions and conventional wisdom. This helps to avoid basing plans on disaster myths and helps to encourage the development of realistic and adaptable options for response. 3. Sensitivity to Operations: A phrase that surfaced with regularity in the finger‐pointing over Hurricane Katrina was “situational awareness.” This is the ability to see the big picture, to understand the dynamics of the crisis, and to see where individual activities fit in. This is precisely what should be taking place at the operational and strategic levels of response. Rather than focusing on the tactical, the emergency management team at the EOC tries to anticipate problems and support requirements; the crisis management team is doing the same thing for long‐range issues. 4. Commitment to Resilience: Resilience, in this case, is to understand what has occurred and to react to it before it becomes worse. In other words, fix the problem, not the blame. Intelligent reaction, improvisation, and creative problem‐solving are the characteristics needed. One must be able to react quickly to a crisis, first by recognizing that one has occurred and then by implementing response strategies appropriate to the crisis. 5. Deference to Expertise: In hierarchical organizations, deference is always accorded to those higher up in the structure. However, these are not always the individuals who have the knowledge or expertise to manage crisis. High reliability organizations have recognized this and allow decisions to be made by those with the appropriate knowledge CRISIS MANAGEMENT 305 and expertise. The emergency management equivalent of this is the use of collaboration. This allows input from experts of all types in a collab orative problem‐solving process. This concept also comes into play when members of the crisis management team allow the operational team to function without interference, and the operational team lets the field tactical commanders handle their assignments without intervention. Reorienting emergency management programs to consider these success factors could go a long way to improving a jurisdiction’s capacity to respond. This is particularly true in terms of strategic response. Building a high reli ability organization increases confidence levels during crisis, thereby reducing the stress on senior officials. Furthermore, it provides for the resolution of many problems before they reach crisis proportions. CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS A previous chapter briefly discussed the role of the Joint Information Center (JIC), a mechanism designed to centralize media operations and ensure unity in the jurisdiction’s message. In the context of tactical operations, the bulk of this message relates to information needed by the public to deal with the crisis directly. Examples of this type of information are hazard warnings, shelter locations, evacuation routes, etc. In the strategic context, however, crisis com munications are more about the message and symbolism than it is about hard information. To a certain extent, crisis communication is based on public expectation and the perception of how well these expectations are being met by local government. Botterell’s fourth law is quite correct – public expectation does become reality, even if only in a symbolic way. FEMA became a response agency not because of any strategic plan on the part of its leaders but because the public expected it after Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew. For this reason, public officials have been setting themselves up for failure for years by raising expectations among citizens that government could respond quickly and effectively to overwhelming crisis even though it lacks the resources to respond to day‐to‐day emergencies. If public health systems are overwhelmed by the annual flu season, can one expect that the presence of a national plan will allow for a rapid response to a pandemic or severe biological attack? The truth is that although the national plan is by all accounts a good one, implementing it will not be easy, and it does not guarantee that every citizen will be adequately treated. A possible reason for raising unrealistic public expectations may be related to the disaster myths discussed in a previous chapter. The simple fact is that government leaders consistently underestimate the capacity of the public to deal with the truth. There is a subtle patronization on the part of officials who 306 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT display an attitude that “we know best” and a resulting decision to “protect” the public by withholding relevant facts. No one wants to be the first senior elected official to stand up before the public and say “Our emergency prepared ness seriously underutilizes capabilities, knowledge, and skills.”1 Nevertheless, these unrealistic expectations can come back to haunt officials following a crisis. News reporters often joke that there are three phases to every story: 1. What happened ? During this phase, reporters are after basic facts: What was the event? Where did it occur? Who was affected? What are you doing about it? How many were injured? These are basic, predictable questions that should be part of the jurisdiction’s crisis communications plan and handled routinely by the JIC. 2. How did it happen? This is the “second day story” where the basic information is replaced by expert interviews and maps and diagrams showing how the incident occurred. Again, these types of questions are predictable and can be handled as routine information requests by the JIC. The JIC can also arrange for subject‐matter experts from the juris diction to provide background information as needed. 3. Who’s to blame? The final phase of any story is an attempt to assign blame for failures that occurred. Was the incident preventable? Was the response inadequate? These types of questions may initially be asked of the JIC but will rapidly escalate to the senior elected official. Waiting until this phase begins to craft a strategic message is an almost sure guarantee of failure. Similar to the other two phases, this phase is predictable and can be planned for as part of a crisis communication plan. This attempt to fix blame is characteristic of the recovery phase. During immediate response, activities are focused on survival and meeting basic needs such as food, water, and shelter. As the crisis passes, underlying social issues are exacerbated, and dissatisfaction with response failures, real or perceived, begins to surface. Witness the repeated charges of racism leveled by the citizens of New Orleans both during the response and as part of the tension between plan ners seeking to implement mitigation strategies and communities seeking to rebuild. These charges were in part a reflection of significant racial tension within the community prior to Hurricane Katrina. This suggests that a major strategic task for the crisis management team is consideration of the message that it wants to send to the public. This is done not so much to deflect blame or to shield officials but rather to create a unifying 1 With thanks to Dennis Dura, New Jersey Department of Human Services. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 307 message that allows the community to effectively recover from crisis. It has been said that at the time of crisis, the only message people want to hear is “It’s going to be alright.” This confidence must somehow be conveyed to the public: “Government is working on this; there have been problems, but we are working to overcome them.” Symbolic gestures become important to the message. There is generally a defining moment in each crisis that determines public perception of the response. Officials need to recognize this moment as what it is – an opportunity to communicate their message – and take concrete action that symbolically reinforces that message. This is the reason that presidents tour disaster sites and why on‐the‐ground meetings with victims are more effective than flyovers. Mayor Giuliani was highly praised for his leadership during September 11, not so much because of his extensive behind‐the‐scenes work but because he was highly visible. Although his undoubted leadership was critical to the success of the response, it was the public perception of that leadership that calmed and reassured citizens. This reinforces the previous discussion that the role of senior officials is dealing with the crisis, not the immediate response. Senior officials must be seen and must be seen in a manner that emphasizes their commitment to the public. Had Michael Brown articulated a unifying message in conjunction with Governor Blanco of Louisiana and Mayor Nagin of New Orleans (e.g. “We are responding with a tremendous amount of resources; there are problems, but together we are fixing them”) and coupled that message with an overwhelming response at the Superdome, the symbolic pressure point, the public impression of the response to Katrina would have been decidedly different. STRATEGIC RECOVERY ISSUES If one accepts that a major focus of strategic response is economic restoration of the community, then it follows that a major concern of senior officials should be the transition to recovery and long‐term reconstruction (see Figure 12.3). This focus allows the crisis management team to guide response toward this desired end state. For example, restoration of critical infrastructure will be coordinated at the operational level, but the crisis management team estab lishes the priority of restoration. An important first decision is the establishment of a governance structure for recovery. Ideally, this will already have been done through the development of a long‐range recovery plan. The governance plan should identify the designated lead agency (an essential step to isolating the crisis) and the mem bership of the recovery task force. It should also provide for the empowerment of the task force to accomplish reconstruction goals and delineate the relation ship of the task force to ongoing response activities. The governance structure 308 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT should also provide for public oversight and involvement in the process through work groups and public hearings. Certain policy issues are predictable due to the nature of disasters. There will be the inevitable conflict between the demand to rebuild in a manner that rep licates predisaster conditions and the desire to improve quality of life through mitigation. These issues played out in New Orleans where official plans to relo cate neighborhoods to less hazardous areas conflicted with the desire of com munities to replicate their predisaster neighborhoods. The situation in New Orleans was a classic one: the significantly reduced population offered an opportunity for relocation and long‐range hazard reduction. However, similar to the Burnham Plan discussed in a previous case study, the plan for New Orleans enjoyed little community support. Similar issues arise as the lessons of a disaster produce recommendations for improved building codes and standards. There is usually a resistance to the extra cost and delays resulting from implementing new codes and standards. Despite its lip service to mitigation, the federal government’s public assistance program has not helped the situation; it will normally not fund rebuilding to codes and standards that were not in existence at the time of the disaster. To make this happen requires a significant application of political will, something that can only be done at the strategic level. Restoration of Services Return to Normalcy Rebuild/ Mitigate Short Term Medium Term Long Term Recovery Plan Focus: Holistic Reconstruction Recovery Annex Focus: Organization to Administer FEMA Programs Individual Assistance Program Public Assistance Categories A&B Public Assistance Program StrategicOperational Figure 12.3 Recovery timeline distinguishing between operational and strategic elements. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 309 Response issues can also have long‐term consequences if not guided by strategy. Debris from Hurricane Iniki in 1992 forced the closure of the landfill on the island of Kauai, a facility that had been expected to be in use for another 20 years. The offshore dumping of debris from the Loma Prieta earth quake provoked substantial public outcry over concerns about environmental damage. Similar issues emerged in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as demonstrated in Case Study 12.1. Environmental issues, historic preservation issues, insurance issues – all these will appear and need to be dealt with by the crisis management team. Many of these public policy issues are predictable and could be addressed through the strategic planning process before disasters occur. CASE STUDY 12.1: HURRICANE KATRINA 2005 – POOR STRATEGIC PLANNING LEADS TO CHARGES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM In April 2006, the mayor of New Orleans, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), and the US Corps of Engineers used emergency authorities to create an emergency landfill to dispose of debris from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In its defense against a restraining order brought by community groups, LDEQ cited the need to speed recovery in and around Orleans Parish and asked for “regulatory flexibility and consideration of the time frame” in constructing the landfill. The result was the creation of the Chef Menteur Landfill, located a mile from the community of Village de l’Est. The landfill was exempt from public safety protections required at other landfills, such as synthetic liners, groundwater monitoring systems, and leachate