250-300 words : Management Decision-Making and Control case study

 

This week’s discussion will focus on management control using the  case study “Brief Integrative Case 3.1: Google in China: Protecting  Property Rights” (p. 415) in International Management: Culture, Strategy, and Behavior.

Decision-making and controlling are two vital, and often  interlinked, functions of international management. Strategic evaluation  and control is the process of determining the effectiveness of a given  strategy in achieving the organizational objectives and taking  corrective actions whenever required. Control can be exercised through  formulation of contingency strategies and a crisis management team.

Using the Decision-Making Process (stages 1-9) outlined in the  textbook (Fig 11-1) and this module’s content, what are your thoughts on  each step in the process using the Google in China case study as it relates to the strategic evaluation and control process definition above?

For example:

• Stage 1: What is the problem perception in the case?
• Stage 2: What is the problem identification in the case?
• Repeat for stages 3-9.

415

Three years later, in 2006, Google.com was again
blocked while Google.cn, Google’s Chinese subsidiary,
remained in operation. The following year, in 2007, CEO
Eric Schmidt gave an upbeat assessment of Google’s out-
look in China amid challenges of censorship issues and
competition from Baidu.com.

More Than a BackRub: Google’s
Rise to Power
But how did Google come to such international promi-
nence? In 1996, Stanford graduate students Larry Page
and Sergey Brin began collaborating on a search engine
called BackRub. This search engine got its name because
Page and Brin used backlinks to measure the importance
of a site.6 By using the innovation called PageRank, a new
system of ranking a website’s relevance using “an objec-
tive measure of its citation importance . . . according to
an idealized model of user behavior,”7 Page and Brin dra-
matically increased search relevance compared to other
search engines like Yahoo.

A little more than a year later, BackRub’s massive
bandwidth usage, which had downloaded over 30 million
indexable HTML pages, made it inoperable on the Stan-
ford server.8 From then on, Larry and Sergey realized the
potential of BackRub, changed its name to Google, and
moved their office to a colleague’s garage.9

Google’s first investor became interested in 1996 when
Sun Microsystem founder Andy Bechtolsheim provided a
$100,000 check, allowing Google to incorporate and
become officially Google Inc. In 1999, more investors
grew attracted to Page and Brin’s idea and, with an
increased budget of around $1 million, Google Inc. was
able to relocate to a real office in Palo Alto, where a staff
of only eight answered about 500,000 queries per day.10

In mid-1999 Google received an additional $25 million
in equity funding for its search engine from two venture
capital firms: Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Buyers. The confidence to invest such a large
amount of capital came from the previous experience
these VCs had in funding high-tech companies, such as
Amazon.com and Cisco Systems. Google’s engineering
genius and a monthly growth rate of 50 percent fueled
only by word of mouth easily proved its value to these
seasoned investors.11

By the year 2000, Google became the world’s largest
search engine, supporting 15 languages.12 Google’s service
was nothing new considering the existing search engines

Google in China
In early 2008 Guo Quan announced plans to sue Google
in the United States for blocking his entire name from
search results in China. But why was his name blocked
from search results? Guo Quan had published an open
letter in early January to his government leaders Hu Jintao
and Wu Bangguo, calling “for government reform [with]
multi-party democratic elections” that served the interests
of the common people.1 In response to his letter, the gov-
ernment labeled Guo as a dissident and a political danger.
He was ultimately arrested on charges of “subversion of
state power.”2

Guo Quan’s name might have forever been lost in the
shadow of the then-upcoming 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympics, but formal and informal networks of informa-
tion helped publicize his case; his harsh sentence, which
will have him imprisoned until at least 2019, and the fact
that he named Google in his suit have made him infa-
mous. The story of Guo Quan reflects the many chal-
lenges faced by Google over the course of the past decade
as it has attempted to expand globally. During this period,
Google’s relationship with China has undergone a series
of advances and setbacks, each reflecting in some way
China’s response to the challenges of the Internet and
social networking as well as Google’s difficulties of trans-
lating a uniquely North American business model to
countries and environments with different regulatory
regimes, legal environments, and fundamental values.