collection systems. The landfill consisted of a 35‐ft deep pit with a natural clay bottom 10–15 ft deep in what is essentially a wetlands area where the water table is one to four feet below the surface. An 80‐ft canal adjacent to the landfill was used by many residents to water lawns and gardens and separated the landfill from the Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge, the largest urban wildlife refuge in the country. The area is considered the most susceptible part of the city to storm surge and was the last area to be dewatered following Hurricane Katrina. Debris trucked to the landfill passed through Village de l’Est at the rate of 1000 truckloads a day, creating concerns over debris from the uncovered trucks being scattered throughout the community. In theory, the Chef Menteur Landfill did not allow the dumping of domestic and commercial appliances, bacteria encouraging materials or hazardous, liquid, infectious, commercial, industrial, or residential wastes. In actual practice, the Environmental Protection Agency believed that only 20–30% of such materials could be filtered out of the debris. Furthermore, inspectors were removed from the site and LDDEQ, and the site operator did not allow testing of the site by outside experts. Although most of eastern New Orleans is African–American, Village de l’Est has a large community of Vietnamese Americans who claimed their concerns were ignored during the 30‐day public comment period when the landfill was proposed. They formed a community action group, Citizens for a Strong New Orleans East (CSNOE), and allied with the Louisiana Environmental Action Network to oppose the landfill based on its potential impact on public health. CSNOE believed that there was more than adequate capacity in five existing landfills (continued on next page) 310 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Another critical area is the need for emergency legislation. It is not uncommon following a disaster to find that agencies do not have the authorities or jurisdic tion necessary to adequately deal with new disaster tasks. There is usually a need to craft new ordinances to meet these needs. There may also be the need, as pre viously noted, to quickly assess lessons from the disaster and to issue new codes and standards to assist mitigation efforts during reconstruction. and that a better organized system of collection using staging areas, and night hauling would be both environmentally sound and faster than the current system. The group claimed that Mayor Nagin lifted zoning rules that had defeated two previous attempts to create landfills near Village de l’Est because the landfill operator agreed to donate 22% of the site’s revenue to the city. They considered it significant that the mayor halted dumping for the week prior to the mayoral election in May, whereas the site was tested and promptly resumed dumping after the election. CSNOE also suggested that the operator was knowingly covering up problems by refusing to allow outside testing and by refusing to allow expert observers full access to the site. Faced with heavy community outrage and resistance, Mayor Nagin reversed his decision, and the Chef Menteur Landfill was closed in late 2006. The Chef Menteur Landfill is an example of the inherent conflict between the need to protect public health and the environment and the desire to rebuild quickly. It is not an isolated case. Similar community resistance to debris removal can also be found in Waggaman, a predominantly African–American community that houses the River Birch Landfill and a construction and demolition debris site where a considerable amount of debris from Hurricane Katrina has been dumped. Heavy traffic by uncovered trucks caused roads to deteriorate and littered the community with trash, raising concerns over asbestos and other health risks. Debris disposal is a response‐generated need. It can therefore be anticipated, and appropriate strategies and plans developed to meet anticipated requirements. Not only is there no evidence that such was the case in New Orleans, there was clearly a failure of strategic crisis management in creating the Chef Menteur Landfill. The issue is not whether the landfill was needed or whether all possible alternatives were considered. Rather, the issue is the failure to anticipate strong community outrage and to have a strategy in place to alleviate concerns by involving the community in the decision‐making process. Community outrage over a landfill is clearly to be expected under most circumstances; when tensions are running high following a crisis, it is inevitable, particularly if the landfill is placed in economically disadvantaged or minority neighborhoods and perceived to lack appropriate public health safeguards. Further exacerbating this perception is historical experience: debris from Hurricane Betsy in 1965 was deposited and burned atop a former landfill that later had to be declared a “Superfund” toxic cleanup site. Natural community resistance to landfills, environmental concerns, and historical experience made the issue of debris removal following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita a significant policy issue. If this issue had been identified and addressed in the early days following Hurricane Katrina, there would have been less need to invoke emergency authorities and confront community outrage almost nine months later. Recommended Reading Ethridge, F. Don’t trash our neighborhood: A New Orleans East Vietnamese community battles a landfill in its midst, Best of New Orleans, June 20, 2006. (continued from previous page) CRISIS MANAGEMENT 311 Overshadowing all these issues, however, is the need to craft a strategy to restore economic vitality to the community as quickly as possible. Following the attacks on September 11, New York Mayor Giuliani made the restoration of the stock exchange a high priority. His staff were also immediately involved in exploring options to support businesses that had been affected, such as tax incentives, bridge loans, and federal grants. Across the country, San Francisco Mayor Willie L. Brown, Jr. and his staff created an “Open for Business” campaign aimed at encouraging the public to patronize local shops and restaurants that had seen a significant drop in business following the attacks (see Figure 12.4). One of the most critical components of economic recovery is the issue of interim and long‐term housing. The sheltering of populations following an event is a continuum that stretches from immediate sheltering to some measure of permanent housing. Unfortunately, most jurisdictions focus solely on the tactical issue of sheltering without accepting that congregate shelters address only a fraction of those who are displaced. Many victims lodge with family or friends, and a small segment of the displaced have resources through insurance. However, this wide dispersion of population can have a severe impact on economic recovery, as was demonstrated in New Orleans. An initial strategic concern is to bring citizens back to the affected area through the provision of temporary housing or quick repairs to damaged homes. However, interim or temporary housing has its own set of problems. Many jurisdictions do not have excess housing stock and have little capacity to absorb displaced populations. This suggests that victims must either be shel Figure 12.4 San Francisco Mayor Willie L. Brown, Jr. created a campaign to counteract the effect of the September 11 attacks on local consumers. This logo, designed by local artist Craig Frazier, was posted on businesses across the city. The campaign was quickly adopted by other cities. 312 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT tered in other communities, as was done after Katrina, or that some form of temporary housing must be constructed similar to those in Kobe or in San Francisco in 1906. However, the modern version of temporary housing, the use of mobile homes, may add to overall community risk and have unin tended social impacts. Furthermore, temporary facilities have a way of becoming semi‐permanent in the absence of an aggressive strategy to close them as quickly as possible. This, in turn, puts pressure on the jurisdiction to expedite reconstruction at the expense of mitigation. Economic recovery is a critical component of strategic response. There is an unfounded expectation on the part of many jurisdictions that the federal government will provide major assistance in rebuilding a community. Unfor tunately, federal recovery programs are extremely limited. In the case of individual assistance, they consist primarily of low‐interest loans provided through the Small Business Administration. Public assistance is provided through a series of programs that require the jurisdiction to expend funds that are then reimbursed. In practice, obtaining reimbursement comes years after the disaster and may represent only a fraction of the jurisdiction’s actual cost. These programs usually have a 25% cost share, and federal staff work hard to reduce the amount they must reimburse. A potential source of revenue is insurance, but this is usually only pertinent to the private sector, as many juris dictions tend to be self‐insured. Significant federal assistance is not provided through traditional reimburse ment programs. Instead, it is provided through special legislation and through hardheaded negotiation with agencies such as FEMA. The issue is a political one and, therefore, in the province of strategic response. Part of the planning for recovery should be the formation of a recovery team to deal with these issues separately from the routine reimbursement programs. CATASTROPHIC EVENTS This book has not distinguished between planning for disasters and planning for catastrophic events. This is because, for the most part, the processes are sim ilar, and, to the responder, there is little difference between them. A citizen affected by an event does not care whether it is an emergency, a disaster, or a catastrophe. Similarly, responders don’t really consider the difference between catastrophic events and disasters. When an event occurs, all necessary resources are applied; nothing is held back on the basis that the event is “merely” a disaster. This supports the contention that catastrophic planning is strategic, rather than operational in nature. In developing plans for catastrophic events, the focus is not only on the juris diction’s response but also on regional strategies. Mutual aid can no longer be drawn from adjacent jurisdictions but must be mobilized on a statewide level. CRISIS MANAGEMENT 313 Evacuees must be moved further than normally called for in disaster plans. Coordination, rather than command and control, becomes even more critical than in disasters, particularly as federal agencies become more involved in providing resources. This suggests two things of concern to the crisis management team. The first is that the jurisdiction must be adequately represented in regional decision‐ making. This goes beyond sending liaisons to the county or state EOC to coor dinate operational issues. Instead, it suggests the need for strong political representation in dealing with state and federal representatives as decisions are made regarding funding and availability of programs. This is closely tied to the second concern: the need to assess long‐range needs and the potential impacts of state and federal programs. In consid ering the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 discussed in Chapter 1, one is struck by the single‐mindedness of the Marquis of Pombal in preserving his workforce by limiting evacuation. If one compares this to the scattering of the evacuees of Hurricane Katrina over the entire United States, and the subsequent reduction in population in New Orleans, one immediately sees the need for local government involvement in deciding how to handle evacuees. This, in fact, seems to be the case in Florida where the state created host communities as part of its catastrophic planning to keep evacuees as close to home as possible. Another example of long‐range impacts on population is the use of trailers as temporary housing. Although a quick and efficient way of meeting immediate needs, trailers are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. The use of trailers in hurricane‐prone areas creates increased risk in subsequent disas ters. The decision to use trailers is usually made unilaterally by the federal government in response to public demand. However, since their use creates long‐range problems for the community, it therefore constitutes a significant strategic issue. The importance of local government engagement in making strategic decisions cannot be overstated. Without the forceful involvement of local government and strong political allies in state and federal legislatures, state and federal agencies tend to implement “business as usual” practices and will mirror strategies that worked in other events. Cultural sensitivities are not always con sidered. An example of how active involvement in the decision‐making process can benefit a local community is shown in the Case Study 12.2 on FEMA’s activities in Yap State in 1991. This brief discussion suggests two areas of strategic planning for the juris diction. The first is the crafting of an overall regional strategy for dealing with the impact of catastrophic events. Such a strategy must consider the jurisdiction’s role as a provider of services as well as that of a user. In a cata strophic event, seemingly remote jurisdictions may find themselves supporting evacuation corridors with traffic control, refueling points, or rest areas and 314 