Rough Beginnings
At the break of the new millennium, Google began to
offer its search services in a Chinese-language format
with the hope of furthering its mission “to organize the
world’s information and make it universally accessible
and useful.”3 Disappointingly, the website was consis-
tently unavailable “about 10 percent of the time . . .
[and] slow and unreliable” due to “extensive filtering
performed by China’s licensed Internet service provid-
ers.”4 This sense of distrust persisted for another two
years until the autumn of 2002, when Google first
became completely unavailable in China because Google
claimed to have “stood by its principles and not
subject[ed] itself to Chinese laws and regulations.”5 The
dysfunctional use of Google search services for main-
landers continued and in December 2003, Google.com
was again blocked in China.

Brief Integrative Case 3.1

Google in China: Protecting Property and Rights

416 Part 3 International Strategic Management

about the close margin in market share and considered the
possibility of perhaps buying out Baidu in competition.
But instead, in mid-2006, Google made a fatal mistake,
selling its 2.6 percent stake of more than $60 million in
Baidu shares and introducing Google.cn to China.18

Nevertheless, Google.cn was launched with the prom-
ise that it would agree to block certain websites in return
for the opportunity to run local Chinese services.19 Google
promised to notify Chinese users when their search results
would be censored and also promised not to maintain any
services that involved personal or confidential data, like
Gmail or Blogger, on the mainland. Google.cn was a
response to improve the poor service Google believed it
was providing in China. As senior policy counsel Andrew
McLaughlin put it, “Google users in China today struggle
with a service that, to be blunt, isn’t very good . . . the
website is slow, and sometimes produces results that when
clicked on, stall out the user’s browser. Our Google News
service is never available; Google Images is accessible
only half the time . . . the level of service we’ve been able
to provide in China is not something we’re proud of.”20

Fundamentally, Google’s strategic move to create a
local presence with Google.cn was driven by its desire
to follow its mission of creating the most organized and
efficient search engine. However, while Google thought
it had the flexibility to set up a better search engine in
China, Baidu CEO Robin Li was already ahead of the
curve. While PageRank was being developed by Page
and Brin, Robin Li was simultaneously working on a
similar strategy for site-ranking called RankDex. As a
result, this similar search concept was brought to Baidu.
In the end, Google had erroneously presumed that it
could overtake Baidu by maximizing its core competen-
cies within China.21

Not only did Baidu have a strong competing search
engine against Google, but it also provided several innova-
tive search features customized for more local tastes. It
introduced community-oriented services, including
information-exchanging bulletin boards and instant messag-
ing. These extra services appealed strongly to Chinese
Internet users and put Baidu ahead of a foreign Google that
did not seem to understand the Chinese market as well.

In addition, Baidu also took an extra step that Google
missed by setting up “a national network of advertising
resellers in 200 Chinese cities to educate businesses about
the power of online advertising.”22 By specifically target-
ing the business market segment, Baidu aimed to secure
the Shanghai business sector. To secure the more general
student population in Beijing, Baidu also offered a search
engine that provided easy access to pirated film and music
downloads.23

While Baidu strategically offered services that targeted
specific market segments, Google was at a loss because
of its slow comprehension of the Chinese market. Among
one of the failures Google made was its attempt to rebrand

at the time, like Yahoo and AOL, but it was indisputable
that Google offered the best search services. The innova-
tive PageRank algorithm was combined with a minimalist
homepage that focused on its search tool and reminded
the user of its chief focus while helping to reinforce con-
fidence in its best feature. Having secured a solid foothold
in America, Google continued to seek more ways to
expand. Visionaries from the very beginning, Page and
Brin created Google to have “simplicity in our user inter-
face and the scalability in our back-end systems [that]
enables us to expand very quickly.”13

By anticipating the need to be flexible in order to
expand, Google was set to go global. And as Larry Page
remarked: “Google’s search engine has always had strong
global appeal. We attribute this success to the site’s sim-
plicity of design, ease of use, and highly relevant results.
By localizing our search services to new international
communities, Google will open up a host of new revenue,
sales, and partnership channels.”14

Unfortunately, Asian countries in general had always
been more difficult to penetrate because of competition
from well-established local search engines. As recently as
2015, local search engine Naver had a market share of
49.8  percent in South Korea, while Google had 36.9 per-
cent.15 Furthermore, China posed the greatest roadblock
with censorship and competition from Baidu. However,
with a population of one billion people and Internet usage
on a steady climb, Google was determined to establish a
stronger foothold in China.