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY 12.2: SUPER TYPHOON OWEN 1990 – JOINT DECISION- MAKING PRESERVES CULTURAL IDEALS In late November 1990, Super Typhoon Owen struck the Federated States of Micronesia, a US protectorate in the northwestern Pacific. With winds exceeding 150 mph, the storm destroyed as much as 95–99% of the housing and 80–90% of the crops on some of the islands. Hardest hit were the states of Yap and Chuuk. Under the terms of the protectorate agreement, FEMA coordinated the response. FEMA’s initial concern was to provide individual assistance through a grant to each of the victims. Chuuk State willingly accepted the funding, but Governor Petrus Tun of Yap State expressed concerns that the money would be misused and creates social problems in a state trying to preserve its cultural heritage. Yap State is proud of its cultural heritage and is committed to preserving its traditional ways. Governor Tun was concerned that a large influx of outside money would disrupt traditional community values. Some months later, a study of Chuuk State conducted by a group of college students from Guam suggested that relief funds had been used to purchase luxury items and for travel to Guam rather than for necessary supplies, justifying the governor’s concern. However, the governor’s refusal to accept funds created a problem for FEMA. US law demanded that comparable assistance be provided in each state. Fortunately, the FEMA FCO, A. Roy Kite, was highly experienced and culturally sensitive. There was a mutual respect between Kite and Governor Tun, and a compromise was soon reached. Instead of the funding that would jeopardize traditional cultural values, FEMA agreed to purchase and distribute family kits to replace items lost in the typhoon. The governor’s staff worked with FEMA to develop lists for the kits that included items such as cooking pots, fish hooks, lanterns, axes, and other household items. The kits met the need for assistance without the influx of cash that might have led to significant social changes. Case Figure 12.2 Super Typhoon Owen, a category 5 typhoon, struck the Federated States of Micronesia in November 1990 with winds exceeding a 150 mph. Source: NOAA. (continued on next page) CRISIS MANAGEMENT 315 may be tasked to provide host sheltering either through congregate facilities or local housing stock. This suggests that the current system for declaring disasters and seeking reimbursements for disaster‐related costs might need to be revised. Reimbursement of host jurisdictions posed a significant problem during the Katrina evacuation. The second strategic planning issue is the development of a strategy to mar shal legislative support and ensure adequate representation in the decision‐ making process. Many jurisdictions already have components of this system in place such as political lobbyists and public information officers. However, in a time of crisis, the actions of these groups must be coordinated under a cohe sive strategy. Although some of the issues arising may be agent generated, for the most part, they will be response generated and can therefore be anticipated. CONCLUSION Previous chapters have made the case for viewing response from three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. Most emergency management programs address the first two but only marginally consider the third level. Yet it is the strategic level that ultimately determines the long‐range success of the response FEMA’s next concern was the development of permanent housing. FEMA had developed plans for typhoon‐resistant housing that were culturally acceptable to Pacific Islanders and planned to provide the materials and funding for the labor necessary to construct the housing. Again, Chuuk State was agreeable, but Governor Tun objected to paying his people to construct housing. The tradition in Yap was that the community helped rebuild a house that was lost through fire or other catastrophe, and the governor was concerned that paying citizens to rebuild their neighbor’s home would signal the end of this tradition. Instead, he asked for technical assistance in building the typhoon‐resistant houses. Governor Tun and Kite were able to work out an acceptable compromise. FEMA provided building materials and tools and deployed a team of SEABEES to travel to the various island groups to train local builders. The local teams then used the tools and materials to build the houses needed by their community. The result was a quick replenishment of the housing stock with typhoon‐resistant structures while preserving the cultural traditions of Yap State. Governor Tun was successful both in reconstructing his severely damaged state and in preserving Yapese cultural traditions. He accomplished this by understanding that the crisis was not the funding of reconstruction but the preservation of cultural traditions while expediting reconstruction. By involving himself in strategic decision‐making, he was able to modify the “business as usual” approach by FEMA and craft a recovery strategy that was effective and mutually agreeable. (continued from previous page) 316 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT and guides the community back to an acceptable end‐state. Although best prac tices documents such as NFP1600 and CPG 101 address the tactical and oper ational levels, there is little emergency management guidance for the strategic level. There is, however, a considerable body of literature on the management of crisis, and these principles can be directly translated to the disaster arena. The proper role of senior managers is management of the crisis, not tactical and operational response. The real issues affecting the community are related to the economic long‐term needs generated by the disaster, and only senior offi cials have the broad social and political perspective necessary to identify and manage these issues. Crisis management, the identification and resolution of long‐range strategic issues, is the principal role of senior officials in a disaster. 