China’s Internet Users and Population
Users Population
(millions) (millions) Percent

2004 96 1,310 7.3
2005 112 1,318 8.5
2006 140 1,326 10.5
2007 213 1,334 16.0
2008 303 1,343 22.6
2009 391 1,351 28.9
2010 466 1,360 34.3
2011 524 1,368 38.3
2012 564 1,377 41.0
2013 618 1,386 44.6
2014 642 1,394 46.0

Source: “China Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats,  www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/china/.

Google vs. Baidu
China’s policies have directly influenced the competitive
landscape for search firms in China. In the space of Inter-
net search, Baidu is usually referred to as China’s Google.
But in reality, Baidu holds a strong market share lead over
Google.16 Prior to the launch of Google.cn in 2006 in
China, Google held 33.3 percent of the search engine mar-
ket share between Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou
while Baidu held 47.9 percent.17 Google was optimistic

Brief Integrative Case 3.1 Google in China: Protecting Property and Rights 417

Secretary of State, called upon Beijing to carry out a thor-
ough and transparent investigation regarding the cyber hacks
of human rights activists’ e-mail accounts. Ultimately, she
threw her weight behind Google’s threat to pull out of China
unless Beijing permitted an “unfiltered search engine.”32

Following the conflict in January, Google formally
announced in March that all Google.cn users would be
directed to the uncensored Google.com.hk website instead.
According to Google, the decision reflected a legal move
that still allowed mainland users access to their search
engine.33 The move to stop offering a local search engine
and battling with China over censorship reflected a shift
in Google’s attitude, giving up competing with Baidu for
Internet usage. In April, Google’s share of Chinese Inter-
net searches dropped from 35.6 percent to 30.9 percent
and Baidu’s rose from 58.4 percent to 64 percent.34
Despite no longer providing Google.cn to China, Google
still cannot escape the censorship battles and attacks on
its server. In 2014, China restricted access to nearly all of
Google’s auxiliary services.35  Almost instantly, Google’s
market share in China dropped to less than 2 percent.

But criticisms of Google have not always been from
China. On March 22, 2011, New York Judge Denny Chin
rejected a settlement between Google and both the Authors
Guild and the Association of American Publishers (AAP).
The original settlement had included an annual payment of
$125 million in royalties to the copyright owners in order for
Google to continue its project of scanning and selling online
access to 150 million books.36 But copyright concerns per-
sisted because no one could establish ownership of the dig-
itized and scanned pages. It was concluded that Google’s
current pact would simply give the company an unfair advan-
tage over its competitors while rewarding it for engaging in
wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission.

In October 2012, the AAP announced a new, yet contro-
versial, settlement deal with Google. For each book already
scanned by Google, publishers could choose to contact
Google for removal. Moving forward, every digitized book
catalog would first require an express opt-in from publish-
ers. None of the financial terms of the deal were released.
The Authors Guild, on the other hand, still remains in litiga-
tion, leading a class-action lawsuit criticizing Google for its
opt-out approach.37  In 2014, legal appeals were filed
challenging the validity of the financial settlement.

Google’s Future: Innovation & Alphabet Inc.
The challenges of censorship in China have forced Google
to look beyond the appeal of China’s gargantuan search
market. Instead, Google has shifted its focus to the oper-
ating systems of smartphones. At the end of 2015,
Google’s Android operating system enjoyed a market
share of nearly 75 percent. Android is closely held by
Google; so closely, in fact, that Google had been unwill-
ing to share the most recent versions of code with Chinese

Google.cn to Guge, which was Chinese for Harvest Song.
Six months after the launch of Guge, “72.6 percent
(62.8 percent of the users whose first choice was Google)
of the interviewed users still weren’t able to [recall] the
Chinese name of Google.”24 The lack of brand loyalty was
reflected in the insignificant number of Google users who
were willing to convert from using the Chinese version of
Google.com to Guge. Most users still preferred to use the
original Google.com that was only censored by the
People’s Republic of China.25

Google seemed to be fighting a losing battle, while
Baidu continued to receive positive press coverage during
its 2005 IPO on NASDAQ. Consequently, in just one year,
Baidu gained 14 percent of the search engine market share
while Google lost 8 percent.26

In the following year, 2007, Google fought hard to hold
onto its piece of the China market, increasing its total mar-
ket share from 19.2 percent to 22.8 percent while Baidu
fell from 63.7 percent to 58.1 percent. Google increased its
efforts by “hiring Chinese employees and . . . partnering
with Chinese technology firms . . . [and establishing] two
research centers, one in Beijing and one in Shanghai.”27

The small victory was short-lived as Google was
soon met with conflict from both China’s and the U.S.’s
governments.

The Challenge of Censorship:
Google under Fire
Shortly after Google.cn received its license from the
Chinese government in 2007, Google proceeded to sign a
set of guidelines, designed to reduce the risk that their
actions would lead to human rights abuses in China and
other countries.28 By promising to comply with censor-
ship when the government filed a formal request, this
effectively removed Google’s presence from the majority
of human rights activities.

From this point forward, Google was fiercely criticized
for running advertisements from nonlicensed medical
websites in 2008, launching free music services, scanning
books without proper copyright laws, and making porno-
graphic content easily available multiple times in 2009.29
What has unfolded in the most recent years has been the
climax of this drama between country and company.

On January 13, 2010, in response to an attack on the
Gmail accounts of human rights activists by the Chinese
government, Google released an initial statement saying
that it was ready to end censorship of its search ser-
vice.30 The announcement caused a stir, with speculations
that Google would pull out of China completely.

Soon afterwards, however, CEO Eric Schmidt released a
counterstatement stating that Google was planning to stay
in China, even if it was forced to close down its local search
services and just carry through with its other range of
services.31 In the same month, Hillary Clinton, the U.S.

418 Part 3 International Strategic Management

a separate case related to the Safari browser, the Federal
Trade Commission penalized Google $22.5 million, “the
largest civil penalty ever levied.”43 Future  lawsuits are
likely to follow in the U.K. following a 2015 British Court
of Appeals ruling that citizens have the right to sue Google
for any misuse of private information.44

Google’s extensive reach in data is only growing in size.
At around the same time that Germany was bringing its
charges against Google, Google cemented its Global Human
Trafficking Hotline Network, committing $3 million to
bring together three NGOs: Polaris Project, Liberty Asia,
and La Strada International. But one question still remains,
even in the face of Google’s good intentions: Can this
company be trusted with sensitive information now regard-
ing potentially trafficked victims? Have we gone too far
by giving Google so much credit and by painting Google
with a philanthropic stroke? In response to these questions,
head of philanthropy at Palantir Technologies Jason Payne
points out, “Just because someone’s human rights have
been eviscerated, doesn’t mean that their civil liberties and
electronic rights can be eviscerated.”45 Regardless of
Google’s legal efforts and privacy challenges, it is still
pressing on with several innovative projects.

The most imaginative of Google’s upcoming projects
is a wearable beta technology device called Google Glass.
The thrust of this new device is in the power of voice
command for queries such as the weather, a built-in GPS,
and the ability to take point-of-view photos and videos
from an intimate perspective. All of this self-generated
media is then directly uploaded to a user’s Google+
account in private mode by default.46

Google is also considering several other projects includ-
ing Android@Home, Google’s attempt at home automa-
tion, connecting light bulbs, coffee pots, and alarm clocks.47
Another project is Google Fiber, which focuses on deliver-
ing Internet speeds “100 times faster than the average Inter-
net connection in the United States.”48 Driverless cars are
also another ambitious goal for the company, which would
go nicely with its current database of road maps. Google’s
strategy is clear: With billions of dollars spent on research
and development, Google knows that it has a responsibility
to push out products that no other company would dare to
dream about, all the while pursuing high-tech inventions
that integrate with our daily lives.