317 Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Son, Inc. CONCLUSION Emergency management is not what you do; it is who you are. —Henry Renteria Former Director, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services The preceding chapters have attempted to make a case for a new way of approaching emergency management. Traditional emergency management has its roots in the early civil defense programs of the Cold War era and is still heavily dominated by the military influence of those times. This has resulted in many programs that are plan‐centric and focused primarily on operational issues. It has also led to the institutionalization of many disaster myths that have been continually challenged by social science. These plans assume that a breakdown of social norms is inevitable in a disaster and that only strong, cen- tralized command and control can overcome the resulting chaos. These plans create an Achilles heel for many programs. In Managing the Unexpected, researchers Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe suggest that plans may create a false sense of security by lulling planners into a sense of predeter- mination, creating a disregard for the dangers of the unexpected. Lee Clarke in Mission Improbable and Erik Auf der Heide in Disaster Response raise similar cautions. The focus on the development of a plan rather than on community resilience is the major reason many emergency management programs fail to build an adequate capacity to respond. Rather than a plan‐centric approach, this book suggests that emergency plans are a component of a holistic program that provides benefit to the community. The goal of emergency management programs is not the management of response but the management of risk, a much broader context. Emergency management programs provide a mechanism for assessing risk and developing and implementing strategies aimed at reducing or eliminating risk and for building the capacity to protect the community from the unexpected. 318 CONCLUSION It is in this area of strategy development that many programs fail. Emergency managers have been doing rote work for years, allowing programs to be driven by grant requirements. Plans are written to conform to grant requirements. Exercises are conducted to conform to grant requirements. Even the size and composition of many emergency management offices have been determined by grant requirements. Somehow along the way the idea of developing risk‐based strategies was lost, and these grant activities became an end in themselves. Despite the lip service given to the four‐phase comprehensive emergency management model, emergency managers have narrowed their focus and directed their work almost solely toward response and almost exclusively to the development of the emergency operations plan. Strategic issues related to mit- igation and recovery are barely addressed. Continuity planning is completely foreign to many emergency managers. This dynamic can change if emergency managers are viewed not as techno- crats but as program managers with the responsibility for crafting strategies for community resilience. When viewed from this perspective, the emergency man- ager’s position changes from one that is viewed as a necessary evil and expense to one that is a key player in building community resilience and assisting in the management of risk. This further suggests that the emergency manager should not write emergency plans but should ensure that emergency plans are written. The difference is subtle but significant – emergency managers are program man- agers who specialize in managing part of the community’s risk rather than tech- nicians who write specialized plans. A manager prepares the community by engaging all the resources of the community under a shared vision of resilience. The capacity to respond to crisis incorporates more than the traditional response functions found in emergency management texts. This capacity is dependent on a collaborative process that can be expanded to include emergent organizations and that can deal with new disaster tasks. It places a premium on improvisation and creative problem‐solving. It also must recognize that roles differ at various levels of response and that successful response must make use of the expert skills of the responders. This suggests that plans need to be considered in relationship to each other based on time of implementation. Instead of a response plan that considers life safety and another plan for continuity and a third for recovery, it may make more sense to have a response plan that incorporates elements of safety, conti- nuity, and response. Breaking down the stovepipes that separate plans can elim- inate confusion and competition for resources during crisis. This also suggests that one must distinguish between the need for command and control functions at the field level of response and the need for coordination at the operational level. Ultimately, the emergency management program must be perceived as add- ing value to the community. This means that it must be consistent with community values and the community’s vision of the future. This suggests that CONCLUSION 319 emergency management plans should be community plans that include all mechanisms by which the community responds to crisis. This concept of value‐ added implies a change in the role of emergency managers. Instead of being experts in tactical and operational response, emergency managers must assume the role of program managers. This means that they are expected to assemble appropriate groups of stakeholders and facilitate the development of strategies for response, recovery, and mitigation. It means accepting responsibility for overseeing the strategic plans that implement this vision. It means providing leadership, not just technical expertise. This leadership role must be built on a solid knowledge of social science research and historical disasters. It also requires the technical skills related to traditional emergency management concepts and methods and the latest national guidance. It requires an understanding of group dynamics and inter- actions, of meeting facilitation skills, and of writing and speaking skills. 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Action agents, 124–25, 207, 227–30, 250, 273 plans, 71, 211, 223–24, 227, 229–30, 272–73, 280, 283 Action plans, 71, 211, 224, 227, 229–30, 273, 280, 283 Actions, corrective, 81, 123–25, 136, 208 Adaptive BC, 154–55 Administrative plan, 99–100, 109, 118, 125, 225 After action report, 38, 67, 120, 123–24, 270, 291 Agenda, 96, 221, 224, 227 Agenda items, 225–27 All‐hazards planning, 11, 45, 81, 129, 212, 214–15, 235, 237, 281–82 Annexes, functional, 235, 237–38 Antisocial behavior, 44, 65–66 Area command, 62, 64, 256–57, 261, 264–65 Assumptions, unspoken, 155, 202, 262 Base plans, 216, 236–37 Behavior, 65–66, 70, 205, 216, 270 Best practices, 42, 107, 109, 112–13, 146, 207, 322, 324 BIA (Business Impact Analysis), 150–55, 159, 289 Boston molasses disaster, 138 Botterell, Art, 70, 244, 269, 276, 294 Burnham Plan, 176–77, 308 Business Impact Analysis. See BIA (Business Impact Analysis) Capabilities‐based planning, 40, 48, 207–8, 214–15 Capability targets, 130–31, 160 CARVER, 131, 133 Cascading Events, 4, 134–35 Catastrophic events, 10, 28, 37, 59, 62–64, 150, 203, 312–13 CEM (Certified Emergency Manager), 31, 86, 88, 323 Charles County, 172 Chef Menteur Landfill, 309–10 Chuuk State, 314–15 Civil Defense Act, 28–29, 110 Civil War, 20–21, 23–24 Cold War, 28, 52–53, 164, 317 Committee, advisory, 96, 98, 220–21 Communications, 38, 60, 70, 82, 120, 267, 269–70 failures, 67, 212, 269 model, 269 systems integration, 261 Community acceptance, 174, 179 goals, 179 values, 68, 164, 188, 236 vision, 13, 175 Community Development Block Grant Program, 171 Community Right‐to‐Know, 111 Comprehensive emergency management, 30, 37, 75, 81, 85, 96, 164–66, 189, 198, 210, 217, 280 Concepts, strategic, 75, 82, 166, 217 INDEX 328 InDEx Conflict Model of Decision Making, 287, 290 Conformance, 112, 118, 166, 180, 235, 274 Consensus, 175, 215, 221–25 Context descriptions, 131, 148–49 Contingency plans, 192–93, 204, 212, 238 Continuity, 70, 99, 107, 156, 166, 180, 185, 191, 199–200, 206, 217, 247, 260 Continuity of Operations Planning. See COOP Continuity planning, 154–55, 157–58, 184, 318 Continuity plans, 57, 157, 212 Continuous improvement, 85, 100, 154–55, 281–82 COOP (Continuity of Operations Planning), 156–57, 161, 184 Coordinating disaster response, 43, 258 Coordination, 42–43, 70, 94–95, 106, 113, 197, 213, 216, 236, 248, 250, 267, 297, 318 Core capabilities, 41, 48, 131, 160 Core competencies, 82, 86, 88 Core functions, 76, 80 Core processes, 152, 154 Corrective action programs, 119, 123–25 Corrective actions, 81–82, 124–25, 136, 208 Creative problem‐solving, 43, 196–97, 216, 248, 282, 304, 318 Crisis barometer, 141, 143 Crisis communications, 210, 305 Crisis management, 293–94, 299–301, 316 Crisis management team, 63, 301, 304–7, 309, 313 Crisis Relocation Program, 29, 31, 74, 182 Crisis response, 1, 7, 61, 125 Critical functions, 41–42, 151, 156, 197, 200, 272 Critical tasks, 40–41, 48, 119 Decision‐making, 48, 69–70, 96–97, 99, 200, 209, 248, 250, 272, 279, 285–91, 294–95, 297 Decision paper format, 233–34 Department of Homeland Security. See DHS (Department of Homeland Security) Department operations centers, 121–22 Development, professional, 282–83 DHS (Department of Homeland Security), 38, 40–43, 47–48, 50, 62, 112, 119, 129, 158, 184, 204, 208, 270 DHS planning model, 42–43, 208–9 Disaster myths, 65, 68, 70, 216, 262, 293, 304–5, 317, 322, 324 Disaster Assistance Act, 28 Disaster management, 43, 71, 248, 279, 291, 293 Disaster Mitigation Act, 110, 169 Disaster operations, 245, 272, 278, 295–96 Disaster planning, 77, 217, 248, 322, 324 Disaster Recovery Institute, 113 Disaster Relief Act, 28–29, 35 Disaster Research Center (DRC), 53, 296, 322–25 Disaster response, 43, 68–69, 75, 173, 185, 192, 249, 258, 278, 297 Disasters characteristics of, 216 defining, 54 hierarchy of, 55, 59 natural, 28–29, 204, 313 paradox of, 69 worst industrial, 14 Discussion‐based exercises, 121–22 Education Project, 89 EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact), 115, 258 EMAP (Emergency Management Accreditation Program), 31, 43 EMAP Standard, 31–32, 84, 99, 112–13, 119, 124, 274 Emergency operations plans, 75, 111, 184, 197, 249 planning, 51, 59, 64, 69–70, 81, 98, 111–12, 140, 169, 199–200 Emergency Management defined, 81 modern, 28 traditional, 75 Emergency Management Accreditation Program. See EMAP (Emergency Management Accreditation Program Emergency Management Assistance Compact. See EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact) Emergency Management Institute, 5, 78, 121, 280 Emergency Management Organizational Structures, Characteristics of Effective, 83 Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, 32, 163 InDEx 329 Emergency management program comprehensive, 84, 99 coordination, 94–95 modern, 94 Emergency managers, successful, 77 Emergency operations center, 181, 186, 197, 238, 264 Emergency operations plans, 80, 111, 125, 182, 184, 191, 199, 210, 213, 235–36, 318, 322 Emergency support functions, 34, 206–7, 235, 263 Ethics, Code of, 90 Evacuation planning, 182–83 Events cascading, 4, 134–35 Exercise functional, 122, 243 objectives, 121–22 operations‐based, 121, 123 programs, 81, 119 tabletop, 121, 242, 301 Exxon Valdez, 192–94 Federal Disaster Act, 28, 110 Federal disaster assistance programs, 114, 172, 174 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 29, 54, 74, 88, 137, 184, 223, 315 Federal recovery programs, 276, 293, 312 Federal Response Plan. See FRP Field operations, 245, 248, 261–62, 298 FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies), 97, 105, 220–21, 251–53, 255 FIRMs (Flood Insurance Rate Maps), 18, 139–40 FRP (Federal Response Plan), 34–35, 37–38, 40, 46, 50, 235, 302 Fugate, Craig, 247–48, 295 Functional annexes, 74, 195, 235–37 clarity, 252–53 Functional planning, 34, 50, 205–7, 209, 212, 215 Gantt chart, 232, 239–40 Geographic information system (GIS), 97, 241–42 Goals, 71, 80, 94, 99, 103, 106, 108, 117, 152, 164, 179, 250, 269, 302 strategic, 61, 102, 106, 118, 121 Goals and objectives, 80, 94, 101–3, 106, 108, 117, 152, 225 Grant programs, 38–39, 110, 235 Group memory, 227–28 policy, 263–64, 267, 293, 301 Group memory, 227–28 Hazard analysis, 3, 5, 81, 109, 137–38, 140, 144, 148, 150–51, 154, 180, 200, 203 identification, 135–37, 150–51, 154 information, 53, 148 Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, 169 Hazards, 3, 11, 120, 122, 127, 134, 141, 144, 147, 165, 199–200, 203, 248 Historical disasters, 2–5, 10, 13, 90 Historical record, 3–4, 7, 150 Holistic community response, 217 disaster recovery, 13 Homeland Security Grant Program, 111, 115 Host communities, 58 Housing, temporary, 206, 272, 311, 313 HSPD (Homeland Security Presidential Directive), 39, 111, 208 Hurricane Iniki, 223, 229, 300, 309 Hurricane Katrina, 43–47, 60, 62, 111, 118, 133, 258, 260–61, 266, 276, 302, 309–10, 313 Hurricanes, 56, 66, 68, 121, 138–39, 146, 175, 182, 204, 248, 298 IAEM (International Association of Emergency Managers), 31, 78, 86–88, 90 ICS field organization, 253–54, 256, 261–62 Identifying resource shortfalls, 120 Impact analysis, 129, 150, 160–61, 281 Implementation, simultaneous, 180, 185, 198 Implementing program plans, 109 Incident Action Plan, 204, 250, 257, 262–63, 268, 272–73, 298 Incident Command System, 39, 69–70, 251–54, 261–63, 265, 270 330 InDEx Incident Management Systems, 38, 213, 251–52 Incident Radio Communications Plan, 271 International Association of Emergency Managers. See IAEM Internet, 137–38, 267–68 Interoperability, 38, 67, 269, 271 Jackson County, 260, 263 JIC (Joint Information Center), 262, 268, 276–77, 305–6 Joint communications plan, 262, 271 Laws of Emergency Management, 244, 269, 294 Levels operational, 61, 119, 271 strategic, 62, 180, 293, 304, 308, 315–16 tactical, 39, 62, 64, 122, 209, 213–14, 221, 295 Lisbon earthquake, 11, 313 Logistics, 57, 113–14, 249, 252, 254, 258, 262, 274 Looting, 65–66 MACS (Multi‐Agency Coordination System), 39–40, 105, 261–65, 298 Management, 78, 83, 93, 180, 253, 263 Managing crisis, 299 Measuring Prevention, 119–20 Meeting facilitation process, 222–26, 229 memorandum, 228 Mental health, 65–66 Military planning model, 69–70 Mission areas, 42, 48–49, 165 Mission statements, 99–101, 103, 105–7, 280, 282 Missouri Buyout Program, 171–72 Mitigation, 30, 37, 75–76, 81, 109–10, 164, 166, 170, 174, 