To better structure the company for future innovation
and diversification, Google reorganized itself under a
newly formed umbrella company, called Alphabet Inc., in
2015. Alphabet Inc. consists of multiple subsidiaries, each
with a distinct focus. Under this new corporate structure,
the Google Inc. brand continues to operate Google.com,
Google Maps, and YouTube, but the tasks associated with
other company goals are spread to newly created Alphabet
Inc. subsidiaries. Calico, incorporated in 2013, is centered
around biotech research and development, with a specific
focus on disease and aging. Google Capital and GV (for-
merly Google Ventures) function as the venture capital

smartphone developers. A recent example of this is when
Google forced the delayed release of a smartphone manu-
factured by Acer Inc., which ran an operating system
called Aliyun. This operating system was allegedly cre-
ated by taking Android’s software and making unapproved
changes that were headed by the Chinese ecommerce
organization Alibaba.38

Relationships are extremely hostile between Google
and China, and the options for China are quickly disap-
pearing. The only course of action left for China is to
build its own Chinese mobile-OS for Chinese mobile
devices.39 Mobile continues to dominate a large portion
of Google’s strategy. When Google purchased Motorola
Mobility in May 2012, it had hoped that the accompany-
ing treasure trove of over 17,000 patents would yield
innumerable benefits. But this has not been the case. After
the $12.4 billion purchase, Google still has yet to win a
decisive legal case with a big payoff.40 As a result, Google
sold Motorola Mobility in January 2014, though it retained
most of the patents as part of the deal.

Regardless of the challenges, Google still has accumu-
lated a powerful tool by acquiring Motorola Mobility’s
patents. Google now possesses among the best IPR for
designing devices, and Google has the software to supple-
ment those devices and integrate them vertically into its
online systems.41  Despite selling most of the hardware
business to Lenovo in 2014, this purchase was ultimately
consistent with Google’s hope to reposition itself as a
bigger player in the space of mobile technology.

The rate at which technology is becoming even more
integrated into our lives is astounding, and Google is on the
forefront of that mission. With its app for Android users,
called “Google Keep,” it hopes to target early software
adopters looking for another way to manage all of their
sticky notes, photos, and lists. But yet again, a central com-
ponent to this new advancement is trust. While some users
are easily giving up more private ground in the routine of
their daily lives, others are questioning whether or not the
free services are worth it, especially because similar projects
like Google Reader or iGoogle have been terminated.42

For Google, these privacy issues have taken off interna-
tionally. In April 2013, Germany prosecuted Google for
“scooping up sensitive personal information in the Street
View mapping project.” The total fine added up to $189,225,
which is a drop in the bucket compared to Google’s profits
of $10.7 billion in 2012. Such fees are usually already fac-
tored into the business expenses of large data-mining cor-
porations like Google. But these fines are not uncommon.
Rather, it is the opposite, and often considered regular
behavior. Google has accumulated several violations over
the years. In 2014, the French regulatory body CNIL forced
Google to pay a large fine. Additionally, the CNIL ruled
that if an individual asks for search results based on his or
her name to be removed from Google’s search engine,
Google must comply. In 2012, Google paid $7 million to
settle with 38 states that had filed against the company. In

Brief Integrative Case 3.1 Google in China: Protecting Property and Rights 419

and human ingenuity. At the same time, Google will con-
tinue to face political threats of censorship and information
restriction and challenges to its privacy policies and prac-
tices. But the reverberations from its new technology will
continue to generate commotion in the markets and chal-
lenges to governments and their information policies.

Questions for Review
1. How would you characterize China’s market for

online search and related services?
2. Why was Google initially attracted to China? What

changed its perspective?
3. Should companies like Google conform to the

Chinese government’s expectation regarding pri-
vacy, censorship, and distribution of information?