185, 200, 247, 308 measures, 170, 172 planning, 165, 169–70, 172 plans, 169–70, 188, 194, 197–98 Mitigation, post disaster, 42, 76, 169, 177, 180, 217 Mitigation, strategies, 169–70, 179, 187, 301, 306 Model, problem‐solving, 127 Multi‐agency Coordination Systems, 39, 258, 261–64, 298, 304 Multi‐year exercise program, 121 Mutual aid, 114, 186, 273–74, 276, 312 national Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, 137 national Emergency Response Teams, 298, 302 national Flood Insurance Program (nFIP), 138–40, 171–72 national Management Association, 80, 107 national Planning Scenarios, 40, 47–48, 204–5 national Preparedness System, 48–50, 111, 322 national Response Framework, 47–50, 322 national Response Plan, 59, 302 national security, 28, 37, 74 national Significance, Incident of, 59, 302 natural Hazards Center (nHC), 53 nEFs (national Essential Functions), 156–57, 160 nEMA (national Emergency Managers Association), 31, 78, 88, 90 new Orleans, 11, 44, 58–59, 68, 118, 150, 156, 183, 202, 266, 275, 299, 303, 306–11 nHC (natural Hazards Center), 53 nIMS (national Incident Management System), 39, 41, 43, 62–63, 70, 115, 215, 235, 251, 253–54, 258, 262–63, 270, 274 nRP (national Response Plan), 34, 46–47, 50, 59, 62, 207, 235, 258, 261, 302 Objectives, 61, 80, 94, 101–3, 106, 108, 113, 116–18, 120–22, 151, 229, 252–53, 273 OCD (Office of Civil Defense), 27–28, 53 Operational control, 181, 261 response, 61–63, 71, 114, 184, 191, 247, 274, 278, 300–301 Operation Market Garden, 104 Operations continuity of, 156, 180, 184, 200 section, 223, 303 Organizational elements, 99, 106, 197 structure, 70, 251, 258, 260, 296–97 Organizational Structure, Characteristics of Effective Emergency Management, 83 Organizations disaster management, 250, 278, 296 high reliability, 220, 304–5 InDEx 331 Paper Plan Syndrome, 192 Perception, public, 45, 55, 102, 306 Performance objectives, 94, 106, 109, 117, 124, 187, 206, 230, 232, 273 PFO (Principal Federal Official), 46–47, 302–3 PIOs (Public Information Officers), 97, 268, 277, 301, 315 Plan hierarchy, 199–200 plan development, 185, 199, 205, 212, 219–20, 242, 244–45 Planning assumptions, 63, 122, 203 Planning, catastrophic, 58–59, 62, 312–13 Planning concepts, 244 group, 214, 233, 238, 243 model, strategic, 214 process, 165, 172, 177–78, 191, 195, 197, 202, 214–16, 220–22, 232–33, 236 techniques, 202 Plans administrative, 109, 118, 125 all‐hazards, 34, 212 continuity, 57, 154, 185, 197, 200, 212 demobilization, 239–40 developing, 165, 216, 219, 312 functional, 205, 237, 251 multiple, 198–99, 217 operational, 177, 186 strategic, 30, 80, 101, 106, 109, 111–13, 116–18, 120, 122, 125, 152, 187–88, 230–31 supporting, 185, 209, 214, 237 unit, 223, 238, 266, 271–72, 276 Policy issues, 180, 182, 233, 244, 298, 300–301, 308 Pombal, 11–13, 313 Portugal, 13 Postdisaster mitigation funds, 110 Preparedness, 28–30, 77, 81, 109–10, 164, 166, 189, 192 strategy, 185 Preplanning, 251, 276, 278 Prince William Sound, 192–94 Principal Federal Official. See PFO Principles of Emergency Management (POEM), 217, 280–81, 283–84 Problem solving model, 286 statement, 124 Procedures, operational, 191 Professional Emergency Manager, 77 Program administration, 94, 101 coordinator, 94–95, 109, 113 elements, 75, 80, 99, 101, 118–19, 127 enterprise‐wide, 93, 95, 114, 125 evaluation, 43, 118 manager, 79, 83 oversight, 95–96, 98 plans, developing, 108 resources, 98, 127 Project planning, 151 Public expectations, 45, 53, 109, 262, 293, 305 Quarantelli, 55–56, 58, 63, 201, 215, 248, 251, 295 Ranking hazards, 140, 142–43, 147, 231 Rebuilding, 133, 174–75, 201, 312 Reconstruction, 11, 13, 50, 156, 174–76, 178, 201, 286, 293, 310, 315 Recovery, 29–30, 68, 75–76, 81, 165–67, 173–78, 185, 189, 191, 197, 247, 259, 293, 307 holistic, 178 planning, pre‐disaster, 174 plans, 5, 177, 180, 197, 200, 206 Recovery, short‐term, 75–76, 177, 179–80, 198 Recovery strategy, 177, 179, 184 task force, 175, 177, 179, 307 Recovery Time Objective, 153–54, 159, 184, 295 Red Cross, 43, 183, 186, 188, 213, 223 Reputation, 145, 153, 276 Resource allocation, 151, 301 inventories, 114–15, 185 management, 108, 249 shortfalls, 113–14, 186, 203 tracking, 267 typing, 115 Response capacity, 30, 37, 122, 293 functions, 109, 180 hierarchy, 62 models, 215 plans, 57, 194–95, 197 strategy, 179, 181, 183, 185, 202 332 InDEx Responsibilities functional, 80, 100, 109, 206, 258 statutory, 253, 256 Restoration, 41, 167, 174, 177, 307, 311 Risk analysis, 75 assessment, 127, 140, 153, 161, 163, 165, 238 management of, 81, 166, 198 tolerance, 140, 144, 148, 167 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), 7–9 Scenario‐based planning, 202, 205, 207–8, 214–15 Scenarios, 121–22, 127–28, 148, 165, 192–94, 202–5, 208 impact‐based, 203 worst‐case, 194, 202–4 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. See SARS Sheltering, 44, 113, 183, 186, 188, 200, 206, 213, 247, 249, 272, 286, 299, 306, 311 Shortfalls, 112–13, 117, 185–86, 203, 208, 275 Social science research, 52–54, 71, 73, 82, 85, 90, 169–70, 216, 300, 319 Source Perrier, 146 Stafford Act, 28–30, 37, 50, 54–57, 59, 110, 169, 173, 302 Staging areas, 204, 213, 274–75, 298, 310 Standards, 31, 39–44, 89, 95, 112, 118, 152, 181, 196, 235, 308, 310 Strategic level plans, 195 planning process, 101–2, 104–8, 120, 125, 187, 207, 309 plan objectives, 118 program elements, 113 recovery issues, 307 Strategic goals, 62, 103, 106, 113, 119, 121, 225 Strategic issues, 247, 294, 296, 298, 300, 302–3, 318 Strategic planning, 62, 80, 82, 95, 99–101, 117, 309, 313 Superdome, 44, 275–76, 303, 307 Tactical concepts, 43, 71, 75, 122, 166, 184, 209, 217, 300–301 issues, 74, 302–3, 309 Tactical response, 61, 63, 247–48, 278, 293, 298, 301–2 Target Capabilities List. See TCL Tasks critical, 119 generic, 245 new, 196, 250, 296 strategic, 306 TCL (Target Capabilities List), 41–43, 47–48, 119, 166 Team, crisis action, 301 Terrorism, 37, 43, 59, 91, 112, 120, 133, 163, 165, 217 THIRA, 129–31, 146, 148, 160–61 Thucydides, 6 Tools, graphic, 232, 238–40 Training, 70, 88, 113, 115–16, 119–20, 123, 188, 194, 196, 208, 244, 254, 258, 302 Tsunamis, 3–4, 11–12, 56–58, 142–43 Unified command, 38, 256–57, 261, 263–64, 297 Unity of command, 253–54 Universal Task List, 119, 166 Value added concept, 81, 91, 93, 101, 105, 170, 179 Vigiles, 7 Vision, 13, 43, 80, 99, 102–6, 110, 185, 187, 300 strategic, 102, 104, 186 Vision statement, 101, 103, 106 Vulnerability, 54, 68, 127, 140, 144, 148, 163, 167, 170, 180, 267 Warnings, 10, 66, 134, 136, 206, 269 WHO (World Health Organization), 8–9 Witt, James Lee, 29, 37 Work plans, 32, 108, 111, 230–31, 253, 273 World Health Organization (WHO), 8–9 Worst‐case scenario, 203–4 Yap State, 313–15 WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT Go to www.wiley.com/go/eula to access Wiley’s ebook EULA.

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