4. What advantages does Baidu have over Google
in the Chinese marketplace? How might Google
overcome those advantages?

5. What recommendations would you make for Google
in China going forward?

Source: This case was prepared by Karl Li and Pin-Pin Liao of Villanova University
under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Doh as the basis for class discussion.
Additional research assistance was provided by Ben Littell.  It is not intended to illus-
trate either effective or ineffective managerial capability or administrative responsibility.

arms of Alphabet Inc., targeting both tech startups and
growth-stage companies. Perhaps the most interesting
subsidiary is Google X (known simply as “X”), which
functions as the heart of innovation at Alphabet Inc. As
a secret research and development lab, Google X is
responsible for developing the driverless car and Google
Glass. Another exciting project, called “Project Loon,”
involves the deployment of atmospheric balloons to
increase Internet access worldwide. 

As Google expands, and its presence permeates devel-
oping markets, its opportunities are abundant. This is
especially true because most of the newly connected Inter-
net users are living in areas of conflict and could poten-
tially experience drastic changes to their social structures
as a result of interacting with Google. A company such
as Google could extend its influence beyond that of a
nation-state by empowering desperate citizens with the
ideas or information they need to incite a revolution. New
innovative Google projects, like “Project Loon,” will con-
nect the developing world with access to information and
communication in ways that were previously impossible.

Ultimately, Google’s international strategy will continue
to align itself with its information strategy, continually
leveraging the opportunities of both computational science

1. “Wife & Son of Well-Known Political Prisoner &
Christian, Guo Quan Arrive in US,” ChinaAid.org,
January 24, 2012, www.chinaaid.org/2012/01/wife-
son-of-well-known-political.html.

2. Ibid.
3. “About Google,” Google.com, May 7, 2013. www.

google.com/about/.
4. Justine Lau, “A History of Google in China,”

Financial Times Online, July 9, 2010, HYPERLINK
“http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/faf86fbc-0009-11df-
8626-00144feabdc0.html?ft_site=falcon” \l
“axzz4S04lPr4a” www.ft.com/cms/s/0/faf86fbc-
0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0.html?ft_
site=falcon#axzz4S04lPr4a.

5. Ibid.
6. John Battelle, “The Birth of Google,” Wired.com,

August 2005, www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/
battelle.html?tw=wn_tophead_4.

7. Lawrence Page, Sergey Brin, Rajeev Motwani, and
Terry Winograd, “The PageRank Citation Ranking:
Bringing Order to the Web,” Stanford Digital
Library Project, September 16, 1997,  http://ilpubs.
stanford.edu:8090/422/1/1999-66 .

8. “BackRub,” Google Web Archives, December 4,
1997, http://web.archive.org/web/19971210065425/
backrub.stanford.edu/backrub.html.

9. “Google: Our History in Depth,” Google.com, May 7,
2013, www.google.com/about/company/history.

10. “If the Check Says ‘Google Inc.,’ We’re ‘Google
Inc.,’” Wired.com, September 7, 2007, www.wired.
com/science/discoveries/news/2007/09/
dayintech_0907.

11. “Google Receives $25 million in Equity Funding,”
Google Web Archives, June 7, 1997,  http://web.
archive.org/web/20000309205910/http://www.
google.com/pressrel/pressrelease1.html.

12. “Google Goes Global with Addition of 10
Languages,” Google.com, May 9, 2000, http://
googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/05/google-goes-
global-with-addition-of-10.html.

13. “Internet and Search Engine Usage by Country,”
Internet World Stats, http://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.
com/images/9780789747884/supplements/
9780789747884_appC .

14. “Google: Our History in Depth.”
15. Maureen Gleeson, “Why Google Can’t Dominate

Search in South Korea,” Oban Digital, January 30,
2015, www.obandigital.com/gb/blog/2015/01/30/
why-google-cant-dominate-search-in-south-korea/.

16. Ginny Marvin, “Google Still Dominant, but Baidu
Benefitting from Google Ban in China Says
eMarketer,” March 31, 2015, http://searchengineland.

ENDNOTES

420 Part 3 International Strategic Management

March 22, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2011/mar/23/google-online-library-plans-thwarted.

37. Julianne Pepitone, “Google Strikes Deal with Pub-
lishers over Universal Library,” CNNMoney.com,
October 4, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/
technology/google-books-settlement/index.html.

38. Paul Mozur, “China Criticizes Android’s Domi-
nance,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324
539404578342132324098420.html.

39. J. O’Dell, “China: Google’s Too Controlling. We
Should Create Our Own Damn Smartphone OS,”
Venturebeat.com, March 5, 2013, http://venturebeat.
com/2013/03/05/china-google-android-drama/.

40. Susan Decker and Brian Womack, “Motorola
Buyout Fails to Yield Patent Jackpot for Google,”
Business Report, April 30, 2013, www.iol.co.za/
business/international/motorola-buyout-fails-to-
yield-patent-jackpot-for-google-1.1508190#.
UYQPdrXqnoI.

41. Google, “Facts about Google’s Acquisition of
Motorola,” press release, 2013, www.google.com/
press/motorola/.

42. Ezra Klein, “Google’s Trust Problem,” Washington
Post, March 21, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/21/googles-trust-
problem/.

43. Claire Cain Miller, “Stern Words, and a Pea-Size
Punishment, for Google,” New York Times, April 22,
2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/business/global/
stern-words-and-pea-size-punishment-for-google.html.

44. Kevin Cahill, “Google Appeal Ruling Should Send
Shivers through US Tech Companies,” Computer
Weekly, March 30, 2015, www.computerweekly.
com/news/4500243342/Google-appeal-ruling-should-
sent-shivers-through-US-tech-companies.

45. Liat Clark, “Google Launches Global Human Traf-
ficking Helpline and Data Network,” Arstechnica,
April 10, 2013,  http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/04/google-launches-global-human-
trafficking-helpline-and-data-network/.

46. Lance Ulanoff, “This Is Why Google Glass Is the
Future,” Mashable, April 30, 2013, http://mashable.
com/2013/04/30/google-glass-future/.

47. Eric Mack, “Google Future Tech: 10 Coolest
Google R&D Projects,” CIO.com, 2013, www.cio.
com/article/694854/Google_Future_Tech_10_Coolest_
Google_R_D_Projects?page5 11#slideshow.

48. Chris Ciaccia, “Google’s Future: Doing the
Impossible,” BGR, April 19, 2013, http://bgr.
com/2013/04/19/google-earnings-analysis-
q1-2013-449971/.

com/google-still-dominant-but-baidu-benefitting-from-
google-ban-in-china-says-emarketer-217745.

17. “Google Losing Market Share in China,” Search
Engine Journal, September 21, 2006, www.
searchenginejournal.com/google-losing-market-
share-in-china/3816.

18. Rebecca Fannin, “Why Google Is Quitting China,”
Forbes.com, January 15, 2010, www.forbes.com/
2010/01/15/baidu-china-search-intelligent-
technology-google.html.

19. “Google: Our History in Depth.”
20. Andrew McLaughlin, “Google in China,” Google’s

Official Blog, January 27, 2006, https://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html.

21. Fannin, “Why Google Is Quitting China.”
22. Ibid.
23. “Google Losing Market Share in China.”
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. “Web History of China,” Timetoast.com, 2010,

www.timetoast.com/timelines/web-history-of-china.
28. Justine Lau, “A History of Google in China,”

Financial Times Online, July 9, 2010, www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/faf86fbc-0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz2MmJQVW1J.

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. “Google Aims to Stay in China Despite Censorship

Clash,” Financial Times, January 22, 2010,
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/f9ff5bcc-06ce-11df-b058-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RynyO1Rd.

32. Chris McGreal and Bobbie Johnson, “Hillary
Clinton Criticises Beijing over Internet Censorship,”
The Guardian, January 21, 2010,  https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/21/hillary-clinton-
china-internet-censorship.

33. “A New Approach to China: An Update,” Google’s
Official Blog, March 22, 2010, http://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-
update.html.

34. Loretta Chao, “Google Loses Chinese Market
Share,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703
465204575207833281993688.html.

35. Charles Riley, “The Great Firewall of China Is
Nearly Complete,” CNN Money, December 30,
2014, http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/
china-internet-firewall-google/.

36. Dominic Rushe, “US Judge Writes Unhappy Ending
for Google’s Online Library Plans,” The Guardian,